Compiled Poli Digest

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CHAPTER III: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE G.R. NO. L-13250, OCTOBER 29, 1971 COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA FACTS: Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the estate of late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a Spanish national and Tangier resident, in the Philippines. In the estate tax return he filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue, Rueda claimed the value of intangible personal properties as exempt from taxes under the proviso of Sec. 122, NIRC: That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. The Collector, however, denied the exemption and assessed the estate of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes (amounting to P161, 874.95) for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The Collector reasoned that there is no reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines because Tangier is a mere

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principality and not a foreign country within the meaning of Sec. 122, NIRC. In effect, the Collector insists that the acquisition of international personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country." Upon appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled that the expression ―foreign country‖ in Sec. 122 refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible person properties of Philippine citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It was therefore not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by the Philippine Government in order to entitle the estate of Estrella to the exemption benefits of Sec. 122. ISSUE: Whether Section 22, NIRC requires that the ―foreign country‖ possesses an international personality to come within its terms. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Tangier comes within the term ―foreign country‖ of Sec. 122 because independence is not a condition of statehood. The following definitions of a State were provided by the Court to justify Tangier‘s statehood: - it is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law (Pound)

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- a sovereign person with the people composing it, viewed as an organized corporate society under a government, with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands (Willoughby) - a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare (Cooley) - the juridical personification of the nation (Esmein) - a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions (Laski) - a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality The SC emphasized, however, that as long as there is power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations (McIver), international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. Assuming that Tangier was bereft of international personality, jurisprudence supports the finding that Sec. 122 treats even a principality as a foreign country. Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara considered California as a foreign country. In Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue, the tiny principality of Liechtenstein, with hardly an international personality, was found to fall under the exemption of Sec. 122.

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G.R. NO. 104226, AUGUST 12, 1993 CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK FACTS: Conchita Romualdez-Yap filed a petition for certiorari to question her separation from the Philippine National Bank. She was the Senior Vice President of the Fund Trust Department of PNB. While she was on leave of absence for medical reasons (April 1, 1986 – February 20, 1987), PNB underwent reorganization (December 3, 1986 by virtue of the Revised Charter of PNB or Executive Order No. 80) that caused the abolition of the Fund Trust Department. As a result of the reorganization, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her separation from service (effective February 1987, though the letter erroneously stated 1986). She contested her separation in the Civil Service Commission, arguing that her separation was made in bad faith because, among others: (1) it was based on her close identification with the previous regime, being the sister of Imelda Marcos; (2) her separation was antedated on February 16, 1986, prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986; (3) the Fund Transfer Department has recently been restored; and (4) she was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new staff. The CSC and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of her separation. ISSUE: Whether the separation reorganization was made in good faith

arising

from

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HELD: YES 1. Requirements for a valid reorganization Reorganization is a management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. While a distinction can be made between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions (e.g. Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (e.g. PNB), the common test for their valid reorganizations is the test of good faith. CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature. These are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty. On the other hand, MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional functions of government. These are functions which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. The option is exercised on the basis of the following are the principles: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake; and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands). Examples are commercial or universal banking which is, not a governmental but, a private sector endeavor.

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Reorganization in either case must be made in good faith. According to Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if: (1) it is for the purpose of economy, or (2) to make bureaucracy more efficient. In those events, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. Otherwise, an "abolition" is void ab initio if it is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith. 2. The reorganization of PNB was done in good faith. The SC found the following circumstances as indicative of PNB‘s good faith in pursuing reorganization:  it was by virtue of a valid law  it was pursued to achieve economy considering PNB‘s critical financial situation at the time  the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error where PNB had submitted documents supporting its stand that the separation actually took effect on 16 February 1987.  the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, which took effect after the lapse of over four years from the date it was abolished in 1987, was primarily caused by the improved financial capability and present needs of PNB  the appointment of SVP Federico Pascual as head of the International Department, from among other

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officers including Yap, is because his qualifications far exceeded those of the other candidates for the position, being a lawyer from the University of the Philippines, a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from Ateneo de Manila, a Master of Laws graduate of Columbia Law School, and a Masteral Arts in Public Administration graduate of the London School of Economics; he had also undergone extensive seminars at the International Department and had been assigned in several foreign branches of PNB; he held the second highest position of Executive Vice President and served as Acting President of PNB; while Yap only holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and has undergone only one seminar on Management and Leadership Training Program. Assuming that her separation was made in bad faith, an action for a quo warranto proceeding prescribes 1 year from the questioned termination. She was separated from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 or about 2 years after when she brought the matter to the CSC. By her inaction in questioning her termination within a period of 1 year, she was considered to have acquiesced to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to the position.

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G.R. NOS. L-55963 & 61045, FEBRUARY 27, 1991 SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA V. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN AND NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA FACTS: Sps. Fontanilla sued the National Irrigation Administration for damages, arising from the tortious act of its driver, Hugo Garcia. NIA denied liability, alleging that it is a government agency tasked with governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable for the tortious acts of its driver who is not a special agent. The SC had ruled that NIA was liable as a government entity exercising proprietary functions. Thus NIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it is a governmental entity. ISSUE: Whether NIA is a government entity exercising governmental or proprietary functions. HELD: 1. NIA is a governmental entity exercising proprietary functions. Governmental functions are classified into governmental / constituent and proprietary / ministrant. GOVERNMENTAL / CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS involve the exercise of sovereignty and are thus considered as compulsory. PROPRIETARY / MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS connote merely the

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exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. 2. The operation of an irrigation system is a proprietary function. In the United States where its irrigation districts are identical to Philippine irrigation systems, irrigation districts are characterized, according to jurisprudence, as public quasi corporations organized to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). They are not considered as exercising sovereign functions where they furnish no facilities for the administration of the sovereign government and its officers have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of the general government, or to enforce any of the laws of the state or any of its other subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed by the district. They have no more power or authority than that of the officers of a private corporation organized for like purposes (Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District). They are thus considered as businesses because the land owners, as members of the corporation, control the affairs of the district and alone are benefited by its operations. While public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises (like those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication, or in the production and distribution of prime necessities,), and even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society (NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated

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Unions), the functions performed by such enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. Its general purposes are not essentially public in their nature, but are only incidentally so. Therefore, an irrigation district is the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). According to McQuillin (The Law of Municipal Corporations), when municipalities undertake to supply water at price, they are engaged in trade. Although the State may regulate the service and rates of water plants owned and operated by municipalities, such property is not employed for governmental purposes and in the ownership and operation thereof, the municipality acts in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative interference. Consequently, they are liable as any private company would be for any negligence in laying out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in furnishing potable water through them. NIA was not created for purposes of local government. NIA was created as a body corporate with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." While it is essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a "governmentfunction" corporation. Certainly, the state and the

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community as a whole are largely benefited by the services NIA renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

G.R. NO. 143377, FEBRUARY 20, 2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: An action for revival of judgment was instituted by the Republic of the Philippines but which the Court dismissed, having found that the Republic was not the real party in interest. The issue began when Rafael Galvez obtained an Original Certificate of Title over four lots in La Union. He sold Lots 1 and 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and Balatbat, who obtained TCTs in their names and who, in turn, subsequently sold the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Lepanto obtained a TCT in its name. Meanwhile, unknown to Lepanto, CFI La Union ordered the cancellation of Galvez/s title over the lots in a land registration case initiated by the Republic of the Philippines. The Order was issued on February 1, 1963, but the same subjects lots were unknowingly sold by Lepanto to Shipside Incorporated on October 28, 1963. Shipside had obtained a TCT in its name and had been exercising proprietary rights since then. The CFI Order was contested by Galvez, but was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA Decision became final and executory on October 23, 1973. A writ of execution was issued and served upon the

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Register of Deeds. However, the writ had not been executed for 24 years until the OSG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, initiated a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles on April 21, 1999, against the successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez. Shipside filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Republic was not the real party in interest because the real property covered by the titles were allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station) and under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority under Republic Act No. 7227; and that the action has prescribed. The Republic, however, countered that prescription does not run against the State, which is still the real party in interest because the transfer of the military reservations to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which will act only as its agent for the realization of its program. The MTD was dismissed thus Shipside raised the issue before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is a real party in interest and can thus claim the imprescriptibility of the State‘s action – N HELD: The action to revive judgment has prescribed (CA Decision became final on October 23, 1973 while the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than 25 years) under NCC 1144(3): an

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action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." The Republic, represented by the OSG, cannot invoke imprescriptibility of State actions because the Republic is not the real party in interest, having transferred the ownership of Camp Wallace, which used to belong to the government, to the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. Under Sec. 4 of R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the BCDA owns, holds and/or administers military reservations including Wallace Air Station and, under Sec. 4, all areas covered by the Wallace Air Station are hereby transferred to the BCDA. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by Shipside‘s title is cancelled. The Republic also cannot invoke the relationship of mere agency between the Government and BCDA. BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government, having been created as a body corporate and vested with the powers of a corporation (Sec. 3, R.A. 7227). It is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in

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general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. The Republic cannot also invoke E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC which held that the Republic is the proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of property, which, at the time of the institution of the suit, was no longer held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner therein were the same and to dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to re-file the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case at bar since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). To hold otherwise is to begin bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to

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prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs.

G.R. NO. L-32052, JULY 25, 1975 PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL FACTS: Labor claims (overtime compensations) were filed by laborers against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration before the Court of Industrial Relations. The claims were granted by CIR. PVTA sought to declare the nullity of the decision on the ground that CIR had no jurisdiction over it and that the Eight-Hour Labor Law did not apply to it being an agency exercising governmental functions. The laborers of PVTA sued the latter before the CIR for payment of their overtime services (in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them) by virtue of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444). PVTA sought the dismissal of the suit on the following ground that it is an agency exercising governmental functions and by such reason, the 8-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it (lack of cause of action) and the CIR has no jurisdiction. The CIR ignored these defenses and ruled in favor of the laborers.

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ISSUES: Whether or not PVTA exercises governmental functions –Y Whether or not agencies exercising governmental functions fall outside the jurisdiction of the CIR and the operation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law – N HELD: 1. PVTA is an agency exercising governmental functions. Under its Charter (R.A. 2265), PVTA was established to, among others, promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments; and improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The distinction, however, between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation has become futile in the era of welfare states where the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare necessitated the expanded role of government. According to Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulted in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members." Chief Justice Makalintal explained in

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Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices how the welfare state concept and the policy for social justice has blurred the distinction of the traditional functions of governmental agencies: the increasing social challenges of the times necessitated the government to undertake private enterprise and initiative, in its sovereign capacity, and to move towards a greater socialization of economic forces for the promotion of social justice. As the welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution", it is thus much more so under the present Charter (1987 Constitution), which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. Functions of that sort [general welfare] "may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

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Nonetheless, the growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Accordingly, in Rubi v. Provincial Board, the Court found that the modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. Edu v. Ericta ruled that laissez-faire was rejected by the 1987 Constitution, having entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. The State could thus live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. Through such activities, "the

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harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. There is no longer any constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. It is a response to a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations be attained. 2. The exercise of governmental functions does not exempt an agency from the operation of labor laws. Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia ruled that it is precisely CIR and not ordinary courts that should pass upon labor controversies. On the other hand, the EightHour Labor Law provides that it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private.

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grounds that: 1. It violates the due process clause, following the American principle of laissez faire, and 2. It constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." ISSUE: W/N the ―Reflector Law‖ violates the due process clause, following the American principle of laissez faire. HELD: No, it does not. The Laissez faire principle is rejected my contemporary American jurisprudence and by Philippine Constitution and jurisprudence.

ROMEO F. EDU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER V. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BR. XVIII, QUEZON CITY, AND TEDDY C. GALO (1970) FACTS: Teddy Galo assails the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 2 (―the Reflector Law‖) on the

Definition of police power (―the greatest and most powerful attribute of government‖): ―state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order

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to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." ~Calalang v. Williams ―the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." ~Primicias v. Fugoso 2. Laissez faire principle no longer recognized in US.  There was a period in American history where series of legislations tending to reduce economic inequality (e.g. in People v. Pomar, a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement; in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, a statute providing for minimum wages) were struck down as violative of the due process clause, under the theory that individuals should have unrestricted freedom in entering into contracts (laissez faire).  But under Pres. Roosevelt‘s ―The New Deal administration‖ the US Supreme Court began rejecting the laissez faire doctrine. 3. Laissez faire doctrine had always been rejected in the Philippines  Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: ―The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past‖  ―the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through

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state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.‖  Justice Laurel, concurring in Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, said that the 1935 Constitution did away with the laissezfaire doctrine. ‖during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and control of public services.‖ 4. ―Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire…The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.‖ ISSUE: W/N the ―Reflector Law‖ (A.O.) is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. HELD: No, it is not.  The A.O. states: ―No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such

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reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night."  penalty for non-compliance is rejection or suspension of vehicle‘s registration and a fine.  ―It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government… What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them…‖ A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. ‖The test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature…The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.‖ Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature

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often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " ‖It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose.

ASSOCIATION DESICCATORS AUTHORITY

OF V.

PHILIPPINE PHILIPPINE

COCONUT COCONUT

FACTS: the Philippine Coconut Authority issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. In its whereas clause, it stated that it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. As such, the PCA will no longer require any coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the

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latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants. Rather, it shall limit itself only to simply registering coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President When petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President, they brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus before the SC. PCA: case should be dismissed as they did not wait for President‘s reply, thereby violating principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. ISSUE: W/N rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies. HELD: No, it does not. ―The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review…has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.‖ ISSUE: W/N PCA‘s resolution is valid. HELD: No, it does not.

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 ―The Philippine Coconut Authority is… an independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines, and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut industry…through a regulatory scheme set up by law.‖  Through this scheme, the government, on August 28, 1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut processing plants and, four months later, phased out some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based commodities. The establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the approval of the President.  On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants. It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the establishment and operation of additional DCN plants, subject to the approval of the President, in view of the increased demand for desiccated coconut products in the world's markets. This authorized the opening of new

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plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all procedures and requirements for registration. This form of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino.  ―These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut industry.‖ The PCA could have only worked under this structure.  ―In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure…In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. ―  Under the Revised Coconut Code, the role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects." And ―To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export..‖  By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-

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all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry.  In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations."  At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA FACTS:  About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863.  Subsequently, a central relief board was appointed to distribute the money. It allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, which was published in the Official Gazette.  Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of

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$80,000 of the relief fund in four installments of $20,000 each.  On account of various petitions of the originally intended beneficiaries of the money, the Philippine Government sued Monte de Piedad to recover the $80,000. The lower court ruled in favor of the Government.  Monte de Piedad asserts: 1. The sum was actually a donation, not a loan, 2. the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty. Hence, the present Philippine government cannot maintain this suit. 3. The Philippine Government has no competence to institute the suit. The money was part of a charitable subscription, whereby the donors were people in Spain, the donees were people in the Philippines, and the Government was merely a trustee. It was never the owner of the money, and therefore could not sue for its recovery as it is not the proper party. 4. Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912 HELD: 1. Evidence shows that the money was a loan, not a donation. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the

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Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. 2. The present Philippine government has the prerogative to enforce charities, as parens patriae  If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character.  Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. Chancellor Kent: ―In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.‖ .  Mormon Church v US: ―it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

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Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital: this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever. 3. The Philippine government has competence to sue.  It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.  To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future. 4. The action has not and can not prescribe.  U. S.vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co.: ―the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound‖  the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.

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CO KIM CHAN V VALDEZ TAN KEH FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that ―all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control‖ invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‘s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

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RATIO: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for ―the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase ―processes of any other government‖ and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur‘s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

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A well-known rule of statutory construction is: ―A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.‖ Another is that ―where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.‖ Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase ―processes of any other governments.‖ In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, ―law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.‖ Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

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Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. SUMMARY OF RATIO: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government

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of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) (source: http://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/co-kimchan-v-valdez-tan-keh/)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. GREGORIO PERFECTO FACTS:  Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Senate was convened and was informed of the loss. Subsequently, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows: ―Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered…To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Senate itself,.. The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.‖

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 The Senate then adopted a resolution referring the case to the Attorney-General. An information was filed against Perfecto for violation of Art 256 of the Penal Code: ―Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .,"  The CFI convicted Fernando, stating: ―We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day…‖ Fernando was convicted following the ruling in U.S. v Helbig. Issue: whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force. HELD: No, it is not. 1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code  That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez, the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." It was found that

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those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing and publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.  The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256. 2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sovereignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.  It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.  According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.  Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a

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distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands.  it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.  The crime of lese majeste (crime against the crown, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers) disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

VILAS V. CITY OF MANILA (1911) FACTS: Vilas, Trigas, and Aguado are creditors of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them, under its present charter, the Government of the PI is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in

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no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. Thus it was elevated to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality liable for obligations of old city. YES HELD: The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants. Argument against liability: Ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporation entity created by the Sp government . When the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality, ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent, death of principal=death of agent Dual Character of Municipal Corporations: 1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state 2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. Stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. McKinley‘s instruction: relinquishment or cession cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law

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belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds. Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity survived both military occupation and cession. The corporate identity and liability of the city was not extinguished. That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, it was said: 'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a

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cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.'

PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (1945) FACTS: Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial

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was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that Peralta is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code." The Solicitor General opined that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by Peralta and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an

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accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. FIRST ISSUE: What is the nature and status of the government established in the Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines? In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon it washeld: The Philippines Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either

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case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a socalled government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations.‖ As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount

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force), the question involved cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. In the case of United States vs. Rice, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant

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is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. SECOND ISSUE: The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or

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character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. THIRD ISSUE: The validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation There is question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts." FOURTH ISSUE: If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

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LAUREL V. MISA (1947) FACTS: Anastacio Laurel was a detainee for alleged collaboration with the enemy during the Japanese occupation. He petitioned for habeas corpus on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter, aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. Laurel contends that sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines, and consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended. Moreover, there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. ISSUE: WON Laurel‘s contentions were valid? NO. RATIO: A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. This should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government of his current residence. This absolute allegiance to their government is not abrogated by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, remaining

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vested in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign also subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, on which petitioner's contention rests. Adopting the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for it would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence. The second contention was also invalid since the change of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of crime of treason committed during the former, because it is an offense on the same government and sovereign people for Art. XVIII of the 1935 Constitution provided that upon the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the US, the Commonwealth of the Philippines will be known as the Republic of the Philippines. Dispositive: Petition was denied. PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION He said that in Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the SC held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the Japanese

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occupation and that SC should hold that no treason could have been committed during it because Art. 114 of the RPC was not then in force. He also does not agree with the majority that adopting theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequence for the reason that the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulation of not involving the population to take part in the military operations against their own country. He also said that the Commonwealth was an instrumentality of the US and had no sovereignty of its own and that treason committed against it or the US is not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Phil.

REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR FACTS: Respondent judge Guillermo Villasor ordered in a previous case to release funds from bank accounts belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as compensation to two construction companies. The Philippine government sought to reverse Villasor's decision, on the ground that it did not authorize the release of funds. ISSUE: WoN Villasor had the authority and jurisdiction to order the release of funds as restitution for damages in a suit against the State? HELD/RATIO: No. Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution says, "The State may not be sued without its consent."

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Villasor awarded the money belonging to a component of the government, the military, without the express authorization from Congress. Villasor acted contrary to the Constitution, and thus acted in excess of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: ―A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.‖ Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that ―a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.‖ Judgment: Petition granted, judgment reversed.

MINUCHER V. CA

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FACTS: Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a ―buy-bust operation‖ conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo (agent of US Drug Enforcement Agency) who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the ‗trumped-up‘ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. ISSUE: WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations RULING: The SC DENIED the petition. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only ―diplomatic agents,‖ are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity

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from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo‘s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious. Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be

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regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The ―buy-bust operation‖ and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

LASCO vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNFRFNRE) 23 February 1995 FACTS:  Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with UNRFNRE, which is a special fund and subsidiary of the UN.  UNRFNRE: Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of

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the UN. This is backed up by a letter from the DFA confirming this.  1991- LA dismissed the complaint, MR denied. NLRC affirmed.  They then filed for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC. Certiorari was not proper because petitioners failed to ask for reconsideration but the SC gave due course because of the implications in international law. Petitioners: acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners. Moreover, it is a Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3). OSG: UNRFNRE is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. It is a specialized agency of the UN and under the UN Charter (Art. 105), it enjoys privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities Specialized Agencies of the UN in which Sec. 4 states that ―the specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process‖ and Sec. 5 states that ―the property and assets of the specialized agencies,

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wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.‖ ISSUE: W/N UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity. HELD/RATIO: YES. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the DFA, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies. The courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4). As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the

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United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, it was held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions. UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the government and the UN for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."

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SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTERAQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT VS. NLRC 14 FEBRUARY 1992  The SEAFDC-AQD is a department of the SEAFDC, an international organization organized by ASEAN countries and sponsored by Japan.  1975-1983: Lazaga was employed by SEAFDC-AQD as Research Associate, Senior External Affairs Officer, then Head of the External Affairs Office.  1986- he was terminated from office due to alleged financial constraints. He was deemed entitled to separation benefits.  1987- he filed a complaint against SEAFDC-AQD for nonpayment of his separation pay and damages.  SEAFDC-AQD: NLRC has no jurisdiction since it is an international organization and that Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained him  LA (1988)- ordered SEAFD-AQD to pay separation pay and other employment benefits plus actual damages and attorney‘s fees. NLRC affirmed. ISSUE: W/N NLRC had jurisdiction. HELD/RATIO: NO. SEAFDC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of NLRC established by ASEAN Countries with Japan to purpose of which is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development

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in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11.). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDECAQD. Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one.

SEAFDEC V. ACOSTA, NLRC 2 SEPTEMBER 1993  Two labor cases were filed by Canto et al. against SEAFDEC before NLRC Iloilo City, claiming wrongful termination from employment.  SEAFDEC- filed MTC on the ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction

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 NLRC- MTD denied, petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.  SC (1992)- dismissed petition for certiorari ISSUE: W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction. HELD/ RATIO: NO. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. (See first SEAFDEC case). AJ Isagani Cruz stated: Certain administrative bodies created by agreement among states may be vested with international personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state. Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it rested its case and certainly well before the proceedings thereat had terminated.

TIJAM V SIBONGHANOY 15 APRIL 1968  July 1948- Spouses Tijam filed a civil case to recover P1,908 from spouses Sibonghanoy

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 After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.  RTC- found in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution was issued against the Surety‘s bond. The Surety filed to deny the motion for execution and motion to quash the writ all denied by the cour  CA affirmed the CFI. On MR, Surety filed its Motion to Dismiss alleging that a month before the filing of the case before the RTC, RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective. Under such law, the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. CA forwarded the case to the SC. ISSUE: W/N Surety may question the jurisdiction of the CFI. HELD/RATIO: NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too

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late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. The action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. It could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction but failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

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INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. CALLEJA FACTS:  On February 23, 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippines and then High Commissioner for Refugees, providing for a refugee operating center in Bataan. ICMC was accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee operating center. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.  On February 7, 1987, the Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiter‘s decision and ordered for the immediate conduct of the certification election. On July 15, 1988, ICMC‘s request for recognition as a specialized agency was granted by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs including the grant of corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a MOA between the Philippine Government and ICMC. The latter then sought for the dismissal of the TUPAS petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted by the Philippine Government, through the DFA.

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ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD/RATIO: YES. There is no doubt that ICMC was granted immunity. Article II of the MOA between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have the status of a specialized agency. Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947 and concurred by the Senate on May 17. 1949, explicitly provides that specialized agencies, including their properties and assets, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process. Moreover, DFA‘s opinion expressing its view that the conduct of the Certification Election is volatile of ICMC‘s diplomatic immunity constitutes a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch that ICMC indeed enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be political question conclusive upon the courts in order not to embarrass a political department of the government. The term ―international organization‖ generally describes an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest. ―Specialized agencies‖ are international organizations having functions in particular fields, as mentioned in Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international

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immunities to international organizations: 1.international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions or the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2. No country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and, 3. The international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members."The raison d‘être for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over ICMC would defeat the very purpose of immunity accorded to the agency, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice a member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

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ICMC‘s immunity does not deprive labor of its basic rights. ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI V. SECRETARY OF LABOR

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FACTS: These are two consolidated cases involving the validity of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD: There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison

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d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.

SANDERS V. VERIDIANO FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private

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respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent fulltime to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent fulltime status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them

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under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature. Issue/Held/Ratio: W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties. YES. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their

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personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent

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REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO FACTS: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land. NO. A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on

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September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.

TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY FACTS: The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087,advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. Herein petitioner-appellant Tan submitted his application after paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond therefore. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline. The proposed area was awarded to petitioner. Thereafter he was given an Ordinary Timber License. However, it was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required. One of the bidders, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of

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Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that the license issued in the name of petitioner be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources revokes Tan‗s timber license. His motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitionerappellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. ISSUE/HELD: W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court. NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI. Petitioner did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust all available administrative remedies.

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VETERANS MANPOWER V. COURT OF APPEAL FACTS: VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State, which had not given consent thereto. ISSUE/HELD: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PCSUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

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YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PCSUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. PNB V. CIR FACTS: Petitioner‘s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the

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garnishment "may be public in character." The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows:‖ The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed

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and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may be garnished National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended."

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In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished

PNB V CIR Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty. Manansala (counsel for United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association—prevailing party). The writ sought to garnish the money of

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People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC) deposited in PNB.  PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character‖. CIR denied PNB‘s motion to quash hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC), can be considered a public fund and in effect exempt from garnishment? NO General rule is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment however it is now settled in our jurisprudence that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." If the office or agency or entity has its own charter vesting it a separate and distinct corporate existence then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.

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2. w/n NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort? YES RAYO V CIF BULACAN Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC, acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents died properties worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away. Petitioners were one of the many victims of the inundated town filed complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.  NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam it is performing a purely governmental function hence it can‘t be sued without the express consent of the State. Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is performing merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam? YES

It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

SSS V CA Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral. Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first 5 days of the month  July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz

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







on the ground: conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon (Indebtedness as of June, 1968 P10,702.58 excluding interests). Notice of Sheriff's Sale was initially published in July 14, 1968 issue of the Sunday Chronicle. Before second publication Spouses Cruz wrote SSS, demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations. Attempts of out of court settlement failed. On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses filed for damages and attorney's fees against SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging that they had fully paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. SSS In its answer stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause provided in the mortgage contract. RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses, enjoined SSS from holding the sale and ordered them to pay the Spouses for Damages-P2,500.00 actual; P35,000.00 moral; P10,000.00 exemplary PP5,000.00 attorney's fees. CA: affirmed RTC‘s decision but eliminated P5000 moral damages; SSS filed for MFR which CA denied hence this appeal

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Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of foreclosure? Not, necessarily. Records show that it was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the time the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage was filed. SSS committed an error in picking the record of 'Socorro C. Cruz' instead of the record of 'Socorro J. Cruz'. SSS, however, denied having committed any error and insists that their motion for foreclosure covers the real estate mortgage of spouses David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. Court is convinced that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on the real estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' and not Spouses Cruz. 2. w/n SSS can be held liable for damages? YES  SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not

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thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.  Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges. In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members, suffice it to say, that expenditures of the System are not confined to the payment of social security benefits.  SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by the lower courts for the award of actual damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's passports had already expired and they did not secure the necessary visas for their trip

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abroad. No moral and temperate damages as the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages. With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside. SAN FERNANDO LA UNION V FIRME Keywords: State may be sued provided there is an express/implied consent to be sued. Facts: Issue/Held/Ratio:  December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.  A compliant for damages against, Third Party Complaint and cross claims were filed. Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's

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fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied hence this appeal on certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt case. Implied consent is when government enters into business contracts descending to the level of the other contracting party or when State files a complaint opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. 2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts? NO Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental

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functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando‘s municipal streets, a governmental function. The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. NIA V CA Keywords: Its charter provides that it may sue and be sued. Facts:  1967 NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through Ventura‘s landholdings as said irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal has 2 outlets which provide private respondents‘ landholdings with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to drain the excess water of said landholdings.  In 1975 Ventura filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages against petitioners NIA alleging that the outlets constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the destruction of the planted crops and also prevented them from planting on their landholdings.

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 Lower court ruled in favor of the Ventura and ordered NIA to pay for damages of P35,000 and P5,000 attorney‘s fee; CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict? NO NIA ―is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No. 552 granted NIA the power ―to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.‖ Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case considering that private respondents‘ action is based on damages caused by the negligence of petitioners. 2. w/n NIA is not liable for tort since it did not act through a special agent as required under paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code? NIA is liable.  Paragph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that: ―The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.‖ Article 2176 of said Code provides that: ―Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is

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no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.‖ Thus, petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act.  In this case NIA constructed irrigation canals on the landholdings of the plaintiffs by scrapping away the surface of the landholdings to raise the embankment of the canal. As a result of the said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the plaintiffs were inundated with water. Although it cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of the NIA is a benefit to the Venturas, the delay of almost 7 years in installing the safety measures such as check gates, drainages, ditches and paddy drains has caused substantial damage to the annual harvest of the plaintiffs of about 30 cavans per hectare. The failure of NIA to provide the necessary safeguards to prevent the inundation of plaintiffs‘ landholdings is the proximate cause of the damages to the poor farmers.

PNR V. IAC G.R. NO. 70547 JANUARY 22, 1993 FACTS: The imputation of culpa on the part of herein petitioners as a result of the collision between its train, bound for Manila from La Union, with a Baliwag transit bus at the railroad crossing on the road going to Hagonoy, Bulacan on August l0, 1974, is the subject of the petition at bar directed against the judgment of affirmance rendered by respondent court.

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Upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes. ISSUE: WON the PNR may be sued. YES It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the train engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing which caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of herein private respondent were not able to move forward or to take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train engineer

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in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely anathema to the conduct of a prudent person placed under the same set of perceived danger. Indeed: When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence commensurate with the surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the duty of the company to use such precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him. Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident. All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he slackened his speed and applied the brake..Withal, these considerations were addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better position to assign weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and the bus

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driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court of origin. PNR also failed to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train amounts to negligence. In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared: The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under Act No. 1510, its charter. The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 provides: Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National Railways, being a factor for socio-economic development and growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the government and as such shall remain in and under government ownership during its corporate existence. The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.

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The charter also provides: Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general powers: (a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.) Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834). The public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66). To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation, Malong continued to hold that:

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. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized."

MALONG V. IAC L-49930, AUG. 7, 1985 FACTS: On Oct. 30, 1977 Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, fell and died from a PNR train. This happened because he had to sit near the door of the coach. This train was overloaded in view of the upcoming All Saints Day. His parents (Malong spouses) prayed in the CFI of Pangasinan that PNR be ordered to pay them damages. The court dismissed the complaint saying it had no jurisdiction because PNR, being a gov‘t instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. Malong spouses appealed to the SC. PNR‘s charter provides the ff: SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - …The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.

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"SEC. 4. General powers. - The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general powers: (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law." (This refers to sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.) Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. Issue: 1.WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or corporate capacity when it created PNR. 2.WON PNR, being a gov‘t instrumentality, is immune from suit. Decision: It acted in a corporate capacity. No, it is not immune from suit. Reasoning: SC held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its charter. The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation. ―Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters

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partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the State.‖ In this case the State has impliedly given its consent to be sued by engaging into a business activity. Judgment: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 FACTS: The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an

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discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners be sued.

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HELD: Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court. FAROLAN JR v. CTA G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993

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FACTS: On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation was declared through a customs broker under Entry No. 8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00 and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty. Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a
re-examination of the shipment. A report on the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls. Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $10.15 per yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously declared. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic woven fabric with 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question.

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Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with the Commissioner of Customs. Commissioner affirmed the Collector of Customs. Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in accordance with law. On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the questioned goods which this Court denied. In view of the fact that the goods were being exposed to the natural elements, release of the goods was ordered.. Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in bad condition. Consequently, private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards 13 it actually lost. TOPICAL ISSUE: whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by private respondent. NO

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Re: forfeiture: Although it is admitted that indeed there was a misdeclaration, such violation, however, does not warrant forfeiture for such act was not committed directly by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee as set forth in Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraph (3), and/or (4). Re: liability: The SC opined that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.

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WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic imported by private respondent.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

INC.,

VS.

FACTS: Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is immune from suit. HELD: Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions".

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The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. DAR V. NLRC, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 1. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a contract for security services. However, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay as well as for damages before the Regional

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Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 2. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the judgment against their property. 3. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA didn‘t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize DAR‘s governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 4. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction. 5. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. 6. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

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ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable. YES HELD: 1. Generally, the State can‘t be sued without its consent. The State‘s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through general or special law. 2. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 3. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. 4. Here, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity 5. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character 6. The claims of private respondents arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims.

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Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied but the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 7. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 8. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION 
V.
JOSE TEODORO 1. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition, PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing

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and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. 2. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover the amount. 3. PAL countered with a third party complaint against the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus CAA was served with summons. The complaint alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed by Capitol Division. 4. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC has lots its juridical personality and because agency of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued. 5. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airport Corporation abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction, and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or upon government airfields, including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts of any kind and to grant concession rights.

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ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the defendant. 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC‘s creditors access to the courts of justice against the CAA is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was organized 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. 4. The CAA comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of

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government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. 5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state. 6. PAL‘s third party-complaint is premised on the assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.

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LARKINS V NLRC, FEBRUARY 23, 1995 1. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services was terminated. These employees were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor, JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own workers. 2. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air Force who were assigned to oversee the dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the employees and ordered reinstatement with full back pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. 3. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947. 4. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: ―In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed

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Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol‖ ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins HELD: No 1. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country. 2. The Agreement mandates that summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. The labor arbiter didn‘t follow the procedure and instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and NOT the Base Commander. 3. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.

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4. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons 5. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces inside the said military base. 6. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the RomualdezBosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint Labor

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Committee established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. 7. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, 
V.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, JUNE 10, 1988 1. Private respondents, American Citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval Station). They were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full time to part time. They instituted grievance proceedings which resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement plus backwages. 2. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau, commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing officer‘s report and asked for the rejection as Mr. Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed the records in public places. 3. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages against Sanders claiming that the allegations were libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private/personal capacity. Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that

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the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties thus the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over both petitioners - NO 1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. 2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn‘t have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. 3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. 4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed

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that the letter he had written (which included the libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. M 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. This act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the redesignation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. 6. Given the official character of the above-described letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the

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necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. 8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. 9. In the case at bar, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 11. Since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private

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respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base. WYLIE V RARANG [GR No. 74135 (May 28, 1992)] PONENTE: J. Gutierrez FACTS: Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the Merchandise Control Guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the ―Plan of the Day‖ a daily publication that featured among others, an ―action line inquiry‖. On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain ―Auring‖ was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.) She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach

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her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can‘t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. ISSUES 1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit. 2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortuous act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes, they are immune. Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even

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without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties. The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. 2. No.

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Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The

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petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent. REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 142476 (March 20, 2001)] Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez FACTS:  July 31, 1987: the Republic and PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other defendants.  On the strength of the complaint, PCGG issued several sequestration orders, one of which covers a Breguet Falcon 50 (aircraft). o The Falcon jet was leased by Unichem from Faysound Ltd. (a US company) o The lease lapsed in 1987, Unichem should have returned in to the owner, Faysound. o Cojuangco or any of the defendants has not claimed ownership or interest in the Falcon jet o Unichem has not been sequestered, only the shared of Cojuangco in Unichem have been sequestered  1987: the lease has been expired for 2 years. PCGG filed a Motion for Authority to Sell Sequestered Aircraft pending Litigation with the Sadiganbayan, because said aircraft was fast deteriorating o Sandiganbayan denied – saying that there was no justification, prima facie or otherwise, for the seizure of the jet.

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 





o PCGG filed petition for certiorari with the SC. SC issued a TRO directing the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from enforcing its assailed Resolution Relying on the TRO, PCGG sold the aircraft to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc. SC dismissed PCGG‘s petition holding that "the decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited administrative powers of the PCGGbut requires the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can grant or withhold the same in the exercise of sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence before it." FAYSOUND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF ARKANSAN AN ACTION TO RECOVER THE FALCON JET FROM FULLER AIRCRAFT. o The District Court ordered that the title to the Falcon jet be returned by Fuller to Faysound o Fuller sued the Republic and PCGG for breach of warranty and damages  a decision was rendered against the Republic and PCGG ordering them to pay Fuller the amount of $13,945,443.01 the PCGG, in order to settle the money judgment against it, entered into an "Agreement"6with Fuller Aircraft providing, among others, that the Republic of the Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal monthly installments, beginning November 15, 1996 and ending October 15, 1997 in settlement

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of Fuller Aircraft's claim which, per decision of the Texas Court, amounts to $14,928,457.29.  The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an ExParte Motion to Withdraw the amount previously deposited with the PNB for the account of the Sandiganbayan in trust for the beneficial owner and that PNB be immediately directed to release the funds on deposit to the Bureau of Treasury for transmission to Walter Fuller Sales, Inc., with the above Agreement and decisions of the US Federal Courts o Sandiganbayan denied the motion saying:  (a) it does not appear from the records that the person lawfully entitled to the escrow deposit has been determined;  (b) the motion contravenes the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan requiring the PCGG to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the sequestered aircraft with the PNB; and  (c) although the records disclose two authenticated copies of foreign judgments, there is no indication that copies of the deed of sale of the aircraft and the compromise agreement have been duly authenticated. o MR by PCGG was denied  In the present petition: Republic contends that respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its

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discretion when it denied PCGG'S motion to release the funds deposited in escrow with the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for transmission to Fuller Aircraft. o The Sandiganbayan failed to file a comment on the instant petition. Thus, this Court has no way of determining why it failed to resolve in more than one decade who is lawfully entitled to the escrow deposit ISSUE/S: WON Republic is liable for ―Agreement‖ with Fuller Aircraft. NO. HELD/RATIO: As shown by the records, Faysound Ltd. is the owner of the Falcon jet. In fact, this is admitted by petitioner Republic itself. As mentioned earlier, Cojuangco or any of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 has no interest in it. Clearly, this aircraft was erroneously sequestered. It is thus patently illegal for the PCGG to sell it to Fuller Aircraft. Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, we rule that petitioner Republic cannot be held liable under the "Agreement." It must be stressed that petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without the approval of the Sandiganbayan.

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Moreover, inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it follows that the "Agreement" between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft is likewise a nullity. Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound by the terms of the said "Agreement" and thus, there can be no cause of action against it. In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly liable if they did not act in good faith and within the scope of their authority in the performance of their official duties. Likewise, in Director of Bureau of Communications vs. Aligaen, this Court held that unauthorized acts by its government officials or officers are not acts of the State. Petitioner must, therefore, take immediate appropriate action against the PCGG personnel involved in the unauthorized sale of the aircraft. US v REYES [GR No. 79253 (March 1, 1993) Ponente: J. Davide Jr. FACTS: • Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in QC. She‘s married to Edgardo, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.

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• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford‘s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. • Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can‘t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford‘s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. • Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. • Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. • May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign

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sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. • July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. • July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford‘s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it‘s improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradford‘s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can‘t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford‘s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. • RTC granted Montoya‘s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of

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attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya‘s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. • Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts‘ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the case is under the RTC‘s jurisdiction – YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court‘s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to

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intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC‘s jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford‘s motion to dismiss. – NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. – NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It‘s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State

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authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. – NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124 Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9

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Facts:  This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.)  Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages.  President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizen‘s Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners.  February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit.

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Held: No Ratio:  Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government.  Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.  Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.  The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are o When the Republic is sued by name

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o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.  The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.

LANSANG vs. CA FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.

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With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued

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in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents‘ complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. 2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner‘s act of terminating respondent GABI‘s concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty. Held: 1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are

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not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. 2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary.

SAYSON V. SINGZON DECEMBER 19, 1973 FACTS: In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also

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approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted. After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to respondent Singson. Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers. Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with the SC. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in issuing the mandamus sought for by respondent HELD/RATIO: Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary

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action for specific performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. What respondent should have done was to file his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed

MINISTERIO V. CEBU AUGUST 31, 1971 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, which the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of and used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that demanded either payment or return of the property to which defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General did not reply. Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it was a suit against the government. It was also held that

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although the suit was filed in the name of the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they were filed against them in their official capacity and thus the action is one against the National Government. Thus this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit against the National Government HELD/RATIO: YES, The government is immune from suit without its consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V NLRC NOVEMBER 11, 1993 FACTS: In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was made with the same conditions except for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards. In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. This decision became final and executor. The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of execution against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against the National Government which requires its consent

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HELD/RATIO: No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent. However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls under the purview of Act no. 3083 provided that the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. G.R. NO. 90478, NOVEMBER 21, 1991 REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: The PCGG filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago etc.

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Tantoco and party however questioned the case filed against them. The Sandiganbayn admitted their Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents. This was objected to by the PCGG. However, after hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff. Thus the present petition for certiorari. The PCGG contends that none none of its members may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," since it is covered by the State‘s immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the PCGG is covered under State immunity? HELD: NO, they had impliedly waived it by instituting the case, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But

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it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or nongovernmental capacity, is unacceptable. It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner

G.R. NOS. L-71998-99 JUNE 2, 1993 DE LOS SANTOS V. IAC FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which they alleged to have been misappropriated without their knowledge or consent by Lorenzo Cadiente, who constructed a road and a creek. Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would "serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs.

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1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the construction. An action for damages was also filed. The trial court ruled that since the construction was a project by Minister of Public Works, the respondents cannot be sued without the consent of the State. ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? HELD: NO, it had impliedly given his consent. Quoting MInisterio v CFI: ―The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the

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jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. In this case, respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no expropriation proceedings were initiated before construction of the projects began Public respondents' belief that the property involved is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners' property, especially since it was under the Torrens system in Santos‘ name. A public infrastructure loses its laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private rights are disregarded Quoting Republic v Sandiganbayan, It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner. G.R. NO. 131544, MARCH 16, 2001 EPG CONSTRUCTION V. SECRETARY VIGILAR FACTS: Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose,

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the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,2 where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units. By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein petitioners for the construction of the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit. Due to the verbal assurance of the DPWH Undersecretary, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions"4 for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the "additional constructions‖ While petitioners completed these agreements, even the verbal one, the Government failed and afterwards refused to compensate them arguing that the contracts were null and void due to the absence of proper appropriation of public funds. The government further argues that they are covered by State‘s immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON respondents are covered by State immunity? HELD: NO The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be

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duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. In this case, although the verbal contracts are indeed null and void due to lack of proper appropriation of public funds, the records reveal that the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas led petitioners-contractors to undertake thecompletion of the government housing project, despite the absence of covering appropriations. On the principle of quantum merui, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.

G.R. NO. L-48214, DECEMBER 19, 1978 SANTIAGO V. GOVT OF PHIL FACTS: Ildefonso Santiago filed an action against the Government represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] which should have been

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constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. The lower court however dismissed the case under the rule that ―the state cannot be sued without its consent.‖ ISSUE:

WON

the

state

is

immune

from

suit?

HELD: NO While the court concedes that the general rule is for a government body to be immune from suit and a party‘s remedy would therefore be to file a claim with such general office, this case falls under an exception. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the conditions under which it received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or governmental agency, is to be condemned. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being presumed. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. The decision goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of

the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to acceptance.

GR. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916 MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF PHIL ISLANDS FACTS: Merritt was riding on his motorcycle when he was hit by a General Hospital ambulance causing extensive injury. He therefore filed a case for tort against the Government. The Government however claims immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the government is immune from suit? HELD: NO

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The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim Under CC1903(5). In this case, since the chauffeur of the ambulance was not a special agent, the Government cannot be held liable without its consent.

REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: WON the respondent‘s decision is valid RULING: No.

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The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.

FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL

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FACTS: On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased from the Shipping Administration a boat described as MV/FS 197 for the sum of P200,000.00, with a down payment of P50,000,00. To secure payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, a mortgage was constituted on the vessel The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the possession of the vessel in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said intervention, claiming to have a better right to the possession of the vessel by reason of a valid and subsisting contract in its favor, and of its right of retention, in view of the expenses it had incurred for the repair of the said vessel. As counterclaim, defendant demanded of the intervenor to comply with the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel pursuant to the provisions of the charter contract. ISSUE: Can the counterclaim?

Government

be

sued

in a YES

HELD: The trial court dismissed the defendants counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, among others, that the state is immune from suit. On appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect

waived

its

right

to

non-suability.

BROWNELL V. LIM FACTS: The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of Japan For which reason the said Alien Property Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2. On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien Property Custodian) issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the United States) executed two formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation to the property transferred, for all such costs and expenses of administration.

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On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, The claimant, however, took no appeal to the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the committee became final On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. Plaintiff‘s action was dismissed. ISSUE: Can the plaintiff claim for damages? NO HELD: The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government. Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the

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Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed

US VS. RUIZ FACTS: Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company, and from which it complied. Later, the United States, through its agent, informed said company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the project for the poorly completed projects it awarded to third parties. The company sued petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for damages. It also asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with others. The United States entered a special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of the defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for the cause of

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action asserted in the complaint. U.S. filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The Trial Court denied the motion and issued a writ. ISSUE: Whether

United

States

may

be

sued

HELD: No. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual can be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the U.S. and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the Government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

JUSMAG V. NLRC FACTS: Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated

allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave. On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG ISSUE:

Can

JUSMAG

be

sued?

NO

HELD: It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.

INDONESIA V. VINZON FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador

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Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent cites various circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners‘ alleged dissatisfaction over respondent‘s services Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a partydefendant in the Philippines. ISSUE: Can respondent sue Republic Of Indonesia? NO HELD: There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with

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private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

G.R. NO. 76607, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES VS. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO Note: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States filed motions to dismiss these cases. CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Private respondents who have been concessionaires inside Clark for years submitted their bids. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a

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suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without its consent.

CASE#2: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It was found during investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators, who found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of the PACAF Clark Air Force Base effected his dismissal. Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio. Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W the cases should be dismissed on the ground of immunity from suit - YES.

CASE#3: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and that they were

1. General Principles: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under the constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is

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expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows: It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate for their control. It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not

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involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. 2. However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individuallynamed petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States government should be liable for their torts. But the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in

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the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. 3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. 4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by

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private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.

G.R. NO. L-26400,, FEBRUARY 29, 1972 VICTORIA AMIGABLE VS.
NICOLAS CUENCA, AS COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES NATURE: appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing Amigable's complaint. FACTS: 1. Victoria Amigable owns a lot in Cebu City shown by a TCT No. T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds on February 1, 1924. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Note: these avenues were already existing in 1921.

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2. March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The Auditor General disallowed it. 3. February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 sqm of land. 4. July 29, 1959 - the court held that that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's money claim against the government; nor did it have jurisdiction over the claim for moral damages because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case - YES. Case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation 1. Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu - where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.

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It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. 2. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

G.R. NO. 129406, MARCH 6, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO NATURE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan FACTS: 1. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, including 227 shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI). 2. So the PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, a resolution assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. The 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent (bec. it could not pay

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the membership due) and so it had to be disposed of in an auction sale. 3. Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages that PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Roberto S. Benedicto. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement, wherein Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, impliedly recognizing that the shares of stock are not ill-gotten. 4. Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution directing PCGG to deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value. PCGG failed to comply. ISSUE: W Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof - NO. 1. PCGG, as a receiver of the sequestered 227 shares, has the function to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt. 2. (relevant part) In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix

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monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic‘s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto‘s prayers in the same case. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach

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of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

G.R. NO. 104269, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. Nature: petition for certiorari to nullify the decision of NLRC 5th Division FACTS: 1. Apr 1, 1989 - DAR entered into a contract for security services with Sultan Security Agency. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, etc. against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 2. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. The decision became final and executory. 3. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. 4. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of DAR. These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. 5. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with NLRC CDO, alleging that the writ issued was

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effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 6. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. DAR now filed a petition for certiorari. It argues: (1) that NLRC cannot assume jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit; (2) NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the nonsuability of the State. ISSUE: W DAR waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency - NO. Petiiton for Certiorari granted. 1. The rule that "the State may not be sued without its consent," is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 2. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have

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divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 3. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. 4. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.. . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. 5. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 6. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party

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an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.

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G.R. NO. L-30671, NOVEMBER 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF CEBU, BRANCH I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION NATURE: certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, declaring final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 1. July 3, 1961 - in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R, a decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the Republic for the amount of P1,712,396.40. 2. June 24, 1969 - Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3,
1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province,
Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 3. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served
notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the ―monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits

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sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said
Writ of Execution‖ 4. The funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with
the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or]
their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by
the AFP Controller,…" ISSUE: W the garnishment of the AFP funds were proper - NO. 1. The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It
is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. 2. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged. 3. Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: ―The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant‘s action ‗only up to the

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completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution‘ and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.‖ 4. The above applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. 5. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong
to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to
a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it.

CITY OF CALOOCAN V. ALLARDE FACTS  Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition.  The CFI declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and

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 





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the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. The City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.

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ISSUE: WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim - YES RATIO:  Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.  The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.

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 In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial process. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance 0134, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds

CITY OF CALOOCAN V ALLARDE All government funds deposited with any official depositary bank of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instruemntalties remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In this case, Caloocan had already approved and passed the ordinance and allocated money for respondent Santiago‘s back salaries plus interest. The case fell squarely within the exception and the amount may therefore be garnished. FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CF I in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her backwages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City

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appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can‘t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim. HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to

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subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person nor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

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MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  In lieu of an expropriation proceeding filed, petitioner Municipality of Makati opened a bank account with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, pursuant to the provisions of PD. 42.  After due hearing, the court fixed the amount of the property and ordered petitioner to pay such amount minus the advanced payments it has made.  After this decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued and a Notice of Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. o However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. o Private respondent then filed a motion praying for the court to order the bank to deliver to the sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.  While these motions are pending, a ―Manifestation‖ was filed, informing the court that private respondent was no longer the owner of the subject property and that ownership to this has been transferred to Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.  A compromise agreement was made between private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank, Inc., which was then approved by the court. The court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of

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P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property, from the garnished account of petitioner but the bank failed to comply as it was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling it to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered.  As the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner raised for the first time that it had two accounts with PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, and the other is for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government ISSUE: WON the balance of the appraised value of the subject property may be levied upon the second account of petitioner municipality - YES RATIO:  Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. o More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. o Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.  The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council

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of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in the said account.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V COURT OF APPEALS Where the municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and disbursement of municipal funds. FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the

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proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. HELD: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already

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enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

PACIFIC PRODUCTS V ONG By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a due from the defendant. The debtor-stranger becomes a forced intervenor; when served with the writ of attachment, he becomes a party to the action. Money in the hands of government agency (engaged in governmental functions), even if due to a third party, is not liable to creditors of the third party through garnishment. To allow this would be to allow a suit against the State without its consent. FACTS: PPI filed a case against Labrador; the Sheriff was ordered to attach Labrador‘s properties. In the mean time, BML Trading won a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications worth 10,500 for copper sulfate. This was garnished by the Sheriff as Labrador was doing business under the name BML Trading. BML however assigned its rights to Ong as Ong advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate. He filed a third party claim. ISSUE: Could the money payable to BML be garnished even if it was still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications? HELD:

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No. The notice of garnishment was made pursuant to an order of attachment against Labrador‘s property. By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor. The Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the Government of the Philippine Islands, when served with the writ of attachment, thus become party to the action. It becomes a suit against the state without their consent. In this case, immunity from suit was not waived because the Bureau entered into a business transaction with BML. The Bureau is a service bureau, not engaged in business. It further was never proved that Labrador was doing business under the name BML trading. Petition dismissed. PACIFIC PRODUCTS V. ONG FACTS:  Petitioner Pacific Products filed an action for sum of money against Hilarion Labrador, doing business under the name and style of BML Trading and Supply. A court order was issued directing the Sheriff of Manila to attach the properties of the latter.  BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate worth P10,500.00. Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the compound.

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 Before the Bureau could release the payment to BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished P9,111.70 out of the P10,500.00.  Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its tights over the P10,500.00 to respondent, Vicente Ong. o It was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate and the parties agreed that the profits will be shared by BML Trading and Vicente Ong on a 40-60 percent basis. It was also their agreement that BML Trading will waive its share in the net profits which may be realized from the transaction should it fail to secure the release of the payment.  Pacific learned about the assignment only when a copy of the third party claim filed by Ong with the Office of the Sheriff of Manila was served on them.  H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70. The corresponding writ of execution was issued and the Sheriff of Manila further garnished Pl,181.65 of the P10,500.00 in the possession of the Bureau.  Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff.  Ong filed an action for damages against Macario Ofilada in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the Pacific Products, and the First Quezon City Insurance.  RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed the decision. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari filed by Pacific.

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ISSUE: WON the garnishment was illegal and void – YES. Petition denied. RATIO:  It is noted that the notice of garnishment served upon the Bureau of Telecommunications was made pursuant to an order of attachment issued by the trial court in the case for sum of money against Labrador. At the time of such service, the amount against which the notice was issued was still in the possession and control of the Bureau. o Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau entered into a business transaction with BML Trading since in this jurisdiction, it is "a well established doctrine that when the Government engages in business, it abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and ascends to the level of a citizen". o This contention is not correct. Suability would follow only if the contract entered into by the government is in the exercise of a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function. The Bureau is a service bureau and is not engaged in business.  By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor – a party to the action upon service of the writ of attachment. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to Subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that

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moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it remains in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.

FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN FACTS:  In an earlier decision, National Irrigation Administration (NIA) was declared liable for the injuries, resulting in the death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA‘s driver employee Hugo Garcia. The Court held that NIA is a government agency performing proprietary functions.  NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver - YES HELD:  The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or

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ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.  The National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. o NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "governmentfunction" corporation. o NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. o NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

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FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government; it is a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Thus, it may be held liable for damages caused by the negligent act of its river who was not a special agent. FACTS: A pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation Administration driven officially of Hugo Garcia bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and Resituto Deligo. Fontanilla died as a result of his injuries. Fontanilla‘s parents sued Nia for damages. The trial court directed NIA to pay damages and actual expenses.

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The NIA is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions by express provision of its charter. Given the negligence in the supervision of the driver as he was travelling at a high speed, NIA is directed to pay damages. Petition granted.

ISSUE: Could the award for moral damages be awarded? HELD: Yes. The solicitor general argues that Garcia was a regular driver, not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability should not be borne by the government agency, but by Garcia himself. The liability of the state has two aspects: its public or governmental aspects were it is liable for the tortuous acts of special agent only and its private or business aspects where it becomes liable as ordinary employer.

CHAPTER IV: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE QUEZON CITY V ERICTA FACTS:  Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 provides that: ―At least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of

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Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.‖.  For years, that section of the Ordinance was not enforced but 7 years after enactment, the City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer to stop any further selling of lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers.  Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Sec. 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is a valid exercise of police power NO HELD:  Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.  Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.  The police power of Quezon City is defined as ―To make such further ordinance and regulations not

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repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe  The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. o The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Sec. 13 ―Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled‖. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. o It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. o Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

ICHONG V HERNANDEZ FACTS:

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 Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.  Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional. o He alleges that the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines, specifically the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China. ISSUE: WON RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power – YES

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RATIO:  Charter of the United Nations imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations o This can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.  All that the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China guarantees is the equality of treatment to Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." o The nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. o Even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

LUTZ V ARANETA

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FACTS:  Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, was enacted due to the threat to the sugar industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar. It provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured, to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the US market.  Walter Lutz, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied.  CFI dismissed the action, hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the tax levied under CA 567 is unconstitutional – NO RATIO:  The tax provided for in CA 567 is not a pure exercise of the taxing power. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.

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Hence, the said objectives of CA 567 are of public concern and CA 567 is therefore constitutional.  Even from the standpoint that CA 567 is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of byproducts and solution of allied problems, as well as to the improvements of living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money being channeled directly to private persons, constitutes expenditure of tax money for private purposes.

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Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. o 3 - a petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. o 4 – a petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.  The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. ISSUE: WON the aforementioned legal measures are constitutional - YES

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM FACTS:  This case (―land for the landless‖) is a consolidation of several cases because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of specific laws. o 1 – a petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants were declared as full owners by EO 228 and as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power. o 2 – a petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.

RATIO:  There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. o To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under

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the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. o The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was a valid exercise of police power and eminent domain. o The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. o RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer.

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 A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. The subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

ORTIGAS & CO. V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  Petitioner Ortigas & Co. sold to a parcel of land in Greenhills Subdivision IV to Emilia Hermoso. Conditions for the sale include restrictions on the use of the land for the construction of residential housing only and the non-erection of signs and billboards for advertisement purposes. Such conditions were annotated on the back of the title of the property.  Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty and constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Hermoso, seeking the demolition of the commercial structure. The complaint was later amended to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and impleaded Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty, the latter having 10% interest in the lot.  The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction, but the appellate court reversed the decision upon Mathay‘s special civil action for

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certiorari, claiming that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power. ISSUE: WON the zoning ordinance can be read into the contract as a valid exercise of police power - YES

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RATIO:  The Court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981.  Laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. o A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.  But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. o Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.

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PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V DE GUZMAN FACTS:  The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine that passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine. Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.  Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (BioChem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OBGyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.  The Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the NBI to investigate. The NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees

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leads to the conclusion that they gained early access to the test questions.  A statistical analysis concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc."  The respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus to compel the petitioners to proceed with their oath taking ceremony. The RTC decided in their favor and the CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus may lie - NO RATIO:  The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.  The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in

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the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.  To be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

CHAVEZ V ROMULO FACTS:  President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the

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issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).  Acting on President Arroyo‘s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the ―Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence‖  Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading the public respondents. ISSUE: WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is a valid exercise of police power – YES RATIO:  Even if petitioner‘s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State‘s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.  The test for determining the validity of a measure is: o The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and o The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.  It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and

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order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, the President deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.  The assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORPORATION V BALITE PORTAL MINING FACTS:  Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area.  Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act which established a Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)

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under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control. A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed with the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. While the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation, which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several cases were filed. Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The panel subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the cases. The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and e xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus praying for the nullification of MO 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed

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the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. ISSUE: WON MO 97-03 impairs the petitioner‘s rights under EP 133 – NO RATIO:  The challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt ―direct state utilization‖ as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute.  With respect to the alleged ―vested rights‖ claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. Until a positive pronouncement is made in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.  Under no circumstances may petitioner‘s rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the

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country‘s natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. DANTE O. GARIN, RESPONDENT. FACTS:  Atty. Dante Garin‘s driver‘s license was confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking along Gandara St.. He was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR), requiring him to appear before the MMDA Traffic Operations Center for appropriate action within 48 hours.  Garin claims: 1. In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of RA No. 7924 (MMDA‘s charter), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution; 2. the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other

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penalties on erring motorists. Therefore, MMDA has no authority to confiscate licenses.  MMDA: 1. a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 2. Revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation. He has 3 options: 1. Voluntaryily pay, file a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, 3. Request referral of TVR to Public Prosecutor.  Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations

HELD: 1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.  a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements

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The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.  Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways…e Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles.‖ 2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.  In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.  There is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature . here is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.  Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend

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or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. 3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.  Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations…  Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. V. DSWD FACTS: R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act) was signed into law in 2004. Under Section 4(a), senior citizens are entitled to a grant of 20% discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all

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establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.  Department Of Finance Director Lourdes Recente clarified the meaning of tax deduction: Under the old Senior Citizens Act, the grant was in the form of a tax credit, which necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. In the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the grant is in the form of a tax deduction, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens. While in the former scheme government shoulders 100% of the discount, in the current scheme government forgoes revenue equivalent to 32% (marginal tax rate) of 20% discounts granted. Establishments thus shoulder some of the burden.  A.O. No. 171 was then issued by the DOH, providing the grant of 20% discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. This was later expanded by A.O. 177 to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic.  Carlos SuperDrug asserts that Sec. 4(a) of RA 9257 is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

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Held:  Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income.  Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.  Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.  However, the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its

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basis in the Constitution (Article XV, Section 4; Article XIII, Section 11)  To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.  The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. ―Police power‖ as been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.‖ It is ―[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.‖  Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good

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CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO); RUBEN, N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L. ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO B. ABAS; AND REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS; ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; AND VICENTE LUKBAN, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: - CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree. As of March 1995, its Officers (Pres  treas) were Barrameda, Espiritu, Enero and Abas, respectively. - In May 1995, CANONECO Directors Obias, Ochoa, Pascua and Ilan held a special meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the meeting 5 showed that President Ruben Barrameda, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer Marcelito Abas were absent despite the fact that he had called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu for the holding thereof, the three chose not to appear. - In that meeting, those present declared all positions in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold elections, which resulted in the present directors‘ being elected as the new officers. - Barrameda, et al challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers.

