Compiled Poli Digest

December 1, 2017 | Author: redbutterfly_766 | Category: Sovereignty, Laissez Faire, Lawsuit, Legal Personality, Common Good
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Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013

CHAPTER III: THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE G.R. NO. L-13250, OCTOBER 29, 1971 COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA FACTS: Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the estate of late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a Spanish national and Tangier resident, in the Philippines. In the estate tax return he filed with the Collector of Internal Revenue, Rueda claimed the value of intangible personal properties as exempt from taxes under the proviso of Sec. 122, NIRC: That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country. The Collector, however, denied the exemption and assessed the estate of deficiency estate and inheritance taxes (amounting to P161, 874.95) for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The Collector reasoned that there is no reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines because Tangier is a mere

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principality and not a foreign country within the meaning of Sec. 122, NIRC. In effect, the Collector insists that the acquisition of international personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country." Upon appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled that the expression ―foreign country‖ in Sec. 122 refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible person properties of Philippine citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It was therefore not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by the Philippine Government in order to entitle the estate of Estrella to the exemption benefits of Sec. 122. ISSUE: Whether Section 22, NIRC requires that the ―foreign country‖ possesses an international personality to come within its terms. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Tangier comes within the term ―foreign country‖ of Sec. 122 because independence is not a condition of statehood. The following definitions of a State were provided by the Court to justify Tangier‘s statehood: - it is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of outside control, bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law (Pound)

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013

- a sovereign person with the people composing it, viewed as an organized corporate society under a government, with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands (Willoughby) - a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare (Cooley) - the juridical personification of the nation (Esmein) - a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions (Laski) - a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality The SC emphasized, however, that as long as there is power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations (McIver), international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. Assuming that Tangier was bereft of international personality, jurisprudence supports the finding that Sec. 122 treats even a principality as a foreign country. Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara considered California as a foreign country. In Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue, the tiny principality of Liechtenstein, with hardly an international personality, was found to fall under the exemption of Sec. 122.

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G.R. NO. 104226, AUGUST 12, 1993 CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK FACTS: Conchita Romualdez-Yap filed a petition for certiorari to question her separation from the Philippine National Bank. She was the Senior Vice President of the Fund Trust Department of PNB. While she was on leave of absence for medical reasons (April 1, 1986 – February 20, 1987), PNB underwent reorganization (December 3, 1986 by virtue of the Revised Charter of PNB or Executive Order No. 80) that caused the abolition of the Fund Trust Department. As a result of the reorganization, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her separation from service (effective February 1987, though the letter erroneously stated 1986). She contested her separation in the Civil Service Commission, arguing that her separation was made in bad faith because, among others: (1) it was based on her close identification with the previous regime, being the sister of Imelda Marcos; (2) her separation was antedated on February 16, 1986, prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986; (3) the Fund Transfer Department has recently been restored; and (4) she was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new staff. The CSC and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of her separation. ISSUE: Whether the separation reorganization was made in good faith

arising

from

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HELD: YES 1. Requirements for a valid reorganization Reorganization is a management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. While a distinction can be made between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions (e.g. Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (e.g. PNB), the common test for their valid reorganizations is the test of good faith. CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature. These are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty. On the other hand, MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional functions of government. These are functions which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. The option is exercised on the basis of the following are the principles: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake; and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands). Examples are commercial or universal banking which is, not a governmental but, a private sector endeavor.

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Reorganization in either case must be made in good faith. According to Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if: (1) it is for the purpose of economy, or (2) to make bureaucracy more efficient. In those events, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. Otherwise, an "abolition" is void ab initio if it is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith. 2. The reorganization of PNB was done in good faith. The SC found the following circumstances as indicative of PNB‘s good faith in pursuing reorganization:  it was by virtue of a valid law  it was pursued to achieve economy considering PNB‘s critical financial situation at the time  the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error where PNB had submitted documents supporting its stand that the separation actually took effect on 16 February 1987.  the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, which took effect after the lapse of over four years from the date it was abolished in 1987, was primarily caused by the improved financial capability and present needs of PNB  the appointment of SVP Federico Pascual as head of the International Department, from among other

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officers including Yap, is because his qualifications far exceeded those of the other candidates for the position, being a lawyer from the University of the Philippines, a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from Ateneo de Manila, a Master of Laws graduate of Columbia Law School, and a Masteral Arts in Public Administration graduate of the London School of Economics; he had also undergone extensive seminars at the International Department and had been assigned in several foreign branches of PNB; he held the second highest position of Executive Vice President and served as Acting President of PNB; while Yap only holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and has undergone only one seminar on Management and Leadership Training Program. Assuming that her separation was made in bad faith, an action for a quo warranto proceeding prescribes 1 year from the questioned termination. She was separated from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 or about 2 years after when she brought the matter to the CSC. By her inaction in questioning her termination within a period of 1 year, she was considered to have acquiesced to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to the position.

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G.R. NOS. L-55963 & 61045, FEBRUARY 27, 1991 SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA V. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN AND NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA FACTS: Sps. Fontanilla sued the National Irrigation Administration for damages, arising from the tortious act of its driver, Hugo Garcia. NIA denied liability, alleging that it is a government agency tasked with governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable for the tortious acts of its driver who is not a special agent. The SC had ruled that NIA was liable as a government entity exercising proprietary functions. Thus NIA filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it is a governmental entity. ISSUE: Whether NIA is a government entity exercising governmental or proprietary functions. HELD: 1. NIA is a governmental entity exercising proprietary functions. Governmental functions are classified into governmental / constituent and proprietary / ministrant. GOVERNMENTAL / CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS involve the exercise of sovereignty and are thus considered as compulsory. PROPRIETARY / MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS connote merely the

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exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. 2. The operation of an irrigation system is a proprietary function. In the United States where its irrigation districts are identical to Philippine irrigation systems, irrigation districts are characterized, according to jurisprudence, as public quasi corporations organized to conduct a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). They are not considered as exercising sovereign functions where they furnish no facilities for the administration of the sovereign government and its officers have no power or authority to exercise any of the functions of the general government, or to enforce any of the laws of the state or any of its other subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed by the district. They have no more power or authority than that of the officers of a private corporation organized for like purposes (Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District). They are thus considered as businesses because the land owners, as members of the corporation, control the affairs of the district and alone are benefited by its operations. While public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises (like those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communication, or in the production and distribution of prime necessities,), and even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society (NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated

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Unions), the functions performed by such enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. Its general purposes are not essentially public in their nature, but are only incidentally so. Therefore, an irrigation district is the owner of its system in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). According to McQuillin (The Law of Municipal Corporations), when municipalities undertake to supply water at price, they are engaged in trade. Although the State may regulate the service and rates of water plants owned and operated by municipalities, such property is not employed for governmental purposes and in the ownership and operation thereof, the municipality acts in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative interference. Consequently, they are liable as any private company would be for any negligence in laying out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in furnishing potable water through them. NIA was not created for purposes of local government. NIA was created as a body corporate with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." While it is essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a "governmentfunction" corporation. Certainly, the state and the

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community as a whole are largely benefited by the services NIA renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

G.R. NO. 143377, FEBRUARY 20, 2001 SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: An action for revival of judgment was instituted by the Republic of the Philippines but which the Court dismissed, having found that the Republic was not the real party in interest. The issue began when Rafael Galvez obtained an Original Certificate of Title over four lots in La Union. He sold Lots 1 and 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and Balatbat, who obtained TCTs in their names and who, in turn, subsequently sold the same lots to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Lepanto obtained a TCT in its name. Meanwhile, unknown to Lepanto, CFI La Union ordered the cancellation of Galvez/s title over the lots in a land registration case initiated by the Republic of the Philippines. The Order was issued on February 1, 1963, but the same subjects lots were unknowingly sold by Lepanto to Shipside Incorporated on October 28, 1963. Shipside had obtained a TCT in its name and had been exercising proprietary rights since then. The CFI Order was contested by Galvez, but was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA Decision became final and executory on October 23, 1973. A writ of execution was issued and served upon the

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Register of Deeds. However, the writ had not been executed for 24 years until the OSG, representing the Republic of the Philippines, initiated a complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of titles on April 21, 1999, against the successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez. Shipside filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Republic was not the real party in interest because the real property covered by the titles were allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station) and under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority under Republic Act No. 7227; and that the action has prescribed. The Republic, however, countered that prescription does not run against the State, which is still the real party in interest because the transfer of the military reservations to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests, but simply a recognition of the need to create a body corporate which will act only as its agent for the realization of its program. The MTD was dismissed thus Shipside raised the issue before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is a real party in interest and can thus claim the imprescriptibility of the State‘s action – N HELD: The action to revive judgment has prescribed (CA Decision became final on October 23, 1973 while the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than 25 years) under NCC 1144(3): an

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action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." The Republic, represented by the OSG, cannot invoke imprescriptibility of State actions because the Republic is not the real party in interest, having transferred the ownership of Camp Wallace, which used to belong to the government, to the Bases Conversion and Development Authority. Under Sec. 4 of R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the BCDA owns, holds and/or administers military reservations including Wallace Air Station and, under Sec. 4, all areas covered by the Wallace Air Station are hereby transferred to the BCDA. Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by Shipside‘s title is cancelled. The Republic also cannot invoke the relationship of mere agency between the Government and BCDA. BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate and distinct from the government, having been created as a body corporate and vested with the powers of a corporation (Sec. 3, R.A. 7227). It is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in

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general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. The Republic cannot also invoke E.B. Marcha Transport Co., Inc. v. IAC which held that the Republic is the proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of property, which, at the time of the institution of the suit, was no longer held by the national government but by the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority against the petitioner therein were the same and to dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to re-file the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case at bar since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). To hold otherwise is to begin bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to

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prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs.

G.R. NO. L-32052, JULY 25, 1975 PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL FACTS: Labor claims (overtime compensations) were filed by laborers against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration before the Court of Industrial Relations. The claims were granted by CIR. PVTA sought to declare the nullity of the decision on the ground that CIR had no jurisdiction over it and that the Eight-Hour Labor Law did not apply to it being an agency exercising governmental functions. The laborers of PVTA sued the latter before the CIR for payment of their overtime services (in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them) by virtue of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444). PVTA sought the dismissal of the suit on the following ground that it is an agency exercising governmental functions and by such reason, the 8-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it (lack of cause of action) and the CIR has no jurisdiction. The CIR ignored these defenses and ruled in favor of the laborers.

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ISSUES: Whether or not PVTA exercises governmental functions –Y Whether or not agencies exercising governmental functions fall outside the jurisdiction of the CIR and the operation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law – N HELD: 1. PVTA is an agency exercising governmental functions. Under its Charter (R.A. 2265), PVTA was established to, among others, promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their investments; and improve the living and economic conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco industry. The distinction, however, between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation has become futile in the era of welfare states where the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare necessitated the expanded role of government. According to Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience," resulted in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members." Chief Justice Makalintal explained in

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Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices how the welfare state concept and the policy for social justice has blurred the distinction of the traditional functions of governmental agencies: the increasing social challenges of the times necessitated the government to undertake private enterprise and initiative, in its sovereign capacity, and to move towards a greater socialization of economic forces for the promotion of social justice. As the welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution", it is thus much more so under the present Charter (1987 Constitution), which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. Functions of that sort [general welfare] "may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

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Nonetheless, the growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals", continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Accordingly, in Rubi v. Provincial Board, the Court found that the modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. Edu v. Ericta ruled that laissez-faire was rejected by the 1987 Constitution, having entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. The State could thus live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. Through such activities, "the

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harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. There is no longer any constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private enterprise. It is a response to a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of laws and the promotion of the interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations be attained. 2. The exercise of governmental functions does not exempt an agency from the operation of labor laws. Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia ruled that it is precisely CIR and not ordinary courts that should pass upon labor controversies. On the other hand, the EightHour Labor Law provides that it shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private.

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grounds that: 1. It violates the due process clause, following the American principle of laissez faire, and 2. It constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." ISSUE: W/N the ―Reflector Law‖ violates the due process clause, following the American principle of laissez faire. HELD: No, it does not. The Laissez faire principle is rejected my contemporary American jurisprudence and by Philippine Constitution and jurisprudence.

ROMEO F. EDU, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER V. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BR. XVIII, QUEZON CITY, AND TEDDY C. GALO (1970) FACTS: Teddy Galo assails the constitutionality of Administrative Order No. 2 (―the Reflector Law‖) on the

Definition of police power (―the greatest and most powerful attribute of government‖): ―state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order

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to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." ~Calalang v. Williams ―the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." ~Primicias v. Fugoso 2. Laissez faire principle no longer recognized in US.  There was a period in American history where series of legislations tending to reduce economic inequality (e.g. in People v. Pomar, a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement; in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, a statute providing for minimum wages) were struck down as violative of the due process clause, under the theory that individuals should have unrestricted freedom in entering into contracts (laissez faire).  But under Pres. Roosevelt‘s ―The New Deal administration‖ the US Supreme Court began rejecting the laissez faire doctrine. 3. Laissez faire doctrine had always been rejected in the Philippines  Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: ―The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past‖  ―the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through

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state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.‖  Justice Laurel, concurring in Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, said that the 1935 Constitution did away with the laissezfaire doctrine. ‖during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and control of public services.‖ 4. ―Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire…The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.‖ ISSUE: W/N the ―Reflector Law‖ (A.O.) is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. HELD: No, it is not.  The A.O. states: ―No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such

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reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night."  penalty for non-compliance is rejection or suspension of vehicle‘s registration and a fine.  ―It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government… What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them…‖ A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. ‖The test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature…The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.‖ Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature

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often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " ‖It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose.

ASSOCIATION DESICCATORS AUTHORITY

OF V.

PHILIPPINE PHILIPPINE

COCONUT COCONUT

FACTS: the Philippine Coconut Authority issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. In its whereas clause, it stated that it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. As such, the PCA will no longer require any coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the

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latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants. Rather, it shall limit itself only to simply registering coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President When petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President, they brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus before the SC. PCA: case should be dismissed as they did not wait for President‘s reply, thereby violating principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. ISSUE: W/N rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies. HELD: No, it does not. ―The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review…has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.‖ ISSUE: W/N PCA‘s resolution is valid. HELD: No, it does not.

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 ―The Philippine Coconut Authority is… an independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines, and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut industry…through a regulatory scheme set up by law.‖  Through this scheme, the government, on August 28, 1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut processing plants and, four months later, phased out some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based commodities. The establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the approval of the President.  On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants. It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the establishment and operation of additional DCN plants, subject to the approval of the President, in view of the increased demand for desiccated coconut products in the world's markets. This authorized the opening of new

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plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all procedures and requirements for registration. This form of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino.  ―These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut industry.‖ The PCA could have only worked under this structure.  ―In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure…In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. ―  Under the Revised Coconut Code, the role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects." And ―To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export..‖  By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-

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all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry.  In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations."  At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA FACTS:  About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863.  Subsequently, a central relief board was appointed to distribute the money. It allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, which was published in the Official Gazette.  Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of

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$80,000 of the relief fund in four installments of $20,000 each.  On account of various petitions of the originally intended beneficiaries of the money, the Philippine Government sued Monte de Piedad to recover the $80,000. The lower court ruled in favor of the Government.  Monte de Piedad asserts: 1. The sum was actually a donation, not a loan, 2. the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty. Hence, the present Philippine government cannot maintain this suit. 3. The Philippine Government has no competence to institute the suit. The money was part of a charitable subscription, whereby the donors were people in Spain, the donees were people in the Philippines, and the Government was merely a trustee. It was never the owner of the money, and therefore could not sue for its recovery as it is not the proper party. 4. Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912 HELD: 1. Evidence shows that the money was a loan, not a donation. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the

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Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. 2. The present Philippine government has the prerogative to enforce charities, as parens patriae  If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character.  Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. Chancellor Kent: ―In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.‖ .  Mormon Church v US: ―it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

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Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital: this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever. 3. The Philippine government has competence to sue.  It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.  To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future. 4. The action has not and can not prescribe.  U. S.vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co.: ―the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound‖  the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.

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CO KIM CHAN V VALDEZ TAN KEH FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that ―all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control‖ invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‘s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

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RATIO: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for ―the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase ―processes of any other government‖ and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur‘s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

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A well-known rule of statutory construction is: ―A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.‖ Another is that ―where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.‖ Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase ―processes of any other governments.‖ In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, ―law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.‖ Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

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Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. SUMMARY OF RATIO: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it. ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government

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of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state) (source: http://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/co-kimchan-v-valdez-tan-keh/)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. GREGORIO PERFECTO FACTS:  Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Senate was convened and was informed of the loss. Subsequently, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows: ―Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered…To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Senate itself,.. The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.‖

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 The Senate then adopted a resolution referring the case to the Attorney-General. An information was filed against Perfecto for violation of Art 256 of the Penal Code: ―Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .,"  The CFI convicted Fernando, stating: ―We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day…‖ Fernando was convicted following the ruling in U.S. v Helbig. Issue: whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force. HELD: No, it is not. 1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code  That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez, the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." It was found that

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those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing and publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.  The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256. 2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sovereignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.  It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.  According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.  Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. Penalties out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a

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distorted monarchical conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands.  it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.  The crime of lese majeste (crime against the crown, crimes against the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers) disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.

VILAS V. CITY OF MANILA (1911) FACTS: Vilas, Trigas, and Aguado are creditors of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them, under its present charter, the Government of the PI is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in

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no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. Thus it was elevated to the US Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality liable for obligations of old city. YES HELD: The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants. Argument against liability: Ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporation entity created by the Sp government . When the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality, ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and agent, death of principal=death of agent Dual Character of Municipal Corporations: 1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the state 2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. Stands for the community in the administration of local affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. McKinley‘s instruction: relinquishment or cession cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law

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belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds. Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity survived both military occupation and cession. The corporate identity and liability of the city was not extinguished. That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public law that that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, it was said: 'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a

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cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.'

PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (1945) FACTS: Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial

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was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that Peralta is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code." The Solicitor General opined that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by Peralta and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an

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accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. FIRST ISSUE: What is the nature and status of the government established in the Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines? In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon it washeld: The Philippines Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either

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case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a socalled government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations.‖ As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount

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force), the question involved cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. In the case of United States vs. Rice, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant

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is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. SECOND ISSUE: The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or

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character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. THIRD ISSUE: The validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation There is question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts." FOURTH ISSUE: If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur.

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LAUREL V. MISA (1947) FACTS: Anastacio Laurel was a detainee for alleged collaboration with the enemy during the Japanese occupation. He petitioned for habeas corpus on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter, aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code. Laurel contends that sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines, and consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended. Moreover, there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. ISSUE: WON Laurel‘s contentions were valid? NO. RATIO: A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. This should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government of his current residence. This absolute allegiance to their government is not abrogated by enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, remaining

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vested in the legitimate government. What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign also subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, on which petitioner's contention rests. Adopting the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for it would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence. The second contention was also invalid since the change of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of crime of treason committed during the former, because it is an offense on the same government and sovereign people for Art. XVIII of the 1935 Constitution provided that upon the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the US, the Commonwealth of the Philippines will be known as the Republic of the Philippines. Dispositive: Petition was denied. PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION He said that in Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the SC held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the Japanese

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occupation and that SC should hold that no treason could have been committed during it because Art. 114 of the RPC was not then in force. He also does not agree with the majority that adopting theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequence for the reason that the suspension does not exempt the occupant from complying with the Hague Regulation of not involving the population to take part in the military operations against their own country. He also said that the Commonwealth was an instrumentality of the US and had no sovereignty of its own and that treason committed against it or the US is not treason against the sovereign and independent Republic of the Phil.

REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR FACTS: Respondent judge Guillermo Villasor ordered in a previous case to release funds from bank accounts belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as compensation to two construction companies. The Philippine government sought to reverse Villasor's decision, on the ground that it did not authorize the release of funds. ISSUE: WoN Villasor had the authority and jurisdiction to order the release of funds as restitution for damages in a suit against the State? HELD/RATIO: No. Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution says, "The State may not be sued without its consent."

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Villasor awarded the money belonging to a component of the government, the military, without the express authorization from Congress. Villasor acted contrary to the Constitution, and thus acted in excess of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: ―A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.‖ Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that ―a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.‖ Judgment: Petition granted, judgment reversed.

MINUCHER V. CA

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FACTS: Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a ―buy-bust operation‖ conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo (agent of US Drug Enforcement Agency) who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the ‗trumped-up‘ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. ISSUE: WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations RULING: The SC DENIED the petition. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only ―diplomatic agents,‖ are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity

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from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo‘s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious. Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be

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regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The ―buy-bust operation‖ and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

LASCO vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNFRFNRE) 23 February 1995 FACTS:  Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with UNRFNRE, which is a special fund and subsidiary of the UN.  UNRFNRE: Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of

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the UN. This is backed up by a letter from the DFA confirming this.  1991- LA dismissed the complaint, MR denied. NLRC affirmed.  They then filed for certiorari without first seeking a reconsideration of the NLRC. Certiorari was not proper because petitioners failed to ask for reconsideration but the SC gave due course because of the implications in international law. Petitioners: acts of mining exploration and exploitation are outside the official functions of an international agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even assuming that private respondent was entitled to diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration work and entered into a contract of employment with petitioners. Moreover, it is a Constitutional mandate that the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3). OSG: UNRFNRE is covered by the mantle of diplomatic immunity. It is a specialized agency of the UN and under the UN Charter (Art. 105), it enjoys privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities Specialized Agencies of the UN in which Sec. 4 states that ―the specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process‖ and Sec. 5 states that ―the property and assets of the specialized agencies,

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wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.‖ ISSUE: W/N UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity. HELD/RATIO: YES. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the DFA, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether an international organization is entitled to diplomatic immunity is a "political question" and such determination by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and quasi-judicial agencies. The courts can only assume jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III, Sec. 4). As a matter of state policy as expressed in the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the generally accepted principles of international law (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the United Nations and a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, the Philippine Government adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the

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United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both treaties have the force and effect of law. Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions" In the International Catholic Migration Commission case, it was held that there is no conflict between the constitutional duty of the State to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and the grant of immunity to international organizations. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in the charters of the international organizations to guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions. UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the government and the UN for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."

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SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTERAQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT VS. NLRC 14 FEBRUARY 1992  The SEAFDC-AQD is a department of the SEAFDC, an international organization organized by ASEAN countries and sponsored by Japan.  1975-1983: Lazaga was employed by SEAFDC-AQD as Research Associate, Senior External Affairs Officer, then Head of the External Affairs Office.  1986- he was terminated from office due to alleged financial constraints. He was deemed entitled to separation benefits.  1987- he filed a complaint against SEAFDC-AQD for nonpayment of his separation pay and damages.  SEAFDC-AQD: NLRC has no jurisdiction since it is an international organization and that Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained him  LA (1988)- ordered SEAFD-AQD to pay separation pay and other employment benefits plus actual damages and attorney‘s fees. NLRC affirmed. ISSUE: W/N NLRC had jurisdiction. HELD/RATIO: NO. SEAFDC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of NLRC established by ASEAN Countries with Japan to purpose of which is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development

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in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11.). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDECAQD. Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one.

SEAFDEC V. ACOSTA, NLRC 2 SEPTEMBER 1993  Two labor cases were filed by Canto et al. against SEAFDEC before NLRC Iloilo City, claiming wrongful termination from employment.  SEAFDEC- filed MTC on the ground that NLRC had no jurisdiction

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 NLRC- MTD denied, petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.  SC (1992)- dismissed petition for certiorari ISSUE: W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction. HELD/ RATIO: NO. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. (See first SEAFDEC case). AJ Isagani Cruz stated: Certain administrative bodies created by agreement among states may be vested with international personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state. Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so before it rested its case and certainly well before the proceedings thereat had terminated.