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The CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners and declared the election null and void.  in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and with the active participation of some officials of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the group of Norberto Ochoa, et al forcibly took possession of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties as officers .  Fortunately, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate issued by the CDA, the petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to perform their respective functions.  However, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO, ―to efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity‖ The present Board may be called upon to render advisory services.  Petitioners: 1.) There is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to lake over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. The exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the power to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. 2.) Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from their positions as members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President does not have the authority

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to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of directors of a private enterprise including electric cooperatives ISSUE: May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative? HELD: petition is impressed with merit.  Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said laws. Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of directors and to remove them for cause. Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily. Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the "suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors and the officers thereof.  Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is explicit on how the dispute should be resolved: ―be settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms…‖Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.‖

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 Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory that the CDA is an agency under its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the President could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA  Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. 16 Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative.  Furthermore, It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-

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interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.

G.R. NO. 135962, MARCH 27, 2000 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. FACTS:  Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) association of homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.  MMDA notified BAVA that pursuant to MMDA‘s mandate to rarionalize the use of Metro Manila‘s roads, Neptune St. would be opened to vehicular traffic. Thus, it requests BAVA to open the points of entry and exit on that street. It also informed BAVA that the perimeter wall separating Neptune and Kalayaan ave, a public road, would be demolished.  BAVA instituted a case for injunction, asserting that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of a private road without a municipal ordinance.  MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. There is no need for the City of Makati

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to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. HELD: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use

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planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: (b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila"  The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. Thee powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.  its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself: ―The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.―

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 Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

ERNESTO FRANCISCO V. BAYANI FERNANDO IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MMDA FACTS: Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (―petitioner‖), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, an original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition

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and Mandamus to enjoin the MMDA from implementing its ―wet flag scheme‖ because: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA‘s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates ―pedestrian rights‖ as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.  Fernando: dismiss because of petitioner‘s lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, contendeds that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking.  Francisco: the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of ―paramount and transcendental importance.‖ HELD: Case dismissed. 1. No standing  no showing of direct injury; no showing of illegal expenditure of money; no showing of clear statutory or constitutional violation to merit transcendental importance 2. Violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts ―petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court‘s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.‖

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3. Flag scheme has legal basis  All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA‘s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents‘ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities.  Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. G.R. NO. 170656 MMDA V. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. G.R. NO. 170657 HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL V. MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC.

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FACTS: - Pursuant to MMDA‘s recommendation to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along Metro Manila‘s thoroughfares, and providing instead ,ass transport terminal facilities, President Arroyo issued E.O. 179, designating MMDA as the implementing Agency for the project. - Viron Transportation Co. filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a Circular closing all bus terminals in Metro Manila. Viron asserts that theMMDA‘s authority to regulate traffic does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property. -Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a TRO. - MMDA asserts: there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that

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the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons. HELD: The MMDA‘s Motion for Reconsideration must fail 1. There is a justiciable controversy  The E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA‘s plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities‖ Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.  a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the Project. 2. EO 179 involves 3rd persons  Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would

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mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. 3. EO 179 is ultra vires.  E.O. No. 125,which former President Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.  it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar.  By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.  In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924 (MMDA‘s charter), which merely grants MMDA with planning, monitoring, coordinating functions for the delivery of metro-wide services, including transportation and traffic management.  In the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air, it was ruled that the MMDA has no legislative, police power. Hence, it has no authority to close terminals, and no authority to implement the project.

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 Even if it had police power, the test for valid police power is: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.  the means employed in this case (closing terminals), as ruled in Lucena v JAC Liner, constitutes undue taking of private property and creates monopolies. It thus failed to go for the less intrusive means.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO AND ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION V. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION FACTS: - The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. All models older that 6 years are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. - Pursuant to the Circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued an implementing Circular stating: all taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. taxi units within the

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National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. - Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators who are grantees of CPC to operate taxicabs within Manila, filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation - Petitioners claim: 1.) they were denied procedural due process as they were not called upon to submit position papers nor summoned to attend any conference as regards the issuance of the BOT Circular, 2.) fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. Their right to substantive due process is thereby violated, 3.) their right to equal protection of the law is violated because the Circular is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. ISSUES: 1. W/N BOT violated petitioners‘ right to Procedural and Substantive Due process. 2. W/N BOT violated petitioners‘ right to equal protection of the law. HELD: 1. No, it is not violated.

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 P.D. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.  it provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: that it ―may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.‖  it is clear from the provision, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process.  As regards substantive due process argument, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. 2. No, it is not violated.

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 it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in the Circular, which states: ―its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board.‖  The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.  the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. CJ Fernando: "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded"  In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinctions.

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G.R. NO. 115044 JANUARY 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF MANILA, AND THE CITY OF MANILA V. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, AS JUDGE, BRANCH 40, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA AND ASSOCIATED CORPORATION G.R. NO. 117263 JANUARY 27, 1995 TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. AND DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA V. HON. VETINO REYES AND ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: Background ~  Charter of the City of Manila (1949): ―The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers…To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on…jai-alai…as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.  in 1951, EO 392 transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board.  in 1953, RA 954 criminalized the playing of jai-alai by persons without a LEGISLATIVE franchise.  in 1971, Municipal Board of Manila nevertheless passed Ordinance no 7065, authorizing the mayor to permit the ADC to establish and operate a Jai-alai in Manila.  in 1975, Marcos issued PD 771, revoking all powers of local government to grant franchises for jai-alai and other forms of gambling. That same year, PD 810 granted the Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement

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Corporation A Franchise To Operate a Jai Alai in Manila. This franchise was cancelled by Aquino‘s EO 169. The case~ - In March-April 1974, Judge Pacquing of RTC Manila issued a series of orders ordering Mayor Alfredo Lim to issue a permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC), allowing it to ―operate the jai-alai‖, pursuant to Manila Ordinance No. 7065. - Subsequently, Executive Secretary Guingona issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or to withdraw such grant of authority, to ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved: 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments is unconstitutional. 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity. 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation in view of executive Order No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai. - ADC then filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, mandamus against Guingona and Sumulong seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority

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that had earlier been granted to ADC. This was granted by Judge Reyes. ISSUES: 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper 2. whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai 3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction HELD: 1. Yes, it is proper  Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim be proven to be true."  the resulting injustice and injury in this case, should the national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-in favor of ADC. The national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct

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jai-alai operations is void since Republic Act No. 954, approved very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.  On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses  it will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy  on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents 2. No, it does not.  Petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act

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No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress.  ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board  neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the City of Manila and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise".  What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Even this power to regulate was removed from local governments and transferred to the GAB in 1951. It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law

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 It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.  There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. 3. yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.  Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. COURT OF APPEALS AND SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION FACTS: - Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly

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into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. - The order was based on National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC") and DENR reports which found that Solar textile was bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Solar‘s Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Result of the analyses of the sample taken showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive - Solar went to the RTC QC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, asserting that its right to due process was violated. Under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." The reprots made no finding of such a threat. - Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC. the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence - RTC dismissed the petition, saying that appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate

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temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. CA reversed the RTC order. ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. HELD: The Board is sustained.  Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders: (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."  it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."  Inspections reports show that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board.  Also, previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner,

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seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.  Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.  Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of suchex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeal

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YNOT V. IAC (1987) FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos. The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef. ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process RULING: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an ―iron rule.‖ Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an

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outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. The Court opined that they do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumscribed by simply killing the animal. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the

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owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the supersedeas bond is cancelled.

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JMM PROMOTION V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist‘s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or

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was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to ―high risk‖ destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC (1995) FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine

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publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional HELD: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate ―Comelec space‖ amounts to ―taking‖ of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

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LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V. JAC LINER (2005) FACTS: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and outof-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means HELD: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and

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not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA (1983)

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FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus

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with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.‖

ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled‘. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.

HELD: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. The police power of Quezon City is defined in subsection 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: ―To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper

Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

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occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938 DE LA CRUZ V. PARAS (1983) FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads ―AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS‖. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

SOLICITOR GENERAL V. MMA FACTS: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was

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permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of driver‘s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executory. Nothwithstanding the Gonong decision, still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of driver‘s licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself ―to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.‖On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid exercise of delegated power to local government acting as agents of the national legislature? HELD: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality

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of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all lawenforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver‘s licenses for traffic violations within the said area. For a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver‘s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their owns ources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail

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against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE (1994)

RATIO: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.O n the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

There is a requirement, however, that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannotb e superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatt he local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cann otbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. • The morality of gambling is not prohibited by the constitution. Such discretion is given to the legislature. In this case, PD 1869 allows the existence of legal forms of gambling. The will of the national legislature cannot be subservient to local ordinances. Ordinances must conform to the following requirements for it to be

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considered valid: o Must not contravene the constitution o Must not be unfair or oppressive o Must not be partial or discriminatory o Must not prohibit but it may regulate o Must be general and consistent with public policy o Must not be unreasonable Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged d ecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

CITY OF MANILA V. LAGUIO (2005)

ISSUES: W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law

FACTS: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

HELD: The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every house,

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building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V CA DARAB V CA FACTS:

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 1964- Lakeview Development Corp. bought a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite. LDC was succeeded by Credito Asiatico Inc. LDC/CAI undertook to develop the property into a residential and industrial estate thus it applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance approving the zoning and subdivision of the property,  1976- Kapasiyahang Bilang 30 was approved granting the application and affirming the project. A consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of Lands. The housing project was registered with the National Housing Authority and was granted a locational clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development subject to certain conditions.  1980- the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite declared certain areas including the subject land as industrial areas.  1987- while developing a phase of the property, a complaint for damages with TRO and PI were filed against CAI in the RTC of Cavite. The plaintiffs therein alleged that they were the actual tillers of the land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for the conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the aforesaid property from agricultural to residential and the same was granted by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform but that the parties had earlier agreed that the plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding such agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered actual damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged

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that the bulldozing was done without any permit from the concerned public authorities.  CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement whereby CAI donated parcels of land in consideration of the execution of deeds of quitclaims and waivers.  Despite the civil case, CAI went on with its project. Meantime, the remaining plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement with CAI in which the latter would execute Deeds of Donation in exchange for their quitclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  1991- TC granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.  However, the project was again opposed by another group of farmers claiming that since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of public agricultural land. They tilled the said agricultural lands and planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily survival. The petitioners requested that the DAR order an official survey of the aforesaid agricultural lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with Kalipunan ng Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA).  1994- Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President of PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of a portion of the CAI property under Rep. Act No. 6657.  The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmerstenants, filed a complaint for Maintenance of

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Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and PI before the DAR Adjudication Board Reg. IV against CAI et al.  DARAB granted the TRO.  CAI admitted that the CAI was the registered owner of the property, but specifically denied that the plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as tenantsoccupants of the aforesaid property since 1961. They asserted that the CAI did not consent to the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of the plaintiffs‘ houses. They further averred that the CAI had entered into a compromise agreement with the occupants of the property. They also alleged that they secured a permit from the Municipal Planning and Development Offices before bulldozing activities on the property were ordered.  The defendants raised the following as their special and affirmative defenses among others: (a) the plaintiffs‘ action is barred by the dismissal of their complaint; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights and interests over the property when they executed deeds of waiver and quitclaim in favor of CAI; (c) then Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella had issued an Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property into a residential area and withdrawing the property from the coverage of the CARL. Finally, the defendants contended that the property had an 18% slope and was undeveloped; as such, it was exempt from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657.  1996- PARAD dismissed the complaint and found that the plaintiffs abandoned and renounced their

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tenancy rights over the land in question and barred from instituting the instant complaint on the ground of Res Judicata; that the remaining 29 other plaintiffs were not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on the land in question and consequently not entitled to security of tenure. It declined to resolve the issue whether or not the property was covered by RA 6657 and on whether the conversion of the property to non-agricultural was legal and efficacious.  Petitioners appealed. The appealed was transmitted to the DARAB. Meantime some of them executed quitclaims waiving their rights from the property in the suit. Thus CAI filed a Motion to Lift Status Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss alleging that the status quo order illegally extended the restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It was also alleged that the complainants-appellants were not qualified beneficiaries of the CARL. The CAI asserted that the re-classification of the land use was valid and legal, and concluded that since the property was not agricultural, it was not covered by the CARL and, thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.  1997- DARAB reversed PARAD decision. MR denied.  CA- reversed DARAB and reinstated the PARAB decision. The CA ruled that under RA6657, sec. 10, all lands with 18% slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the exception speaks of ―18% in slope and undeveloped land.‖ Per report of the PARAD, the property subject of the suit has an 18% slope and was still

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undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption. And that as early as 1976, the land was already classified by the Municipality of Carmona as residential.  Petitioners: the property subject of the suit is agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL. They assert that the reclassification of the property made by the Municipal Council of Carmona was subject to the approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as provided for by EO648, sec. 5 but since there was no such approval, the said resolution was ineffective. They argue that RA6657 sec. 65, the DAR is vested with exclusive authority to reclassify a landholding from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit that the exclusive authority of the DAR is not negated by RA7160, sec.60 (LGC). They also insist that the conversion of the property under Kapasiyahang Blg30, was subject to the approval of the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property had not yet been completed even after RA6657 took effect. Hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent to secure an exemption thereto, after complying with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994.  CAI: the property was validly reclassified by the Municipal Council of Carmona pursuant to its authority under RA2264 or Local Autonomy Act of 1959. Until revoked, the reclassification made by the council remained valid. Per DOJ Opinion No. 40, Series of 1990, the private respondent was not required to secure clearance or approval from the DAR since the reclassification took place on June 15, 1988, when RA6657 took effect. The respondent

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asserts that it had complied with all the requirements under PD 957, as amended. Morevore, other agencies had already previously found the property unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The respondent asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere squatters and not tenants on the property of the private respondent. Hence, the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as well as the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from the decision of the PARAD.  ISSUE (with regard to eminent domain): W/N the subject property is covered by RA 6657 or the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). HELD/RATIO: NO. RA6657 provides that the CARL shall ―cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.‖ As to what constitutes ―agricultural land‖ it is referred to as ―land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. ―Agricultural lands‖ are only those lands which are ―arable and suitable agricultural lands‖ and ―do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.‖ Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the property cannot in any language be considered as ―agricultural lands.‖ These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in

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the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a lowcost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail‘s pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. RA2264, sec. 3 amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of DAR. RA6657, sec. 65 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of RA6657.

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When Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80 hectares of the property into non-agricultural land, he did so pursuant to his authority under RA3844, as amended, by PD 815 and PD 946. It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the property was not tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local Government and the National Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. DIPDIPIO EARTH-SAVER’S MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL V SEC. GOZUN, DENR, ET AL. Chico-Nazario,J. 30 March 2006

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FACTS:  25 July 1987- Pres. Aquino promulgated EO279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.  1994- Pres. Ramos executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corp over areas in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino, including Barangay Dipdipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.  1995- Pres. Ramos signed into law RA 7942 entitled, "An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.  2001- petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to the DENR Sec. for the cancellation of the FTAA for the primary reason that RA7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.  2002- Panel of Arbitrators of the Mining and Geosciences Bureau rejected the demand for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.1avvphil.net

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 Petitioners: They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.  Public respondents: Sec. 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that "to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase." ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. HELD/RATIO: NO. The Mining Act was held to be valid. Sec. 76 of the Mining Act as well as the DENR IRR provided for just compensation. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just

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compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two. A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way. The requisites of taking in eminent domain include (Castellvi v CA): (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

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(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. As shown by jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking. In the case at bar, the entry referred to in Sec. 76 and the easement rights under Sec. 75 of RA 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the deprivation of proprietary rights. The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein. The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems.

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On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence. While the Court declared that Sec. 75 is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just compensation. The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public" has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the government‘s thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Panganiban, J. 2 December 1998 FACTS:  Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Cavite.

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 1982- Philippine Human Resources Development Center and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency entered into an agreement which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center.  1983- MOA between Benitez and PHRDC by which she would lease and/or sell for a period of 20 years the subject property in favor of PHRDC. It was granted permit by Benitez and the Philippine Women‘s University to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives...‘. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations.  After the lease contract expired, negotiations began on the purchase of the property on a plain offer from Benitez to sell the same. It was agreed that the purchase price would be at P70 per sqm. In view of this agreement, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale.  However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell the lot in question.  1995- She and PWU demanded payment of rentals and to vacate the premises. It later filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioner.  For failure to acquire the property, CMDF instituted a complaint for eminent domain under EO1035. A writ of possession was issued by the Court but later quashed. ISSUE:

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W/N the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated. HELD/RATIO: NO. Sec. 7 of EO1035 (providing for the procedures and guidelines for the expeditious acquisition by the government of private real properties or rights thereon for infrastructure and other government development projects) provides that when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. There being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based on defendant‘s 1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to defendant as landowner has been effected, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession should be granted. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. In this case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry

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and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial physical possession of the property because the lease, which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well. What will happen if the required writ of possession is not issued? It would be absurd to require petitioner to first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to issue in petitioner‘s favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste of precious time and resources. This precisely is the sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of government infrastructure or development projects, which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly, said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the State‘s power of eminent domain. CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. CA

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20 November 2000 Pardo, J. FACTS:  Conrado Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, CN a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corp (PSC). PSC was declared in default and the RTC found in favor of Leviste.  A writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land in the name of PSC were sold at a public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corp. A writ of possession was issued in favor of VRC. The writ included the power lines of CANORECO standing on certain portions of the subject property.  Later, VRC moved for the removal and demolition of improvements on the land, including the electric posts. CANORECO opposed on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.  RTC issued writ of demolition.  CANORECO filed with CA a petition for prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction which was eventually denied. Meantime, the sheriff went through with the demolition. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

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HELD/RATIO: YES. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269 (creating the National Electrification Administration) includes the exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In Republic vs. PLDT, it was held that: ―the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private

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respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V MANUBAY AGROINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Panganiban, J. 18 August 2004 FACTS:  1996- Napocor was to undertake an electrification project in connecting Leyte to Luzon. In order to carry out said project, it needed to build its transmission lines across certain lands owned by private individuals including private respondent.  Napocor filed a complaint for expropriation before the RTC in order to acquire easement of right of way over the land which MAIDC owns.  RTC issued a writ of possession and directed the sheriff to immediately place Napocor in possession of said land. In determining the fair compensation, the court appointed 3 commissioners to survey the land.  Taking into consideration the condition, the surroundings and the potentials of respondent‘s

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expropriated property, the RTC approved Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon‘s recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation for the property. The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property.  Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A of RA6395 (revising the Charter of the Napocor), as amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law prescribes as just compensation for the acquired easement of a right of way over an expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.  CA: affirmed the RTC holding that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude expropriation. Section 3-A thereof allowed the power company to acquire not just an easement of a right of way, but even the land itself. Such easement was deemed by the appellate court to be a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered electric lines traversing respondent‘s property would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely

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-- the value and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs because of the high-tension current conveyed through the lines. Respondent was therefore deemed entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found the award of P550 per square meter to be proper and reasonable. ISSUE: W/N the assessed compensation was just. HELD/RATIO: YES. An easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain, but the owner‘s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

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In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square meter is justified. Both the Report of Commissioner Bulao and the commissioners‘ majority Report were based on uncontroverted facts supported by documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular inspection of the property. As can be gleaned from the records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating

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the evidence submitted to them; neither did they misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and respondent appellate court has not been grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V PLDT En Banc 27 January 1969 FACTS:  Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA‘s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.  Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many

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rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau‘s) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.  1958- DoT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc. for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radiotelephone overseas calls received by RCA‘s station to and from local residents. But PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT‘s facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.  On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance

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Telephone Company, in CFI of Manila praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant‘s telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.  CFI rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. ISSUE: May the PLDT be compelled to enter into an interconnection contract with the petitioner? HELD/RATIO:

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YES. Generally, parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. But while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT‘s lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just

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compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU V HEIRS OF PASTOR Panganiban 20 June 2000 FACTS:  Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to expropriate property of the respondents.  In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation‖.  The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated, Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20, 000.  Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the SC, raising a pure question of law. ISSUE:

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Who has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is P20,000? HELD/RATIO: RTC. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." Remanded to RTC.

DEVORAH BARDILLON V BARANGAY MASILI Panganiban, J. 30 April 2003 FACTS:

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Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints for expropriation against Bardillon for the purpose of erecting a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. The 1st complaint was filed before the MTC following the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on the purchase offer but the complaint was dismissed for lack of interest for failure of the barangay to appear at the pre-trial. The 2nd complaint was filed before the RTC but Bardillon filed an MTD on the ground of res judicata. The RTC judge denied the MTD holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the proceeding so res judicata does not apply. The CA also dismissed the petition on the same ground and ignored the RTC‘s writ of possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint. ISSUE: Who had jurisdiction? HELD/RATIO: RTC.An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because the subject of the action is the government‘s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the MTC had no jurisdiction, res judicata does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are found in Section 2, Rule 67. For LGUs, expropriation is also governed by Sec. 19 of the LGC. In expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate

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entry are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In this case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor the city after it filed the complaint and deposited the amount required was proper because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. NAPOCOR V CA, POBRE Carpio, J. 12 August 2004 FACTS:  Pobre was the owner of a parcel of land which he developed into a resort-subdivision which he named the ―Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.‖  1972- Pobre leased lots in the subdivision to NPC  1977- NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire a portion of his property. CFI ordered the expropriation upon payment of P25 per sqm. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre‘s complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.

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 1979- NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre for additional land are to be used for its well site. It deposited 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court‘s issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.  1984- Pobre filed MTD second complaint for expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his property. He prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC‘s actions and for the payment of damages.  1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation case on the ground that it had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre‘s opposition.  CFI-granted NPC‘s MTC but allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court admitted Pobre‘s exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object. It denied NPC‘s motion to reconsider the submission of the case for decision. It eventually found in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to compensate him. CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N NPC must pay just compensation for the entire property. HELD/RATIO: YES. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the

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landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this case, it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. The Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. It has been held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPC‘s taking of Pobre‘s property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for

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Pobre‘s entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobre‘s repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre‘s property rights. Thus the SC computed the compensation for the entire property based on the valuation of the commissioners at 6%pa interest plus temperate and exemplary damages.

MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the ―sports development and recreational activities‖ of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused. On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was ―in line with the program of the Municipal

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Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.‖ Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property HELD: Eminent domain is ―the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.‖ It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.

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Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided: (1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted; (2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no ―genuine necessity‖ to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowner‘s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.

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REPUBLIC V. CA FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings over 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University. HELD: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching

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that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the property of the Ching Cuancos. The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. ISSUE: W/N there was no due process? HELD: Petition is granted. However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an

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ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) V. CA FACTS: ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry. PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA‘s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The

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construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to ―negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC‘s present occupancy rights on the subject land. Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed. ISSUE: W/N the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA‘s term. HELD: Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the

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Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as ―legal personality.‖ When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the

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Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA‘s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. V. CA FACTS: Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land situated in Tondo Manila. Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila against the occupants of the said property on the ground of termination of the lease contract and nonpayment of rentals. Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner.

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Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the properties of Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis whether or not the expropriation is valid. HELD: No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent domain as expressly granted by the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken

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for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for socialized housing which shows that private property is the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of acquisition an states that the modes include "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Upon examination of the records, the court found that the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is

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for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC FACTS: Certain parcels of land were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. A Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government. Eventually, the land was subdivided and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels were acquired by San Roque, which begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land. Republic filed the present case alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case. San Roque claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without

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legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation. HELD: EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights. Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title. The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.

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From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.

MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN V. IAC FACTS: Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, passed Resolution to expropriate same land. It hereafter filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. RTC issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful. IAC affirmed. HELD: From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available

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road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ... Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle, adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land, and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if this lot is the one to be expropriated.

BARDILLON V. BRGY MASILI

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FACTS: 2 Complaints for eminent domain were filed by the Brgy Masili for the purpose of expropriating a (144) square meter-parcel of land owned by Bardillon. Bardillon acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale. Bardillon argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC‘s Writ of Possession over her property, issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint.

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Held: SC not persuaded. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

BARDILLON V BARANGAY MASILI

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FACTS: Barangay Masili filed two complaints to expropriate a 144 sqm parcel of land owned by Bardillon for a multipurpose hall; their first offer was 200,000. The case was dismissed for the failure of reopndent and counsel to appear at pre-trial (MTC). The second complaint was approved (RTC). The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction and the RTC validly ruled. ISSUE: 1. Could the MTC have jurisdiction over the case? No, An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because the subject of the action is the government‘s exercise of eminent domain – a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation. 2. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises? No. The Writ of Possession was valid. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are governed by Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are 1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance 2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Held: Petition denied. The expropriation is valid.

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LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA FACTS: Petitioners bought land from the City of Cebu. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC‘s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. An ordinance was soon passed, identifying lots for socialized housing, including the contested lot. The ordinance appropriated ~6M for the lot. Petitioners filed an action for nullity of Ordinance 1843 for being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process Yes. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners‘ property was singled out for

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expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners‘ property as the site of a socialized housing project. Specifically, the ordinance is against the Constitution and RAs that call for a particular order priority in acquiring land and expropriating only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. The singling out of petitioner‘s small property was plain oppression and showed manifest partiality against petitioners as only few squatters would benefit. The ordinance failed to show any reasonable relation between the end sought and means adopted. HELD: PETITION GRANTED.

MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general grant of authority. FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the

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cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditionsimposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC V PLDT

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All private property may be expropriated, except money and choses in action. Even services may be subject to eminent domain. FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommuncations set up a Government Telephone System using its equipment but renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. PLDT complained that the bureau was violating the conditions of the interconnection referring to the rented trunk lines, because the government used the liens not only for government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of PLDT. They gave notice and disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Petitioner commenced a suit against PLDT praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities. PLDT compels it cannot be compelled to enter into this contract without any prior agreement. ISSUE: Can an interconnection between PLDT and the GTS be a valid object for expropriation? HELD: Yes, in an exercise of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to payment of just compensation.

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The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the telephone systems is similar to an easement of right of way.

AYALA DE ROXAS V CITY MANILA Imposing an easement is considered taking. FACTS: Plaintiff wanted to construct a terrace on her property; it would be over a 3m strip of land between her house and the edge of the canal of Sibacon. Her application for permit was denied because the City Engineer said the city wanted that 3m of land as a place of discharging and landing goods and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and fishermen, and to be a towpath

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The City of Manila and City Engineer must issue a license allowing her to construct her terrace. PEOPLE V FAJARDO Municipal oridnance prohibiting a building that would impair the view of the plaza from the highway was taking. FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia were convicted for violating Ordinance 7 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for constructing a building destroying the view of the public plaza, without a permit. Fajardo, the former mayor, built the property even after denial of the permit because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon. ISSUE: Was the ordinance valid?

ISSUE: Did this constitute a deprivation of property? HELD: Yes. No one shall be deprived of property until after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect and resotre possession to the injured party. The easement intended would amount to expropriating preventing exclusive use. The question here is not the establishment of an easement which might be objected by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the city of Manila because it is an attempt to suppress without due process of law real rights attached to ownership.

HELD: No. While the mayor has the authority to regulate property in the interest of general welfare, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. Every structure that may be erected would interfere with the view. The appellants would be constrained to let their land remain idle. Further, the power of the municipal council to require building permits rests upon fire limts. There is no showing of these fire limits. They had no authority to promulgate the said ordinance.

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NPC V GUTIERREZ Eminent domain may consist in an imposition of a burden, without loss of title or possession. FACTS: NPC was a GOCC with the power of eminent domain for the construction and operation of electric transmission lines. NPC had to pass the lands of Gutierrez, et al. The negotiations for easement were unsuccessful and eminent domain proceedings were started. They were paid P973.00. ISSUE: Should NPC pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines? HELD: Full compensation. The transmission lines perpetually deprive defendants of their proprietary rights, as they will not be allowed to plant anything higher than three meters; the high-tensino current also poses a danger to life and limbs. The acquisition of easement falls within the purpose of eminent domain, as it deprives defendants of ordinary use of their property. It must be noted that even if petitioner only sought an easement of right of way, the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator.

REPUBLIC V CASTELLVI

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Requisites for valid taking: expropriator must enter a private property, entry must be for more than a momentary period, entry must be under warrant or color of authority, property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government (AFP) in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. If the time of taking was the government‘s lease, the price would be P.20/sqm, while if the time of taking followed Castellvi‘s interpretation the price would be P15/sqm. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a monetary period and (2) devoting it to public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: 1. WON the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lessee.

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No the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced. The elements of taking are: Requisites for valid taking: expropriator must enter a private property, entry must be for more than a momentary period, entry must be under warrant or color of authority, property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

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 In the case at bar, these elements were not persent when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. 2. What is just compensation? It is to be deermined as of the date of filing the complaint. In the instant case, the taking must be reckoned when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. A price of P5/sqm is fair.

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AMIGABLE V CUENCA

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Keywords: Power of eminent domain; taking in the constitutional sense FACTS:  Victoria Amigable owner of Lot in Banilad Estate, Cebu City reflected no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government

used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now and that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925. 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President for payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it. 1959, Amigable filed against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership, possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues and for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00. Defendants filed a joint answer 1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; 2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; 3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since Government had not given its consent to be sued; and 4) that it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area hence

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Amigable has no cause of action against the defendants.  CFI ruled that it doesn‘t have jurisdiction as the government cant be sued without its consent; Amigable appealed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Amigable may properly sue the government? YES  Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. Considering that no

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annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.  However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.  For damages, Amigable is entitled of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. VELARMA V CA Keywords: Facts: This case arose from an ―ejectment suit filed by Pansacola against Velarma before RTC which alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981, Velarma surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual, Quezon (2) that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences but Velarma still refused to vacate (3) that Panascola filed Criminal Case against Velarma in 1986 for violation

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of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite such judgment and repeated demands to vacate, Velarma continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the suit. RTC: Ordered Velarma to vacate the property. Trial court found that Panascola had satisfactorily established her ownership over the parcel of land in question and that Velarma occupied Panascola‘s land without authority of law and against the will of the owner through strategy and stealth. The argument of Velarma that Panascola has no cause of action against him since it was already the municipality that owns the lot by virtue of an agreement between the former owner Publio (husband of Pansacola) to exchange the subject lot with an abandoned road and bridge of the Municipality REYES V CA of Mauban (recorded in the minutes of a meeting of Sangguniang Bayan), failed. But trial court held that Velarma‘s claim was unwarranted as there was no deed had ever been executed to perfect the deal between the municipality and Publio therefore Panascola remained the owner of the property. CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Velarma‘s agreement to sell the property to the government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a forcible entry suit? NO

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Although Publio Pansacola signified before the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial road, there was no execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land. No evidence was introduced by Velarma to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, Panascola continues to retain ownership of the land. Keywords: Public benefit is now synonymous with public welfare or public benefit; Relocation site for informal settlers was converted into a low-cost housing project. Facts:  1977, NHA filed separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmariñas, Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were

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relocated from Metro Manila. TC granted the expropriation and the payment of just compensation. For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the said order, petitioners filed a complaint for forfeiture of rights before RTC and alleged that NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metro Manila on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues: 1) concerning capital gains tax; 2) registration fees and other expenses for the transfer of title to respondent NHA and for attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioners. Ocular inspections showed that: 1) only one of the lots is already occupied by relocatees whose houses are made of light materials with very few houses partly made of hollow blocks. The relocatees were relocated only in 1994; 2)most of the area is almost occupied by houses and structures, most of which are made of concrete materials are not being occupied by squatters TC dismissed the complaint filed and held that: (1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have abandoned the public purpose for which the subject properties were expropriated because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA

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actually pursued the public purpose of the expropriation when it entered into a contract with Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no condition imposed in the expropriation judgment that the subject properties shall revert back to its original owners in case the purpose of expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just compensation, the basis should be the value at the time the property was taken. CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NHA failed to comply with the conditions and in effect forfeited its right to expropriate? NO  1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea

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that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public ESTATE OF JIMINEZ V PEZA convenience."  The act of NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.  Moreover, the Constitution itself under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that: "SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments."  When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise

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of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner." Keywords: Public use Facts: Issue/Held/Ratio:  1981, PEZA filed an expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. Jimenez contended that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. RTC then released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. PEZA then appealed to CA.  Jimenez offered a compromise with PEZA namely: 1) Withdrawal of PEZA‘s appeal with respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages; 2) swap of Lot 1406B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since PEZA has no money yet to pay for the lot. The swap arrangement recognized the fact that the lot 1406-B is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for

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said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. PEZA approved the compromise agreement was signed by Jadiniano.  However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to Jimenez as PEZA was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. TC annulled the said compromise agreement and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said order PEZA moved for its reconsideration but it was denied. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. Having upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, what is then the status of the expropriation proceedings? The situation of the parties will revert back to status before the execution of the compromise agreement, that is, the second stage of the expropriation proceedings, which is the determination of the just compensation. Expropriation proceedings involve 2 phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (when the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since if finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be

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ascertained by 3 commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the dependant. In the case at bar, the first phase was concluded already order of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the compromise agreement trial court could only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and executory. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by petition to annual the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed. According to Jimenez, the appellate court erred in interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just compensation. Jimenez claims that the original demand is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for expropriation inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement subjected the said order

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to rescission. Since the order of expropriation was rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate and the purpose of expropriation have again become subject to dispute. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said to rescission but instead constituted an admission by Jimenez of Peza‘s authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner. Said expropriate order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. 2. w/n PEZA expropriated for Public use? YES Peza has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. PEZA expropriated the subject land for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto. The authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for

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what public use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA's original charter. FILSTREAM V CA Keywords: Facts:  Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. In 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila against the occupants of the said property on the ground of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The respondents appealed before the RTC and then CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision.  On May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream before RTC Manila. On November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the properties of Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to

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qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.  On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate of the subject land owned by petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of Possession, which were denied by the RTC, along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was denied for procedural flaws.  The decision of the MTC on the ejectment case became final and upon motion of Filstream, the MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a supervening event in that the properties subject of the dispute have already been ordered condemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises, that prompted the private respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a

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temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which was granted. A Petition for Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC decision denying the motion to quash the writ of execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the respondent and the City of Manila were consolidated and an injunction was issued against the writ of execution. These cases were however dismissed by RTC upon motion of Filstream for violation of the SC Circular against forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Exparte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted.  As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from implementing the order of demolition dated January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed. Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which granted herein private respondents' prayer for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Issue/Held/Ratio:

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1. w/n the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis w/n the expropriation is valid? NO  The City of Manila has the power of eminent domain as expressly granted by the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)".  The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for socialized housing which shows that private property is the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of acquisition an states that the modes include "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted."

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 Upon examination of the records, the court found that the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified.  Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

MANOSCA V CA Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013

Keywords: Public use; historical landmark of Felix Manalo, founder of INC Facts: Manosca inherited a piece of land at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, (492 square meters) The parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo and declared the land to be a national historical landmark. Republic of Phil filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. Manosca argued that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Manosca‘s petition was denied hence this certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n ―public use‖ requirement of Eminent Domain is present in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by NHI as a national historical landmark? YES  Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion

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over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency.  Manosca assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.  Court held that guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. The idea that ―public use‖ is strictly limited to clear cases of ―use by the public‖ has long been discarded.  The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

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MODAY V CA Keywords: Public Use; it is the Municipality of Bunawan has the authority to expropriate not the Sang. Panlalawigan Facts:

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 SB of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the Mayor to expropriate a hectare of land owned by Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." The resolution was approved by Mayor but later disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan commenting that there are still available lots for the establishment of the center. Despite this, the municipality still filed a petition for Eminent Domain.  RTC granted municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.  Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.  Moday sought to reverse the decision and declare Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void. Issue/Held/Ratio:

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1. w/n the municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? YES, municipality can expropriate.  Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.  The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and MUN. OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY CORP void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is

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beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

Keywords: Public use; lack of compliance in filing of expropriation Facts: Municipality of Paranaque issued SB Resolution for complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corp over

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two parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. It was stated purpose that petitioner declined the offer of negotiated sale by the Municipality. RTC finding the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance granted it. In 1994, respondent argued that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. TC denied the petition and the MFR hence this appeal. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action? NO Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case ―substantially complies with the requirements of the law‖ because the terms ―ordinance‖ and ―resolution‖ are synonymous for ―the purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the

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power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter‘s control and restraints, imposed ―through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.‖ In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.

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2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved? NO All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can ―reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.‖ Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case (i.e. final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue) it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.

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DAR V NLRC NOVEMBER 11, 1993 7. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a contract for security services. However, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay as well as for damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 8. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the judgment against their property. 9. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA didn‘t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize DAR‘s governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 10. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction. 11. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

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More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. 12. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable HELD: YES 9. Generally, the State can‘t be sued without its consent. The State‘s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through general or special law. 10. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 11. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. 12. Here, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity

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13. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character 14. The claims of private respondents arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied but the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 15. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 16. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.

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NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION 
VS.
JOSE TEODORO 6. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition, PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. 7. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover the amount. 8. PAL countered with a third party complaint against the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus CAA was served with summons. The complaint alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed by Capitol Division. 9. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC has lots its juridical personality and because agency of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued. 10. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airport Corporation abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction, and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or upon government airfields,

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including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts of any kind and to grant concession rights. ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the defendant. 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC‘s creditors access to the courts of justice against the CAA is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was organized 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions

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4.

5. 6.

7.

of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The CAA comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state. PAL‘s third party-complaint is premised on the assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.

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LARKINS V NLRC FEBRUARY 23, 1995 5. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services was terminated. These employees were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor, JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own workers. 6. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air Force who were assigned to oversee the dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the employees and ordered reinstatement with full back pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. 7. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947. 8. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: ―In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed

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Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol‖ ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins Held: No 8. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country. 9. The Agreement mandates that summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. The labor arbiter didn‘t follow the procedure and instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and NOT the Base Commander. 10. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.

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11. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons 12. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces inside the said military base. 13. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint

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Labor Committee established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. 14. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, 
VS.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II JUNE 10, 1988 4. private respondents, American Citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval Station). They were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full time to part time. They instituted grievance proceedings which resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement plus backwages. 5. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau, commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing officer‘s report and asked for the rejection as Mr. Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed the records in public places. 6. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages against Sanders claiming that the allegations were libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private/personal capacity. Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that

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the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties thus the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over both petitioners NO 1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. 2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn‘t have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. 3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. 4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed

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that the letter he had written (which included the libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. M 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. This act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the redesignation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. 6. Given the official character of the above-described letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the

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necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. 8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. 9. In the case at bar, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 11. Since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private

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respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.

LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA GR 155746 1. Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which was Lot 1029 in Capitol Hills. Petitioners purchased it on installment basis but then the 210 lots eventually were reverted back to the Province of Cebu. The province tried to annul the sale thus the petitioners (buyers) prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages. TC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered Province to execute the final deed of sale. CA affirmed the decision thus thereafter, TCT was issued in the name of petitioners. 2. However, when they took possession of the lot, it was already occupied by squatters thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. MTC issued demolition order. 3. When it was about to be implemented, Mayor Garcia requested the deferment on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters thus the MTCC issued orders suspending the demolition. 4. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

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5. Then, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. 6. Ordinance No. 1843 was then enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. 7. Petitioners then filed with the RTC then the CA after it was dismissed, an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people ISSUE: W/N this expropriation contravenes the Constitution yes 1. Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160: Eminent Domain. ―A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws‖

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2. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners‘ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City. 3. However, the local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. 4. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 5. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution 6. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. 7. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide the priorities in the acquisition of land. It shall be made in the ff order: a. Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,

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including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; b. Alienable lands of the public domain; c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; d. Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and f. Privately-owned lands. 8. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners‘ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted (land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted) 9. Prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners‘ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition.

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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V SPOUSES CHIONG GR 152436 1. NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC wanting to acquire an easement of right of way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned by the spouses Chiong and the heirs of Angeles to be used in its Northwestern Luzon transmission line project. 2. In their answer, they pointed out that NPC had already entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less (Lot A) and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square meters of the adjacent property (Lot B). Respondents said that the FMV for both properties was P1,100.00 per sqm or a total of P8,800,000.00 and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay them said amount. 3. Court then granted issuance of a writ of possession. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the controversy would be limited to determining the actual land area taken by NPC and the just compensation to be paid by NPC. TC appointed the commissioners and they submitted their report finding that the property classified as unirrigated Riceland shall have a FMV of P500 per sqm considering that the property is situated 900 meters from the town proper. 4. TC appointed as commissioners, Atty. Alog, Atty. Castillo, and Ms. Regadio, to determine the fair market value of the land, as well as the total area taken by NPC from respondents.

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a. Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio – the property classified as unirrigated riceland shall have a fair market value of P500.00 per square meter b. Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles an easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses Chiong be paid total easement fees of P9,187.05.The affected properties of the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles were assessed by Atty. Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per square meter, while those of the Spouses Chiong were assigned a fair market value of P15.75 per square meter. 5. Court then gave due course to the report of Atty Castillo and Ms. Ragadio. 6. Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for certiorari with the appellate court: it alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it: (a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the land taken without first issuing an order of expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation recommended by the two commissioners without a hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full market value of the property instead of a mere easement fee. 7. CA: dismissed. NPC moved for reconsideration. ISSUE: W/N full market value of the property instead of easement fee should be paid HELD: YES 1. A formal hearing or trial was not required for the petitioner to avail of its opportunity to object and

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have filed a motion raising all possible grounds for objecting to the findings and recommendations of the commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to remand the report to the commissioners for additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge the majority report, for reasons petitioner could muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the opportunity to register its opposition. The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court at P500.00 per square meter. The appellate court affirmed the said valuation. NPC the expropriation was not to be limited for the purpose of easement of right-of-way. In fact, in their Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000 square meters wherein it constructed structures for its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner failed to controvert this material allegation. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value

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of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits 7. In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and the proofs which included the fair market value of P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the respondents. 8. This valuation by owners of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the compensation to be awarded. 9. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the owners valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only P500 as recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.

ESLABAN V DE ONORIO GR 146062 1. Clarita de Enorio‘s lot was affected a the main irrigation canal construction of the NIA. Her husband agreed to the construction provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of the documents by the COA. A right of

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way agreement was executed between them and paid P4180 as Right of Way damages. 2. Now, De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property but when Eslaban refused, she filed a complaint against him before RTC praying for compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal. 3. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that: the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141. 4. TC: ordered the National Irrigation Administration to pay de Onorio 107k as just compensation. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision hence this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION. 1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed

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2.

3.

4.

5.

and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use. it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of

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6.

7.

8.

9.

taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.14

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CIR V CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION JUNE 26, 2006 1. Central Luzon Drug Corporation opened 3 drugstores as a franchise under the business name, ―Mercury Drug‖. In conformity to the mandate of RA 7432, it granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicine to senior citizens. Pursuant to Rev Reg 294, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, the corporation deducted 219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. 2. For said taxable period, the corporation reported a net loss of 20,963 in its corporate income tax return. As a consequence, the corporation did not pay income tax for 1995. 3. It then claimed the amount of 219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, it filed a claim for refund in the amount of 150,193. This amount represents the tax credit allegedly due to the corporation under RA 7432. 4. CTA: even if the law treats the discounts granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, it cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability. Likewise, no refund can be granted because there was no tax which was erroneously or illegally collected.

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5. CA: the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales 1. RA 7432 provides, ―the grant of twenty percent discount from all establishments relative ... purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit. 2. The above provision explicitly employed the word "tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a "deduction" from gross sales. 3. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. 4. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount -- when claimed – shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. 5. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the

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6.

7.

tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.

PANES V VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE NOVEMBER 27, 1996 1. Marcos issued PD1107 establishing the Philippine Root Crops Research and Training Center in the Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA). It had the power to expropriate lands situated within the barrios, thus VISCA filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners to: a. Establish experimental fields b. Construct buildings laboratories and housing facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops Center; and c. integrate and conduct country-wide researches on root crops. 2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank

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representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76. 3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties. 4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated were not within the area specified under PD No. 1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794 providing that the just compensation shall not be in excess of the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the provincial assessor, which is lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of contract and violating the equal protection clause; and (5) there was no public necessity for the acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands. 5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands involved in the expropriation proceedings, their tenure of work as tenants being secured and protected by law, they cannot be removed from their landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted the intervenors‘ motion to which VISCA filed its reply. It denied that they were tenants and that their reliance to the decree was misplaced since the proscription therein against the ejectment or removal of tenants is applicable as regards landowners,

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landholders and agricultural lessors and not as regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf. 6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because expropriation was not one of the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42 was only applicable to untenanted private properties and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be expropriated were indeed within the area indicated by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation. 7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was tainted with GAD when it denied immediate possession of the properties. The authority of the petitioner to take immediate possession of the subject properties appear clear and explicit. The contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is nothing in PD 42 that indicates this. 8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed by the Constitution and it runs counter to the agrarian laws. ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of possession NO 1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount

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equivalent to the assessed value of the subject property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay 2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Thus, the determination of just compensation, by virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was converted from being a judicial prerogative to an executive decision. Because the executive determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No. 1533 to be unconstitutional and void. 3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount with the PNB representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No. 42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties for purposes of taxation. 4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the

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subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67 – that there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

BELEN V CA MARCH 11, 1991 1. Belen leased a small portion of land (100sqm) from Manotok Services situated in Tondo, Manila. Belen built his house there. Juliano occupied part of the land; he bought a house standing there and moved in without Belen‘s knowledge. Upon learning about Juliano, they came up with an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay ½ of the rental to Manotok Realty. However, the houses were burned. Belen acceded to Juliano‘s continued stay on the condition that it should only be for 1 ½ years. When Juliano failed to leave the presmies, Belen brought suit in the MTC. 2. MTC: ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment. 3. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok

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Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the premises in question and as correctly contended by Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were also deemed terminated. 4. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved against him. 5. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in determining the "pivotal and decisive issue — whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belen‘s lessor, has retained ownership of the lot in question, the expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670)‖. 6. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result, Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a sublease can never extend beyond the duration of the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen appealed by certiorari to the SC ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the land considering it didn‘t receive money as payment for the subject property yet HELD: yes 1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the owners‘ right to due process of law. The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the

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2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. But it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated." This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first." Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City Assessor. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D. No. 1533, the basis for determining just compensation was fixed at the market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Here, there is no mention of any market value declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees peg just compensation at the market value determined by the City Assessor.

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7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

REPUBLIC (DAR) V CA OCTOBER 30, 1996 1. ACIL Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Dvao del Norte which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Certificates were cancelled and new ones issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. 2. The lands were valued by Land Bank however, in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, Land Bank valued the land uniformly. 3. ACIL rejected the government‘s offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price per hectare. 4. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40 instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the statement ACIL filed with DAR. 5. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion

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was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that a petition for just compensation under RA 6657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. 6. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to RTC HELD: N 1. §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, §57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. 2. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: a. (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

b. (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. EPZA v. Duly - the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies — rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the

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case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. 8. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657.

MERALCO V PINEDA FEB 13, 1992 1. MERALCO filed a complaint for eminent domain for the lots of the 42 private respondents. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, MERALCO needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement 2. But despite the opposition, the court issued an order authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the possession of the property. Private respondents then filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid 40 pesos per sqm and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of 71k from MERALCO‘s deposit account with the PNB. This they did 3x and Judge Pineda then granted the motion of withdrawal. 3. The court then stressed that it will appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a

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credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." 4. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. 5. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence. ISSUE: W/N the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation HELD: YES 1. Sec. 5 of Rules 67, ROC: Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. 2. Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten days, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections,

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the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. 3. Binan case: There are2 stages in every action of expropriation. a. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. b. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 4. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. 5. Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per

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hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects‖. He arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. 6. Likewise, MERALCO has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. 7. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. 8. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. 9. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive 10. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.

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11. Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. 12. The respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAURA SANTOS and 43 more claimants G.R. No. 57524, January 08, 1986 1. 66,096 square meters of land in Parañaque and Muntinlupa claimed by 44 persons is being expropriated, for the widening and con-struction of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road. 2. The Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed at P40 per square meter. The Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts. 3. CFI Rizal granted the fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2,641,190. 4. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of the Philippines. 14 claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. They were paid the amounts due to them at that price Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly indicative of the fair market value of the lands at the time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early in 1969. 6. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation. The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter. 7. May 13, 1972 - trial court fixed P100 a square meter as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants

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8. June 29, 1981 - CA modified the trial court's decision and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6% legal rate of interest from February 7, 1969, the date of the filing of the complaint. 9. Republic contends that CA erred in disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter. Issue: What is the correct valuation of the expropriated land - only P40 per square meter for the expropriated lands. 1. We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. 2. Also, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the filing of the instant expropriation case. 3. The statement in the 1970 report of the commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on any documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay. More-over, those prices refer to 1970 or more than a year after the expropriation was effected. 4. In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters. She was already paid P1,036,360 for her expropriated land.

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5. Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial assessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasonable price. 6. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated.

G.R. NO. 156093, FEBRUARY 2, 2007 NATIONAL POWER CORP. V.
SPOUSES DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE BRANCH, REYNALDO FERRER, AND S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP. NATURE: petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Napocor seeks to annul CA decision which affirmed RTC decision fixing FMV at P10,000 per sqm 1. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of rightof-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. 2. November 27, 1998 - petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625

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square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters. 3. NAPOCOR deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then it filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order, which was granted. 4. However, the trial court dropped Sps Dela Cruz and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz. As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-ininterest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement. 5. Meanwhile, trial court issued an Order directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics. 6. October 05, 1999. - commissioners recommended that the fair market value of the real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter. However, the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. Upon the submission of the commissioners‘ report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it. 7. December 28, 1999 - RTC Order fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. Napocor filed Motion for

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Reconsideration claiming it is exorbitant, unjust and unreasonable. RTC denied this MR, explaining that the price for 1999 must be considered, which is the time when the writ of possession was issued. 8. CA affirmed RTC: The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the land owner. CA noted that since the property underwent important changes and improvements, "the highest and most profitable use of the property is good for residential and commercial purposes. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: 1) W the respondents were denied due process - Yes. 1. The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners‘ findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties‘ (in particular, petitioner‘s) right to due process was violated. 2. Based on Rule 67 Sec. 6-8, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings. 3. The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a

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mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, (1) where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, (2) where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (3) where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all." 4. There are very specific rules for expropriation cases that require the strict observance of procedural and substantive due process because expropriation cases involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private property for public purposes and the disbursement of public funds as just compensation for the private property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case cures the defect in due process. 2) W the valuation of just compensation was correct No. 1. In this case, the commissioners arrived at the figure of P10, 000 in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures, the property‘s location and, allegedly, the

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prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the area. 2. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 3. The commissioners‘ report itself is flawed considering that its recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the complaint (when just compensation should have been determined), and the time when the commissioners‘ report recommending the just compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just compensation.

G.R. NO. 170422, MARCH 07, 2008 SPS. EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG V. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES NATURE: Petition assailing the CA decision in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Edmond Lee and Helen Huang. 1. 7 August 2001 - Sps Huang received a notice informing them that their landholding is covered by the government‘s compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant

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to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). 2. 1 June 2001 - Sps received from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a copy of the notice of land valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195 hectares of the property. Petitioners rejected the offer. 3. DARAB conducted a summary administrative proceeding to etermine the valuation and compensation of the subject property. DARAB ordered the LBP to pay petitioners the original amount offered by DAR. 4. Aggrieved, Sps filed an original petition for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan. They offered the appraisal report presented in Civil Case No. 7171, a prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land adjacent to the property subject of this case. 5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SAC should have refrained from taking judicial notice of its own decision in Civil Case No. 7171 in resolving just compensation in the present case, especially because it disregarded the other factors set in RA 6657. According to the Court of Appeals, the SAC should have judiciously made an independent finding of fact and explained the legal basis thereof, hence the CA remanded the case to the trial court ―for proper and judicious determination of just compensation, appointing for that purpose a set of commissioners.‖ 6. Sps allege that the remand of the case would give LBP undue opportunity which it already had during the proceedings a quo, and which opportunity it failed to take advantage of. Also, it argues that R.A. No. 6657 does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven

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factors enumerated therein in its determination of just compensation. ISSUE: W remand of the case is proper for the determination of proper valuation - YES. 1. SAC‘s reliance on the valuation made by the appraisal company is misplaced, since the valuation was not arrived at using the factors required by the law and prescribed by the AO No. 5. 2. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be considered in determining just compensation reads: SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non- payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institutions on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. This formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to in Section 17 of the law.

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3. We find that the factors required by the law and enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not observed by the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. However, this is not to say that the Court favors the valuation given by LBP. We find that LBP‘s valuation is too low vis-á- vis the value suggested by the appraisal company. All told, we find that the remand of the case is in order to better determine the proper valuation of the subject property. RELEVANT: 4. We clarify, however, that we are not in accord with the declaration of the Court of Appeals on the appointment of commissioners in the instant case. CA, in its decision, stated: x x x Consequently, when the Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court determines just compensation, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court. xxx SAC should have appointed competent and disinterested commissioners to assist it in valuating the property in question. The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in agrarian reform cases. We do not agree. While the Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in special agrarian courts, it is clear that unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. And when the court does resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not

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circumscribed to appoint three commissioners, unlike the modality under Rule 67. With the remand of the case, it is now up to the SAC, or to the parties, to determine if there is a need to avail of commissioners to arrive at the proper valuation of the subject land.

G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. G.R. NO. 118745 OCTOBER 6, 1995 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL. 1. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, the petitions were ordered consolidated. 2. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,

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private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. They sought to compel DAR to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. 3. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 4. DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.

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5. DAR/ Landbank maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

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ISSUE/HELD: (1) W the opening of trust account is acceptable form of payment - NO. 1. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". (2) W the DAR Administrative circular is constitutional NO. 1. DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued

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Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". (3) W private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the case 1. DAR's contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 of the same law. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:" xxx The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. xxx The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must

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be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.

RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY = date of filing the complaint, unless filing came after actual taking

G.R. NO. 113194. MARCH 11, 1996 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MACAPANTON MANGONDATO 1. 1978 - Napocor took possession of a 21,995 square meter land situated in Marawi City, owned by

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Mangondato, and under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974. 2. NAPOCOR alleged that the land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City, so that in exchange for the city‘s waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a ‗financial assistance‘ of P40.00 per square meter. 3. Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid ‗financial assistance‘ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. 4. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On August 14, 1990, NAPOCOR‘s board passed Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of P40.00 per square meter for the 12,132 square meter portion (P485,280.00) plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 (P698,808.00) pending the determination whether P100.00 per square meter is the fair market value of the property. So Mangondato was paid P1,184,088.00. 5. March, 1992 - the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of A Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to Mangondato‘s request of provisional payment of P100.00 per square meter excluding interest and without prejudice to Mangondato‘s pursuance of claims for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the P1,184,088.00

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earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which payments total P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land. 6. However, Mangondato still demanded that he be paid P300 oer square meter because his land was classified as industrial. 7. July 7, 1992 - Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property and the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the surrender of the property. 8. July 27, 1992 - Napocor filed Civil Case No. 610-92 which is a Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato over the subject property 9. Mangondato answered that he treats the P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as partial payment for the rent for the use of his property. Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in damages for the unauthorized taking and continued possession of his land from 1978 until the filing of the Complaiant. Furthermore, he argues that should the lower court order the expropriation of the subject property, that the just compensation for the land be reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation case. 10. The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P10,997,500.00, provisionally fixing the value of the land at P500.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR opposed the provisional value quoted by the lower court saying that the basis of the provisional value of the land should be the assessed value of the property as of the time of the taking which in this case is 1978.

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ISSUE: What is the correct basis for the valuation of just compensation: (1) 1992 or at the time of filing of complaint for eminent domain, or (2) 1978 or at the time of taking. HELD: Here, SC followed the general rule (filing complaint), because only in 1992 did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. SC affirmed the CA when the latter held that: ―If We decree that the fair market value of the land be determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason other than for eminent domain would occupy another‘s property and when later pressed for payment, first negotiate for a low price and then conveniently expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property for the purpose of eminent domain should be reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy the property and that the value of the property should be computed as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the meantime in the value of the property.‖ RATIO: 1. The general rule in determining ―just compensation‖ in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into

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the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 2. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare. 3. Side Issue: Where is there "taking" of property? This Court has defined the elements of ―taking‖ as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain in Republic v. Castelvi: ―A number of circumstances must be present in the ‗taking‘ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.‖ Here, in this case, the petitioner‘s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted

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that the property was public land and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid ―financial assistance‖ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondent‘s ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. learly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain.

G.R. NO. 146062, JUNE 28, 2001 SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. V. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO NATURE: petition for review of CA which affirmed RTC ordering National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking of the latter‘s property. 1. Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. 2. October 6, 1981 - Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.

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3. 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property 4.The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement. 5. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NI WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION - TAKING! 1. There are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, §4 provided: Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of

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condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . .. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. 2. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. 3. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." 4. Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value

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after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. 5. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . . . In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by

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the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis. G.R. NO. 129998, DECEMBER 29, 1998 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. LOURDES HENSON NATURE: appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals , which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, ordering Napocor to pay respondents landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five (5) parcels of land 1. March 21, 1990 - NPC originally instituted with RTC for eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. 2. Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga. Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision. 3. July 10, 1990 - the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of respondents' property, to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990. 4. September 5, 1990 - trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11,

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1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land 5. April 5, 1991 - the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property. 6. May 19, 1993 - the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. Petitioner then appealed to CA, which affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: W the valuation of the commissioners is correct - No, because they based the valuation on adjacent residential lots. 1. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. 2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village

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Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. 3. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.

REPUBLIC V KER CO. [GR NO. 136171 (JULY 2, 2002)] Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City apetition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-BuhanginInterchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the taxdeclaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.

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HELD: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Justcompensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides that justcompensation is to be determined as ofthe date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim.

CITY OF CEBU VS. SPOUSES APOLONIO AND BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. NO. 142971, MAY 7, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C .J: FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for

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a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court‘s decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the

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date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

NEPOMUCENO V CITY OF SURIGAO [GR NO. 146091 (JULY 28, 2008)] FACTS:  Maria Paz Nepomuceno filed a complaint to recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m. lot which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria Paz alleged that the city government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted expropriation proceedings for its acquisition.  She wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable settlement for the payment of the portion taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay them anything.  A second letter was sent to sought the Mayor‘s reconsideration but they were again turned down.  respondents admitted the existence of the road in question but alleged that it was constructed way back in the 1960s during the administration of former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that time, the lot was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way agreement in favor of the municipal government. However, a copy of the agreement could no

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longer be found because the records were completely destroyed and lost when the Office of the City Engineer was demolished by typhoon Nitang in 1994.  RTC ordered the City to pay spouses Nepomuceno the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney‘s fees, and the further sum of P3,260.00 as compensation for the portion of land in dispute, with legal interest thereon from 1960 until fully paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of the said City. o The claims for moral and exemplary damages are denied for lack of basis  CA modified the RTC decision and held that petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral damages for having been rebuffed by Mayor Sering in the presence of other people. It also awarded petitioners P20,000 as attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses considering that they were forced to litigate to protect their rights and had to travel to Surigao City from their residence in Ormoc City to prosecute their claim. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other respects.  SPOUSES NEPOMUCENO claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity demand that the value at the time of actual payment should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They demandP200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,400 plus legal interest.

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ISSUE: WON, as alleged by spouses Nepomuceno, it is the amount at time of payment which should be the basis. HELD/RATIO: In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this rule is: The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it." Thus, the value of petitioners‘ property must be ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no

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agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V ANGAS [GR. NOS. 60225-26 (MAY 8, 1992)] Ponente: Paras J. FACTS:  On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance.  Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid." Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the

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 

 

petitioner. The same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and executory. May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents [Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through counsel, filed with the trial court an exparte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to PD 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."

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 February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.  Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.  NPC moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that PD 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.  January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. HELD/RATIO: NO. Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:

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By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. his has already been settled in several cases decided by this Court. Private respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which term includes the questioned judgment of the lower court in the case at bar. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated.

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The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public

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purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

WYCOCO V CASPILLO [GR NO. 146733 (JANUARY 13, 2004)] J. Ynares-Santiago FACTS:  Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija.  In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million.  After the DAR‘s evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines, a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco ( modified to P2,280,159.82).

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 The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding.  Pending litigation, DARAB requested Land Bank to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.  Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.  The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. ISSUES:

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(1) WON the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, validly acquired jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation. (2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the compensation arrived at is supported by evidence. (3) WON Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell. (4) WON the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid. HELD/RATIO: 1. YES. The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco‘s complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco‘s land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and LBP‘s conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or agreements; and the entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of action. Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was rendered moot and academic in view of the DARAB‘s dismissal of the administrative case to

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give way to and in recognition of the court‘s power to determine just compensation. 2. NO. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco‘s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 3. NO.

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The DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR‘s non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area. 4. PARTLY MERITOUS In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.

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Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just compensation. The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof. None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits cannot be granted.