TIJAM V SIBONGHANOY 15 APRIL 1968  July 1948- Spouses Tijam filed a civil case to recover P1,908 from spouses Sibonghanoy

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 After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.  RTC- found in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution was issued against the Surety‘s bond. The Surety filed to deny the motion for execution and motion to quash the writ all denied by the cour  CA affirmed the CFI. On MR, Surety filed its Motion to Dismiss alleging that a month before the filing of the case before the RTC, RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective. Under such law, the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. CA forwarded the case to the SC. ISSUE: W/N Surety may question the jurisdiction of the CFI. HELD/RATIO: NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too

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late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. The action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore. It could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction but failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.

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INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. CALLEJA FACTS:  On February 23, 1981, an Agreement was forged between the Philippines and then High Commissioner for Refugees, providing for a refugee operating center in Bataan. ICMC was accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee operating center. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.  On February 7, 1987, the Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiter‘s decision and ordered for the immediate conduct of the certification election. On July 15, 1988, ICMC‘s request for recognition as a specialized agency was granted by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs including the grant of corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a MOA between the Philippine Government and ICMC. The latter then sought for the dismissal of the TUPAS petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly granted by the Philippine Government, through the DFA.

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ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD/RATIO: YES. There is no doubt that ICMC was granted immunity. Article II of the MOA between the Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have the status of a specialized agency. Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947 and concurred by the Senate on May 17. 1949, explicitly provides that specialized agencies, including their properties and assets, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process. Moreover, DFA‘s opinion expressing its view that the conduct of the Certification Election is volatile of ICMC‘s diplomatic immunity constitutes a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch that ICMC indeed enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be political question conclusive upon the courts in order not to embarrass a political department of the government. The term ―international organization‖ generally describes an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest. ―Specialized agencies‖ are international organizations having functions in particular fields, as mentioned in Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international

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immunities to international organizations: 1.international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions or the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2. No country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and, 3. The international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members."The raison d‘être for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor over ICMC would defeat the very purpose of immunity accorded to the agency, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice a member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

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ICMC‘s immunity does not deprive labor of its basic rights. ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party."Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC and the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings.

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI V. SECRETARY OF LABOR

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FACTS: These are two consolidated cases involving the validity of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application of Philippine labor laws. HELD: There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison

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d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions. ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.

SANDERS V. VERIDIANO FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private

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respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent fulltime to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent fulltime status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them

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under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature. Issue/Held/Ratio: W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties. YES. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their

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personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent

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REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO FACTS: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land. NO. A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on

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September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.

TAN V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY FACTS: The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087,advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. Herein petitioner-appellant Tan submitted his application after paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond therefore. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline. The proposed area was awarded to petitioner. Thereafter he was given an Ordinary Timber License. However, it was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required. One of the bidders, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of

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Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that the license issued in the name of petitioner be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources revokes Tan‗s timber license. His motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitionerappellant to continue operation in the area covered by his timber license. ISSUE/HELD: W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court. NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI. Petitioner did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust all available administrative remedies.

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VETERANS MANPOWER V. COURT OF APPEAL FACTS: VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State, which had not given consent thereto. ISSUE/HELD: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PCSUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

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YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PCSUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. PNB V. CIR FACTS: Petitioner‘s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the

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garnishment "may be public in character." The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows:‖ The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed

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and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may be garnished National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended."

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In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished

PNB V CIR Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty. Manansala (counsel for United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association—prevailing party). The writ sought to garnish the money of

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People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC) deposited in PNB.  PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character‖. CIR denied PNB‘s motion to quash hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n People‘s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC), can be considered a public fund and in effect exempt from garnishment? NO General rule is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment however it is now settled in our jurisprudence that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations." If the office or agency or entity has its own charter vesting it a separate and distinct corporate existence then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished.

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2. w/n NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort? YES RAYO V CIF BULACAN Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC, acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents died properties worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away. Petitioners were one of the many victims of the inundated town filed complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.  NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam it is performing a purely governmental function hence it can‘t be sued without the express consent of the State. Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is performing merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it can sue and be sued in any court. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam? YES

It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

SSS V CA Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies Facts:  March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral. Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first 5 days of the month  July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz

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on the ground: conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October, 1967 with the default on to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon (Indebtedness as of June, 1968 P10,702.58 excluding interests). Notice of Sheriff's Sale was initially published in July 14, 1968 issue of the Sunday Chronicle. Before second publication Spouses Cruz wrote SSS, demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of their monthly amortizations. Attempts of out of court settlement failed. On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses filed for damages and attorney's fees against SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging that they had fully paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. SSS In its answer stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage executed in its favor by private respondents by virtue of the automatic acceleration clause provided in the mortgage contract. RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses, enjoined SSS from holding the sale and ordered them to pay the Spouses for Damages-P2,500.00 actual; P35,000.00 moral; P10,000.00 exemplary PP5,000.00 attorney's fees. CA: affirmed RTC‘s decision but eliminated P5000 moral damages; SSS filed for MFR which CA denied hence this appeal

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Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of foreclosure? Not, necessarily. Records show that it was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz' who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the time the application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage was filed. SSS committed an error in picking the record of 'Socorro C. Cruz' instead of the record of 'Socorro J. Cruz'. SSS, however, denied having committed any error and insists that their motion for foreclosure covers the real estate mortgage of spouses David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. Court is convinced that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on the real estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' and not Spouses Cruz. 2. w/n SSS can be held liable for damages? YES  SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not

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thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.  Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied that, in so far as contractual loan agreements with private parties are concerned, the SSS enters into them for profit considering that the borrowers pay interest, which is money paid for the use of money, plus other charges. In so far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable for damages would be to deplete the benefit funds available for its covered members, suffice it to say, that expenditures of the System are not confined to the payment of social security benefits.  SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by the lower courts for the award of actual damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's passports had already expired and they did not secure the necessary visas for their trip

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abroad. No moral and temperate damages as the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to warrant moral and temperate damages. With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside. SAN FERNANDO LA UNION V FIRME Keywords: State may be sued provided there is an express/implied consent to be sued. Facts: Issue/Held/Ratio:  December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.  A compliant for damages against, Third Party Complaint and cross claims were filed. Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's

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fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied hence this appeal on certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt case. Implied consent is when government enters into business contracts descending to the level of the other contracting party or when State files a complaint opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. 2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts? NO Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons. Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental

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functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando‘s municipal streets, a governmental function. The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. NIA V CA Keywords: Its charter provides that it may sue and be sued. Facts:  1967 NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which passed through Ventura‘s landholdings as said irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal has 2 outlets which provide private respondents‘ landholdings with water coming from said canal and at the same time serve to drain the excess water of said landholdings.  In 1975 Ventura filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages against petitioners NIA alleging that the outlets constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow of water from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the inundation of said landholdings causing the destruction of the planted crops and also prevented them from planting on their landholdings.

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 Lower court ruled in favor of the Ventura and ordered NIA to pay for damages of P35,000 and P5,000 attorney‘s fee; CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict? NO NIA ―is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No. 552 granted NIA the power ―to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.‖ Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case considering that private respondents‘ action is based on damages caused by the negligence of petitioners. 2. w/n NIA is not liable for tort since it did not act through a special agent as required under paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code? NIA is liable.  Paragph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that: ―The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.‖ Article 2176 of said Code provides that: ―Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is

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no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.‖ Thus, petitioners are liable for the damages caused by their negligent act.  In this case NIA constructed irrigation canals on the landholdings of the plaintiffs by scrapping away the surface of the landholdings to raise the embankment of the canal. As a result of the said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the plaintiffs were inundated with water. Although it cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of the NIA is a benefit to the Venturas, the delay of almost 7 years in installing the safety measures such as check gates, drainages, ditches and paddy drains has caused substantial damage to the annual harvest of the plaintiffs of about 30 cavans per hectare. The failure of NIA to provide the necessary safeguards to prevent the inundation of plaintiffs‘ landholdings is the proximate cause of the damages to the poor farmers.

PNR V. IAC G.R. NO. 70547 JANUARY 22, 1993 FACTS: The imputation of culpa on the part of herein petitioners as a result of the collision between its train, bound for Manila from La Union, with a Baliwag transit bus at the railroad crossing on the road going to Hagonoy, Bulacan on August l0, 1974, is the subject of the petition at bar directed against the judgment of affirmance rendered by respondent court.

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Upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes. ISSUE: WON the PNR may be sued. YES It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the train engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing which caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of herein private respondent were not able to move forward or to take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train engineer

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in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is definitely anathema to the conduct of a prudent person placed under the same set of perceived danger. Indeed: When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence commensurate with the surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the duty of the company to use such precautions, by warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him. Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place of the accident. All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he slackened his speed and applied the brake..Withal, these considerations were addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better position to assign weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and the bus

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driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court of origin. PNR also failed to install a semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train amounts to negligence. In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc, declared: The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under Act No. 1510, its charter. The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 provides: Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National Railways, being a factor for socio-economic development and growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure program of the government and as such shall remain in and under government ownership during its corporate existence. The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.

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The charter also provides: Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general powers: (a) To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.) Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834). The public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66). To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in transportation, Malong continued to hold that:

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. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized."

MALONG V. IAC L-49930, AUG. 7, 1985 FACTS: On Oct. 30, 1977 Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, fell and died from a PNR train. This happened because he had to sit near the door of the coach. This train was overloaded in view of the upcoming All Saints Day. His parents (Malong spouses) prayed in the CFI of Pangasinan that PNR be ordered to pay them damages. The court dismissed the complaint saying it had no jurisdiction because PNR, being a gov‘t instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State. Malong spouses appealed to the SC. PNR‘s charter provides the ff: SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - …The Philippine National Railways must be administered with the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and freight prices possible.

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"SEC. 4. General powers. - The Philippine National Railways shall have the following general powers: (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law." (This refers to sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.) Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any court. Issue: 1.WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or corporate capacity when it created PNR. 2.WON PNR, being a gov‘t instrumentality, is immune from suit. Decision: It acted in a corporate capacity. No, it is not immune from suit. Reasoning: SC held that the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its charter. The point is that when the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other private corporation. ―Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters

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partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the State.‖ In this case the State has impliedly given its consent to be sued by engaging into a business activity. Judgment: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 FACTS: The action in question was — upon complaint of the respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-organization an

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discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic performing government functions. The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners be sued.

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HELD: Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of executive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court. FAROLAN JR v. CTA G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993

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FACTS: On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation was declared through a customs broker under Entry No. 8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00 and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty. Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a
re-examination of the shipment. A report on the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls. Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $10.15 per yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously declared. Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic woven fabric with 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question.

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Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent then appealed the decision of the Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with the Commissioner of Customs. Commissioner affirmed the Collector of Customs. Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in accordance with law. On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition asking for the release of the questioned goods which this Court denied. In view of the fact that the goods were being exposed to the natural elements, release of the goods was ordered.. Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in bad condition. Consequently, private respondent demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards 13 it actually lost. TOPICAL ISSUE: whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards actually lost by private respondent. NO

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Re: forfeiture: Although it is admitted that indeed there was a misdeclaration, such violation, however, does not warrant forfeiture for such act was not committed directly by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee as set forth in Section 2530, paragraph m, subparagraph (3), and/or (4). Re: liability: The SC opined that the Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may not be sued without its consent," categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private respondent's claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fail.

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WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic imported by private respondent.

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE

INC.,

VS.

FACTS: Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons. ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is immune from suit. HELD: Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions".

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The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. DAR V. NLRC, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 1. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a contract for security services. However, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay as well as for damages before the Regional

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Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 2. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the judgment against their property. 3. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA didn‘t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize DAR‘s governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 4. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction. 5. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. 6. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

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ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable. YES HELD: 1. Generally, the State can‘t be sued without its consent. The State‘s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through general or special law. 2. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 3. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. 4. Here, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity 5. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character 6. The claims of private respondents arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims.

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Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied but the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 7. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 8. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.

NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION 
V.
JOSE TEODORO 1. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition, PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing

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and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. 2. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover the amount. 3. PAL countered with a third party complaint against the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus CAA was served with summons. The complaint alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed by Capitol Division. 4. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC has lots its juridical personality and because agency of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued. 5. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airport Corporation abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction, and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or upon government airfields, including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts of any kind and to grant concession rights.

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ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the defendant. 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC‘s creditors access to the courts of justice against the CAA is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was organized 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. 4. The CAA comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of

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government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. 5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state. 6. PAL‘s third party-complaint is premised on the assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.

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LARKINS V NLRC, FEBRUARY 23, 1995 1. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services was terminated. These employees were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor, JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own workers. 2. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air Force who were assigned to oversee the dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the employees and ordered reinstatement with full back pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. 3. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947. 4. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: ―In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed

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Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol‖ ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins HELD: No 1. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country. 2. The Agreement mandates that summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. The labor arbiter didn‘t follow the procedure and instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and NOT the Base Commander. 3. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.

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4. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons 5. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces inside the said military base. 6. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the RomualdezBosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint Labor

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Committee established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. 7. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, 
V.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, JUNE 10, 1988 1. Private respondents, American Citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval Station). They were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full time to part time. They instituted grievance proceedings which resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement plus backwages. 2. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau, commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing officer‘s report and asked for the rejection as Mr. Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed the records in public places. 3. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages against Sanders claiming that the allegations were libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private/personal capacity. Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that

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the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties thus the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over both petitioners - NO 1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. 2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn‘t have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. 3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. 4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed

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that the letter he had written (which included the libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. M 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. This act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the redesignation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. 6. Given the official character of the above-described letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the

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necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. 8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. 9. In the case at bar, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 11. Since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private

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respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base. WYLIE V RARANG [GR No. 74135 (May 28, 1992)] PONENTE: J. Gutierrez FACTS: Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the Merchandise Control Guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the ―Plan of the Day‖ a daily publication that featured among others, an ―action line inquiry‖. On Feb. 3, 1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain ―Auring‖ was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.) She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach

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her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country can‘t be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed. ISSUES 1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit. 2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortuous act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit? HELD/RATIO: 1. Yes, they are immune. Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even

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without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties. The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them – between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. 2. No.

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Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The

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petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent. REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 142476 (March 20, 2001)] Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez FACTS:  July 31, 1987: the Republic and PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other defendants.  On the strength of the complaint, PCGG issued several sequestration orders, one of which covers a Breguet Falcon 50 (aircraft). o The Falcon jet was leased by Unichem from Faysound Ltd. (a US company) o The lease lapsed in 1987, Unichem should have returned in to the owner, Faysound. o Cojuangco or any of the defendants has not claimed ownership or interest in the Falcon jet o Unichem has not been sequestered, only the shared of Cojuangco in Unichem have been sequestered  1987: the lease has been expired for 2 years. PCGG filed a Motion for Authority to Sell Sequestered Aircraft pending Litigation with the Sadiganbayan, because said aircraft was fast deteriorating o Sandiganbayan denied – saying that there was no justification, prima facie or otherwise, for the seizure of the jet.

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 





o PCGG filed petition for certiorari with the SC. SC issued a TRO directing the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from enforcing its assailed Resolution Relying on the TRO, PCGG sold the aircraft to Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc. SC dismissed PCGG‘s petition holding that "the decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited administrative powers of the PCGGbut requires the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can grant or withhold the same in the exercise of sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence before it." FAYSOUND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF ARKANSAN AN ACTION TO RECOVER THE FALCON JET FROM FULLER AIRCRAFT. o The District Court ordered that the title to the Falcon jet be returned by Fuller to Faysound o Fuller sued the Republic and PCGG for breach of warranty and damages  a decision was rendered against the Republic and PCGG ordering them to pay Fuller the amount of $13,945,443.01 the PCGG, in order to settle the money judgment against it, entered into an "Agreement"6with Fuller Aircraft providing, among others, that the Republic of the Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal monthly installments, beginning November 15, 1996 and ending October 15, 1997 in settlement

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of Fuller Aircraft's claim which, per decision of the Texas Court, amounts to $14,928,457.29.  The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an ExParte Motion to Withdraw the amount previously deposited with the PNB for the account of the Sandiganbayan in trust for the beneficial owner and that PNB be immediately directed to release the funds on deposit to the Bureau of Treasury for transmission to Walter Fuller Sales, Inc., with the above Agreement and decisions of the US Federal Courts o Sandiganbayan denied the motion saying:  (a) it does not appear from the records that the person lawfully entitled to the escrow deposit has been determined;  (b) the motion contravenes the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan requiring the PCGG to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the sequestered aircraft with the PNB; and  (c) although the records disclose two authenticated copies of foreign judgments, there is no indication that copies of the deed of sale of the aircraft and the compromise agreement have been duly authenticated. o MR by PCGG was denied  In the present petition: Republic contends that respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its

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discretion when it denied PCGG'S motion to release the funds deposited in escrow with the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for transmission to Fuller Aircraft. o The Sandiganbayan failed to file a comment on the instant petition. Thus, this Court has no way of determining why it failed to resolve in more than one decade who is lawfully entitled to the escrow deposit ISSUE/S: WON Republic is liable for ―Agreement‖ with Fuller Aircraft. NO. HELD/RATIO: As shown by the records, Faysound Ltd. is the owner of the Falcon jet. In fact, this is admitted by petitioner Republic itself. As mentioned earlier, Cojuangco or any of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 has no interest in it. Clearly, this aircraft was erroneously sequestered. It is thus patently illegal for the PCGG to sell it to Fuller Aircraft. Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, we rule that petitioner Republic cannot be held liable under the "Agreement." It must be stressed that petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without the approval of the Sandiganbayan.

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Moreover, inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it follows that the "Agreement" between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft is likewise a nullity. Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound by the terms of the said "Agreement" and thus, there can be no cause of action against it. In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly liable if they did not act in good faith and within the scope of their authority in the performance of their official duties. Likewise, in Director of Bureau of Communications vs. Aligaen, this Court held that unauthorized acts by its government officials or officers are not acts of the State. Petitioner must, therefore, take immediate appropriate action against the PCGG personnel involved in the unauthorized sale of the aircraft. US v REYES [GR No. 79253 (March 1, 1993) Ponente: J. Davide Jr. FACTS: • Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in QC. She‘s married to Edgardo, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.

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• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford‘s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. • Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can‘t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford‘s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. • Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. • Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. • May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign

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sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. • July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. • July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford‘s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it‘s improper, unlawful & highlydiscriminatory and beyond Bradford‘s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can‘t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford‘s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. • RTC granted Montoya‘s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of

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attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya‘s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. • Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts‘ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the case is under the RTC‘s jurisdiction – YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court‘s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to

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intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC‘s jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford‘s motion to dismiss. – NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. – NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It‘s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State

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authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. – NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124 Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9

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Facts:  This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.)  Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages.  President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizen‘s Mendiola Commission and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for damages by the petitioners.  February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights. Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit.

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Held: No Ratio:  Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the government.  Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.  Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.  The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are o When the Republic is sued by name

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o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.  The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers. The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.

LANSANG vs. CA FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.

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With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued

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in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents‘ complaint against petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without its consent. 2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner‘s act of terminating respondent GABI‘s concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty. Held: 1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are

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not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. 2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary.

SAYSON V. SINGZON DECEMBER 19, 1973 FACTS: In January, 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also

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approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted. After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to respondent Singson. Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers. Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with the SC. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in issuing the mandamus sought for by respondent HELD/RATIO: Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary

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action for specific performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. What respondent should have done was to file his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed

MINISTERIO V. CEBU AUGUST 31, 1971 FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters, which the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of and used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that demanded either payment or return of the property to which defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General did not reply. Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one against the government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it was a suit against the government. It was also held that

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although the suit was filed in the name of the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they were filed against them in their official capacity and thus the action is one against the National Government. Thus this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit against the National Government HELD/RATIO: YES, The government is immune from suit without its consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. However, it is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V NLRC NOVEMBER 11, 1993 FACTS: In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was made with the same conditions except for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards. In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. This decision became final and executor. The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of execution against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against the National Government which requires its consent

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HELD/RATIO: No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that the State may not be sued without its consent. However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls under the purview of Act no. 3083 provided that the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. G.R. NO. 90478, NOVEMBER 21, 1991 REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: The PCGG filed a case for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago etc.

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Tantoco and party however questioned the case filed against them. The Sandiganbayn admitted their Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents. This was objected to by the PCGG. However, after hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents), and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff. Thus the present petition for certiorari. The PCGG contends that none none of its members may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance," since it is covered by the State‘s immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the PCGG is covered under State immunity? HELD: NO, they had impliedly waived it by instituting the case, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like compulsion. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But

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it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or nongovernmental capacity, is unacceptable. It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner

G.R. NOS. L-71998-99 JUNE 2, 1993 DE LOS SANTOS V. IAC FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which they alleged to have been misappropriated without their knowledge or consent by Lorenzo Cadiente, who constructed a road and a creek. Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would "serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs.

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1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the construction. An action for damages was also filed. The trial court ruled that since the construction was a project by Minister of Public Works, the respondents cannot be sued without the consent of the State. ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? HELD: NO, it had impliedly given his consent. Quoting MInisterio v CFI: ―The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the

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jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. In this case, respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no expropriation proceedings were initiated before construction of the projects began Public respondents' belief that the property involved is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners' property, especially since it was under the Torrens system in Santos‘ name. A public infrastructure loses its laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private rights are disregarded Quoting Republic v Sandiganbayan, It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner. G.R. NO. 131544, MARCH 16, 2001 EPG CONSTRUCTION V. SECRETARY VIGILAR FACTS: Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose,

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the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,2 where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units. By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein petitioners for the construction of the housing units. Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit. Due to the verbal assurance of the DPWH Undersecretary, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions"4 for the completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for the "additional constructions‖ While petitioners completed these agreements, even the verbal one, the Government failed and afterwards refused to compensate them arguing that the contracts were null and void due to the absence of proper appropriation of public funds. The government further argues that they are covered by State‘s immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON respondents are covered by State immunity? HELD: NO The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be

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duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — for construction done on the public works housing project. In this case, although the verbal contracts are indeed null and void due to lack of proper appropriation of public funds, the records reveal that the verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas led petitioners-contractors to undertake thecompletion of the government housing project, despite the absence of covering appropriations. On the principle of quantum merui, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.

G.R. NO. L-48214, DECEMBER 19, 1978 SANTIAGO V. GOVT OF PHIL FACTS: Ildefonso Santiago filed an action against the Government represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his spouse in with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] which should have been

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constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. That led him to conclude that under the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. The lower court however dismissed the case under the rule that ―the state cannot be sued without its consent.‖ ISSUE:

WON

the

state

is

immune

from

suit?

HELD: NO While the court concedes that the general rule is for a government body to be immune from suit and a party‘s remedy would therefore be to file a claim with such general office, this case falls under an exception. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the conditions under which it received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or governmental agency, is to be condemned. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being presumed. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It can be implied. The decision goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of

the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to acceptance.

GR. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916 MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF PHIL ISLANDS FACTS: Merritt was riding on his motorcycle when he was hit by a General Hospital ambulance causing extensive injury. He therefore filed a case for tort against the Government. The Government however claims immunity from suit. ISSUE: WON the government is immune from suit? HELD: NO

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The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim Under CC1903(5). In this case, since the chauffeur of the ambulance was not a special agent, the Government cannot be held liable without its consent.

REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: WON the respondent‘s decision is valid RULING: No.

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The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.

FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL

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FACTS: On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased from the Shipping Administration a boat described as MV/FS 197 for the sum of P200,000.00, with a down payment of P50,000,00. To secure payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, a mortgage was constituted on the vessel The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the possession of the vessel in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said intervention, claiming to have a better right to the possession of the vessel by reason of a valid and subsisting contract in its favor, and of its right of retention, in view of the expenses it had incurred for the repair of the said vessel. As counterclaim, defendant demanded of the intervenor to comply with the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel pursuant to the provisions of the charter contract. ISSUE: Can the counterclaim?

Government

be

sued

in a YES

HELD: The trial court dismissed the defendants counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, among others, that the state is immune from suit. On appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect

waived

its

right

to

non-suability.

BROWNELL V. LIM FACTS: The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of Japan For which reason the said Alien Property Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2. On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien Property Custodian) issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the United States) executed two formal agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation to the property transferred, for all such costs and expenses of administration.

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On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, The claimant, however, took no appeal to the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the committee became final On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. Plaintiff‘s action was dismissed. ISSUE: Can the plaintiff claim for damages? NO HELD: The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with the consent of said government. Plaintiff argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the

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Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability, but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against any party in the answer in intervention it filed

US VS. RUIZ FACTS: Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Said company was requested by telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company, and from which it complied. Later, the United States, through its agent, informed said company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the project for the poorly completed projects it awarded to third parties. The company sued petitioner for specific performance and if no longer possible, for damages. It also asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with others. The United States entered a special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of the defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for the cause of

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action asserted in the complaint. U.S. filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The Trial Court denied the motion and issued a writ. ISSUE: Whether

United

States

may

be

sued

HELD: No. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual can be thus deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the U.S. and the Philippines, undisputed a function of the Government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

JUSMAG V. NLRC FACTS: Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. His services were terminated

allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was also advised that he was under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave. On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG ISSUE:

Can

JUSMAG

be

sued?

NO

HELD: It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot not prosper.

INDONESIA V. VINZON FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador

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Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent cites various circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners‘ alleged dissatisfaction over respondent‘s services Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a partydefendant in the Philippines. ISSUE: Can respondent sue Republic Of Indonesia? NO HELD: There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with

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private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

G.R. NO. 76607, FEBRUARY 26, 1990 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES VS. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO Note: These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States filed motions to dismiss these cases. CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Private respondents who have been concessionaires inside Clark for years submitted their bids. The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a

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suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complained of and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit against the United States without its consent.

CASE#2: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It was found during investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and referred the case to a board of arbitrators, who found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of the PACAF Clark Air Force Base effected his dismissal. Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio. Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in effect against the United States, which had not given its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W the cases should be dismissed on the ground of immunity from suit - YES.

CASE#3: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and that they were

1. General Principles: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under the constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." In the case of the United States of America, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is

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expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows: It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power and authority within the bases which are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate for their control. It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer on the United States of America a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not

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involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. 2. However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individuallynamed petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States government should be liable for their torts. But the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent. Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in

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the case at bar. No less important, the said provision appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts. 3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. 4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by

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private person's. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee. Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.

G.R. NO. L-26400,, FEBRUARY 29, 1972 VICTORIA AMIGABLE VS.
NICOLAS CUENCA, AS COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES NATURE: appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing Amigable's complaint. FACTS: 1. Victoria Amigable owns a lot in Cebu City shown by a TCT No. T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds on February 1, 1924. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Note: these avenues were already existing in 1921.

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2. March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The Auditor General disallowed it. 3. February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 sqm of land. 4. July 29, 1959 - the court held that that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's money claim against the government; nor did it have jurisdiction over the claim for moral damages because the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government under the facts of the case - YES. Case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation 1. Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu - where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.

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It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. 2. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.

G.R. NO. 129406, MARCH 6, 2006 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO NATURE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan FACTS: 1. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, including 227 shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI). 2. So the PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, a resolution assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. The 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent (bec. it could not pay

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the membership due) and so it had to be disposed of in an auction sale. 3. Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages that PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Roberto S. Benedicto. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement, wherein Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, impliedly recognizing that the shares of stock are not ill-gotten. 4. Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution directing PCGG to deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value. PCGG failed to comply. ISSUE: W Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof - NO. 1. PCGG, as a receiver of the sequestered 227 shares, has the function to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt. 2. (relevant part) In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix

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monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic‘s act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedicto‘s prayers in the same case. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach

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of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.

G.R. NO. 104269, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. Nature: petition for certiorari to nullify the decision of NLRC 5th Division FACTS: 1. Apr 1, 1989 - DAR entered into a contract for security services with Sultan Security Agency. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, etc. against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 2. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims. The decision became final and executory. 3. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. 4. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of DAR. These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. 5. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with NLRC CDO, alleging that the writ issued was

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effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 6. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. DAR now filed a petition for certiorari. It argues: (1) that NLRC cannot assume jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit; (2) NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the nonsuability of the State. ISSUE: W DAR waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency - NO. Petiiton for Certiorari granted. 1. The rule that "the State may not be sued without its consent," is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 2. The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have

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divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 3. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. 4. But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.. . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. 5. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 6. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party

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an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.

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G.R. NO. L-30671, NOVEMBER 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF CEBU, BRANCH I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO
UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION NATURE: certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, declaring final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 1. July 3, 1961 - in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R, a decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the Republic for the amount of P1,712,396.40. 2. June 24, 1969 - Honorable Guillermo P.
Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3,
1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province,
Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 3. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein) served
notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the ―monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits

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sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said
Writ of Execution‖ 4. The funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with
the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or]
their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by
the AFP Controller,…" ISSUE: W the garnishment of the AFP funds were proper - NO. 1. The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It
is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. 2. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged. 3. Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: ―The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant‘s action ‗only up to the

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completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution‘ and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.‖ 4. The above applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. 5. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong
to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to
a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids
it.

CITY OF CALOOCAN V. ALLARDE FACTS  Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition.  The CFI declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and

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 







the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. The City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city.

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ISSUE: WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim - YES RATIO:  Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.  The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.

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 In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial process. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance 0134, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds

CITY OF CALOOCAN V ALLARDE All government funds deposited with any official depositary bank of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instruemntalties remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In this case, Caloocan had already approved and passed the ordinance and allocated money for respondent Santiago‘s back salaries plus interest. The case fell squarely within the exception and the amount may therefore be garnished. FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CF I in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her backwages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City

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appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer can‘t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago‘s claim. HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to

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subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person nor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiago‘s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.

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MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  In lieu of an expropriation proceeding filed, petitioner Municipality of Makati opened a bank account with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, pursuant to the provisions of PD. 42.  After due hearing, the court fixed the amount of the property and ordered petitioner to pay such amount minus the advanced payments it has made.  After this decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued and a Notice of Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. o However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. o Private respondent then filed a motion praying for the court to order the bank to deliver to the sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.  While these motions are pending, a ―Manifestation‖ was filed, informing the court that private respondent was no longer the owner of the subject property and that ownership to this has been transferred to Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.  A compromise agreement was made between private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank, Inc., which was then approved by the court. The court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of

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P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property, from the garnished account of petitioner but the bank failed to comply as it was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling it to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered.  As the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner raised for the first time that it had two accounts with PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, and the other is for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government ISSUE: WON the balance of the appraised value of the subject property may be levied upon the second account of petitioner municipality - YES RATIO:  Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. o More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. o Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.  The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council

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of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in the said account.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI V COURT OF APPEALS Where the municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and disbursement of municipal funds. FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the

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proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution. HELD: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are already

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enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.

PACIFIC PRODUCTS V ONG By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a due from the defendant. The debtor-stranger becomes a forced intervenor; when served with the writ of attachment, he becomes a party to the action. Money in the hands of government agency (engaged in governmental functions), even if due to a third party, is not liable to creditors of the third party through garnishment. To allow this would be to allow a suit against the State without its consent. FACTS: PPI filed a case against Labrador; the Sheriff was ordered to attach Labrador‘s properties. In the mean time, BML Trading won a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications worth 10,500 for copper sulfate. This was garnished by the Sheriff as Labrador was doing business under the name BML Trading. BML however assigned its rights to Ong as Ong advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate. He filed a third party claim. ISSUE: Could the money payable to BML be garnished even if it was still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications? HELD:

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No. The notice of garnishment was made pursuant to an order of attachment against Labrador‘s property. By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor. The Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the Government of the Philippine Islands, when served with the writ of attachment, thus become party to the action. It becomes a suit against the state without their consent. In this case, immunity from suit was not waived because the Bureau entered into a business transaction with BML. The Bureau is a service bureau, not engaged in business. It further was never proved that Labrador was doing business under the name BML trading. Petition dismissed. PACIFIC PRODUCTS V. ONG FACTS:  Petitioner Pacific Products filed an action for sum of money against Hilarion Labrador, doing business under the name and style of BML Trading and Supply. A court order was issued directing the Sheriff of Manila to attach the properties of the latter.  BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of bluestone copper sulfate worth P10,500.00. Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the compound.

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 Before the Bureau could release the payment to BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished P9,111.70 out of the P10,500.00.  Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its tights over the P10,500.00 to respondent, Vicente Ong. o It was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate and the parties agreed that the profits will be shared by BML Trading and Vicente Ong on a 40-60 percent basis. It was also their agreement that BML Trading will waive its share in the net profits which may be realized from the transaction should it fail to secure the release of the payment.  Pacific learned about the assignment only when a copy of the third party claim filed by Ong with the Office of the Sheriff of Manila was served on them.  H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70. The corresponding writ of execution was issued and the Sheriff of Manila further garnished Pl,181.65 of the P10,500.00 in the possession of the Bureau.  Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff.  Ong filed an action for damages against Macario Ofilada in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the Pacific Products, and the First Quezon City Insurance.  RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed the decision. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari filed by Pacific.

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ISSUE: WON the garnishment was illegal and void – YES. Petition denied. RATIO:  It is noted that the notice of garnishment served upon the Bureau of Telecommunications was made pursuant to an order of attachment issued by the trial court in the case for sum of money against Labrador. At the time of such service, the amount against which the notice was issued was still in the possession and control of the Bureau. o Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was waived when the Bureau entered into a business transaction with BML Trading since in this jurisdiction, it is "a well established doctrine that when the Government engages in business, it abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and ascends to the level of a citizen". o This contention is not correct. Suability would follow only if the contract entered into by the government is in the exercise of a proprietary as distinguished from a governmental function. The Bureau is a service bureau and is not engaged in business.  By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor – a party to the action upon service of the writ of attachment. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to Subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that

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moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it remains in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.

FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN FACTS:  In an earlier decision, National Irrigation Administration (NIA) was declared liable for the injuries, resulting in the death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA‘s driver employee Hugo Garcia. The Court held that NIA is a government agency performing proprietary functions.  NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver - YES HELD:  The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or

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ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.  The National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. o NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "governmentfunction" corporation. o NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. o NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

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FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government; it is a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Thus, it may be held liable for damages caused by the negligent act of its river who was not a special agent. FACTS: A pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation Administration driven officially of Hugo Garcia bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and Resituto Deligo. Fontanilla died as a result of his injuries. Fontanilla‘s parents sued Nia for damages. The trial court directed NIA to pay damages and actual expenses.

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The NIA is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions by express provision of its charter. Given the negligence in the supervision of the driver as he was travelling at a high speed, NIA is directed to pay damages. Petition granted.

ISSUE: Could the award for moral damages be awarded? HELD: Yes. The solicitor general argues that Garcia was a regular driver, not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability should not be borne by the government agency, but by Garcia himself. The liability of the state has two aspects: its public or governmental aspects were it is liable for the tortuous acts of special agent only and its private or business aspects where it becomes liable as ordinary employer.

CHAPTER IV: FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE QUEZON CITY V ERICTA FACTS:  Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 provides that: ―At least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of

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Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.‖.  For years, that section of the Ordinance was not enforced but 7 years after enactment, the City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer to stop any further selling of lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers.  Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Sec. 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is a valid exercise of police power NO HELD:  Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.  Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.  The police power of Quezon City is defined as ―To make such further ordinance and regulations not

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repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe  The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. o The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Sec. 13 ―Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled‖. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. o It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. o Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

ICHONG V HERNANDEZ FACTS:

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 Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business.  Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional. o He alleges that the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines, specifically the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China. ISSUE: WON RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power – YES

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RATIO:  Charter of the United Nations imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations o This can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.  All that the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China guarantees is the equality of treatment to Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." o The nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. o Even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

LUTZ V ARANETA

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FACTS:  Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, was enacted due to the threat to the sugar industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar. It provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured, to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the US market.  Walter Lutz, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied.  CFI dismissed the action, hence this appeal. ISSUE: WON the tax levied under CA 567 is unconstitutional – NO RATIO:  The tax provided for in CA 567 is not a pure exercise of the taxing power. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.

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Hence, the said objectives of CA 567 are of public concern and CA 567 is therefore constitutional.  Even from the standpoint that CA 567 is a pure tax measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar production, utilization of byproducts and solution of allied problems, as well as to the improvements of living and working conditions in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such money being channeled directly to private persons, constitutes expenditure of tax money for private purposes.

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Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. o 3 - a petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. o 4 – a petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.  The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural lands. ISSUE: WON the aforementioned legal measures are constitutional - YES

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM FACTS:  This case (―land for the landless‖) is a consolidation of several cases because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of specific laws. o 1 – a petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. The tenants were declared as full owners by EO 228 and as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s power. o 2 – a petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.

RATIO:  There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. o To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under

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the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. o The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was a valid exercise of police power and eminent domain. o The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. o RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer.

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 A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. The subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

ORTIGAS & CO. V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:  Petitioner Ortigas & Co. sold to a parcel of land in Greenhills Subdivision IV to Emilia Hermoso. Conditions for the sale include restrictions on the use of the land for the construction of residential housing only and the non-erection of signs and billboards for advertisement purposes. Such conditions were annotated on the back of the title of the property.  Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty and constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.  Petitioner filed a complaint against Hermoso, seeking the demolition of the commercial structure. The complaint was later amended to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and impleaded Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso Realty, the latter having 10% interest in the lot.  The trial court issued the writ of preliminary injunction, but the appellate court reversed the decision upon Mathay‘s special civil action for

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certiorari, claiming that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power. ISSUE: WON the zoning ordinance can be read into the contract as a valid exercise of police power - YES

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RATIO:  The Court observed that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981.  Laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. o A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.  But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. o Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract.

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PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION V DE GUZMAN FACTS:  The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine that passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine. Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.  Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (BioChem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OBGyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.  The Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the NBI to investigate. The NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees

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leads to the conclusion that they gained early access to the test questions.  A statistical analysis concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc."  The respondents filed a special civil action for mandamus to compel the petitioners to proceed with their oath taking ceremony. The RTC decided in their favor and the CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus may lie - NO RATIO:  The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.  The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in

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the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine.  To be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will.

CHAVEZ V ROMULO FACTS:  President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the

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issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).  Acting on President Arroyo‘s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the ―Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence‖  Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading the public respondents. ISSUE: WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is a valid exercise of police power – YES RATIO:  Even if petitioner‘s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State‘s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.  The test for determining the validity of a measure is: o The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power; and o The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.  It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and

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order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, the President deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.  The assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORPORATION V BALITE PORTAL MINING FACTS:  Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area.  Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act which established a Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)

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 





under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and control. A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed with the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed as RED Mines Case. While the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation, which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau accepted and registered the integrated MPSA application of petitioner and thereafter, several cases were filed. Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The panel subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was consolidated with the cases. The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and e xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus praying for the nullification of MO 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed

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the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR. ISSUE: WON MO 97-03 impairs the petitioner‘s rights under EP 133 – NO RATIO:  The challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt ―direct state utilization‖ as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Consequently, the petition was premature. The said memorandum order did not impose any obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties to the dispute.  With respect to the alleged ―vested rights‖ claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. Until a positive pronouncement is made in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.  Under no circumstances may petitioner‘s rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and utilization of the

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country‘s natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the demands of the general welfare

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. DANTE O. GARIN, RESPONDENT. FACTS:  Atty. Dante Garin‘s driver‘s license was confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking along Gandara St.. He was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR), requiring him to appear before the MMDA Traffic Operations Center for appropriate action within 48 hours.  Garin claims: 1. In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f) of RA No. 7924 (MMDA‘s charter), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution; 2. the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other

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penalties on erring motorists. Therefore, MMDA has no authority to confiscate licenses.  MMDA: 1. a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 2. Revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation. He has 3 options: 1. Voluntaryily pay, file a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, 3. Request referral of TVR to Public Prosecutor.  Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations

HELD: 1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.  a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements

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The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.  Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways…e Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles.‖ 2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.  In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.  There is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature . here is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.  Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend

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or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. 3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.  Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations…  Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded – and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. V. DSWD FACTS: R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act) was signed into law in 2004. Under Section 4(a), senior citizens are entitled to a grant of 20% discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all

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establishments. The establishment may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.  Department Of Finance Director Lourdes Recente clarified the meaning of tax deduction: Under the old Senior Citizens Act, the grant was in the form of a tax credit, which necessitates that prior payments of taxes have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. In the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the grant is in the form of a tax deduction, the establishment concerned is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to senior citizens. While in the former scheme government shoulders 100% of the discount, in the current scheme government forgoes revenue equivalent to 32% (marginal tax rate) of 20% discounts granted. Establishments thus shoulder some of the burden.  A.O. No. 171 was then issued by the DOH, providing the grant of 20% discount in the purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. This was later expanded by A.O. 177 to both prescription and non-prescription medicines whether branded or generic.  Carlos SuperDrug asserts that Sec. 4(a) of RA 9257 is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.

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Held:  Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross income and results in a lower taxable income.  Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.  Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.  However, the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its

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basis in the Constitution (Article XV, Section 4; Article XIII, Section 11)  To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction.  The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. ―Police power‖ as been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.‖ It is ―[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.‖  Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good

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CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO); RUBEN, N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L. ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO B. ABAS; AND REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS; ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; AND VICENTE LUKBAN, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: - CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree. As of March 1995, its Officers (Pres  treas) were Barrameda, Espiritu, Enero and Abas, respectively. - In May 1995, CANONECO Directors Obias, Ochoa, Pascua and Ilan held a special meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the meeting 5 showed that President Ruben Barrameda, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer Marcelito Abas were absent despite the fact that he had called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu for the holding thereof, the three chose not to appear. - In that meeting, those present declared all positions in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold elections, which resulted in the present directors‘ being elected as the new officers. - Barrameda, et al challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by filing with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers.

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The CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners and declared the election null and void.  in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and with the active participation of some officials of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the group of Norberto Ochoa, et al forcibly took possession of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties as officers .  Fortunately, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate issued by the CDA, the petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to perform their respective functions.  However, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO, ―to efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity‖ The present Board may be called upon to render advisory services.  Petitioners: 1.) There is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to lake over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. The exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the power to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. 2.) Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from their positions as members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President does not have the authority

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to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of directors of a private enterprise including electric cooperatives ISSUE: May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative? HELD: petition is impressed with merit.  Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said laws. Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of directors and to remove them for cause. Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily. Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the "suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors and the officers thereof.  Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is explicit on how the dispute should be resolved: ―be settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms…‖Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.‖

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 Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory that the CDA is an agency under its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the President could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA  Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. 16 Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take over the internal management of a cooperative.  Furthermore, It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-

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interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.

G.R. NO. 135962, MARCH 27, 2000 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. FACTS:  Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) association of homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.  MMDA notified BAVA that pursuant to MMDA‘s mandate to rarionalize the use of Metro Manila‘s roads, Neptune St. would be opened to vehicular traffic. Thus, it requests BAVA to open the points of entry and exit on that street. It also informed BAVA that the perimeter wall separating Neptune and Kalayaan ave, a public road, would be demolished.  BAVA instituted a case for injunction, asserting that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of a private road without a municipal ordinance.  MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. There is no need for the City of Makati

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to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. HELD: Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use

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planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: (b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations,infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila"  The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. Thee powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.  its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself: ―The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.―

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 Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.

ERNESTO FRANCISCO V. BAYANI FERNANDO IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MMDA FACTS: Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (―petitioner‖), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, an original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition

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and Mandamus to enjoin the MMDA from implementing its ―wet flag scheme‖ because: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA‘s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates ―pedestrian rights‖ as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards.  Fernando: dismiss because of petitioner‘s lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, contendeds that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking.  Francisco: the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of ―paramount and transcendental importance.‖ HELD: Case dismissed. 1. No standing  no showing of direct injury; no showing of illegal expenditure of money; no showing of clear statutory or constitutional violation to merit transcendental importance 2. Violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts ―petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court‘s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.‖

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3. Flag scheme has legal basis  All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA‘s jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents‘ implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities.  Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag Scheme. G.R. NO. 170656 MMDA V. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. G.R. NO. 170657 HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL V. MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC.

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FACTS: - Pursuant to MMDA‘s recommendation to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along Metro Manila‘s thoroughfares, and providing instead ,ass transport terminal facilities, President Arroyo issued E.O. 179, designating MMDA as the implementing Agency for the project. - Viron Transportation Co. filed a petition for declaratory relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a Circular closing all bus terminals in Metro Manila. Viron asserts that theMMDA‘s authority to regulate traffic does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property. -Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a TRO. - MMDA asserts: there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that

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the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons. HELD: The MMDA‘s Motion for Reconsideration must fail 1. There is a justiciable controversy  The E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA‘s plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities‖ Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.  a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the Project. 2. EO 179 involves 3rd persons  Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would

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mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. 3. EO 179 is ultra vires.  E.O. No. 125,which former President Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.  it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar.  By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.  In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924 (MMDA‘s charter), which merely grants MMDA with planning, monitoring, coordinating functions for the delivery of metro-wide services, including transportation and traffic management.  In the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air, it was ruled that the MMDA has no legislative, police power. Hence, it has no authority to close terminals, and no authority to implement the project.

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 Even if it had police power, the test for valid police power is: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.  the means employed in this case (closing terminals), as ruled in Lucena v JAC Liner, constitutes undue taking of private property and creates monopolies. It thus failed to go for the less intrusive means.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO AND ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION V. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION FACTS: - The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. All models older that 6 years are ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered and operated as taxis. - Pursuant to the Circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation issued an implementing Circular stating: all taxi units with year models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any further dropping order from the BOT. taxi units within the

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National Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. - Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators who are grantees of CPC to operate taxicabs within Manila, filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation - Petitioners claim: 1.) they were denied procedural due process as they were not called upon to submit position papers nor summoned to attend any conference as regards the issuance of the BOT Circular, 2.) fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of registration. Their right to substantive due process is thereby violated, 3.) their right to equal protection of the law is violated because the Circular is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. ISSUES: 1. W/N BOT violated petitioners‘ right to Procedural and Substantive Due process. 2. W/N BOT violated petitioners‘ right to equal protection of the law. HELD: 1. No, it is not violated.

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 P.D. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.  it provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: that it ―may also can conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.‖  it is clear from the provision, however, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process.  As regards substantive due process argument, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. 2. No, it is not violated.

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 it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in the Circular, which states: ―its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board.‖  The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.  the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. CJ Fernando: "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded"  In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinctions.