DE KNECHT V CA [GR NO. 108015 (MAY 20, 1998)] Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht

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and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts‘ property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court

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however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished. The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the ownersanymore of the said land. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, theorder of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government. Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds

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embodied in various maxims of the common law — one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

VISAYAN REFINING V CAMUS [GR NO. L-15870 ( DECEMBER 3, 1919)] J. STREET FACTS:  Sept. 13, 1919: the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of an area of about 1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the municipality of Parañaque,

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Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of Manila. It is stated in communication of the Governor-General that the property in question is desired by the Government of the Philippine Islands for military and aviation purposes.  Numerous persons are named in the complaint as defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended to be expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded appear the names of the three petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question.  Visayan Refining, Worcester and Leas nterposed a demurrer, questioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes.  Contemporaneously with the filing of their demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of First Instance to revoke its order of September 15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative authority for the proposed expropriation, but it contains one additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of P600,000, had been made without authority of law.

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ISSUE: WON title has passed to the Government. HELD/RATIO: The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate possession when the Government of the Philippine Islands is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which is in part as follows: SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government . . . in any competent court of the Philippines, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately upon the land covered by such proceedings, after depositing with the provincial treasurer the value of said land in cash, as previously and promptly determined and fixed by the competent court, which money the provincial treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final decision of the court: Provided, however, That the court may permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited with the provincial treasurer a certificate of deposit of any depository of the Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited by the court. The certificate and the sums represented by it shall be subject to the order and final decision of the court, and the court shall have authority to place said plaintiff in possession of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the proper orders and a mandate, if necessary.

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SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendants of the compensation awarded by the sentence, or after the tender of said sum to the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or in case the court orders the price to be paid into court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate the land so condemned to the public use specified in the sentence. In case payment is made to the court, the clerk of the same shall be liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall be obliged to receive the same. In connection with the foregoing provisions found in laws enact under the American regime is to be considered the following provision of the Civil Code: ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority for some purpose of proven public utility and after payment of the proper compensation. Unless this requisite has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be. Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty, providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the expropriator finally dependent upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.

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While we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just compensation must be made, the further fact must not be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional provision in force in these lands Islands requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is true that in rare instances the proceedings may be voluntarily abandoned before the expropriation is complete or the proceedings may fail because the expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases the owner retains the property; and if possession has been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted that the title does not actually pass to the expropriator until a certified copy of the record of the judgment is recorded in the office of the register of deeds (sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the proceedings is reached the compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the court is plainly directed to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the defendant just compensation for the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code Civ. Proc.). Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of compensation by him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247, Code Civ. Proc.).

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REPUBLIC V SALEM INVESTMENT CORP. [GR NO. 137569 (JUNE 23, 2000)] J. Mendoza FACTS:  BP 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of defendants in this case, including a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama  Five years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract with intervenor Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property.  Guerrero file with the RTC of Pasay a complaint for specific performance against De la Rama.  While this case for specific performance was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government.  As already stated, the De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14,

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1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. The only issue in this case is who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question? o The De la Ramas claim that they should receive the amount of just compensation because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on February 17, 1983. o On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero argues that the title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property.

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 Pasay City RTC, Br. 111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. ISSUE: WON Guerrero is entitled to receive just compensation. HELD/RATIO: YES. Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation.[25] In both instances, just compensation is determined by the courts. The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As explained in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". . . . The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for

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the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. . . . It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.

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including the expropriated area, which was then owned by the De la Ramas. It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract‘s validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.

In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of the land in question. The constitutionality of this law was upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990, the government commenced the second stage of expropriation through the filing of a petition for the determination of just compensation. This stage was not completed, however, because of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with them and did not at that point pass to the government.

CITY OF MANILA V ROXAS [GR NO. L-39671 (JUNE 29, 1934)] J. Hull FACTS:  The City of Manila appeals from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila awarding to two private property owners whose lands were taken by expropriation proceedings, an allowance for the taxes paid to the City of Manila under protest, covering a period of time between the dispossession of the owners and the taking of title by the city.

As to the Contract to Sell As the trial court in the case for specific performance ruled, the contract to sell covered the entire Lot 834,

ISSUE: WON taxes paid by the owner after taking by expropriator are reimbursable.

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HELD/RATIO: YES. While taxes are assessed against the holder of the title, the owner of the property is entitled to the beneficient use of his property until title changes. If pursuant to law, immediate possession may be taken, the withholding this right from the owner must be compensated for as well as the formal taking. In In re Mayor, etc., of City of New York it is said that: Certainly it would not be "just compensation" to take a man's land, and compel him to pay the taxes and assessments thereafter levied on the property, while at the same time withholding the purchase price. . . . Upon the city's theory, therefore, the owner must not alone be deprived of the unrestricted use of his property and of the ad interim use of his money, but he must also compelled to pay for its police protection, and for public movements charged against it as a benefit, during all the period of delay, for which he is in no way responsible, and which he is powerless to shorten. It will be seen that, if this theory be correct, the owners award would be constantly diminished by each year's delay, until, if the period were long enough, it would be entirely wiped out. It can hardly be contended that a theory which, logically followed out, would under any possible circumstances produce such a result, affords a satisfactory basis for an award of "just compensation."

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. . . The power may be allowed the unrestricted use of the premises after taking, and the premises maybe of such a character, and so situated, that the income derivable therefrom is a full equivalent for interest, taxes, and assessments. Such is the case where the property has been fully improved and rented, and where there has been no loss of tenancy or diminution of rental pending the condemnation proceedings. There is no error in a court's awarding, as part of the just compensation required by law, the amount of taxes and assessments paid covering the period where the original owner had merely the naked legal title. Where all benefits have been taken away, the corresponding burdens should be assumed by the State. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V COURT OF APPEALS JULY 2, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. RTC condemned the land and had it expropriated upon the payment of just compensation by the Republic. The issue arose in relation 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessorin-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of

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five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just compensation for the expropriated area. During this period, Pres Estrada also issued proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of said property to Bulacan State University and another 5 hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine carabaos. Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be depositing the amount equivalent to the just compensation of the property. Respondent filed a counter motion to raise the price of the property or an option to have the property returned to them. RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the return of the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to pay the just compensation for it. HELD/RATIO: No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the

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basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it was held that ―both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.‖ The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda de Villaroya, wherein the court ordered the return of the property does not apply in the case at hand. That case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.

REPUBLIC V VICENTE LIM JUNE 29, 2005 FACTS: The petitioner, Republic instituted expropriation proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC

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ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of just compensation. For failure of the petitioner to pay the just compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for damages and recovery of possession of the land against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return of the property because of the notation in the TCT which stated that, ―subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.‖ They were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage in 1976 for the former‘s failure to pay. In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This decision was sustained by the CA. A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for reconsideration was filed. ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of the land despite its failure to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation. HELD/RATIO: As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent‘s

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predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as ―reasonable market value of the two lots in question.‖ Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court‘s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation. From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation, and that ―non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession

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of the expropriated lots.‖ However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic‘s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that ―the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.‖

BELEN V CA A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. In the early part of 1978 part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family without Belen‘s consent. Belen and Juliano came to an agreement that he would be allowed to stay temporarily by paying half of the rentals to Manotok Services A fire razed their properties. Upon Juliano‘s pleas, he was allowed to build another house in the property for a period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him to vacate the premises.

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In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670. His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC ISSUE: WON there was valid expropriation of the property HELD/RATIO: No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called "Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this Court as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation." PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a

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housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL V CA JANUARY 23, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Filstream is the owner of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before MTC of Manila against private respondents on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to vacate the premises and pay the back rentals. This decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which the decision became final and executory. However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said property. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low and thus violative of the just compensation provision. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

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During this period, Filstream filed for motion for execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The private respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay the execution due to the supervening event which is the expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case for issuance of writ of execution and petition for certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping). Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was granted. Private respondents then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition for certiorari with the SC to nullify the resolutions of the CA. The two cases were consolidated. ISSUE: WON petitioners were denied due process of law by the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for failure to submit clear and readable copies. HELD/RATIO: Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation

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proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. Where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice. Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for non-compliance with respondent court‘s internal rules, respondent CA should have instead entertained petitioner Filstream‘s petition for review on Certiorari, and ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding pleadings which it deems relevant and replace those which are unreadable.

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BIGLANG AWA V JUDGE BACALLA NOVEMBER 22, 2000 FACTS: The Biglang-awa‘s are the registered owners of certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City. The government needed to expropriate part of the aforesaid property of petitioner for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic to submit documents to determine just compensation of the property and failure to do so would give rise to an expropriation proceeding for said property. Petitioner failed to submit the said documents and thus the Republic through the DPWH filed with RTC an expropriation suit for the said properties. The respondent deposited the amount for the compensation of the properties of the petitioners and thus the RTC issued a writ of possession. An order to vacate the premises was also issued to petitioners. The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the acquisition of, or entry into, the property being expropriated. This was denied the RTC. Thus a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC. ISSUE: WON the right to due process of the petitioners was violated by respondent Republic

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HELD/RATIO: No. Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. The trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited, Thus, , the only requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ―ministerial. The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure alone is neither ―capricious‖ nor ―oppressive‖, as the said rule affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation of their property in expropriation proceedings, one of which is the deposit requirement which constitutes advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds, and stands as indemnity for damages should the proceedings fail of consummation.

FRANCIA V MUNICPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN MARCH 24, 2008 A complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of Meycauayan against petitioners Francia

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for the purpose of establishing a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. Petitioners allege that the land to be expropriated was raw land which was soon to be developed by them and that the price offer was too low. RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose and that it would improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. It ordered that writ of possession be issued upon deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the property. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for failure to hold a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. CA nullified the order of expropriation but retained the writ of possession. Thus the appeal to the SC. ISSUE: WON prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession HELD/RATIO: Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.

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CITY OF MANILA V SERRANO JUNE 20, 2001 FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila‘s first district in Tondo. One of the properties sought to be expropriated was Lot 1-C belonging to Felisa De Guia. After her death, the estate of Feliza de Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the regional trial court, branch 53, manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986. The property was subsequently sold on January 24, 1996 to Demetria de Guia to whom TCT no. 226048 was issued. Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, with the RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), Respondents allege that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because RA. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation. Dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. After petitioner had made a deposit, RTC issued a writ of possession to petitioner. Respondents filed for a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that said

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properties were not exempt from execution. Nevertheless, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation as was held in Filstream v CA. Thus petitioners were enjoined from expropriating the said property. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it held that there had been no compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. no. 7279. HELD/RATIO: Yes. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. no. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the law. Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated

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CITY OF ILOILO V JUDGE LEGASPI NOVEMBER 25, 2004 FACTS: On 07 March 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, Administratrix of the estate made a formal estate to purchase the property for P250 per square meter for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with the city‘s housing development program Later Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against private respondents. On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited 15% of the fair market value of the property may immediately take possession of the property in accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 Judge Legaspi held in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession until after the trial on the merits of the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus the filing of this petition. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: WON petitioner is entitled to the writ of possession Yes. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in an expropriation suit are as follows: (1) the filing of a

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complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that ―hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated.‖ From the foregoing, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance with the requirements for socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for socialized housing. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. WON there has been a waiver on the part of petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine

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(9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time limit as to when a local government may immediately take possession of the real property. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.

NAPOCOR V POBRE AUGUST 12, 2004 FACTS: Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resortsubdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the property after it was certified by the Commission on Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain

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Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 squaremeter portion of the Property to which the court granted upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092 Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it had found an alternative site and that it had already abandoned the said project in Pobre‘s property. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss but without prejudice to Pobre‘s allegation in relation to damages he incurred. RTC later ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to execute the deed of sale upon full payment.

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Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC. ISSUE: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its own complaint in eminent domain cases. No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 171 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions

G.R. NO. 139495. NOVEMBER 27, 2000 MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) V. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN 1

SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.

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FACTS: Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land that she sold by eminent domain to the government to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu. Since the project never pushed through, Chiongbian said that she was assured by NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used. ISSUE: WON the land can be reconveyed? HELD: NO The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination CHIONGBIAN‘s testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed.

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Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[26] A judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties[27] and it is not valid and binding on a party who did not sign the same.[28] Since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot legally invoke the same.

AGAN JR. V. PIATCO MAY 5, 2003 The petitioners (a mix of employees and service providers of NAIA Terminal I and II), which stand to lose their livelihood with the implementation of 1997 Concession Agreement, Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and Supplements, seeks to prohibit PIATCO, MIAA and DOTC in the implementation of said agreements. FACTS: 1) 1989 August, DOTC engaged Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA to determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. 2) ADP submits its Draft Final Report to the DOTC on December 1989. 3) 1994 October 5, Asia‘s Emerging Dragons Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA Terminal III under a BOT agreement.

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4) 1996 February 13, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project. 5) 1996 July 23, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee invited all bidders to a pre-bid conference on Jul 29. Second pre-bid confe was held on August 29. 6) 1996 September 20, the Paircargo Consortium (composed of People‘s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc., Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc., and Security Bank Corp.) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. 7) 1996 October 2, PBAC notified AEDC that Paircargo, had pre-qualified. 8) 1997 February 27, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into PIATCO. 9) 1997 April 1, DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDAICC. 10) 1997 July 9, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO. July 12, the Government and PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement. 11) 1998 November 26, the Government and PIATCO signed ARCA. 12) Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA dated 27 Aug 1999, 4 Sept 2000, and 22 June 2001. 13) 2002 Sept 17, the workers of the international airline service providers filed a petition for Prohibition. Other petitioners followed filing. 14) 2003 March 6, PIATCO informed the Court that PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Court of Arbitration pursuant to Sec 10.02 of the ARCA.

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ISSUE :WON the Concession Agreement is unconstitutional? HELD: YES Sec. 5.10 of the 1997 Concession Agreement violates Article XII, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitutional provision allows for temporary takeover of public facilities in times of national emergency. Since the takeover is temporary and extends only to the operation of the business and not the ownership, government is not required to compensate the owner. Neither can the owner claim just compensation for the use of the business and its properties because the takeover is in exercise of the State‘s police power and not of its power of eminent domain. The 1997 Concession Agreement, on the other hand, says that in the event of a takeover, ―Concessionaire shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover…‖ ―PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government and obligate the government pay reasonable cost for the use of Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its exercise must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Also, The 1987 Constitution strictly regulates monopolies. Art XII, Sec. 19 says: The State shall

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regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. The 1997 Concession Agreement gave PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the island of Luzon, with the exception of already existing terminals such as those in the Subic Bay Freeport, Clark Special Economic Zone, and in Laoag City. This privilege, however, is subject to reasonable regulation and supervision and should not violate the rights of third parties. There are service providers at the NAIA I with existing contracts with the MIAA valid until 2010; since the 1997 Concession Agreement says PIATCO is not bound to honor existing contracts with MIAA, transferring operations from NAIA I to NAIA III would unduly prejudice them. ―PIATCO cannot, by law and certainly not by contract, render a valid and binding contract nugatory. PIATCO, by the mere expedient claiming an exclusive right to operate, cannot require the Government to break its contractual obligations to the service providers.‖

G.R. NO. 146587, JULY 2, 2002 REPUBLIC V. CA RP instituted expropriation proceedings to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. It was afterwards utilized by the Bulacan State University. Luis Santos, the respondent, previously owned part of the expropriated area. A Complaint was filed due to the fact that a sum of 1m remained unpaid by the government.

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ISSUE: (1) WON the property was taken under eminent domain? YES (2) WON the previous owner can recover the property? NO (3) WON interest should be paid by the Republic along with the just compensation? YES HELD: (1) The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, , all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect

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merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: (1) the taking must be for public use, (2) just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining ―public use,‖ two approaches are utilized – (1) public employment or the actual use by the public, and (2) public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. In this case, the expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out

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that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use. (2)as ruled in Valdehueza v Republic, ―plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value‖ In this case, petitioner has occupied, utilized an exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in remproceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. (3) The constitutional limitation of ―just compensation‖ is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who

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receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. In this case, the lower court was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and ―took‖ the property.

G.R. NO. 112526, OCTOBER 12, 2001 STA ROSA REALTY V CA FACTS: Sta Rosa Realty was the registered owner of two parcels of land that according to petitioner, were watersheds which respondents usurped its rights. These respondents sought an easement of right of way over the area and petitioned DAR for compulsory acquisition, which Sta Rosa objected to since the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. DARAB however ruled in favour of the acquiisiton and ordered payment to Sta Rosa.

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ISSUE: WON the property is covered by CARP despite fact that part of it is a watershed area? HELD: remanded to DARAB RA 6657 provides for two modes of acquisition: (1) compulsory (2) voluntary. In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation

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(2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. POLICE POWER: To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. EMINENT DOMAIN: But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR. Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to the proper classification of the land. While The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, due to proof showing that the the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage

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of CARP because of its very high slopes, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

G.R. NO. 139083, AUGUST 30, 2001 PARIS V ALFECHE FACTS: Florencia Paris is the registered owner of a parcel of land tenanted by respondents who are recipients of Emancipation Patents. Paris argues that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law. She argues that her homesteads are exempt from land reform. In support of her position, she cites the cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants. ISSUES: (1) WON Paris‘ lands are exempt from land reform? NO (2)WON Paris‘ is entitled to just compensation? YES HELD: (1) PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:

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"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it." Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who had been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties. However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote: ". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree." Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm

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(2) Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted, their value had not even been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.

G.R. NO. 155746, OCTOBER 13, 2004 LAGCAO V LABRA FACTS: The province of Cebu donated to the city of Cebu parcels of land which the petitioners purchased on instalment basis. However, problems as to their ownership ensued. First, the Province of Cebu tried to reacquire the land from which the petitioners were able to get a favourable decision from the court. Second, the lot they purchased had squatters which they instituted ejectment proceedings against but during a request of deferment of the demolition by the City to find another location for the squatters, the Sagguninang Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution that identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Thus the present petition by the petitioners alleging that the expropriation of the property is unconstitutional? ISSUE: WON expropriation?

the

property

may

be

subject

to

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HELD: NO While housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is (1) genuine necessity and (2) that necessity must be of public character. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sec 9 and 10 provide for (1) order in acquisition of land (2) priority in modes of acquisition. In this case, the order was not followed. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. The City of Cebu failed to establish that (1) no other land is appropriate for their housing projects and (2) exhausted all other modes of acquisition and made a valid and definite offer. The petition is therefore granted in favour of petitioners to reacquire their land.

G.R. NO. 137152, JANUARY 29, 2001 CITY OF MANDALUYONG V FRANCISCO

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FACTS: The City of Mandaluyong filed expropriation proceedings against defendants for urban land reform purposes. The respondents argued that they had no right to expropriate due to the ff: (1) Not for a public purpose (2) Lots are too small and petitioner already has a lot of other lots for socialized housing (3) the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. The TC ruled in the favour of respondents, stating that they were ―small property owners‖ thus exempt from expropriation. This was affirmed by CA thus the present petition. ISSUE: WON the lands may be expropriated? HELD: NO Due to the passage of the Urban Det and Housing Act, all city and municipal govts were (1) mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities (2) identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, (3) acquire the lands (4) dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or

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abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. They also may be acquired through the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. In this case, the SC found that the respondents fell under ―small property owners‖ which is define: ―those whose only real property consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas." The partition of the property six months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts. Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279 TAN V. DEL ROSARIO (237 SCRA 324) FACTS: Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income

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Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional provision: Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who practice his profession and not to those who are engaged to single proprietorship. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the aforestated provision of the constitution HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all things of equal conditions and of same class. It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to the existence of substantial difference between one who practice his profession alone and one who is engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496 was an independent law. But since it is attached to a

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law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation of equal protection clause.

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: hether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. HELD: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. OSMENA V. ORBOS (220 SCRA 703) FACTS: On October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). It was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.

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Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956, promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred due to the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the under recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Further, that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the powers granted to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. NO. HELD: The OPSF was established precisely to protect local consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the

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economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil companies are allowed to recover those portions of their costs which they would not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices existing at any given time. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.: ―The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.‖ Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.

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PUNSALAN V. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it. ISSUE: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation. HELD: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is

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imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.

LLADOC V. CIR FACTS: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid. HELD: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished

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from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

GEROCHE V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACTS: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR‘s projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax. HELD: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State‘s police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and

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perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the country‘s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State‘s police objectives If generation of revenue is the primary purpose regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact revenue is incidentally raised does not make imposition a tax.

and tax; that the

The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION V. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: The petitioner-appellant, an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659, promulgated by the Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor. The main contention of the appellant in its appeal and the principal ground of its petition for declaratory judgment is that the City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the operation

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of

massage

clinics

within

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its

jurisdiction

HELD: If we can ascertain the intention of the Manila Municipal Board in promulgating the Ordinance in question, much of the objection of appellant to its legality may be solved. It would appear to us that the purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much less to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in the Philippines. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. This intention can readily be understood by the building requirements in Section 3 of the Ordinance, requiring that there be separate rooms for male and female customers; that instead of said rooms being separated by permanent partitions and swinging doors, there should only be sliding curtains between them; that there should be "no private rooms or separated compartments, except those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing room, office or kitchen"; that every massage clinic should be provided with only one entrance and shall have no direct or indirect communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building; and that no operator, massagists, attendant or helper will be allowed "to use or allow the use of a massage clinic as a place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any immoral or incident act", and in fixing the operating hours of such clinic between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m.

As regards the permit fee of P100.00, it will be seen that said fee is made payable not by the masseur or massagist, but by the operator of a massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and rather unreasonable. However, much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of said fee without considering it as a tax for revenue purposes: The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large without necessarily being a tax Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals, and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS V. CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) paid the City of Manila the fixed license fees prescribed by Ordinance 3358 for the years 1954

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to 1957. In 1954, City Ordinance 3634 and 3816 were passed; where the term ―general merchandise‖ found therein included all articles in Sections 123 to 148 of the Tax Code (thus, also liquor under Sedctions 133 to 135). The Tabacalera paid its wholesaler‘s and retailer‘s taxes. In 1954, the City Treasurer addressed a letter to an accounting firm, expressing the view that liquor dealers paying the annual wholesale and retail fixed tax under Ordinance 3358 are not subject to the wholesale aand retail deaklers‘ taxes prescribed by City Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816. The Tabacalera, upon learning of said stopped including quarterly sworn declaratons required by the latter ordinances, and in 1957, demanded refunde of the alleged overpayment. The claim was disallowed. ISSUE: Whether there is a distinction between Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634, 3301 and 3816, to prevent refund to the company. HELD: Generally, the term ―tax‖ applies to all kinds of exactions which become public funds. Legally, however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal license fees for the privilege to engage in the business of selling liquor or alcohol beverages; considering that the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially) harmful to public health and morals, and must be subject to supervision or regulation by the State and by cities and municipalities authorized to act in the premises. On the

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other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816 imposed taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale or retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation, or for selling the same article, without it being in violation of the rule against double taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in its letter is of no consequence as the government is not bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its officers, specially on matters of law. The company, thus, is not entitled to refund

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA‘s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing

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real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaque‘s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of ―government-owned andcontrolled corporations‖ upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA‘s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor. ISSUE: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. HELD: 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

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MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises ―all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.‖ 2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

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No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like ―roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,‖ are owned by the State. The term ―ports‖ includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a ―port‖ constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one ―intended for public use.‖ The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user‘s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

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The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax. c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA‘s case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance. d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely

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toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAA‘s assets adverse to the Republic. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V GUINGONA GR NO. 134577 (18 NOVEMBER 1998) (POLITICAL QUESTION) Petitioners herein filed a petition for quo warranto calling for the Court to annul the election of Senator Juan Flavier as the Senate Minority Floor Leader and declaring Senator Francisco Tatad as the rightful holder of that position.

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The Eleventh Congress was composed of 10 senators from LAMP, 7 senators from Lakas-NUCDUMDP, 2 independents, and 1 each from LP, Aksyon Demokrasya, PRP, and Gabay Bayan. During its first regular session, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party, numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCDUMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader. It is the petitioners' position that when the Constitution says that the Senate President shall be elected by ―a majority‖ of its members, then those who did not vote for the Senate President would constitute the minority. Thus, by recognizing the Lakas-NUCDUMDP senators as the minority block, the Constitution has been violated. ISSUE: (1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case; (2) WON there has been a violation of Section 16(1), Article 16 of the Constitution.

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HELD: The Court took cognizance of the case despite protestations from the respondents of a political question. Jurisdiction being determined by the allegations in the pleading or petition, the Court said that the allegation of petitioners of a violation of the Constitution made for a case over which it had a prima facie jurisdiction. The petition calls for an interpretation or application of the Constitution and whether the Senate President had correctly construed the meaning of the words ―minority‖ and ―majority‖ which, under the Court's expanded duty under Article VIII, falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. The Court then observed that the Constitution did not provide for the manner of selecting other officers of Congress apart from the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. All that the Charter says is that '[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.' Thus, the method of selecting such officers must be prescribed and is a prerogative of the houses of Congress themselves. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders and neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices nor prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold.

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Thus, while adherence to the Constitution is a proper question for the Court, this case does not actually present a question which the Court can pass upon. Nonetheless, the Court, calling upon its duty ―to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion,‖ declared that the Senate President did not abuse his discretion in recognizing the LakasNUCD-UMDP senators as the minority block in view of the fact that it is one of the minority groups in the Senate. PETITION DISMISSED. (Also see: Bagatsing v Committee on Privatization, Sanidad v COMELEC 73 SCRA 333, and Romulo v Yniquez 141 SCRA 263)

JAWORKSI V PAGCOR GR NO. 144463 (14 JANUARY 2004) (DELEGATION OF POWERS) Respondent PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 and was granted a franchise ―To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance.‖ On 31 March 1998, the PAGCOR entered into an agreement with its corespondent SAGE Corporation whereby it granted the latter authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR‘s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors.

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Petitioner sought the nullification of the contract claiming among other that PAGCOR had no power to grant SAGE the authority to operate gambling activities via the internet. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. In the case at bar, the agreement entered into by PAGCOR and SAGE, in essence, gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR‘s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditions. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator‘s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

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(See also: Lim v Pacquing 240 SCRA 649)

GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219, GR NO. 157584 (SAME; PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION) On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Petitioner Garcian, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

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HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." (See also: Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v CA GR No. 100481, 22 January 1997 where the Legislature delegated the power to fix rates to the President who may then exercise such power directly without first withdrawing the earlier delegation made to the Philippine Ports Authority.)

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RODRIGUEZ V GELLA 92 PHIL 603, GR NO. L-6266 (SAME; EMERGENCY POWERS DELEGATED TO PRESIDENT)

THE

On 16 December 1941, Congress, pursuant to Section 26, Article VI of the then Constitution, passed CA 671, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Subsequently, Congress filed HB 727 intending repeal CA 671 but which the President vetoed on the ground that war was still subsisting as a fact due to the Korean War. Subsequently still, the President issued EO 545 and 546 appropriation funds for various purposes. Petitioners seek to invalidate the issuances. ISSUE: WON the EO‘s are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO‘s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is

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not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. (See also David v Macapagal-Arroyo which distinguishes the power of the President to declare a ―state of emergency‖ under Sec 18, Art VII and the exercise of emergency powers under Section 17, Art XII)

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PEOPLE V VERA 65 PHIL 56, GR NO. L-45685 (SAME; DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE; DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because, among other things, Act No. 4221, the Probation Law, is an undue delegation of legislative power in that it subjects the effectivity of the measure to the absolute discretion of the provincial boards in Section 11 thereof: ―This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.‖ ISSUE: WON there is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the

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doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. (Note: The decision said that Legislatures may validly leave the determination of the applicability of measures to the people [so-called option laws] but that such laws can only be of local application. The effectivity of laws of general application cannot without running afoul of nondelegation and equal protection.) (See also: Osmena v Orbos, Tablarin v Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730, Eastern Shipping v POEA 166 SCRA 533, and, in contrapposto, Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v Garcia)

CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES V POEA 243 SCRA 666, GR. NO. 114714 (SAME; DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES) Respondent POEA issued Board Resolution 1 in January 1998, mandating the increase compensation

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and benefits the provided for in POEA's Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. Thus, the contract now provides that:  in case of death, the employer should pay the beneficiaries in the amount of $50,000 and additional $7000 to each child under 21 but not more than 4 children;  if done within war or warlike area, it should be doubled. Petitioners filed an action seeking to nullify the resolution contending that the POEA does not have the power and authority fix rates for compensation and benefits as the same is a function of the Legislative. HELD: The Court found the issuance of Board Resolution 1 valid. While the making of laws is a nondelegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, the latter may nonetheless validly delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to administrative agencies in implementing a given legislation and effectuate its policies. This is because the legislature may sometimes find it impractical, if not impossible, to anticipate all the situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purpose of the law and that the regulation is not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. This is power of subordinate legislation. (Note: It goes without saying that for there to be a valid delegation of the rule-making power, the law effecting such a delegation must be complete in itself and must

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provide for sufficient standards that the administrative agency can follow.)

U.S. V ANG TANG HO 43 PHIL 1, GR NO. L-17122 (SAME; SAME; TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION; COMPLETENESS TEST) On 30 July 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 authorizing the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of rice, palay, and corn. Pursuant to this Act, on 1 August 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Subsequently, respondent Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos, a price much higher than that prescribed by the EO. He was thus charged and found guilty of violating EO 53. Respondent now challenges the validity of the issuance. HELD: The Court found in favor of respondent. Act No. 2868 is an invalid delegation of legislative power because it is not a complete issuance in and of itself. The completeness of a measure can be determined if, upon leaving the hands of the Legislature, nothing is left for the Executive and its administrative agencies but to enforce the policy enunciated therein. In the case at bar, it will be observed that what the respondent violated is EO 53 and not Act 2868. As a matter of fact, the Act does not penalize the sale of rice, palay, or corn at any price. It is only the EO which provided for that. Thus, Act

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2868 was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature as it did not state any clear cut policy which the Executive was then to enforce. It left the determination of the policy with the Executive. (Note: In Calalang v Williams, the Court held that something as general as ―public interest‖ or ―public welfare‖ was sufficient as a policy statement.)

YNOT V IAC 148 SCRA 659, GR NO. L-74457 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST) Then President Marcos issued EO 626-A, making the interprovincial transport of carabaos and carabeef as well as the slaughtering of caraboas in a manner not complying with EO 626 illegal. Petitioner Ynot was apprehended transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and pursuant to EO 626-A, the animals were summarily confiscated. Petitioner challenges the validity of EO 626-A insofar as it imposes a penalty without according the ownder the right to be heard. Furthermore, petitioner challenges the exercise by Persident Marcos of legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. HELD: The Court struck down the measure because it, among others, was an undue delegation of legislative power. The Court observed that the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission or, as the case may be, the Director of Animal Industrey were given authority to dispose of the confiscated animals/meat products by distributing them to charitable and similar

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institutions ‖as they may see fit.‖ The Court found this to be a ―roving commission‖ which provided the Executive officers so empowered with a wide and sweeping authority, unrestrained by the usual standard and reasonable guidelines or limitations to be observed in executing their mandate. Such authority, the Court said, is too laden with danger of partiality, abuse, and corruption. The Court said that the Executive's authority had to be ―canalized‖ within banks to keep it from overflowing. (See also: de la Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294, Demetria v Alba 148 SCRA 208, Lozano v Martinez 146 SCRA 323)

CHIONGBIAN V ORBOS 245 SCRA 253, GR NO. 96754 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME) Section 13 of RA 6734 authorized the President to merge existing administrative regions. Thus, President Aquino issued EO 429, ―Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.‖ Petitioners seek the nullification of the subject EO contending that the provision allowing the President to merge existing administrative regions did not provide for a sufficient standard by which the President may exercise such power. Hence, the provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that while RA 6734 does not explicitly provide for the standard by which the President may exercise the power to reorganize, such standard may nonetheless be

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abstracted from other statutes which have been enacted on the same subject. For example, in RA 5435, the President was given the power to reorganize the Executive Department ―to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency in government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.‖ The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law. The choice of President is logical because the division intended to facilitate the administration of executive departments and local governments. It has been traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the President the power to merge existing regions, Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions

GEROCHI V DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY GR NO. 159796, 17 JULY 2007 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME) Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power CorporationStrategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent ERC a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for ―Missionary Electrification.‖ Subsequently, NPC filed another petition praying for the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental Charge be approved for

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withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund manged by the PSALM. The ERC approved the petitions, authorizing that collection of the same from the end-users on a monthly basis and, eventually, the withdrawal of up to P70M from the STF. On the basis of the same, the Panay Electric Company, Inc. charged petitioner and all other end-users with the Universal charge which was reflected in their monthly electric bills. Petitioners now come before the Court to assail the Universal Charge provided for in the EPIRA to be implemented through the IRR in that the charge is in the nature of a tax and the power of taxation is a strictly legislative function. Thus, delegating the same to and administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional. HELD: All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.

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Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity endusers, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

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invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; (2) Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that ―all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control‖ invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; (3) And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‘s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

C. THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE KIM CHAN V VALDEZ TAN KEH 75 PHIL 113, GR NO. L-5 (DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION) Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had

HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,

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for ―the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.‖ And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase ―processes of any other government‖ and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. If, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur‘s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: ―A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.‖ xxx xxx xxx Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase ―processes of any other governments.‖ xxx xxx xxx Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in

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force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V DUQUE GR NO. 173034, 9 OCTOBER 2007 (SAME; WHAT CONSTITUTES “GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW”) PHAP filed this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code) claiming that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the scope of the Milk Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the International Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severel resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR. Relevant ISSUE: WON the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law

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of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Constitution, international law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties). Admittedly, the ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS. On the other hand, the Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be

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classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of international law.

IN RE: GARCIA 2 SCRA 984 (15 AUGUST 1961) (SAME; IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW SHOULD BE UPHELD) Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of ―Bachillerato Superior‖ in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the ―Insitututo de Cervantes‖ for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as ―Licenciado en derecho‖. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. ISSUE: WON a treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar HELD: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the

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Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

of securing a certification from the Nat‘l Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

GONZALES V HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230, GR NO. L-21897 (SAME; SAME) Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

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As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in ―All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. (See also: Ichong v Hernandez 101 Phil 115)

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V LANTION GR NO. 139465, 18 JANUARY 2000 (SAME; SAME) On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069, ―Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America,‖ the

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department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. ISSUE: (1) WON private respondent can be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto; (2) WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to

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a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process. The rule of pacta suntservanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite (See also: Philip Morris, Inc v CA)

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E. DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND THE STATE CHAVEZ V ROMULO GR NO. 157036 (9 JUNE 2004) (DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND STATE; RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS) Pursuant to PGMA‘s speech stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief Ebdane issued the ―Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.‖ It revoked all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence(PTCFOR), subject to renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines. ISSUES: (1) WON the revocation of the PTCFOR's pursuant to the Guidelines is a violation of the people‘s right to property; (2) WON the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power HELD: The Court ruled against petitioner. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the

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issuance of the Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

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VI.

BILL

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OF

RIGHTS

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

PBMEO, a legitimate labor union, decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third shifts. PBM informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. It also warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration. Hence, PBM with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'" The Court of Industrial

v.

Relations found PBMEO‘s officers guilty of unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CIR. It ruled that the demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. It also ruled that while the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights 229 SCRA 117 (1994)

Simon, Jr. (in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City) sent a "Demolition Notice" to respondents (officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Inc) in which they were given a grace-period of three (3) days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North

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EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park." Afterwards, private respondents filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. Acting on the complaint, the CHR directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." The CHR denied the motion to dismiss. The Court ruled that the extent of CHR's investigative power is limited to ―all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring — "(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also

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refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action." Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. Republic v. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10 (2003)

The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt

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practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The primary issue for resolution herein is whether PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The other issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the case before the presentation of evidence and the legality of the search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG

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had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized them. Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

The City of Manila enacted an ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This ordinance was

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enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process. The City answered that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power. The trial court ruled that the ordinance as unconstitutional. In reversing the lower court‘s decision, the Supreme Court held that the mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and

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thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 124 (1919)

Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) filed an action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stock- holders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) argues that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use. The issue is whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the

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registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to due process is universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. However, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. Hence, while Smith, Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or

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casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondents challenged the constitutionality of said ordinance on the ground that is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The trial court held the ordinance as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court‘s decision and ruled that the ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

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Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1926)

Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness free from dismemberment and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable. Facts : Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do. Issue: Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the

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state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660 (1919)

Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. It includes the right to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally

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deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,‖ was challenged. Issue: Whether or not the said law is constitutional. Held: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. The reasons for the section included (1) it was an attempt for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General added the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Among other things, it was held that the term "nonChristian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its

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Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."

Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)

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Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things it owns; it includes the right to secure, use, and dispose of them. Facts: US citizens wanted to lease their agricultural land to Nakatsuka, a Japanese farmer. A Washington statute disqualified aliens who had not in good faith declared intention to become citizens of the United States from taking or holding interests in land in the State for farming or other purposes. It provided that upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he failed to disclose the nature and extent of his interest. Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings, as he threatened to prosecute them. Complainants alleged that the restriction violated the federal and state constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan. Issue: Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: No. Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into

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two classes -- those who may and those who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is forbidden, to own and as defined. The court disagreed with appellants and ruled that the case involved the privilege of owning or controlling agricultural land within the State. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance, and affect the safety and power of the State itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. Nuñez v Averia GR No L-38415 (1974)

Public office is not property but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer‘s right to office. Facts: Nuñez contested the election results for the Mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud, irregularities, and corrupt practices. The original protestee was Edgardo Morales who was ambushed and killed, hence succeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon. Nuñez‘s protest was denied on the ground that it was moot and academic, citing the Presidents General Order 3&4 to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees. Issue: Were the dismissal orders valid?

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Held: The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the similar cases of Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t must be emphasized that the `right' of the private respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite." The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote

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buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." Bince v COMELEC GR No 111624-25 (1995)

The court has recognized while public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right. Facts:  The elections for the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan, 6th District was composed of 10 municipalities.  Private Respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the Certificates of Canvass for San Quintin, on the ground that it contained false statements.  The Provincial Board of Canvassers ruled against Micu. Micu appealed to the COMELEC which credited Micu with 1,535 votes and Bince with 1,055 votes from San Quintin.  Micu and the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed petition for correction of votes. Bince ultimately had 27,370 votes and Micu had 27,369 votes. Bince was not proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from COMELEC and filed a formal motion for such authority.  COMELEC promulgated an order directing the PBC to continue with the canvass and proclaim the winning candidates.

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 The PBC acted on the petitions for correction, allowing such.  Bince appealed arguing the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  MICU filed an urgent motion for the PBC to reconvene and proceed with canvass. Bince filed a petition for preliminary injunction and alternative prayer for proclamation as winner.  The PBC Chairman filed a petition with COMELEC seeking a definite ruling as to who should be proclaimed, as there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, Micu will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.  Bince was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC ruled in his favor and annulled the proclamation of Bince.  Bince filed for certiorari, arguing the COMELEC resolution was promulgated without prior notice and hearing. The court ruled [relevant to syllabus] Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public

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office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate. We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.  Micu filed a motion to hear the pending incidents left in court. Both parties filed their respective position papers. The COMELEC ruled that Bince was to be proclaimed winner.  Micu filed an MR which was granted.

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Issue: Who was entitled to the seat? Held: Micu. In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more. In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes. Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation. As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice. Crespo v Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed

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against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the responden t Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, highhanded, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary principles of due process.

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On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. Issue: Was petitioner denied due process? Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held: It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in t he absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

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In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception of institutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process. The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last local elections held on18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office. Republic v Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation GR No 149927 (2004)

A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process

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and teh non-impairment clauses of the Constitution it can be revoked by the State in the public interest. Facts: Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-naBato. When they discovered deposits in Mount Mabio, they applied for and were granted such license, but it was later cancelled. The Trial Court opined that it was a property right protected under due process, which required notice and hearing. The cancellation therefore was held to be unjust. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and cited the non-impairment of obligations and contracts. Issue: Did the cancellation of license violate due process for being without due notice and hearing? The license can be revoked or rescinded by executive action because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause. The license itself provides such condition. It can be validly revoked by the state in an exercise of police power in accordance with the Regalian doctrine. It also was not a bill of attainder, a legislative act inflicting punishment without judicial trial. The proclamation only declared the nullity of a license, not guilt or punishment. Even if it was an executive act by President Aquino, she was validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.

C. Jian 93 3 cases (Pedro to 94- 4 cases (Yu Eng Cong to Javier)

Kwong

Sin)

SATURNINA GALMAN, et al, petitioners vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents (1986) TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

Facts: - On August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino was coldbloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." - The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. Marcos instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it." - Due to the public outrage that followed, Marcos was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the assassination. The Board submitted their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. The minority report, submitted first, was received congenially and cordially by Marcos who treated

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the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan. In contrast, when the majority report was submitted Marcos coldly received the authors and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done." Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy, while the minority report

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would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending, and one General Custodio as the crime could not have been planned without his intervention. Galman‘s widow, et al filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." They pray that the SC retrain the Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. Although the SC initially granted a TRO, it later withdrew the same. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. It in

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effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In their second motion for reconsideration, they included the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," where he revealed that Marcos ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases (People v Custodio) against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, The SC appointed a 3-member commission to hear and receive evidence of the charges of collusion and other relevant matters, andsubmit their findings to the Court. The Commission, upon reviewing the evidence found that the proceedings in the Aquino-Galman case had been vitiated by lack of due process and recommended that the prayer for declaration of mistrial in people v Custodio be granted.

Issues: 1. W/N the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan should be declared a mistrial. 2. W/N a retrial would constitute double jeopardy.

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Held: First Issue – YES, IT SHOULD BE The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of aright or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and are trial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the century -and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio .Second Issue – NO, IT DOES NOT. Ratio Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or

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acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Reasoning - Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanod bayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total

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absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure the irrecantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the" dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were no tmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian

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President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the government becomes the law breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to all. LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FRANCISCO, J.:

Facts: - Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president‘s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which

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Tabuena replied, ―Yes, sir, I will do it.‖ This order was followed by a Presidential memorandum repeating said order. - Tabuena, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds through a manager‘s check for said amount payable to Tabuena, which was encashed and delivered to Marcos‘ personal secretary. No receipt was issued. - The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, ―out of the ordinary‖ and ―not based on the normal procedure‖. Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented. It was even affirmed that were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA. - Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan violated Tabuena‘s rights when it propounded several questions to witnesses. Held: Yes IT DID While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes

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only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10) questions Questions from the court after Tabuena‘s cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67), more than five times Prosecutor Viernes‘ questions on crossexamination (14), and more than double the total of direct examination and cross-examination questions which is thirty-one. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.i[ This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides But not only should his examination be limited to asking ―clarificatory‖ questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter‘s questions in length. The ―cold neutrality of an impartial judge‖ requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta

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when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, respondents. PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: - Imelda Marcos, was Minister of Human Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA). Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). - Marcos, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement by virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI a parcel of land. - Marcos, as Chairman of PGHFI then signed a Sublease Agreement with Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC). - Marcos was subsequently charged for entering into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. - The Sandiganbayan convicted Marcos of the charge after it found that the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement was unfair and

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unreasonably low in contrast to the rental rate in the Sub-lease Agreement with the TNCC. It appeared, however, that during the deliberation period the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit the petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Unlike Garchitorena and Balajadia, Atienza was in favor of exonerating Marcos. As there was no unanimity of votes, Presiding Justice Garchitorena formed a Special Division of five (5) justices composed of himself, Balajadia, Atienza, Amores, and del Rosario. It was found that Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario lunched together in a Quezon City restaurant where they discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices, Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit Marcos in some cases, and convict her in others. After the meeting, Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Issues: W/N Sandiganbayan violated Marcos‘ right to due process. Held: ABSOLUTELY.

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First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it. Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion of the three justices came to light only when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her conviction. Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases. Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza and Amores were members of the Special Division but were not present when petitioner's cases were discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. In effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They were denied their right to vote for the conviction or acquittal of petitioner. These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be tried by a collegial court. Pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether

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her cases are before a regular division of three (3) justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. It is indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the members of the division. Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative and could be changed. It is only after all the justices have been heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in importance for experience shows that an opinion that starts as a minority opinion could become the majority opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members. In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws. That minority opinion

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could sway the opinion of this Court towards the acquittal of petitioner. Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our courts. More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused. Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

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GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: - George I. Rivera, the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"), was charged by the LBP President with dishonesty and violation of Anti-Graft laws on the basis of affidavits by Lao and Perez. - Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a 10% commission (which he received). He also received from Lao, a Wynner investor, P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. - Rivera was further charged with having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC Memo Circ. 1025 as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month. - After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of CSC Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3,

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paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The penalty imposed was forced resignation without benefits. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which reduced the penalty to suspension for 1 year. On appeal by Rivera and LBP to the CSC, the CSC sustained the decision of the LBP. Rivera claims he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.

Issues: W/N Rivera was denied due process. Held: YES, HE WAS. In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose

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decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision. The case should be remanded to the CSC for resolution without the participation of Commissioner Gaminde. MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.

Facts: - Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic Representative Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991

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he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of Japan Air Lines (JAL) for Flight 742. Mrs. Lolita Kondo, a passenger of Flight 742 filed a complaint alleging that Singson required her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took place where Singson was asked by the security officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession. However, when the lower panel of the check-in counter he was manning was searched, $265 was found. Singson was administratively charged and investigated by a committee formed by PAL, which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. PAL dismissed Singson. Singson then lodged a complaint, which was heard by the Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who found PAL‘s evidence in terminating Singson‘s employment insufficient. Thus, he ordered Singson‘s reinstatement. On appeal to the NLRC (Raul Aquino was by this time the presiding commissioner), the judgment was reversed. Singson‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied (this time, Aquino had no part). Singson assails the Resolution of the NLRC on account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his own decision as labor arbiter

Issue: W/N Singson was denied due process.

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Held: YES, HE WAS In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations , the Court laid down the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. In addition, administrative due process includes: (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;

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(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rules of Procedure of NLRC, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. His right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. NLRC decision set aside and remanded.

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN TAGAY” and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO accused,

Facts: - During a barangay fiesta, witnesses heard several gunshots. Shortly thereafter, they saw Julio Herida, and Edmund and Rene Tracilla stabbing and hacking Herlito Delara, who eventually died. - Herida and Jamila denied any participation in the killing and claimed that it was Delara who attempted to kill Herida when he started firing his revolver at him, allegedly because of a misunderstanding arising from carpentry job on Delida‘s house that Herida failed to do. The trial court acquitted Jamila but found Herida guilty of murder. - Among Herida‘s assigned errors is that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him. He points out that over seventy percent (70%) of the testimonies of the prosecution‘s material witnesses were elicited by the judge, while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the judge himself. He submits that under these circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial was violated. Issue: W/N Herida‘s right to a fair and impartial trial was violated by alleged bias on the part of the judge.

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Held: NO The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial court did intensively question the witnesses. For instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution eyewitness, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from the judge. However, we note that the judge also intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When appellant took the stand, 63 questions were added, with 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge. The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however, was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer, the trial court had to ask many questions to clarify important matters. The judge‘s behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and decide the results. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel. Disposition: Proclamation 420 is valid, except for the tax exemption.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARIETO ADORA, accused-appellant. PANGANIBAN, J.:

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plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Facts: - Marieto Adora was charged with the alleged rape of Cecilia Cotorno, his brother-in-law‘s daughter who had been under his care and custody in Rapu-Rapu, Albay since the latter was a child. - Cecilia was raped by Adora on 4 occasions, and always under the threat that Cecilia or her aunt would be beheaded. Cecilia only broke her silence about the rapes when it was discovered that she was pregnant. Adora claims that the interventions of the trial court showed that the judge had sided with the prosecution; thus, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. He argues that: 1. the trial judge directed the prosecutor as to who should be called in as witnesses; 2. he disallowed as misleading a question propounded by the defense counsel, without waiting for an objection from the prosecution; 3. the questions propounded by the court on witnesses were not clarificatory, but were in the nature of a direct examination. Issue: W/N such acts by the judge showed bias on his part. Held: NO

―Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in directing questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the truth. . In such an effort, a judge may examine or crossexamine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party This is not only the right but also the duty of a trial judge. Under our system of legal procedure where he is judge of both the law and the facts, it is often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. ―We do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the permissible limits of what questions he could propound to a witness. The trial judge sought to elicit information on whether appellant used sufficient ―intimidation‖ on the victim. He wanted only to elucidate how the witness appeared to the court as she was testifying on the stand. That the answers of the witness formed part of the decision is not a proof of prejudgment or bias towards the prosecution. ―We believe he merely performed his function to ferret out the truth so his decision would be cogent and based on facts. Thus, we hold that the scales of justice had remained equal throughout the trial and appellant had been given a fair hearing characterized by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.‖

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 People v. Castillo (1998)

Facts: Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside the pub while talking w/ his co-worker. Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the pub and informed him that he‘ll be on his way home. However, when he was about an arm‘s length from Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand. Eulogio placed a chair between the two to stop Castillo from further attacking Tony. Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of Tony‘s death was the stab wound on his chest. Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony by the compound of Iglesia ni Cristo. TC did not appreciate Castillo‘s defense of alibi and held that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, the accused having surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon. And although treachery was present,

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it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength. Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him, for propounding questions that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. He alleges that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral character, which could not be objected to by defense counsel, because they have been ventilited by the judge himself. HELD: Whether the judge was impartial. YES The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge‘s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge‘s queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions

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propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. There was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the ‗cold neutrality of an impartial judge‘ implicit in the guarantee of due process. That the trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. People v. Larranaga (2003)

Facts: Appellants assailed before the Supreme Court the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed against the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong and sentencing each of them to the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. Among other things, the appellants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Held: The Court reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason why it should deviate from the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the trial court. There was a clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly

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dragged the victims into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, held them captive against their will, and raped them. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to her death, while Jacqueline has remained missing until now. Discharged state witness Davidson Valiente Rusia positively identified the appellants as the malefactors. His detailed narration of the circumstances leading to the horrible death and disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by, the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated as to its material points by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim's family. As the Court reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, it could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify, against the appellants. In the same vein, it was improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives. Thus, as between the appellants' mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court was convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. Anent appellants' alibi, a thorough examination of the evidence for the defense showed that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of time and place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the

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Chiong sisters were abducted. In view of the foregoing, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with modifications as to the penalty imposed and the award of damages. Considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants was, according to the Court, in order.

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no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel.

CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2001)

Topical: Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and made comments when the defense witnesses were testifying. Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his questions or comments. Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel were about to present additional witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites of alibi, thus: . . . Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be

FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against Paitim for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service. Petitioners

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maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners‘ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty asc harged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is

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mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not,therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.

Tejano v. Ombudsman (2005)

Facts: A report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, discovered an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G). It implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The resolution by the Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was affirmed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Office of the

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Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special Prosecutor and Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor. A reinvestigation was granted. The Special recommended the dismissal of the case, concurred by the Deputy Special Prosecutor. On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note ―assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.‖ Petitioner attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether Desierto acted with grave abuse of discretion Ratio: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. The officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. InZambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal of the Secretary‘s own previous decision, which he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. The SC has equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor

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Relations Commission, because one of its members, Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided on as a former labor arbiter. Likewise, the SC struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on appeal. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being

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human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus: Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as reality. The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is given ample power to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty. The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desierto‘s disapproval of the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.

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21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desierto‘s actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC: . . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner‘s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

Samartino v. Raon (2002)

Facts: Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite. On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment. They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo,

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she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner‘s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents‘ motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. Issue: Whether the summons were properly served to Sarmartino Held: No. n actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be

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effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant‘s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant‘s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of. The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. In the case at bar, the sheriff‘s Return of Summons simply states: This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto attached. Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were

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made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner‘s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner‘s residence. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first

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be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.

Delos Santos v. NLRC (2001)

Facts: On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos (janitor) was illegally dismissed for alleged frustrated qualified theft when he was moving to the adjacent lot of the company upon instruction of a certain Narciso. Narciso Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The general manager, apparently appeased by Honrado‘s apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt of his letter of apology and exculpated him of any wrongdoing. However, the company through its counsel filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for frustrated qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack of evidence. On 23 August 1993, upon request of TopFlite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos, CAMARA STEEL terminated his services. Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March 1994 rendered a decision ordering respondent CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos CAMARA STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and, accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum and other pleadings. Respondent CAMARA STEEL

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empathically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded as respondent in NLRC-NCR Cases, subject of the present appeal, was never summoned for which reason it was deprived of procedural due process, therefore the case should be remanded. Issue:Whether jurisdiction over Top-Flit was acquired. Yes. Held: CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress upon the SC that Top-flite, being a necessary party, should have been summoned and the failure to do so would justify the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter. However, the records show that Top-Flite was not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was in fact afforded an opportunity to be heard when it submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by Top-Flite in par. 5 of its Motion for Intervention where it stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph but the Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of the position of the movant." In other words, the failure of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the opportunity to ventilate its side and challenge petitioner in its position paper, not to mention the comment which it submitted through counsel before the SC. It moved to intervene not because it had no notice of the proceedings but because its position paper allegedly was not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired by service of summons, it can also be acquired by voluntary appearance before the court which

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includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case, as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly worker, to tread once again the calvary of a protracted litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash of technicality. Bautista v. CA (2004)

Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc., for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that they have been in actual and uninterrupted possession of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the name of respondents; and that the said title and the derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.

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After several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence. Petitioners claim that the arbitrary acts of the trial court have resulted in the denial of their right to due process, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Orders. Petitioners further aver that the trial judge displayed ―noticeable partiality and prejudice‖ in dealing with their case, by granting several continuances to respondents while denying petitioner‘s Urgent Motion for Postponement. They cite four instances wherein respondents were granted extensions to file responsive pleadings and two instances wherein respondents‘ requests for postponement were similarly granted. Issue: Whether the trial court acted arbitrarily. No. Held: Far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the court‘s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.

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Petitioners‘ contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. In other words, we cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent‘s witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness.

Eastern Broadcasting v Dans, Carreon, et al. Gutierrez, J. 19 July 1985

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Facts:  Petitioner is asking to reopen the Radio Station DYRE which was summarily closed on grounds of national security.  The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it.  No action was taken by the respondents (Minister of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of National Telecomm, etc.) to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech.  Petitioner‘s president subsequently filed a Motion to withdraw petition since it had sold the station and that the new owner was granted the requisite license and franchise to operate said radio station.  However, the SC found the need to resolve the issue for guidance of the lower courts. Issue: W/N due process was observed in the closure of DYRE. Held/Ratio:

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NO. Guidelines laid down by the SC: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. [a. the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; c. The decision must have something to support itself; d. The evidence must be substantial; e. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; f. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; g. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.] (2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be 3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule — that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the

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substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. (5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection. (6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy

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(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

Tatad v Sandiganbayan Yap, J. 21 March 1988

Facts:  Tatad, as Secretary of the Department of Public Information, was charged with alleged violations of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.  Five years later, he resigned. Two months thereafter, another complaint was lodged by Antonio de los Reyes against him this time with the Tanodbayan for the same charges.  1980- The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report recommending appropriate legal action on the matter.  Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied. MR also denied.  By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.  1985- the Tanodbayan approved a resolution recommending that informations be filed against

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petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, five informations were filed against him.  Petitoner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on the follow grounds: 1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations; 2. Prescription of the offenses charged 3 of the 5 cases; 3. The facts charged where he allegedly failed to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973 do not constitute an offense; 4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant  Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. MR denied.  Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of

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the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial? Held/Ratio: YES. Antonio de los Reyes‘ original complaint, which was termed a report, was filed in 1974. Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits

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and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. There was such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced. Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. There was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of

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preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Inocencio Gonzales v CSC Puno, J. 2 September 1993

Facts:  Gonzales was employed at the Agricultural Training Institute of the Department of Agriculture for 36 years. On his 25th year of service, he received a merit award recognizing his continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the government. On his 30th year, he repeated the feat. His record of service is without any wart of malfeasance or misfeasance in office.  1990- He had to visit his children in the US so he took several leaves of absences.

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 On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay starting from the second week of July to December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical check-up free of charge due to my childrens' medical plan benefits". The letter was personally delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his address in US.  For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not act on the letter-request. It was neither approved nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI started acting adversely on petitioner's request.  ATI's Assistant Director and OIC wrote to petitioner declaring him absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning him that should he not report within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped from the rolls. The letter was addressed at petitioner's house in QC. The letter, however, was returned to sender (ATI).  What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a copy of the order.  When he came back from the US and reported for work on November 19, 1990, he found out that Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his position. By himself, he protested to the Civil Service Commission on December 14, 1990. His letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems

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Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action. On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner was duly notified before he was dropped from the roll. His appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was rejected. Petition to the CSC was denied. Issue: W/N petitioner was accorded due process before he was dropped from the rolls. Held/Ratio: NO. It ought to be self-evident that security of tenure can not be a shield against absences without proper approval by the authorities. Leaves are matters of private convenience and cannot prejudice public service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on the higher needs of public service. Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he invokes the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution should be sustained. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1985 is the governing rule on notice before an employee can be dropped from the rolls due to absence without leave, viz: 4. The agency should notify in writing the employee, who is absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty (30) days, to report within five (5) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, he shall be dropped from the rolls. The Circular does not specifically state where the notice shall be sent. In the case at bar, ATI knew that petitioner was staying in the US. The letter of June 25, 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly

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carried his address in the United States. The records do not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge, however, the letter of ATI's Asst. Director and OIC was inexplicably mailed to his house in QC. The letter was not received by petitioner per certification of the Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City. The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right to continue his employment in the government and unduly dilutes the protection of due process. To be sure, the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36) long years of faithful and dedicated, service to the government of the petitioner. Nothing less than strict compliance with the demands of due process should have been demanded by the respondent Commission from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the case. Nor can we give our concurrence to the further ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial of due process to the petitioner was cured by the publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have been proper if the address of petitioner were unknown. Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru the newspapers. There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show that ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the petitioner. Petitioner filed his request for leave without pay on June 25, 1990 while still in the United States. Though petitioner has no right to presume that his request would be granted, nonetheless it was no less a duty on the part of officials ATI to act immediately on the

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request, if only because petitioner was abroad and needed reasonable time and resources to return to the Philippine on a five (5) day call. The OIC did not explain why all of a sudden the "exigencies of the service" required the immediate return of the petitioner. If the "exigencies of the service" were real why was he allowed to go on leave. Worse still, the order dropping petitioner from the rolls was never sent to him. Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he returned to the Philippines on November.

Alfredo Lim and Rafelito Garayblas v CA Carpio, J. 12 August 2002

Facts:  Bistro filed a petition before the RTC against Mayor Lim who allegedly instructed policemen to inspect and investigate its license as well as work permits and health certificates of its staff,  The inspection resulted in stoppage of work in the night club and restaurant operations.  Later, Mayor Lim refused to accept application for business license and work permits for that year.  Bistro interposes that municipal corporations cannot prohibit operations of nightclubs. They may regulate but not prevent.  RTC- issued preliminary injunction.  Lim, however, issued an order closing Bistro‘s operations.

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 Bistro filed a contempt case against Lim which was later withdrawn in exchange that the preliminary injunction be respected.  Lim- filed a motion to dissolve the injunction alleging that the power of the mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and staff is implicit in Manila‘s revised charter and in the LGC.  RTC- denied motion  CA- denied Lim‘s petition. A writ of PI may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be held on the merits. Issue: W/N Bistro was denied due process. Held/Ratio: YES. Injunction proper. There was no due process in the order to close the business. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of conditions of its business licenses or permits. He refused to grant the license even without considering whether the legal prerequisites were met. The authority of mayors to issue business permits is beyond question (LGC and Manila Charter). The power to refuse to issue such license and permits is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for issuance of such license and permits. The mayor must observe due process by giving the applicant notice and opportunity to be heard.

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The mayor indeed had authority to inspect and investigate for violations of conditions but does not have power to order a police raid on these establishments on guise of inspection or investigation. Lim acted beyond his authority.

Unicraft Industries v CA Ynares-Santiago, J. 26 March 2001

Facts:  Private respondents were employees of Unicraft for at least over a year, performing work necessary and desirable to its operation. Its principal office was in Apao, Mandaue City and when it opened a branch in Lapu-Lapu, private respondents were transferred there.  Unicraft however failed to comply with certain requirements and it was ordered closed by the local government thus effecting the mass dismissal of private respondents.  Private respondents: contended that they were dismissed because of their union activities.  Petitioner: no illegal dismissal, the closure of the branch was virtue of a lawful order of the LG.  Unicraft and its counsel failed to appear before the Voluntary Arbitrator who found in favor of private respondents.  Unicraft filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that they were denied opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before the voluntary arbitrator. CA remanded to the VA.

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 Instead of conducting further proceedings, however, the voluntary arbitrator filed a comment praying, inter alia, that he be declared to have lost jurisdiction over the case upon rendition of the judgment  CA re-examined the stipulation of the parties and thereafter rendered the assailed resolution allowing, among others, the partial execution of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator with respect to the award of separation pay and attorney‘s fees. MR denied. Issue: W/N Unicraft was denied due process. Held/Ratio: NO, it was not accorded due process at the VA level because it was not able to present evidence as can be gleaned from the stipulation entered into by the parties before the CA. This is an acknowledgment by both parties that the proceedings before the VA have not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed resolution ordering the immediate execution of the award of separation pay and attorney‘s fees. Prior to that, the VA filed a comment contending that he had lost jurisdiction over the case after he rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may still be subject to review, such as here where there was a violation of petitioners‘ right to due process and to be heard. In spite of statutory provisions making ―final‖ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, the SC has

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taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantive justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law where brought to our attention. The right of due process is fundamental in our legal system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons of convenience or merely to comply with technical formalities but because of a strong conviction that every man must have his day in court. In its most basic sense, the right to due process is simply that every man is accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Its very concept contemplates freedom from arbitrariness, as what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors all attempts to make an accusation synonymous with liability.