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G.R. NO. 115044 JANUARY 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF MANILA, AND THE CITY OF MANILA V. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, AS JUDGE, BRANCH 40, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA AND ASSOCIATED CORPORATION G.R. NO. 117263 JANUARY 27, 1995 TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. AND DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA V. HON. VETINO REYES AND ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FACTS: Background ~  Charter of the City of Manila (1949): ―The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers…To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on…jai-alai…as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.  in 1951, EO 392 transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board.  in 1953, RA 954 criminalized the playing of jai-alai by persons without a LEGISLATIVE franchise.  in 1971, Municipal Board of Manila nevertheless passed Ordinance no 7065, authorizing the mayor to permit the ADC to establish and operate a Jai-alai in Manila.  in 1975, Marcos issued PD 771, revoking all powers of local government to grant franchises for jai-alai and other forms of gambling. That same year, PD 810 granted the Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement

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Corporation A Franchise To Operate a Jai Alai in Manila. This franchise was cancelled by Aquino‘s EO 169. The case~ - In March-April 1974, Judge Pacquing of RTC Manila issued a series of orders ordering Mayor Alfredo Lim to issue a permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC), allowing it to ―operate the jai-alai‖, pursuant to Manila Ordinance No. 7065. - Subsequently, Executive Secretary Guingona issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or to withdraw such grant of authority, to ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved: 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments is unconstitutional. 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity. 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation in view of executive Order No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai. - ADC then filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, mandamus against Guingona and Sumulong seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority

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that had earlier been granted to ADC. This was granted by Judge Reyes. ISSUES: 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper 2. whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai 3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction HELD: 1. Yes, it is proper  Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim be proven to be true."  the resulting injustice and injury in this case, should the national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-in favor of ADC. The national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct

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jai-alai operations is void since Republic Act No. 954, approved very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.  On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses  it will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy  on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents 2. No, it does not.  Petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act

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No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress.  ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board  neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the City of Manila and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise".  What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Even this power to regulate was removed from local governments and transferred to the GAB in 1951. It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law

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 It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.  There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. 3. yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.  Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. COURT OF APPEALS AND SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION FACTS: - Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly

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into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. - The order was based on National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC") and DENR reports which found that Solar textile was bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Solar‘s Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Result of the analyses of the sample taken showed that the wastewater is highly pollutive - Solar went to the RTC QC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, asserting that its right to due process was violated. Under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." The reprots made no finding of such a threat. - Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC. the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence - RTC dismissed the petition, saying that appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate

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temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. CA reversed the RTC order. ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board. HELD: The Board is sustained.  Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders: (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."  it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."  Inspections reports show that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the Board.  Also, previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner,

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seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.  Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.  Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of suchex parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeal

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YNOT V. IAC (1987) FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos. The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef. ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process RULING: The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an ―iron rule.‖ Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an

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outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. The Court opined that they do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumscribed by simply killing the animal. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the

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owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the supersedeas bond is cancelled.

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JMM PROMOTION V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist‘s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or

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was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to ―high risk‖ destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC (1995) FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a nonprofit organization of newspaper and magazine

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publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional HELD: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate ―Comelec space‖ amounts to ―taking‖ of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

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LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V. JAC LINER (2005) FACTS: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and outof-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means HELD: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and

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not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA (1983)

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FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus

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with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.‖

ISSUE: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled‘. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.

HELD: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. The police power of Quezon City is defined in subsection 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: ―To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper

Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

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occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938 DE LA CRUZ V. PARAS (1983) FACTS: De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads ―AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS‖. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

SOLICITOR GENERAL V. MMA FACTS: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was

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permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of driver‘s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final and executory. Nothwithstanding the Gonong decision, still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of driver‘s licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself ―to detach license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.‖On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of such ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid exercise of delegated power to local government acting as agents of the national legislature? HELD: No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality

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of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all lawenforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver‘s licenses for traffic violations within the said area. For a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under consideration did not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver‘s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their owns ources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail

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against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE (1994)

RATIO: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.O n the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

There is a requirement, however, that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannotb e superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatt he local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cann otbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. • The morality of gambling is not prohibited by the constitution. Such discretion is given to the legislature. In this case, PD 1869 allows the existence of legal forms of gambling. The will of the national legislature cannot be subservient to local ordinances. Ordinances must conform to the following requirements for it to be

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considered valid: o Must not contravene the constitution o Must not be unfair or oppressive o Must not be partial or discriminatory o Must not prohibit but it may regulate o Must be general and consistent with public policy o Must not be unreasonable Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged d ecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

CITY OF MANILA V. LAGUIO (2005)

ISSUES: W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law

FACTS: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

HELD: The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every house,

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building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V CA DARAB V CA FACTS:

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 1964- Lakeview Development Corp. bought a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite. LDC was succeeded by Credito Asiatico Inc. LDC/CAI undertook to develop the property into a residential and industrial estate thus it applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona for an ordinance approving the zoning and subdivision of the property,  1976- Kapasiyahang Bilang 30 was approved granting the application and affirming the project. A consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of Lands. The housing project was registered with the National Housing Authority and was granted a locational clearance from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development subject to certain conditions.  1980- the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite declared certain areas including the subject land as industrial areas.  1987- while developing a phase of the property, a complaint for damages with TRO and PI were filed against CAI in the RTC of Cavite. The plaintiffs therein alleged that they were the actual tillers of the land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for the conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the aforesaid property from agricultural to residential and the same was granted by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform but that the parties had earlier agreed that the plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding such agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered actual damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged

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that the bulldozing was done without any permit from the concerned public authorities.  CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement whereby CAI donated parcels of land in consideration of the execution of deeds of quitclaims and waivers.  Despite the civil case, CAI went on with its project. Meantime, the remaining plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement with CAI in which the latter would execute Deeds of Donation in exchange for their quitclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.  1991- TC granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.  However, the project was again opposed by another group of farmers claiming that since 1961, they had been occupying a parcel of public agricultural land. They tilled the said agricultural lands and planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit trees and raised small livestock for daily survival. The petitioners requested that the DAR order an official survey of the aforesaid agricultural lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with Kalipunan ng Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA).  1994- Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President of PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of a portion of the CAI property under Rep. Act No. 6657.  The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmerstenants, filed a complaint for Maintenance of

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Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and PI before the DAR Adjudication Board Reg. IV against CAI et al.  DARAB granted the TRO.  CAI admitted that the CAI was the registered owner of the property, but specifically denied that the plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as tenantsoccupants of the aforesaid property since 1961. They asserted that the CAI did not consent to the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of the plaintiffs‘ houses. They further averred that the CAI had entered into a compromise agreement with the occupants of the property. They also alleged that they secured a permit from the Municipal Planning and Development Offices before bulldozing activities on the property were ordered.  The defendants raised the following as their special and affirmative defenses among others: (a) the plaintiffs‘ action is barred by the dismissal of their complaint; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights and interests over the property when they executed deeds of waiver and quitclaim in favor of CAI; (c) then Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella had issued an Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property into a residential area and withdrawing the property from the coverage of the CARL. Finally, the defendants contended that the property had an 18% slope and was undeveloped; as such, it was exempt from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657.  1996- PARAD dismissed the complaint and found that the plaintiffs abandoned and renounced their

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tenancy rights over the land in question and barred from instituting the instant complaint on the ground of Res Judicata; that the remaining 29 other plaintiffs were not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on the land in question and consequently not entitled to security of tenure. It declined to resolve the issue whether or not the property was covered by RA 6657 and on whether the conversion of the property to non-agricultural was legal and efficacious.  Petitioners appealed. The appealed was transmitted to the DARAB. Meantime some of them executed quitclaims waiving their rights from the property in the suit. Thus CAI filed a Motion to Lift Status Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss alleging that the status quo order illegally extended the restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It was also alleged that the complainants-appellants were not qualified beneficiaries of the CARL. The CAI asserted that the re-classification of the land use was valid and legal, and concluded that since the property was not agricultural, it was not covered by the CARL and, thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.  1997- DARAB reversed PARAD decision. MR denied.  CA- reversed DARAB and reinstated the PARAB decision. The CA ruled that under RA6657, sec. 10, all lands with 18% slope and over, except those already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the exception speaks of ―18% in slope and undeveloped land.‖ Per report of the PARAD, the property subject of the suit has an 18% slope and was still

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undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption. And that as early as 1976, the land was already classified by the Municipality of Carmona as residential.  Petitioners: the property subject of the suit is agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL. They assert that the reclassification of the property made by the Municipal Council of Carmona was subject to the approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as provided for by EO648, sec. 5 but since there was no such approval, the said resolution was ineffective. They argue that RA6657 sec. 65, the DAR is vested with exclusive authority to reclassify a landholding from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit that the exclusive authority of the DAR is not negated by RA7160, sec.60 (LGC). They also insist that the conversion of the property under Kapasiyahang Blg30, was subject to the approval of the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property had not yet been completed even after RA6657 took effect. Hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent to secure an exemption thereto, after complying with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994.  CAI: the property was validly reclassified by the Municipal Council of Carmona pursuant to its authority under RA2264 or Local Autonomy Act of 1959. Until revoked, the reclassification made by the council remained valid. Per DOJ Opinion No. 40, Series of 1990, the private respondent was not required to secure clearance or approval from the DAR since the reclassification took place on June 15, 1988, when RA6657 took effect. The respondent

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asserts that it had complied with all the requirements under PD 957, as amended. Morevore, other agencies had already previously found the property unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The respondent asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere squatters and not tenants on the property of the private respondent. Hence, the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as well as the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from the decision of the PARAD.  ISSUE (with regard to eminent domain): W/N the subject property is covered by RA 6657 or the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). HELD/RATIO: NO. RA6657 provides that the CARL shall ―cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.‖ As to what constitutes ―agricultural land‖ it is referred to as ―land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. ―Agricultural lands‖ are only those lands which are ―arable and suitable agricultural lands‖ and ―do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.‖ Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the property cannot in any language be considered as ―agricultural lands.‖ These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in

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the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a lowcost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail‘s pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. RA2264, sec. 3 amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National Planning Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs. The power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of DAR. RA6657, sec. 65 relied upon by the petitioner applies only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for the conversion of lands previously placed under the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already converted as residential lands prior to the passage of RA6657.

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When Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80 hectares of the property into non-agricultural land, he did so pursuant to his authority under RA3844, as amended, by PD 815 and PD 946. It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared that the property was not tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President; as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local Government and the National Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. DIPDIPIO EARTH-SAVER’S MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL V SEC. GOZUN, DENR, ET AL. Chico-Nazario,J. 30 March 2006

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FACTS:  25 July 1987- Pres. Aquino promulgated EO279 which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.  1994- Pres. Ramos executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining Corp over areas in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino, including Barangay Dipdipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.  1995- Pres. Ramos signed into law RA 7942 entitled, "An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.  2001- petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to the DENR Sec. for the cancellation of the FTAA for the primary reason that RA7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.  2002- Panel of Arbitrators of the Mining and Geosciences Bureau rejected the demand for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.1avvphil.net

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 Petitioners: They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.  Public respondents: Sec. 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that "to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase." ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. HELD/RATIO: NO. The Mining Act was held to be valid. Sec. 76 of the Mining Act as well as the DENR IRR provided for just compensation. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just

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compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two. A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right of way. The requisites of taking in eminent domain include (Castellvi v CA): (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

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(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. As shown by jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking. In the case at bar, the entry referred to in Sec. 76 and the easement rights under Sec. 75 of RA 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the deprivation of proprietary rights. The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein. The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems.

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On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence. While the Court declared that Sec. 75 is a taking provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional on the ground that it allows taking of private property without the determination of public use and the payment of just compensation. The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public" has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a pivotal role in the economic development of the country and is a vital tool in the government‘s thrust of accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry which is of public benefit. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Panganiban, J. 2 December 1998 FACTS:  Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Cavite.

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 1982- Philippine Human Resources Development Center and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency entered into an agreement which involved the establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center.  1983- MOA between Benitez and PHRDC by which she would lease and/or sell for a period of 20 years the subject property in favor of PHRDC. It was granted permit by Benitez and the Philippine Women‘s University to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives...‘. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations.  After the lease contract expired, negotiations began on the purchase of the property on a plain offer from Benitez to sell the same. It was agreed that the purchase price would be at P70 per sqm. In view of this agreement, PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale.  However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell the lot in question.  1995- She and PWU demanded payment of rentals and to vacate the premises. It later filed an unlawful detainer suit against petitioner.  For failure to acquire the property, CMDF instituted a complaint for eminent domain under EO1035. A writ of possession was issued by the Court but later quashed. ISSUE:

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W/N the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated. HELD/RATIO: NO. Sec. 7 of EO1035 (providing for the procedures and guidelines for the expeditious acquisition by the government of private real properties or rights thereon for infrastructure and other government development projects) provides that when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. There being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject matter hereof based on defendant‘s 1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to defendant as landowner has been effected, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession should be granted. The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. In this case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry

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and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial physical possession of the property because the lease, which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well. What will happen if the required writ of possession is not issued? It would be absurd to require petitioner to first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to issue in petitioner‘s favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste of precious time and resources. This precisely is the sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of government infrastructure or development projects, which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly, said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the State‘s power of eminent domain. CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. CA

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20 November 2000 Pardo, J. FACTS:  Conrado Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, CN a complaint for collection of a sum of money and foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter Corp (PSC). PSC was declared in default and the RTC found in favor of Leviste.  A writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land in the name of PSC were sold at a public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corp. A writ of possession was issued in favor of VRC. The writ included the power lines of CANORECO standing on certain portions of the subject property.  Later, VRC moved for the removal and demolition of improvements on the land, including the electric posts. CANORECO opposed on the ground, among other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property.  RTC issued writ of demolition.  CANORECO filed with CA a petition for prohibition with restraining order and preliminary injunction which was eventually denied. Meantime, the sheriff went through with the demolition. ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the power lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

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HELD/RATIO: YES. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 269 (creating the National Electrification Administration) includes the exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems. Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In Republic vs. PLDT, it was held that: ―the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private

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respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V MANUBAY AGROINDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Panganiban, J. 18 August 2004 FACTS:  1996- Napocor was to undertake an electrification project in connecting Leyte to Luzon. In order to carry out said project, it needed to build its transmission lines across certain lands owned by private individuals including private respondent.  Napocor filed a complaint for expropriation before the RTC in order to acquire easement of right of way over the land which MAIDC owns.  RTC issued a writ of possession and directed the sheriff to immediately place Napocor in possession of said land. In determining the fair compensation, the court appointed 3 commissioners to survey the land.  Taking into consideration the condition, the surroundings and the potentials of respondent‘s

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expropriated property, the RTC approved Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon‘s recommended amount of P550 per square meter as just compensation for the property. The trial court opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project would impose a limitation on the use of the land for an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the payment of the full value of the property.  Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A of RA6395 (revising the Charter of the Napocor), as amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law prescribes as just compensation for the acquired easement of a right of way over an expropriated property an easement fee in an amount not exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such property. The trial court relied on the earlier pronouncements of this Court that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, valuations made by the executive branch or the legislature are at best initial or preliminary only.  CA: affirmed the RTC holding that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude expropriation. Section 3-A thereof allowed the power company to acquire not just an easement of a right of way, but even the land itself. Such easement was deemed by the appellate court to be a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered electric lines traversing respondent‘s property would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely

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-- the value and the use of the affected property; as well as endanger lives and limbs because of the high-tension current conveyed through the lines. Respondent was therefore deemed entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found the award of P550 per square meter to be proper and reasonable. ISSUE: W/N the assessed compensation was just. HELD/RATIO: YES. An easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker‘s gain, but the owner‘s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

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In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is not limited to the assessed value of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these values may serve as factors to be considered in the judicial valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial court had considered the Report of the commissioners and the proofs submitted by the parties. The price of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest approximation of the market value of the lots in the adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square meter is justified. Both the Report of Commissioner Bulao and the commissioners‘ majority Report were based on uncontroverted facts supported by documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular inspection of the property. As can be gleaned from the records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating

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the evidence submitted to them; neither did they misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and respondent appellate court has not been grossly exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V PLDT En Banc 27 January 1969 FACTS:  Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA‘s domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.  Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many

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rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau‘s) own schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former.  1958- DoT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc. for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radiotelephone overseas calls received by RCA‘s station to and from local residents. But PLDT complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT‘s facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.  On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance

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Telephone Company, in CFI of Manila praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant‘s telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.  CFI rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. ISSUE: May the PLDT be compelled to enter into an interconnection contract with the petitioner? HELD/RATIO:

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YES. Generally, parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. But while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT‘s lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just

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compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU V HEIRS OF PASTOR Panganiban 20 June 2000 FACTS:  Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to expropriate property of the respondents.  In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation‖.  The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated, Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20, 000.  Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the SC, raising a pure question of law. ISSUE:

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Who has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is P20,000? HELD/RATIO: RTC. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." Remanded to RTC.

DEVORAH BARDILLON V BARANGAY MASILI Panganiban, J. 30 April 2003 FACTS:

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Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints for expropriation against Bardillon for the purpose of erecting a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. The 1st complaint was filed before the MTC following the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on the purchase offer but the complaint was dismissed for lack of interest for failure of the barangay to appear at the pre-trial. The 2nd complaint was filed before the RTC but Bardillon filed an MTD on the ground of res judicata. The RTC judge denied the MTD holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the proceeding so res judicata does not apply. The CA also dismissed the petition on the same ground and ignored the RTC‘s writ of possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint. ISSUE: Who had jurisdiction? HELD/RATIO: RTC.An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because the subject of the action is the government‘s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the MTC had no jurisdiction, res judicata does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are found in Section 2, Rule 67. For LGUs, expropriation is also governed by Sec. 19 of the LGC. In expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate

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entry are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In this case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor the city after it filed the complaint and deposited the amount required was proper because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. NAPOCOR V CA, POBRE Carpio, J. 12 August 2004 FACTS:  Pobre was the owner of a parcel of land which he developed into a resort-subdivision which he named the ―Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.‖  1972- Pobre leased lots in the subdivision to NPC  1977- NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire a portion of his property. CFI ordered the expropriation upon payment of P25 per sqm. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre‘s complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.

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 1979- NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre for additional land are to be used for its well site. It deposited 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court‘s issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.  1984- Pobre filed MTD second complaint for expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his property. He prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC‘s actions and for the payment of damages.  1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation case on the ground that it had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre‘s opposition.  CFI-granted NPC‘s MTC but allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court admitted Pobre‘s exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object. It denied NPC‘s motion to reconsider the submission of the case for decision. It eventually found in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to compensate him. CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N NPC must pay just compensation for the entire property. HELD/RATIO: YES. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the

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landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this case, it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property. The Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. It has been held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPC‘s taking of Pobre‘s property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for

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Pobre‘s entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobre‘s repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre‘s property rights. Thus the SC computed the compensation for the entire property based on the valuation of the commissioners at 6%pa interest plus temperate and exemplary damages.

MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the ―sports development and recreational activities‖ of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused. On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was ―in line with the program of the Municipal

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Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.‖ Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property HELD: Eminent domain is ―the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.‖ It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.

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Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Provided: (1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted; (2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no ―genuine necessity‖ to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowner‘s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.

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REPUBLIC V. CA FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings over 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University. HELD: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching

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that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. V. CITY OF PASIG FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the property of the Ching Cuancos. The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. ISSUE: W/N there was no due process? HELD: Petition is granted. However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an

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ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) V. CA FACTS: ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry. PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA‘s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The

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construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to ―negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC‘s present occupancy rights on the subject land. Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed. ISSUE: W/N the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA‘s term. HELD: Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the

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Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as ―legal personality.‖ When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the

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Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic. In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA‘s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. V. CA FACTS: Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land situated in Tondo Manila. Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila against the occupants of the said property on the ground of termination of the lease contract and nonpayment of rentals. Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner.

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Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the properties of Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. ISSUE: W/N the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis whether or not the expropriation is valid. HELD: No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent domain as expressly granted by the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken

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for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for socialized housing which shows that private property is the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of acquisition an states that the modes include "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Upon examination of the records, the court found that the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is

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for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC FACTS: Certain parcels of land were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. A Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the government. Eventually, the land was subdivided and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels were acquired by San Roque, which begun construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land. Republic filed the present case alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case. San Roque claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without

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legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation. HELD: EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights. Republic manifestly failed to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title. The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.

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From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.

MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN V. IAC FACTS: Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy equipment. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, passed Resolution to expropriate same land. It hereafter filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. RTC issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful. IAC affirmed. HELD: From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available

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road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ... Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle, adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land, and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if this lot is the one to be expropriated.

BARDILLON V. BRGY MASILI

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FACTS: 2 Complaints for eminent domain were filed by the Brgy Masili for the purpose of expropriating a (144) square meter-parcel of land owned by Bardillon. Bardillon acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale. Bardillon argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC‘s Writ of Possession over her property, issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint.

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Held: SC not persuaded. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

BARDILLON V BARANGAY MASILI

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FACTS: Barangay Masili filed two complaints to expropriate a 144 sqm parcel of land owned by Bardillon for a multipurpose hall; their first offer was 200,000. The case was dismissed for the failure of reopndent and counsel to appear at pre-trial (MTC). The second complaint was approved (RTC). The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction and the RTC validly ruled. ISSUE: 1. Could the MTC have jurisdiction over the case? No, An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because the subject of the action is the government‘s exercise of eminent domain – a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation. 2. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises? No. The Writ of Possession was valid. The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are governed by Rule 67, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are 1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance 2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Held: Petition denied. The expropriation is valid.

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LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA FACTS: Petitioners bought land from the City of Cebu. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC‘s decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. An ordinance was soon passed, identifying lots for socialized housing, including the contested lot. The ordinance appropriated ~6M for the lot. Petitioners filed an action for nullity of Ordinance 1843 for being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of substantive due process Yes. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners‘ property was singled out for

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expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners‘ property as the site of a socialized housing project. Specifically, the ordinance is against the Constitution and RAs that call for a particular order priority in acquiring land and expropriating only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. The singling out of petitioner‘s small property was plain oppression and showed manifest partiality against petitioners as only few squatters would benefit. The ordinance failed to show any reasonable relation between the end sought and means adopted. HELD: PETITION GRANTED.

MANILA V CHINESE COMMUNITY Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general grant of authority. FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the

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cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditionsimposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC V PLDT

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All private property may be expropriated, except money and choses in action. Even services may be subject to eminent domain. FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommuncations set up a Government Telephone System using its equipment but renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. PLDT complained that the bureau was violating the conditions of the interconnection referring to the rented trunk lines, because the government used the liens not only for government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of PLDT. They gave notice and disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau. Petitioner commenced a suit against PLDT praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities. PLDT compels it cannot be compelled to enter into this contract without any prior agreement. ISSUE: Can an interconnection between PLDT and the GTS be a valid object for expropriation? HELD: Yes, in an exercise of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to payment of just compensation.

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The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the telephone systems is similar to an easement of right of way.

AYALA DE ROXAS V CITY MANILA Imposing an easement is considered taking. FACTS: Plaintiff wanted to construct a terrace on her property; it would be over a 3m strip of land between her house and the edge of the canal of Sibacon. Her application for permit was denied because the City Engineer said the city wanted that 3m of land as a place of discharging and landing goods and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and fishermen, and to be a towpath

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The City of Manila and City Engineer must issue a license allowing her to construct her terrace. PEOPLE V FAJARDO Municipal oridnance prohibiting a building that would impair the view of the plaza from the highway was taking. FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia were convicted for violating Ordinance 7 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for constructing a building destroying the view of the public plaza, without a permit. Fajardo, the former mayor, built the property even after denial of the permit because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon. ISSUE: Was the ordinance valid?

ISSUE: Did this constitute a deprivation of property? HELD: Yes. No one shall be deprived of property until after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect and resotre possession to the injured party. The easement intended would amount to expropriating preventing exclusive use. The question here is not the establishment of an easement which might be objected by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the city of Manila because it is an attempt to suppress without due process of law real rights attached to ownership.

HELD: No. While the mayor has the authority to regulate property in the interest of general welfare, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. Every structure that may be erected would interfere with the view. The appellants would be constrained to let their land remain idle. Further, the power of the municipal council to require building permits rests upon fire limts. There is no showing of these fire limits. They had no authority to promulgate the said ordinance.

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NPC V GUTIERREZ Eminent domain may consist in an imposition of a burden, without loss of title or possession. FACTS: NPC was a GOCC with the power of eminent domain for the construction and operation of electric transmission lines. NPC had to pass the lands of Gutierrez, et al. The negotiations for easement were unsuccessful and eminent domain proceedings were started. They were paid P973.00. ISSUE: Should NPC pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines? HELD: Full compensation. The transmission lines perpetually deprive defendants of their proprietary rights, as they will not be allowed to plant anything higher than three meters; the high-tensino current also poses a danger to life and limbs. The acquisition of easement falls within the purpose of eminent domain, as it deprives defendants of ordinary use of their property. It must be noted that even if petitioner only sought an easement of right of way, the power of eminent domain may be exercised although title was not transferred to the expropriator.

REPUBLIC V CASTELLVI

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Requisites for valid taking: expropriator must enter a private property, entry must be for more than a momentary period, entry must be under warrant or color of authority, property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government (AFP) in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. If the time of taking was the government‘s lease, the price would be P.20/sqm, while if the time of taking followed Castellvi‘s interpretation the price would be P15/sqm. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a monetary period and (2) devoting it to public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present. ISSUE: 1. WON the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lessee.

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No the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced. The elements of taking are: Requisites for valid taking: expropriator must enter a private property, entry must be for more than a momentary period, entry must be under warrant or color of authority, property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

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 In the case at bar, these elements were not persent when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease. 2. What is just compensation? It is to be deermined as of the date of filing the complaint. In the instant case, the taking must be reckoned when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. A price of P5/sqm is fair.



AMIGABLE V CUENCA



Keywords: Power of eminent domain; taking in the constitutional sense FACTS:  Victoria Amigable owner of Lot in Banilad Estate, Cebu City reflected no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government

used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now and that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925. 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President for payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it. 1959, Amigable filed against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership, possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues and for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00. Defendants filed a joint answer 1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; 2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; 3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since Government had not given its consent to be sued; and 4) that it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area hence

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Amigable has no cause of action against the defendants.  CFI ruled that it doesn‘t have jurisdiction as the government cant be sued without its consent; Amigable appealed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Amigable may properly sue the government? YES  Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. Considering that no

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annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.  However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.  For damages, Amigable is entitled of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. VELARMA V CA Keywords: Facts: This case arose from an ―ejectment suit filed by Pansacola against Velarma before RTC which alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981, Velarma surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay Lual, Quezon (2) that the matter was reported to the Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences but Velarma still refused to vacate (3) that Panascola filed Criminal Case against Velarma in 1986 for violation

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of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite such judgment and repeated demands to vacate, Velarma continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the suit. RTC: Ordered Velarma to vacate the property. Trial court found that Panascola had satisfactorily established her ownership over the parcel of land in question and that Velarma occupied Panascola‘s land without authority of law and against the will of the owner through strategy and stealth. The argument of Velarma that Panascola has no cause of action against him since it was already the municipality that owns the lot by virtue of an agreement between the former owner Publio (husband of Pansacola) to exchange the subject lot with an abandoned road and bridge of the Municipality REYES V CA of Mauban (recorded in the minutes of a meeting of Sangguniang Bayan), failed. But trial court held that Velarma‘s claim was unwarranted as there was no deed had ever been executed to perfect the deal between the municipality and Publio therefore Panascola remained the owner of the property. CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n Velarma‘s agreement to sell the property to the government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a forcible entry suit? NO

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Although Publio Pansacola signified before the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial road, there was no execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the land. No evidence was introduced by Velarma to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, Panascola continues to retain ownership of the land. Keywords: Public benefit is now synonymous with public welfare or public benefit; Relocation site for informal settlers was converted into a low-cost housing project. Facts:  1977, NHA filed separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmariñas, Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were

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relocated from Metro Manila. TC granted the expropriation and the payment of just compensation. For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to comply with the said order, petitioners filed a complaint for forfeiture of rights before RTC and alleged that NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metro Manila on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court. NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial amount to herein petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be executed in view of several issues: 1) concerning capital gains tax; 2) registration fees and other expenses for the transfer of title to respondent NHA and for attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., collaborating counsel for petitioners. Ocular inspections showed that: 1) only one of the lots is already occupied by relocatees whose houses are made of light materials with very few houses partly made of hollow blocks. The relocatees were relocated only in 1994; 2)most of the area is almost occupied by houses and structures, most of which are made of concrete materials are not being occupied by squatters TC dismissed the complaint filed and held that: (1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have abandoned the public purpose for which the subject properties were expropriated because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA

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actually pursued the public purpose of the expropriation when it entered into a contract with Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no condition imposed in the expropriation judgment that the subject properties shall revert back to its original owners in case the purpose of expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just compensation, the basis should be the value at the time the property was taken. CA affirmed. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n NHA failed to comply with the conditions and in effect forfeited its right to expropriate? NO  1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea

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that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public ESTATE OF JIMINEZ V PEZA convenience."  The act of NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.  Moreover, the Constitution itself under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that: "SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments."  When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise

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of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner." Keywords: Public use Facts: Issue/Held/Ratio:  1981, PEZA filed an expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. Jimenez contended that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. RTC then released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. PEZA then appealed to CA.  Jimenez offered a compromise with PEZA namely: 1) Withdrawal of PEZA‘s appeal with respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages; 2) swap of Lot 1406B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 since PEZA has no money yet to pay for the lot. The swap arrangement recognized the fact that the lot 1406-B is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for

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said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. PEZA approved the compromise agreement was signed by Jadiniano.  However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to Jimenez as PEZA was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. TC annulled the said compromise agreement and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said order PEZA moved for its reconsideration but it was denied. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. Having upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, what is then the status of the expropriation proceedings? The situation of the parties will revert back to status before the execution of the compromise agreement, that is, the second stage of the expropriation proceedings, which is the determination of the just compensation. Expropriation proceedings involve 2 phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (when the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one since if finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be

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ascertained by 3 commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the dependant. In the case at bar, the first phase was concluded already order of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the compromise agreement trial court could only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and executory. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by petition to annual the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was filed. According to Jimenez, the appellate court erred in interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just compensation. Jimenez claims that the original demand is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for expropriation inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement subjected the said order

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to rescission. Since the order of expropriation was rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate and the purpose of expropriation have again become subject to dispute. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said to rescission but instead constituted an admission by Jimenez of Peza‘s authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner. Said expropriate order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. 2. w/n PEZA expropriated for Public use? YES Peza has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. PEZA expropriated the subject land for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto. The authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for

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what public use the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA's original charter. FILSTREAM V CA Keywords: Facts:  Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. In 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila against the occupants of the said property on the ground of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The respondents appealed before the RTC and then CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision.  On May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream before RTC Manila. On November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the properties of Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to

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qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.  On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate of the subject land owned by petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of Possession, which were denied by the RTC, along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was denied for procedural flaws.  The decision of the MTC on the ejectment case became final and upon motion of Filstream, the MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a supervening event in that the properties subject of the dispute have already been ordered condemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises, that prompted the private respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a

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temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which was granted. A Petition for Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC decision denying the motion to quash the writ of execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the respondent and the City of Manila were consolidated and an injunction was issued against the writ of execution. These cases were however dismissed by RTC upon motion of Filstream for violation of the SC Circular against forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Exparte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted.  As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from implementing the order of demolition dated January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed. Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which granted herein private respondents' prayer for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Issue/Held/Ratio:

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1. w/n the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis w/n the expropriation is valid? NO  The City of Manila has the power of eminent domain as expressly granted by the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)".  The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for socialized housing which shows that private property is the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of acquisition an states that the modes include "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted."

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 Upon examination of the records, the court found that the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified.  Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

MANOSCA V CA Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013

Keywords: Public use; historical landmark of Felix Manalo, founder of INC Facts: Manosca inherited a piece of land at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, (492 square meters) The parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo and declared the land to be a national historical landmark. Republic of Phil filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. Manosca argued that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Manosca‘s petition was denied hence this certiorari. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n ―public use‖ requirement of Eminent Domain is present in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by NHI as a national historical landmark? YES  Eminent domain is an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion

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over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency.  Manosca assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.  Court held that guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates. The idea that ―public use‖ is strictly limited to clear cases of ―use by the public‖ has long been discarded.  The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

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MODAY V CA Keywords: Public Use; it is the Municipality of Bunawan has the authority to expropriate not the Sang. Panlalawigan Facts:

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 SB of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the Mayor to expropriate a hectare of land owned by Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." The resolution was approved by Mayor but later disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan commenting that there are still available lots for the establishment of the center. Despite this, the municipality still filed a petition for Eminent Domain.  RTC granted municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.  Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.  Moday sought to reverse the decision and declare Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void. Issue/Held/Ratio:

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1. w/n the municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan? YES, municipality can expropriate.  Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.  The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and MUN. OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY CORP void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is

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beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue.  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.

Keywords: Public use; lack of compliance in filing of expropriation Facts: Municipality of Paranaque issued SB Resolution for complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corp over

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two parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. It was stated purpose that petitioner declined the offer of negotiated sale by the Municipality. RTC finding the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance granted it. In 1994, respondent argued that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. TC denied the petition and the MFR hence this appeal. Issue/Held/Ratio: 1. w/n resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action? NO Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case ―substantially complies with the requirements of the law‖ because the terms ―ordinance‖ and ―resolution‖ are synonymous for ―the purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the

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power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter‘s control and restraints, imposed ―through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.‖ In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.

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2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily involved? NO All the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can ―reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.‖ Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case (i.e. final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue) it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.

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DAR V NLRC NOVEMBER 11, 1993 7. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a contract for security services. However, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay as well as for damages before the Regional Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and Sultan Security Agency. 8. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the judgment against their property. 9. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA didn‘t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize DAR‘s governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good. 10. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction. 11. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

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More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. 12. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable HELD: YES 9. Generally, the State can‘t be sued without its consent. The State‘s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through general or special law. 10. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 11. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. 12. Here, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity

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13. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character 14. The claims of private respondents arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied but the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. 15. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 16. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law.

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NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION 
VS.
JOSE TEODORO 6. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition, PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. 7. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover the amount. 8. PAL countered with a third party complaint against the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus CAA was served with summons. The complaint alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed by Capitol Division. 9. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC has lots its juridical personality and because agency of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued. 10. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts of the National Airport Corporation abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. All works, construction, and improvements made by the National Airports Corporation or any agency of the National Government in or upon government airfields,

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including all appropriations or the unreleased and unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts of any kind and to grant concession rights. ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the defendant. 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC‘s creditors access to the courts of justice against the CAA is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the obligations for which the entity was organized 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernment capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions

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4.

5. 6.

7.

of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The CAA comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state. PAL‘s third party-complaint is premised on the assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least for the limited object of winding up its affairs under Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. No trustees, assignees or receivers have been designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice then should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation. The error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, and may be corrected by amendment of the pleadings if deemed necessary.

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LARKINS V NLRC FEBRUARY 23, 1995 5. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services was terminated. These employees were allowed to continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor, JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own workers. 6. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air Force who were assigned to oversee the dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the employees and ordered reinstatement with full back pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. 7. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original and amended, were ever served on her. Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947. 8. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: ―In the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and considering our finding that the real party respondent is the United States Government through its Armed

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Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such execution be made subject to existing international agreements diplomatic protocol‖ ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins Held: No 8. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S. military bases in the country. 9. The Agreement mandates that summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. The labor arbiter didn‘t follow the procedure and instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and NOT the Base Commander. 10. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null and void.

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11. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the said body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons 12. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS where the appellees previously worked as dormitory attendants is just one of the various units of the United States Armed Forces inside the said military base. 13. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between the United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees should be settled under grievance or labor relations procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint

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Labor Committee established in Article III of the Base Labor Agreement. 14. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, 
VS.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II JUNE 10, 1988 4. private respondents, American Citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines, were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval Station). They were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full time to part time. They instituted grievance proceedings which resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement plus backwages. 5. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau, commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing officer‘s report and asked for the rejection as Mr. Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed the records in public places. 6. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages against Sanders claiming that the allegations were libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private/personal capacity. Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that

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the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties thus the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over both petitioners NO 1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. 2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn‘t have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. 3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. 4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed

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that the letter he had written (which included the libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. M 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. This act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the redesignation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. 6. Given the official character of the above-described letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the

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necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. 8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. 9. In the case at bar, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 11. Since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private

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respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.

LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA GR 155746 1. Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which was Lot 1029 in Capitol Hills. Petitioners purchased it on installment basis but then the 210 lots eventually were reverted back to the Province of Cebu. The province tried to annul the sale thus the petitioners (buyers) prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages. TC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered Province to execute the final deed of sale. CA affirmed the decision thus thereafter, TCT was issued in the name of petitioners. 2. However, when they took possession of the lot, it was already occupied by squatters thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. MTC issued demolition order. 3. When it was about to be implemented, Mayor Garcia requested the deferment on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters thus the MTCC issued orders suspending the demolition. 4. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

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5. Then, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. 6. Ordinance No. 1843 was then enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. 7. Petitioners then filed with the RTC then the CA after it was dismissed, an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people ISSUE: W/N this expropriation contravenes the Constitution yes 1. Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160: Eminent Domain. ―A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws‖

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2. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners‘ lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City. 3. However, the local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. 4. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 5. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution 6. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. 7. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide the priorities in the acquisition of land. It shall be made in the ff order: a. Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,

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including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; b. Alienable lands of the public domain; c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; d. Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired; e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and f. Privately-owned lands. 8. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners‘ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted (land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted) 9. Prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners‘ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition.

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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V SPOUSES CHIONG GR 152436 1. NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC wanting to acquire an easement of right of way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned by the spouses Chiong and the heirs of Angeles to be used in its Northwestern Luzon transmission line project. 2. In their answer, they pointed out that NPC had already entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less (Lot A) and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square meters of the adjacent property (Lot B). Respondents said that the FMV for both properties was P1,100.00 per sqm or a total of P8,800,000.00 and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay them said amount. 3. Court then granted issuance of a writ of possession. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the controversy would be limited to determining the actual land area taken by NPC and the just compensation to be paid by NPC. TC appointed the commissioners and they submitted their report finding that the property classified as unirrigated Riceland shall have a FMV of P500 per sqm considering that the property is situated 900 meters from the town proper. 4. TC appointed as commissioners, Atty. Alog, Atty. Castillo, and Ms. Regadio, to determine the fair market value of the land, as well as the total area taken by NPC from respondents.

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a. Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio – the property classified as unirrigated riceland shall have a fair market value of P500.00 per square meter b. Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles an easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses Chiong be paid total easement fees of P9,187.05.The affected properties of the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles were assessed by Atty. Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per square meter, while those of the Spouses Chiong were assigned a fair market value of P15.75 per square meter. 5. Court then gave due course to the report of Atty Castillo and Ms. Ragadio. 6. Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for certiorari with the appellate court: it alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it: (a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the land taken without first issuing an order of expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation recommended by the two commissioners without a hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full market value of the property instead of a mere easement fee. 7. CA: dismissed. NPC moved for reconsideration. ISSUE: W/N full market value of the property instead of easement fee should be paid HELD: YES 1. A formal hearing or trial was not required for the petitioner to avail of its opportunity to object and

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have filed a motion raising all possible grounds for objecting to the findings and recommendations of the commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to remand the report to the commissioners for additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge the majority report, for reasons petitioner could muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the opportunity to register its opposition. The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court at P500.00 per square meter. The appellate court affirmed the said valuation. NPC the expropriation was not to be limited for the purpose of easement of right-of-way. In fact, in their Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000 square meters wherein it constructed structures for its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner failed to controvert this material allegation. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor. The rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value

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of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits 7. In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and the proofs which included the fair market value of P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the respondents. 8. This valuation by owners of the property may not be binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the compensation to be awarded. 9. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the owners valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only P500 as recommended in the majority report of the commissioners.

ESLABAN V DE ONORIO GR 146062 1. Clarita de Enorio‘s lot was affected a the main irrigation canal construction of the NIA. Her husband agreed to the construction provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of the documents by the COA. A right of

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way agreement was executed between them and paid P4180 as Right of Way damages. 2. Now, De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property but when Eslaban refused, she filed a complaint against him before RTC praying for compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal. 3. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that: the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141. 4. TC: ordered the National Irrigation Administration to pay de Onorio 107k as just compensation. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision hence this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION. 1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed

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2.

3.

4.

5.

and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to some public use, the first thing that the government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to public use. it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of

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6.

7.

8.

9.

taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis.14

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CIR V CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION JUNE 26, 2006 1. Central Luzon Drug Corporation opened 3 drugstores as a franchise under the business name, ―Mercury Drug‖. In conformity to the mandate of RA 7432, it granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicine to senior citizens. Pursuant to Rev Reg 294, which states that the discount given to senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, the corporation deducted 219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995. 2. For said taxable period, the corporation reported a net loss of 20,963 in its corporate income tax return. As a consequence, the corporation did not pay income tax for 1995. 3. It then claimed the amount of 219,778 should be applied as a tax credit, it filed a claim for refund in the amount of 150,193. This amount represents the tax credit allegedly due to the corporation under RA 7432. 4. CTA: even if the law treats the discounts granted to senior citizens as a tax credit, it cannot apply when there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability. Likewise, no refund can be granted because there was no tax which was erroneously or illegally collected.

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5. CA: the 20% discount given to senior citizens which is treated as a tax credit is considered just compensation and, as such, may be carried over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability. ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount may be claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales 1. RA 7432 provides, ―the grant of twenty percent discount from all establishments relative ... purchase of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit. 2. The above provision explicitly employed the word "tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a "deduction" from gross sales. 3. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. 4. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount -- when claimed – shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability. 5. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. Where there is no tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for the period, the

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6.

7.

tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a tax credit, not a refund. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned.

PANES V VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE NOVEMBER 27, 1996 1. Marcos issued PD1107 establishing the Philippine Root Crops Research and Training Center in the Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA). It had the power to expropriate lands situated within the barrios, thus VISCA filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners to: a. Establish experimental fields b. Construct buildings laboratories and housing facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops Center; and c. integrate and conduct country-wide researches on root crops. 2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank

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representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76. 3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties. 4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated were not within the area specified under PD No. 1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794 providing that the just compensation shall not be in excess of the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the provincial assessor, which is lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of contract and violating the equal protection clause; and (5) there was no public necessity for the acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands. 5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands involved in the expropriation proceedings, their tenure of work as tenants being secured and protected by law, they cannot be removed from their landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted the intervenors‘ motion to which VISCA filed its reply. It denied that they were tenants and that their reliance to the decree was misplaced since the proscription therein against the ejectment or removal of tenants is applicable as regards landowners,

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landholders and agricultural lessors and not as regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf. 6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because expropriation was not one of the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42 was only applicable to untenanted private properties and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be expropriated were indeed within the area indicated by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation. 7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was tainted with GAD when it denied immediate possession of the properties. The authority of the petitioner to take immediate possession of the subject properties appear clear and explicit. The contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is nothing in PD 42 that indicates this. 8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed by the Constitution and it runs counter to the agrarian laws. ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of possession NO 1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount

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equivalent to the assessed value of the subject property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay 2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Thus, the determination of just compensation, by virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was converted from being a judicial prerogative to an executive decision. Because the executive determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No. 1533 to be unconstitutional and void. 3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount with the PNB representing the assessed value of the lands for taxation purposes as determined under P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No. 42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the subject properties for purposes of taxation. 4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative that any right to the immediate possession of the

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subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of Rule 67 – that there must be a deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the subject property as provisionally and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.

BELEN V CA MARCH 11, 1991 1. Belen leased a small portion of land (100sqm) from Manotok Services situated in Tondo, Manila. Belen built his house there. Juliano occupied part of the land; he bought a house standing there and moved in without Belen‘s knowledge. Upon learning about Juliano, they came up with an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay ½ of the rental to Manotok Realty. However, the houses were burned. Belen acceded to Juliano‘s continued stay on the condition that it should only be for 1 ½ years. When Juliano failed to leave the presmies, Belen brought suit in the MTC. 2. MTC: ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment. 3. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok

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Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the premises in question and as correctly contended by Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were also deemed terminated. 4. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved against him. 5. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in determining the "pivotal and decisive issue — whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belen‘s lessor, has retained ownership of the lot in question, the expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670)‖. 6. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result, Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a sublease can never extend beyond the duration of the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen appealed by certiorari to the SC ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the land considering it didn‘t receive money as payment for the subject property yet HELD: yes 1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the owners‘ right to due process of law. The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the

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2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. But it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically expropriated." This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first." Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City Assessor. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D. No. 1533, the basis for determining just compensation was fixed at the market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Here, there is no mention of any market value declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees peg just compensation at the market value determined by the City Assessor.

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7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

REPUBLIC (DAR) V CA OCTOBER 30, 1996 1. ACIL Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Dvao del Norte which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Certificates were cancelled and new ones issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. 2. The lands were valued by Land Bank however, in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, Land Bank valued the land uniformly. 3. ACIL rejected the government‘s offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price per hectare. 4. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40 instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the statement ACIL filed with DAR. 5. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion

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was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that a petition for just compensation under RA 6657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. 6. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to RTC HELD: N 1. §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, §57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. 2. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: a. (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners" and

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

b. (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]." The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. EPZA v. Duly - the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies — rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the

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case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. 8. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657.

MERALCO V PINEDA FEB 13, 1992 1. MERALCO filed a complaint for eminent domain for the lots of the 42 private respondents. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, MERALCO needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement 2. But despite the opposition, the court issued an order authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the possession of the property. Private respondents then filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid 40 pesos per sqm and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of 71k from MERALCO‘s deposit account with the PNB. This they did 3x and Judge Pineda then granted the motion of withdrawal. 3. The court then stressed that it will appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a

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credible real estate broker, or the judge himself would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." 4. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. 5. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence. ISSUE: W/N the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation HELD: YES 1. Sec. 5 of Rules 67, ROC: Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. 2. Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten days, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections,

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the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken. 3. Binan case: There are2 stages in every action of expropriation. a. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. b. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 4. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. 5. Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per

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hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects‖. He arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper hearing. 6. Likewise, MERALCO has not been given the opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. 7. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. 8. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. 9. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive 10. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.

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11. Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. 12. The respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MAURA SANTOS and 43 more claimants G.R. No. 57524, January 08, 1986 1. 66,096 square meters of land in Parañaque and Muntinlupa claimed by 44 persons is being expropriated, for the widening and con-struction of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road. 2. The Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed at P40 per square meter. The Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts. 3. CFI Rizal granted the fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2,641,190. 4. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of the Philippines. 14 claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. They were paid the amounts due to them at that price Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly indicative of the fair market value of the lands at the time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early in 1969. 6. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation. The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter. 7. May 13, 1972 - trial court fixed P100 a square meter as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants

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8. June 29, 1981 - CA modified the trial court's decision and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6% legal rate of interest from February 7, 1969, the date of the filing of the complaint. 9. Republic contends that CA erred in disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter. Issue: What is the correct valuation of the expropriated land - only P40 per square meter for the expropriated lands. 1. We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. 2. Also, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the filing of the instant expropriation case. 3. The statement in the 1970 report of the commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on any documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay. More-over, those prices refer to 1970 or more than a year after the expropriation was effected. 4. In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters. She was already paid P1,036,360 for her expropriated land.

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5. Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial assessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasonable price. 6. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated.