Jane Caras v CA and People of the Philippines Quisumbing, J. 2 October 2001

Facts:  Jane Caras was charge in 15 related cases of violation of the BP22.  When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded ―not guilty‖. Thereafter, trial proceeded.  The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and purchase

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orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the checks in question which were drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank. When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason ―Account Closed‖. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so. The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they were given to Marivic Nakpil,]alleged sister of the complainant, as ―guarantee deposit,‖ that is, for every gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued personal checks to guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor deposited with any bank. With regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35, accused claimed that she entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her signature but without any amount or numerical figures on the face of the check. On May 13, 1994, the Court found her guilty of all charges. MR denied by TC. CA affirmed. Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been dishonored by the drawee bank

Issue: On due process, W/N failure to give notice of dishonor is a denial of due process.

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Held/Ratio: YES. ). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Lao v CA) Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, she cannot be convicted of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be rebutted by the accusedpetitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.

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The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioner‘s actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause.

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Mariveles Shipyard v CA Quisumbing, J. 11 November 2003

Facts:  In October 1993, petitioner corporation, Mariveles Shipyard Corp., engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Longest Force deployed its security guards at petitioner‘s shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan. According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force (LF). However, it found the services unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with LF. In turn, LF

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terminated the security guards (private respondents). Thus these private respondents filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal, underpayment of w ages, nonpayment of overtime pay, premium pay forholiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and attorney‘s fees against LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Meanwhile, LF filed a crossclaim against petitioner. Petitioner denied liability on account of illegal dismissal, stressing that no employeremployee relationship existed between it and the private respondents. They also wanted the crossclaim be dismissed. The Labor Arbiter declared LF and petitioner jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of complainants. It also ordered LF to reinstate to former or equivalent positions the respondents without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages. NLRC affirmed in toto. CA denied petitioner‘s special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner avers that there was denial of due process of law when the Labor Arbiter failed to have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds that the Arbiter did not observe the mandatory language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 0102, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure which provided that: If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an

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Order to that effect and shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor… Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process. Held/Ratio: NO, he was given ample opportunity to present his side. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not necessary. In any event, as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that such opportunity more than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.

VALLADOLID v. INCIONG

FACTS:

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JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu). The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent financial and business information was being leaked from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to be the leak who sends important information to the competitor. Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In response to the application for clearance and Valladolid‘s complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding ―no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from‖. Contention c/o JRM: The order of Hon. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional. Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but it is not encouraged. HELD: The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation

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of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8, section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.

FERNANDEZ v. NLRC

FACTS: Reynaldo worked as a bus driver for Nelbusco, Inc. On February 28, 1993, the airconditioning unit of the bus which Reynaldo was driving suffered a mechanical breakdown. The company told Reynaldo to wait until the airconditioning unit was repaired. No other bus was assigned to Reynaldo to keep him gainfully employed. Reynaldo continued reporting to his employer‘s office for work, only to find out that the airconditioning unit had not been repaired. More than six months elapsed but Reynaldo was not given work. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. HELD:

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As earlier noted, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain one‘s side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the case at bar, private respondents were given ample opportunity to do just that but they failed, for unknown reasons, to avail themselves of such opportunity. They themselves moved that they be allowed to present additional affidavits on August 19, 1991, but they never did; no valid reason was given for their failure to do so. Their contention that the labor arbiter failed to rule on their motion deserves scant consideration. It is axiomatic – in fact, it is plainly commonsensical – that when a counsel asks for an extension of time within which to file a pleading, he must be ready with that pleading on the date specified in his motion, even absent a resolution or order disposing of his motion. TORRES v. GONZALES

FACTS: In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres‘ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep‘t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

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ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts, which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have

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breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who ―having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.‖ Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President‘s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. ZALDIVAR v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent‘s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in

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the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC‘s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free‖ was publicized in leading newspapers. Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

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ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression. HELD: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

SEC OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE RALPH LANTION

FACTS:

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Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: W/N Jimenez is deprived of due process. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refers to an impending threat of deprivation of one‘s property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. GOV’T OF USA v. PURUGANAN

FACTS: This petition is a sequel of the case of Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion.

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HELD: No Violation of Due Process Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ‘s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge‘s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court‘s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule. It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings

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had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away. In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government‘s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, ―constitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.‖ GOV’T OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA

FACTS: The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an ―Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. ‖Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent

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Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high ―flight risk.‖ After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denyinghis application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. ISSUE: W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail? HELD: No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail. Accordingly, although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee‘s rights to life, liberty, and due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, particularly the

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed ―clear and convincing evidence‖ should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by ―clear and convincing evidence‖ that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may be granted bail on the basis of ―clear and convincing evidence.‖ ROXAS v. VASQUEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PCINP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract

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was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the respondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process. HELD: It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and

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should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

Ortigas v Lufthansa J. Barredo

Facts: Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which was filled with discrimination. During the trial, there were several postponements of the trial from both sides. Three hearings were postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the request of both parties, and 10 on the request of respondents.

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Due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the no-show of their European employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list due to his non-appearance in the day that the crossexam on him was to be finished and the judge moved for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no postponements were to be made again) Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a seat change to first class during the stop overs, he wasn‘t given any. He was only given the option when he was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from Manila. Issues: 1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion when it denied the defendant‘s motion for postponement on Sept 24, 1966. 2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his testimony was not finished 3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant pay indemnities Held: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages from 100k to 150k. Ratio: 1. The case had been pending for about three years and had actually suffered during that period even more than the usually permissible number of continuances, quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's

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counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule had been served on counsel the month previous. It must be assumed that due preparations and arrangements were to be made since the receipt of that notice to insure the presence in Manila for the expected witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not leave their respective stations and places of work to attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was enough time and opportunity for defendant to have made the corresponding adjustments in the assignments of its personnel so as to enable its witnesses to be in court. As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed because of the absence of evidence only when such absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it." This means that it must be shown to the court that due diligence had been exercised in either securing the presence of the evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof. Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well justified in denying the requested postponement. We cannot see any reason why, despite its having

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knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month before, defendant did not see to it that its expected witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible." 2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted harassment and embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule 132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form

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part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the impugned action of the trial court relative to the testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the same, they claimed that even his direct testimony, without taking into account anymore his answers to the cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff, cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses in defendant's answer. However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a logical consequence of the previous order denying defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial, the next thing in order was to declare the presentation of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it

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was necessary to determine what evidence could be considered to be for the defendant. And so when counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically no alternative for the court but to grant the same. Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer any objection thereto. 3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered to so dictate. Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the company's self-interest at the expense of, embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part of the plaintiffs. These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.

Emin v. De Leon J. Quisimbing

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Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers. Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. The signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil service eligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never issued to any one. Two separate investigations were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates, The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and

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gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. His motion to dismiss was denied. Teacher witnesses for the prosecution Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A. 6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas‘ and Delgado‘s testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the fake certificates of eligibility. In its resolution, the CSC found Emin guilty. In his amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over the administrative cases against the public school teachers; and (2) whether petitioner was accorded due process. The CA dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: (1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the present case; (2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process. Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the coverage of the term ―teachers‖ are limited to: (1) public school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities; and (2) school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees

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under the category of ―medical and dental personnel‖. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words following an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Had Congress intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating Committee that should have investigated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC‘s jurisdiction over his case. Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary. Equally unmeritorious is petitioner‘s contention that he was denied due process. He avers that he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in

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administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Nothing on record shows he asked for crossexamination as most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no crossexamination took place. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Commission. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Neither is there merit in petitioner‘s assertion that he was denied the right to due process when the CSC Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. The report submitted by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely recommendatory in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such procedure is not unusual in an administrative proceeding. Petition is denied. Rodson Phil. v. CA

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Facts: On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson Philippines, Inc., Eurasia Heavy Industries, Inc., Autographics, Inc. and Peter Y. Rodriguez, filed a Complaint for damages against respondent Eastar Resources (Asia) Corporation with the RTC Cebu. The respondent in its Answer, denied all the material averments of the complaint and interposed a compulsory counterclaim amounting to P29,000,000. After the presentation of witnesses, the petitioners filed their formal offer of evidence. The petitioners rested their case after their documentary evidence was admitted by the court. The respondent then presented one witness, Mary C. Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent prayed for time to make their formal offer of evidence. The court granted the respondent‘s motion and gave it a period of fifteen (15) days to do so. The court then granted the petitioners a period of ten (10) days from service of the said formal offer within which to file their comment thereon. The petitioners declared in open court that they would be presenting rebuttal evidence, and prayed that the hearing for the said purpose be set at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 1994. The case was reset to June 1, 1994. The respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and sent a copy thereof to the petitioners on June 1, 1994. When the case was called for the presentation of the petitioners‘ rebuttal evidence on the said date, the new counsel for the petitioners manifested her desire to recall the respondent‘s witness, Mary Maquilan, for further cross-examination. She reasoned that she was not satisfied with the cross-examination of the previous

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counsel, and asked for time to file the necessary motion. The court granted the same, and gave her fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the respondent a period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to file its comment or opposition. The court held in abeyance the resolution of the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence until such time that the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan for further cross-examination was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the petitioners filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for further cross-examination. In the meantime, Judge Juaban retired from the government service. Judge Martin A. Ocampo was appointed presiding judge of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7. The hearing of the petitioners‘ motion to recall the witness was set for hearing on March 26, 1996. During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners called the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan as witness for additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the petitioners‘ recalling the latter as a hostile witness on the presentation of its rebuttal evidence. In the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident despite the denial of the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan for additional cross-examination. On April 1, 1996, the trial court sent a subpoena to Maquilan, requiring her to appear before the court and to testify as a hostile rebuttal witness for the petitioners.

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The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident of Quezon City, which was more than fifty (50) kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled to testify under Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court. In its Order, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself upon motion of the petitioners from further hearing the case. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11, presided by Judge Isaias P. Dicdican. After a review of the records, the trial court discovered that the petitioners‘ motion to recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the petitioners had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of documentary evidence; and, that the said formal offer of evidence had not yet been resolved by the court. The TC issued an Order admitting the respondent‘s documentary evidence for the purposes they were offered. The petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set and prayed that they be given a chance to file their written objection to the formal offer of evidence filed by the respondent. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence did not toll the ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners‘ comment thereon. The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the petition for being devoid of merit.

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ISSUE: WON the court erred when it resolved the respondent's formal offer of evidence and admitted such documentary evidence before they could file their comment or opposition thereto. Petitioners assert that during the hearing of March 26, 1996, the petitioners called the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence, and that the court declared that there was no need for them to do so as yet because of the unresolved motion. They emphasized that even after the court denied their motion to recall Maquilan as witness and ordered them to present her as a hostile witness on rebuttal evidence, the court still failed to resolve the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. SC ruled that the petitioners were amply accorded the chance and/or opportunity to register their objections to the private respondent‘s offer of evidence. For as early as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged with knowledge or notice that they were being required to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that action on the offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the motion to recall a witness. Resultantly, since the disposition of the motion to recall was made the condition sine qua non for further action on the private respondent‘s offer of evidence, the petitioners should have lost no time in submitting their comment to the offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March 29, 1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further cross-examination. Even during the time that the petitioners were supposed to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast

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and loose with court processes. Even then, as correctly argued by the respondent, there was actually no more time to suspend, as it had long expired on June 12, 1997, for which reason the respondent‘s formal offer of documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution. Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing his discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and judiciously. The petitioners failed to append to their petition at bar a copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17, 1997 Order of the trial court, admitting the documentary evidence offered by the respondent. The said pleading is very relevant in this case, because we could there discern if the petitioners had prayed for a chance to file their comment on or opposition to the admission of the respondent‘s documentary evidence, and incorporated therein their objections to the said motion, if any. Even considering the merits of the case, the petition must still fail. Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994 within which to file their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within which to file such comment was not suspended by the filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional cross-examination. What was merely suspended by such motion was the trial court‘s resolution of the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The petitioners failed to file their comment within the period therefor. Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence was prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet file their comment thereon because of the petitioners‘

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unresolved motion. The respondent had already presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already testified on direct and cross-examination. Hence, the respondent was obliged to formally offer its documentary evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right to adduce rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome the probative weight of the respondent‘s documentary evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware that the respondent had a counterclaim of P29,000,000, it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance in filing their comment without delay. However, by their own negligence, the petitioners failed to file the said comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of certiorari to shield themselves from their own omission and negligence. It must be stressed that he who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with clean hands. AILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar‘s appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position. Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,

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together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent judge issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge gave another time to file her comment again. During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a judge. Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case. 2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process. 3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the

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status quo until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought. 2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trialtype hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he was given the opportunity to present his position. 3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner

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that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

QUINTOS v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos and private respondent Jose T. Villarosa were candidates for Governor of Occidental Mindoro in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was declared winner with 57,136 votes. Petitioner lost to private respondent by 1,093 votes. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an election protest claiming that massive fraud and illegal electoral practices were committed in the contested precincts during the registration, the voting and the counting of the votes. On June 15, 2001, private respondent filed his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim. Private respondent‘s counsel moved that the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao be allowed to take first custody of the Contested Ballot Boxes before their transmittal to the COMELEC. The Comelec denied the motion. From the COMELEC‘s Order, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Private respondent stated that petitioner identified only one (1) ballot box as subject of his protest. Private respondent, however, identified thirteen (13) ballot boxes from the same municipality in his counter-protest. Thus, the total number of Contested Ballot Boxes, both in the protest and counter-protest, is 14. Private

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respondent explained that the Contested Ballot Boxes were also the subject of two municipal election protests both filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, and both handled by counsel of private respondent. The RTC ordered them to be brought before the court the Contested Ballot Boxes. Private respondent averred that if COMELEC Resolution No. 2812 were strictly implemented, the resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of Paluan would suffer undue delay. The COMELEC would take first custody of the 14 Contested Ballot Boxes. The resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of Paluan would have to wait for the COMELEC to complete its revision of the ballots in the Contested Ballot Boxes. On August 27, 2001, the COMELEC rendered the Assailed Order granting private respondent‘s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration subject to guidelines. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the COMELEC dated August 27, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the COMELEC denied petitioner's Motion. TOPICAL ISSUE: Whether the failure to give petitioner the opportunity to comment or oppose private respondent‘s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is a denial of due process. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC issued the Assailed Order of August 27, 2001 without giving him the opportunity to comment or oppose the motion for partial reconsideration. This, bewails petitioner, violates his right to due process.

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The Solicitor General correctly stated that there was no denial of due process since petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted on, albeit unfavorably, in the Order dated September 12, 2001. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process since the COMELEC gave petitioner the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC, in issuing the Assailed Orders allowing the Regional Trial Court to take prior custody of the Contested Ballot Boxes, did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In giving the Regional Trial Court first access to the Contested Ballot Boxes, the COMELEC sought to prevent delay in the resolution of the two protest cases pending before the trial court. However, first access by the Regional Trial Court is only limited to the period of time when the COMELEC is still revising other protested ballot boxes. The primary concern for such arrangement is the expeditious disposition of protest cases, which is underscored in Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812.

VILLARUEL, JR. v. FERNANDO

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FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (―ATO‖), Department of Transportation and Communication (―DOTC‖). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (―Abarca‖), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (―CATC‖). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region. Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary Cal at DOTC. Without acting on respondents‘ request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under ―preventive suspension‖ for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already

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lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit. Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner which the TC granted. For petitioner‘s continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial court‘s order of 26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (―OSG‖), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court‘s order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The TC declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.The TC ordered Villaruel to pay. Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a nonextendible extension until 13 December 1996 within

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which to file petitioner‘s memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner‘s appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Resolution became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition. On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriff‘s Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial court‘s decision never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioner‘s memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998. ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process. The negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In short, the OSG‘s negligence binds petitioner. The petition has no merit.

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Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner‘s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents‘ allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages. Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG‘s failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE v. GARCIA

FACTS: On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De Andrada (Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple) over Lot No. 6-H-2.

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On September 28, 1938, Patricia sold the property to petitioner. The Deed of Sale contained a provision that ―the purchase of Lot No. 6-H-2 was subject to the right of way granted by me (Patricia Ruedas Vda. de Andrada) to the spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia.‖ On April 17, 1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu and moved for the annotation of the August 17, 1938 document executed by Patricia on TCT No. RT-3972. Petitioner retained ownership over Lot No. 6-H-2 whereas the estate of the late Garcia couple (Garcia Estate) was inherited by Vicente E. Garcia and Jose E. Garcia from whom respondent acquired his title in 1996. Sometime after acquiring the Garcia Estate, respondent came across the 1952 documents that granted to the deceased Garcia couple a road right of way through petitioner‘s Lot No. 6-H-2. Thus, on May 19, 1997, respondent filed, before the RTC of Cebu, a cadastral court, a petition captioned “Engineer Edgar John A. Garcia v. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City G.I.R.O. Rec. No. 5988, Lot No. 6-H-2.” They want to inscribe and annotate in the TCT No. RT-3972 a road right of way. The cadastral court issued on June 6, 1997 an Order requiring the Register of Deeds ―to inform this [c]ourt regarding the status of the aforementioned title.

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In its Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds informed the cadastral court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under herein petitioner‘s name and that it ―appears to be clean and devoid of any encumbrance/annotations.‖ On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an Order granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner received a copy of the Order of July 23, 1997. Petitioner entered its special appearance and filed a ―Motion for Reconsideration and Recall‖ and expressed ―caution‖ that it was not necessarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Petitioner contended that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due process, that the petition of respondent was for specific performance of a private agreement cognizable only by an ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to enforce a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the statute of limitations and prescription. The cadastral court denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. The court held that firstly, there was no violation of substantial or procedural due process as the court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, it heard petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration in open court, and allowed both parties to submit their respective memoranda including documentary exhibits prior to its ruling on the motion. Secondly, the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree of 1979 eliminated the

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distinction between the general jurisdiction of the RTC and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a Land Registration Court. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record shows the existence of an easement of right of way in favor of respondent. On July 9, 1999, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it in its Resolution of August 9, 1999. ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. NO The SC finds against petitioner. The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right to due process of the law. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence in support of one‘s defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. The records reveal that the cadastral court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the cadastral court heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in open court wherein both parties presented their respective arguments to defend their rights and the

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court likewise allowed the parties to file their respective memoranda prior to ruling on the motion for reconsideration. Indeed, deprivation of the right to due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his Motion for Reconsideration[20] as what happened in the instant case. Suntay v. People

FACTS: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner. On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs

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On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the

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respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition. Petitioner‘s Claim:  while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law. Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing Ruling: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him. True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the

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petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious

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criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. Co v Barbers 290 SCRA 717

1. Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov Castillo-Co and Engr Ringor alleging that in the course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the HoR Committee on Good Government chaired by him uncovered some irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor & the Provincial Engineer 2. The equipment purchased was not brand new as required, there was overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery and an attempt to cover up the irregularities. 3. Co and Ringoer were then placed under preventive suspension for 6 months, a week after the complaint was filed. It was signed by the director and approved by the deputy

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Ombudsman. Both filed for motions for reconsideration contending they were deprived of due process because they weren‘t afforded the opportunity to controvert the evidence against them before the suspension order was issued. It was rejected thus this petition for review. Issue: W/N they were deprived of due process NO 1. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. 2. Lastimosa case: suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. 3. The immediate issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to: xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

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Equitable Banking Corporation v Calderon GR 156168 (DISHONOR OF CALDERON’S CREDIT CARD, NOT TO EXCEED HIS APPROVED CREDIT LIMIT

1. Calderon, a businessman engaged in several business activities here and a broad, and a stockholder of PLDT is a seasoned traveler. He was issued an Equitable International Visa card which can be used for both peso and dollar transactions. Credit limit: 20,000 pesos and 3000 US dollars 2. He went to Hong Kong in 1986 and bought several Gucci items which amounted to 4,030 HK dollars = 523 US dollars. He paid with his card. 3. The saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. 4. Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBC‘s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed a complaint for damages against EBC. 5. Answer: card in excess of credit limit already, Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase.

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6. TC: "defendant bank was negligent if not in bad faith, in suspending, or ‗blacklisting‘ plaintiff‘s credit card without notice or basis, thus it was ordered to pay damages. CA affirmed the decision. Issue: W/N EPB was negligent/in bad faith for suspending the card without notice N 1. Question: Was moral damages proper despite its finding that petitioner‘s actions have not been attended with any malice or bad faith? NO 2. Moral damages - include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. 3. Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. 4. Here, the CA ruled that no malice or bad faith attended petitioner‘s dishonor of respondent‘s credit card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states: a. xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges shall

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be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof. 5. As to the suspension without notice, prior to the incident, Calderon made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong in the previous year amounting to 14 thousand US dollars while having only a deposit of 3,639 US dollars but even though they exceeded his limit, these purchases were accommodated. He was even late in his payment. 6. Although he deposited 14,000 US dollars the day he left for Hong Kong, he did not bother to request the bank for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension." 7. As issuer of the card, the bank has the option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the bank deemed proper, not the least of which are the cardholder‘s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any additional requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states: ―The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holder‘s privileges which have been terminated for any reason whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and upon payment of an additional processing fee equivalent to annual fee‖

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8. tThe provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad. Housing Authority v Evangelista GR 140945 2005

1. Petitioner filed a case for recovery of real property originally awarded to a certain Adela Salindon. After Salindon‘s death, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the property was transferred to the Florendos. However, the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and thus petition was declared the owner of the property. 2. Despite the decision, the property was auctioned off by the QC Treasurer‘s Office for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was a certain Sarte. 3. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was granted by the RTC. Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name of Sarte who divided the property into two lots. 4. Now, petitioner filed a case against Sarte. While it was pending, Sarte executed in favor of

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Evangelista (respondent), a Deed of Assignment covering the 1st lot. TCT was then issued in his name. 5. Although it was annotated that there was an adverse claim. Petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business and BPI as defendants but the trial court denied the motion. Thus it instead filed a complaint for ANNULMENT of the Deed of Assignment. 6. TC: auction issued in the name of Salindon where Sarte was the buyer is null and void thus TCT in favor of Sarte should be cancelled. Any transfer (including any assignment) is also declared null and void. 7. Evangelista (respondent/assignee) then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court‘s judgment particularly the nullity of the transfer alleging extrinsic fraud as ground. Since he wasn‘t a party to the civil case, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property and thus the judgment was NOT binding upon him. ISSUE: W/N the judgment declaring void the assignment bound Evangelista No 1. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and resolution are void. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

his submission to its authority or by service of summons. In this case, it is undisputed that Evangelista was never made a party to the Civil Case. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court‘s decision decreed that ―(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void. , together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.‖ It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent‘s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. It was already after Evangelista acquired the property and after TCT No. 122944 was issued in his name that petitioner‘s adverse claim (Entry No. 7159) and a notice of lis pendens (Entry No. 1367) were annotated.

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7. It should also be pointed out that it was in petitioner‘s Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated, not the judgment. As records show, at the time the notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already been entered into by respondent and Sarte, and TCT No. 122944 was already issued in Evangelista‘s name on December 21, 1994. Insular Life Assurance Co v Young GR 140964 2002

1. Young acquired by purchase Insular Savings Bank from the Licaros family for 65,000,000.00. Young et al obtained 55% equity while Jorge Go et al owned 45%. The bank then granted them loans (153000000) secured by promissory notes. 2. Araneta, a stockholder of the Bank, wanted to purchase 99.82% of its outstanding capital stock for 340M on the condition that the ownership of the hsares will be consolidated in Young‘s name. Araneta paid Young 14M as downpayment. Young then bought from Go et al their 45% equity in the Bank for 153M. to pay this, he obtained a short-term loan of 170M from the International Corporate Bank to finance the purchase. 3. However, Araneta backed out and demanded the return of the downpayment. Meanwhile, Young‘s loan from Interbank became due. Young entered into a Credit Agreement with Insular Life for 200M. To secure the loan, he executed a deed of Pledge of 1,324,864 shares which represented

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99.82% of the outstanding capital stock of the bank. 4. He likewise executed a promissory note in favor of Insular Life in the same amount. The Credit Agreement provides that Insular Life shall have the prior right to purchase the shares owned by young and those owned by other stockholders. Thereafter, Insular Life and Insular Life Pension Fund informed Young of their intention to acquire 30% (Young‘s) and 12% (other SHs) of the Bank‘s outstanding shares 5. Insular Life and Young then entered into a MOA where Insular Life and its Pension Fund agreed to purchase common shares for a total consideration of 198M. However, it had discovered some irregularities in the Bank‘s ―kiting operations‖. Young took the responsibility and offered to the bank the 45% of his holdings as security. 6. Young admitted that due to business reverses, he shall not be able to pay his obligations under the Credit Agreement between him and Insular thus he unconditionally and irrevocably waive the benefit of the period of the loan. Thereafter, Insular Life instructed its counsel to foreclosure the pledge constituted upon the shares. IL then informed Young. A public auction was conducted wherein Insular Life appropriated to itself, not only the original 1,324,864 shares, but also the 250,000 shares subsequently issued by the Bank and delivered to Insular Life by way of pledge because there only IL submitted its bid for the first auction sale and a subsequent auction sale.

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7. Young and his associates filed with the RTC a complaint against the bank, IL for annulment of notarial sale, specific performance and damages alleging that the notarial sale conducted is void as it does not comply with the requirement of notice of the second auction sale. 8. RTC: dismissed the complaint and ordered the respondents to pay the Bank their respective loans. They appealed to the CA which reversed the decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the MOA executed is not enforceable considering that Young committed fraud, misrepresented on the warranties and failed to comply with his obligations. Dismissed. Hence this petition. 9. The CA reversed the decision ruling that the MOA is binding because it was not validly rescinded. Insular failed to notify Young in exercising its option to rescind the MOA. The Appellate Court then concluded that Young's loan with Insular Life is deemed fully paid based on the representation and warranty in the MOA that "the entire proceeds of the sale shall be used to pay off the outstanding debt of Robert T. Young to Insular Life. Likewise, it also concluded that the loans of the other respondents have been fully paid. Issue: W/N the MOA was enforceable and that the loan have been fully paid upon foreclosure of the pledge NO. 1. The CA construed the MOA as a contract of sale. But contrary to the findings of the CA, the MOA provisions negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. The MOA is merely a contract to

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sell since the parties therein specifically undertook to enter into a contract of sale if the stipulated conditions are met and the representation and warranties given by Young prove to be true. The obligation of petitioner Insular Life to purchase, as well as the concomitant obligation of Young to convey to it the shares, are subject to the fulfillment of the conditions contained in the MOA. 2. Once the conditions, representation and warranties are satisfied, then it is incumbent upon the parties to perform their respective obligations under the contract. Conversely, in the event that these conditions are not met or complied with, no obligation on the part of either party arises. 3. Since no sale transpired between the parties, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Insular Life purchased 55% of the total shares of the Bank under the MOA. Consequently, its findings that the debt of Young has been fully paid and that Insular Life is liable to pay for the remaining 45% equity have no basis. It must be emphasized that the MOA did not convey title of the shares to Insular Life. If ever there was delivery of the said shares to Insular Life, it was because they were pledged by Young to Insular Life under the Credit Agreement. 4. The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that the auction sale is void since petitioners failed to send a separate notice for the second auction. Based on Article 2112 of the Civil Code, there is no prohibition in the law against the sending of ONE NOTICE for the 1st and 2nd public auction.

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5. Petitioners contend that the CA likewise erred when it declared in its decision that the unpaid accounts of the other respondents have been fully paid. 6. There is no showing how the CA reached such conclusion. In doing so, the Court of Appeals violated the constitutional mandate that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 7. Indeed, due process demands that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. It must be observed that those respondents did not contest petitioners' counterclaim against them. Lorbes v CA GR 139884

1. petitioners mortgaged their land to the Carloses. A year later, the mortgage obligation had increased and fearing foreclosure of the property, they asked their son-in-law for help. Delos Reyes agreed to rdeem the property but because he didn‘t have money at the time, he asked his family friend, Cruz, an employee of Land Bank for help. 2. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Landbank using the subject property as collateral.

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3. Landbank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses informing them that the loan has been approved. TCT was cancelled and transferred in the name of Cruz. Years later, petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the property but the offer was refused. Thus it filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages claiming that the deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of the bank for the loan. 4. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon private respondents on August 1, 1994. Cruz/Delos Reyes filed their answer beyond the reglamentary period, or only on September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5, 1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondents in default, which the trial court granted in an order dated September 16, 1994. On September 30 of the same year, petitioners presented their evidence ex parte before the trial court 5. TC: in favor of the petitioners upon finding that the deed of absolute sale didn‘t reflect the true intention of the parties. 6. CA reversed the decision: Cruz/Delos Reyes were denied due process by the refusal of the trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. The reformation of the Deed of Absolute

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Sale is improper because there is no showing that such instrument failed to express the true intention of the parties by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the execution thereof. ISSUE: (topic) W/N there was denial of due process YES W/N there the deed of absolute sale is an equitable mortgage YES 1. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. 2. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 3. In this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying private respondents‘ motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented by petitioners ex parte, especially considering that an answer was filed, though out of time. 4. The default order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of private respondents‘ due process rights. However, the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for by private respondents, and second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that private respondents would have presented

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before the RTC were capably ventilated before respondent court, and were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the correctness of the evaluation of petitioners‘ evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the RTC. 5. Applying the foregoing considerations to the instant case, the Court finds that the true intention between the parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the property in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the Carloses. 6. Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and its supporting documents do not reflect the true arrangement between the parties as to how the loan proceeds are to be actually applied because it was not the intention of the parties for these documents to do so. The sole purpose for preparing these documents was to satisfy Land Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to Cruz‘s application for a housing loan was met. Tanada v Tuvera (ratio copied from a digest! )

On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. 

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Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.  The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.  Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity 

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Issue: W/N publication is still required in the light of the clause "unless otherwise provided" 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. 2. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to 1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; 2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; 3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; 4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; 5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. 3. Further publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. 4. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their

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approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the OG, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

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353

Republic v Express Telecommunications

1. On December 29, 1992 – BAYANTEL filed an application with the NTC (Nati‘l Telecomm Comm) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System. Prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel‘s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-pate motion to admit an amended application. Subsequently hearings were conducted. 2. Before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order (Dec 1993) stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. 3. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel‘s motion to revive the latter‘s application and set the case for hearings on February. EXTELCOM filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of Bayantel‘s application arguing

4.

5.

6.

7.

that Bayantel‘s motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago thus all evidence are outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity. May 3, 2000 – NTC issued an Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service applying Rule 15 Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the order reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS. CA granted and dismissed Bayantel‘s amended application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. MR filed by the NTC and Bayantel. Meanwhile, Extelcom filed a motion for partial reconsideration, praying that NTC Memo Circular (allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS) be also declared void. CA dismissed all the motions. In the present petition, Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules of 1993 because these Revised Rules deleted the phrase ―on its own initiative‖, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of

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general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. ISSUE: W/N the 1993 Revised Rules should be applied NO 1. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. 2. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. 3. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

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4. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. 5. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. 6. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. 7. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. 8. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that:Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided 9. Citing Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the

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rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 10. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 11. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.

Tropical Homes Inc v NHA 152 SCRA 540 (appeal)

1. Tropical Homes entered into a contract with Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better Living Subdivision. A 10% downpayment upon the execution of the contract was required and the balance payable monthly. The contract provided that upon default in payment of any installment within 90 days from its due date, the contract will be automatically cancelled. 2. Since there was non-payment for a period of 7 months already, the contract was cancelled and all earlier payments were considered forfeited in favor of the corporation. Cordova then filed a letter complaint with the Investigating Committee of the Dept of Trade asking for a refund 3. The case was then referred to the NHA which issued the resolution: refund Cordova. MR filed by Tropical, but denied.

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4. In the meantime, PD 1344 was passed providing that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases covering unsound real estate business practices, claims involving refund, specific performance, etc. The decision of the NHA shall be final after the lapse of 15 days from date of receipt. It is only appealable to the President and if there is no appeal within 30 days, the decision is deemed affirmed. 5. Tropical, availing of this decree, appealed to the President. No copy of the appeal was furnished to respondent NHA. 6. Cordova then filed a motion for execution, to which NHA issued a Writ of Execution. The President failed to act on the appeal thus this petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: W/N PD 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds that it deprives Tropical access to courts of law and the manner of appeal is violative of due process NO 1. The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in any way affect the correctness of the decision rendered against him. There is no discussion whatsoever on the merits of the original case. As far as the records show, the NHA decision appears to be fair and correct. 2. Moreover, the resolution promulgated by respondent NHA, was issued before the passage of the questioned decree. The writ of execution it issued, as admitted by the petitioner in its memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D. No. 1344.

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3. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 4. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not constitutional origin. 5. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review. 6. On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure on the part of the President to act upon an appeal does not necessarily mean that the appealed decision automatically becomes final and executory. Access to the courts of law may still be made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such decision is far from being final and executory. DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE DEPUTY NITORREDA, et al., respondents. FRANCISCO, J.:

OMBUDSMAN,

CESAR

Nature: motion for reconsideration 1. Respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI). They sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school arising from the implementation of certain school policies.

Y.

2. On their scheduled meeting, private respondents and the other complaining students travelled all the way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City. Their presence in the said office was duly noted by DECS Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with them. However, instead of conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly did not even have a previous appointment. 3. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter, petitioner presided over the conference between the Arriesgados and the aggrieved students. 4. March 29, 1994 - petitioner submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman a report wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement between the parties. However, private respondents‘ affidavit-complaint attested that as a result of the said dispute, they were barred from taking the final examinations and participating in the graduation rites. 5. The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713, Complaints‘ averments were confirmed by the school itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that the complaining student were not allowed to take the final examination until and unless they agree to the withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against herein respondent .

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6. When petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied, he filed an ―Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction‖ with this Court. Issue: W RA 6770 is unconstitutional for failure to provide the right to appeal - NO. Held/ Ratio: 1. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.7 for their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases from the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that: ―The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with‖ the provisions of the law.‖ 2. Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one‘s case. The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative cases manifest sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

357 [G.R. No. 142888. June 6, 2001] EVELIO P. BARATA, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR., OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Nature: Petition for Review in Certiorari 1. Petitioner heads the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners' Association, Inc. whose members have occupied a certain parcel of land in Mandaluyong City. 2. Sometime in March 1995, the City Government of Mandaluyong initiated the construction of medium size condominiums and row houses for the benefit of qualified members of the said homeowners' association. 3. To give way to the construction, the members of the said homeowners' association had to vacate the area which they were occupying as the medium size housing project and row houses were supposed to be completed within 540 days from June 1995. 4. When the period for construction lapsed, petitioner and the members of the homeowners' association demanded the completion of the said housing project but the same allegedly fell on deaf ears. 5. Alleging that the demands have been ignored, petitioner filed on May 17, 1999 an administrative complaint against Mayor Abalos, Jr. for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) for failing to act promptly on letters and requests sent by the public.

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6. July 21, 1999 - Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative complaint "for insufficiency of evidence." 7. September 10, 1999. - The Motion for Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The order was received by petitioner on October 15, 1999. 8. November 4, 1999 - petitioner appealed by way of a petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 140272. The Second Division denied the petition in the Resolution of November 24, 1999 in view of A.M. No. 9-2-02-SC and the ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The resolution was received by petitioner on January 18, 2000. 9. February 1, 2000 - petitioner filed a "Petition for Review on Certiorari" with the CA which rendered a Decision dated April 10, 2000 dismissing the petition on the ground that the decision exonerating respondent mayor of administrative charge is not appealable and that the petition was filed out of time. Issue: W CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision of an administrative charge is not appealable - NO. 1. Petitioner claims that respondent court erred in ruling that it has no appellate authority to review the decision of the Ombudsman arguing that pursuant to the decision of this Court in Fabian vs. Desierto, decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals. He insists that the Ombudsman‘s decision absolving respondent Abalos of the charge against him is appealable. In his Reply, petitioner stresses that the Office of the Ombudsman should not restrict the right of appeal allowed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 nor limit the power of

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review of this Court. He contends that whether the decision of the Ombudsman is for conviction or acquittal of the respondent, it should be reviewed by this Court. 2. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 provides: "SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

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The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest may require." 3. It is clear that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public censure, or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. The last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that in all administratively disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court was rendered invalid and of no effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which laid down the rule that said Section 27 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases without violating the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence. Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. The only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand. 4. Pursuant to AO No. 7, where the respondent is absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and unappealable. It is implicit in Section 27, and with greater reason, that decisions of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the charge, should be final and unappealable.

359

Needless to state, in appropriate cases involving oppressive or arbitrary action, the complainant is not deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to the Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman. 5. The same case teaches that the failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases from the decision of the Ombudsman is not a denial of due process for the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. It should be recalled that the Second Division of this Court in G.R. No.140272 denied the appeal by way of petition for review on certiorari in its Resolution dated November 24, 1999 precisely in view of the ruling in the Fabian case. Simply put, the correct recourse was to the Court of Appeals and not to this Court. This notwithstanding, even on the assumption that appeal is allowed, the same can no longer prosper. As correctly pointed out by private respondent, since the Order dated September 10, 1999 of the Ombudsman denying the motion for reconsideration was received by petitioner on October 15, 1999, petitioner had until October 25, 1999 to appeal in accordance with Section 27, R.A. 6770 or at the most, until November 24, 1999, if he availed of the 30-day extension provided under Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. However, the petition was filed with the Court of Appeals only on February 1, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period.

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 [G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999] FELIX A. SAJOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Nature: petition to set aside a resolution of the Court of Appeals 1. April 23, 1991 - RTC Branch 118, Pasay City, convicted petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal Case NO. 97-12635, of estafa. 2. Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, and, thereafter, filed an appellant's brief, which appeal is now pending therein. 3. June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal through Attorney Mariano Cervo. Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the Court of Appeals. 4. February 21, 1992 - petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Extension of Time to File Brief," asking for an additional thirty-day period to file appellant's brief, which the court granted. On March 20, 1992, petitioner filed a "Petition for Second Extension of Time to File Brief", which the court likewise granted. Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for Third Extension of Time to File Brief." The court granted the motion. 5. November 27, 1992 - CA resolved to dismiss petitioner's appeal for failure to file his brief within the third extension granted by the court. Petitioner could not give any plausible explanation for his failure to file brief. 6. March 12, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that his counsel, Attorney Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief because

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of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or negligence or omission, intentional or otherwise, in the performance of his avowed professional duty." 7. March 30, 1993 - CA denied the motion for being a prohibited pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on April 12, 1993. Issue: W Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file appellant's brief 1. Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Revised Rules of Court provides "Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An Appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: xxx (e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;" 2. In Sps. Lawa vs. Court of Appeals, we said: "True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's right, however, carries with it the correspondent respect for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice. The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court." 3. In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that: "Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while

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the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances." While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 4. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied him the right to due process when it dismissed his appeal because of his counsel's negligence. We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse that he relied on the services of his counsel and that he was busy is "flimsy". Were we to accept his excuse, this Court would have to open cases dismissed many years ago on the ground of counsel's neglect. In many cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is matched by his client's own negligence."

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

361

Nature: two petitions for certiorari and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose ―Jinggoy‖ P. Estrada and several others. 1. April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of P200 Million from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis ―Chavit‖ Singson through the latter‘s assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. 2. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundation‘s treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation‘s account with the Equitable PCI Bank. 3. In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints including Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757. 4. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The

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Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder. 5. April 4, 2001 - the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President, including one for plunder. 6. April 5, 2001 - petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman‘s Joint Resolution finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. This was denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. 7. Also on April 5, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused‘s Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward Serapio. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused, including petitioner. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 200. For his part,

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petitioner‘s co-accused Jose ―Jinggoy‖ Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right. 8. May 4, 2001 - during the hearing for the Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner‘s petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. 9. May 17, 2001 - four days before the hearing on petitioner‘s petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of all three accused, and a motion for joint bail hearings. Petitioner questioned this in the hearing on his petition for bail. So Sandiganbayan reset the hearing to enable the court to resolve the prosecution‘s pending motions as well as petitioner‘s motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed. 10. May 31, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner‘s April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001 Resolution. 11. June 1, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the

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case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. 12. However, Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001. 13. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed a motion to quash on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ―ill-gotten wealth‖ as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling. By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioner‘s motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. 14. The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the

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motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner‘s guilt of plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings. 15. July 9, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner‘s motion to quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said resolution. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose ―Jinggoy‖ Estrada was also resolved by the Sandiganbayan. 16. July 10, 2001 - just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan‘s rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with

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his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. 19. July 20, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. 20. August 9, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan‘s Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. 21. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as against him.

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He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.[36] Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest. Issue: W Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner‘s omnibus motion - NO. 1. Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman‘s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. Citing Raro v. Sandiganbayan: ‗x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish ‗probable cause‘ for filing of information against the supposed offender.‖ 2. Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their

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resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying petitioner‘s motion for reinvestigation. 3. Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner‘s omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused. It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman‘s Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman‘s resolution, but failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman‘s resolution may be granted. 4. It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a

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right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation. 5. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for tria. As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, ―[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." 6. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officer‘s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of

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probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.

366 PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; et. al petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor I; et al. respondents. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J

Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman 1. The Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality. However, the Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3 recommended that the amount of P450,000.00 be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of Bernaldez Street. Discussion thereon was deferred. 2. February 6, 2002 - Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V. Paña, issued a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal Engineer prepared a Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B. Espejo and Mayor Budiongan. 3. March 6, 2002 - Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of Herbert Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor, Inc, after public bidding. The Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign and enter into contract with Malmis relative to the above project in the amount of P339,808.00. So Malmis commenced with the project. 4. Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds. Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 8 approving the realignment of

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the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the contract price. 5. July 3, 2002 - respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for the purpose. 6. July 31, 2003 - the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause and recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioners. 7. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated April 28, 2004, modifying the charge. Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as Criminal Case No. 28076. 8. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information charging them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. It held that although Malmis benefited from the contract, the same is not unwarranted considering that the project was implemented, executed and completed. 9. June 27, 2005 - an Amended Information was filed charging petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.

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No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal Treasury which was originally appropriated for the purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its Resolution dated August 18, 2005. 10. On even date, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for Reinvestigation arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It held that it is too late in the day to remand the case for reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already been arraigned and the case had long been set for pretrial proceedings, with both parties having filed their respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075, the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners however were not given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the modified charges. Thus, it granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a motion for reinvestigation) of the said office's Memorandum dated April 28, 2004. 11. Petitioners maintain that the modification of the charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No.

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3019 denied their rights to due process since they were not given the opportunity to answer and present evidence on the new charge in a preliminary investigation. Issue: W the Petitioners were denied the opportunity to present counter-evidence in a new preliminary investigation - NO. 1. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. 2. Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without

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affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights. 3. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest of the petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005. 4. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." 5. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it,

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save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to said officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.

369 ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.:

1. December 27, 1991 - Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank. It also required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act. 2. (9) additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC. 3. January 3, 1992 - (11) more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same court. The Informations were similarly worded as the

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earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where these accounts were maintained. 4. All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court. 5. Meanwhile, Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992. 6. August 24, 1992 - Central Bank, pursuant to the government‘s policy of further liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking system. 7. Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318. 8. September 19, 1993 - the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases. 9. February 28, 1994 - petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos

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had earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992. 10. August 11, 1994 - petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central Bank‘s reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with the government. 11. September 6, 1994 - the trial court denied petitioners‘ motion. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994. 12. November 21, 1994 - petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied petitioners‘ motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995. 13. Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction were respectively with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in denying petitioners‘ respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Issue: (1) W the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation? NO. 1. Petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation

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of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that government‘s ban on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960. 2. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted. 3.Petitioners have expressly waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners admit posting bail immediately following their return to the country, entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on the ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation.

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The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

1. An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. 2. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 3. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. 4. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issues: W the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful No. W petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation - No. 

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RULING: 1. The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. 2. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. 3. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. 4. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment

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and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. 5. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

373 G.R. Nos. 138859-60. February 22, 2001 ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent. PANGANIBAN, J.:

Honorable

Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation. Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing two Orders of the Sandiganbayan 1. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. 2. Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the prosecution of ―the aforenamed respondents‖ for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. 3. April 16, 1998 - Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On

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the same day, he filed a ―Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation.‖ 4. June 8, 1998 - Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. 5. August 8, 1998 - petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned. 6. February 15, 1999 - On the scheduled arraignment, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. 7. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner‘s plea for preliminary investigation. Issue: W the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment YES. Held: 1. Preliminary investigation is ―an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.‖The Court explained that the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to ―protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first

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ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer." 2. The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court. The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional trial court. 3. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen years. Under the aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation. 4. It is undisputed, however, that before the Information against petitioner was filed, no preliminary investigation had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the Ombudsman admitted that ―petitioner was denied of his right to preliminary investigation.‖ We find no basis for the Sandiganbayan‘s ruling that petitioner ―had not given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information.‖ 5. First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the September 19, 1995 Order. After learning of the filing of the Information against him when he was served a Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard to him. Several months later, moments before his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the

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preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given the court timely notice of this deficiency. 6. Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information, petitioner had known that the proceedings and the investigation against his co-accused were pending, he cannot be expected to know of the investigator‘s subsequent act of charging him. Precisely, he had not been previously included therein and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof. 7. In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that ―the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.‖ Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. 8. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner‘s right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, ―[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.‖ 9. We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted. 10. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan‘s reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. This provision cannot

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justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. YUSOP v SANDIGANBAYAN February 22, 2001 Facts: Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also required respondents, within ten days from receipt thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other pieces of contraverting evidence. The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They

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were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation." In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. 24525 was concerned. On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment. Hence, this recourse. Issue :

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1. Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment? 2. Is the filing of the bail bond constitutive of a waiver for seeking the right of preliminary investigation? Held: Petition is partly meritorious remanded in Sandiganbayan for conduct of Preliminary investigation. Annent to the first issue. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan's reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. This provision cannot justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party to the case and was not accorded any right to present evidence on his behalf. In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that the basic rudiments of due process are complied with.‖ For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition.

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Anent to the second issue: In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx." We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted. VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN July 27, 2008 FACTS: charging former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose ―Jinggoy‖ Estrada, Charlie ―Atong‖

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Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, John Does and Jane Does, with the crime of Plunder. The Ombudsman moved to amend the Information twice - initially, to introduce changes in the Information (including a change in the appellation of the accused Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy to John Doe a.k.a. as Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy), and thereafter, to include Jaime C. Dichaves as accused; the Sandiganbayan granted the motions. In the course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion dated 8 January 2002[8] seeking, among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy. The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused John Doe who was designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy; and that, in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should issue against him after he had been identified to be also using the name Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at 2041 M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a positive identification had been made through photographs, as early as the Senate Impeachment Trial against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, that John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one and the same person.

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The petitioner‘s response was a Petition to Conduct Preliminary Investigation[10] filed with the Ombudsman. The petitioner argued that: (1) he was not subjected to a preliminary investigation or to any previous inquiry to determine the existence of probable cause against him for the crime of plunder or any other offense, as: a. he was not included as respondent in either of the two Ombudsman cases – bases of the criminal proceeding; b. neither his name nor his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City was mentioned at any stage of the preliminary investigation conducted in the criminal cases; c. the preliminary investigation in the cases that led to the filing the case was conducted without notice to him and without his participation; d. he was not served any subpoena, whether at his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City or at any other address, for the purpose of informing him of any complaint against him for plunder or any other offense and for the purpose of directing him to file his counter-affidavit; (2) dictates of basic fairness and due process of law require that petitioner be given the opportunity to avail himself of the right to a preliminary investigation since the offense involved is nonbailable in character.

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ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman complied with the basic requirements of due process and the prevailing rules and jurisprudence on preliminary investigation. HELD/RATIO: NO. A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. Thus, as in a court proceeding (albeit with appropriate adjustments because it is essentially still an administrative proceeding in which the prosecutor or investigating officer is a quasi-judicial officer by the nature of his functions), a preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process.

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In light of the due process requirement, the standards that at the very least assume great materiality and significance are those enunciated in the leading case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. This case instructively tells us - in defining the basic due process safeguards in administrative proceedings that the decision (by an administrative body) must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them; it should not, however, detract from the tribunal‘s duty to actively see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the petitioner‘s right to due process has been violated. PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872–75 MENDOZA; February 21, 2001 NATURE - An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo FACTS

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- Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, whereupon the cases were consolidated and jointly tried. The evidence for the prosecution: - In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused), then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two halfbrothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts. Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joy‘s vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone what he had done to her. - 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and at other times licking her vagina.

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- Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named Aira, 2 years old. On April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the room crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did something to her, which she demonstrated by opening her right leg and moving one of her right fingers toward her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter and thought that her father was just joking with the latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days that followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why her vagina hurt, Aira said it was because of the things her grandfather had been doing to her vagina, showing her mother what had been done to her.On vagina. She also noticed that her daughter was running a fever, and that her vagina was red and swollen. She took Aira to Dr. Lydia Buyboy, who told her that her daughter had lacerations in her vaginal area and that she had probably been fingered. However, the doctor declined to give a medical certificate as she did not want to get involved in any case. - Mary Grace Ocampo( stepdaughter of accused), Angelina‘s daughter, married Ranold, accused‘s son by first wife Caridad and Regail‘s brother. Mary Grace testified that she had been molested by her stepfather when she was 9 years old. She recalled when, as a new couple, Angelina and accused spent the night at an aunt‘s house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Mary Grace was with them. According to Mary Grace, accused went to her side, raised her clothes, and fondled her breasts. His hands went lower. She was unable to resist

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accused‘s advances because of his strength and threats. To prevent a recurrence of the event, Mary Grace moved out of their house and went to live with her aunt in Angeles City. Kimberly was around Aira‘s age, and Regail remembered hearing that pus had also come out of the child‘s vagina. When she told her about Dr. Buyboy‘s findings, Mary Grace lost no time and took Kimberly to Dr. Buyboy, who made the same findings. - Angelina and Loida went to the police station to make a report and brought the children to the Ospital ng Angeles for physical examination. They went back to the Mabalacat Police Station and gave their statements. They went to the NBI for another physical examination. The evidence for the defense: - Accused denied the allegations against him. He said there were always several people in their house at any time, and so it was impossible for him to have an opportunity to molest any of the complainants. He believed that Mary Joy had accused him because he always noticed whenever she came home late and scolded her. As for Mary Grace‘s complaint, he claimed he was in fact the one who caught Kimberly playing with her organ and that he reported this to Kimberly‘s parents. He believes that Regail filed the complaint against him because he had scolded her and punished her when she went out on a date with a married man, and again when she went out with her cousin after she had married Meryll Robertson. As to Roan, he claimed he never molested her. Of his granddaughter Aira, accused-appellant said that she was a liar and a naughty child.

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- On April 30, 1997, during Loida Kellow‘s despedida, he was drinking with his friends when he developed a headache and decided to sleep. At around 10PM, he was awakened by his son Renel who gave him glass of bitter liquid to drink. The drink contained sleeping pills. After taking one sip, he set it aside. When he woke up the next morning, he looked for his family, but they were not around. He got home at 8PM, but there was still no sign of them. - The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his watch and ring and bought a ticket on the Super Ferry 10. At 9PM, he sailed for Cebu and stayed with his eldest son, Rolando Velasquez. Three weeks later, he learned of the cases filed against him from the newspapers and television. However, because he had no job and no money, he was unable to return to Pampanga to clear his name. He was found in Cebu and arrested in July. - The accused presented several witnesses to testify that he is a man of good repute, and to corroborate his story. TC RULING: The accused was convicted of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in denying the accused of his right to preliminary investigation. NO.

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2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Regail Velasquez. NO. 3. WON the trial court erred in giving credibility to Mary Joy Ocampo‘s testimony. YES. HELD 1. NO. It is an established jurisprudence that the issue of lack of or a defective preliminary investigation should be raised before or during trial and such statutory right to a preliminary investigation is deemed waived when appellant, as in this case, failed to claim it before plea. Moreover, in appellant‘s arguments, it is unclear whether this alleged motion for preliminary investigation which was denied by the trial court was anchored on the lack of it or merely a defect thereon or a mere motion for reinvestigation. When it does not appear from the record that a preliminary investigation was not granted the accused, it must be presumed that the proceedings in the trial court were in accordance with law. So that where no objection has been made at the trial, appellant must be taken to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit thereof. Failing to raise the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during the trial, appellant is now estopped to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any rate, absence of preliminary investigation merely affects the regularity of the proceedings but does not affect the trial court‘s jurisdiction or impair the validity of the information.

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JUDY ANN SANTOS v PEOPLE August 26, 2008 FACTS: BIR Commissioner Parayno, Jr. wrote DOJ Secretary Gonzales a letter regarding the possible filing of criminal charges against Judy Ann Santos. The letter read: ―I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary investigation and filing of an information in court if evidence so warrants, the herein attached Joint Affidavit of RODERICK C. ABAD, STIMSON P. CUREG, VILMA V. CARONAN, RHODORA L. DELOS REYES under Group SupervisorTEODORA V. PURINO, of the National Investigation Division, BIR National Office Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City, recommending the criminal prosecution of MS. JUDY ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS forsubstantial underdeclaration of income, which constitutes asprima facie evidence of false or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC and punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of the Tax Code.‖ In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized the findings of the investigating BIR officers that petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely from ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR offices and those given by petitioner's accountant and third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received in 2002 income in the amount of at least P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but also from

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other sources, such as movies and product endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from petitioner's underdeclaration amounted to P1,718,925.52, including incremental penalties; the non-declaration by petitioner of an amount equivalent to at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return was considered a substantial underdeclaration of income, which constituted prima facieevidence of false or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended; and petitioner's failure to account as part of her income the professional fees she received from sources other than ABS-CBN and her underdeclaration of the income she received from ABS-CBN amounted to manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended. ISSUE: WON the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash. HELD/RATIO: NO. The Petition for Review which petitioner intended to file before the CTA en banc relied on two grounds: (1) the lack of authority of Prosecuting Attorney Torrevillas to file the Information; and (2) the filing of the said Information in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. Petitioner's argument must fail in light of BIR Commissioner Parayno's letter dated 19 May 2005 to DOJ Secretary Gonzales referring "for preliminary investigation and filing of an information in court if

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evidence so warrants," the findings of the BIR officers recommending the criminal prosecution of petitioner. In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno already gave his prior approval to the filing of an information in court should the DOJ, based on the evidence submitted, find probable cause against petitioner during the preliminary investigation. Section 220 of the NIRC, as amended, simply requires that the BIR Commissioner approve the institution of civil or criminal action against a tax law violator, but it does not describe in what form such approval must be given. In this case, BIR Commissioner Parayno's letter of 19 May 2005 already states his express approval of the filing of an information against petitioner and his signature need not appear on the Resolution of the State Prosecutor or the Information itself. Still on the purported lack of authority of Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas to file the Information, petitioner asserts that it is the City Prosecutor under the Quezon City Charter, who has the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses allegedly committed within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, such as petitioner's case. The Court is not persuaded. Under Republic Act No. 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City, the City Prosecutor shall have the following duties relating to the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses: SEC. 28. The City Attorney - His assistants - His duties. – xxxx

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(g) He shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the municipal courts of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to the criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals. (h) He shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances and have the necessary information or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused. He or any of his assistants may conduct such investigations by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for this purpose may issue subpoena, summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to the municipal court or the Court of First Instance. No witness summoned to testify under this section shall be under obligation to give any testimony which tend to incriminate himself. Evident from the foregoing is that the City Prosecutor has the power to investigate crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the city, and which can be prosecuted before the trial courts of the said city. The charge against petitioner, however, is already within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CTA, as the Information states that her gross underdeclaration resulted in an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24, excluding interest and penalties. The City Prosecutor

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does not have the authority to appear before the CTA, which is now of the same rank as the Court of Appeals. In contrast, the DOJ is the principal law agency of the Philippine government which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm. It has the power to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. Under the DOJ is the Office of the State Prosecutor whose functions are described as follows: Sec. 8. Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. - The Office of the Chief State Prosecutor shall have the following functions: (1) Assist the Secretary in the performance of powers and functions of the Department relative to its role as the prosecution arm of the government; (2) Implement the provisions of laws, and rules, and carry out the policies, and projects of the Department investigation and prosecution of

executive orders plans, programs relative to the criminal cases;

(3) Assist the Secretary in exercising supervision and control over the National Prosecution Service as constituted under P.D. No. 1275 and/or otherwise hereinafter provided; and (4) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary.[54] As explained by CTA First Division in its Resolution dated 11 May 2006:

[T]he power or authority of the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño, Jr. and his deputies in the Department of Justice to prosecute cases is national in scope; and the Special Prosecutor's authority to sign and file informations in court proceeds from the exercise of said person's authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Moreover, there is nothing in the Revised Quezon City Charter which would suggest that the power of the City Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the city is to the exclusion of the State Prosecutors. In fact, the Office of the State Prosecutor exercises control and supervision over City Prosecutors under Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. As regards petitioner's second ground, the Court is unconvinced. First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. The same cannot be said herein. Second, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process when she was given the opportunity to file her affidavits and other pleadings and submit evidence before the DOJ during the preliminary investigation of her case and before the Information was filed against her. Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard. In addition, preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on

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the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause based on the parties' evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the case. Third, petitioner cannot likewise aver that she has been denied equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. BAVIERA v PAGLINAWAN February 8, 2007 Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local residents foreign securities called GTPMF. These securities were not registered with the SEC and were then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCBSingapore. The Investment Capital Association of the Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the

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selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the local mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this country. Petitioner learned that the SCB had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section 8.1 of the Securities Regulation Code against private respondents but was denied holding that it should have been filed with the SEC. Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse thecomplaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution. AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

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March 3, 2008 FACTS: On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina AguirreOlondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.

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Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. RULING: 1. No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

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Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e. [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. 2. No. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not mean ―actual and positive cause‖ nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

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The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against the supposed offender. The court‘s duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the assailed executive determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the

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extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted without authority. Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In ruling the way he did – that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent

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by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal code. We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case. ROQUE v OMBUDSMAN May 12, 1999 Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officials' rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.

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FACTS:  Petitioners are Schools Division Superintendents  COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotments released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices  As a result of the audit, auditors found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of PD No. 1445.  affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners  the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation  petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits  Two Information for violation of Sec. 3(g) and Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations charged several respondents, among whom was petitioners.  On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counteraffidavits, until the present[,] or, more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent [and no] case [has]

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been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner" ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints against petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a] speedy disposition of cases. HELD/RATIO: YES. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. This Court, however, has held that the rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.‖ In First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained: Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue. Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution and RA 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him. More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed

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against them. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman cases, this Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so. SOCRATES V SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Petitioner is the incumbent governor of Palawan until the respondent Rodriguez was appointed as Acting Governor in his stead, after the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Two complaints for violation of RA 3019 was filed by respondent Rodriguez and other provincial board

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members of Palawan with the Office of the Tanodbayan. The controversial act done was in relation to the purchase and repair of a vessel which was also approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Note that pending the case, he won the election and became the incumbent governor once again.) Petitioner filed a motion to suspend preliminary investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Of the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary investigation. Before his arraignment, petitioner also filed a motion to quash the information in the cases filed against him which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus he filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the SC for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (G.R. Nos. 116259-60) No TRO was issued for his petition, thus his arraignment proceeded and the prosecution moved to suspend him while the case is pending which was initially opposed by petitioner but said opposition was later withdrawn. In the interim, petitioner also filed a motion to include as principals other officers involved in the purchase of the vessel in question. He argued that the non-inclusion of these co-principals violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the informations null and void. The court without deciding on his motion, granted the motion to suspend him pendent lite for a period of 90 days.

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He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied and he filed a petition for certiorari with the SC (2nd certiorari) which was consolidated with his first petition for certiorari. In relation to G.R. Nos. 116259-60 his ,ain argument is that the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine Issues: WON there was violation of due process due to the 6 year dea;ay in the termination of the preliminary investigation? Held/Ratio: No, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the accused: 1) Initially preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on account of the motion of petitioner, entitled ―Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation.‖ Until an Ombudsman has been appointed 2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private complainant, then Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a lettermanifestation correcting the complaint 3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these cases file with the Office of the

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Ombudsman a reply to complainant‘s manifestation; 4) Thus preliminary investigation was started on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the accused herein, were required to submit counteraffidavits; 5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, petitioner, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds: (a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and (b) That the complaint does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a period of time within which to oppose the motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after protracted deliberations; 6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an ―Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File Appropriate Pleading.‖ Counsel prayed that ―respondents be granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to comply with the order of March 11, 1991‖; 7) The petitioner filed a motion to quash/dismiss on December 17, 1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some time for the prosecution to resolve the motion and there never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the complaint against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;

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8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed

thereafter, the Informations in these cases were after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss. Thus, from the aforementioned sequence of events, it can be gleaned that it was the petitioner‘s delaying tactics which caused the delay of the termination of the preliminary investigation. ANG TIBAY V CIR February 27. 1940 J. laurel

Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. moved for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. They argued that: 1) Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; 2) That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 3) that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and

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functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents which are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein. ISSUE WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR Held/Ratio: Yes, motion for new trial granted Indeed, CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." HOWEVER this does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. The primary rights which should be respected are as follows: 1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present

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2) 3) 4)

5)

6)

7)

his own case and submit evidence in support thereof the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. The decision must have something to support itself. the evidence must be substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The CIR (any tribunal) or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The CIR (any board or body) should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.