G.R. NO. 156093, FEBRUARY 2, 2007 NATIONAL POWER CORP. V.
SPOUSES DELA CRUZ, METROBANK, DASMARIÑAS, CAVITE BRANCH, REYNALDO FERRER, AND S.K. DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER CORP. NATURE: petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Napocor seeks to annul CA decision which affirmed RTC decision fixing FMV at P10,000 per sqm 1. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of rightof-way over portions of land within the areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project. 2. November 27, 1998 - petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625

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square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters. 3. NAPOCOR deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then it filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, 1999 Order, which was granted. 4. However, the trial court dropped Sps Dela Cruz and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz. As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-ininterest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise agreement. 5. Meanwhile, trial court issued an Order directing the constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics. 6. October 05, 1999. - commissioners recommended that the fair market value of the real properties is P10,000.00 per square meter. However, the commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct hearings before them. Upon the submission of the commissioners‘ report, petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file its objections to it. 7. December 28, 1999 - RTC Order fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. Napocor filed Motion for

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Reconsideration claiming it is exorbitant, unjust and unreasonable. RTC denied this MR, explaining that the price for 1999 must be considered, which is the time when the writ of possession was issued. 8. CA affirmed RTC: The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the land owner. CA noted that since the property underwent important changes and improvements, "the highest and most profitable use of the property is good for residential and commercial purposes. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: 1) W the respondents were denied due process - Yes. 1. The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard the commissioners‘ findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the part of the trial court because the parties‘ (in particular, petitioner‘s) right to due process was violated. 2. Based on Rule 67 Sec. 6-8, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings. 3. The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a

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mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a hearing before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, that is, (1) where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, (2) where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (3) where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all." 4. There are very specific rules for expropriation cases that require the strict observance of procedural and substantive due process because expropriation cases involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private property for public purposes and the disbursement of public funds as just compensation for the private property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case cures the defect in due process. 2) W the valuation of just compensation was correct No. 1. In this case, the commissioners arrived at the figure of P10, 000 in question after their ocular inspection of the property, wherein they considered the surrounding structures, the property‘s location and, allegedly, the

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prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the area. 2. It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 3. The commissioners‘ report itself is flawed considering that its recommended just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the complaint (when just compensation should have been determined), and the time when the commissioners‘ report recommending the just compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just compensation.

G.R. NO. 170422, MARCH 07, 2008 SPS. EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG V. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES NATURE: Petition assailing the CA decision in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Edmond Lee and Helen Huang. 1. 7 August 2001 - Sps Huang received a notice informing them that their landholding is covered by the government‘s compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant

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to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). 2. 1 June 2001 - Sps received from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a copy of the notice of land valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195 hectares of the property. Petitioners rejected the offer. 3. DARAB conducted a summary administrative proceeding to etermine the valuation and compensation of the subject property. DARAB ordered the LBP to pay petitioners the original amount offered by DAR. 4. Aggrieved, Sps filed an original petition for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan. They offered the appraisal report presented in Civil Case No. 7171, a prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land adjacent to the property subject of this case. 5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SAC should have refrained from taking judicial notice of its own decision in Civil Case No. 7171 in resolving just compensation in the present case, especially because it disregarded the other factors set in RA 6657. According to the Court of Appeals, the SAC should have judiciously made an independent finding of fact and explained the legal basis thereof, hence the CA remanded the case to the trial court ―for proper and judicious determination of just compensation, appointing for that purpose a set of commissioners.‖ 6. Sps allege that the remand of the case would give LBP undue opportunity which it already had during the proceedings a quo, and which opportunity it failed to take advantage of. Also, it argues that R.A. No. 6657 does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven

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factors enumerated therein in its determination of just compensation. ISSUE: W remand of the case is proper for the determination of proper valuation - YES. 1. SAC‘s reliance on the valuation made by the appraisal company is misplaced, since the valuation was not arrived at using the factors required by the law and prescribed by the AO No. 5. 2. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the factors to be considered in determining just compensation reads: SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non- payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institutions on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. This formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to in Section 17 of the law.

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3. We find that the factors required by the law and enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not observed by the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. However, this is not to say that the Court favors the valuation given by LBP. We find that LBP‘s valuation is too low vis-á- vis the value suggested by the appraisal company. All told, we find that the remand of the case is in order to better determine the proper valuation of the subject property. RELEVANT: 4. We clarify, however, that we are not in accord with the declaration of the Court of Appeals on the appointment of commissioners in the instant case. CA, in its decision, stated: x x x Consequently, when the Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court determines just compensation, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court. xxx SAC should have appointed competent and disinterested commissioners to assist it in valuating the property in question. The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the appointment of commissioners is mandatory in agrarian reform cases. We do not agree. While the Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in special agrarian courts, it is clear that unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. And when the court does resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not

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circumscribed to appoint three commissioners, unlike the modality under Rule 67. With the remand of the case, it is now up to the SAC, or to the parties, to determine if there is a need to avail of commissioners to arrive at the proper valuation of the subject land.

G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. G.R. NO. 118745 OCTOBER 6, 1995 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL. 1. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, the petitions were ordered consolidated. 2. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,

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private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. They sought to compel DAR to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. 3. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 4. DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.

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5. DAR/ Landbank maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.

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ISSUE/HELD: (1) W the opening of trust account is acceptable form of payment - NO. 1. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands — xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". (2) W the DAR Administrative circular is constitutional NO. 1. DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued

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Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". (3) W private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the case 1. DAR's contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 of the same law. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:" xxx The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. xxx The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must

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be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.

RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY = date of filing the complaint, unless filing came after actual taking

G.R. NO. 113194. MARCH 11, 1996 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MACAPANTON MANGONDATO 1. 1978 - Napocor took possession of a 21,995 square meter land situated in Marawi City, owned by

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Mangondato, and under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974. 2. NAPOCOR alleged that the land was until then possessed and administered by Marawi City, so that in exchange for the city‘s waiver and quitclaim of any right over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a ‗financial assistance‘ of P40.00 per square meter. 3. Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid ‗financial assistance‘ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. 4. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On August 14, 1990, NAPOCOR‘s board passed Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be paid the base price of P40.00 per square meter for the 12,132 square meter portion (P485,280.00) plus 12% interest per annum from 1978 (P698,808.00) pending the determination whether P100.00 per square meter is the fair market value of the property. So Mangondato was paid P1,184,088.00. 5. March, 1992 - the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of A Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to Mangondato‘s request of provisional payment of P100.00 per square meter excluding interest and without prejudice to Mangondato‘s pursuance of claims for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the P1,184,088.00

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earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which payments total P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land. 6. However, Mangondato still demanded that he be paid P300 oer square meter because his land was classified as industrial. 7. July 7, 1992 - Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property and the payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the surrender of the property. 8. July 27, 1992 - Napocor filed Civil Case No. 610-92 which is a Complaint for eminent domain against Mangondato over the subject property 9. Mangondato answered that he treats the P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as partial payment for the rent for the use of his property. Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in damages for the unauthorized taking and continued possession of his land from 1978 until the filing of the Complaiant. Furthermore, he argues that should the lower court order the expropriation of the subject property, that the just compensation for the land be reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation case. 10. The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P10,997,500.00, provisionally fixing the value of the land at P500.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR opposed the provisional value quoted by the lower court saying that the basis of the provisional value of the land should be the assessed value of the property as of the time of the taking which in this case is 1978.

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ISSUE: What is the correct basis for the valuation of just compensation: (1) 1992 or at the time of filing of complaint for eminent domain, or (2) 1978 or at the time of taking. HELD: Here, SC followed the general rule (filing complaint), because only in 1992 did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. SC affirmed the CA when the latter held that: ―If We decree that the fair market value of the land be determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason other than for eminent domain would occupy another‘s property and when later pressed for payment, first negotiate for a low price and then conveniently expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property for the purpose of eminent domain should be reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy the property and that the value of the property should be computed as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the meantime in the value of the property.‖ RATIO: 1. The general rule in determining ―just compensation‖ in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into

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the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. 2. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The exception finds application where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare. 3. Side Issue: Where is there "taking" of property? This Court has defined the elements of ―taking‖ as the main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent domain in Republic v. Castelvi: ―A number of circumstances must be present in the ‗taking‘ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.‖ Here, in this case, the petitioner‘s entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted

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that the property was public land and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid ―financial assistance‖ to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondent‘s ownership and negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. learly, this is not the intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent domain. Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain.

G.R. NO. 146062, JUNE 28, 2001 SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. V. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO NATURE: petition for review of CA which affirmed RTC ordering National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking of the latter‘s property. 1. Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. 2. October 6, 1981 - Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.

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3. 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property 4.The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement. 5. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NI WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION - TAKING! 1. There are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, §4 provided: Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of

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condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . .. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. 2. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the court deems just and equitable. 3. Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first." 4. Even before the new rule, however, it was already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value

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after the passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. 5. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara: Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . . . In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by

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the trial court to make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare basis. G.R. NO. 129998, DECEMBER 29, 1998 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. LOURDES HENSON NATURE: appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals , which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, ordering Napocor to pay respondents landowners/claimants just compensation for the taking of their five (5) parcels of land 1. March 21, 1990 - NPC originally instituted with RTC for eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. 2. Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga. Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision. 3. July 10, 1990 - the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of respondents' property, to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990. 4. September 5, 1990 - trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11,

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1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land 5. April 5, 1991 - the trial court issued an order appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in the reception of evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of the subject property. 6. May 19, 1993 - the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. Petitioner then appealed to CA, which affirmed the RTC. ISSUE: W the valuation of the commissioners is correct - No, because they based the valuation on adjacent residential lots. 1. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. 2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village

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Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. 3. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.

REPUBLIC V KER CO. [GR NO. 136171 (JULY 2, 2002)] Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City apetition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-BuhanginInterchange in Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition for expropriation was filed, the taxdeclaration of the property indicated its assessed value at a lower price. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just compensation.

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HELD: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Justcompensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the property as stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the property is taken into account and such value refers to the highest price in terms of money which a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public market. In computing just compensation for expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides that justcompensation is to be determined as ofthe date of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding petitioner's claim.

CITY OF CEBU VS. SPOUSES APOLONIO AND BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. NO. 142971, MAY 7, 2002] DAVIDE, JR., C .J: FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for

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a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court‘s decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the

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date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

NEPOMUCENO V CITY OF SURIGAO [GR NO. 146091 (JULY 28, 2008)] FACTS:  Maria Paz Nepomuceno filed a complaint to recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m. lot which was occupied, developed and used as a city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria Paz alleged that the city government neither asked her permission to use the land nor instituted expropriation proceedings for its acquisition.  She wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor) Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable settlement for the payment of the portion taken over by the city. They subsequently met with Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay them anything.  A second letter was sent to sought the Mayor‘s reconsideration but they were again turned down.  respondents admitted the existence of the road in question but alleged that it was constructed way back in the 1960s during the administration of former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that time, the lot was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way agreement in favor of the municipal government. However, a copy of the agreement could no

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longer be found because the records were completely destroyed and lost when the Office of the City Engineer was demolished by typhoon Nitang in 1994.  RTC ordered the City to pay spouses Nepomuceno the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney‘s fees, and the further sum of P3,260.00 as compensation for the portion of land in dispute, with legal interest thereon from 1960 until fully paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of the said City. o The claims for moral and exemplary damages are denied for lack of basis  CA modified the RTC decision and held that petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral damages for having been rebuffed by Mayor Sering in the presence of other people. It also awarded petitioners P20,000 as attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses considering that they were forced to litigate to protect their rights and had to travel to Surigao City from their residence in Ormoc City to prosecute their claim. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other respects.  SPOUSES NEPOMUCENO claim that, in fixing the value of their property, justice and equity demand that the value at the time of actual payment should be the basis, not the value at the time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They demandP200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,400 plus legal interest.

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ISSUE: WON, as alleged by spouses Nepomuceno, it is the amount at time of payment which should be the basis. HELD/RATIO: In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that where actual taking is made without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and the owner seeks recovery of the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this rule is: The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it." Thus, the value of petitioners‘ property must be ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other principles laid down by case law. Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no

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agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V ANGAS [GR. NOS. 60225-26 (MAY 8, 1992)] Ponente: Paras J. FACTS:  On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance.  Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid." Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the

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 

 

petitioner. The same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and executory. May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents [Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through counsel, filed with the trial court an exparte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to PD 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."

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 February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.  Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.  NPC moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that PD 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.  January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. HELD/RATIO: NO. Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:

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By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. his has already been settled in several cases decided by this Court. Private respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest, which term includes the questioned judgment of the lower court in the case at bar. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated.

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The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public

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purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

WYCOCO V CASPILLO [GR NO. 146733 (JANUARY 13, 2004)] J. Ynares-Santiago FACTS:  Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija.  In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million.  After the DAR‘s evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines, a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco ( modified to P2,280,159.82).

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 The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding.  Pending litigation, DARAB requested Land Bank to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.  Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.  The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. ISSUES:

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(1) WON the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, validly acquired jurisdiction over the instant case for determination of just compensation. (2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the compensation arrived at is supported by evidence. (3) WON Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell. (4) WON the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid. HELD/RATIO: 1. YES. The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco‘s complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco‘s land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and LBP‘s conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or agreements; and the entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of action. Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was rendered moot and academic in view of the DARAB‘s dismissal of the administrative case to

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give way to and in recognition of the court‘s power to determine just compensation. 2. NO. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco‘s land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these factors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is necessary. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. 3. NO.

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The DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR‘s non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area. 4. PARTLY MERITOUS In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner. It must be stressed, however, that in these cases, the imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order. This is because the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process.

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Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The basis of the 12% interest would be the just compensation that would be determined by the Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the instant case. In the same vein, the amount determined by the Special Agrarian Court would also be the basis of the interest income on the cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the time of the taking of the property up to the time of actual payment of just compensation. The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof. None having been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits cannot be granted.

DE KNECHT V CA [GR NO. 108015 (MAY 20, 1998)] Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht

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and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for the expropriation of Knechts‘ property. The government wanted to use the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction for the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The property of the Knechts was part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court

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however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their residence was demolished. The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the property and allege that they must be given just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners of the land at subject. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the ownersanymore of the said land. The Knechts' right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to redeem it one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, theorder of dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land. Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice of the auction sale. However, this question has been previously raised in the cases which have been already set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the lawful owners of the land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the government. Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds

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embodied in various maxims of the common law — one, public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.

VISAYAN REFINING V CAMUS [GR NO. L-15870 ( DECEMBER 3, 1919)] J. STREET FACTS:  Sept. 13, 1919: the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of an area of about 1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the municipality of Parañaque,

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Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of Manila. It is stated in communication of the Governor-General that the property in question is desired by the Government of the Philippine Islands for military and aviation purposes.  Numerous persons are named in the complaint as defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended to be expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded appear the names of the three petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question.  Visayan Refining, Worcester and Leas nterposed a demurrer, questioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes.  Contemporaneously with the filing of their demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of First Instance to revoke its order of September 15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative authority for the proposed expropriation, but it contains one additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of P600,000, had been made without authority of law.

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ISSUE: WON title has passed to the Government. HELD/RATIO: The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate possession when the Government of the Philippine Islands is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which is in part as follows: SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government . . . in any competent court of the Philippines, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately upon the land covered by such proceedings, after depositing with the provincial treasurer the value of said land in cash, as previously and promptly determined and fixed by the competent court, which money the provincial treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final decision of the court: Provided, however, That the court may permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited with the provincial treasurer a certificate of deposit of any depository of the Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited by the court. The certificate and the sums represented by it shall be subject to the order and final decision of the court, and the court shall have authority to place said plaintiff in possession of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the proper orders and a mandate, if necessary.

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SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendants of the compensation awarded by the sentence, or after the tender of said sum to the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or in case the court orders the price to be paid into court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate the land so condemned to the public use specified in the sentence. In case payment is made to the court, the clerk of the same shall be liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall be obliged to receive the same. In connection with the foregoing provisions found in laws enact under the American regime is to be considered the following provision of the Civil Code: ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority for some purpose of proven public utility and after payment of the proper compensation. Unless this requisite has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be. Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty, providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the expropriator finally dependent upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.

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While we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just compensation must be made, the further fact must not be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional provision in force in these lands Islands requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is true that in rare instances the proceedings may be voluntarily abandoned before the expropriation is complete or the proceedings may fail because the expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases the owner retains the property; and if possession has been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted that the title does not actually pass to the expropriator until a certified copy of the record of the judgment is recorded in the office of the register of deeds (sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the proceedings is reached the compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the court is plainly directed to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the defendant just compensation for the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code Civ. Proc.). Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of compensation by him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247, Code Civ. Proc.).

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REPUBLIC V SALEM INVESTMENT CORP. [GR NO. 137569 (JUNE 23, 2000)] J. Mendoza FACTS:  BP 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of defendants in this case, including a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama  Five years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract with intervenor Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property.  Guerrero file with the RTC of Pasay a complaint for specific performance against De la Rama.  While this case for specific performance was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government.  As already stated, the De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14,

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1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. The only issue in this case is who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question? o The De la Ramas claim that they should receive the amount of just compensation because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on February 17, 1983. o On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero argues that the title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property.

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 Pasay City RTC, Br. 111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. ISSUE: WON Guerrero is entitled to receive just compensation. HELD/RATIO: YES. Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by legislation.[25] In both instances, just compensation is determined by the courts. The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As explained in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". . . . The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for

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the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. . . . It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.

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including the expropriated area, which was then owned by the De la Ramas. It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract‘s validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.

In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of the land in question. The constitutionality of this law was upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990, the government commenced the second stage of expropriation through the filing of a petition for the determination of just compensation. This stage was not completed, however, because of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with them and did not at that point pass to the government.

CITY OF MANILA V ROXAS [GR NO. L-39671 (JUNE 29, 1934)] J. Hull FACTS:  The City of Manila appeals from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila awarding to two private property owners whose lands were taken by expropriation proceedings, an allowance for the taxes paid to the City of Manila under protest, covering a period of time between the dispossession of the owners and the taking of title by the city.

As to the Contract to Sell As the trial court in the case for specific performance ruled, the contract to sell covered the entire Lot 834,

ISSUE: WON taxes paid by the owner after taking by expropriator are reimbursable.

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HELD/RATIO: YES. While taxes are assessed against the holder of the title, the owner of the property is entitled to the beneficient use of his property until title changes. If pursuant to law, immediate possession may be taken, the withholding this right from the owner must be compensated for as well as the formal taking. In In re Mayor, etc., of City of New York it is said that: Certainly it would not be "just compensation" to take a man's land, and compel him to pay the taxes and assessments thereafter levied on the property, while at the same time withholding the purchase price. . . . Upon the city's theory, therefore, the owner must not alone be deprived of the unrestricted use of his property and of the ad interim use of his money, but he must also compelled to pay for its police protection, and for public movements charged against it as a benefit, during all the period of delay, for which he is in no way responsible, and which he is powerless to shorten. It will be seen that, if this theory be correct, the owners award would be constantly diminished by each year's delay, until, if the period were long enough, it would be entirely wiped out. It can hardly be contended that a theory which, logically followed out, would under any possible circumstances produce such a result, affords a satisfactory basis for an award of "just compensation."

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. . . The power may be allowed the unrestricted use of the premises after taking, and the premises maybe of such a character, and so situated, that the income derivable therefrom is a full equivalent for interest, taxes, and assessments. Such is the case where the property has been fully improved and rented, and where there has been no loss of tenancy or diminution of rental pending the condemnation proceedings. There is no error in a court's awarding, as part of the just compensation required by law, the amount of taxes and assessments paid covering the period where the original owner had merely the naked legal title. Where all benefits have been taken away, the corresponding burdens should be assumed by the State. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V COURT OF APPEALS JULY 2, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Republic instituted expropriation proceedings in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. RTC condemned the land and had it expropriated upon the payment of just compensation by the Republic. The issue arose in relation 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessorin-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of

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five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just compensation for the expropriated area. During this period, Pres Estrada also issued proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of said property to Bulacan State University and another 5 hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine carabaos. Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be depositing the amount equivalent to the just compensation of the property. Respondent filed a counter motion to raise the price of the property or an option to have the property returned to them. RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision. ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the return of the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to pay the just compensation for it. HELD/RATIO: No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the

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basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it was held that ―both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.‖ The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda de Villaroya, wherein the court ordered the return of the property does not apply in the case at hand. That case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.

REPUBLIC V VICENTE LIM JUNE 29, 2005 FACTS: The petitioner, Republic instituted expropriation proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC

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ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of just compensation. For failure of the petitioner to pay the just compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for damages and recovery of possession of the land against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return of the property because of the notation in the TCT which stated that, ―subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.‖ They were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage in 1976 for the former‘s failure to pay. In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This decision was sustained by the CA. A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for reconsideration was filed. ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of the land despite its failure to pay respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation. HELD/RATIO: As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondent‘s

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predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as ―reasonable market value of the two lots in question.‖ Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court‘s mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation. From the taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner for his loss. There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation, and that ―non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession

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of the expropriated lots.‖ However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republic‘s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that ―the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.‖

BELEN V CA A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. In the early part of 1978 part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family without Belen‘s consent. Belen and Juliano came to an agreement that he would be allowed to stay temporarily by paying half of the rentals to Manotok Services A fire razed their properties. Upon Juliano‘s pleas, he was allowed to build another house in the property for a period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him to vacate the premises.

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In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670. His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on certiorari with the SC ISSUE: WON there was valid expropriation of the property HELD/RATIO: No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called "Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this Court as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation." PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a

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housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL V CA JANUARY 23, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Filstream is the owner of adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before MTC of Manila against private respondents on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to vacate the premises and pay the back rentals. This decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which the decision became final and executory. However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said property. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low and thus violative of the just compensation provision. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

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During this period, Filstream filed for motion for execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The private respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay the execution due to the supervening event which is the expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case for issuance of writ of execution and petition for certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping). Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was granted. Private respondents then filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition for certiorari with the SC to nullify the resolutions of the CA. The two cases were consolidated. ISSUE: WON petitioners were denied due process of law by the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for failure to submit clear and readable copies. HELD/RATIO: Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation

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proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. Where substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice. Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for non-compliance with respondent court‘s internal rules, respondent CA should have instead entertained petitioner Filstream‘s petition for review on Certiorari, and ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding pleadings which it deems relevant and replace those which are unreadable.

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BIGLANG AWA V JUDGE BACALLA NOVEMBER 22, 2000 FACTS: The Biglang-awa‘s are the registered owners of certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City. The government needed to expropriate part of the aforesaid property of petitioner for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic to submit documents to determine just compensation of the property and failure to do so would give rise to an expropriation proceeding for said property. Petitioner failed to submit the said documents and thus the Republic through the DPWH filed with RTC an expropriation suit for the said properties. The respondent deposited the amount for the compensation of the properties of the petitioners and thus the RTC issued a writ of possession. An order to vacate the premises was also issued to petitioners. The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration on the ground that respondent failed to comply with the provisions of E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the acquisition of, or entry into, the property being expropriated. This was denied the RTC. Thus a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC. ISSUE: WON the right to due process of the petitioners was violated by respondent Republic

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HELD/RATIO: No. Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. The trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited, Thus, , the only requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ―ministerial. The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure alone is neither ―capricious‖ nor ―oppressive‖, as the said rule affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation of their property in expropriation proceedings, one of which is the deposit requirement which constitutes advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds, and stands as indemnity for damages should the proceedings fail of consummation.

FRANCIA V MUNICPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN MARCH 24, 2008 A complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of Meycauayan against petitioners Francia

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for the purpose of establishing a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks. Petitioners allege that the land to be expropriated was raw land which was soon to be developed by them and that the price offer was too low. RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose and that it would improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. It ordered that writ of possession be issued upon deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the property. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for failure to hold a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. CA nullified the order of expropriation but retained the writ of possession. Thus the appeal to the SC. ISSUE: WON prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession HELD/RATIO: Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.

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CITY OF MANILA V SERRANO JUNE 20, 2001 FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila‘s first district in Tondo. One of the properties sought to be expropriated was Lot 1-C belonging to Felisa De Guia. After her death, the estate of Feliza de Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the regional trial court, branch 53, manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986. The property was subsequently sold on January 24, 1996 to Demetria de Guia to whom TCT no. 226048 was issued. Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, with the RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), Respondents allege that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because RA. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation. Dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. After petitioner had made a deposit, RTC issued a writ of possession to petitioner. Respondents filed for a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that said

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properties were not exempt from execution. Nevertheless, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation as was held in Filstream v CA. Thus petitioners were enjoined from expropriating the said property. Hence this petition. ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it held that there had been no compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. no. 7279. HELD/RATIO: Yes. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. no. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the law. Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated

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CITY OF ILOILO V JUDGE LEGASPI NOVEMBER 25, 2004 FACTS: On 07 March 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, Administratrix of the estate made a formal estate to purchase the property for P250 per square meter for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with the city‘s housing development program Later Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against private respondents. On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited 15% of the fair market value of the property may immediately take possession of the property in accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160 Judge Legaspi held in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession until after the trial on the merits of the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus the filing of this petition. ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: WON petitioner is entitled to the writ of possession Yes. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in an expropriation suit are as follows: (1) the filing of a

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complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that ―hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated.‖ From the foregoing, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance with the requirements for socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for socialized housing. For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. WON there has been a waiver on the part of petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine

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(9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time limit as to when a local government may immediately take possession of the real property. As long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.

NAPOCOR V POBRE AUGUST 12, 2004 FACTS: Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resortsubdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the property after it was certified by the Commission on Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain

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Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 squaremeter portion of the Property to which the court granted upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092 Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it had found an alternative site and that it had already abandoned the said project in Pobre‘s property. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss but without prejudice to Pobre‘s allegation in relation to damages he incurred. RTC later ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to execute the deed of sale upon full payment.

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Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC. ISSUE: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its own complaint in eminent domain cases. No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 171 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions

G.R. NO. 139495. NOVEMBER 27, 2000 MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) V. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN 1

SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.

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FACTS: Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land that she sold by eminent domain to the government to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu. Since the project never pushed through, Chiongbian said that she was assured by NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used. ISSUE: WON the land can be reconveyed? HELD: NO The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination CHIONGBIAN‘s testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed.

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Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.[26] A judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties[27] and it is not valid and binding on a party who did not sign the same.[28] Since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot legally invoke the same.

AGAN JR. V. PIATCO MAY 5, 2003 The petitioners (a mix of employees and service providers of NAIA Terminal I and II), which stand to lose their livelihood with the implementation of 1997 Concession Agreement, Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and Supplements, seeks to prohibit PIATCO, MIAA and DOTC in the implementation of said agreements. FACTS: 1) 1989 August, DOTC engaged Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA to determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. 2) ADP submits its Draft Final Report to the DOTC on December 1989. 3) 1994 October 5, Asia‘s Emerging Dragons Corp. (AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA Terminal III under a BOT agreement.

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4) 1996 February 13, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project. 5) 1996 July 23, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee invited all bidders to a pre-bid conference on Jul 29. Second pre-bid confe was held on August 29. 6) 1996 September 20, the Paircargo Consortium (composed of People‘s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc., Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc., and Security Bank Corp.) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. 7) 1996 October 2, PBAC notified AEDC that Paircargo, had pre-qualified. 8) 1997 February 27, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into PIATCO. 9) 1997 April 1, DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDAICC. 10) 1997 July 9, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO. July 12, the Government and PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement. 11) 1998 November 26, the Government and PIATCO signed ARCA. 12) Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA dated 27 Aug 1999, 4 Sept 2000, and 22 June 2001. 13) 2002 Sept 17, the workers of the international airline service providers filed a petition for Prohibition. Other petitioners followed filing. 14) 2003 March 6, PIATCO informed the Court that PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before the International Court of Arbitration pursuant to Sec 10.02 of the ARCA.

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ISSUE :WON the Concession Agreement is unconstitutional? HELD: YES Sec. 5.10 of the 1997 Concession Agreement violates Article XII, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitutional provision allows for temporary takeover of public facilities in times of national emergency. Since the takeover is temporary and extends only to the operation of the business and not the ownership, government is not required to compensate the owner. Neither can the owner claim just compensation for the use of the business and its properties because the takeover is in exercise of the State‘s police power and not of its power of eminent domain. The 1997 Concession Agreement, on the other hand, says that in the event of a takeover, ―Concessionaire shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover…‖ ―PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government and obligate the government pay reasonable cost for the use of Terminal and/or Terminal Complex. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its exercise must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its exercise. Also, The 1987 Constitution strictly regulates monopolies. Art XII, Sec. 19 says: The State shall

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regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. The 1997 Concession Agreement gave PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within the island of Luzon, with the exception of already existing terminals such as those in the Subic Bay Freeport, Clark Special Economic Zone, and in Laoag City. This privilege, however, is subject to reasonable regulation and supervision and should not violate the rights of third parties. There are service providers at the NAIA I with existing contracts with the MIAA valid until 2010; since the 1997 Concession Agreement says PIATCO is not bound to honor existing contracts with MIAA, transferring operations from NAIA I to NAIA III would unduly prejudice them. ―PIATCO cannot, by law and certainly not by contract, render a valid and binding contract nugatory. PIATCO, by the mere expedient claiming an exclusive right to operate, cannot require the Government to break its contractual obligations to the service providers.‖

G.R. NO. 146587, JULY 2, 2002 REPUBLIC V. CA RP instituted expropriation proceedings to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the ―Voice of the Philippines‖ project. It was afterwards utilized by the Bulacan State University. Luis Santos, the respondent, previously owned part of the expropriated area. A Complaint was filed due to the fact that a sum of 1m remained unpaid by the government.

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ISSUE: (1) WON the property was taken under eminent domain? YES (2) WON the previous owner can recover the property? NO (3) WON interest should be paid by the Republic along with the just compensation? YES HELD: (1) The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, , all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect

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merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: (1) the taking must be for public use, (2) just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining ―public use,‖ two approaches are utilized – (1) public employment or the actual use by the public, and (2) public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. In this case, the expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out

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that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use. (2)as ruled in Valdehueza v Republic, ―plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value‖ In this case, petitioner has occupied, utilized an exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in remproceeding, condemnation acts upon the property.After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance. (3) The constitutional limitation of ―just compensation‖ is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who

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receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. In this case, the lower court was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and ―took‖ the property.

G.R. NO. 112526, OCTOBER 12, 2001 STA ROSA REALTY V CA FACTS: Sta Rosa Realty was the registered owner of two parcels of land that according to petitioner, were watersheds which respondents usurped its rights. These respondents sought an easement of right of way over the area and petitioned DAR for compulsory acquisition, which Sta Rosa objected to since the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. DARAB however ruled in favour of the acquiisiton and ordered payment to Sta Rosa.

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ISSUE: WON the property is covered by CARP despite fact that part of it is a watershed area? HELD: remanded to DARAB RA 6657 provides for two modes of acquisition: (1) compulsory (2) voluntary. In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation

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(2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. POLICE POWER: To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. EMINENT DOMAIN: But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR. Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to the proper classification of the land. While The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, due to proof showing that the the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage

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of CARP because of its very high slopes, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

G.R. NO. 139083, AUGUST 30, 2001 PARIS V ALFECHE FACTS: Florencia Paris is the registered owner of a parcel of land tenanted by respondents who are recipients of Emancipation Patents. Paris argues that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being contrary to law. She argues that her homesteads are exempt from land reform. In support of her position, she cites the cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants. ISSUES: (1) WON Paris‘ lands are exempt from land reform? NO (2)WON Paris‘ is entitled to just compensation? YES HELD: (1) PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:

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"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it." Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who had been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties. However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote: ". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree." Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm

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(2) Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full payment of the cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted, their value had not even been determined yet. In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.

G.R. NO. 155746, OCTOBER 13, 2004 LAGCAO V LABRA FACTS: The province of Cebu donated to the city of Cebu parcels of land which the petitioners purchased on instalment basis. However, problems as to their ownership ensued. First, the Province of Cebu tried to reacquire the land from which the petitioners were able to get a favourable decision from the court. Second, the lot they purchased had squatters which they instituted ejectment proceedings against but during a request of deferment of the demolition by the City to find another location for the squatters, the Sagguninang Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution that identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Thus the present petition by the petitioners alleging that the expropriation of the property is unconstitutional? ISSUE: WON expropriation?

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to

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HELD: NO While housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is (1) genuine necessity and (2) that necessity must be of public character. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sec 9 and 10 provide for (1) order in acquisition of land (2) priority in modes of acquisition. In this case, the order was not followed. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. The City of Cebu failed to establish that (1) no other land is appropriate for their housing projects and (2) exhausted all other modes of acquisition and made a valid and definite offer. The petition is therefore granted in favour of petitioners to reacquire their land.

G.R. NO. 137152, JANUARY 29, 2001 CITY OF MANDALUYONG V FRANCISCO

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FACTS: The City of Mandaluyong filed expropriation proceedings against defendants for urban land reform purposes. The respondents argued that they had no right to expropriate due to the ff: (1) Not for a public purpose (2) Lots are too small and petitioner already has a lot of other lots for socialized housing (3) the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. The TC ruled in the favour of respondents, stating that they were ―small property owners‖ thus exempt from expropriation. This was affirmed by CA thus the present petition. ISSUE: WON the lands may be expropriated? HELD: NO Due to the passage of the Urban Det and Housing Act, all city and municipal govts were (1) mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities (2) identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, (3) acquire the lands (4) dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or

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abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. They also may be acquired through the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. In this case, the SC found that the respondents fell under ―small property owners‖ which is define: ―those whose only real property consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas." The partition of the property six months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts. Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279 TAN V. DEL ROSARIO (237 SCRA 324) FACTS: Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income

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Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional provision: Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one who practice his profession and not to those who are engaged to single proprietorship. Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the aforestated provision of the constitution HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and; applies to all things of equal conditions and of same class. It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to the existence of substantial difference between one who practice his profession alone and one who is engaged to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups: Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496 was an independent law. But since it is attached to a

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law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no violation of equal protection clause.

PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: hether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. HELD: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. OSMENA V. ORBOS (220 SCRA 703) FACTS: On October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). It was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude oil.

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Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956, promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost under recovery incurred due to the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the under recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance. Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective." Further, that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created." ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the powers granted to the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the State. NO. HELD: The OPSF was established precisely to protect local consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the

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economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise, for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil companies are allowed to recover those portions of their costs which they would not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices existing at any given time. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.: ―The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.‖ Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.

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PUNSALAN V. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it. ISSUE: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation. HELD: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is

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imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.

LLADOC V. CIR FACTS: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest. ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid. HELD: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished

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from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

GEROCHE V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACTS: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR‘s projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a chance to be heard and be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax. HELD: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State‘s police power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and assures the attainment and

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perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the country‘s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit of the State‘s police objectives If generation of revenue is the primary purpose regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact revenue is incidentally raised does not make imposition a tax.

and tax; that the

The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION V. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: The petitioner-appellant, an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage clinics in the City of Manila and other parts of the country, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659, promulgated by the Municipal Board and approved by the City Mayor. The main contention of the appellant in its appeal and the principal ground of its petition for declaratory judgment is that the City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the operation

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of

massage

clinics

within

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its

jurisdiction

HELD: If we can ascertain the intention of the Manila Municipal Board in promulgating the Ordinance in question, much of the objection of appellant to its legality may be solved. It would appear to us that the purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much less to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in the Philippines. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. This intention can readily be understood by the building requirements in Section 3 of the Ordinance, requiring that there be separate rooms for male and female customers; that instead of said rooms being separated by permanent partitions and swinging doors, there should only be sliding curtains between them; that there should be "no private rooms or separated compartments, except those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing room, office or kitchen"; that every massage clinic should be provided with only one entrance and shall have no direct or indirect communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building; and that no operator, massagists, attendant or helper will be allowed "to use or allow the use of a massage clinic as a place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any immoral or incident act", and in fixing the operating hours of such clinic between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m.

As regards the permit fee of P100.00, it will be seen that said fee is made payable not by the masseur or massagist, but by the operator of a massage clinic who may not be a massagist himself. Compared to permit fees required in other operations, P100.00 may appear to be too large and rather unreasonable. However, much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of said fee without considering it as a tax for revenue purposes: The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the police power. The amount may be so large as to itself show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked distinction between license fees imposed upon useful and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the latter case the fee may be very large without necessarily being a tax Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals, and consequently, imposed the said permit fee for its regulation

COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS V. CITY OF MANILA FACTS: Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) paid the City of Manila the fixed license fees prescribed by Ordinance 3358 for the years 1954

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to 1957. In 1954, City Ordinance 3634 and 3816 were passed; where the term ―general merchandise‖ found therein included all articles in Sections 123 to 148 of the Tax Code (thus, also liquor under Sedctions 133 to 135). The Tabacalera paid its wholesaler‘s and retailer‘s taxes. In 1954, the City Treasurer addressed a letter to an accounting firm, expressing the view that liquor dealers paying the annual wholesale and retail fixed tax under Ordinance 3358 are not subject to the wholesale aand retail deaklers‘ taxes prescribed by City Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816. The Tabacalera, upon learning of said stopped including quarterly sworn declaratons required by the latter ordinances, and in 1957, demanded refunde of the alleged overpayment. The claim was disallowed. ISSUE: Whether there is a distinction between Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634, 3301 and 3816, to prevent refund to the company. HELD: Generally, the term ―tax‖ applies to all kinds of exactions which become public funds. Legally, however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal license fees for the privilege to engage in the business of selling liquor or alcohol beverages; considering that the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially) harmful to public health and morals, and must be subject to supervision or regulation by the State and by cities and municipalities authorized to act in the premises. On the

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other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816 imposed taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale or retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation, or for selling the same article, without it being in violation of the rule against double taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in its letter is of no consequence as the government is not bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its officers, specially on matters of law. The company, thus, is not entitled to refund

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA‘s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing

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real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaque‘s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of ―government-owned andcontrolled corporations‖ upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA‘s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor. ISSUE: WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. HELD: 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

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MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises ―all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.‖ 2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

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No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like ―roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,‖ are owned by the State. The term ―ports‖ includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a ―port‖ constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one ―intended for public use.‖ The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user‘s tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

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The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax. c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA‘s case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance. d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely

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toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAA‘s assets adverse to the Republic. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V GUINGONA GR NO. 134577 (18 NOVEMBER 1998) (POLITICAL QUESTION) Petitioners herein filed a petition for quo warranto calling for the Court to annul the election of Senator Juan Flavier as the Senate Minority Floor Leader and declaring Senator Francisco Tatad as the rightful holder of that position.

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The Eleventh Congress was composed of 10 senators from LAMP, 7 senators from Lakas-NUCDUMDP, 2 independents, and 1 each from LP, Aksyon Demokrasya, PRP, and Gabay Bayan. During its first regular session, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party, numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCDUMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader. It is the petitioners' position that when the Constitution says that the Senate President shall be elected by ―a majority‖ of its members, then those who did not vote for the Senate President would constitute the minority. Thus, by recognizing the Lakas-NUCDUMDP senators as the minority block, the Constitution has been violated. ISSUE: (1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case; (2) WON there has been a violation of Section 16(1), Article 16 of the Constitution.

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HELD: The Court took cognizance of the case despite protestations from the respondents of a political question. Jurisdiction being determined by the allegations in the pleading or petition, the Court said that the allegation of petitioners of a violation of the Constitution made for a case over which it had a prima facie jurisdiction. The petition calls for an interpretation or application of the Constitution and whether the Senate President had correctly construed the meaning of the words ―minority‖ and ―majority‖ which, under the Court's expanded duty under Article VIII, falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction. The Court then observed that the Constitution did not provide for the manner of selecting other officers of Congress apart from the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. All that the Charter says is that '[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.' Thus, the method of selecting such officers must be prescribed and is a prerogative of the houses of Congress themselves. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders and neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices nor prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold.

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Thus, while adherence to the Constitution is a proper question for the Court, this case does not actually present a question which the Court can pass upon. Nonetheless, the Court, calling upon its duty ―to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion,‖ declared that the Senate President did not abuse his discretion in recognizing the LakasNUCD-UMDP senators as the minority block in view of the fact that it is one of the minority groups in the Senate. PETITION DISMISSED. (Also see: Bagatsing v Committee on Privatization, Sanidad v COMELEC 73 SCRA 333, and Romulo v Yniquez 141 SCRA 263)

JAWORKSI V PAGCOR GR NO. 144463 (14 JANUARY 2004) (DELEGATION OF POWERS) Respondent PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 and was granted a franchise ―To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance.‖ On 31 March 1998, the PAGCOR entered into an agreement with its corespondent SAGE Corporation whereby it granted the latter authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR‘s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors.

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Petitioner sought the nullification of the contract claiming among other that PAGCOR had no power to grant SAGE the authority to operate gambling activities via the internet. HELD: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. In the case at bar, the agreement entered into by PAGCOR and SAGE, in essence, gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR‘s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditions. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator‘s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

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(See also: Lim v Pacquing 240 SCRA 649)

GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 211 SCRA 219, GR NO. 157584 (SAME; PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION) On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Petitioner Garcian, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

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HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ." (See also: Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v CA GR No. 100481, 22 January 1997 where the Legislature delegated the power to fix rates to the President who may then exercise such power directly without first withdrawing the earlier delegation made to the Philippine Ports Authority.)

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RODRIGUEZ V GELLA 92 PHIL 603, GR NO. L-6266 (SAME; EMERGENCY POWERS DELEGATED TO PRESIDENT)

THE

On 16 December 1941, Congress, pursuant to Section 26, Article VI of the then Constitution, passed CA 671, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war involving the Philippines and authorizing the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency." Subsequently, Congress filed HB 727 intending repeal CA 671 but which the President vetoed on the ground that war was still subsisting as a fact due to the Korean War. Subsequently still, the President issued EO 545 and 546 appropriation funds for various purposes. Petitioners seek to invalidate the issuances. ISSUE: WON the EO‘s are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO‘s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is

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not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. (See also David v Macapagal-Arroyo which distinguishes the power of the President to declare a ―state of emergency‖ under Sec 18, Art VII and the exercise of emergency powers under Section 17, Art XII)

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PEOPLE V VERA 65 PHIL 56, GR NO. L-45685 (SAME; DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE; DELEGATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because, among other things, Act No. 4221, the Probation Law, is an undue delegation of legislative power in that it subjects the effectivity of the measure to the absolute discretion of the provincial boards in Section 11 thereof: ―This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.‖ ISSUE: WON there is an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the

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doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. (Note: The decision said that Legislatures may validly leave the determination of the applicability of measures to the people [so-called option laws] but that such laws can only be of local application. The effectivity of laws of general application cannot without running afoul of nondelegation and equal protection.) (See also: Osmena v Orbos, Tablarin v Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730, Eastern Shipping v POEA 166 SCRA 533, and, in contrapposto, Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v Garcia)

CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES V POEA 243 SCRA 666, GR. NO. 114714 (SAME; DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES) Respondent POEA issued Board Resolution 1 in January 1998, mandating the increase compensation

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and benefits the provided for in POEA's Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. Thus, the contract now provides that:  in case of death, the employer should pay the beneficiaries in the amount of $50,000 and additional $7000 to each child under 21 but not more than 4 children;  if done within war or warlike area, it should be doubled. Petitioners filed an action seeking to nullify the resolution contending that the POEA does not have the power and authority fix rates for compensation and benefits as the same is a function of the Legislative. HELD: The Court found the issuance of Board Resolution 1 valid. While the making of laws is a nondelegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, the latter may nonetheless validly delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to administrative agencies in implementing a given legislation and effectuate its policies. This is because the legislature may sometimes find it impractical, if not impossible, to anticipate all the situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purpose of the law and that the regulation is not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. This is power of subordinate legislation. (Note: It goes without saying that for there to be a valid delegation of the rule-making power, the law effecting such a delegation must be complete in itself and must

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provide for sufficient standards that the administrative agency can follow.)

U.S. V ANG TANG HO 43 PHIL 1, GR NO. L-17122 (SAME; SAME; TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION; COMPLETENESS TEST) On 30 July 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 authorizing the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of rice, palay, and corn. Pursuant to this Act, on 1 August 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Subsequently, respondent Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos, a price much higher than that prescribed by the EO. He was thus charged and found guilty of violating EO 53. Respondent now challenges the validity of the issuance. HELD: The Court found in favor of respondent. Act No. 2868 is an invalid delegation of legislative power because it is not a complete issuance in and of itself. The completeness of a measure can be determined if, upon leaving the hands of the Legislature, nothing is left for the Executive and its administrative agencies but to enforce the policy enunciated therein. In the case at bar, it will be observed that what the respondent violated is EO 53 and not Act 2868. As a matter of fact, the Act does not penalize the sale of rice, palay, or corn at any price. It is only the EO which provided for that. Thus, Act

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2868 was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature as it did not state any clear cut policy which the Executive was then to enforce. It left the determination of the policy with the Executive. (Note: In Calalang v Williams, the Court held that something as general as ―public interest‖ or ―public welfare‖ was sufficient as a policy statement.)

YNOT V IAC 148 SCRA 659, GR NO. L-74457 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST) Then President Marcos issued EO 626-A, making the interprovincial transport of carabaos and carabeef as well as the slaughtering of caraboas in a manner not complying with EO 626 illegal. Petitioner Ynot was apprehended transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and pursuant to EO 626-A, the animals were summarily confiscated. Petitioner challenges the validity of EO 626-A insofar as it imposes a penalty without according the ownder the right to be heard. Furthermore, petitioner challenges the exercise by Persident Marcos of legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. HELD: The Court struck down the measure because it, among others, was an undue delegation of legislative power. The Court observed that the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission or, as the case may be, the Director of Animal Industrey were given authority to dispose of the confiscated animals/meat products by distributing them to charitable and similar

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institutions ‖as they may see fit.‖ The Court found this to be a ―roving commission‖ which provided the Executive officers so empowered with a wide and sweeping authority, unrestrained by the usual standard and reasonable guidelines or limitations to be observed in executing their mandate. Such authority, the Court said, is too laden with danger of partiality, abuse, and corruption. The Court said that the Executive's authority had to be ―canalized‖ within banks to keep it from overflowing. (See also: de la Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294, Demetria v Alba 148 SCRA 208, Lozano v Martinez 146 SCRA 323)

CHIONGBIAN V ORBOS 245 SCRA 253, GR NO. 96754 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME) Section 13 of RA 6734 authorized the President to merge existing administrative regions. Thus, President Aquino issued EO 429, ―Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.‖ Petitioners seek the nullification of the subject EO contending that the provision allowing the President to merge existing administrative regions did not provide for a sufficient standard by which the President may exercise such power. Hence, the provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that while RA 6734 does not explicitly provide for the standard by which the President may exercise the power to reorganize, such standard may nonetheless be

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abstracted from other statutes which have been enacted on the same subject. For example, in RA 5435, the President was given the power to reorganize the Executive Department ―to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency in government to enable it to pursue its programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.‖ The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law. The choice of President is logical because the division intended to facilitate the administration of executive departments and local governments. It has been traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the President the power to merge existing regions, Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions

GEROCHI V DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY GR NO. 159796, 17 JULY 2007 (SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME) Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power CorporationStrategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent ERC a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for ―Missionary Electrification.‖ Subsequently, NPC filed another petition praying for the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental Charge be approved for

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withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund manged by the PSALM. The ERC approved the petitions, authorizing that collection of the same from the end-users on a monthly basis and, eventually, the withdrawal of up to P70M from the STF. On the basis of the same, the Panay Electric Company, Inc. charged petitioner and all other end-users with the Universal charge which was reflected in their monthly electric bills. Petitioners now come before the Court to assail the Universal Charge provided for in the EPIRA to be implemented through the IRR in that the charge is in the nature of a tax and the power of taxation is a strictly legislative function. Thus, delegating the same to and administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional. HELD: All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.