8)

In the case at hand, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, , a conclusion of law. The interest of justice would be better

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served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. NAMIL V COMELEC October 28, 2003 J. Callejo Sr.

Facts: On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP) No. 80311083 which contained, inter alia, the petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan winning candidates The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang issued COCVP No. 8031109 which listed the private respondents as winners, Private respondent Kapina wrote the COMELEC requesting that she and the others who were proclaimed as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the winning candidates and the new members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang. After receiving the comments and reports of the election officers involved in the incident, Commissioner Mehold Sadain submitted his recommendation to the COMELEC that there was valid proclamation of private

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respondents and that there being such, adjudication on the matter is no longer required. This recommendation was adopted by the public respondent COMELEC in its Resolution 4615. Thus, petitioners moved that Resolution No. 4615 be declared null and void for being issued without according them due notice and hearing. The petitioners allege that they were never accorded the chance to present their side in connection with the investigation that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner Sadain and on the memoranda/report of the public respondent‘s officers and only learned about the controversy only when they were notified of the assailed resolution of the public respondent Issue: WON petitioners were deprived of due process Held/Ratio: Yes, While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a broad power to enforce all election laws, the same is subject to the right of the parties to due process. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the

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questioned order based solely on private respondent’s allegations. Citing Binan v COMELEC, the court held that petitioners cannot be deprived of office without due process of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. The Court also cited the case of Farinas v COMELEC where it ruled that that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.

VILLEGAS V HIU CHIONG November 10, 1978 J. Fernandez

City Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municpal Board of Manila and signed by mayor Villegas on March 27, 1968 Section 1 of said Ordinance prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and

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members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI of Manila to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. He argues that said ordinance is discriminatory and violates the rule of uniformity in taxation. He also states that as a police power measure, it makes no distinctions between useful and non-useful occupations in the collection of the permit fee. He finally argues that it is oppressive and unreasonable being applicable only to aliens. CFI issued the writ prayed for. Petitioner Mayor Villegas files this petition for certiorari with the SC. Issue: WON Ordinance 6537 is null and void. Held/Ratio: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation. Moreover, The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same

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amount is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive . Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. TAN v DEL ROSARIO October 3, 1994 J. Vitug

Facts: This case is about two consolidated petitions, the first of which questions the constitutionality of RA 7496 Simplied Net Income Taxation Scheme(SNIT). The petitioners state that the said statute violates Art VI Sec 28(1) which provides that the rule of taxation must be uniform and equitable and that the Congress should evolve a progressive system of taxation. The second petition question validity of Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by CIR in accordance with RA 7496. The petitioners state that

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CIR had exceeded its authority in applying SNIT to professional partnerships. Issue: WON there was violation of the EPC Held/Ratio: No Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. It does not prohibit classification so long as it is germane to the purpose of the law and makes substantial distinctions. Such classifications are valid so long as they are not arbitrary and inappropriate. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. The law did not intend to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership. Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco July 30, 1910 Johnson J.

Facts: On the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, defendant Chuoco Tiaco was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China,

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Later he was able to return to the Islands but he feared, as that he should be again deported by the said defendants,. Thus he filed with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant. This petition was granted. The defendants filed this present petition with the SC and they argue that since the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese empire is a private one of the governor-general of these islands, and the defendant A. S. Crossfield exceeded these authority by trying the case and issuing the injunction and refusing to allow the demurrer and motion for the dismissal of the complaint Issue: WON it is within the power of the State to deport aliens and whether doing such would be a violation of equal protection and due process of law Held/Ratio: Yes. every government has the inherent power to expel from its borders aliens whose presence has been found detrimental to the public interest. . The international community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to fix the conditions under which foreigners should be allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may be more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a legitimate manifestation of territorial power and not contrary to law. the expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that the executive power may expel, without appeal, any person whose presence tends to disturb the public peace.

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The power to exclude or expel aliens being a power affecting international relations is vested in the political department of the Government. The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but the exercise of one and the same power. Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere it if has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances or occasion any other disorder contrary to the public safety It has been repeatedly decided when a government is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is not governed by that "due process of law" which governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For instance, the courts of the United States have decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by jury being one of the steps in the "due process of law" in dealing with civil rights

Peralta v COMELEC March 11, 1978 J. Antonio

Facts: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. They were assailing the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978

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Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, which grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation. Petitioners argue that the optional straight party voting scheme is violative of the equal protection clause. They argue that an independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause in the 1978 Election Code and thus invalid Held/Ratio: No. the 1978 Election Code is valid. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classifications. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. 14 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it

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applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not. Exactness in division is impossible and never looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis on general lines for the division Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.

398 Ceniza v COMELEC January 28, 1980 CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Facts: On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. It was provided in said BP that Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now existing with an annual regular derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly urbanized city To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No. 1421which enumerated the cities which are not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials. Included therein were Cebu City and Mandaue City. The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They assail Section 3 of BP. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically located and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum They argue that said law is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of

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the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. They also state that Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. Issue: WON, there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Held/Ratio: No. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units and independence. Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or

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industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.

United Democratic Opposition v COMELEC 104 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 56515

(equal protection; scope of equality; political laws) In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a plebiscite for the people‘s approval. The YES vote was being advanced by KBL – Marcos‘ Party while the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant

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to Res‘ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws. ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELEC‘s denial of their request. HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‗pulong-pulong‘ or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‗Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy‘. In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense. Gumabon v Director of Prisons 37 SCRA 420, G.R. No. L-30026

(same; same; political crimes) Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed

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with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC. Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed therein. Hence, the without such complexion the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor? ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment,

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then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Nunez v Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433, G.R. No. L-50581-50617

Nuňez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuňez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuňez‘s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by

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certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuňez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it ―must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.‖ Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

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Mirasol v DPWH G.R. No. 158793, 8 June 2006

(equal protection of laws; valid qualifications; substantial qualifications) On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. HELD: The Court found that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification among modes of transport is that of ―motorized‖ against the ―non-motorized.‖ Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models. The Court

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found that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon 163 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 81958

(equal protection; substantial distinctions; requisites) Department of Labor Secretary Drilon issued Department Order No. 1, otherwise known as the ―Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers,‖ imposing, among other things, a ban on the deployment of female domestic helpers and other female workers of similar skill. Petitioner, a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas employment, sought the nullification of D.O. No. 1 arguing, among other things, that the same is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD: The Court agreed that there is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not

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import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court said that it is a matter of judicial notice that female domestics and similar workers are subjected to exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. On the other hand, there is no evidence that male OCWs suffer from the same predicament and that there is no showing that the government should act in a similar manner with regard to them. The Court here is not saying that there is a superiority of men over women. All it is saying is that, based on available evidence, there is a marked distinction in their working conditions and predicaments. (see also: Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA, 243 SCRA 666; JMM Promotion and Management v CA; Dumlao v COMELEC; Tolentino v Secretary of Finance; Inchong v Hernandez)

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents. G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:

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Himagan, was a policeman that was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. The TC issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides: Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours). Himagan questions the order stating that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. ISSUE: WON Himagan‘s right to equal protection has been violated? NO RATIO: HImagan misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the

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Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand

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absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents. G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995 MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: The Ombudsman received an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. Because of this, the Ombudsman issued subpoena duces tecum to to the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as

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vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988." The petitioners contest this, stating that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce evidence against themselves. ISSUE: WON it is within Ombudsman‘s power to issue the order of subpoena duces tecum? YES RATIO: At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. 1 On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national

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economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. First, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. Second, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and

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charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not necessary. Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI, 12 of the Constitution means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution. Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.

406 TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. .G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998 MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Petitioners, an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies, challenge the validity of BP Blg No. 881, which requires radio and tv to give free broadcast to electoral candidates. They base their challenge on the ff. grounds: (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. ISSUES: WON it is violative of their due process and just compensation? NO WON it is violative of their right to equal protection? NO RATIO: (1) SPetitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause 6 and the eminent domain provision 7 of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation. Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by

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the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." 10 In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. 18 It would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving free air time. the COMELEC however, does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. 23

(2) Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. They contend that newspapers and magazines are not

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similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, 27 we upheld their right to the payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide under § The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. (1) Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. (2) Government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. (3) The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming

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universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance. Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of the law has no basis. In addition, their plea that §92 (free air time) and §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime where moneyed candidates could monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage of candidates with less resources. That is what Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure of interested parties to have the law repealed or at least modified. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitionerintervenors. G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999 MARTINEZ, J.:

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FACTS: The case stems from the charge against petitioner Panfilo Lacson, and 11 others, for the murder of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The case was first under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon the contention of Lacson that the RTC has the proper jurisdiction to thresh the matter since RA 7975 limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher, it was transferred to RTC-QC. the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. TWhile these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, , House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 . Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."

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ISSUES: (1) WON it violates Lacson‘s right to equal protection? NO (2) WON it is an ex post facto law? NO RATIO: (1) The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case. A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable

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under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.. Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had

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already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. Evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law. In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative

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powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40 (2) Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. In this case,.R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition. 5Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54 In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56 WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

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The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a fullpledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. The primary argument of Jalosjos is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been reelected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman ISSUE: WON membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? NO RATIO: The Constitution guarantees the equal protection of laws.This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a

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particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. The SC finds that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, 
vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents. KAPUNAN, J.:

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Facts: The International School is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. It hires both foreign and local teachers as members of the faculty. The foreign hires are granted certain benefits not given to local hire such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The discrepancy between the salary of local and foreign hires was brought up by the ISAE,, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"4 of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and localhires. ISSUE: WON the salary discrepancy is based on a reasonable distinction? NO RATIO: the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy

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and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The localhires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups

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have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreignhires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent. CARPIO, J.

FACTS: July 10, 1983 - Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old. January 4, 1985 - Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (―PD 1146‖). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. Nicolas‘ last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985. January 31, 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas‘ application for retirement ―effective 17 February 1984,‖ granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter April 22 1992- Nicolas died. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. June 8 1992, - GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no

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right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of retirement on ―17 February 1984.‖ Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension. TC: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension. CA: agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension came from the deceased pensioner‘s salary deductions. ISSUES: (1) WON the prohibition is based on reasonable classification? NO (2)WON the prohibition under PD 1146 is a denial of due process? YES, RATIO: (1) A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

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Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.[31] Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner‘s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. (2) Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees‘ monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the

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mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the member‘s retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation. In PD 1146, There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit.

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People v. Cayat

Facts: ―Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind.‖ The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law. Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term ‗non-Christian tribes‘ refers to a geographical area and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the nonChristian tribes‖ The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It

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is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc City

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing ―on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.‖ Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.

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Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed? Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax Philippine Judges v. Prado

Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The

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respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional. Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar

Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan

Facts: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member

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Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit Held: Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by such executive order, it was that of herein petitioner. Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho

Facts: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also

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lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws Tiu vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled ―An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes.‖ Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special privileges. then the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-andduty-free privilege was operative, viz.:w ―Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone]. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to nonSSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided

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herein‖ Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present ―fenced-in former Subic Naval Base‖ only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee. Held: We first determine the purpose of the law. From the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses. Obviously, the ―lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement‖ are its object From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, both local and foreign. Among such enticements are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on

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banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers. We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, ―The intent of a statute is the law.‖[ Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called ―secured area‖ and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the ―secured area‖ are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis

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to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the ―secured area,‖ which is already fenced off, to prevent ―fraudulent importation of merchandise‖ or smuggling. It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fencedoff free port zone. We believe that the classification set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to establish a ―self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center‖ in the area. There will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it. Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the ―secured area.‖ The residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required. CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT

COMMISSION

ON

GOOD

Facts: -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and ―enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." -PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government. -PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,

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transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Issue:Whether the compromise agreement entered into between PCGG and the Marcoses violate equal protection? YES Ratio: Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.[58] Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: ―No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.‖ The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that ―taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

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Moncado v. People’s THE CASE IN IN SPANISH!! Sorry.

Court

Stonehill v. Diokno

FACTS: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in ―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.‖ By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: ―Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).‖ The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

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(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners‘ consent; and that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the people‘s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a ―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs

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Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.‖ In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a ―violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,‖ — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: ―Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.‖

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Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized. PEOPLE VS. MALASUGUI (2007)

FACTS: March 5, 1935 – Tan Why, a merchant, was found with several head wounds and a fractured skull on a path leading to a barrio in Cotabato, and situated within the property of Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why merely responded ―Kagui‖ when he was asked who had attacked him. Tan Why was brought to the hospital, but he died shortly afterwards. Lt. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered the immediate arrest of Kagui Malasugui. Lt. Jacaria had been informed that Malasugui had just redeemed 2 pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops and was carrying money, and so when Malasugui was brought to him, he asked the latter for the bracelets and he then voluntarily gave them. After this, Lt. Jacaria asked him if he had anything else, he ―tremblingly‖ answered in the negative.

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He was later searched, without his opposition, and the following were found: Tan Why‘s pocketbook, P92 in bills, Tan Why‘s ID, and a memorandum of amounts. Malasugui was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was convicted by the CFI-Cotabato. Malasugui testified at trial that he was forced to produce the bracelet, pocketbook and money, and that the rest were all fabricated. ISSUE/HELD: W/N the articles taken are admissible in evidence – YES. RATIO: When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may be waived, and such waiver MAY BE MADE expressly or impliedly. Also, Malasugui was legally arrested without a judicial warrant because there were facts personally known to Lt. Jacaria (p.226, middle part) which gave him reason to believe or suspect that a crime had in fact been committed and that Malasugui was responsible. When the search of the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to a lawful arrest, they cannot be considered unlawful or unreasonable. The Constitution only prohibits those arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant which are unreasonable. (OLD) Sec. 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads: ―A person charged with a crime may be searched for

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dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the crime.‖ People v. Damaso

Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night time when he was not around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the owner‘s presence is valid. Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accusedappellant without his knowledge is a violation of the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December 1975] Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia

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carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of Davao, proceeded to the Velasco‘s room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they entered the room. There are conficting claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibañez or whether Velasco‘s wife, who was allegedly inside the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter Held: Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then rented by Velasco. Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the written statement of Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, ―a manicurist by occupation.‖ If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy

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alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant People v. Marti

Facts: - The appellant Andre Marti had a package delivered w/ Manila Packaging & Export Forwarders to a certain Walter Frierz in Zurich Switzerland. - Upon final inspection by the proprietor of the forwarder Job Reyes he notice a peculiar smell emanating from the package and proceeded to investigate. - He then gave a sample to the NBI narcotics lab and later brought along 3 NBI agents to his office to have them look at the packages: he personally opens the packages and allows them to be viewed by the officers. - After Marti was located and invited for questioning the results of the tests came revealing that the sample of the content of the packages was indeed ganja ―the devil‘s lettuce‖. - Thus Marti was charged and convicted for violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. - On appeal Marti alleges that the ganja confiscated should not be held as admissible evidence against him since the procurement of the same went against his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

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W/N: the right against unreasonable search and seizure may be invoked against private individuals. Held: No, both American and Philippine jurisprudence as well as the records of the code commission attest that the Bill of Rights can only be invoked against the State and not against private entities. In the instant case the search and seizure was effected by Job Reyes the proprietor of the delivery service on his own initiative. As such the authorities had no involvement and the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked to render such evidence inadmissible. The bill of rights was established to regulate the disparate powers of the State in administering justice in order to safeguard individuals from abuses as such they were never intended to be operative against private individuals. Valmonte v. De Villa Facts 1. The NCR District command was created to conduct security operations within the Metro Manila Area to maintain peace and order. However, petitioners aver that because of the installation of checkpoints, residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary disposition of the military. Cars and vehicles were being subjected to regular searches and checkups especially at night or at dawn without the benefit of a search warrant or court order. 2. The fear increased when one time at dawn, Parpon, a supply officer of Valenzuela, was shot to death after refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and continuing to speed off despite warning shots fired.

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4.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed. Petitioner Valmonte said that he has been stopped and searched without a warrant.

Issue: W/N there was a violation of the constitutionalprotected right against unlawful search and seizures NO Ratio: 1. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed 2. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

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4.

5.

6.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security etween the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community

PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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2. SOME PROCEDURAL RULES (Macri p. 112-113) 3. ONLY A JUDGE MAY VALIDLY ISSUE A WARRANT Harvey v Santiago Aberrant case; upheld validity of arrest of pedophiles on order of the Immigration Commissioner Santiago because there was probably cause based on months of surveillance. The requirement that probable cause is to be determined by a judge does not extend to deportation because it is not criminal but administrative. The existence of photographs justified the arrest and the seizure without warrant. Pedophilia, though not a crime, was offense to public morals.

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The ―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report‖ read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his

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care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now.

Seized during the petitioner‗s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec. 69 of Revised Administrative Code.

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of

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Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. (2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners.

Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

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The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and

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Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired.

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people.

4. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient

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to undicue a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.

Facts: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other words, the applicant‗s knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows:"That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law."At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at night and for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant.

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Issues: (1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay. No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavits based on mere hearsay. The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause. But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts. The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.

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Yes, the search can be made at night. Section 101 of General Order‗s number 58 authorizes search made at night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or in the place ordered tube searched. However, since the search warrant is declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at night.

(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as required by the law. Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description. Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a particular description of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position

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enabling him to identify the articles in question, which he did.

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Issues: 1) Was the warrant valid? No. It violated the single warrant single offense rule because it was a general warrant.

Asian Surety vs. Herrera Must refer to one specific offense. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: On October 1965, upon a sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion. By virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the place in the office of the petitioner in Republic Market and carried away two car loads of documents, papers and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing the validity of the SW, contending that it does not follow the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid SW.

The constitution requires that a SW should be issued upon a probable cause in connection with one single offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for four separate and distinct offenses. Estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid for it is a general warrant.

It also failed to particularly describe the objects to be seized. The constitution mandates that objects to be seized should be couched not on generic but specific terms. Section 2 provides that a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal properties. a) Property subject to the offense b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense

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In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three of the description in relation to the things to be seized in the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in generic terms. The respondent judge did not bother to specify the things to be seized that would be admitted as evidence to the offense charged.

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of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.

Thus, the nearer the time at which the observation of an offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of a probable cause. In the case at bar, the alleged commission of the crime is from 1961 To 1964 and the application for search warrant was made in 1965.

It also violated the rule that it should be served in the day. In the case at bar, the SW was conducted evening of Oct 27, 1 965 at 7:3 0 pm until morning. Thus, there can be doubt as to the establishment of a probable cause because of the remoteness of time. Petition granted. The gap between the offense and application for search warrant was remote. The rules for affidavit are 1 ) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be toor emote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant 2) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense id too remote from the time when the affidavit was made or the search warrant issued but generally speaking, a lapse of time

20th Century Fox v CA PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

In cases involving violation of PD 49, a basic requirement for validity of the search warrant is the presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films

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from which the pirated films are supposed to have been copied.

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the NBI‗s anti-film piracy campaign. NBI conducted surveillance and subsequently filed three applications for search warrants, eventually isused by the lower court. Private respondents filed and were granted a motion to lift.

Issue: WON the judge property lifted the search warrants issued earlier on application of NBI on basis of petitioner‗s complaint

Ruling: The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.

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The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower court.

The lower court held that the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents' establishments was not persuasive. They were never shown to the court. The case should be dismissed as the allegation was not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Placer v Villanueva The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the judge. He is not reliant on the findings of the fiscal..

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Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal‗s certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

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Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal‗s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal‗s certification and require submission of the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.

Petition dismissed.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Soliven v Makasiar It is not necessary that a judge personally examine the complainant and his witness. It is sufficient the judge personally determine probable cause.

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Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court‗s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

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But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

in the President‗s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court‗s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President‗s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder‗s time, also demands undivided attention.

Cruz v Judge Areola FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the

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filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on the complaint filed by herein complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended that the case be set for trial. Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the fact that although respondent Judge already issued a warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to giveaway to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the accused. They believe that there is no longer any reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that there exists probable cause to indict the accused. In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the presiding judge of her branch. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring the implementations of the warrant of arrest

HELD: NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution‗s job. The second kind of preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge. In making the required personal determination, a judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judge‗s sound discretion. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. For the determination of whether probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate

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the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. It appears from the records that the challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely exercised his sound discretion in not immediately issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On her part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.

Sales v Sandiganbayan Determination of probable cause is exclusive province of the judge. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after

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conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a subpoena directing him to filehis counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supportingdocuments. He did it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesn‗t have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined the witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead of conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended the filing of information for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

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Issues: (1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary investigation. (2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting evidence. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMB‗s certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of the latter‗s flawed report and one side factual findings.

Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed because of the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing of the sort but followed the resolution of the graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person

The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan‗s assertion of having found probable cause on its own, considering the OMB‗s defective report and findings, which merely relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense.

Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary investigation. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Lim v Felix If the judge relied solely on the certification of the prosecutor he cannot be said to have personally determined probable cause.

Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor‗s certification in each submitted information recommending the existence of a probable cause.

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Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer than an offense complained of has been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainants and witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either; 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue arrest warrant and 2. If there is no sufficient establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutor‗s certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions to the existence of probable cause. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also mandates that ³x x x probable cause should be personally determined by the judge x x´. This means that

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1. The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge.2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge 3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or release. In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the certification of the prosecutor, without personally examining the information (which still in Masbate, and wherein the respondent denied the motion for transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground that certification id enough ground for the determination of probable cause and issuance of warrant ).Thus, there is no personal examination conducted by the judge to establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the respondent committed abuse of discretion.

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Distinguished. The former is executive in nature and part of a ROSECU TOR‗S JOB. While the latter aka preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to the JUDGE.

Okabe v Judge Gutierrez PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The judge committed GAD in finding probable cause because the investigating prosecutor submitted the only the resolution of the preliminary investigation and the complainant‗s affidavit. The witnesses and reply affidavits were not presented.

Note: Preliminary investigation for the determination of sufficient ground for filing of information and investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner,

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who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.

During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court‗s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama‗s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the

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resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent‗s counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter‗s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

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120 4cases

HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that:

SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

C.Jian 118 cases 119 cases

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D. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

People v. Damaso 212 SCRA 547 (1992), Supra Philippine Constabulary officers and personnel were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended several people including Berlina Aritumba. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Urdaneta were they found subversive documents, a radio, and several firearms. After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. The group interviewed a certain Luzviminda Morados, an alleged househelper of Bernie Mendoza, who pointed the location of the house under surveillance. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they

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already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', xerox copiers and a computer machine. The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom Hence, Basilio Damaso (alias Bernie Mendoza), was charged and convicted in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Damaso contends that the search conducted by the PC officers were illegal. The Solicitor General counters that a search may be validly conducted without a search warrant with if the search was conducted with the consent of the person searched and since the evidence seized was in plain view of the authorities. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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In reversing his conviction, the Court said that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. The Court found no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant.

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Tambasen v. People 246 SCRA 184 (1995) A police officer applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house in Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of a search warrant, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in the application. On another date, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized two envelopes containing P14,000.00 and various communication equipment. Hence, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. His motion was granted by the MTCC which opined that any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered by the warrant and that the money could not be considered as "subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling. However, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision, saying that the any illegality in the search involves matters of defense which should be properly raised at the criminal action or

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actions that may be filed against Tambasen. Petitioner contends that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal possession of subversive documents" in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court (now Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

In attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC, the Court said that, on its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specified offense. The caption of the search warrant reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void.

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. Clearly then, the money which was

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not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversive is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Pangandaman v. Casar 159 SCRA 599 (1988) A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. The relatives of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified — and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Afterwards, a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed with respondent Judge Casar. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." The lawyer for the victims' relatives filed a motion for reconsideration seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and

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manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. Said motion was denied by the trial court.

While the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arrest of petitioners, it said that the warrant issued by the trial court was in the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. The warrant in question was issued against fifty (50) "John Does", not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify. Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 262 SCRA 219 (1996), Supra An intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB), received information that private respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other items used or intended to be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated videotapes. Said officer then filed a verified Application for Search Warrant with prayer for the seizure of the properties described in the search warrant. After the issuance of the warrant, this was served on private respondents which led to the seizure of the properties described in the warrant. Private respondent then filed an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For the Return of the Seized Articles alleging that the search warrant violates the constitutional requirements of particularity of the description of the warrant, being a general warrant and thus, null and void. The RTC granted the motion in which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court found respondent‗s contention untenable. The Court said that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized 1) when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; 2) or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. If the articles

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desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles, subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. The Court said that search warrant authorized only the seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other acts in violation of Sec. 56 of P.D. 49. The search warrant ordered the seizure of the following properties: "(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the attached list; (b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per attached list); PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

(c) Television sets, video cassettes records, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or material used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the abovementioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described."

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Clearly, the above items could not be any more specific as the circumstances will allow since they are all used or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of pirated tapes. Therefore, the finding of the appellate court that the Search Warrant is a "general" warrant is devoid of basis.

Kho v. Makalintal 306 SCRA 70 (1999), Supra In this case, petitioners sought to restrain the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, handsets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle. The search warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses of Kho on the basis of confidential information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and "chop-chop" vehicles. Armed with search warrants, the NBI recovered various high-powered firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition from the two houses. Then, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash

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Search Warrants contending that the subject search warrants are general warrants prescribed by the Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized were not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.. The MTC denied the motion, hence, this petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court affirmed the MTC decision. It ruled that a description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise; PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern. Further the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.

Records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be seized thus: Search Warrant No. 90-11

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"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners, monitoring device and the like."

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Search Warrant No. 90-13

In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could not have been in a position to know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized. Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises to be searched, they could not have known the particular type of weapons involved before seeing such weapons at close range, which was of course impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for subject search warrants.

"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio communications equipments, scanners, monitoring devices and others." Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to: "Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and ammunitions for the said firearms." Search Warrant No. 90-14 states: "Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts."

Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue 344 SCRA 36 (2000)

The Court held that the said warrants comply with Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the effort and time spent in researching on the details to be embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of the search nugatory.

Based on a complaint filed by a certain Rodrigo Abos, former Operating Chief of Unifish Packing Corporation, to the BIR that said company and Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting evasion of tax payments, the BIR applied for search warrants for the search of the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation which the RTC judge issued. The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing the search warrants. Petitioners filed the instant petition for review assailing the validity of the warrants issued, based on the following: there was no probable cause for the judge to issue the

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warrants; and the warrants did not particularly describe the things to be seized.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that before issuing the warrants, the respondent judge took the deposition of Abos, who had access to company records showing the illegal activities and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Most of the items listed in the warrants, however, failed to meet the test of particularity, thus, items not particularly described were ordered to be returned to petitioners. However, the warrants authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices remain valid since no other more adequate and detailed description could be given precisely because they are unregistered.

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and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.

People v. Salanguit 356 SCRA 683 (2001), Supra

Furthermore, the general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko was found guilty of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. In his appeal before the Court, appellant contested his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable,

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of

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marijuana under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court ruled that the seized marijuana brick is inadmissible in evidence against appellant. First, the warrant authorized only the seizure of shabu, and not marijuana. Secondly, the seizure of the marijuana brick could not be justified under the "plain view doctrine" because the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. The Court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu" under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court held that with respect to the seizure of shabu from appellant's residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to appellant's claim that there was undue and unnecessary force employed by the searching party in effecting the warrant, the Court found no evidence to support the allegation. Appellant did not present any affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, to attest to the truth of his claim.

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Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion 307 SCRA 253 (1999)

Police Chief Inspector Pascua applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court presided by the herein respondent, Hon. Asuncion, against the management, represented by petitioners, of Paper Industries Corporation, allegedly in possession of several high-powered firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Although it was supported by depositions of two police officers "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosive Office of the PNP was however attached. At the hearing for the issuance of search warrant Inspector Pascua did not testify but merely introduced as witness Police Officer Bacolod who stated that, from information gathered from reliable sources, he "believed" that PICOP security guards had no license to possess subject firearms. Thereafter, Search Warrant No. 799 (95) was issued. It identified only one place — "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur" as the place to be searched. However, PICOP has 200 office/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL

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depots/quick service outlet and 800 miscellaneous structures spread over 155 hectares of land. Searches were made by the police who recovered several armalites, grenade launcher, 38 caliber revolvers, 45 caliber pistols, hand grenades and ammunitions kept inside the ammo dam and security headquarters or office of PICOP. The PNP then filed with the Department of Justice a complaint for illegal possession of firearms against petitioners who moved to quash the search warrant PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

on the ground of its illegality. The motion and a subsequent motion were denied, hence, resort to this petition.

The requisites for a valid search warrant are: 1) probable cause present; 2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; 3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; 4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and 5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the case at bar the search warrant was issued based solely on affidavits. The trial judge failed to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, witness Bacolod had no

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personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms and the place to be searched was not described with particularity.

In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/ buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 pier/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.

Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are

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inadmissible, the complaint and the proceedings before the State Prosecutor have no leg to stand on. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

People v. Court of Appeals 291 SCRA 400 (1998) A search warrant was served against Azfar Hussain which resulted in his arrest together with 3 other Pakistanis and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects, i.e. dynamite sticks, plastic explosives, fragmentation grenade and high powered firearms and ammunitions. Charged in court, they pleaded not guilty and submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible" on the ground that the place searched, in which the accused were then residing, was Apartment No. 1, a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the search warrant. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision alleging that the police officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before the judge for the issuance of a search warrant.

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The Supreme Court held that while their contention may be conceded, the trouble is that the place described in the search warrant, which is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof, was not that which the police officers who applied for the search warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the search warrant. It does not suffice for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.

People v. Tiu Won Chua 405 SCRA 280 (2003) Appellants were convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No. 7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction.

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5. PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE Burgos v. Chief of Staff Facts:

The Supreme Court held that a mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused because of the test buy operation conducted before obtaining the search warrant. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. It also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described properly.

However, the search conducted on the car parked away from the building, however, was illegal because it was not part of the place described to be searched and it was not incidental to a lawful arrest.

- Judge Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants, by virtue of which the premises of the ―Metropolitan Mail‖ and ―We Forum‖ newspapers were searched. - Police seized printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession of publisher-editor Jose Burgos, Jr. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

- Burgos filed for writ of mandamus and prohibition for the return of the materials seized and to enjoin respondents from using said materials from being used as evidence against him. - One of Burgos‗ many arguments against the search warrants is that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.

Issues: (topical only) W/N it is necessary that property to be searched is owned by the person against

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whom the warrant is issued.

Held:

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and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

NO, OWNERSHIP IS NOT NECESSARY, ONLY POSSESSION 6. CONDUCT OF THE SEARCH

Under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. YOLANDA GESMUNDO, accusedappellant.

[a] Property subject of the offense; PADILLA, J p: [b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the search

Facts: - After having allegedly witnessed accused sell marijuana outside her house, police investigators procured a search warrant to search accused‗s house for marijuana. - Accused claims that while she was seated in the sala, Sgt. Yte, one of the officers conducting the search, was showing her something which the latter claimed to be a search warrant when someone uttered the following words "ito na" coming from the direction of the kitchen. She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four

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other companions who entered the house through the back door which was opened at that time. - She claims that the marijuana supposedly seized by the raiding police team in her possession, was planted by the police officers.

Issue: W/N police complied with the proper procedure for conducting a search by virtue of a warrant.

As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. 20 a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law.

Held: NO THEY DID NOT The search of the accused-appellant's house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. 19 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Furthermore, The police authorities in the case at bar testified that they submitted an inventory to the court without the marijuana, the latter having been turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Having made no return or inventory to the warrantissuing court, there is no proof that the police really found marijuana in the house of the accused. It is also required that the marijuana received be presented as evidence. The identity of the marijuana which constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before the court. Accused is acquitted.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant. CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

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Chinese currencies, typewriters, and even the Toyota Corolla (good lord)

Issues: W/N the manner of conducting the search and seizure was proper.

Facts: - A search warrant was issued by the RTC Pasay commanding a search of Go‗s residence and to seize Shabu, weighing scales and other drug paraphernalia. - In order to gain entry into Go‗s house, they sideswept (sinagi) Go‗s Toyota Corolla GLI which was parked outside. Jack Go, accused‗s son and the only one present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him that they had a warrant for the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. - Barangay Kagawads were later called to be witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

- Police officers then seized a plastic bag containing a yellowish substance, a weighing scale, various documents, bank books, money in Philippine and

Held: NO, NOT AT ALL.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. An examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellant‗s residence was conducted.

In order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers deliberately side- swiped appellant‗s car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following the regular ―knock and announce‖ procedure as outlined

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in Section 7, Rule 126. Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation, the deliberate sideswiping of appellant‗s car was unreasonable and unjustified.

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Also, despite the warrant‗s limiting the search and seizure to shabu and drug paraphernalia, the police seized numerous other items, which are clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia.

Furthermore, the inventory made was not detailed, as was required. Neither was the accused nor the barangay officials issued an inventory receipt. In explaining why they handcuffed jack to a chair while they conducted their search, the police explained that not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating procedure. There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen entered appellant‗s residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.

The raiding team‗s departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellant‗s residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence.

Benny Go is ACQUITTED. Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN PART, and the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject premises which belong to him as listed in said

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Motion. The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State.

7. WARRANTLESS ARREST IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOUCAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA

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liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of ―Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.‖ (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the

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Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in

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court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

(http://mclairgarcia.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/umil-vsramos/)

MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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PUNO, J.: YES, IT IS Facts: - Patrolman Fulgencio was instructed by his station commander to monitor the activities of Sucro, following information that Sucro was selling marijuana. - Pat. Fulgencio hid himself under a house 2 meters away from an adjacent chapel. From there, he observed Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer. This was done three times, and every transaction was reported by Fulgencio to his superior. - Police officers then intercepted the 3rd buyer, who threw a tea bag containing marijuana to the ground. The buyer admitted that he purchased the bag from Sucro. - Police then arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel.

Issue: W/N the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, W/N the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

Held:

―Section 5, Rule 113. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; ―

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to his superiors.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accusedappellant.

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Held: YES, THE ARREST IS LEGAL ―Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

QUIASON, J.: Facts: - A buy-bust operation was conducted outside De Lara‗s house to entrap De Lara, a suspected drug dealer. During the transaction, De Lara sensed the presence of police officers and so ran into his house. He was later subdued by the police. - De Lara denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that the arresting officers merely planted the marijuana on his person. He claims that as he was returnig home after fetching his son, he was arrested by police who then proceeded to dearch his house without a warrant.

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense…‖ PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest".

Issue: W/N De Lara‗s arrest was legal. W/N the seizure of prohibited drugs from inside his house was legal.

We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited drugs found inside appellant's house. The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant's arrest inside his

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house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.

However, the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the booking sheet are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there was no showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.

Issue: W/N Bohol‗s arrest, and the search on his person are legal.

Held: YES

Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARDO BOHOL, accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: - Acting on information that Bohol was engaged in the illegal drug trade, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation to entrap him. - P02 Estrada handed Bohol a marked P100 bill and Bohol, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules which p02 Estrada suspected to be shabu. Police officers then emerged from their hiding places and arrested Bohol. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure: ―Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;‖

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Considering the legality of Bohol‗s warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute valid warrantless searches and seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRIQUE HINDOY and BELLA B. NEGROSA, accused-appellants. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Facts: - a woman informant went to the polce station and reported that a certain ―Bella‖ would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs that day at a certain address. Acting on the information, police went to the address to conduct a buy-bust operation. - They knocked on the door of the accused and pretended to buy marijuana. After an exchange of P1000 in marked bills and a brick (1 kilo) of marijuana was made, police arrested the accused and searched their house where they found even more bricks of mary jane. - The accused, live-in partners, maintain that they could not have committed the crimes charged in the informations because they were sleeping at the time said crimes were allegedly perpetrated. Consequently, the search conducted by the police officers was not incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. The confiscated contraband was, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against them.

Issue: W/N the arrest and search were legal.

Held: YES DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

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The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor.

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is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. LI YIN CHU alias ROBERT LI, appellant. CARPIO, J.: It is true that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, ―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.‖ It is equally true that any evidence obtained in violation of such right shall be inadmissible in evidence. This right, however, is not without exceptions, as in instances of searches incidental to lawful arrests. Under paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed,

Facts: - A man showed up at the PNP station at Camp Crame and reported that Robert Li was engaged in illegal drug activity in Metro Manila. The police then planned to conduct a buy bust operation on the basis of the report. - the informer called up appellant and made arrangement for the purchase of five to ten kilos of shabu to be delivered between 4 to 5 p.m. that same day (July 4, 1999) in front of Iceberg Food House along Banawe Street, Quezon City. - Around 5 o‗clock in the afternoon, appellant arrived on board a blue Honda Civic car with plate number WBY 852. He was approached by the informer and both conversed in Chinese since appellant could not speak English or Tagalog. The informer then called SPO1 delos Santos, who was just about two meters away, to approach. The informer

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introduced SPO1 delos Santos as "Mr. Nueva" to appellant. The informer told appellant that Mr. Nueva wanted to buy shabu. After shaking hands with SPO1 delos Santos, appellant opened the left rear door of the car and showed the shabu to SPO1 delos Santos by pointing to the plastic bag on top of the back seat of the car. SPO1 delos Santos opened the plastic bag and saw a transparent self-sealing plastic bag inside. He removed the seal and felt the substance inside the bag with his fingers. Convinced that the substance inside the self-sealing bag was shabu, he gave a pre-arranged signal to SPO1 Pastrana, who immediately rushed to the scene. SPO1 Pastrana and SPO1 delos Santos identified themselves as police officers and placed appellant under arrest. With the informer doing the interpretation in Chinese language, appellant was PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

informed of his constitutional rights. The police officers thereafter confiscated the shabu and the Honda Civic car.

Issue: W/N Bohol‗s arrest, and the search on his person are legal.

Held: YES

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Appellant contends that the arresting officers merely framed him up. The Court is aware that in drug-related cases, frame-up and "hulidap" are common and standard line of defenses. However, like alibi, frame-up is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. For this defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing.11 In this case, appellant has gravely failed to substantiate his allegations of a frame-up. Appellant‗s claim that the police merely planted the shabu deserves scant consideration. It is incredible that the police officers would plant a very large quantity of shabu when a few sticks of marijuana could have been used, with great ease, to frame-up appellant. Records also show that appellant and the police officers are strangers to each other. Nothing in the records explains why the prosecution witnesses would fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime. Appellant then harps on the poseur-buyer‗s failure to present to appellant the buy- bust money in exchange for the shabu. No law or rule of evidence requires the simultaneous exchange of the buy-bust money and the shabu. The well-entrenched principle is that the accused commits the crime of illegal sale drugs as soon as he consummates the sale transaction, whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.

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True, Delos Santos, as poseur buyer, failed to show appellant the buy-bust money. However, Delos Santos satisfactorily explained that he was unable to give appellant the buy-bust money because he immediately signaled Pastrana, his back- up, to arrest appellant so as "to evade any commotion or any armed back-up." Delos Santos also testified that the buy-bust money, consisting of genuine and boodle money, existed and was at the car which he and the other police operatives PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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buyer did not immediately arrest the suspect but returned to the station to make a report. It was only in the evening of the same day that the police, without a warrant, arrested the accused.

Issue: W/N the arrest was legal.

Held: boarded en route to Banawe Street. Therefore, while the payment for the shabu sold was not simultaneous with the delivery of the shabu, there was definitely money, both genuine and boodle, to pay for the sale of the shabu.

NO A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant. REGALADO, J.:

Facts: Another buy-bust operation with facts of similar import to those of the immediately preceding cases. Except in this case, the police officer acting as poseur

In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his

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custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.

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and Molina as they were riding on a ―trisikad‖ and demanded that they open the black bag they were carrying. - The bag was revealed to contain dried marijuana leaves. Mula and Molina were thereafter handcuffed. (note: Paguidopon and the police did not know Mula‗s name until after they were arrested)

Issue: W/N Bohol‗s arrest, and the search on his person are legal.

Held: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: - SP01 Paguidopon received information that a drug pusher was in Davao. As Mula was passing by on his motorcycle,t he informant pointed Mula out as the alleged drug pusher to SP01 Paguidopon. - The following month, SP01 Paguidopon received information that Mula would be passing through NHA, Ma- a, Davao City. Paguidopon then intercepted Mula

YES to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to

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commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused- appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

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Accused are therefore acquitted.

People v Francisco Antinero Beriarmente 25 September 2001

Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accusedappellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.

Ynares-Santiago, J. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: Sinarlo was the poseur-buyer while Francisco Antinero was the target in a buy-bust operation. Together they rode in a tricycle to one Boy Bebelone‗s house followed by policemen. In front of Boy Bebelone's house, accused Beriarmente handed over to Randy Sinarlo a straw sack that Beriarmente had picked up from a house along Sawang Street. As soon as the policemen saw the sack change hands, they arrested accused Beriarmente. They examined the contents of the sack and concluded that it contained marijuana

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plants, prompting them to confiscate the same. They then brought accused Beriarmente to the police station. Issue: W/N guilt of the accused sufficiently established. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 The prosecution witnesses identified accused Francisco Beriarmente in open court as the person who sold and handed over the sack of marijuana plants to witness Randy Sinarlo. The latter also identified the sack and its contents, which SPO2 Caballero had placed inside a plastic container, as the very same sack and marijuana plants that the accused sold and gave to him.

The version of the accused: he was instructed to get a sack along Sawang Street and to deliver said sack to the NFA Milling. He and Randy Sinarlo then rode a tricycle and he fetched the sack from Rosita as instructed. Without knowing the contents of the sack, he gave the same to Randy Sinarlo. On the way to the NFA area, they were intercepted by the police and he was arrested, while Randy Sinarlo was not apprehended. He was brought to the municipal building where the police tried to interrogate him. However, since the lawyer they assigned to him did not show up, the investigation did not push through. Thereafter, he was incarcerated in the municipal jail.

Held/Ratio: YES. There is no question that the buy-bust operation conducted by the police in the case at bar was proper. There is no showing of irregularity in the conduct of the same. Consequently, the arrest of accused-appellant, though warrantless, falls squarely under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, which provides that a peace officer or private person may make an arrest, without a warrant, when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, in his presence. The accused-appellant was caught inflagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by the police on the basis of information received from a police asset that the accused- appellant was looking for a buyer. His arrest, therefore, was lawful and the sack of marijuana plants confiscated from him were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.

Accused: there was no trial buy-bust operation because: (1) there was no trial buy- bust operation to validate the

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suspicion that accused was really engaged in the sale of illegal drugs; (2) the poseur-buyer used his own money to purchase the marijuana plants, not marked money; and (3) no marked money was presented as evidence in court.

In the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs, what is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the goods from the accused-appellant and the same was presented as evidence in court. Neither is there a rule of law which requires that there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.

There is also no rule that requires the police to use only marked money in buy-bust operations. In fact, this Court has ruled that the failure to use marked money or to present it in evidence is not material since the sale cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof. The non-presentation of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of the illegal drugs is adequately established and the substance itself is presented before the court. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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There is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buybust operations. It is of judicial notice that drug pushers sell their wares to any prospective customer, stranger or not, in both public or private places, with no regard for time.

People v Antonio Enrile Cruz, J. Facts: The buy-bust plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.

Prosecution witnesses (2 policemen) allege that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over to accused Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams.

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W/N Enrile‘s guilt established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal.

At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration. Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the marijuana.

Held/Ratio: NO. Re credence of Abugatal‘s sworn statement. It was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation, including the right to the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. There is no showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had been informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel.

If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.

Re warrantless arrest Issue:

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Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances : (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana.

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According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately arrested him.

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto.

The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.

People v Joselito del Rosario Belosillo, J.

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Facts: Joselito del Rosario et al. were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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the police station. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera

shot and killed her. Joselito was the alleged driver of the getaway tricycle involved in the incident.

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, the police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold- uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to

Joselito: contends that the lower court erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.

Issue: W/N Del Rosario‘s arrest proper.

Held/Ratio: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. The SC has previously held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the

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act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with homicide.

On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation. However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this case.

People v Fidel Cubcubin

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Prosecution: At about 3:30 in the morning the desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team responded to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. A tricycle driver told the police that accused and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Café about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith the police interviewed people at the café. They found out from a tricycle driver where he lived so they proceeded there. The policemen knocked on the door for about three minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description given by the tricycle driver and who turned out to be the accused. The police operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the cemetery. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Mendoza, J. Facts: The accused, armed with an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with no serial number shot Henry Piamonte, hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latter‗s instantaneous death.

Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. The police asked permission to enter and look around the house. He was brought to the Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, he was positively identified as the victim‗s companion. The police investigators asked accused-appellant where the fatal gun was. But he refused to tell them so his permission was sought to go back to his house to conduct a further search. They later found the gun. The accused was then taken to the police station, where he

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was photographed along with the things seized from him.

Issue: W/N arrest proper.

Held/Ratio: NO. Under ROC113 §5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that ―‗personal knowledge of facts‗ in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.‖

In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether there was ―probable cause‖ for the arresting officers to believe that accusedappellant committed the crime. There was none. The two did not have ―personal knowledge of facts‖

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indicating that accused- appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by the waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver who told them that the physical description given by the waitress fitted accusedappellant and who said he knew where accusedappellant lived and accompanied them to accusedappellant‗s house. Thus, they merely relied on information given to them by others.

Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, as

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will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.

People v Gabriel Gerente Grino-Aquino, J. 10 March 1993

Facts: Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.

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Held/Ratio: NO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. ROC 113.5 provides: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

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to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;" "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. ROC113.12 provides: Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

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Edwin Cadua v Court of Appeals Quisumbing, J. 19 August 1999

Facts: The police were dispatched to where a mother and daughter were allegedly held up and in need of police assistance. At the address given, the police found the complainants who stated that the alleged holduppers had just fled. Then, the police officers requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search. As they were patrolling around the area, complainants informed the police officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants. The police officers then noticed two (2) men walking alongside the street and as the officers slowed down the mobile PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified the men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his

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waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber ―paltik‖ revolver. PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Cadua‗s companion, who was later identified as Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar‗s possession was found a fan knife.

Issue: W/N Cadua‘s his right to be protected from any unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated.

Held/Ratio: NO. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As explained by a respected authority on criminal procedure:

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―It has been ruled that ‗personal knowledge of facts‗, in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is

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apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of life.‖

The incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

―Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.‖

Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after its

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commission. The right to search includes in these instances that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission.

When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the ―paltik‖ was found in his possession, and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed. Petitioner‗s movements clearly suggested the presence of a weapon tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive response to petitioner‗s actions which, under the circumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive attack with a lethal weapon. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Facts:The accused was arrested upon an informer‗s tip that appellant was one of the suspects in the killing of three persons some weeks before in Quiapo, Manila.

Responding to the information, Sub-station Commander Jaime Ortega, PO3 Liquido Delgado, Mario Montes and SPO4 Oscar V. Clemente proceeded to the Muslim area where they saw several persons conversing at the corner of Elizondo St.. One of said persons had a suspicious bulge in his stomach, and when frisked, a .45 cal. pistol with an extended magazine and six (6) live bullets was recovered from the center front of his waist line. Major Ortega took the gun and brought appellant to the sub-station. SPO4 Redolfin Coloma notified SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza of the WPD Homicide Division to take custody of the appellant. That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the person of the accused and the subject firearm for safekeeping.

People v Datukon Bansil Issue: 10 March 1999 Quisumbing, J.

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W/N the testimony of the prosecution‘s witness was sufficient.

Held/Ratio: NO. The testimony of SPO4 Clemente is full of inconsistencies on material points, such as how the arresting team was able to single out appellant as the suspect, and among them who actually recovered the firearm from appellant. Initially, SPO4 Clemente testified that they were able to identify appellant because the informant told the desk officer the attire of the accused, yet upon further questioning, he could not even remember the supposed attire of the appellant used in identifying the latter at the time of arrest. Further, on direct examination, SPO4 Clemente initially testified that he was the one who recovered the subject firearm from the appellant; however, on cross-examination, he testified that it was actually another operative whose name he can no longer recall who recovered the firearm from the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

appellant. Considering that there were only four members of the arresting team, including himself, his memory lapses renders his credibility suspect.

While a police officer is not expected to remember every single detail regarding the arrest, he is supposed to remember the important details relating to the commission of the crime, most especially when such incident occurred in his presence and with his active involvement. Further, no seizure receipt was issued by the arresting team for the gun, if indeed it was taken from the accused. Receipts for seized items are mandatory on the part of apprehending and seizing police officers.

While the trial court found that appellant was lawfully arrested without a warrant since he was actually committing a crime in the presence of a peace officer under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure based on the informant‗s tip and the ―bulging waistline‖ of the appellant, we find that there was no probable cause for the arrest of the appellant. The arresting team was only armed with the knowledge of the suspect‗s ―attire‖ which the prosecution witness admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name. They were not even given a specific place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the Muslim Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small

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restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4 Clemente claims that accused had a ―bulging waistline‖, this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

Roger Posadas, et al. v Ombudsman

Mendoza, J. 29 September 2000 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: UP Diliman Chancellor Posadas asked the assistance of the NBI I determining the persons responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina in a frat rumble in 1994.

The NBI, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police

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Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.

Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects.

Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

Issue:

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Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant.

Held/Ratio: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

NO. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided ROC113.5: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.

Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.

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Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under ROC113.5 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.

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To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects.

People v Peralta, et al. Panganiban, J. 30 March 2004 Facts: On November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.

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Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the above-named accused.

On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation.

On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three separate

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statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the participation of each and everyone of them.

On the basis of Garcia‗s sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning at the police station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft together with Garcia. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were ―fruits of the poisonous tree‖ and, hence, inadmissible in evidence.

The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court. Issue: W/N illegality of arrest waived. Held/Ratio: YES.

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circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search. The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.

Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional

Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.

Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general‗s argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.

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Callanta v Villanueva

487

further reinvestigation of the cases. But the City Fiscal did not. On the other hand the Fiscal appeared at the proceedings to prosecute the petitioner, indicating that he was in agreement with the complaint already filed

Fernando, J. 20 June 1977 After the issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail fixed in the amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. Facts: Judge Villanueva denied the motions to quash the two complaints for grave oral defamation against petitioner and thus issued the warrants of arrest. The warrants are being contested on the ground that it should have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary examination. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Petitioner: After conducting his preliminary examination and after acquiring jurisdiction over the petitioner the respondent Court referred the complaints to the City Fiscal. So that on March 4, 1965, the arraignment and hearing of the cases were postponed because the City Fiscal was investigating them. It may also be noted that at the proceedings in said criminal cases on April 20, 1965, the Fiscal entered his appearance for the government and manifested that he was ready for trial. If the Fiscal did not agree with the Judge in the latter's investigation of the case, he would have asked for a

Issue: May the petitioner question validity of arrest.

Held/Ratio: NO. [BUT take note of ROC114.26]

With the express admission by petitioner that she had posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty, it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of

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the warrants of arrest. Zacarias v Cruz: Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person, stop him from discussing the validity of his arrest. Luna v Plaza: where petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted... prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City Fiscal of Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The matter was referred to his office. It was he who appeared at the hearing and manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. It would be then to pay an undue premium to technicalities to assert that under such circumstances the procedural requisite, assuming that the contention of petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the preliminary examination was not in fact complied with.

Francisco Juan Larranaga v CA, supra

488

Puno, J. Facts: September- the police were to carry out the arrest of Larranaga (in connection with the Chiong sisters murder case) but his counsel remonstrated against the warrantless arrest so the police were not able to arrest him. His counsel, Atty. Armovit, assured that he would bring Larranaga for preliminary investigation.

Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated as waiver of his client‗s right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armovit‗s verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.

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Larranaga‗s effort to stop the filing of a criminal information against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the CA impleading the RTC to prevent petitioner‗s arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by Larranaga‗s counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. CA denied petitions.

Issue: W/N Larranaga was lawfully arrested.

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Held/Ratio: NO. The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested‖. For one, the petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months before

It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital offense – kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner‗s counsel was far from being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non- extendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion ―x x x prevented petitioner from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates,

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teachers, proctors and security guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. Webb vs. de Leon: that ―attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasijudicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, ‗the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.‗ A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage.‖

8. WARRANTLESS ARREST

490

G. BJ 130 last Garcia v Locsin 131 cases 132 cases 133 cases 134 - 1 case ( Veroy v Layague)

case;

De 3 2 -3

MANALILI v. CA Facts: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be ´highµ on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)

491

In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established with Manalili·s suspicious behaviour. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: W/N the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible. Held: Yes The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law: 1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest

PEOPLE v. SY CHUA

2. Search of moving vehicles 3. Seizure in plain view 4. Customs search 5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

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SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused- appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the ZestO juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused- appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the

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scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Held: The arrest of accused-appellant was unlawful. The trial court confused the concepts of a ―stopand-frisk‖ and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the

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law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made— the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused- appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. ―Reliable information‖ alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accusedappellant‗s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

With regard to the concept of ―stop-and frisk‖: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a ―stop-andfrisk‖. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer‗s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a ―stop-andfrisk‖ serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the ―stop and frisk‖ principles is applicable to justify the

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warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.

MALACAT v. CA

Facts: In response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot patrol (all of them in uniform) along Quezon PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line.

Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner'sguilt beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest. Held: The arrest and search of petitioner were invalid.

Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes. . . moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner.

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and- frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made ³ the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.

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Facts: Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of appellant.

On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being rented by appellant‗s live-in partner, named Eva. They approached appellant and introduced themselves as police officers. They showed appellant the search warrant and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser penalty. While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and his live-in partner. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

PEOPLE v. ESTELLA They found a plastic container under the kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live

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ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed a receipt for the seized items and arrested appellant.

Held: The Constitution bars the admission of evidence gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug was searched for and found in a hut that has not been proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found therein.

PEOPLE v. NUEVAS Facts: Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking in Olongapo City, came across Jesus Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a

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blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.

The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. When the police officers introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag over to them. After the items were confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the police office. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the Fiscal‗s office where they were informed of the charges against them.

Issue: W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

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Held: NO. The search conducted in Nuevas‗ case was made with his consent. However, in Din‗s case, there was none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the cost of others‗ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas‗ conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by which they got hold of the plastic bag. Neither can Din‗s silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Thus, the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. On the other hand, Inocencio‗s supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to

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illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

PEOPLE v. MONTILLA

Facts: Police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmariňas carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was

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no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal. Held: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are:

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there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the ―early morning‖ of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

(1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

(6) ―stop and frisk‖ measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender

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(1) dangerous weapons, and

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(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana.

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: W/N the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltran‗s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

Facts: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a ―buybust‖ operation was conducted.

Held:

At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants‗ pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the

A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one‗s person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being

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incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

NARCOM agents. When Abello asked ―aling Rosa‖ about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked ―cash katutak‖.

violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught redhanded. There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie ―Balweg‖. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

PEOPLE v. ARUTA

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 Facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain ―Aling Rosa‖ will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who ―Aling Rosa‖ was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as

Issue: W/N the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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PEOPLE v MALMSTEDT

Held: The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused‗s bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When

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accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

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effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Held: It was a lawful arrest. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is

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true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

PEOPLE v. SUCRO Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado‗s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana

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at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado‗s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

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The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties.

People Vs. Tangliben [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990]

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant.

Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

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People Vs. Malmstedt

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following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.

[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]

Facts: In an information filed against the accusedappellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.

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Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspiciouslooking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ACCUSED‗S DEFENSE During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two

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(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.

Held:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

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When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an

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accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.

POSADAS v. CA 188 SCRA 288

Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal MemorialColleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"

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bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so.

He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether search is

or valid.

Not

the

Section 12, Rule 136 of theRules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

warantless

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against

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unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

People v. Hindoy G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001)

FACTS: A woman informant came to the station and reported that a certain "Bella" of 248 Sto. Rosario St., Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal drugs that day. On the strength of that information, Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant, went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3 Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup. They knocked on the door and BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it.

Eugenio said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring to marijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is) so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00 marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of one kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE, in turn, handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they

510

identified themselves as police officers. After giving the prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and Cariaga entered the house then announced that they were going to conduct a search. Under a table, they found a bag made of abaca containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who transmitted the same to the NBI for chemical analysis.

HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the sellers and possessors of the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust operation. Such positive identification prevails over their feeble denial and declaration that the abaca bag which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only left to their custody by a certain Marlyn.

Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of the police officers to conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband. The search, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid notwithstanding the absence of a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

warrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend

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beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control. In the case at bar, upon consummation of the illicit sale, PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1 Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and BELLA were apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter, the officers searched the room where BELLA supposedly got the first block of marijuana. There, they found an abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the bag yielded twelve more blocks of compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial court, therefore, was correct in admitting all thirteen blocks of marijuana in evidence.

People v. Cubcubin, Jr.

511

HELD: The arrest without warrant was illegal because the police officers did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances was based entirely on what the witnesses had told them. The police officers did not have probable cause either because at the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was not doing anything overtly criminal. However, accused-appellant cannot question the validity of his arrest without warrant because he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. He also did not move to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction due to the illegal arrest. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

G.R. No. 136267. (July 10, 2001)

FACTS: Witnesses identified Accused-Appellant as the last person to have been seen together with the murdered victim. Policemen went to his house and asked permission to search. They found a bloodied white shirt and two .38 caliber shells. The policemen asked him to go with them to the café where he was last seen with the victim where the witness positively identified him. The Policemen asked for his permission to go back to the house to search for the gun. They found the weapon and arrested Accused-Appellant.

The bloodied shirt, shells, and firearm are inadmissible as evidence for being the product of an illegal search. The search was illegal because it was not proven that the accused-appellant gave his consent to the search. Even assuming that the arrest was valid, the search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because the items that were seized were not within the immediate control of the accused. In fact, the policemen seized the firearm only after going back to the house of accused-appellant. Neither can the plain view doctrine apply in this case since the policemen did not come upon the objects inadvertently.

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PITA v. CA Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an AntiSmut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.

Among the publications burned, was "Pinoy Playboy"magazines published plaintiff Leo Pita.

seized,

and

Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff‗s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminateseizure, confiscation and burning of PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

later by

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author,

and

co-edited

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publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search andseizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;

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2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge‗s sound discretion.

HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL. NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY

FACTS: Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.

Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged

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violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.

ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.

HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

514

Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

People Vs. Amminudin [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]

Facts:Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.

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The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner.

An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC

515

headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: legal.

Whether or not search of defendant‗s bag is

Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

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People Vs. Saycon

516

Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with them.

[236 SCRA 325; G.R. No. 110995; 5 Sept 1994]

Facts: On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doña Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard

At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu."

Issue: valid.

Whether or Not the warrantless search was

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Held: The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported that the accused would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some external sign indicating that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into account in determining probable cause. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

517

The policemen identified themselves and asked the woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested and was convicted in the trial court.

She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since the warrantless search is invalid, not having been pursuant to lawful arrest.

People v. Ayangao ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful. YES WON the warrantless search was permissible. YES FACTS: Policemen received information that a woman would be traveling with marijuana from Mountain Province to Pampanga.

The informant went with them in the place pointed and he personally identified the woman. They approached the woman. The policemen noticed protruding marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes.

HELD: The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually committing a crime when she was arrested — transporting marijuana, such is an act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender.

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518

atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region

This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers received the tip PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant‗s arrival was not known by the informant. AFFIRMED.

VALMONTE v. DE VILLA

As part of its program to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that the residents are worried about their safety and about being harassed especially when Parpon, a supply officer, was gunned down allegedly by NCRDC officals.

Valmonte claims that he himself had been searched without a warrant by the military manning the checkpoint.

ISSUE: W/N the checkpoints are valid as they are considered reasonable searches YES

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 Facts the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as

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per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search

Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.

But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

519

RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002 Caballes was charged with theft for stealing cable conductors belonging to NAPOCOR. These conductors were found in his jeep. It was alleged that while he was driving his jeepney, two officers flagged down his jeepney and searched the insides without a warrant. The police officers claimed that while they were on a routine patrol, they saw his jeepney being unusually covered with kakawati leaves. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid NO Section 2, Article III: ―no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge‖. Exceptions: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

Search of a moving vehicle: One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A

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checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.

520

PEOPLE v. LIBNAO G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or inspection of petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious doesn‗t constitute probable cause as to justify the search without warrant. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks They received a tip that the drug pushers would be transporting the drugs, riding a tricycle. Thus they set up a checkpoint. At about 1:00 o‗clock in the morning of the following day, the police Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as Libnao and her co-accused Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the two‗s uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center. They brought with them the black bag. The bag was opened as soon as the barangay captain arrived in the presence of Libnao and Nunga. Inside were bricks of marijuana leaves.

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was illegal NO Libnao contends that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle

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Peace officers are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction Jurisprudence: There‗s probable cause in the following instances: (some examples) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers where police officers received an information that the accused,

521

who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious- looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant‗s bag was not illegal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO [G.R. No. 141137. January 20, 2004] 15 police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban when a car sped by past them thus they were ordered to go back to the checkpoint. When asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, they could not offer any. The police officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were the others, to be afraid and acting suspicious. Suspecting a bomb might be

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inside, they ordered Vinecario to open the bag which he did. They notice a small package wrapped in paper and asked him to take it out. One of the police officers tore the paper and the smell of marijuana then was noticeable. They were then brought to the police station. Vinecario and his companions were then charged and convicted for violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) for having possessed, transported and delivered marijuana

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid YES (probable cause found) Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in

522

the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee In light then of appellants‗ speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his coappellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.

People v. BALINGAN

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G.R. No. 105834 February 13, 1995 the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the information that Balingan was going to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the information, P/Lt. Manuel Obrera formed a surveillance team monitor appellant's movements. The team was deployed at different places in Baguio City, including Balingan‗s house on Brookside and bus stations Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage (like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. She then boarded the bus. When the bus passed by the checkpoint, Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her luggage; she did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera. Lt. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Balingan was then charged and convicted for having violated RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act)

523

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure on board the bus was valid YES Witness Obrera clearly set forth the events that led to appellant's arrest, starting from the receipt by him of an informant's tip. He was able to establish that: appellant had physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag from the time she left her house at Brookside until she boarded and sat PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

on the third row behind the driver of Dangwa bus with plate number NTU153 bound for Manila; conducted a search of the same bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint, they found the subject gray bag on the overhead luggage compartment corresponding to appellant's seat; upon inspection, the bag was found to contain suspected marijuana flowering tops which even during preliminary tests yielded positive for the presence of THC, an active component of marijuana. The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a moving, public vehicle. The search was made pursuant to a tip received from an informant. Their surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana

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Bagalihog v Fernandez G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991 On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.

Issue: W/N the seizure WITHOUT A WARRANT and eventual impounding of the motorcycle was valid NO. SC: ―We do not find that the importance of the motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases excused its seizure without a warrant. The authorities had enough time to comply with the required procedure but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional shortcut. The crime was committed on March 17, 1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

524

March 19, 1989, or two days later. During that period, the private respondent had all the opportunity to apply for a search warrant and establish probable cause in accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court. He did not.‖ The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the search warrant redundant for it is not denied that the vehicle remained with the petitioner until it was forcibly taken from him. The fear that it would be dismantled or hidden was mere speculation that was not borne out by the facts. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the motorcycle without the first obtaining a warrant has not been established. There was no waiver. The petitioner merely agreed to cooperate with the investigators and to produce the vehicle when needed, but he did not agree to have it impounded. The record shows that he expressed reservations when this was suggested and said he needed the motorcycle for his official duties as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and in his private business

PEOPLE V MUSA G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993 T/Sgt. Belarga, leader of a NARCOM team instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa. Information received from civilian informer was that Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place

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Sgt Ani then went to the house Mari Musa and approached him when he came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20 marked money. After receiving the money, Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife. They then found drugs in the kitchen and confiscated them. Defense: While he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. 3 NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He

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also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away.

W/N the search and seizure inside his house (the kitchen to be exact) was valid NO In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object

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What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.

PEOPLE V FIGUEROA [G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000] The "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. There are 4 elements of valid seizure based on the plain view doctrine: Prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in which the police are LEGALLY present in the pursuit of their official duties The evidence was INADVERTENTLY discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are The evidence must be immediately apparent PLAIN VIEW justified the seizure of the evidence without further search. In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no

Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1927 for manufacturing, producing, preparing or processing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a 2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis Special Investigtor Palencia testified that they received a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that a certain Obet was allegedly engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in Makati City. He then instructed their informant to establish contact with Obet for a buybust operation. After several hours, the informant reported that Obet was already waiting for her, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she was ready with P150,000. Palencia then caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them to the informant Palencia then saw the informant hand over the money to Obet. While counting the money, Obet sensed the

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presence of other people in the area. Obet, who was in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of Palencia, while hurrying towards the house. Obet then held hostage his mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her 2 children for the next 3 hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom Obet surrendered. Palencia then brought OBET, his firearm and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters. Obet then volunteered the information that his source was Betty thus he, accompanied by Palencia went to her house. Betty denied being the source. Once inside the house, Obet went to the kitchen and pointed to what he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. The investigator then seized the items. Palencia said that when he searched Betty‗s house, he didn‗t have a warrant but it was with Betty‗s consent but he never saw Obet nor Betty manufacture the shabu. DEFENSE: Obet said he was approached by a certain Eva wanting to buy drugs. He told her he wasn‗t selling. He noticed that someone was peeping from the dark thus he got his gun. While he was locking the door, he accidentally fired it as he forgot it was cocked. He was then arrested. Eva, in front of the police insisted that they go to Betty‗s (his former live-in-partner) house. They searched the place without Betty‗s consent and without a warrant and found drugs inside the kitchen. Betty denied they were hers.

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Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid NO a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable and offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown. In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.The third condition does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked for a search warrant Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter held in custody for further questioning on illegal drugs. OBET was held in custody and investigated or interrogated about the source

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of the shabu, none of which was found during the buybust operation. In short he was held in custody as a consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a follow-up to link him to the source and establish a conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu.

PEOPLE v NUEVAS G.R. No. 170233

February 22, 2007

PO3 Fami testified that while conducting a surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, he received a tip that a certain male person, more or less 5‗4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Nuevas alight from a motor vehicle Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the 2 other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less 5 kilos PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Nuevas with the officers proceeded to a certain place where Din and Inocencio, the 2 other male persons would be making their delivery. They found Din, who was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. Fami testified that the search was done with their consent. They were then found guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid NO The searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. The police officers did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense.

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The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. However, in Nuevas‗s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating

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bag to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his ‗associates,‗ offering himself as an informant.

People v Salanguit [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001] Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the residence of Robert Salanguit He presented as his witness SPO1 Badua, who testified that as a poseurbuyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salanguit‗s room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salanguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted a group of 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salanguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on accusedappellant‗s door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and 2 bricks of dried leaves which appeared

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to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. Note that marijuana wasn‗t indicated in the search warrant, only shabu. Defense: As they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof. When Salanguit demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accusedappellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.

ISSUE: W/N the search and seizure was illegal despite the issuance of a warrant YES w/n marijuana found inside the house is admissible in evidence NO The warrant authorized the seizure of ―undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.‖ Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. None was shown showing the existence of drug paraphernalia. Salanguti said the warrant was void.

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However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not make the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. None was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the ―plain view‖ of the searching party Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the ―plain view doctrine‖ can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

What the ‗plain view‗ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the

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prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. THE extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‗plain view‗ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-appellant‗s person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.

People v Pasudag G.R. No. 128822

May 4, 2001

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SPO2 Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct antijueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

He reported it back to the police station and they assembled a team who went to the house of Pasudag. When they went to his house, he asked Pasudag to bring him to the backyard. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted seven marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police station

W/N the search and eventual confiscation of the marijuana plants was valid NO As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

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papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. "The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more that mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.

United Laboratories, Inc. – Petitioner vs G.R. No. 163858 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Occupants, June 28, 1985

Philippines

and/or

Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila-Respondents

FACTS: Rolando H. Besarra of the National Bureau of Investigation filed for search warrant concerning the first two floors of Shalimar Building owned and operated by Ernesto Isip and for seizure of UNILAB particularly Revicon multi vitamins, Disudrin, sundry items that are unauthorized production/ manufacture of the said drugs after surveillance of an asset of Armadillo Protective and Security Agency. After which the search warrant was served on respondent building. The search and seizure was able to produce 792 bottles of Disudrin and 30 boxes each containing 100 pieces of Inoflox. When the seized objects was to be turned over to the Bureau of Food and Drugs, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence assailing that the searching team searched from first to fourth floors and the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila while what is indicated on the search warrant is the first and second floors of Shalimar Bldg. located at No. 1571, Aragon St. Sta. Cruz thus all those that was seized were fruit of a poisonous tree thus inadmissible for evidence. On March 11,

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2004 the RTC granted the respondents motion contending that ground used by respondents to quash the search warrant was not invoked and that the seizure of the items was based on the ―plain view doctrine.‖ On the other hand the respondents assailed that it should be the BFAD and not the petitioners who should apply the search warrant. BFAD submitted the result of its examination on the seized materials and found it to be substandard. On May 28, 2004 the RTC rendered its decision noting that the search warrant is only for the counterfeit products of Revicon and not the actual products seized.

ISSUES: Whether or not the bottles of Disudrin and boxes of Inoflox are inadmissible as evidence against the respondents. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the plain view doctrine hence can be admitted as evidence.

HELD:

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The petition is denied for lack of merit. A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines. A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable cause of the object‗s incriminating evidence. In other words, to be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officer‗s instantaneous sensory perception of the object. The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search,

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without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. Since the articles allegedly seized during the implementation of the search warrant – Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some such. No need whatever for some public assay. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondent‗s place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor of legality. The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes were found outside the door of the respondents‗ laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the raiding team – precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items were contained were themselves so designated to replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes the letters ―ABR‖ under the words

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―60 ml,‖ appeared to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that ―ABR‖ is the acronym for ―amber bottle round‖ describing the bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is contained. Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

PEOPLE V. GUZMAN GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001

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The accused was found guilty by the trial court of violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

HELD: The accused is GUILTY. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an unlicensed firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It was within the immediate control of the arrested person. Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where in plain view of the police when the accused was arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not authorized by law; and 3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All elements concurring, the accused is thus guilty. Lastly, the accused failed to quash the information against him before arraignment thus he is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.

PEOPLE v DE GRACIA 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)

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Facts: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d‗état staged in December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. Ruling: YES It is admitted PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.

GUANZON v DE VILLA 181 SCRA 623 [GR No. 80508 (January 30, 1990) Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specifictarget house to be search and that there is no search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residentswere rudely rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls andwindows of their houses. The residents were at the point of high- powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residentscomplained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The

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residents also reported incidents of maulings, spotbeatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

Held: It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that theobjectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights

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of the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

ROAN v GONZALES 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the

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resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non- existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.

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It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guarantee.

E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. CA1

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent of all those involved?

What was construed: The word ―any‖ in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a

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device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie- talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia‗s office. Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.

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case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).

The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.

Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.

1 By Dana Batnag PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier

―The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.‖

The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation. ―This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization

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of all the parties,‖ Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.

―The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.‖

Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

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as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ZULUETA v CA PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

253 SCRA 699 (1996)

ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD: The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction

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declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WATEROUR DRUG CORPORATION v NLRC GR No. 113271 (October 16, 1997)

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received

Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice PresidentGeneral Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine toemployees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.

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As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.

In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March

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1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.

In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico.

In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement.

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.

In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:

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With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.

The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.

Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Held: As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's

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receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.

In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.

Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in

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the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters.

Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Catolico'sdismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of

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Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

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in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.

March 12, 1987 Per Curiam In re Wenceslao Laureta PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained

Facts: Almost identical letters were personally sent to Justices Narvasa, M. Herrera, and Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance of threats to effect a change of the Court‗s adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed),

In said letter, it stated that petitioner intended to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of the three minuteresolutions in question.

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Indeed,, Maravilla-Ilustre filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution ―making‖ her opponents the ―illegal owners‖ of vast estates; charging some Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering their ―unjust resolution‖ ―through manifest and evident bad faith‖; and charging Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their ―unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986.‖ Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished to the Supreme Court nor the members.Thus, the SC in its resolution petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, why she should not be held in contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, , why no disciplinary action should be taken

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against him for the statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client‗s name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices are matters covered by the constitutional right of freedom of speech and right to privacy.

Held/Ratio: No. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would

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realize the accusations.

unjustness

and

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unfairness

of

their

The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the ―proper forum‖ to effect a change of the Court‗s adverse Resolution; Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; and for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort;

F. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Nov 26 1970 J. Fernando Mutuc v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Mutuc after setting forth his residency in Pampanga filed for candidacy as a member of the Constitutional Convention. His petition was granted y COMELEC but he was prohibited from using taped jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. He filed this petition for prohibition to assail said ruling of COMELEC as being violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.

Issue:WON the ruling of the COMELEC prohibiting petitioner from using taped jingles is a form of censorship and thus a violation of his freedom of speech.

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PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Held/Ratio: Yes. In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been a constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. The constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances

February 15, 2008 CJ Puno Chavez v Gonzales

The case involves the Garci tapes which on June 7, 2005 Atty Alan Paguia had released in the media. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. On june 11, 2005, NTC issued a press release which stated that the Garcia tapes were fraudulent and warned that the

broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation by the media shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.

Thus this petition for certiorari was filed by Franks Chavez alleging that such issuances by respondents violated the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,

WON the regulations and issuances made by the NTC were violations of the freedom of speech Held/Ratio: Yes. All speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. Thus the tests applicable to each type also differ.

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The general tests are: a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ―extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.‖ PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

To determine which test to apply, a distinction also has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. As regards the latter, it is the clear and present danger rule which should be applied.

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In the case at bar what applies is the clear and present danger rule, as they questioned issuances were content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content— fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v COMELEC April 21 1988 J. Mendoza

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc (TELEBAP). is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner is GMA Network Inc. They are challenging the validity of §92 on the ground that:

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it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Issue: WON Sec 92 of BP 881 is unconstitutional PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Held/Ratio:

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frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that ―any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? ―[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.‖ As regards the argument that petitioners should be compensated for the airtime, the court held that Under §92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution.

No. Regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are

Finally, as regards the differential treatment between print and broadcast media, the court held that there are important differences in the characteristics of the two media, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them

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Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC May 22, 1995 J. Feliciano PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: PPI assails the constitutionality of Resolution 2272 which grants free print space called ―COMELEC space‖ to be provided by at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city. PPI argues that this violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Moreover, the requirement that publishers give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude. Finally they argue that said resolution is a violation of the freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

Issue: WON Resolution 2272 is unconstitutional

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Held/Ratio: Yes. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Resolution No. 2772 amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

March 31, 1992 J. Gutierrez Adiong v COMELEC

Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provided for an enumeration of lawful forms of proganda as well and Prohibited forms of propaganda for the elections. It provides: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda: Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. —

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Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles.

Issue: WON the prohibition provided in Resolution 2347 is unconstitutional

It is unlawful: xxx xxx xxx Held/Ratio: (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)

Yes The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

speech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided

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must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.

When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. The prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information

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Tolentino v Secretary of Finance October 30, 1995 J. Mendoza

Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.

Petitioners reiterate their previous claims that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution. They complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994.

They also argue that said act discriminates against the press and religion. PPI argued that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press.

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Facts: Gonzales v Katigbak Issue: WON RA 7716 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory against the press

Held/Ratio: No. The Court held that as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication. Since what the law granted to the press was a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is that by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the

The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The issue being raised is in relation the classification of the film Kapit sa Patalim as ―For Adults Only" by the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT). PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Initially, the sub-committee decision was to classify said film as ―For Adults Only‖. It was only in the motion for reconsideration that it was allowed to be shown without any deletions or cuts. However, BRMPT held that there remains deficiencies in the application so it will withhold the showing of the film until the deficiencies were filled up. Thus this petition for certiorari.

same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. Issue:

July 22, 1985 CJ Fernando

WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of BRMPT and whether or not said classification was valid

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Held/Ratio: Yes, there was an abuse of discretion, but it was not grave The court held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films.This is not to deny that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship.

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That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Court concluded that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave

Viva Productions v CA and Hubert Webb March 13, 1997 J. Melo The test, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence

Facts: The case revolves around the film the Jessica Alfaro Story which depicts the life of Ms. Alfaro, part of which her involvement with the Vizconde Massacre. Private respondent Hubert Webb sent a letter to Viva Productions warning them that the projected showing of said movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate the sub judice rule and his rights as an accused.

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Since said warning went unheeded, respondent filed a petition for contempt complaining that the acts of petitioner and Alfaro concerning movie were contumacious, within the contemplation of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

A cease and desist order was issued was RTC of Paranaque. Respondnet also filed a petition for injunction and damages with the RTC of Makati which granted injunction. The appeal by Viva Production to the CA was denied. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: whether or not the the lower court erred in granting the injunction sought for.

Held/Ratio: Yes. The court took note of the rather unreasonable period that had elapsed from the time of the issuance of the restraining order by the Parañaque court up to the writing of this decision. The Court also notes that the order of the said court

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specifically failed to lay down any factual basis constituting a clear and present danger which will justify prior restraint of the constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time to hear and resolve the issues raised in the petition for contempt. MTRCB v ABS-CBN ABS-CBN aired ―Prosti-tuition,‖ an episode of the television (TV) program ―The Inside Story‖ produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. Some of the students were named by the segment as belonging Philippine Women‗s University and this caused a great uproar in the PWU.

Thus a petition was filed with the MTRCB alleging that said episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students. MTRCB initiated a complaint in the MTRCB.

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Respondents‗s defense was that ―The Inside Story‖ is a ―public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial,‖ the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. Thus petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents

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Held/Ratio: Yes. Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986 provides the power of MTRCB. It states: ―SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and duties: x

The MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondent to pay P20,000 for failing to ask for a permit to show the episode of the said program. Said decision was affirmed on Appeal with the MTRCB. Thus a petition for certiorari was filed with the RTC which set aside said decision. Motion for Reconsideration by MTRCB was denied. Thus this petition for certiorari.

Issue: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

WON MTRCB had the power to review the program ―The Inside Story‖.

x

x

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b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non- theatrical distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or for export The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all ‗television programs.‘ By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to ‗approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x.‗ . Thus, when the law says ―all television programs,‖ the word ―all‖ covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. Respondents claim that the showing of ―The Inside Story‖ is protected by the constitutional provision on

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freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.

The only exception to power of MTRCB to review are those exhibited the Philippine Government and its departments/agencies and newsreels. Thus respondent argues that said program is a newsreel and thus belongs to the exception. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as ―straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.‖ Clearly, the ―The Inside Story‖ cannot be considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions

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ABSCBN v COMELEC January 28, 2000 J. Panganiban

An information was received by COMELEC from a reliable source stated that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcast immediately." Thus it issued a resolution which restrained ABSCBN from conducting said survey. COMELEC argues that said project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). Comelec justifies its Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful election ABSCBN filed for TRO before the court which was granted. This petition for certiorari was filed to assail the resolution of COMELEC

Issue: WON COMELEC has the power to ban ABSCBN from holding and reporting exit polls.

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Held/Ratio: No. An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots.

Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown. When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom.

In the case at hand, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Moreover, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.

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Social Weather Station v COMELEC G.R. No. 147571, 5 May 2001 Petitioners wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.‖

Chavez vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004

Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not commit an offense by entering

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into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non- removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

LIBEL Alonzo v Court of Appeals February 1995

court suits their pasttime.‖ Upon such statement, petitioner was charged and convicted of libel. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

HELD: The Court acquitted the petitioner. It said that while the statements of Dr. Alonzo could indeed be considered defamatory, it nonetheless fell within the exceptions provided for by the first paragraph of Article 354. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the privileged character of the report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides."

G.R. No. 110088, 1

Petitioner, as Field Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission, filed a report with their head office concerning the non-compliance of the Sto. Nino Medical Clinic and the Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic. The report noted the several violations committed by the clinics. In her closing statement, petitioner made mention that, ―This particular clinic should be closely monitored because, aside from the above mentioned violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make

Baguio Midland Courier v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107566, 25 November 2004 Private respondent Labo was a mayoralty candidate for Baguio during the 1984 elections. The Baguio Midland Courier published election-related articles, several of which cast respondent Labo in an unfavorable light (e.g. That he did not pay his debts, that he is illiterate, etc). A charge of defamation of character was filed against

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petitioner and one of its columnists, Afable. As a defense, petitioners invoked public interest as a defense saying that the public has a right to know those running for public office. The CA denied this argument saying that the public interest and ―fair comment‖ principles did not apply to the private respondent as he was, as yet, not a public officer and was thus a private citizen.

HELD: Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution; this Court had recognized the public‗s right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office. Plainly, the rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein. In addition, the Court ruled that petitioner Afable‗s article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, petitioner Afable‗s column with respect to private respondent‗s indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent.

Fernando v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 159751, 6 December 2006 Petitioners here were charged for the sale and distribution of pornographic materials. Upon a valid search warrant, the police searched the premises of the store Music Fair where they found 25 VHS tapes and 10 different magazines which they deemed were pornographic. At trial, the accused were convicted of the crime charged.

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Upon appeal, petitioners argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the materials confiscated from the store were indeed pornographic and insist that the materials were covered by the freedom of speech for being expressions of artistry.

HELD: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. There is no perfect definition of ―obscenity‖ but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is ―patently offensive.‖ No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive ―hard core‖ sexual conduct. What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge‗s sound discretion. In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of facts.

OBSCENITY (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

U.S. v Kottinger 45 Phil 352 The accused Kottinger's camera store was raided. Among the photos found were pictures that showed native Filipino inhabitants in their native garb. He was thus charged with violating Section 12 of Act 277, the Philippine Libel Law. The photos were used as postcards.

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protected by the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. HELD: Although Philippine laws do not define what obscenity means, the Court defined the obscene or obscenity as ―something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy.‖ There are two tests to determine whether something is obscene: 1) whether it corrupts the minds of the viewer of such materials; 2) whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. In the case at bar, it only PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

portrayed the inhabitants in their native attire. Moreover, there are foreign publications of a similar nature which are imported and circulated in the Philippines, such as a book about the Ifugaos. As such, the pictures were not considered obscene within the meaning of the law. CRITICISMS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT People v Alarcon 69 Phil 265 After the court handed down its decision in this main case and while appeal was then pending, one Luis M. Taruc caused the publication of a letter addressed to the President. The letter was a rebuke of the decision of the court and the magistrates who passed upon the case. Taruc was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for what he said. In response, Taruc argued for his absolution by invoking, among others, that what he published was

HELD: The Court dismissed. Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the allimportant duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.

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Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 79690-707 The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent‗s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a) That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC‗s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in

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this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free‖ was publicized in leading newspapers.

HELD: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of

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professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society

Estrada v Evardone 2007

G.R. No. 175147. 6 December

Petitioners allege that respondent made derogatory remarks against the Supreme Court and then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban after the former handed out its decision in the Lambino case. It was reported in the PDI that Evardone asserted that the then Chief Justice had intended to run for the Senate which precipitated junking of the initiative. Thus, petitioners allege that the Evardone meant to undermine the Court and show that its decision was tainted with partiality.

HELD: After a careful consideration of the parties' arguments, we do not find respondent's statements contemptuous. The Court finds sufficient and acceptable the explanation of respondent that he had no intention to undermine the integrity of the Chief Justice, much less that of the Court so as to degrade the administration of justice. There is nothing in his statements that insinuate or suggest that the Court was susceptible to influence in Lambino. Neither is there anything in his statements that can be considered as a

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malicious attack on the proceedings of the Court as to cast doubt on the integrity of the Court. To be sure, respondent even stated that he abides by, and respects, the decision of the Court, and was willing to go through the usual remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration, or simply to push anew for the third mode to amend the Charter. His remarks about the Chief Justice eyeing a Senate seat were mere speculations/personal observations based on a precedent not derogatory or contumacious enough to warrant sanction from the Court.

We have held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right of self-preservation. Courts are universally acknowledged to PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

be vested, by their very creation, with the power to impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and as corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach of insults and pollution. Judges are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court and not for retaliation or vindication. Thus, being a drastic and extraordinary remedy, the power of contempt should not

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be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of justice.

Miriam College Foundation v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127830. 15 December 2000 The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation‗s school paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. The Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

HELD: Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some

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restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students

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Sam 155 two 156 cases 157 cases

Ray 158 cases 159 cases 160 cases 161 3 cases

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because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

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Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz (2005) Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal

―Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.‖ 3. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE German vs. Barangan (1985)

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Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Barangan and his underlings from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacanang. And considering that German‗s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacanang.

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grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.

Issue: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Estrada vs. Escritor (2003)

Held: No prohibition. Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted antigovernment slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent‗s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah‗s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a

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Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‗ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State‗s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State‗s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of

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religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Centeno vs. Villalon (1994) Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD. As a consequence, an PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno

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filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?

Held: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

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Tolentino vs. Sec. Of Finance (1995) Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

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Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate‗s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

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The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Caunca vs. Salazar (1949) Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

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Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one‗s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Macros vs. Manglapus (1989) Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

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Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.

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However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Manotoc vs. CA (1986) Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the

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country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

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Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION Chavez vs. PEA and Amari (2002) Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intraPoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."

Issue: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

Held: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern: ―…Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.

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These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy- making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.

Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.

Garcia vs. BOI (1990) PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: The case involved the application by a Taiwanese private corporation, the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), for registration as a new producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. The Philippine Board of Investments (BOI) approved the

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application, giving various fiscal incentives owing to the pioneering status of the investment. The application as approved specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment. However, news broke out that the investor amended its application to change the investment site from the province of Bataan to the province of Batangas. The Congressman of Bataan (the original site) who opposed the change in location of the investment, requested the BOI toprovide a copy of the original application, the amended application, and the supporting documents to each. The BOI denied the request, stating that the investor (BPC) refused to give consent to the release of the requested documents, relying on Section 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code, which states: ―Confidentiality of Applications. All applications and their supporting documents filed under this Code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the applicant or on orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.‖

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mentioned Article 81 may be disclosed upon the consent of the applicant, or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Court ordered that the petitioner could have access to BOI‗s records on the original and amended applications for registration excluding, however, papers containing trade secrets and other business and financial information. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The documents were used by the Congressman to support his opposition to the change of location of the proposed investment. Unfortunately, the court did not articulate a test or definition of what is a commercial or trade secret.

Decision The Congressman filed a case before the Supreme Court, which ruled that the requested copies of certain documents may not be denied, as it is the constitutional right of a citizen to have access to information on issues of public interest under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPC's applications is not absolute and based on above

3.TEST OF VALID GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE

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GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L27833; 18 APR 1969]

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on: (1) constitutional grounds - the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. (2) the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement

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the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 is unconstitutional? NO, but only because they were unable to get the required 2/3 vote. Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech.

(3) the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.

―clear and present danger‖ rule - evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established.

Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under

'dangerous tendency' rule - ―If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.‖ It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient

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that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. In this case, the clearand present danger rule was applied: The term clear seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable. In considering the constitutionality of the law, the Court took into account that this was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied This is not to say, that once such a situation is found to exist there is no limit to the allowable limitations on such constitutional rights. The clear and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should there be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but also that they be limited in scope. There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" must be such that they are free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional objection of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms "election campaign" or "partisan political activity." They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate or party;(c) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election or any party or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving

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contributions for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest. 46 However, the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command. .Unfortunately, the necessary two-third vote, however, not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play. Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic Act No. 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional. G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997 VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HUBERT J.P.WEBB, respondents.

MELO, J.: FACTS:

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RTC-Paranaque restrained the exhibition of the movie, the Jessica Alfaro Story. RTC-Makati also issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner further proceeding, engaging, using or implementing the promotional advertising and marketing programs for the movie entitled "The Jessica Alfaro Story" and from showing or causing the same to be shown or exhibited in all theaters in the entire country UNTIL after the final termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the criminal action now pending before the Paranaque Regional Trial Court ISSUE: WON both courts acted with grave abuse of discretion in restraining the exhibition of the film? YES RATIO: PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The order of RTC-Paranaque specifically failed to lay down any factual basis constituting a clear and present danger which will justify prior restraint of the constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time to hear and resolve the issues raised in the petition for contempt. (read the whole case, yun lang relevant for clear and present danger test :/) G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

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JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner, vs. RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.

FACTS: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, it was stated that after the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in

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the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." 4 The City of Manila however rejected their petition filing due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The Mayor suggested, however, in accordance, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured." ISSUE: WON the order of the mayor to refuse the petition and to change the venue is constitutional? NO Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as 's the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 18

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advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.For the. constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided, In this case, what is at issue are the places for the assembly. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required . Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority In these cases:

There are of course limits to its exercise.What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not

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(1) Luneta - There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

peace rally would startWhenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. (2) US Embassy – A novel aspect to this case is the fact that the Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which states that ―. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity‖ However, they were unable to prove the presence of clear and present danger. To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There was also

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assurance that all steps for the safety of the rally were to be made. Wherefore the mandatory injunction to the petitioner is granted.

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee, vs. ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant. MALCOLM, J.: FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." He was thus charged and convicted in the lower court for a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority

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instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

ISSUE: WON the conviction of Perez is valid? YES RATIO: The provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes.

But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

.G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

DE LA CRUZ v CA BELLOSILLO, J.: FACTS:

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government,

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Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of DECS. The CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement without backwages which petitioners questioned. In the CA, their petitioners were dismissed for lack of merit. Thus the present petition were petitioners contend they were merely exercising their right to peaceably assemble and should therefore be entitled to backwages. ISSUE: WON petitioners‗ actions fall under peaceful assembly? NO RATIO: As ruled in previous cases, the petitioners‗ actions "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure the Government to correct their grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances.

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The the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible. Petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cariño. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cariño might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

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the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948] Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated. Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of

determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. The Mayor‗s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.

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Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983 HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, vs. RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent. FERNANDO, CJ.: Petitionr Hector Ruiz, the Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen‗s Alliance for National Reconciliation wrote to Respondent Richard Gordon for a permit to hold a prayer- rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on December 4,1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it will be finished in the early evening. It was also requested that a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M will be held. Due to misunderstandings and lack of initiative by petitioner to check if his petition was granted, he filed a petition with the SC in order for their rally to be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

allowed. Unbeknownst to him, Gordon already granted the rally on the following conditions: 1. The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and orderly;

2. Your organization will be responsible for any loss or damage to government property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle; 3. The parade/march shall proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave., and Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., thence to the Rizal Triangle Even as there was no controversy to speak of, the SC held it best to reiterate the following doctrine with regard to freedom of assembly: "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the timewhen it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so

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minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

FACTS: Three sets of petitioners question the constitutionality of BP 880 They argue among others that (1) B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. (2) It curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. (3) it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. ISSUE: WON constitutional? YES

BP

880

is

NC RATIO: G.R. No. 169838 BAYAN

April 25, 2006 v

ERMITA

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,

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together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. . But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is A test has thus been laid down: There is no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." In this case, BP 880 was made due to the Court‗s ruling in Reyes v Bagatsing It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as

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a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.21 A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power independently under Republic Act No. 716024 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.

Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. The Court noted however that every city and municipality MUST set aside a freedom park considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law‗s system of regulation of the people‗s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior

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permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.

SUBAYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996) PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Facts: twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and twenty-four (24) others were seriously wounded by gunshots during the Welga ng Bayan held on September 20, 1985 at Escalante, Negros Occidental. Twenty (20) counts of Murder and twenty- four (24) counts of Frustrated Murder were filed with respondent Sandiganbayan against those allegedly responsible for the death and injuries of the victims. Charged were several

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civilian government officials, personnel from the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, and from the para-military group Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) The rally was without permit from the local authorities, although the plan was not kept secret from them. The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on September 18, 1985. At around noontime on that day, there were speeches delivered by speakers from among the demonstrators using the public address system on an improvised platform, addressing the crowd assembled in front of the Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted anti-Marcos and anti-Military slogans, among others.

After a last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd by Ponseca through a letter to the demonstrators in front of the Rural Bank had failed, the dispersal operation by Capt. Sanson began. Four firetrucks were dispatched to the crowd of demonstrators, two of them — the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks — towards the demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank of Escalante. These hosed the demonstrators with water but even after the water from them had been exhausted, the demonstrators stayed put. Capt. Sanson then ordered the throwing of teargas to the demonstrators by

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two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas caused the demonstrators to lie face down on the ground; they persisted in their places rather than disperse. Then, a single shot rang out followed by successive gunfire from different directions. As one witness had described it, it was like New Year‗s Eve. This firing lasted for a few minutes. Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses to have shouted ―Stop firing‖ repeatedly and, after some time, the firing had stopped, but not soon enough for men and women from the rallyists‗ group who died and others who were wounded as a result of the gunfire HELD: The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses, people empowerment was codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials that under our Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people. It is thus important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for in a republican government, it is the people who should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance should not be abridged by officials momentarily holding the powers of government.

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BANGALISAN vs. CA Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged ―mass actions‖ on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with ―grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.‖ They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately.

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Held: As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, ―It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but nondisruptive avenues, other PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

than the mass actions in question, petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.‖

whereby

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the ―mass actions,‖ but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

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GSIS v. Kapisanan ng Manggagawa ng GSIS Facts: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave. On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. Held: The mass action was held to be invalid because of a contract stipulation stating that: ―The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the principle of shared responsibility … on all matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all GSIS employees …. Accordingly, … the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS

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management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules ....‖ PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement mechanism.

MALABANAN VS RAMENTO FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral

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defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not a written contract between the school and its employees and students are valid only for one semester. HELD: The motion was denied. Furthermore, in conclusion, the court reiterates that while we value the rights of students to complete their in the school or university of their choice and while We fully respect their right to resort rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, without resort to intimidation, coercion, violence. Academic freedom in all forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be subvert freedom into degenerate license.

ALCUAZ v. PSBA FACTS: On May 2, 1988, the Second Division rendered a decision in the instant case which prodded the Intervener Union to file a motion for reconsideration, its arguments hinges the pronouncement that: Likewise it is provided in the Manual, that the written contact required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of First Semester. The PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students, or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process in untenable. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any

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church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. NO violation Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 ―advantageous to the government‖ does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

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chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words ―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.‖ The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to ―to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,‖ the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider the issue.

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Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children. Held. Affirmed. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al (2003) FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non- governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.

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Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion. YES RULING: Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.

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RAUL GONZALEZ v. ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA.

597

ROMAN

CATHOLIC

Facts: Gonzalez brought the suit against the archbishop in the CFI of Manila and prayed for judgment declaring that he, the lawful heir to the chaplaincy and its income; establishing the right of the petitioner and his successors to be appointed to and receive the income of the chaplaincy during their infancy whenever it may be vacant and, pending such appointment, to receive the income for their maintenance and support. The trial court directed the archbishop to appoint Gonzalez as chaplain; and ordered payment to him the sum being the aggregate net income of the chaplaincy during the vacancy, less the expense of having the prescribed masses celebrated in each year. It reserved to the petitioner any legal right he may have to proceed in the proper court for cancellation of the certificate of registration of the property in the name of the archbishop.

vacancy, or in respect to the reformation of the certificate of registration so as to show the fiduciary character of the title. Without deciding whether such disposition of the surplus was proper or what should be its disposition in the future, that a son of the last incumbent, who was properly refused appointment as chaplain because he had not the qualifications prescribed by the Canon Law, was not entitled, as the nearest relative, to the accrued surplus.

Austria vs. NLRC Facts: Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the "SDA") is a religious corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine law and is represented in this case by the other private respondents, officers of the SDA)

Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed the chaplain? PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.

Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed the judgment and absolved the archbishop from the complaint, 'without prejudice to the right of proper persons in interest to proceed for independent relief,' in respect to the income accrued during the

Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m., petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission. During said call, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo

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and petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada.

29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services. HELD: The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

"one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its

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members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not ex- communicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.

K. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE 1. Scope Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc., Inc. v. Sec. of DILG 403 SCRA 558 (2003) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, for being violative of the equal protection clause and nonimpairment clause of the Constitution because of the withdrawal by the said Code of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners.

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The Supreme Court ruled that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court held that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. The Court likewise ruled that there was no violation of the non-impairment clause. The constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect

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a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. Clemons v. Nolting 42 Phil. 702 (1922) Clemons, an American citizen, agreed to be employed as an electrical engineer for the government at the sum of $4,000 per annum. The government promised to pay to the petitioner his salary in "dollars ;" the contract was made in the United States; the Government offered to pay the petitioner in "Philippine currency" at the rate of two to one which Clemons refused; at the time the payment in question was offered, Philippine currency was at a discount; two pesos in Philippine currency was not equivalent to one "dollar" and the petitioner insisted that his salary should be paid in "dollars" or their equivalent value. The issue in this case was whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, when it enters into a contract with an officer or employee under a promise to pay his salary in "dollars," pay such salary in Philippine currency at the rate of two to one if the officer or employee insists that his salary should be paid in the terms (specie) of his contract. Respondent Auditor General contends that under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands a debt of the Government, payable in "dollars," may be paid in Philippine currency at the rate of two to one even though the debt grew out of a special contract which provided that the same should be paid in "dollars." The Court said that the right of the legislative department of the state to adopt legislation changing or

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altering the obligation of contract has been answered in the negative so many times that it scarcely merits the citation of authorities now in its support. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties. 2. Limitations a. Police Power Philippine National Bank v. Remigio 231 SCRA 362 (1994) Respondent obtained a loan from PNB and mortgaged five parcels of land as security. Respondent defaulted on said loan; hence, PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the properties in question. Respondent made partial payments to his indebtedness. Meanwhile, P.D. No 72 was enacted that mandated agrarian reform. Under said law, lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it covered were the parcels of land. PNB offered to sell the land to respondent at a much higher price as to which he refused since he reasoned that he had already paid more than double of his previous indebtedness. So,

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respondent filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale and breach of contract. While the case was yet pending with the trial court, petitioner additionally received from the Land Bank of the Philippines cash and Land Bank Bonds in payment of the foreclosed parcels. The trial court ruled against respondent which the Court Appeals reversed. The Court ruled that the parcels of land in dispute were clearly still subject to private respondent's right of redemption. It said that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights.

Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations 17 SCRA 25 (1966) Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents herein — i.e. the fifteen (15) winning tenants named in

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the dispositive part above-quoted — have for years worked on said land under the share tenancy system. Before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change their tenancy contract from share tenancy system to leasehold tenancy. Petitioners filed suit alleging that the aforesaid section of said law is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the freedom of contract and impairs property rights, as well the obligation of contracts. In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the Court said that the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic Act No. 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. Republic Act No. 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our law-making body, was passed by Congress in compliance with the constitutional mandate that 'the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State' (Art. II, sec. 5) and that 'the State shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture . . ..' (Art. XIV, sec. 6)."

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Ganzon v. Inserto 123 SCRA 713 (1983) Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed between private respondents Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. A day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the petitioners with the respondent court. Then, private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," which the trial court granted notwithstanding the opposition of private respondents. The issue in this case is whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of the promissory note. The Court said that the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very

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issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.

602

The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

b. Eminent Domain c. Taxation Kabiling v. National Housing Authority 156 SCRA 623 (1987) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1808, a law authorizing the expropriation of properties in favor of qualified squatter families, on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts. The Court upheld the constitutionality of said decree. The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of the police power of the State. The police power of the State has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare. The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit.

La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco 39 Phil. 567 (1919) A contract was entered into between La Insular and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco (as surety), whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla Co-Siong in a quantity of not less than two nor more than five boxes of two thousand packages each at a fixed price of P172 per box. When the contract was executed, cigarettes were subject to a specific tax of one peso for each thousand cigarettes which liability incurred to the manufacturer, plaintiffappellee La Insular. A new law was passed which increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes. The monthly statements thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff showed this increase. Defendant was not able to pay its purchases to which La Insular filed suit for specific performance. The trial court acted favorably to La Insular. The dispute is upon the point of liability for the increased tax imposed by Act No. 2432. Defendant CoSiong contends that said law increases from P172 to P182 per box the price which he was obligated to pay

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for the cigarettes, which alteration in the contract has the effect of releasing the surety. The Court held that that in order to effect a release of the surety, the change in the contract must, as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contract. A recognized exception — more apparent than real — is found in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held to be released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of the official term or in the duties of the officer whose fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. In the case at bar the Government of the Philippine Islands was in no sense a party to the contract of July 15, 1913, between the plaintiff and the defendants; and it is readily seen that when the Legislature of these Islands increased the internal revenue tax upon cigarettes, this was an act done by a stranger to the contract, and not by any person in privity therewith. The consequence is that, properly speaking, the legislative fiat, placing the burden of the tax on the purchaser, did not in any wise affect the obligation of the contract as between the parties. It was merely an external factor which, supervening upon the situation created by the contract, made it impossible for the purchaser to realize the benefit which would have accrued to him if the seller had been required to pay the tax. Nearly all changes in taxation affect existing contracts in some way or other, but this does not necessarily change such contracts in a legal sense. Hence, where an Act of the Legislature imposes a new or additional tax upon goods contracted to be sold and places the burden of paying said tax upon the purchaser, the obligation of the contract between the

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contracting parties is not thereby changed in the sense necessary to release the surety upon the obligation for the purchase price of the goods. 3. Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come within the context of the provision. C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala 273 SCRA 437 (1997), Supra C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of the order of the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources revoked said license on the grounds of gross violation of its terms and conditions. It also did not reinstate their TLA saying that it might negate efforts to enhance the conservation and protection of our forest resources. On appeal, petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the country; that Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this effect "must be stated in good form, not implied"; and that in any case, any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect petitioner's vested rights in its TLA No. 106. The Court said that the cancellation of its license does not constitute an impairment of the obligation of its contract. It cited the case of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.

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Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: "while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause." Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections 289 SCRA 337, Supra Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;

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and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election. Radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them or franchise, the exercise of the which may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service, such as providing print space or air time to Comelec. Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA Network, Inc. a franchise and does not constitute denial of due process and that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore §2 of Resolution No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing for payment of just compensation is invalid. B.P. Blg. 881, §92 does not single out radio and television stations in providing free air time. There are important differences in the characteristics of the broadcast media and the print media, which justify their differential treatment for free speech purposes. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their

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franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. L. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS Art. III, Sec. 11 M. MIRANDA DOCTINE Art. III, Sec. 12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) The U.S. Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held that statements obtained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It laid down procedural rules which the police and the prosecution should follow when a person is under custodial investigation. 1) Prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination. 2) ―Custodial interrogation‖, within rule limiting admissibility of statements stemming from such interrogation, means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise

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deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 3) Unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused person of the right to silence and to assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, person must, before any questioning, be warned that he has right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed. 4) Defendant may waive effectuation of right to counsel and to remain silent, provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 5) There can be no questioning if defendant indicates in any manner and at any stage of interrogation process that he wishes to consult with attorney before speaking. 6) Police may not question individual if he is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. 7) Mere fact that accused may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. 8) Coercion can be mental as well as physical and blood of accused is not the only hallmark of unconstitutional inquisition. 9) Incommunicado interrogation of individuals in policedominated atmosphere, while not physical intimidation, is equally destructive of human dignity, and current practice is at odds with principle that individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.

People v. De la Cruz 279 SCRA 245 (1997)

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In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence by their horrified neighbors. They were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore external signs of sexual assault. None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant. They interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested. The investigation commenced at around 9:00 A.M. at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal at the time when appellant was still without counsel. Appellant, who was afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and with an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo) and who only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling, was charged with multiple murder. Appellant's defense was that he was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights prior to and while undergoing custodial investigation. Appellant testified that although he was conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated his extrajudicial confession and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, his supposed counsel. Record shows that his answers to the questions appearing in his extrajudicial confession are in fluent, flawless and expressive Tagalog. Appellant further claimed that he was tortured by the police authorities into signing the

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same. While he admits having been at the residence of the victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that same night when he proceeded to his brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. The trial court rendered judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse. The Supreme Court held that the accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must be informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with one. Appellant's conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession obtained without assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence against him; that the Bill of Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in the same light. With the exception of appellant's putative extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accusedappellant. BELLOSILLO, J Facts: - Two men and a woman were seen grappling for possession of a bag. After taking possession of the bag, the 2 armed men shot the woman in the head. They then boarded a tricycle driven by Del Rosario

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and sped away. Witnesses took note of the tricycle‘s plate number. - The police then located Del Rosario and invited him for interview. Del Rosario then gave statements concerning the locations and identities of the gunmen. (He even went with them to the location of the gunmen but one of the gunmen was found dead after a shootout that had taken place earlier) He was thereafter detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on a later date. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. He was later charged with Robbery with Homicide. - Transcripts reveal that del Rosario was handcuffed by police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. Issues: W/N Del Rosario‘s Miranda rights were violated. Held: YES, THEY WERE Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforces after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41

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This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that — . . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer. From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions

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on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. His warrantless arrest was also illegal as it was not among those permitted by Rule 113. Dispositive ACQUITTED and RELEASED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant. FRANCISCO, J.: Facts: - Nine year old Len-len Antolin was found dead, an apparent victim of rape with homicide. Bravo was seen talking to Len-len on the day of her disappearance, inviting her to an alleged birthday party and to a treat of balut and Coke. He was then seen to be leaving with Len-len. - The police found Bravo at his work place and invited him for questioning after informing him that he was a suspect for Len-len‘s killing. At the police station, Bravo admitted that he was with Len-len but he was too drunk on the night in question that he could not remember what he did to her. The police did not inform Bravo of his Miranda rights because, according to them, he was only being informally interviewed. Issues: W/N Bravo‘s Miranda rights were violated.

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Held: YES, THEY WERE The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedly made by him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible. Dispositive ACQUITTED and RELEASED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIÑAS, FEDERICO AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIÑAS y ODAL, accused KAPUNAN, J.:

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Facts: - At 9:30 in the evening a group of eight armed men wearing masks entered a house in Caloocan where they robbed the premises and gang raped the owner‘s niece and employee. - Bagas, one of the accused, claims that police (with Ampatin, one of the accused) one day had barged into the handicrafts factory in Pasay where he was employed as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain ―Mario‖ and searched the building. Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, ―Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito‖ and ―Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino.‖ It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. - Bagas was then brought to the police station where he faced the victims of the crime face to face. He was asked if he knew the co-accused and replied in the negative. The policemen then told the told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen intervened.

Held: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation.ii[6] Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular

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suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.iii[7] Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.iv[8] This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsingv[9] and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra.vi[10] The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatoryvii[11] and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.viii[12] Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accusedappellant. In fact, records show that the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction.ix[13] In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.

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As regards the manner of identification, there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification.x[14] The fact that he was brought out of the detention cell alone and was made to stand before the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does not detract from the validity of the identification process. However, we agree that complainants‘ out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankeexi[15] which lists the following factors: xxx (1) the witness‘ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness‘ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process. The out-of-court identification of herein accusedappellant by complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive. Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accusedappellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the detention cell to be presented to them for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of

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the suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits. Also, Bagas had a credible alibi. He was locked in his place of employment in Pasay during the night in question. Dispositive BAGAS ACQUITTED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.: Facts: - Escordial was charged with robbery with rape after allegedly breaking into a ladies‘ boarding house one evening, robbing the inhabitants of their money and raping on of them. - Escordail, while watching a basketball game, was invited to the police station where he was asked to take off his shirt. The rape victim positively identified him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the back of his neck and his voice. - The other inhabitants of the boarding house identified him through a police line up.

Held: While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent

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counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest.42 However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accusedappellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial

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itself to a mere formality."44 We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.45 Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"46 Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of these testimonies.47 Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof,49 it is admissible as evidence

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against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent.

ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: - Manzano was arrested following a buy-bust operation where he was caught selling 4 tea-bag sized plastic bags filled with marijuana. - Manzano claims he has been "investigated, interrogated and made to sign an accomplished booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of counsel."

PUNO, J.: Facts: - An audit examination revealed that Navallo, Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National Vocational School, had a shortage of P16,483.62. - Navallo claims he was deprived of his rights according to II, 12 of the Constitution when he was ―pressured‖ to sign the examination report. Held: Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule.

vs.

Held: This Court has already emphasized that "(w)hen an arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report at a police station, he does not (thereby) admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person being detained. 3 The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the custodial investigation which would otherwise require the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused. GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant. Bellosillo, J.:

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Facts: - Endino and Galgarin stabbed and shot Dennis Aquino in front of his girlfriend in Puerto Princesa City. Aquino then died. - Galgarin was arrested in Antipolo and was set to be transported to Palawan to stand trial. On the way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. - Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.

Held: Apropos the court a quo's admission of accusedappellant's videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could

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have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: - Guillermo, an employee of Keyser plastics, approached the company guard and calmly told him that he killed Victor Keyser and requested for help in carrying the body to the garbage dump so that he may burn it. - Once police arrived at the premises, a half-naked Guillermo told them‖ Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko ito.‖ They then found Keyser‘s dismembered limbs and chopped torso. Keyser‘s head was found in a cement bag.

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- When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenter‘s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter‘s saw. When asked as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his coemployees.2[17] He expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. - The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation, which was conducted without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. - Guillermo, who was in police custody, was subsequently interviewed by Gus Abelgas of ABSCBN and Kara David of GMA 7 where he admitted committing the crime and expressed no remorse. He described how he committed the killings as well as his motive (he was treated like an animal, being made to work for years without being paid and was improperly fed). Held: The confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the Constitution.

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Under Article III of the Constitution,3[43] a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. Even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellant‘s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. Appellant‘s spontaneous statements made to a private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him. Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant. Regalado, J.:

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Facts: - Aquinaldo, a middle-aged teacher was stabbed and killed inside her classroom. Witnesses saw a man in blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front, using slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel wrapped around his neck. - When police went to Aguinaldo‘s family to inquire for possible suspects, they pointed to appellant, the ―jilted boyfriend‖ of the victim‘s sister, as a possible suspect. - Policemen went to Paynor‘s workplace and found him wearing maong pants, white T-shirt with markings in front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck and a brown hat on his head. He was brought to the station where he was positively identified by witnesses. - Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his clothing and personal items, and the same were later introduced as evidence during the trial. Held: The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that any confession or admission obtained in violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right

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applies only against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent. Sarmiento, J.: Facts: - Usman Hassan, an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador, was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel solely on the basis of one witness‘s testimony, which was taken only 2 days after the incident and sworn to 4 days after the killing and was practically forced out by the police. Witness said victim was stabbed only once, which was disputed by the medico-legal report which found the victim tabbed 6 times. - Hassan was also ―presented‖ alone to the witness by the police and the relatives of the victim in the Funeral Parlor. Held: The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of

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Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20 Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused. As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accusedappellant should be acquitted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants. De Leon Jr, J.: Facts: - Continente et al were charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in connection with the ambush of US Col. James Rowe‘s (JUSMAG

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Commander) car in the corner of Tomas Morato and Timog, which led to his death. Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents established through a confidential intelligence information the involvement of Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman. Continente was taken into custody where he admitted to his participation in the ambush as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA. Documents were confiscated, including a letter which had the acronyms "STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team, Regional Command". Itaas was likewise arrested following intelligence information. He likewise admitted his participation in the ambush as member of the NPA‘s Sparrow unit. Continente and Itaas insisted on making extrajudicial confessions to the police despite the absence of counsel. They were nevertheless provided with counsel by the police, who assisted them.

Held: Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal assistance during their respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final

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choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.xii[57] If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to give their statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.xiii[58] Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.xiv[59] What is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to counsel is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to provide him with the best defense. People v Hatton 16 June 1992 Medialdea, J. Facts: Faustino Algarme and 3 friends were walking down the street when Hatton allegedly stabbed Faustino. Hatton and his companion fled while Algarme was rushed to the hospital where he died.

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One of Algarme‘s companions reported the incident to the police headquarters. Three policemen, one of whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him to the scene of the crime where they beamed their flashlights towards the house of Nonong Hatton where he believed the tall man and his companion entered. According to Algarme‘s companion, the day after the incident when he went to the Police station to shed light on the incident, he narrated to the police officers what really transpired. He told them that the features of the assailant was still in his memory and that if they can show or present a person who will fit his description, he can identify him. He waited at the police station but the police failed to present any person to him. On the second day after the incident, he was picked-up from his office and made to identify their suspect who turned out to be the accused-appellant. The latter was sitting on a bench in the police station and a policeman pointed to him as their suspect. Hatton interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on that same night, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., he was in the house of his friend to celebrate the baptism of a friend‘s child. During the entire period, he got up only twice to go to the comfort room. Issue: 1. W/N Hatton was properly identified in a police line-up. 2. W/N he was deprived of his right to be represented by counsel. Held/Ratio: 1. NO.

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The prosecution through its witness, made it appear that the latter identified the accused-appellant in a police line-up. The details however, showed otherwise. From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person who stabbed the victim. At that moment, he had the impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the proceedings in the police station where he was supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed the deceased, not because he was certain that the accused-appellant was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, the witness pointed to him as "the man." From all indications, the identification of accused-appellant by Ongue was suggested by the police and this is objectionable. 2. NO. Hatton argued that when he was presented in a lineup of sorts he was not represented by a counsel. This allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation. This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v Wade is that the presence of counsel is indispensable in a postindictment line-up. In this case, the accused had already been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to

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represent him. It was fifteen days after his arrest and the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he was presented in a police line-up to be identified by the prosecution witness. In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police station only to be identified by a witness to the killing of Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage. the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admission or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.

People v De Guzman Melo, J. 30 June 1993 Facts: De Guzman et al fired at a family in a jeepney hitting the passengers and killing the father. They later hijacked another jeepney and rode away. The accused were identified from a group of 15 persons who were presented to 3 of the victims. During the joint trial of the cases, they were again positively identified the as the perpetrators of the crimes. Particularly, Lorna Carteciano further testified

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that Victor Nuñez was the gunman who shot her husband, Major Carteciano, in the head. (Topical) It is alleged that the accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when he was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance of counsel. Issue: W/N accused was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Held/Ratio: NO. He was not then under custodial investigation. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation the right is likewise not violated where during a police lineup where the accused was identified by the victim, because he was not, at that moment, under custodial investigation.

People v Ordono and Medina Per Curiam 29 June 2000

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Facts: The decomposing body of a young girl was found in the bushes. She was identified as Shirley Victore, who was reported missing 3 days before. The NBI examination revealed that she was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed to the accused who were invited by the police for questioning. However, for lack of evidence linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go home. They returned a few days later and acknowledged having committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist them in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be that as it may, the statements of the two accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of their voluntary statements. They were thereafter detained. A local radio host visited them to interview them. A few days later, they were brought to the PAO for assistance and counseling. The PAO lawyer, Atty. Corpuz, apprised each of the

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accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second signature/ thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the two separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised them of their constitutional rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge who further apprised them of their constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused Ordoño and Medina to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing. During arraignment, they retracted their statements and pled not guilty. Issue: W/N their right to counsel was violated.

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Held/Ratio: YES. Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation. In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that

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before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the essential safeguards. Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.

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The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.

People v Bagnate Per Curiam 20 May 2004 Facts: The accused was turned over to the police for custodial investigation. Without asking the name of appellant, the police officer informed him in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is willing to cooperate, the accused

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assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. It was later learned that appellant‘s real name is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told the police of his willingness to confess, he was again informed of his rights, and was asked if he wanted to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in Manila. The police offered the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave the investigation room and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined appellant to see if he was physically harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty. Brotamonte noticed that appellant‘s left hand was handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with the police asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. After appellant‘s confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and went back to his office. As far as he could recall, the entire process took more than an hour. The next day, the accused was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as

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the authenticity of the signatures of the accused and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to the accused the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them. Judge Base inspected his body and asked him if he was forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked him if he was still willing to sign it again and he answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which the accused affixed his signature. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the crimes were committed by him. Later on, the accused repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and assailed its admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his confession. Issue: W/N his right to counsel was violated. Held/Ratio: NO. To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be ―willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual‘s constitutional rights. In People

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v. Basay, the Court stressed that an accused‘s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or duress was employed by the police authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He informed appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions propounded by the police. Also, it was shown that he signed the confession with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before Judge Base, who, before administering the oath to appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his rights and the consequences of his confession. The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant‘s extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an

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accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime. People v Lucero Puno 29 May 1995 Facts: Lucero et al were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. They ambushed the complainant and took with them cash and jewelry. Killed in the incident was the driver of the complainant. Lucero and the Echavez brothers were apprehended by the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS) and brought to their headquarters. Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared

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that even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot the driver. In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was. Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice. Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at his residence. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined the document and explained to Lucero its legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily.

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Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed the statement. Issue: W/N Lucero was denied the right to counsel. Held/Ratio: YES. There was no "substantial" compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. However, the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in

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the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. People v Bandula Bellosillo 27 May 1994 Facts: The accused were found guilty for robbery with homicide after killing a lawyer and ransacking his house. Among the evidence admitted were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." "These extrajudicial confessions made by accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula extracted during custodial investigation," the trial court ruled, "have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession, it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)." On appeal, appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.

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Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged. From the records, it was shown that when accusedappellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Issue: W/N there was a violation of the rights of the accused. Held/Ratio: YES. The Constitution requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously

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doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. (Morales v Enrile) At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. People v Hernandez Puno 4 December 1997 Facts:

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Hernandez et al were arrested, one by one, as suspects in the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. The first to be apprehended was accused Hernandez. He was arrested on February 5, 1992 by the Central Police District (CPD) in connection with another crime. When the CPD learned that Hernandez was a suspect in the Tan kidnapping case, he was turned over to the CIS for investigation. In the CIS, Hernandez waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel in the presence of one Atty. Solomon Villanueva and voluntarily admitted his participation in the crime. In his extrajudicial confession, Hernandez confirmed that in January 1992, his friend, accused Lorenzo, asked him to join his group to kidnap Sharleen Tan. He revealed their individual participation. He stated that accused Bolante and Jacob were the ones who abducted Sharleen. Accused Mansuer drove the taxi carrying Bolante, Jacob and Sharleen. They dropped off Sharleen at a house in John Kennedy Street, Project 8, Quezon City. It was Jacob who got in touch with Sharleen's family to demand for ransom. Mansuer and Jacob were the ones who picked up the ransom. After three days, Jacob gave Hernandez P15,000 as his share of the ransom money. The confession of Hernandez led to the apprehension of the other accused. When arrested, accused Lorenzo and Tumaneng waived their right to counsel and agreed to execute extrajudicial confessions in the presence of Atty. Villanueva. Accused Jacob also executed an extrajudicial confession and waived his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva and his

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common-law wife Margarita Albiso. Meantime, accused Famodulan, was invited by the CIS operatives to shed light on the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. He executed a sworn statement where he waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva. For their defense, appellants simply denied complicity in the kidnapping of Sharleen. Appellants Lorenzo and Tumaneng claimed that their extrajudicial confessions were elicited under duress. Appellant Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the money as directed by accused Hernandez. Issue: 1. W/N the extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence. 2.(MAIN) W/N Atty. Villanueva not an independent and competent counsel. ( They insist that Atty. Solomon Villanueva who was provided by the CIS operatives to assist them in the waiver of their rights to silence and to counsel is neither an independent nor a competent lawyer. They argue that since Atty. Villanueva was once a member of the Judge Advocate's Office, his sympathies are suspect. They also assail the competence of Atty. Villanueva to assist them during the custodial investigation. Allegedly, at no instance did Atty. Villanueva prevent appellants from incriminating themselves.)

Held/Ratio: 1. YES.

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Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to prove the involuntariness of his confession. In the case at bar, appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this burden. Their accusation lacks proof and is belied by the records. No medical certificate was presented to prove their maltreatment. Neither did they exhibit any physical marks of violence. The records reveal that appellants did not file an administrative or criminal complaint against their alleged torturers. During the preliminary investigation, appellants even subscribed their confession before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu who certified that he personally examined appellants and was fully convinced that they voluntarily executed and understood their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the trial court rightly rejected appellants' allegation of maltreatment. 2. ATTY. VILLANUEVA IS AN INDEPENDENT AND COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL. The fact that Atty. Villanueva is a retired member of the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on his impartiality in assisting appellants during their custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence of bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva. Appellants' charge is specious and speculative. (People v Aquino) The right to counsel is designed to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court. While our

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litigation is adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to ascertain the truth for justice is not justice unless predicated on truth. The accused under investigation is assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from them. In the case at bar, appellants waived their rights to remain silent and to counsel in the presence and with the assistance of Atty. Villanueva. Atty. Villanueva cannot be faulted when he did not prevent appellants from truthfully answering the questions propounded by the investigators. For allowing the free flow of truth, Atty. Villanueva cannot be deemed as an incompetent counsel. A lawyer's oath binds him to prevent falsehood and not to suppress truth.

People v Barasina Melo 21 January 1994 Facts: The accused shot and killed Fiscal Mayo. He was apprehended while trying to escape. (Relevant to topic) On appeal, the accused-appellant makes reference to the manner the extrajudicial confession and waiver were extracted from him in the absence of a lawyer of his own choice. He maintains that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza in the course of the custodial investigation but it was turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo Torres who assisted during the interrogation upon the directive of

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P.Lt. Surapa. Accused-appellant concludes that the extrajudicial statement can not thus be utilized against him for want of competent, independent counsel of his own choice. Issue: W/N his right to counsel as provided in the constitution was violated. Held/Ratio: NO. Quoting the CA, the SC held that the claim of the appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his own choice, is belied by records. During the custodial investigation, he failed to indicate in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney of his own preference before speaking or giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by the appellant after the custodial investigation is an afterthought. Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.

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This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.

People v Jerez Romero 29 January 1998 Facts: The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide. Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National Police testified that upon appellant‘s arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights. In the presence of Atty. Augusto Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not appellant understood the consequences of his confession. Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his defense and that the extra-judicial confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, coercion and intimidation. Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests. Issue:

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W/N he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel rendering his extrajudicial confession inadmissible. Held/Ratio: NO. EJ admissible. When appellant executed the extrajudicial confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. ―The presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as he is due to depart for Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available, appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation and the latter answered in the affirmative. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the final

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choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former‘s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Thus, ―once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People v. Villanueva, the Court declared that ―voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaniety and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.‖ A scrutiny of the sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the commission of the offense charged which the accused himself could only have known.

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People vs. Niero Suela (2002) Facts: 3 armed men (Niero Suela, Edgar S. and Edgardo Batocan) rob the house of Rosas. They took tv, cash, jewelries etc amounting to P657K and stabbed & killed Gabilo. Edgar Suela contacted Rosas‘ secretary, telling her that if Rosas will agree, he will relay information as to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for Gabilo‘s death for P200K. An entrapment ensued and this effected his arrest. While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire to give an extrajudicial confession. Hence, they were brought to the IBP for the taking down of their confessions. In the extra judicial confession of the Suelas they also impleaded Edgardo Batocan who also participated in the crime. A warrant of arrest was issued against Batocan, during his custody he also expressed his desire to give an extrajudicial confession. The trial court held that the appellants had been assisted by competent and independent counsel during the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to Director Rosas asking him for forgiveness as well as the discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former‘s house, further convinced his guilt. Finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced them to death. Hence, this automatic review of the Decision. Issue: 1. w/n batocan‘s extrajudicial confession as admissible evidence against him? No

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2. w/n extrajudicial confessions of the Suelas as admissible against them? No Held: 1. With respect to Batocan, he did not finish first year high school. He was interviewed before he gave his confession for around five minutes. After this initial interview with Atty. Rous, counsel just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Atty. Rous‘ attention even seemed divided for while hewas attending the custodial investigation, he was also looking over another paperwork on his desk. In view of these, the court is not convinced that Batocan‘s extrajudicial confession was obtained without violating his constitutional rights. 2. As to the Suelas, Atty. Sansano did not understand the exact nature of appellants‘ rights to counsel and to remain silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to answer as an obstruction in the investigation. Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did not even bother to find out the gist of their proposed statements in order to apprise them of the nature and consequences of their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly, appellants were not accorded competent and independent counsel whom they could rely on to look after their interests. As to the admissibility of the wristwatch, it is of limited probative value as it was taken without a search warrant and not

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as an incident of a valid arrest. It is clearly a fruit of a poisonous tree and as such, could not be admitted and appreciated against the accused. a. As to Nerio Suelas‘ letter to Director Rosas, this was written while Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation. In open court, he admitted having written it. The fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in evidence. Even excluding the wristwatch and the written extrajudicial confessions, there is still material evidence on record which prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of robbery with homicide. While under the new rules, an aggravating circumstance that is NOT alleged in the information CANNOT be appreciated in determining the criminal liability of the accused, the rules do not prevent its appreciation for the purpose of determining civil liability. Aquino vs. Paiste Aquino, Garganta, and Adeling went to the house of Paiste to convince her respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After Paiste was shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it was genuine. However, she told the three that she had no money.

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Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent the following day. The two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no money, petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold bar would be good investment. Due to their insistence Paiste bought the gold bar for Php 50,000. Paiste had the gold tested but it turned out to be fake; Paiste then proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the transaction. Paiste brought petitioner to NBI in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta. Subsequently, Paiste filed charges against Aquino for Estafa. RTC held petitioner, Garganta et. al. guilty as charged, CA affirmed.

Issue: w/n the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence? YES Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular

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suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule begins to operate. In CAB, petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed. However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino. It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy, which was not objected to . Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of

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Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the custodial investigation did not push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.

People vs. Judge Ayson (2009) Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos‘ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

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Issue: 1. w/n respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused? No Held: It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights 1) right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law

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excuses no one. The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 2) Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative. This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, " Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police

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custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.24 He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,

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compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances. Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — a) to refuse to be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to crossexamination by the prosecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted. It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be

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sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside. In CAB Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. Magtoto vs. Manguera (1975) *case did not discuss the facts of the case, it focused on a discourse of the history of the Right Against Self Incrimination. (Lifted relevant text from case)*

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No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence, and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel. We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason

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why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new right granted to a detained person in the present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution. When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972 meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our considered opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra. The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the historical fact that the constitutional and legal guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary, underwent a slow and tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in question might indeed have come late in the progress of the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to proclaim; We cannot properly do more.

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People v Tunday (1988) Facts: Jarolan Lawre, who was convicted of qualified theft and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on the basis mainly of his extrajudicial confession. Lawre and 2 others illegally took an Isuzu truck loaded with 14 rolls of iron rod while it was parked in the corner of Tondo. En route the truck collided with a jeep and Lawre's companions fled, leaving him alone at the wheel. Sulit who was directing traffic, approached Lawre and asked him why he did not stop at the timely traffic signal but all the latter did was scratch his head. Then he suddenly ran away. Abad, the owner of the truck, reported the incident to the police which, on the basis of the Identification furnished by Sulit, arrested Lawre and his co-accused Alfredo Tunday. Lawre gave a statement in which he admitted stealing the truck with its contents, but Tunday refused to submit to any interrogation. Tunday was eventually acquitted for insufficient evidence, but Lawre was found guilty despite his defense of alibi and his allegation that the extrajudicial confession was illegally obtained. Issue: w/n the extrajudicial admission of Tunday is admissible? No, not admissible. Held: Examination of the extrajudicial confession shows it is lacking with details that according to the trial court bespeak the guilt of the accused as no one but the actual perpetrator of the offense could have described it with such particularity. As convincing as it appears to

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be, however, it must still be rejected for violation of the Constitution. ―In Galit, we held that a confession must be made with the assistance of counsel unless the right to counsel is waived with the assistance of counsel. Under Article III, Section 12 of the new Constitution, it is not only provided that the right to the assistance of counsel, to be validly waived, must be made in writing but that it must also be done in the presence of counsel. These requirements have not been met." Apart from this, it is clear from the said sworn statement that the accused-appellant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Typically, the interrogation began with the standard sacramental recital of such rights, but without any effort to explain them, and ended with the mechanical question of whether he understood the notification, followed by the usual docile "Opo" from the suspect. There is now a long list of cases that have outlawed this unfeeling procedure as not sufficient to satisfy the imperative requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the protection of the person under custodial investigation. The confession having been obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights, it is not admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant. Still and all, the conviction can be sustained, but on another basis. The evidence shows conclusively that the authorized driver of the truck Cabilto, who parked the same in the corner of Rodriguez and Patria streets when the period of the truck ban began. When the truck collided with the jeep, it was already in the comer of Lopez and Rodriguez streets, and the person at the wheel was the accused-appellant. He was caught red-

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handed. When questioned, he simply scratched his head, and the next instant he had already bolted. The accused-appellant was positively Identified as the person in possession — of and actually driving — the stolen truck. But all he pleaded in his defense was his feeble alibi. Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996) Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District inMetro Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of apostal delivery van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. In May 1982, petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law should favour him as an accused. Issue: w/n A A3.12 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect and petitioner‘s extrajudicial confession be held as in admissible evidence? No

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Held: Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right was likewise without the benefit of counsel. The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows: ―No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.‖ In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as follows: ―(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These

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rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.‖ In Magtoto case it held that the provisions of the 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible.

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Definitive ruling in Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that ―(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.‖ Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, ―x x x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x. While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation ofMorales.‖Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. Petitioner‘s contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that ―(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,‖ what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal

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statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law. People v. Jara (1986) Facts: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide fo r the killing and robbery of Ampara on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention. Issue: there was a valid waiver of right to counsel during extrajudicial confession? No

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Held: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession and such proof was absent here. People vs. Mahinay(1999) Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions contending that his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial confession was taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights on custodial interrogation. Issue: w/n court erred in convicting the accused merely on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond reasonable ground? No w/n his rights to lawful custodial investigation was violated?

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Held: The court held that absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction must be consistent with each other which were proven in the case. The extrajudicial confession taken from the accused was within the requirement of Miranda rights and within lawful means where his confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer. Miranda Rights include: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person; 2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an

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4.

5.

6.

7.

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independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is

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void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People vs. Fabro (1997) Facts: Nicomedes Fabro, and four others were charged with murder of a certain Dionisio Joaquin. RTC found them guilty. In Fabros‘ appeal, he contends that his defense of alibi should be considered and that his extrajudicial confession must be deemed inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellant‘s

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confession was extracted under threat and intimidation; (2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco‘s participation was only as a witness during the signing of the prepared confession and not during the investigation or interrogation itself; and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession without having read it and without the presence of counsel. Issue: w/n the appellant‘s confession admissible? YES Held: A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given: 1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery 2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and 3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences. When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused. This adherence to the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession itself. It starts off with a Pasubali wherein appellant was informed of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay which confirmed that he understood said rights. Both parts also serve as a written proof of appellant‘s waiver in fulfilment of the requirements of the Constitution. Confession - It is a declaration made voluntarily and

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without compulsion or inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. Confession or admission obtained in violation of SEC. 12 and SEC. 17 ART. III shall be inadmissible in evidence, because a confession of guilt constitutes formidable evidence against the accused, on the principle that no one will knowingly, freely and deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience, particularly where the facts given could have been known only by accused.

People vs. Alicando Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim‘s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death

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penalty. Issue: w/n death penalty proper? No Held: The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he

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was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. People vs de Lara (1994) Facts: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, as a consequence of which, accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by running inside his house. The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused, proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation.

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During the investigation, accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void. He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet. Issue: 1. w/n the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid? Yes 2. w/n the documents (photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet) signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence? No Held: 1. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. The policemen‘s entry into the house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the accused‘s arrest inside the house. A

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contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. 2. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.)

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testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.

PEOPLE V LINSANGAN Facts: The accused appealed to this Court alleging that the lower court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the P10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. Held: The court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses is entitled to great respect unless and until they are clearly shown to be arbitrary, which the defense failed to do. The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial investigation. Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the

PEOPLE V MORICO Facts: Appellant claims that his signatures on the Receipt of Property Seized from him, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report and the "PansamantalangPagtalikodsamgaKarapatansaArtikulo 125‖ were obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation. Held: With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, [t]he Court reiterates its ruling in People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and maybe useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police

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themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction". However, we sustain appellant's contention that his signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the assistance of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 (1992), we stated that appellant's signature on this document is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken from appellant, as a result of a violation of his constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.

PEOPLE V LUVENDINO Facts: Luvendino contends that the "demonstration" or reenactment and his extrajudicial confession were effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the confession should be held inadmissible in evidence because they had been involuntarily made. Held: Luvendino validly waived his right to counsel so far as his extrajudicial confession was concerned, although he was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his confession at the police headquarters (disregarding for present purposes only, the subsequent events in the office of the Provincial Fiscal). At the time the extrajudicial confession and waiver were first executed

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(i.e., 10 February 1983), there was no rule of doctrine prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be validly made only with the assistance of counsel. It is scarcely necessary to add that we are here referring only to extrajudicial confessions and waivers which were made voluntarily and intelligently.

PEOPLE v. DY Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny‘s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused. Held: In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence

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against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

PEOPLE V SAMUS Facts: Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody cannot be admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of Pontaños and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded for being ―fruits of the poisonous tree.‖ Held: While it is true that the confessions of appellant were made without benefit of counsel, they are still admissible in evidence because of appellant‘s failure to make timely objections before the trial court. If only the defense had proffered them on time, the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present

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additional evidence to support its case. To disregard a major portion of the prosecution‘s case at a late stage during an appeal goes against the norms of fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is dispensed not only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be that as it may, and even if we now affirm appellant‘s conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with the trial court‘s imposition of the death sentence, because the proven aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the Information. N. RIGHT TO BAIL PEOPLE V FITZGERALD Facts: Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua(rape of a 13 year old girl) and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Held: It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age

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increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating thatrespondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison.

ENRILE V SALAZAR Facts: In February 1990, SenEnrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling. HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.

LAVIDES V CA Facts:

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ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against him and asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled. Trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner‘s motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds. Held: In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is required. On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a

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motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused‘s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.

CARPIO V MAGLALANG Facts: An information for murder was filed against Escaño and ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga. Four days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court issued an order of arrest against Escaño recommending no bail for his provisional liberty. In opposing said application, the public prosecutor averred that the accused was charged with a capital offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel. Held: A reading of the April 2, 1987 order convinces us that the court below was remiss in its duty as enunciated in People vs. San Diego. Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of prosecution witnesses but not their

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respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escaño. On this point alone, the order granting bail to Escaño should be invalidated.

COMMENDADOR V DE VILLA Facts: In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail. Held: The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-

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charge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup.

BAYLON V SISON Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused. Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a

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well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion. A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes: . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. BASCO vs. RAPATALO 269 SCRA 220

FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and

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trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution‘s witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995. Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: ―No objection: P80,000.00,‖ signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995. Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutor‘s option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter‘s recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was

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not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainant‘s motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration. Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn lettercomplaint, complainant Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing. ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING EVIDENCE? NO. HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release. It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article

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114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, ―No person‖ charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action.‖ When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, ―is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge‘s individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.

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Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

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of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of the state‘ s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After hearing, the court‘s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge‘s evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.

An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 1294.

Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v. Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules

The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court‘s determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting

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bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor‘s recommendation. In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles , SC reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison); (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied. The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. PEOPLE v CABRAL 303 SCRA 361 ROMERO; February 18, 1999

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FACTS - Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15 year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, the accused filed a motion for bail which was opposed by the petitioner. - The lower court grated the motion on the ground that despite the crime alleged to have been committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence thus far presented is not strong enough to warrant denial of the bail. The judge in concluding thus cited the fact that the girl went with the offender voluntarily and did not resist during the commission of the rape. In addition, the judge quoted the medico legal report as not conclusion that rape was in fact committed consideration that the lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or months old when the medical examination was performed six days after the offense occurred. - The CA affirmed the decision saying that there was no abuse of discretion in this case. ―There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of the law.‖ The People filed the appeal on the ground that while the judge had discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused this discretion. ISSUE

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- WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong evidence proving respondent‘s guilt for the crime charged. HELD YES - The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to mention and include some facts which are significant factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of the said factors and circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail. Reasoning - Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides: “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.” - Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides: ―No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution.‖ - In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right considering that the punishment for the offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is

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dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should which should be strong to justify denial. this determination is a matter of judicial discretion. - By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an offense has been committed as charged, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. - In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the judge are as follows: 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is

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strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the petition should be denied. - Based on the duties, the court‘s order granting or denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY SHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity. SEPARATE OPINION VITUG [dissenting] - The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the rules of Court are not open when the question is whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion. These special reliefs are available only when the judge has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his decision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely acting on bias and whim.

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CORTES VS CATRAL 279 SCRA 1 (1997) FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral for granting bail without hearing. 1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a crime that is supposedly not bailable without hearing. Catral says that in one of them, the case was frustrated homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of 200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak. In the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, for murder, the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no bail recommended. When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the information made no mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge ‚acting on the said recommendation and again guided by the provision of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in conjunction with the evidence extant on the record approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar Carrao. A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar Carrao‚ letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to the

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provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he granted bail to the accused without conducting any hearing. 2. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says that bailbond recommended was 180K. Accused filed for reduction and there was no opposition from prosecutor. 3. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio Bong Decierto. Catral averred that he was acting on the recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on record is merely circumstantial and there was no eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00. 4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban house to get an envelope.

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ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against respondent judge. YES. HELD: Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant‚ character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice. When the accused is charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, not only to take into account the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an accused charged with murder, without having conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

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The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the accused.

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accused were still at large as he even had to direct their arrest in the same order where he simultaneously granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

FACTS: The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce evidence in his own rebuttal. The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d‘etat in relation to the ―Oakwood Incident.‖ In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not valid classification petitioner and Jalosjos exists RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.

between

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In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor. Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a "political offense." Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP. xxx A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however. The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from

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the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is

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strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.

xxx

Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for accused‘s provisional release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail.

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention. Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is

PEOPLE VS. FORTES 223 SCRA 619 25 JUN 1993

Issue: Whether or Not the accused‘s right to bail violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.

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It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court.

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Respondent Judge issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail, admitting failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00 ( P840,000.00 for the multiple murder and P355,200.00 for multiple frustrated murder). Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed sent a telegram to Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. ISSUE: W/N the amount of for bail is reasonable?

DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE 41 SCRA 1 FACTS: Ricardo de la Camara, Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested and detained in Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. Then came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident. At the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.

HELD: YES. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,it is not beyond the realm of probability that a person charged with a crime, especially where his defense is weak, would make himself scarce and frustrate the hearing of his case. Thus, a bail is a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. If the

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Constitution did not prohibit this, the right to bail becomes meaningless. The sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive", Therefore, that fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail is clearly violative of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. Guidelines in the fixing of bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail (2) nature of the offense (3) penalty for the offense charged (4) character and reputation of the accused (5) health of the accused (6) character and strength of the evidence (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial (8) forfeiture of other bonds (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases Discretion is with the court to rule upon the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where

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conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, SC will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. However, because petitoner escaped from jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the Judges order.

Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan GR No 148571 Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court could act, Jimenez filed before it an ―Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,‖ which prayed that petitioner‘s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing and the court directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had

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surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Issue: WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held: As suggested by the use of the word ―conviction,‖ the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail ―flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.‖ It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

GOV’T. OF HONG KONG V. OLALIA & JUAN MUNOZ (April 19, 2007) Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez Facts: Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with 3 counts of the offense of ―accepting an advantage as agent,‖ in violation of Section 9 (1a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. He also faced 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faced a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge As early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high ―flight risk.‖ Muñoz filed an MR questioning the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by subsequent respondent Judge Olalia in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail (P750K).

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On December 21, 2001, petitioner government filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Issue: W/N trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail for there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings? Ratio: Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one‘s liberty. The US v. Purganan ruling (bail granted only to crim proceedings) applies squarely to private respondent‘s case. However, the SC cannot ignore the following trends in international law The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other

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fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the SC, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court‘s ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the State‘s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has

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admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.

two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. ―Temporary detention‖ may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that Munoz had been detained for over

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee‘s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be

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granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO 198 SCRA 130 5 JUN 1991 Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten

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days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest. This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,

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therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. PEOPLE v MANES 303 SCRA 231 PARDO; February 17, 1999

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FACTS - July 12, 1991, Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province filed with RTC Iloilo City, an INFORMATION charging the accused with MURDER: "That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death immediately thereafter." - prosecution recommended NO BAIL for the provisional liberty of the accused. - July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARREST against the accused - October 18, 1991 – TC ordered the case ARCHIVED for failure to locate the two accused - June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes were ARRESTED in Romblon, Romblon

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- September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, both accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the information

SERGON Manes with a gory knife and he also saw Nicanor running away, with blood on his back.

- August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FOR BAIL which was opposed by the prosecution. TC did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial.

Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the premises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manes fired two more shots. It could not be determined whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading. Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound.

- January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of murder - February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SC where accused questioned TC‘s failure (a) to hear the petition for bail (b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful aggression According to the prosecution > June 23, 1991 – 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and pointed a 38 caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the one to kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused

According to the accused(Ramil) > June 23, 1991 – in the afternoon, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a

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gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the basketball court. > While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they were arrested in Romblon. - prosecution‘s set of facts was favored by the court ISSUE WON petitioner has a right to bail HELD NO Ratio When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion Reasoning - In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of

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guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail. - the defense of relative because:

FAILED TO PROSPER

1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to defense of relative is absent because if it were true that Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered injuries. 2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was then under attack, he would not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. - even though prosecution failed to show evident premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder. Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of

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them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.

PEOPLE v HOLGADO GR No. L-2809 (March 22, 1950) Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : ―If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio todefend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.‖ This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminaloffense without due process of law", and that all

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accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference tothe commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. PEOPLE v SANTOCILDES GR No. 109149 (December 21, 1999) Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9 years old. Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel

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and even conducted the direct examination and crossexaminations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said person "presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a professional and skillful manner." Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived, though no fault of his own, to be defended by a person authorized to practice law amounting to denial of due process. Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutorymachinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic

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rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of conviction and ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for new trial. The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate Ompong's unauthorized practice of law. PEOPLE v AGBAYANI GR No. 122770 (January 16, 1998) Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial. Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure

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prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court. PEOPLE v MAGSI GR No. L-32888 (August 12, 1983) Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that

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date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty butqualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder and made to suffer the death penalty.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights of the accused.

Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55 SCRA 243-244): the trial courts shouldexercise solicitous care before sentencing the accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses

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by first insuring that the accused fully understands the gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences attached thereto as well as the meaning and significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance. PEOPLE v MALUNSING GR No. L-29015 (April 29, 1975) Facts: It was the failure of the lower court to respect the constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is a very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire proceeding in the case, the appellant while present did not know what was going on; the trial court never apprised the appellant of his fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take the witness stand. Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly manifested in the opening of the trial that appellant intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was an admission that he did appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that

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while in the original complaint there were two other accused with the same surname as the lawyer, Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a kinsman, they were both discharged for lack of probable cause, the court ask the appellant if he has a lawyer; after answering in the negative, the Court then appointed Atty. Pajarito as counsel de oficio for the defendant. After marking it of record that he was appointed as counsel de oficio, the Attorney was ask whether he wanted to confer with the appellant. This was answered with: ―I think I know the case.‖ The Court then immediately proceeded with the hearing. In the decision itself, there is this meaningful admission by the court: ―No evidence was presented for and in behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas.‖ Issue: Whether or not the appointed counsel de oficio Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the exercise of his profession. Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, were the accused has indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the number of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended but the result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then

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rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee of right to counsel. PEOPLE v CUIZON GR No. 109287 (April 18, 1996) FACTS: Cuizon, Pua, and Paul Lee are found guilty of transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu. However, Appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Filipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the reception of Lee‘s testimony, his counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present additional evidence, and the case was considered submitted for decision after the filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum. ISSUE: WON the trial court violated Paul Lee's constitutional right to due process. RULING: YES. The SolGen was right in saying that the trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is

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clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial. PEOPLE v SERZO GR No. 118435 (June 20, 1997) FACTS: Alfredo (victim) together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were staying inside their house comfortably watching television when Susana Serzo mother of the accused and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son (Mario Serzo Jr) the accused in this case. The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo at his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life and was declared dead on arrival in the hospital. Appellant was charged with murder filed by Rizal Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata. Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case

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proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and trial, accused was found guilty of the crime charged. The accused contends that he was denied his right to counsel, a narration of the proceedings before the trial court, arraignment was set by the trial court during which appellant appeared without counsel. Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. The presentation of evidence for the defense was reset as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested his intention to secure the services of a counsel de parte hence Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio as a consequence Appellant appeared without counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint another counsel de oficio, respectively Bella Antonano and Atty. Bonifacia Garcia. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of murder. Hence, appealed was made to the SC. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not giving the defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own choice. RULING: NO, SC affirmed the decision of the trial court. The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution. The right covers the period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of judgment and even on appeal however right to counsel de parte is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the states's and the offended party's equally important right to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may

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restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like. In this case, appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-named lawyers. Therefore, it do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to counsel because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance

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such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him. AMION v JUDGE CHIONGSON AM No. RTJ-97-1371 (January 22, 1999) FACTS: The allegations against respondent judge are premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for accused-complainant despite the latter‘s objection thereto on the ground that he had his own retained counsel in the person of Atty. Depasucat. Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Ong of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the criminal case. He further avers that his retained counsel was ready for hearing but on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty. Depasucat was ill. It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Ong. Notwithstanding complainant-accused‘s vehement opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the trial with Atty. Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held between said counsel de oficio and himself.

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ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the accused constitutional rights. RULING: NO. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the ―preference in the choice of counsel‖ pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in criminal prosecution. Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would have led to the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his side. Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused‘s counsel de parte pursuant to the court‘s desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. ANDRADA v PEOPLE GR No. 135222 (March 4, 2005)

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Facts: - On September 24, 1986 at about 1:15 am, Sgt Sumabong, Sgt Gaces and Cpl Aresinio Ugerio were eating at the Marlow‘s Restaurant in Baguio City. When Cpl Ugerio talked to a woman who passed by their table, petitioner Peter Andrada, approached him and scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong advised Andrada to pay his bills and go home as he was apparently drunk. - As Sumabong was paying the bills, he heard Ugerio moan in pain. He then saw Andrada hacking Ugerio with a bolo. Sumabong approached them but Andrada ran away. Andrada was then arrested in a waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and Magsaysay Ave. - Andrada invoked self defense claiming that Ugerio and Sumabong slapped his face and pointed their guns to his head. He also said that he ran away to his house in Camdas Subd. He checked to see if his mother was around to accompany him to surrender, but nobody was home. On his way to surrender, he say his mother with a policeman. They proceeded to the police station in Magsaysay Ave where Andrada surrenderd. The RTC however ruled against Andrada.

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must show that Andrada has the real interest to surrender unconditionally to the police authorities. - In this case however, surrender was not spontaneous. PEOPLE v VALDESANCHO GR No. 137051-52 (May 30, 2001) FACTS: Two counts of the crime of rape was charged against Vicente Valdesancho. It was alleged that the rape was committed against Elvie Basco on August 15 and 16 1994, respectively. All evidence of the prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by the accused on these dates.

Held: No

The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He contends that Elvie together with her mother, Leonida, filed the instant cases against them because of the serious quarrel between Erlinda (wife of the accused and the older sister of the victim) and Leonida because of the latter's relationship with a lesbian. He also said that he had no misunderstanding or quarrel with Elvie. He proved that on these dates he was in the town of Sta. Maria helping Ka Usting prepare for the town fiesta. He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie, was no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She already transferred to Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where she was in Grade 2.

Ratio: - Evidences showed that Andrada, after attacking the victim, ran away. However, he was apprehended by the policemen who were in the waiting shed. - For voluntary surrender to be accepted as a mitigating circumstance, it should be spontaneous and it

The accused was convicted for two counts of rape committed on August 15 and 16, 1993 when the informations filed against him alleged August 15 and 16, 1994 as the dates when the crimes were committed. He contends that he was denied due process to defend

Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be invoked by Andrada

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himself. His whole defense of alibi centered around August 15 and 16, 1994, the alleged dates of the rape incidents. ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. RULING. YES. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict an accused for an offense not alleged in the complaint or information violates such right. The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of the charges against him was explained by this Court as early as 1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen,[27] viz: "First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are

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sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged." PEOPLE v CRISOLOGO GR No. 74145 (June 17, 1987) FACTS: Zosimo Crisologo alias ―Amang‖, a deaf-mute, was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1 May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged against him through sign language but apparently no sign language expert or representative was available. The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was given due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely

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circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; against him, and, further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing this constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer,

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and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary means to know and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a condition where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the transaction upon which the accusation is based. PEOPLE v QUITLONG GR No. 121502 (July 10, 1998) FACTS - Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change, he found out that he only received P35 for his P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The 3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got stabbed and fell to the ground. - The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for reinvestigation alleging that ―it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court acted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits. The information, as amended, included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike accused-appellants who were immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza

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remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. - On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision. ISSUES 1. WON the RTC abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and among the accusedappellants 2. WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide HELD 1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are only accomplices. 2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority in number would not per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. - Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused

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shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. - object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime. People v Marcelo March 22, 1999 J. Vitug Facts:

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Carmelita lives with her two daughters Josefina and Jaezel. Not far from their residence is the store owned by accused Ernesto Marcelo. The children grew fond of Ernesto because he usually gives them candies and in time Carmelita felt at ease with him and would leave the children under his care when she is away. On March 8, 1993, Josefina would complain to her mother about a pain in her vagina and Carmelita would even notice her daughter inserting her hand in her panty to prevent it from touching her vagina. When this strange behavior recurred, she confronted her daughter who admitted that accused, would insert his finger, and then later on his penis into his vagina. An information for rape was then filed against Ernesto. RTC convicted him. Ernesto argues that the information averred to have taken place on 11 March 1993 and 06 March 1993, pointing out that the trial court convicted him in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51492 despite its opinion that rape had been committed not on 06 March 1993 but in the morning of 08 March before Carmelita arrived to fetch her children. He thus argues that the allegation in the information, not being sufficiently definite on the date of the commission of the crime, has violated the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him so as to give him the full opportunity to prepare for his defense. Issue: WON the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against him was violated when the information failed to state the exact date the rape was committed. Held/ Ratio:

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No. Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, in relation to Section 11 thereof, provides that the complaint or information would be sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. With respect particularly to the time of the commission of the offense, it ―is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.‖

People v Ambray February 25, 1999 J. Gonzaga-Reyes Facts: Melenia Hernandez, the victim, was a grade three student at the time of the alleged rape. She was the daughter of the common law wife of the accused Ambray. On March 13, 1996, she said that at around 2am, the accused woke her up and brought her to bed and inserted his penis on her vagina and sexually abused her. She was not able to see her mother immediately, thus she revealed the incident to her aunt which led to the filing the information against accused. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

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Issue: WON the penalty imposed against the accused should have been reduced

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Although it was shown that the accused is the commonlaw spouse of the victim‘s mother, the first special qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. The failure to allege the fact of relationship between the accused and the victim in the information for rape is fatal and consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

Facts: The Senados were sleeping in their household when suddenly they heard a gunshot which hit their light which thus causing the room to be covered in total darkness. Afterwards, four bursts of gunfire were subsequently heard. When the firing ceased, she saw accused Paglinawan holding an M16 rifle looking at their house which was lighter because of a bulb. He found and his wife and children injured, and another child, Jerry, dead. An information was filed against appellant accusing him of murder. RTC convicted only convicted him for murder qualified with treachery. Issue: WON, accused can also be found guilty for the injuries suffered by the wife and children Held/Ratio: No. the information filed in this case is only for the murder of Jerry Senados, the seven-year old child of Segundino and Millianita Senados. Though the prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses that Millianita Senados and Junior Senados were injured, the court cannot hold accused-appellant liable for said injuries since he was not properly charged therefore. The Constitution is clear that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, a person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged, otherwise, he would be denied the due process of law

People v Paglinawan January 31, 2000 J. Mendoza

People v De Vera June 9, 1999 J. Vitug

Held/Ratio: Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code to which the accused is charged provides for attendant circumstances for which the imposable penalty is death. The first circumstances provides: ―1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.‖

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Facts: At around midnight of December 31, 1993, while they were playing with fireworks, Neil saw accused go under a mango tree. After a short while, he heard a gun shot, which was followed by the falling body of his brother Gerardo. When he looked around, he saw the accused, whom he clearly recognized, holding a long-barreled gun, about one meter long, also locally known as "sumpak." Just as he started to assist his brother, he heard shouts, about 40 to 50 meters away, that her sister Perlita was also dead. He speculated that that the shooting was an offshoot of the land dispute between his father and the accused. Three informations were filed against the accused, one for the murder of Gerardo Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer, and the third for illegal possession of firearms. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Homicide and of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death Issue: WON accused can be tried and held liable or convicted for two or more criminal cases at the same time Held/Ratio: No. while the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the two informations. Thus appellant cannot be held liable

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for the complex crime of murder with homicide but should be held liable separately for these crimes. To do so would deprive the accused of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Romualdez v Sandiganbayan July 29, 2004 J. Panganiban Facts: The People of the Philippines through the PCGG filed an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the accused, Alfredo Romualdez with violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019. The information provided that the accused, being the brother-in-law of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and therefore, related to him by affinity within the third civil degree, for the purpose of promoting his self-interests and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by Pres. Marcos. Petitioner claims that the phrase ―to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government‖ is vague and violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him. He further complains that the provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be presumed innocent

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Issue: WON Section 5 of RA 30194 was unconstitutional for being void for vagueness. Held/Ratio: It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Nonetheless, the term intervene should be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to ―to come between.‖ Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or application with the government. It is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial. People v Bryan Ferdinand Dy 4

“Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.”

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January 16, 2003 J. Ynares-Santiago Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by accused Dy for the decision finding him guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness. One of their main contentions is that the right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their participation in the trial; Issue: WON there has been a violation of the rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them. Held/Ratio: NO. Indeed, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation may not be waived and indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of ―not guilty‖ in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information. Abalos v People September 17, 2002 J. Quisumbing Facts: On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification of Private Documents was filed against the accused–

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appellant Braulio Abalos in the MTC of Dagupan City. On December 12, 1994, another Information for Falsification of Private Document was filed against the accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the Dagupan Municipal Trial Court, the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Initially, the motion to quash was granted, but this was later reversed in a motion for certiorari filed in the RTC. On the MTC Lingayen, he also filed a motion to quash but this was also denied. He appealed in both cases, which was consolidated by the CA who later decided to dismiss his appeals, Thus the petition on certiorari. Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of jurisdiction over the criminal cases for falsification by the MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues that both courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction over his case. He avers that only one crime was committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature of the criminal intent proved Issue:

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The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in a single information. However, petitioner failed to raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to a waiver and his objection on this point can no longer be raised on appeal. In his Motion to Quash filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping, double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of ―multifariousness of offenses alleged‖ in his petition before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated, and obviously to no avail. People v Palarca May 29, 2002 J. Ynares-Santiago

Held/Ratio:

Private complainant, a 70 year widow was tending to her sari-sari store, while accused, who was a frequent buyer in the store, was finishing his two bottles of beer. While complainant was drinking her pills for her insomnia, accused entered the kitchen and forcibly raped her. An information was filed against him for rape through force and intimidation. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus the appeal to the SC.

No. there was a waiver of his right.

Issue:

WON the informations filed in Lingayen as well as in Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of offenses merged in one information.

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WON an information lacking certain material allegations may still sustain a conviction. Held/Ratio: Yes, the accused-appellant failed to interpose any objection to the presentation by the prosecution of evidence which tended to prove that he committed the rape by force and intimidation. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In People v. Lopez, we held that an information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus Failure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will. Acebedo v Sarmiento December 16, 1970 J. Fernando Facts:

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On August 3, 1959, a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against petitioner and a certain Chi Chan Tan with the CFI Pampanga. As there were no further proceedings, petitioner on May 19, 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent Judge denied this on July 10, 1965. After two more years, came the trial with the complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for June 7, 1967 such witness did not show up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for petitioner, however, not only objected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. Initially, respondent judge granted the dismissal, but he later reversed himself and proceeded with the trial. Issue: WON the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated. Held/Ratio: Yes. The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the event of a nonobservance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case

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In the case at hand, Petitioner not once but twice did seek to have the prosecution for damage to property against him terminated as the matter was pending for at least six years, the first time he sought to put an end to it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the complaining witness testified on direct examination but made no appearance when his cross-examination was to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration could therefore be had without offending the provision on double jeopardy. People v Ginez May 27, 1991 J. Paras Facts: An information for libel was filed on January 27, 1987 before the RTC of San Fernando, La Union against Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986 issue. On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for joint hearing and at the same time asked the court to defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21, 1987, on the ground that the other accused, Manaois, had lately been arrested and filed bond for his provisional liberty. The motion was granted and the court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of

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the case with respect to the accused Manaois for May 18, 1987. On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate medical attention. In an order dated June 16, 1987, the Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of the case to July 30, 1987. This was also postponed when counsel for the accused failed to appear during the hearings. When the RTC on September 16, 1987 reset the hearing to October 15, 1987 private complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second eye operation. On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel against private complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois as the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the accused On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued an Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice Guerrero to appear. The motion for reconsideration was denied and thus this instant petition. Issue: WON the rights of the accused to a speedy trial had been violated. Held/Ratio” No. the court held that said right has not been violated and held that the dismissal of the case as regards private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature

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and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice." Private complainant's absences at the hearings of the case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious reasons therefore. Said absences are evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who had waived their appearance at the trial of the case. It should be remembered that the right to a speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, as in the instant case where it was satisfactorily proven that private complainant had to undergo eye operations, hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. The subject case for libel was dismissed on October 15, 1987, some eight and a half months after the information was filed. This period is not such an extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause capricious and vexatious delay. While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights UY v ADRIANO G.R. No. 159098. 27 October 2006. (right to speedy trial; purpose;

factors)

Petitioners were charged for the violation of Article 188 of the Revised Penal Code for manufacturing and

selling soy sauce using the name and trademark of ―Marca Pina Soy Sauce,‖ passing off their product as the genuine article. For various reasons, the prosecution of the case stalled (delay in the presentation of witnesses, a statutory change in the court with jurisdiction over cases with the same subject matter, petitioners filed motions instead of responsive pleadings, etc.) and the proceedings lasted for six years. Thus the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information (at the RTC) claiming that their right to speedy trial had been violated by the lackadaisical attitude of the public attorney in prosecuting the case. HELD: The Court ruled against the petitioners. It ruled that the right to speedy disposition of cases was for the benefit and protection of the accused in criminal cases in order that: (1) oppressive pre-trial incarceration would be prevented; (2) the anxiety and concern of the accused would be minimized; and (3) the possibility of the defense being impaired would be limited. As such, the factors to be examined in disposing claims of speedy trial are the following: (a) length of delay (not really indicative of a violation, it is merely a trigger for the analysis); (b) reason for the delay (it must be demonstrated that the delay was capricious, oppressive, unreasonable, and vexatious; or it must be due top unjustifiable causes; delay due to the ordinary course of justice is not a violation); (c) assertion of the right (the accused must assert the right at the soonest possible instance); (d) prejudice to the accused (the accused must specifically allege how their rights as enumerated above had been violated).

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DACANAY v PEOPLE G.R. No. 101302. 25 January 1995 (right to speedy trial; right to separate trial) The government levied a charge of economic sabotage against the principal officers of the National Sugar Trading Corporation through smuggling with regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1986. The case remained pending until 1991 herein petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate and Separate Trial invoking his right to speedy trial. HELD: The Court ruled for petitioner. A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution. As defined in the case of Flores v. People, 61 SCRA 331 (1974), a speedy trial is one ―conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.‖ The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. The main objection of respondent People of the Philippines to he separate trial asked by Petitioner is that such a procedure would entail a repetitive presentation of evidence but such inconvenience and expense on the part of the Government cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person‘s life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution.

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This is particularly true in the case of petitioner where the prosecutors‘ opposition to the request for separate trial was based on the ground that the principal accused in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot be placed under arrest because he remains outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial. PEOPLE v OPIDA G.R. No. L-46272. 13 June 1986 (right of the accused; impartial judge; appearance of impartiality) This is a criminal case on automatic review by the Supreme Court of the imposition of the death penalty upon the two accused. The case stems from the killing of one Fabian Gaban. Allegedly, the accused and several others ganged up on him, hitting him with beer bottles and fist blows until one among them, Mario del Mundo, took out a knife and killed the victim. Del Mundo is still at large, however the two defendants herein were charged as co-conspirators. During trial, the judge questioned and interrogated the accused and defence witnesses in a very disrespectful and mocking manner going so far as to comment on the infidelity of one of the accused‘s mother and to insinuate that Opida is mentally ill. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered their release. It said that it was not enough for judges to be impartial, they must moreover appear

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impartial. The Court said that the judge in this case failed miserably. Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety. Nevertheless, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized. Considering the way they were tried, we now declare that they should not be detained in jail a minute longer. While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that, because their constitutional rights have been violated, their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick condemnor and must set the defendants free. PEOPLE v CASTILLO G.R. No. 120282. 20 April 1998 (right of the accused; impartiality of the judge; clarificatory questions) Defendant was accused of the killing of Tony Dometita. During trial, the judge of the trial court propounded upon

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the defendant several clarificatory questions. The trial court convicted. Upon automatic appeal to the SC, defendants charge the trial judge with impartiality alleging that he took over the work of the prosecution by asking questions which were well-within the responsibility of the prosecution. Specifically, defendant alleges that the judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted the cross-examination when the answer would be beneficial to the prosecution, asked questions alluding to the character of the defendant which the defense could not object to. HELD: No merit. The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge‘s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge‘s queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. As correctly observed by the solicitor general, ―there was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal

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or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the ‗cold neutrality of an impartial judge‘ implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).‖ That the trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. PEOPLE v SANCHEZ G.R. No. 121038-45. 25 January 1999. (impartial trial; media publicity) This is the rape-slay case of Allan Gomez and Eileen Sarmenta for which former Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna was convicted. Defense claims that they were denied the right to an impartial trial because of the pervasive media coverage of the case which characterized the defendants as being guilty of the crime. HELD: Denied. Citing the case of People v Teehankee, the Court said that, ―Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-today, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational

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criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. ―At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.‖ The Court also said that in fact, media enhances the rights of the accused as it brings to the public‘s eye possible violation of such rights. GARCIA v DOMINGO 52 SCRA 143 (1973) (rights of the accused; public trial) For the convenience of the parties, the respondent judge held hearings in the comfort of his airconditioned chambers instead of in the courtroom. No objection was made by anyone by this arrangement. After judgment was rendered against the accused, counsel for the defense sought to invalidate the proceedings as being violative of the accused‘s right to public trial.

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HELD: Denied. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. It possesses that character when anyone interest in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. Here, it was undeniable that even if the hearings were not held in its usual place (i.e. the courtroom), the same was still open to the public and whoever wished to observed the proceedings were free to do so. PEOPLE v MONJE G.R. No. 146689. 27 September 2002 (rights of the accused; right to meet witnesses face to face; cross-examination; purpose) Accused herein were charged and convicted of the rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl. The prosecution‘s case was woven completely upon the testimony of one Michael Cordero who testified that he saw the accused with the victim and three others walking to the ricefield where the victim‘s body was later found. During trial, however, and after a short initial cross-examination, Cordero refused to return to court so that he may be questioned by the defense witness more fully. Notwithstanding this repeated refusal and despite the

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court warning that his testimony would be stricken from the record, the court nonetheless convicted the accuse based mostly on such testimony. HELD: The Court reversed the conviction and ordered the immediate release of the accused. It bears stressing that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987 Constitution specifically mandates that "the accused shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him in his direct examination, and it serves to sift, modify, or explain what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one‘s adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his

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motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused, these objectives of cross-examination were never attained in this case because of the continued failure and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his crossexamination. CAAMIC v GALAPON A.M. No. MTJ-93-887. 7 October 1994 (subpoena; nature; purpose) In a letter addressed to the Court Administrator, petitioner sent complaint charges for grave coercion against respondent judge. She alleged that she received a subpoena from the respondent ordering her to appear in court. When she did, she claims that she was threatened, berated, and coerced by respondent into giving him P8,000.00 to the judge which represented the amount that she received as death benefit resulting from the death of her common-law husband. Respondent filed a comment materially denying the allegations in the complain saying that the subpoena was issued upon the request of one Generosa Sandagan who, as it turns out, is the mother of petitioner‘s common-law-husband and who was merely seeking the recovery of the proceeds of the death benefits of her son. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and fined the judge with further admonition. A subpoena "is

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a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz.,administrative conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa Sandagan for the latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or remotely related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the request and using his official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper. The public trust character of his office would have been enough reason for him to decline the request. And, there being no case in his sala in connection with which complainant could be subpoenaed, respondent then had absolutely no power or authority to issue one to the complainant. He thus

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exhibited his ignorance of the elementary rule on issuance of subpoenas. There is something more, however, in this case. In using the subpoena form for criminal cases, which was never explained by respondent, nothing could have been intended but to sow fear in the mind of the complainant and compel her attendance, for her failure to do so would have subjected her to "the penalty of law." There was, therefore, some element of intimidation, oppression or abuse of authority, which aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on issuance of subpoenas. Considering that it was done upon request of a party which has no case before his court, he invited legitimate criticism against his office as an instrument of oppression. GIMENEZ v NAZARENO 160 SCRA 1 (rights of the accused; trial in absentia; requisites) Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was charged with murder. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing, he escaped from detention. Prosecutors file a motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking Sec 19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the

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witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was dismissed against the five accused, while proceedings against de la Vega were held in abeyance. The defendant sought reconsideration of the abeyance but was denied. ISSUE 1: WON court loses jurisdiction over an accused who escapes from detention after arraignment HELD 1: NO. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. ISSUE 2: WON an accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence and cross examine witnesses

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HELD 2: NO. The requisites for a trial in absentia are: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. The right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a personal right and can be waived. Failure to appear during trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of these rights. Thus, rendering judgment for a trial in absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed innocent. The accused is still presumed to be innocent, and his conviction must be based on evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE v MACARAEG CONCEPCION; January 14, 1986 FACTS Private Respondent Vasco Valdez was charged with Homicide before the CFI of Pangasinan for the death f one Severs Paulo and posted bail for h i s provisional release. Attached to the bail bond was awaiver stipulating that the trial may proceed in hisabsence.- When the case was called for trial, the prosecutionpresented Welino Paulo, as its 1st witness, who when asked if he could identify the accused, answered in the affirmative. Since the accused was not present in court, the prosecution asked the court to order the presence of the accused so that he c o u l d b e identified. Counsel for accused o b j e c t e d t o t h e motion by invoking the waiver in the bail bond and contended that the absence of the

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accused is part of his defense. R e s p o n d e n t J u d g e D a n i e l M a c a r a e g o f t h e C F I , invoking the case of Aquino v Military CommissionNo.2 denied the motion: ―The issue at bar was one of those squarely raised in the Aquino case where six out of ten Justices voted that the accused may not be compelled to be present during the trial when he is to b e identified by the witnesses of the prosecution w h i l e f o u r v o t e d t h a t t h e accused may be compelled in this instance. The reason of the m a j o r i t y i s t h a t t h e a c c u s e d m u s t n o t b e compelled to assist the prosecution in proving its case.‖ The prosecution moved for reconsideration but respondent Judge denied the motion. Prosecution then filed this petition with prayer for a TRO. The SC granted the petition and issued a TRO, restraining the respondent Court from further proceeding with the criminal case. ISSUE WON the accused, despite having w a i v e d h i s presence at the trial, may still be compelled to bepresent in the same trial when he is to be identified HELD YES. Stare Decisis. Reasoning-

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The rule adopted by the Court in the case of Aquinovs. Military Commission No. 2 (supra) is that while the accused may waive his presence at the trial of the case, his presence may be compelled when he is to be identified. The Court said: ―Since only 6 Justices are of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings while Justices are in agreement that he may so waive such right, except when he is to he identified, the result is that the respondent Commission's Order requiring his presence at all times d u r i n g t h e proceedings before it should be m o d i f i e d , i n t h e sense that petitioners presence shall be requiredonly in the instance just indicated. Petition GRANTED, orders of respondent Judge ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judge is ordered toi s s u e the necessary process to c o m p e l t h e attendance of the accused at the hearing of thec r i m i n a l case for p u r p o s e s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Temporary TRO lifted and set aside

G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX MAGUMNANG, defendants-appellants. GANCAYCO, J.:p

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Rex Magumnang was charged with highway robbery with homicide along with the other accused. However After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from confinement and had not been apprehended since then. The trial court found him guilty. He therefore seeks to appeal the conviction. ISSUE: WON he may appeal his conviction? NO . Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated evenas he remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no standing in court.

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By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. The jurisdiction of the court once acquires, is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. Where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. A trial in absentia will thus occur when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. ON PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard

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Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. P. HABEAS CORPUS G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000 NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up to present1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. He was requesting transfer from Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,2 but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then discovered that the entire records appear to have been destroyed due to a fire. He filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus due to his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

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ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be released under writ of habeas corpus? NO RATIO: was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.15 As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint.The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner's release. Also, in order that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of jurisdiction.The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949] (Sorry couldn‘t find the original case!) Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been

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exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one‘s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the respondents to make a return of the writ on or before July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; After the return of the respondents, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ of habeas corpus.[22]

RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, vs. HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,

Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that ―except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.‖ The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained.

Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police filed an application with RTC-Pampanga for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles

The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the

ISSUE: WON petition for habeas corpus should be granted? NO

RATIO:

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the

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instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Parañaque City, under a Mission Order. Records show that the U.S. passports which were confiscated from the him when he was arrested by PNP and purportedly issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator have been determined to have been tampered. As a consequence, said passports were cancelled by the U.S. Embassy. It has been ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.

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Paredes v. G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991

Sandiganbayan

Facts: In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the presence of accused because the summon was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes. His motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing validity of the preliminary investigation that it was conducted without his notice. In the meantime, Paredes was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was reverted back to public domain. Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. He refused to post bail in protest against the injustice to him as Governor•. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging that the warrant for her husband‘s arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and,

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that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed. ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus is proper?NO RATIO: The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation

MANALO v PNP CHIEF CALDERON (Reyes, J/2007) FACTS: A fire broke out in a polling area in an elementary school due to five malefactors bearing firearms who poured gasoline over a ballot box and set it ablaze,

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causing the death of two people and injuriesto nine others. In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of petitioners as the perpetrators of the school burning.[3] The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are all members of the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNPRSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident at the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.[4] A PNP memorandum was thus passed, that required the monitoring of the petitioners in their camp base as well as escorts when they leave the premises. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging that the monitoring was an illegal deprivation of their liberty. ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be issued? NO RATIO: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and efficient defense of personal freedom. The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.[21]

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Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained released from confinement.[22] If respondents are not detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the petition should perforce be dismissed.[23]

In this case, no illegal deprivation of liberty is shown to exist: (1) the assailed memoranda decreeing the monitoring of their movements cannot be considered as a form of curtailment of their freedom guaranteed under our Constitution. It is evident that petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside camp be monitored. Even petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.[30] (2) the ―restrictive custody‖ complained of by petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. (3) petitioners‘ reliance on Moncup ] is misplaced. In said case, petitioner was ordered released by respondent but his release was saddled with restrictions. There, petitioner was required to secure prior approval for:

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(a) any travel outside Metro Manila; and (b) a change in residence. His freedom of speech was likewise muffled by a prohibition on granting interviews to local or foreign media. He was likewise ordered to report regularly to respondent] In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature of those imposed in Moncupa exist. To reiterate, petitioners are merely held to account for their movements inside and outside the camp‘s premises. They are not required to secure prior approval before they can move out of the camp, only that each of them be accompanied by an escort and their time of departure and arrival noted. (4) members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline, (5) although the PNP is civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian officials.[35]

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WHEREFORE, the petition COURSE and DISMISSED.

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is DENIED

DUE

G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988 JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners, vs. BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY CARIAN, respondents. TEEHANKEE, C. J.: FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the parents of two young persons, Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos who werevarrested with others by the military, detained in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to have been released after nine days. But they were not released to their parents, who had been visiting them, nor to any other responsible person — and were never seen or heard from by anyone since then. Alleging that the signatures of the desaparecidos on their release papers were falsified and thus, they were never released by the military said release being a scheme of the respondents to prolong their detention, torture and interrogation, the petitioners-parents filed the petition at bar on December 17,1981. ISSUE: WON habeas corpus may be issued? NO RATIO: The release of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic.. Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of the detainees, which we share, particularly, where the standard and prescribed procedure in effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and "each party must prove his own affirmative allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of selfdefense in a killing rests on the accused In this case, respondents were unable to prove that the alleged release occurred. (1) The signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. (2) Respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for releasing detainees: (3) The inherent implausibility of respondent Carian's reason for supposedly releasing the detainees — that they had agreed to act as spies. (4( What is likewise difficult of comprehension is that according to the affidavits of Major Cabauatan and Lt. Maranon, elements of their command after encountering a group of "heavily armed men" captured the detainees with other alleged Comminist Terrorists; with one casualty on the latter's side, yet all of them except the two detainees "were released on or before September 23, 1981, having been found out that no sufficient evidence would be established to warrant their further detention" However, the Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief sought by petitioners. It is not the repository of all remedies for every grievance.. It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos. ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation and appropriate action as may be warranted by its

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findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon. This Resolution is immediately executory. . January 4, 1995 G.R. No. 117568 ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent. Vitug, J.: Rolando Angeles y Bombita was charged and sentenced to life imprisonment for the illegal possession of shabu. He has now lodged a petition for habeas corpus, invoking (a) Republic Act No. 7659, which has reduced the penalties prescribed under the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and (b) the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin Simon y Sunga, 3 which has confirmed the retroactive application of the above-numbered amendatory law. ISSUE: WON the petition of habeas corpus may prosper? NO RATIO: All courts of competent jurisdiction mat entertain petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have served the maximum of the applicable penalties newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659.

704

In this regard, the formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the petitions are filed may refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights or to the Public Attorney‘s Office for possible assistance to the prisoners concerned The foregoing notwithstanding, Angeles‘ petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted. Petitioner, it appears, has only served the minimum of his sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be released on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which reads: Sec. 5. It shall be the duty WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus, being still premature, is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, (LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents. HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.: FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and children of Wilfredo Torres. A conditional pardon was at

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first granted to Torres but the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted because he had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition. Thus, the Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and 7 Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus is valid? NO RATIO: Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000. Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is

705

not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to cost CONTADO

v.

TAN

FACTS: This petition for habeas corpus was flied on November 20, 1978 by Nora Contado, Adelina Razon and Nena Tizon in behalf of their spouses Crispo Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon. The respondents are Rufilo L. Tan, the then Municipal Mayor of Llorente, Eastern Samar Petitioners alleged that on September 13,1978, their spouses were arrested by members of the Integrated National Police of Llorente, Eastern Samar, In their separate amended returns, respondents denied the material allegations of the petition stating that they (respondents) merely invited the three missing persons for questioning and reiterated that they had been released on the same day on September 13, 1978 at 8:00 p.m. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed for being moot and academic. Petitioners, in their reply to the separate amended returns, stated that the subject persons were never released on September 13,1978 or on any day thereafter as shown by the affidavits of one Diosdado Camora and one Diomedes Bono.

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HELD: The Sandiganbayan decision, lenient as it was, proves beyond per adventure the falsity of the incredible claim by res respondents in their returns and amended returns in the case at bar that they released the three detainees-victims on the very same night of their arrest on September 13,1978. They thereby flaunted the authority of this Court; brazenly perjured themselves in swearing to their false returns; failed to give respect due to justice and truth and created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice and prevented the resolution of this case with the promptness which its very nature required, involving as it did, the liberty and lives of the three victims. It is beyond doubt the bounden duty of respondents having custody of a detained person to respect and obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a court or judge having jurisdiction in the premises and properly served upon them, and every person who unlawfully disobeys the Court's commands or unlawfully resists or counsels' resistance to its execution is in contempt of court and may be summarily punished therefor. Disobedience to the writ may take the form of neglecting or refusing to produce the person whose presence is sought by the writ, of failing to make a return, of making a false or evasive return, or of refusing to obey the final order or judgment entered in the proceedings. The Court herein exercises this power on a corrective and not a retaliatory or vindictive principle (though it could impose a heavier penalty and order respondents" imprisonment for a substantial period of time) and

706

therefore finds respondents guilty of contempt of court and sentences each of them to pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P l,000.00) as hereinbelow ordered. But the respondents must face criminal charges for their perjured returns to the writ, as set forth hereinabove.

Q.

SPEEDY

CADALIN

DISPOSITION v.

POEA

OF

CASES

ADMINISTRATOR

FACTS: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII, a foreign corporation engaged in construction. The claimants say that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules HELD: It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all

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proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC. Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975. SAMBANG v. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL Facts: Petitioner, then a constable 2nd class (C2C) in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and his brother Vicente Sumbang, a civilian, were accused with the

707

killing of Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes committed on May 29, 1988 in Bo. Obrero, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City. Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1989, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". The prosecution started presenting its witnesses on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence on February 27, 1991. On the other hand, Vicente Sumbang was convicted of Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on March 27, 1991. On January 14, 1992, Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police (PNP) Law" took effect. The PNP law provides among others for the integration of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) into the PNP including its functions, officers and other enlisted personnel and also provides for the continuation of court-martial proceedings against PC-INP criminal offenders already arraigned prior to its effectivity. The composition of the general court-martial RECOM 6 was also subjected to changes and petitioner's criminal case remained pending and unresolved. On February 17, 1999 and August 4, 1999, respectively, Letter Order Nos. 80 and 436 of the National Headquarters, Philippine National Police (NHQ-PNP) were issued by the PNP Director General constituting general court-martial PRO 6, Iloilo City which took over petitioner's criminal case. The respondent general court-martial then scheduled the dates for the continuation of the hearing of petitioner's case. On September 29, 1999 hearing, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case alleging among others that

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there was inordinate delay in the trial of his case which is in violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial and disposition of his case HELD: "It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered." Although it is unfortunate that it took about eight years from 1991 before the trial of this case was resumed, in 1999, we do not find such delay as amounting to a violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial considering that such delay could not be attributable to the prosecution. The cases cited by petitioner upholding the right of the accused to a speedy trial are not in point since the delay therein complained of was due to the vacillation and procrastination of the prosecuting officers and their lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of their duties, which circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. The prosecution in the instant case had

708

already presented its four witnesses, all of whom, except for the fourth witness, were cross-examined by petitioner's counsel on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991, respectively. LICAROS

v.

SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the amount of P19,731,320.00. In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no relation to herein petitioner), one of the principal accused, together with four companions, delivered in sacks a substantial portion of the stolen money to the Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home Savings Bank had its offices, of which herein petitioner was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr., then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the deposit kept secret; As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not rendered the Decision. HELD: On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was deemed submitted for the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the

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violation of his right to a speedy disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not been ruled upon by public respondent. Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case from the time it is deemed submitted for decision. Considering that the subject criminal case was submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we were to consider the period provided under Section 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12 months from the submission of the case for decision, the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to perform its mandated duty to render a decision on the case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then, the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period to decide the case under the law has long expired As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed since the subject case has been deemed submitted for decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor undertaken any procedural device to prolong the proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it is undeniable that such delay has caused much prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner, whose career as bank executive and businessman has suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles‘ sword over his head for more than a decade. We need

709

not stress the consequences and problems inherent in this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which include the prospects of unrealized business transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered travel opportunities and a besmirched reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact due to his being a senior executive of the bank where the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the abovecited case. TILENDO vs. OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 165975 Facts: Tilendo is President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College (CCSPC). CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the construction of its Agriculture Building and Science Academic Building. Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019. Complaint basically alleged that Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was President of the CCSPC, using government funds for personal purposes. The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building. The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed the anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of

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Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a factfinding investigation. NBI conducted investigations pertaining to the case. Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report charging accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC. OMB found probable cause and ordered filing of information. Tilendo opposed raising right to speedy disposition of cases, the case having dragged for years. HELD: In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary to Tilendo‘s view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and administrative complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly states that ―upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

710

Even assuming there was delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to have slept on his right to a speedy disposition of cases. From 22 October 1999, when he submitted to the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December 2002. It seems that Tilendo was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him. He did not take any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. Tilendo‘s inaction gives the impression that he did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it was impliedly with his acquiescence ROQUE

v.

OFFICE

OF

THE

OMBUDSMAN

Facts: On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies and violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-

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MIN-91-0203 On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that ‗[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent submission of their counteraffidavits, until the present[,] or more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner HELD: We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of ‗speedy disposition‘ of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner‘s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that ‗delay may be due to a painstaking and

711

grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official.‘ In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republc Act 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such ‗painstaking and grueling scrutiny‘ as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. GUIANI

v.

SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: After the creation of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the regional Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH-ARMM) began the implementation of regional, provincial and district impact projects to be funded from the infrastructure seed money of P615 Million from the Office of the Regional Governor of ARMM. On October 15, 1992, the Commission on AuditSpecial Audit Office (COA-SAO) conducted a physical inspection of the impact projects and found several irregularities therein. More specifically, the COA-SAO found that in relation to the concreting of the CotabatoLanao Road, the contractors bloated the accomplishment reports. This enabled them to claim on their progress billings, resulting in an overpayment by the government of P4,164,000.00, and concealed the negative slippage incurred by said contractors. It also

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discovered that mobilizations fees advanced to contractors amounting to P15,798,675.00 remained unrecouped, when these were supposed to be deducted from contractors‘ progress billings. On December 8, 1992, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, asked the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Commission on Audit, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, instituted a complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) against regional officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-ARMM. The complaint was docketed as Case No. OMB-0-92-2771. On July 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended the indictment of petitioners, among others, for various violations of RA 3019. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. on October 8, 1998, and by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on October 16, 1998.[1]Immediately thereafter, 21 criminal informations were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Cases Nos. 24963-24983 Petitioenrs say that the DELAY OF ALMOST SIX (6) YEARS TO RESOLVE THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DISREGARDED THE OMBUDSMAN‘S DUTY, AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 violated their constitutional rights. HELD: As meticulously detailed by the Ombudsman above, the period of time that elapsed during the

712

conduct of the preliminary investigation in this case was warranted by the sequence of events. Because of the complexity of the transactions complained of which were contained in a two-page report from the COA, the Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) sought further substantiation of the allegations therein and requested for the complete report of the COA Special Audit Office. The authenticated SAO Report No. 93-04 was received by the GIO on November 16, 1994. It was only then that the GIO required all forty-one respondents to file their counter-affidavits. Most of the respondents, including some of petitioners herein, moved for extensions of time. All the counter-affidavits were received in August 1995, owing to the number of respondents. Thereafter, the COA filed reply-affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29, 1996. It was only after the submission of the last pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the preliminary investigation can be said to have been concluded. The time to resolve the cases commences from this date. In the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert

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713

such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay The records of this case show that petitioners raised their objections to the perceived delay in the resolution of the complaints against them only on September 27, 1999, when they filed their Omnibus Motion with the Sandiganbayan. It would appear, therefore, that petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the proceedings. ABADIA

v.

COURT

OF

APPEALS

Facts: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges. On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. HELD: In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners‘ submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private

respondent – or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter – a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the ―duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no time frame within which to transmit the records of the case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation within which the Chief of Staff must act on the recommendation of dismissal However, it must be stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary detention. Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with dispatch in dealing with the private respondent‘s case.

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714

Over three years have elapsed since the respondent‘s arrest. To this day, there is no indication – and it has not been alleged – that records of the case have been forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority. This case does not even involve complex issues of fact and law. The central issue which the appropriate military appellate authority will have to review is whether or not the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the Articles of War. DIMAYACYAC

v.

JUDGE

ROXAS

Facts: An information for falsification of public documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner along with some others. Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than one offense was charged in the information. RTC

granted

motion

to

quash

More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for falsification of public documents docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case

Nos.

Q-93-49988

and

49989

The SOolicitor General then invoked the right to speedy disposition of cases for the accused HELD: As to the length of delay, it is established that the prosecution did not take any action on petitioner‘s case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the prosecution failed to effect the very simple remedy of filing two separate informations against petitioner until October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the refiling of the proper informations. However, the prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain the circumstances that may have caused such delay precisely because petitioner never raised the issue of the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the case. There is nothing on record to show what happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and therefore, a violation of petitioner‘s constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. What the records clearly show is that petitioner never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. The only ground he raised in assailing the subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to light the issue on petitioner‘s right to a speedy disposition of his case, and only when the case was brought to the appellate court on certiorari. Even in this

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715

petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.

in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

R.

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against selfincrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth

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must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court convicted him of murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the accused immediately after the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was already under the mercy of the police.

People v. Rondero (Scope of Right Against SelfIncrimination) The accused was seen by the victim‘s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of homicide only.

Villaflor v. Summers (Scope of Right Against SelfIncrimination) Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Held: Guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. The absence of sperm does not negate the commission of rape since the mere touching of the pudenda by the male organ is already considered as consummated rape. The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her person. Contusions were found on Mylene‘s face, arms and thighs. Hence, death is the appropriate penalty. People v. Gallarde (Scope of Right Against SelfIncrimination)

HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even without the assistance of counsel, being purely a mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner‘s constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary

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to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. Page 218 Regala v. Sandiganbayan (Scope of Right Against Self-Incrimination) Facts: Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings. Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of illgotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. 1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. Cojuangco, et al." 2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm). 3. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of clients, personal and business circumstances; assisted in organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case

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0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders etc; delivered documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., (1) stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and (2) a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings (as office practice) 4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG‘s "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired in helping set up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares 6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly 3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); a wholly-owned investment arm

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7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB

the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of PCGG against Roco

8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate business purposes and already transferred shares

13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in the alleged ill-gotten wealth 10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded Roco. 11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely (PCGG‘s Comment): (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares 12. PCGG‘s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation; (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting

14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG 15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction or equal protection clause, favoritism and undue preference; not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG; unreasonable or unjust ISSUE: Privileged Information Whether or not the lawyer‘s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because

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the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint. 1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons: 1. Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. 2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established. The attorneyclient privilege does not attach until there is a client. 3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. 4. Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. 2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences 1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation) 2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. (case at bar) 3. Government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an

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individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD EXCEPTION) 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar) 5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential 3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as codefendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients) 4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. 5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed. Their services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all

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that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: ―Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: ―An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of…‖ c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: ―duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.‖ d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: ―A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.‖

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e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," 7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. SEPARATE OPINIONS (THREE OTHER JUSTICES: VITUG, DAVIDE AND PUNO) VITUG, J., concurring: 1. Confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence 2. A situation of what it could elicit from a counsel against his client, unreasonable and with thinly disguised threat of incrimination. DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting 1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue burried: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the

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defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. 2. Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' prayer to exclude them. The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. 3. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. 4. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss. The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness. 5. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable. The lawyer-client privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. 6. Wrong use of American jurisprudence in ponencia: 1. Issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States.

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2. In the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are codefendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators. 7. Lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. 8. As a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege. Identity of a client is not within the lawyer-client privilege in this manner because every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents. PUNO, J., dissenting: 1. MAIN POINT OF PUNO: Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions. But petitioners need to prove that prove they fall within the exceptions to the general rule. Needs factual basis. 2. REASON: Attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. 3. Legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facie: in furtherance of present or intended

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continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy. [like this case]

ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.

4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege: petitioners included as defendants and conspirators.

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

5. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on condition they reveal the identity of their client.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates petitioner's right against self-incrimination.

6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to discover the truth, need to protect adversary system of justice, need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against self-incrimination and effective counsel in criminal litigations.

HELD: Yes. The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

7. Attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.

8. PCGG relented on its original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.

FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents. (Scope of Right Against Self-Incrimination) Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge

the

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which

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does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes. p. 218 Galman v. Pamaran (Immunity) Facts: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and

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testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition. Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against selfincrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence. Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.

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In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.

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Issue: 2. WON the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board and not to an investigating officer Held: YES. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Immunity Statutes: 1. One which grants ―Use Immunity‖ - prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

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2. One which grants ―Transactional Immunity‖ - grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against selfincrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Summary:

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As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results — the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against selfincrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. S. NON-DETENTION BY REASON OF POLITICAL BELIEFS OR ASPIRATIONS T. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Caunca v. Salazar (Involuntary servitude) Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,

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respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one‘s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the

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individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. People v Lagman and Zosa, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13 (Service in defense of the State) Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

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In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws

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enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1). Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) (Naval enlistment) The Court refused to apply the 13th Amendment to merchant seamen who had jumped ship, been caught, and been impressed back into maritime service without due process. The Court explained that 13th Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude, even though absolute on its face, contained various implicit exceptions. In support of the finding of an exception to the 13th Amendment, the Court argued that the Bill of Rights also contained unstated exceptions: The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten Amendments to the constitution . . . [are] subject to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. . . . Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (article 1) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to

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public morals or private reputation; the right of the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy (art. 5) does not prevent a second trial, if upon the first trial the jury failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon the defendant's motion. . . . In 1897, state laws which barred individuals from carrying concealed weapons were common, and usually upheld by state supreme courts; the laws did not forbid state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The prohibitions on concealed carry are the exceptions that prove the rule. Only if the Second Amendment is an individual right does the Court's invocation of a concealed carry exception make any sense. Kapisanan ng Manggagawa v. Gotamco Saw Mill (GR No. L-1573, 29 March 1948) (Return to work order in industries affected with public interest) Facts: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa Pilipinas declared a strike against Gotamco Saw Mill because the latter did not accede to the former‘s request of a salary increase. While the case was being heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the parties reached a temporary wage arrangement and the workers were ordered to go back to work while the saw mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers by P2.00, let them take home small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood, and was enjoined from laying-

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off, suspending, or dismissing any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union. Conversely, the workers were enjoined from staging walk-outs or strikes during the pendency of the hearing. Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held in contempt of court for having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case, for picketing on the premises of the saw mill, and for grave threats which prevented the remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that one of its representatives conferred with the management of the saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of the work and employed four new Chinese laborers without express authority of the court and in violation of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR ruled that there was a violation of the previous order of the CIR by the union, which warranted the commencement of contempt proceedings and that the saw mill did not violate Section 19 of CA 103. Issue: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Ruling: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does not offend against the constitutional inhibition proscribing involuntary servitude. The provisions of CA 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. In order to attain this object, Section 19 was

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promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital. Among other things, Section 19 lays down the ―implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the CIR for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled.‖ Thus, the voluntariness of the employee‘s entering into such a contract of employment—he has a free choice between entering into it or not—with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. Issue: W/N the previous order of the CIR, which ordered the union laborers to go back to work, is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic proscription of involuntary servitude. Ruling: NO. The order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. That order was made after hearing, and Section 19 of CA 103 authorizes such order when the dispute cannot in its opinion be promptly decided or settled. The very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the CIR the power to issue the

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order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry.  Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were ―subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power.‖  From Justice Perfecto‘s concurring and dissenting opinion: If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to perform something which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement of the controversy, as they can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel them to continue therein. U. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS PEOPLE V. DIONISIO FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is not duly authorized in any capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati and for that purpose has in possession the cash amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated August 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double receipt. He was thereby charged in violation of Republic Act No. 3063.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his offense infringes the Constitutional provision that ―Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.‖ (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, of the Constitution of the Phils) RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ―The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit.‖ (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88) DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON (PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS) Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional

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brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for prohibition instead. Petitioners have assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its provisions. Held: Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is neither cruel, inhuman,or degrading. It is no different from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct.

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People v Dacuycuy (Prohibited punishments) Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. Issue: W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid. Held: NOT VALID. The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dep‘t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers. Harden v. Director of Prisons (Prohibited punishments) On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and

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the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, both in Hongkong, over P1, 000,000 in cash. Mrs. Harden filed to the court a motion to order Mr. Harden to return all the amounts mentioned to re deposit them with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China with respect to their conjugal partnership. Mr. Harden failed to comply, wherein, he was committed to jail for an indeterminate period of time until he complies with the court‘s orders. Contention of the State: The petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by the petitioner was denied based on the following arguments. The term of imprisonment by the petitioner in this case in indefinite and might last through life, but the terms of the sentence is left open for him to avoid more years by just complying with the courts orders. His imprisonment for more than six months is not excessive or unjust since he was given the right to comply with said orders. The imprisonment is but a pure remedial measure to coerce the petitioner to act and perform the orders. Contention of the Accused: Mr. Harden contends that he has no means to comply with the court‘s orders since he was committed to jail. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in committing the petitioner in jail for an indeterminate period of time until complying with the court‘s orders for a mere reason of disobedience. Ruling: The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive since it is the outcome of the act of

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the petitioner. The petitioner was given the choice to prevent his more time of detention in jail by just complying with the said orders, but he did nothing. The court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is charged, its judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Whether the act charged has been committed or can still be performed is already determined by the order or judgment of the trial court wherein the petitioner for habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. The petition is denied.

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U. Prohibited Punishments Art. III, Sec. 19 People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo The SC upheld the validity of the Death Penalty law against the challenge that there are no compelling reasons for the enactment of the same. The Court also rejected the contention that the death penalty is cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and said that the US Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia did not categorically rule on such issue; what was in use was the arbitrariness pervading the procedure by which the death penalty was imposed. Per

Curiam

Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found no substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb the verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG) A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the reversal of the death sentence. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659. Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is unconstitutional Held: No. Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration & supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for lack of merit.  Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate. o The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused

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by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. o Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.  Accused-appellant maintains that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life.

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o In support of his contention, accusedappellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia:: "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life"  The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: 1) That the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their

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new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture. 2) That rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life. Phil. SC: We disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".  The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.  Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,

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rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death.  The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. o Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. o People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law

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provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"  Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society o What R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes. o Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was committed or by the

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reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.  The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. o Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery

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with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.  SC: The death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because: o The perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry o They have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing so  People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds

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the respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself. Francis v Resweber Where a mechanical failure in the electric chair prevented the execution of the convict and another execution date was scheduled by the warden, the US Supreme Court denied the plea of the convict that he was being subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment – as there is no intent to inflict unnecessary pain or any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution. The situation of the victim is just as through he has suffered the anguish in any other occurrence, such as a fire in the cellblock. January 13, 1947 Facts: Francis was convicted of murder and was sentenced to electrocution. The electric chair sent out a current but failed to cause his death because of some mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair and returned to prison. A new death warrant was issued. Francis argued that a new execution would constitute double jeopardy (5th Amendment) and cruel and unusual punishment (8th Amendment). Issue: Was an order for re-execution tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment? No. There is no cruel and unusual punishment. The fact that Francis has already been subjected to a current of electricity does not make his subsequent execution any

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more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish human life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented consummation does not add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. Dispositve: Petition denied. Re-execution is ordered. Dissent (Burton, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge): Subjecting Francis to the electric chair again is a cruel and unusual punishment. In determining whether the proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must measure it against a lawful electrocution. The contrast is that between instantaneous death and death by installments -- caused by electric shocks administered after one or more intervening periods of complete consciousness of the victim. Electrocution, when instantaneous, can be inflicted by a state in conformity with due process of law. The all-important consideration is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and substantially painless that the punishment shall be reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of death itself. Electrocution has been approved only in a form that eliminates suffering. Echegaray v Secretary of Justice

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The SC said that the suspension of the execution of the death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power, as an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve, although its effect is the same; the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. It cannot be denied however that Congress can amend RA 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect is a commutation of sentence. Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. The power to control the execution of the SC‘s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution

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vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conform to law and justice. The Court also rejected public respondent‘s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the

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President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of coequal and coordinate powers of the three branches of the government. Pagdayawon v Secretary of Justice The mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a bill seeking the repeal of RA 7659 should not per se warrant the outright issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a ground for the stay of a death sentence. Facts: Thirty death row inmates sought to enjoin the execution of their death sentences in view of a possible repeal of laws authorizing the imposition of death penalty. The SC has the power to control the enforcement of its decisions, including the issuance of a TRO to stay the execution of a death sentence which is already final. Issue: Can a TRO be issued for the death sentences? No. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses of Congress should not per se warrant outright issuance of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a ground for a stay of a death sentence. While newspaper reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of

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the death penalty, such is by no means an assurance that these same legislators will eventually vote for the modification or repeal of the law. V. Non-imprisonment for Debt Art. III, Sec. 20 People v. Nitafan GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Facts: - Betty Sia Ang received in trust from Allied Banking Corp ―Gordon Plastics, plastic sheeting and Hook Chromed, in the total amount of P398,000.00, specified in a trust receipt‖, under the obligation on her part to sell the same and account for the proceeds of the sale or return the same to Allied Bank if unsold. - However, she later paid only P283,115. Allied Bank thus charged Betty Sia Ang with estafa. - On motion, Judge Nitafan quashed the information on the ground that a trust receipt transaction is an evidence of a loan being secured so that there is, as between the parties to it, a creditor-debtor relationship. The penal clause of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is inoperative because it does not actually punish an offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the relevant estafa provision in the Revised Penal Code. - Betty Sia Ang asserts that P.D. 115 is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. She argues that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely commercial undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it. Held: PD 115‘s penal clause is valid

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A trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer. Apart from a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement has a security feature that is covered by the trust receipt itself. That second feature is what provides the much needed financial assistance to our traders in the importation or purchase of goods or merchandise through the use of those goods or merchandise as collateral for the advancements made by a bank. The title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate and distinct agreement. The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no violation of a right against imprisonment for nonpayment of a debt. The misuse of trust receipts therefore should be deterred to prevent any possible havoc in trade circles and the banking community . The offense is punished as a malum prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or malice. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest. The enactment of P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of the police power of the State and is, thus, constitutional. W. Double Jeopardy Art. III, Sec. 21

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Held: 1. Requisites a. Valid complaint or information b. Filed before a competent court c. To which the defendant has pleaded Icasiano v Sandiganbayan Facts: - In 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme court against MTC Judge Icasiano for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence for issuing orders of detention against Magbago for contempt of court. The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit in 1988. - Magbago, had apparently filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, also in 1987, a complaint charging Judge Icasiano with a violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). This was likewise dismissed during the preliminary investigation stage. - A similar complaint, however, appeared to have been filed with the office of the Tanodbayan which was transferred to the (then) newly-created Office of the Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor working on the case was not aware of the previous complaint and dismissal thereof, and thus filed an information against Judge Icasiano with the Sandiganbayan. - Judge Icasiano asserts that the information should be quashed because he would be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Double jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because: 1. the Supreme Court case was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature. 2. the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint with the Ombudsman cannot bar the present prosecution because it was dismissed in the preliminary investigation stage. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. People v Grospe Facts: - Manuel Parulan was charged with B.P. 22 involving a check with the amount of P86K and with estafa for a check with an amount of P11k. The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. - The trial court dismissed the two cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, saying that the two essential elements that make up the offenses involving

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dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where false assurances were given. - The People filed a petition for certiorari challenging the dismissal as being issued with grave abuse of discretion. - Parulan argues that the order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject him to double jeopardy.

prosecution had already concluded the presentation of its evidence and the defense was about to finish theirs when the prosecution filed a motion to charge Gonzales with rape since the evidence submitted indicated that the crime evidently committed was rape and not qualified seduction. - The trial court thus dismissed the case for qualified seduction and the prosecution filed 6 informations for rape with the RTC. Gonzales entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.

Held: NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void decision of the trial court does not place Parulan in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense.

Held: NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The dismissal being null and void (as it was erroneous), the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy. Gonzales v Court of Appeals Facts: - Gonzales was charged with qualified seduction with the MTC, to which he pleaded ―not guilty‖. The

The requisites for double jeopardy: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. When all the above elements concur, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can be rightly barred. There is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the offense of rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the Regional Trial Court.

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Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case for qualified seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was provisional but likewise with the express consent of the accused. (Note: Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. — When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.)

Joan Flores v Hon. Francisco Joven, RTC-Surigao del Sur, Emmanuel Navarro Austria-Martinez 27 December 2002 Facts: Flores caused the filing of a criminal against Navarro and 9 other persons for rape. Before the accused were arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently describe the crime of rape and in any of its forms. The trial court

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re-set the arraignment as the prosecution intended to file several other cases of rape against the accused. An amended information for rape was later filed against Navarro, as the principal accused. He filed a motion to quash the amended information. RTC granted the motion finding that Navarro was not one of those identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that the Information failed to show his particular participation in the crime. Navarro, however, was not released from detention as there were still pending cases against him. MR was denied. Hence this case for certiorari. Meanwhile, Navarro‘s other co-accused were arraigned and pleaded ―not guilty‖ to the charges against them. Trial commenced as regards their respective cases. Later, Navarro escaped from detention and has remained at large. Before presentation of evidence, it dropped the infromations against the other 6 principal accused for insufficiency of evidence which was granted by the trial court Issue: W/N the RTC erred in quashing the information. Held/Ratio: YES. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the records of this case adequately show that respondent Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually abused petitioner. In the Flores‘ sworn statement, she stated that she knew the perpetrators by face and further declared under oath that she was able to identify them later at the police station during line-up

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The offended party has the right to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process, subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, in this case, double jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The third requisite is not present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro has not been arraigned

People v Aurelio Balisacan Bengzon 31 August 1966 Facts: Balisacan was charged with homicide. To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. RTC acquitted him.

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Issue:1. W/N the RTC was correct in acquitting the accused despite his plea of guilty when arraigned. 2.W/N the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held/Ratio: 1. YES. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard. 2. NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore — as the court a quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there

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having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. d. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. People v Hon. Gregorio Pineda, CFI Rizal and Consolacion Naval

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NO. The mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused. Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of a former case for the same offense, no jeopardy attaches. People v Hon. Martin Villarama, and Jaime Manuel

Melo 16 February 1993 Facts: Consolacion Naval was accused of having committed the crime of estafa before the CFI of Rizal, Branches 19 and 21. She moved for the quashal of the second charge on the supposition that she was in danger of being convicted for the same felony. Judge Pineda of Branch 21 found in her favor. Issue: W/N the court was correct in granting the motion to quash. Held/Ratio:

Medialdea 23 June 1992 Facts: Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having in his possession 0.08 grams of shabu. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued after which the prosecution rested its case. Counsel for Manuel verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. That same day, the respondent

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Judge issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of the decision. The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the accused's motion. MR of prosecution was denied. Issue: W/N it was proper for the RTC to grant the request to plead to a guilty to a lesser offense without the prosecutor’s and the offended party’s consent. Held/Ratio: YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial

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stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under Rule 116.2 is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case at bar, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.

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The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his plea. However, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal. Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the

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offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government. No Double Jeopardy Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated. Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. xxx However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party…Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party,i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

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Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu (1992) Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa involving the amount of P50, 000. Upon his arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and the court set the pre-trial and trial of the case on Apr 17, 1990. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what transpired on Apr 17, 1990. However, it appears that hearing was again scheduled for Sept 27 and 28 1990. When the case was called for hearing on Sept 27, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present. Not wanting to take advantage of their absence, and considering that there were other cases to be heard, the prosecutor moved for the cancellation of the hearing on that date as well as the hearing to be held on the following day, which the court granted. The hearing was reset, unfortunately the case was still included in the trial calendars of the court for Sept 28. When the case was called for the hearing on that date, only the fiscal appeared for prosecution. The court then issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On Jul 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging therein that the dismissal of the case by the court on Sept 28 1990 without his consent amounted to his acquittal; hence, he would be placed in double jeopardy if the case were to be reopened or cont inue. The trial court set aside the dismissal order of Sept 28 1990 in its Order of Aug 9 1991 on the ground that the court was only misled in issuing the same due to the stenographers‘ failure to transcribe the order given in open court issued the previous day, hence, it was issued without due process. Also on the same day,

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the court denied the petitioners‘ motion to dismiss on the ground that the order of dismissal of 28 September 1990was set aside in the aforesaid order. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the other denying his motion to dismiss, alleging that he cannot be blamed or faulted for a.) the failure of the stenographer b.) any error in the dismissal of the case c.) the inclusion of the case in the calendar of Sept 28 1990. Issue/held/ratio: 1. w/n an order dismissing a criminal case after accused had been arraigned, issued in open court through inadvertence or mistake during a hearing that had already been cancelled, be set aside by the court and the case tried without placing the accused in double jeopardy? No Double Jeopardy yet. The erroneous dismissal order of Sept 28 1990 was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it unquestionably deprived the State of a fair opportunity to present and proved its case. Thus, its right to due process was violated. The said order is null and void and hence, cannot be pleaded by the petitioner to bar the subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a reopening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The dismissal of Sept 28 1990, being null and void because the trial court lost its jurisdiction to issue the same and violated the right of the prosecution to due process. The three requisites of double jeopardy are: 1.) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second 2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly

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terminated and 3.) A second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only; a. upon a valid indictment b. Before a competent court c. after arraignment d. when valid plea has been entered e. when the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. It having been shown that in this case, the requisites of a valid termination of the first jeopardy are not present, the petitioner cannot hide behind the protective mantle of double jeopardy. The petition is dismissed

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the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in various cases including that cited in Our decision…‖ SC, acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision declared that this Court had affirmed the decision of the court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment imposed in the said trial court‘s decision.‘ Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the decision anew. The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Promulgation.

Cuison vs. CA (1998) Facts: RTC found Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide, sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Sapigao P30,000.00 and heirs of Castro P30,000.00. CA affirmed RTC‘s decision with the modification that civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00 In a petition for review in SC it was remanded to RTC for promulgation of decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, 1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence service of his sentence. OSG filed for motion for clarification of the aforementioned decision, On Aug 17, 1995, CA rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions thereof: ‗In the dispositive portion of this Court‘s decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of

Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n petitioner’s right against double jeopardy was violated? NO To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following must be proven: ― x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted). And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.‖ Petitioner contends that ―the promulgation by Judge Ramos on Apr 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court‘s

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decision of Jun 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner x x x.‖ As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense. We must stress that Respondent Court‘s questioned Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and the full execution of the penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. PS Bank vs. Spouses Bermoy (2005) Facts: Petitioner charged spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy with estafa through falsification of a public document. Upon arraignment, the spouses pleaded not guilty to the

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charge. Upon hearing, private prosecutor and defense counsel admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused. Initial hearing was set. During the hearings, the prosecution presented its witnesses and rested its case after the presentation of the testimonies. However, instead of presenting evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify the spouses as the accused. The case was dismissed and the spouses Bermoy were acquitted. Upon appeal to the CA, the ruling was affirmed. It held that even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Issue/held/ratio: 1. w/n double jeopardy has attached in the case? NO For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro requires the following elements in the first criminal case: (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (b) The court had jurisdiction; (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (d) He was convicted oracquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.

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On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal. All the elements were present in the criminal case. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered ―not guilty‖ pleas. Finally, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses. Dismissal of action

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petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners‘ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended. A complaint ―grave threats‖ was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MFR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for ―certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO‖ (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue/held/ratio: 1. w/n dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal? NO 2. w/n the judge ignored petitioner‘s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207? NO

Paulin vs. Gimenez (1993) Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties,

For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows

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that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. When the ground for the motion to dismiss is insufficiency of evidence PEOPLE v. CITY COURT OF SILAY Facts: Respondents were charged with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document." After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on this motion, respondent court dismissed the case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. Held: It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents was erroneous. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was

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a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at that stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of justice in the instant case. When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the rights of the accused to speedy trial ESMENA v. POGOY Facts: Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded ―Not Guilty‖. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest‘s request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priest‘s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to

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recognize the complainant‘s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy. Held: The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal was not ready because his witness was not in court. Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" would not change the legal effect of the dismissal. If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an acquittal of the defendant. PEOPLE v. TAMPAL Facts: Tampal et al were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical injuries. The case was set for

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hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge. Issue: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases. Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case. The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this

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does not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. Revival of the criminal cases provisionally dismissed PEOPLE v. LACSON Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. Held: Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. ―Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.‖The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should

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not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. Appeal by the prosecution People v. Maquiling Doctrine: The rule against double jeopardy proscribes as appeal from a judgment of acquittal. Facts: According to witnesses, Ramil Maquiling boxed the deceased Pacasum who was compelled to box back. When Ramil fell, appellant, elder brother of Ramil helped him and tried to pacify. They ran out of the disco but when the deceased and his companions followed outside, Ramil Maquiling and his companions were waiting and another fist fight ensued. During the fight, appellant went to his car and got a pistol. He fired a warning shot and then shot deceased twice on the left thigh. Appellant then fired another shot and hit the deceased on the chest. He died due to the gun shot wounds. Another person, Jojo Villarimo suffered gunshot wounds on his upper right leg which required medical attendance. On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the private complainants, the Department of Justice subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of homicide to murder. To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of

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not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989. Trial ensued. The trial court rendered its Decision convicting private respondent of homicide and serious physical injuries. The CA reversed and accepted the claim of selfdefense. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify and stop Frederick from inflicting further harm on his brother, he was instead boxed on the right cheek by Frederick. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun [i]n hand.The deceased Frederick not only aimed the shotgun [at] him but actually fired at the accused. And the accused shot at the deceased only after he was himself injured by the deceased who fired a shotgun at him. He likewise shot at Olegario ‗Jojo‘ Villaremo to disarm him as he likewise took possession of the shotgun. ISSUE:

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judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court reads: "Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating that ―no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. v. Kepner: the United States Supreme Court, reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision, declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in double jeopardy.

WON the appeal is proper. NO Elements of Double Jeopardy: The petition is not meritorious. Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of





the accused individuals are charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain their conviction; the court has jurisdiction;



the accused have been arraigned and have pleaded; and

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they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is

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dismissed without their express consent. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the existence of the first, third and fourth elements. To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. PETITION is DENIED. People v. Hon. Perlita Tirona [G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005] Facts: Petitioner for review on certiorari seeking annulment of decision of Judge Tirona acquitting accused private respondent Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot. The NBI, w/ 2 search warrants, conducted a search of Muyot‘s house. They allegedly found 498.1094 grams of shabu which led to the filing of an information charging private respondent with Violation of Section

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16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent -Branch 102 of the QC RTC Accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, Tirona acquitted private respondent on grounds of reasonable doubt. Petitioner now contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed GAOD in ignoring material facts which if considered would lead to a finding of guilt. Petitioner posits that the Double Jeopardy Clause does permit a review of acquittals decreed by trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial will be required even if the judgment should be overturned. It thus argues that appealing the acquittal of private respondent would not be violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. Issue: W/n the decision of the respondent court acquitting Muyot can be reviewed on a petition for review on certiorari? Ratio: In PP v. Velasco, the Court ruled that as mandated by the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot

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be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as represented by the prosecution, were denied due process. From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. The fact that the petition was given due course does not necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency of the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the appealability of an acquittal. We have categorically ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a finding of mistrial, no appeal will lie in case of an acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us, we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the accused‘s right against double jeopardy. People v. Navarro G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975 FACTS: Catuday was charged before Municipal Court of Makati with crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino. While the case was pending, he was

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also charged with frustrated theft. The CFI of Rizal acquitted Jaime Catuday. In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the theft case which was heard. Sometime in December 1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI, respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft case was then in the rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, and upon order of the court, the parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, respondent Judge rendered one decision, acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat case and frustrated theft case) were tried jointly." The provincial fiscal, together with the private prosecutor, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, proving that respondent Judge's decision be annulled for lack of due process insofar as the light threat case was concerned. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second Division) issued a resolution to the effect that "considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit." ISSUE: WON this case is proper. YES.

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This petition for certiorari is granted. Respondents here have not pointed to any court order for joint trial, as indeed there is none. Joint trial is not called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the accused in the two cases is only one person, but there are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the theft case. The threat was supposed to have been made on March 5, 1968; the theft was allegedly committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the charges are for offenses founded on the same facts or form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character. Consequently, the court had no power to try them jointly. Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings, subpoenas, court orders, transcript of stenographic notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the captions include both Criminal Case No. 20145 (light threat) and Criminal Case No. 20146 (frustrated theft), there was joint trial of the cases, and the court properly treated the hearing as joint and acted accordingly with respect to the two cases. It has been held, however, that a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect, for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the charging part that is the gist of the accusation. Evidently, the State had been deprived of due process, which act was an abuse of discretion on

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the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction, rendering the judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime Catuday, in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat, NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process, and, consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby.

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In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal of private respondent JAIME CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. PEOPLE V TAC-AN CALLEJO; February 27, 2003 FACTS - Mario Austria is the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail. - He falsified a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, , a public/official document, by stating that certain firearms are a property of the provincial; government of Batangas and issued it to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, a civilian agent, for his own use in connection with the performance of his official duties and functions - Out of the 11 witnesses listed in the information, only 3 were notified. When the case was called for pre-trial, the 3 did not appear and the RTC dismissed the case. - The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply because three of its witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the initial pre-trial. - CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were

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mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a writ of certiorari. - Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. ISSUE WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case simply because three witnesses of its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pretrial of the case HELD YES - Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is enough that the accused is represented by his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. - The State, like the accused is also entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is,

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therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no effect. - The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not place the private respondent in double jeopardy. Ratio The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. - to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. - Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused Petition GRANTED Gorion v RTC of Cebu 1992 1. an information against Gorion was filed in Court for Estafa. However, on the hearing date for Sept 27, Gorion wasn‘t there thus the prosecutor suggested that it be moved to another date for the accused to be able to defend himself. Thus the Judge approved the resetting of the Sept 27 hearing as well as the Sept 28 hearing to October 4. 2. But on the 28th, the case was still called for hearing as it was included in the calendar. But without any witnesses or evidence presented by the prosecutor, the case was dismissed.

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3. Counsel for Gorion, Atty. Bilocura, received a copy of this order on 4 October 1990. However, he received a copy of the 27 September 1990 Order only on 15 June 1992. 4. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what actually transpired on 4 October 1990. In any event, the case was called again on 31 May 1991, but the Court reset the hearing to 18, 22, 23 and 25 July 1991 on the ground that it had not yet received from the Chief Justice of this Court a reply to the Presiding Judge's request for an extension of the trial dates. 5. On 2 July 1991, Gorion filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging therein that the dismissal of the case by the court on 28 September 1990 without his consent amounted to his acquittal; hence, he would be placed in double jeopardy Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy involved in this case NO 1. It is obvious to this Court that the trial court was, on 28 September 1990, divested of jurisdiction, pro hac vice, to issue any order, much leas one of dismissal, in Criminal Case No. CBU-16727 for the simple reason that said case was already effectively removed from its trial calendar for that date in view of the previous day's order cancelling the hearing of the case on 27 and 28 September 1990 2. The Judge, Clerk of Court and the prosecution should shoulder the blame because unless amnesia suddenly struck all of them simultaneously, it cannot be imagined that in a brief span of about twenty-four hours, they had all

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forgotten about the order dictated in open court cancelling the hearing for 27 and 28 September 1990. 3. The erroneous dismissal order of 28 September 1990 was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it unquestionably deprived the State of a fair opportunity to present and prove its case. 4. Thus, its right to due process was violated. The said order is null and void and hence, cannot be pleaded by Gorion to bar the subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a re-opening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. Summerville General Merchandise v Eugenio August 7, 2007 1. The president and general manager of Summerville accused several persons (incorporators of AROTECH Corp) of unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale and unfair competition of Royal brand playing cards, the design and mark of which are claimed to have been duly patented/copyrighted and registered. 2. After due investigation, the City Prosecutor‘s Office of Manila recommended the prosecution of respondents for unfair competition. Thus an information for unfair competition was filed 3. Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000; however, on June 22 of the same year, private respondents filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice assailing the May 31, 2000 Resolution of the City Prosecutor‘s Office 4. Undersecretary Puno affirmed the resolution of the Prosecutor however DOJ Secretary Perez

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issued his Resolution which recalled and set aside the Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but without however issuing a ruling on the propriety of the complaint and merely indicated that the case would be further reviewed and the corresponding resolution would be issued. 5. DOJ then issued a Resolution dismissing both the complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim filed by private respondents. This was done after the arraignment which the accused refused to enter a plea. Feeling aggrieved, Summerville immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary‘s ruling. 6. the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion to Withdraw Informationon the basis of the Resolution issued by Secretary Perez. The next day, the RTC issued the order dismissing the case. MR filed by Summerville. 7. trial court issued an Orderholding in abeyance all pending incidents to await the final resolution of the motion filed before the DOJ. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court has all the facts necessary to resolve the pending incidents and also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. ISSUE: w/n double jeopardy already attached in this case NO 1. First, in Santos v Orda: The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the

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recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court‘s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case 2. In this case, it can be readily seen from the Order of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the Information, that the trial court glaringly failed to conduct its own determination of a prima facie case, and simply adopted the Resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice. 3. This failure of Judge Eugenio to independently evaluate and assess the merits of the case against the accused violates the complainant‘s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 4. Thus, it is only but proper for this Court to remand the case to the trial court to rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information anew. 5. Since the order granting the withdrawal of the Information was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite (that the accused has been convicted, acquitted, or the case has been dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused) was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in Martinez v Court of Appeals 1. Martinez was accused by VP Laurel for libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and

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2.

1.

2.

3.

scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate Laurel filed a motion to set the case for arraignment and pre-trial. Action on the motion was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon. Gerardo Pepito, pending assumption of duty of Judge Yuzon's successor. (Yuzon retired earlier) In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Tabanag filed before the trial court on a motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review, which was granted by Judge Pepito then Acting Justice Secretary Bello declaredthat while the language used in the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as if embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to cause the dismissal of the information filed against Martinez. Thus a MTD was then filed. At the hearing, upon manifestation of Laurel‘s counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish

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said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter ten days to respond. 4. The prosecutor didn‘t comply with the trial court's order; this notwithstanding, said court, through Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued an order dismissing the case. (note: no arraignment was held) 5. Laurel appealed arguing that the order of dismissal was void because it was only based on the Secretary‘s Opinion. CA granted the appeal thus it remanded the case to TC for arraignment. 6. Martinez went up to the SC contending that his right against double jeopardy has been violated Issue: W/N double jeopardy attaches in this case NO 1. Appeal against the order of dismissal was not foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said order having issued before arraignment. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused 2. Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. 3. As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the

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discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp 4. The dismissal order having been issued in violation of private complainant's right to due process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err in setting aside said dismissal order. Discharge of co-accused Bogo-Medellin Milling v Son 1. Hermosa, Tuñacaowere accused by BogoMedellin of qualified theft. Information was then filed in court. However, Bogo-Medellin filed on 14 April 1986 a manifestation informing the trial court of petitioner Hermosa's desire and willingness to act as state witness and to testify against his coaccused, private respondent Tuñacao who, Hermosa claimed, was the most guilty. 2. Initially, Judge Tomol denied the application of Bogo-Medellin for discharge of Hermosa. On Bogo-Medellin's motion for reconsideration, however, Judge Tomol issued an order reversing himself and discharging Hermosa from the information for qualified theft. 3. On the initial scheduled date of hearing, Hermosa failed to appear before the trial court. The hearing was then rescheduled, first to 20 January and later to 3 March. By the latter date, respondent Judge Son had become Presiding Judge of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

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4. On the 3 March hearing, counsel for Tuñacao manifested to the court that he would be moving for reconsideration of the order of Judge Tomol discharging petitioner Hermosa from the qualified theft information. 5. Bogo-Medellin opposed the motion for reconsideration upon the ground that reinstatement of Hermosa as co-accused in would place him in double jeopardy, considering that the order of Judge Tomol discharging Hermosa had resulted in his acquittal of the crime of qualified theft. Issue: W/N there would be double jeopardy if Hermosa would be reinstated YES 1. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the following are the requisites for the defense of double jeopardy: a. There must be a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; b. Filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; c. After the accused had been arraigned and pleaded to the charge; d. Than the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent; e. The second offense charged is the same as the first offense charged, or for an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof; or f. The second offense necessarily includes or

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2.

3.

4.

5.

is necessarily included in the first offense charged. the discharge of Hermosa must be considered as valid for present purposes, that is, for determination of whether a second and prohibited jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of Hermosa as a co-accused in the qualified theft information. The general rule is that the discharge of an accused in order that he may turn state witness, is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court. The effect of the discharge of a defendant is specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the following manner: The order indicated in the preceding section, shall amount to an acquittal of the accused discharged and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge. Once the discharge of an accused from the information is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows and persists unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify against his co-defendant, in which case the defense of double jeopardy is withdrawn from him and becomes unavailable to him. Until it is shown that the discharged accused has in fact failed or refused to testify against his co-defendant, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court had not been actually fulfilled, would not affect the legal consequence of the

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discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting acquittal. 6. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record to show that petitioner Hermosa failed or refused to testify against his co-accused, i.e., that he reneged on his covenant with the prosecution. 7. All the record shows is that petitioner Hermosa failed to attend two scheduled hearings, which does not necessarily show that he had violated his undertaking to testify against his co-accused "in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge." He has still YET to testify.

2.

3.

Argel v Judge Pascua August 20, 2006 4.

1. Argel complained against Judge Pascua that he was already acquitted in an earlier decision but then she amended her decision and instead convicted him 2. Judge said that she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified him because of the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision Issue: W/N the amended decision is null and void YES 1. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought

about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy The fact that respondent never had any intention of having complainant incarcerated on the basis of the second decision but only to make him answer for the civil liabilities arising from the crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate her from administrative liability. 2. Crimes Covered

P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 142024 July 20, 2001 MENDOZA, J.:

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Nature: petition for review of the decision of Court of Appeals 1. June 23, 1991 - Petitioner Sarabia, then a member of the city police force with intimidation, pointed his gun at complainant Josephine Picos-Mapalad and her then boyfriend, complainant Anastacio Mapalad and forced them to perform sexual acts against their will. 2. Three criminal informations against petitioner for grave coercion were filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, which resulted in the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 4399, 4400, and 4401 in that court. Court found him guilty in all three cases.

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contends the incident which gave rise to this case is also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with violence against or intimidation of person wherein he was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the Court of Appeals. W there is double jeopardy - NO. To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

3. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, the three criminal cases were raffled to two salas of the court. Branch 1 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 4399 and 4400. Branch 47 of the RTC of Bohol ordered the transfer of the records of Criminal Case No. 9730 to Branch I of the same court to be consolidated with Criminal Case No. 9729 and 9731. The three cases were finally raffled off to Branch 48 of the RTC.

With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, ß7 of the Rules of Court, the test is whether one offense is identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or frustration of the other or whether one offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. On the other hand, Rule 120, ß5 provides:

4. Branch 48 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. ñ An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

5. Petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He

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The third requisite, identity of offenses, is absent in this case. The crime for which petitioner now stands charged is not the same as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of person for which he was convicted. Neither is the former an attempt to commit the latter or a frustration thereof. And the former crime does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in, the first crime charged. ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 93475

June 5, 1991

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rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. 4. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea of not guilty. 5. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p 1. 14 March 1985 - an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. 2. (2) informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. 3. 29 June 1987 - the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig

W there could be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code YES. 1. The petitioner is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant

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absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise.

requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.

2. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in the previous case.

4. Since the informations were for separate offenses ó the first against a person and the second against public peace and order ó one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 3. Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against Security are committed by means of dolo. Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the penalty by one degree. Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents. G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987

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FELICIANO, J.: Nature: petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 1. 1 February 1975 - members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. 2. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 3. 24 November 1975 - Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1. 4. 2 February 1976 - Manuel Opulencia filed motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. 5. Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense.

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6. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. 7. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Judge granted the accused's motion to quash. 8. Petitioner argues that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. Whether there is double jeopardy - Yes. :| 1. The first sentence of Article IV (22) 1973 Constitution sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different

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from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. 2. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. 3. The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and

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another offense under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13 4. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise

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to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).

though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

5. In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

7. By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.

6. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which

8. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in this case. 3. Act punished by a law or ordinance, conviction or acquittal shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. 4. Doctrine of Supervening Event PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents. G.R. No. 99287

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June 23, 1992 MEDIALDEA, J.: Nature: petition for certiorari seeking to reverse RTC decision 1. Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425 for possession of 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) 2. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425. Judge found the accused guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. W Respondent Judge erred in granting accused's request to plead guilty to a lesser offense - YES. 1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter.

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2. However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. 3. In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan, We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. 4. As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. 5. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular. 6. The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his

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plea. We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. relevant: 7. Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated. uch supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Under Rule 117, Sec. 7: the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. X. Ex post facto law and Bill of Attainder Art. III, Sec. 22 1. Ex post facto law a. Kinds b. Characteristics

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c. Some cases REYNALDO R. BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. L-61776 March 23, 1984 1. Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury and the Teachers‘ Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers‘ Camp resulting in damage to the government of several million pesos. 2. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1976. 3. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was elected. 4. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his coaccused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this Court and the cases are now pending review in G. R. Nos. L-54645-76.

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5. However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. 6. Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying pending trial of their cases. 7. On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner ―from their public positions or from any other public office that they may be holding x x x ‖ 8. Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that ―to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law‖. The motion was denied by respondent court in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this petition for certiorari. 9. Petitioner submits that respondent court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because in the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, its application would violate the Constitutional provision against enactment of ex post facto law; W BP 195 is an ex post facto law - NO. 1. We find no merit in petitioner‘s contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas

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Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. 2. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. 3. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. 4. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage

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of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word ―office‖ the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged. FAJARDO v COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 128508 (February 1, 1999) Petitioner: Daniel G. Fajardo Respondent (s): Court of Appeals, Hon. Florentino P. Pedronio (in his capacity as presiding Judge, RTC Br 31, Iloilo City, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Station Commander of Iloilo City FACTS: On May 26, 1988, the RTC Br 31 of Iloilo City convicted petitioner of violation of BP Blg 22 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 8 months imprisonment and pay the costs. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. By decision promulgated on February 27, 1990, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari of the conviction before the SC but latter also denied said petition. On June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation before the trial court contending that he was eligible for probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application and hence, not applicable to him. Trial court denied petitioner‘s motion for probation and so did CA.

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ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner could qualify to apply for probation under PD No. 986 since he had appealed from his conviction in 1988, after PD 1990 amending PD 986 become effective in 1986. 2. Whether or not PD 1990 is an ex post facto law hence, invalid. HELD: 1. NO. PD 1990 provides, ―no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction‖. At the time of the commission of the offense in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation but he was convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, PD 1990 was then in full effect. He could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed. 2. NO. PD 1990 is valid. It is not an ex post facto law in its application and neither is it considered as such. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. PD 1990 is not penal in character just like the Probation Law that it amends. 2. Bill of Attainder a. Definition. b. Characteristics

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IV.

CITIZENSHIP

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appeal from a judgment of CFI of Cebu, who likewise remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs.

A. General Principles 1. Definition

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is a citizen of the Philippine Islands?

a. Distinguished from nationality 2. Usual modes of acquiring citizenship 3. Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines: a. Before adoption of the 1935 Constitution i. Jus Sanguinis ii. Jus Soli ROA v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS GR No. L-7011 (October 30, 1912) FACTS: On July 6, 1889, appellant Tranquilino Roa was born in lawful wedlock in the Philippines to a Chinese father and a Filipina mother. His father went to China in 1985 and died there about 1900. On 1901, while still a minor, appellant was sent to China by his mother to study. When he returned to the Philippine Islands on 1910, he was denied admission by the Board of Special Inquiry for the reason that he takes the nationality of his father and thus becomes a subject of the Emperor of China and not a citizen of the Philippines, to which the Insular Collector of Customs affirmed. Appellant filed the

HELD: YES. The mother before she married was a Spanish subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her husband, which occurred after the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States, she, under the rule prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the Philippine Islands, being that of her native country. If it may be said that during the lifetime of the father minor children follow his nationality, it logically follows, by the widow placing herself and her children within the jurisdiction of the United States on his death, whereby she herself reacquires her former nationality, and she being the natural guardian of such children, that they should follow her nationality, with the proviso that on becoming of age they may elect for themselves. The nationality of the appellant having followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this country. b. After adoption of the 1935 Constitution 4. Natural-born citizens 5. Marriage by Filipino to an alien 6. Policy against dual-allegiances

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MERCADO v MANZANO GR No. 135083 (May 26, 1999) NATURE: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vicemayor of Makati City. Important details on Edu Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents. FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vicemayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano was an American citizen. On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him according to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed the Second Division‘s ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying: Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth).

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Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood). Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and holds and American passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship. Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City. ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to intervene granted. YES. 2. WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. NO. REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to protect because he is ―a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be

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proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.‖ This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, there had already been a proclamation of the election results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private respondent from the race when he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies when the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is WON the second placer may be declared winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so was Mercado, being a rival candidate. Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the private respondent had the most votes. Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code (which declares as ―disqualified from running for elective local position… Those with dualcitizenship‖), Congress has ―command[ed] in explicit

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terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office.‖ Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a person‘s volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a question of which state‘s law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a threat to a country‘s sovereignty. In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, ―dual citizenship‖ in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean ―dual allegiance‖. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual citizenship. In private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Naturalborn”. “I am not a permanent resident of , or immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…” The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to

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renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that ―By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.‖ Therefore, petitioner Mercado‘s contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent‘s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of his American citizenship. Also, equally without merit is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was registered as an American citizen with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used for his last travel to the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an American passport was simply an assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar v. COMELEC).

ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.

Manzano‘s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here, received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari, DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications prescribed. VALLES v COMELEC GR No. 137000 (August 9, 2000) FACTS: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.

RULING: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent’s father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.

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Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Dual citizenship in the LGC, Sec 40, means dual allegiance JACOT v DAL AND COMELEC GR No. 179848 (November 27, 2008) Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor? HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

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AASJS - CALILUNG v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATUMANONG GR No. 160869 (May 11, 2007) Facts: Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 arguing that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Issue: Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. Held: R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. The court held that that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of

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dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. 7. Attack on one's citizenship may be made only through a direct, not a collateral proceeding. Co v HRET July 30, 1991 J. Gutierrez Jr. Facts: On May 11, 1987, congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar transpired. Among the candidates were petitioner Balinquit and private respondent Ong. Ong was proclaimed the winner. However, an election protests was filed against him on

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the ground that he is not a natural born citizen, nor was he a resident of the second district. One of petitioner‘s argument was that respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The HRE ruled for private respondent Ong. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus the petition on certiorari with the SC. Issue: WON the issue on the citizenship of respondent Ong can extend to a collateral attack on the citizenship of his father. Held/Ratio: No. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death just so we can go after the respondent. The petitioners questioning of the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach cannot done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak 8. Res judicata in cases involving citizenship B. Citizens of the Philippines 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution a. Re: 1935 Constitution

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Valles v COMELEC August 9, 2000 J. Purisima Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, with a Filipino father and Australian father. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In 1992, she ran for was elected as governor of Davao Oriental. This was contested by her opponent Gil Taojo in a petition of quo warranto on the ground of her Australian Citizenship.COMELEC dismissed the petition. When she ran in 1995, she again won against Rabat which was also contested. Said petition was also dismissed. Thus this petition for certiorari. In her reelection in 1998, her citizenship was again contested by now petitioner Valles. COMELEC again dismissed the case. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition for certiorari. Issue: WON Lopez was a Filipino citizen.

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Yes. Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country which were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Lopez‘s father, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, thus under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law he is deemed a Filipino citizen. By virtue of the same laws, herein private respondent Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. Tecson v COMELEC March 3, 2004 J. Vitug Facts: On December 31, 2003, Roland Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner Victorino Fornier filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners. Even on the assumption that his father Lorenzo Pou was a Filipino citizen, such could not have

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been transmitted to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. COMELEC dismissed the case. The motiton for rconsideration filed by petitioner was also dismissed. Thus this petition for certiorari. Issue: WON FPJ was a Filipino citizen Held/Ratio: Yes. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 which provided that: ―...that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands …‖ The only conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou that could be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the ―en masse Filipinization‖ that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are

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Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Chiongbian v De Leon January 31, 1949 CJ Moran Facts: This a petition filed by William CHiongbian seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from cancelling the registration certificates of his vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to him. The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen Issue: WON petitioner is a Filipino citizen Held/Ratio: Yes. The Article IV of the 1935 Constitution provides that: SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: … (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines … In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis. Thus his father became a Filipino

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citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. The argument that subsection 2 is is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee . The framers adopted said provision fully cognizant of the transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, they would have so clearly stated. b. Re: 1973 Constitution 2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 3. Those born before January 17, 1973, who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. a. Procedure for election b. When to elect Cuenco v Secretary of Justice May 26, 1962 J. Concepcion Facts: Counsel for petitioner Alfonso DyCuenco wrote to the Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon the ground that he had exercised the right to elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4)

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of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. He stated that he was born of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother. He is married to a Filipina with who he has four children. He also stated that he had already renounce all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to the DOJ Sec who opined that hat the alleged Philippine citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen Petitioner sough rehearing and reconsideration and argued that the delay in electing citizenship was due to the belief that he was a citizen of the Philippines. When it was referred back to DOJ sec, petition was denied. Petitioner then instituted in the CFI of Manila this action for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to recognize as valid said election of Philippine citizenship by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of registration. Issue: WON delay to elect citizenship was justified in petitioner‘s circumstance Held/Ratio:

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NO. Petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

said delay or to warrant extension of the period to elect Philippine citizenship.

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. For this reason, petitioner introduced evidence to the effect that he is referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his marriage contract and in the birth certificates of his children; that he married a Filipina; and that he enlisted in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December, 1942.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner Ching, an applicant for admission to the Philippine Bar, was born to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution. As such, his citizenship followed that of his father‘s. The 1973 and 1987 Constitutions allowed individuals to elect to perfect their Filipino citizenship for which CA 625 provided the procedure. In all cases, perfection of one‘s citizenship had to be done ―upon reaching the age of majority‖ which has been taken to mean that it must be done ―within reasonable time‖ from reaching such age. In turn, “within reasonable time” has been taken to mean three (3) years although the Court in Cuenco v Justice Secretary said that the three year rule was not inflexible but warned against over-extending the time period. In this case, Ching only elected to become a Filipino citizen at the age of thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase ―upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special

However, he stated that he joined a unit of Chinese volunteers and that he registered himself in the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese. Moreover, it appears that, as early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be a citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until four (4) years later, or in May 1951. The reasons given by him for such delay were his alleged financial difficulties and the illness of members of his family. These reasons are patently insufficient to excuse

In re: Ching. Bar Matter No. 914, 01 October 1999 (citizenship; perfection of Filipino citizenship; age of majority; reasonable time)

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circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Villahermosa v Commissioner of Immigration 80 Phil 541, 31 March 1948 (citizenship; jus sanguinis; subsequent acquisition of citizenship by parent) This is a petition for a Writ of Habea Corpus; the petitioner is the mother of Delfin Co, an 18-year-old Chinese national who was apprehended with a party of his compatriots who entered the Philippines illegally. Delfin and company was adjudged as illegal aliens and ordered deported back to China. Petitioner, who had lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to Delfin‘s father, filed an Oath of Allegiance with the Civil Registry of Tarlac for which reason, under CA No. 63, she thus resumed her Philippine citizenship. Petitioner thus came to court arguing that since she is once again a Philippine citizen and since the citizenship of a minor follows that of his mother, Delfin Co is, for all intents and purposes, a Filipino citizen and cannot be deported to China. HELD: Petition denied. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother,

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because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not have reacquired such citizenship. While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution; but, according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his father's demise. This petition is moreover to be denied on the strength of precedents heretofore established, because Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any posterior change of status can not affect the legality of his detention for purposes of deportation. Republic v Chule Lim G.R. No. 153883, 13 January 2004 Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed a petition to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in her birth certificate, among which was her citizenship which was listed as Chinese when she claims to be a Filipino. The petition was granted. However, petitioner herein filed an appeal specifically on the correction of her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having complied with the legal requirements for election of citizenship in that the respondent never elected her Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as

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provided for in Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent needs to elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the ageof majority? HELD: Petition denied; judgment upheld. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship applyonly to legitimate children; the case at bar clearly states that respondent is an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. C. Naturalization 1. Modes of Naturalization a. Direct b. Derivative 2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance. 3. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws. 4. Naturalization under C.A. 473 a. Qualifications b. Disqualifications c. Procedure Republic v Hamilton Tan Keh G.R. No. 144742, 11 November 2004 (petition for naturalization; publication requirements) Respondent filed a petition for naturalization pursuant to RA 530 and caused the publication of the Notice of

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Initial Hearing in the manner prescribed by law. On the date of initial hearing, 27 April 1995, the OSG entered its appearance and manifested its objection on the ground that as per Section 10 of CA 473, the initial hearings of petition for naturalization are proscribed within 30 days preceding the next election (which, in this case was 08 May 1995). The hearing of the case was reset to 09 June 1995 at which time the OSG again filed a Motion to Dismiss as no publication of this subsequent hearing was made. As such, the court did not obtain jurisdiction over the case. HELD: The Court disagreed with the Republic. A plain reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that for there to be a valid publication, the following requisites must concur: (1) the petition and notice of hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the applicant resides. The said provision also requires that copies of the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in the office of the clerk of court or in the building where the office is located. Further, the petition shall not be heard within six (6) months from the date of last publication of the notice. The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing was originally set during the prohibited period in Section 10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited period in Section 9, did not render the publication of the notice and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan Keh had strictly complied with all the requirements under Section 9. His petition and the notice of hearing were duly published once a week for three consecutive weeks in

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the Official Gazette during the month of September 1994 and in a newspaper of general circulation in July 1994. Moreover, the original date of hearing, April 27, 1995, was not within six (6) months from the last publication of the notice thereof. There are two prohibited periods that must be reckoned with under Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473. Section 9 provides that the notice must set forth, inter alia, "the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within six months from the date of last publication of the notice." Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding any election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on respondent Tan Keh‘s petition was not within any of these two prohibited periods. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GAN TSITUNG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. GAN TSITUNG, , -versus-REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-20819

November 29, 1965

CONCEPCION FACTS: On December 24, 1954, CFI- Manila rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines, filed on November 14, 1953, by appellant Gan Tsitung. On the latter's motion, he was, on December 26, 1956, allowed to and did take his oath of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines and the

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corresponding certificate of naturalization was issued to him. Subsequently, or on May 10, 1962, the Solicitor General filed a petition praying that said decision and certificate of naturalization be respectively annulled and cancelled, upon the ground that the notice of the filing of said petition and of the hearing thereof had been published in the Official Gazette only once, instead of once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in violation of Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Law. After due hearing said court issued on October 15, 1962, the order complained of granting relief sought by the Solicitor General. Hence the present appeal. ISSUE: WON publication is necessary to make his naturalization valid? YES RATIO: The SC decided the case based on the ruling on Ong Son Cui Republic which explicitly held that "there being only one publication of said notice hearing in this case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly incomplete and, therefore, insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and grant the petition." This doctrine was reiterated in Celestino Co y Quing Reyes vs. Republicupon the ground that noncompliance with the provisions of Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization Act, relative to the publication of the aforesaid notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks — affects the

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jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

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between the applicant and the Solicitor General but a matter impressed with the highest public interest, involving as it does an inquiry as to when an alien should be allowed to enjoy the coveted boon of Filipino citizenship. It is for this reason that the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with requirements of the law. The government can at all stages of the proceeding raise the issue of such non-compliance even without filing a formal opposition to the petition.

Sy v Republic MAKASIAR, J. Facts: Juanita Sy filed a petition for naturalization in CFIManila, however, the notice of the petition as Published in the Daily Mirror, a newspaper of general circulation, and as posted on the Court bulletin board, did not restate verbatim the petition, but merely summarized some of the averments therein. Thus the Solicitor General argues that since she was unable to comply with the requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 473, she should not be afforded citizenship. ISSUE: WON publication of naturalization is necessary? YES

The requirement by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, that the copy of the petition to be posted and published should be a textual or verbatim restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Noncompliance therewith, as in the instant case, nullifies the proceedings including the decision rendered therein in favor of the applicant ( WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER 11, 1961 AND THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 23, 1965, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE. ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. MENDOZA, J.:

RATIO:

FACTS:

WE have ruled with undeviating uniformity "that a naturalization proceeding is not simply a private contest

Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of

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Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. The TC granted his petition for naturalization. However this was reversed by the CA after the OSG noted several infirmities in his petition: (1) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473 (pertinent defect) (2) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (3) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (4) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4 Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance ISSUE: Won substantial compliance with the law is sufficient to grant him citizenship? NO

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It is settled, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Republic vs. Dela Rosa (sorry couldn‘t find case online; only found a digest) Facts: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on February 27, 1992. On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of the Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition

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for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done on January instead of having it on March, " where he manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the Supreme Court. Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his citizenship as Filipino. Held:No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory.

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The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period d. Effects of naturalization Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 Facts: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino

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citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is

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generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962 e. Denaturalization 5. Naturalization by direct legislative action 6. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. No. 9139] a. Special Committee on Naturalization b. Qualifications c. Disqualifications d. Procedure e. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children f. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization D. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship (C.A. 63) 1. Loss of Citizenship a. By naturalization in a foreign country b. By express renunciation of citizenship Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC (Aug. 1, 1989) Ponente: Cruz, J. FACTS:  Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous.

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



Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

ISSUES: *The original issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to

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rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holding public office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of justice. 1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? 2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him? HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a preproclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. 2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired

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Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. - Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. - The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. - The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. 3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected. 4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

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*Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.): Although no decision has been rendered by the COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however, that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case. YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989 THE CASE Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus (right to due process) with a prayer to be released from arbitrary detention as he claims that his continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious. FACTS  Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.  Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.  Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed commercial documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate Philippine Consul

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 Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding a Filipino citizenship as well  Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for A Philippine citizenship through naturalization he consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce ‗absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty‖ and pledged to ―maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and it succeeding consequences should they be violated.

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in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu‘s acts constitute a renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship? YES HELD Petitioner‘s motion for release from detention is DENIED (along with other motions filed). Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such

1.) By direct act of Congress 2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to the Republic Act 9225 3.) By administrative repatriation—take the oath of Allegiance to the Republic and register the same in the local civil registry or in the place where the person resides/last resided; original citizenship is acquired c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance d. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country e. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization

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f. By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war 2. Reacquisition of Citizenship a. Taking an oath of allegiance b. Naturalization c. Repatriation ANGAT V. REPUBLIC 14 SEPT.1999 Facts: Angat was a natural born citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in the US. On March 11, 1996, he filed a petition with the RTC to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. The court thereafter repatriated him. Issue: Whether repatriation cases

the

RTC

has

jurisdiction

over

Held: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction thereover. The court‘s order was thereby null and void. The Special Committee on Naturalization was reactivated on June 8, 1995, hence, when Angat filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Committee constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under PD No. 725 (a Decree providing for repatriation of Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural born Filipinos) was in place. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

[174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989] Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the

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public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the privaterespondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employeesowe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of

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the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the

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vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. BENGZON VS. HRET [357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001] Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,

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Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign country.‖ He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.‖ Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Asdistinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a

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naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA V. COURT OF APPEALS POSTED IN UNCATEGORIZED BY ADMIN ON 27 FEB 2010 G.R. No. 125793 (August 29, 2006) Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization,20petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 (pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72). Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered deported to his country of origin. Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa alleged, among others, that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota

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immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in §13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. 21 Held: RA 8171, ―An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos,‖ was enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz.: 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and naturalborn Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not one of those disqualified, as enumerated in the law: 1.1 Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; 2. Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; 3. Person convicted of crimes involving moral

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turpitude; or 4. Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases. Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He does not. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to naturalborn Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that, if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino, subsequently, had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents. d. Direct act of Congress

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