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Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity endusers, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and management the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

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invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; (2) Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that ―all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control‖ invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; (3) And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‘s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

C. THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE KIM CHAN V VALDEZ TAN KEH 75 PHIL 113, GR NO. L-5 (DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION) Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had

HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,

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for ―the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.‖ And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase ―processes of any other government‖ and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. If, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur‘s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: ―A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.‖ xxx xxx xxx Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase ―processes of any other governments.‖ xxx xxx xxx Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in

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force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V DUQUE GR NO. 173034, 9 OCTOBER 2007 (SAME; WHAT CONSTITUTES “GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW”) PHAP filed this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code) claiming that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the scope of the Milk Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the International Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severel resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR. Relevant ISSUE: WON the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law

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of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Constitution, international law can become domestic law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties). Admittedly, the ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article 8. However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS. On the other hand, the Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be

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classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of international law.

IN RE: GARCIA 2 SCRA 984 (15 AUGUST 1961) (SAME; IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW SHOULD BE UPHELD) Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of ―Bachillerato Superior‖ in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the ―Insitututo de Cervantes‖ for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as ―Licenciado en derecho‖. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. ISSUE: WON a treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar HELD: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the

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Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

of securing a certification from the Nat‘l Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.

GONZALES V HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230, GR NO. L-21897 (SAME; SAME) Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

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As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in ―All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. (See also: Ichong v Hernandez 101 Phil 115)

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V LANTION GR NO. 139465, 18 JANUARY 2000 (SAME; SAME) On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069, ―Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America,‖ the

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department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. ISSUE: (1) WON private respondent can be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto; (2) WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to

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a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process. The rule of pacta suntservanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite (See also: Philip Morris, Inc v CA)

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E. DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND THE STATE CHAVEZ V ROMULO GR NO. 157036 (9 JUNE 2004) (DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND STATE; RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS) Pursuant to PGMA‘s speech stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief Ebdane issued the ―Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.‖ It revoked all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence(PTCFOR), subject to renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to court to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines. ISSUES: (1) WON the revocation of the PTCFOR's pursuant to the Guidelines is a violation of the people‘s right to property; (2) WON the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power HELD: The Court ruled against petitioner. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the

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issuance of the Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

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VI.

BILL

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OF

RIGHTS

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

PBMEO, a legitimate labor union, decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third shifts. PBM informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. It also warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration. Hence, PBM with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'" The Court of Industrial

v.

Relations found PBMEO‘s officers guilty of unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CIR. It ruled that the demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. It also ruled that while the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights 229 SCRA 117 (1994)

Simon, Jr. (in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City) sent a "Demolition Notice" to respondents (officers and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Inc) in which they were given a grace-period of three (3) days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North

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EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park." Afterwards, private respondents filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. Acting on the complaint, the CHR directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." The CHR denied the motion to dismiss. The Court ruled that the extent of CHR's investigative power is limited to ―all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring — "(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also

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refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action." Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. Republic v. Sandiganbayan 407 SCRA 10 (2003)

The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt

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practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The primary issue for resolution herein is whether PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The other issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the case before the presentation of evidence and the legality of the search and seizure. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG

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had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized them. Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

The City of Manila enacted an ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This ordinance was

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enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process. The City answered that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power. The trial court ruled that the ordinance as unconstitutional. In reversing the lower court‘s decision, the Supreme Court held that the mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and

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thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 124 (1919)

Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) filed an action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Joaquin Natividad, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stock- holders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) argues that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its property without due process of law because by the passage of the law the company was automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use. The issue is whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the

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registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to due process is universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property is concerned. However, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine ship-building. Hence, while Smith, Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision. Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978)

The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or

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casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondents challenged the constitutionality of said ordinance on the ground that is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The trial court held the ordinance as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court‘s decision and ruled that the ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

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Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1926)

Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness free from dismemberment and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable. Facts : Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do. Issue: Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the

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state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660 (1919)

Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. It includes the right to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways. Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally

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deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,‖ was challenged. Issue: Whether or not the said law is constitutional. Held: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. The reasons for the section included (1) it was an attempt for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General added the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Among other things, it was held that the term "nonChristian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its

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Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."

Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)

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Property is anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more than the things it owns; it includes the right to secure, use, and dispose of them. Facts: US citizens wanted to lease their agricultural land to Nakatsuka, a Japanese farmer. A Washington statute disqualified aliens who had not in good faith declared intention to become citizens of the United States from taking or holding interests in land in the State for farming or other purposes. It provided that upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he failed to disclose the nature and extent of his interest. Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings, as he threatened to prosecute them. Complainants alleged that the restriction violated the federal and state constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan. Issue: Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: No. Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into

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two classes -- those who may and those who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is forbidden, to own and as defined. The court disagreed with appellants and ruled that the case involved the privilege of owning or controlling agricultural land within the State. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance, and affect the safety and power of the State itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. Nuñez v Averia GR No L-38415 (1974)

Public office is not property but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer‘s right to office. Facts: Nuñez contested the election results for the Mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud, irregularities, and corrupt practices. The original protestee was Edgardo Morales who was ambushed and killed, hence succeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon. Nuñez‘s protest was denied on the ground that it was moot and academic, citing the Presidents General Order 3&4 to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees. Issue: Were the dismissal orders valid?

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Held: The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the similar cases of Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t must be emphasized that the `right' of the private respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite." The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote

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buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." Bince v COMELEC GR No 111624-25 (1995)

The court has recognized while public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right. Facts:  The elections for the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan, 6th District was composed of 10 municipalities.  Private Respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the Certificates of Canvass for San Quintin, on the ground that it contained false statements.  The Provincial Board of Canvassers ruled against Micu. Micu appealed to the COMELEC which credited Micu with 1,535 votes and Bince with 1,055 votes from San Quintin.  Micu and the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed petition for correction of votes. Bince ultimately had 27,370 votes and Micu had 27,369 votes. Bince was not proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from COMELEC and filed a formal motion for such authority.  COMELEC promulgated an order directing the PBC to continue with the canvass and proclaim the winning candidates.

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 The PBC acted on the petitions for correction, allowing such.  Bince appealed arguing the PBC had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  MICU filed an urgent motion for the PBC to reconvene and proceed with canvass. Bince filed a petition for preliminary injunction and alternative prayer for proclamation as winner.  The PBC Chairman filed a petition with COMELEC seeking a definite ruling as to who should be proclaimed, as there were corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, Micu will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.  Bince was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC ruled in his favor and annulled the proclamation of Bince.  Bince filed for certiorari, arguing the COMELEC resolution was promulgated without prior notice and hearing. The court ruled [relevant to syllabus] Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public

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office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate. We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.  Micu filed a motion to hear the pending incidents left in court. Both parties filed their respective position papers. The COMELEC ruled that Bince was to be proclaimed winner.  Micu filed an MR which was granted.

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Issue: Who was entitled to the seat? Held: Micu. In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more. In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes. Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation. As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice. Crespo v Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66 (1988)

Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed

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against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the responden t Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, highhanded, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary principles of due process.

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On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. Issue: Was petitioner denied due process? Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held: It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in t he absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

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In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception of institutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process. The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last local elections held on18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office. Republic v Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation GR No 149927 (2004)

A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process

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and teh non-impairment clauses of the Constitution it can be revoked by the State in the public interest. Facts: Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-naBato. When they discovered deposits in Mount Mabio, they applied for and were granted such license, but it was later cancelled. The Trial Court opined that it was a property right protected under due process, which required notice and hearing. The cancellation therefore was held to be unjust. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and cited the non-impairment of obligations and contracts. Issue: Did the cancellation of license violate due process for being without due notice and hearing? The license can be revoked or rescinded by executive action because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause. The license itself provides such condition. It can be validly revoked by the state in an exercise of police power in accordance with the Regalian doctrine. It also was not a bill of attainder, a legislative act inflicting punishment without judicial trial. The proclamation only declared the nullity of a license, not guilt or punishment. Even if it was an executive act by President Aquino, she was validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.

C. Jian 93 3 cases (Pedro to 94- 4 cases (Yu Eng Cong to Javier)

Kwong

Sin)

SATURNINA GALMAN, et al, petitioners vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents (1986) TEEHANKEE, C.J.:

Facts: - On August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino was coldbloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." - The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. Marcos instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it." - Due to the public outrage that followed, Marcos was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the assassination. The Board submitted their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. The minority report, submitted first, was received congenially and cordially by Marcos who treated

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the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan. In contrast, when the majority report was submitted Marcos coldly received the authors and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have done." Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy, while the minority report

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would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending, and one General Custodio as the crime could not have been planned without his intervention. Galman‘s widow, et al filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino assassination." They pray that the SC retrain the Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. Although the SC initially granted a TRO, it later withdrew the same. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. It in

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effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In their second motion for reconsideration, they included the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," where he revealed that Marcos ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases (People v Custodio) against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, The SC appointed a 3-member commission to hear and receive evidence of the charges of collusion and other relevant matters, andsubmit their findings to the Court. The Commission, upon reviewing the evidence found that the proceedings in the Aquino-Galman case had been vitiated by lack of due process and recommended that the prayer for declaration of mistrial in people v Custodio be granted.

Issues: 1. W/N the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan should be declared a mistrial. 2. W/N a retrial would constitute double jeopardy.

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Held: First Issue – YES, IT SHOULD BE The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of aright or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and are trial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the century -and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio .Second Issue – NO, IT DOES NOT. Ratio Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or

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acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Reasoning - Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanod bayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total

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absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure the irrecantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the" dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were no tmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian

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President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the government becomes the law breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to all. LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FRANCISCO, J.:

Facts: - Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president‘s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which

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Tabuena replied, ―Yes, sir, I will do it.‖ This order was followed by a Presidential memorandum repeating said order. - Tabuena, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds through a manager‘s check for said amount payable to Tabuena, which was encashed and delivered to Marcos‘ personal secretary. No receipt was issued. - The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, ―out of the ordinary‖ and ―not based on the normal procedure‖. Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented. It was even affirmed that were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA. - Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS Memorandum. Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan violated Tabuena‘s rights when it propounded several questions to witnesses. Held: Yes IT DID While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes

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only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination After the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10) questions Questions from the court after Tabuena‘s cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67), more than five times Prosecutor Viernes‘ questions on crossexamination (14), and more than double the total of direct examination and cross-examination questions which is thirty-one. The questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.i[ This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides But not only should his examination be limited to asking ―clarificatory‖ questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter‘s questions in length. The ―cold neutrality of an impartial judge‖ requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta

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when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.

IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, respondents. PURISIMA, J.:

Facts: - Imelda Marcos, was Minister of Human Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA). Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI). - Marcos, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement by virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI a parcel of land. - Marcos, as Chairman of PGHFI then signed a Sublease Agreement with Transnational Construction Corporation (TNCC). - Marcos was subsequently charged for entering into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. - The Sandiganbayan convicted Marcos of the charge after it found that the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement was unfair and

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unreasonably low in contrast to the rental rate in the Sub-lease Agreement with the TNCC. It appeared, however, that during the deliberation period the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit the petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Unlike Garchitorena and Balajadia, Atienza was in favor of exonerating Marcos. As there was no unanimity of votes, Presiding Justice Garchitorena formed a Special Division of five (5) justices composed of himself, Balajadia, Atienza, Amores, and del Rosario. It was found that Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario lunched together in a Quezon City restaurant where they discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices, Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit Marcos in some cases, and convict her in others. After the meeting, Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Issues: W/N Sandiganbayan violated Marcos‘ right to due process. Held: ABSOLUTELY.

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First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it. Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion of the three justices came to light only when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her conviction. Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases. Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza and Amores were members of the Special Division but were not present when petitioner's cases were discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. In effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They were denied their right to vote for the conviction or acquittal of petitioner. These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be tried by a collegial court. Pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether

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her cases are before a regular division of three (3) justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. It is indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the members of the division. Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative and could be changed. It is only after all the justices have been heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in importance for experience shows that an opinion that starts as a minority opinion could become the majority opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members. In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws. That minority opinion

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could sway the opinion of this Court towards the acquittal of petitioner. Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings for a void judgment does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our courts. More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused. Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

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GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: - George I. Rivera, the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"), was charged by the LBP President with dishonesty and violation of Anti-Graft laws on the basis of affidavits by Lao and Perez. - Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a 10% commission (which he received). He also received from Lao, a Wynner investor, P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. - Rivera was further charged with having served and acted, without prior authority required by CSC Memo Circ. 1025 as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month. - After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of CSC Rules. He was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3,

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paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The penalty imposed was forced resignation without benefits. On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which reduced the penalty to suspension for 1 year. On appeal by Rivera and LBP to the CSC, the CSC sustained the decision of the LBP. Rivera claims he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.

Issues: W/N Rivera was denied due process. Held: YES, HE WAS. In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said: In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose

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decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision. The case should be remanded to the CSC for resolution without the participation of Commissioner Gaminde. MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.

Facts: - Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic Representative Passenger, Handling Division. His duty consisted of checking in passengers and baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991

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he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of Japan Air Lines (JAL) for Flight 742. Mrs. Lolita Kondo, a passenger of Flight 742 filed a complaint alleging that Singson required her to pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took place where Singson was asked by the security officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession. However, when the lower panel of the check-in counter he was manning was searched, $265 was found. Singson was administratively charged and investigated by a committee formed by PAL, which found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. PAL dismissed Singson. Singson then lodged a complaint, which was heard by the Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who found PAL‘s evidence in terminating Singson‘s employment insufficient. Thus, he ordered Singson‘s reinstatement. On appeal to the NLRC (Raul Aquino was by this time the presiding commissioner), the judgment was reversed. Singson‘s Motion for Reconsideration was denied (this time, Aquino had no part). Singson assails the Resolution of the NLRC on account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal his own decision as labor arbiter

Issue: W/N Singson was denied due process.

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Held: YES, HE WAS In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations , the Court laid down the requisites of procedural due process in administrative proceedings, to wit: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. In addition, administrative due process includes: (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;

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(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. Singson was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL's appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter. Under Rules of Procedure of NLRC, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the Division that handed it down was not composed of three impartial commissioners. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. His right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. NLRC decision set aside and remanded.

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN TAGAY” and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO accused,

Facts: - During a barangay fiesta, witnesses heard several gunshots. Shortly thereafter, they saw Julio Herida, and Edmund and Rene Tracilla stabbing and hacking Herlito Delara, who eventually died. - Herida and Jamila denied any participation in the killing and claimed that it was Delara who attempted to kill Herida when he started firing his revolver at him, allegedly because of a misunderstanding arising from carpentry job on Delida‘s house that Herida failed to do. The trial court acquitted Jamila but found Herida guilty of murder. - Among Herida‘s assigned errors is that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him. He points out that over seventy percent (70%) of the testimonies of the prosecution‘s material witnesses were elicited by the judge, while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the judge himself. He submits that under these circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial was violated. Issue: W/N Herida‘s right to a fair and impartial trial was violated by alleged bias on the part of the judge.

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Held: NO The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial court did intensively question the witnesses. For instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution eyewitness, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from the judge. However, we note that the judge also intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When appellant took the stand, 63 questions were added, with 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge. The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however, was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer, the trial court had to ask many questions to clarify important matters. The judge‘s behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and decide the results. Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel. Disposition: Proclamation 420 is valid, except for the tax exemption.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARIETO ADORA, accused-appellant. PANGANIBAN, J.:

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plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

Facts: - Marieto Adora was charged with the alleged rape of Cecilia Cotorno, his brother-in-law‘s daughter who had been under his care and custody in Rapu-Rapu, Albay since the latter was a child. - Cecilia was raped by Adora on 4 occasions, and always under the threat that Cecilia or her aunt would be beheaded. Cecilia only broke her silence about the rapes when it was discovered that she was pregnant. Adora claims that the interventions of the trial court showed that the judge had sided with the prosecution; thus, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. He argues that: 1. the trial judge directed the prosecutor as to who should be called in as witnesses; 2. he disallowed as misleading a question propounded by the defense counsel, without waiting for an objection from the prosecution; 3. the questions propounded by the court on witnesses were not clarificatory, but were in the nature of a direct examination. Issue: W/N such acts by the judge showed bias on his part. Held: NO

―Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in directing questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the truth. . In such an effort, a judge may examine or crossexamine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party This is not only the right but also the duty of a trial judge. Under our system of legal procedure where he is judge of both the law and the facts, it is often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. ―We do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the permissible limits of what questions he could propound to a witness. The trial judge sought to elicit information on whether appellant used sufficient ―intimidation‖ on the victim. He wanted only to elucidate how the witness appeared to the court as she was testifying on the stand. That the answers of the witness formed part of the decision is not a proof of prejudgment or bias towards the prosecution. ―We believe he merely performed his function to ferret out the truth so his decision would be cogent and based on facts. Thus, we hold that the scales of justice had remained equal throughout the trial and appellant had been given a fair hearing characterized by the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.‖

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 People v. Castillo (1998)

Facts: Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside the pub while talking w/ his co-worker. Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the pub and informed him that he‘ll be on his way home. However, when he was about an arm‘s length from Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand. Eulogio placed a chair between the two to stop Castillo from further attacking Tony. Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of Tony‘s death was the stab wound on his chest. Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony by the compound of Iglesia ni Cristo. TC did not appreciate Castillo‘s defense of alibi and held that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, the accused having surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon. And although treachery was present,

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it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior strength. Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him, for propounding questions that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. He alleges that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral character, which could not be objected to by defense counsel, because they have been ventilited by the judge himself. HELD: Whether the judge was impartial. YES The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge‘s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge‘s queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions

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propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. There was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the ‗cold neutrality of an impartial judge‘ implicit in the guarantee of due process. That the trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. People v. Larranaga (2003)

Facts: Appellants assailed before the Supreme Court the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed against the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong and sentencing each of them to the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. Among other things, the appellants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Held: The Court reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason why it should deviate from the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the trial court. There was a clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly

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dragged the victims into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, held them captive against their will, and raped them. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting to her death, while Jacqueline has remained missing until now. Discharged state witness Davidson Valiente Rusia positively identified the appellants as the malefactors. His detailed narration of the circumstances leading to the horrible death and disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by, the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated as to its material points by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim's family. As the Court reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes, it could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify, against the appellants. In the same vein, it was improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives. Thus, as between the appellants' mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court was convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. Anent appellants' alibi, a thorough examination of the evidence for the defense showed that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of time and place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the

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Chiong sisters were abducted. In view of the foregoing, the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with modifications as to the penalty imposed and the award of damages. Considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants was, according to the Court, in order.

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no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel.

CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2001)

Topical: Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and made comments when the defense witnesses were testifying. Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his questions or comments. Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate but was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel were about to present additional witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites of alibi, thus: . . . Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be

FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against Paitim for DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service. Petitioners

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maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners‘ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty asc harged. The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is

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mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges. Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can not,therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.

Tejano v. Ombudsman (2005)

Facts: A report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, discovered an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G). It implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The resolution by the Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was affirmed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Office of the

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Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special Prosecutor and Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor. A reinvestigation was granted. The Special recommended the dismissal of the case, concurred by the Deputy Special Prosecutor. On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note ―assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.‖ Petitioner attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether Desierto acted with grave abuse of discretion Ratio: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. The officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review. InZambales Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal of the Secretary‘s own previous decision, which he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. The SC has equally declared void a decision rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor

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Relations Commission, because one of its members, Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of the case which he had earlier decided on as a former labor arbiter. Likewise, the SC struck down a decision of Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770 In earlier recommending the filing of information, then Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced, from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position contradictory to his earlier finding. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on appeal. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being

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human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier decided, thus: Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. His actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance when appearance is as important as reality. The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the government, is given ample power to designate another prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty. The fact that the motion for reconsideration of Ombudsman Desierto‘s disapproval of the 03 November 1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.

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21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of Ombudsman Desierto‘s actuation. As stressed in Singson v. NLRC: . . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner‘s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

Samartino v. Raon (2002)

Facts: Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite. On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment. They alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo,

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she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner‘s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted respondents‘ motion to declare petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. Issue: Whether the summons were properly served to Sarmartino Held: No. n actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be

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effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant‘s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant‘s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of. The substituted service should be availed only when the defendant cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. In the case at bar, the sheriff‘s Return of Summons simply states: This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I have caused the service of summons, together with the attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing his signature at the lower left portion of the original summons hereto attached. Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were

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made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner‘s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner‘s residence. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first

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be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.

Delos Santos v. NLRC (2001)

Facts: On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos (janitor) was illegally dismissed for alleged frustrated qualified theft when he was moving to the adjacent lot of the company upon instruction of a certain Narciso. Narciso Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The general manager, apparently appeased by Honrado‘s apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt of his letter of apology and exculpated him of any wrongdoing. However, the company through its counsel filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for frustrated qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack of evidence. On 23 August 1993, upon request of TopFlite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos, CAMARA STEEL terminated his services. Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March 1994 rendered a decision ordering respondent CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos CAMARA STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and, accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum and other pleadings. Respondent CAMARA STEEL

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empathically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded as respondent in NLRC-NCR Cases, subject of the present appeal, was never summoned for which reason it was deprived of procedural due process, therefore the case should be remanded. Issue:Whether jurisdiction over Top-Flit was acquired. Yes. Held: CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress upon the SC that Top-flite, being a necessary party, should have been summoned and the failure to do so would justify the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter. However, the records show that Top-Flite was not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was in fact afforded an opportunity to be heard when it submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by Top-Flite in par. 5 of its Motion for Intervention where it stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph but the Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of the position of the movant." In other words, the failure of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the opportunity to ventilate its side and challenge petitioner in its position paper, not to mention the comment which it submitted through counsel before the SC. It moved to intervene not because it had no notice of the proceedings but because its position paper allegedly was not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired by service of summons, it can also be acquired by voluntary appearance before the court which

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includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case, as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly worker, to tread once again the calvary of a protracted litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash of technicality. Bautista v. CA (2004)

Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc., for quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly Javellana. Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that they have been in actual and uninterrupted possession of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the name of respondents; and that the said title and the derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in dispute.

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After several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence. Petitioners claim that the arbitrary acts of the trial court have resulted in the denial of their right to due process, and that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged Orders. Petitioners further aver that the trial judge displayed ―noticeable partiality and prejudice‖ in dealing with their case, by granting several continuances to respondents while denying petitioner‘s Urgent Motion for Postponement. They cite four instances wherein respondents were granted extensions to file responsive pleadings and two instances wherein respondents‘ requests for postponement were similarly granted. Issue: Whether the trial court acted arbitrarily. No. Held: Far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the court‘s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.

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Petitioners‘ contention that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. In other words, we cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another day, because of the absence of a party. That the absence of a party during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent‘s witnesses is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or capriciousness.

Eastern Broadcasting v Dans, Carreon, et al. Gutierrez, J. 19 July 1985

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Facts:  Petitioner is asking to reopen the Radio Station DYRE which was summarily closed on grounds of national security.  The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it.  No action was taken by the respondents (Minister of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of National Telecomm, etc.) to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech.  Petitioner‘s president subsequently filed a Motion to withdraw petition since it had sold the station and that the new owner was granted the requisite license and franchise to operate said radio station.  However, the SC found the need to resolve the issue for guidance of the lower courts. Issue: W/N due process was observed in the closure of DYRE. Held/Ratio:

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NO. Guidelines laid down by the SC: (1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. [a. the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; c. The decision must have something to support itself; d. The evidence must be substantial; e. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; f. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; g. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.] (2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be 3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule — that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the

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substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. (5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection. (6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy

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(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

Tatad v Sandiganbayan Yap, J. 21 March 1988

Facts:  Tatad, as Secretary of the Department of Public Information, was charged with alleged violations of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said report.  Five years later, he resigned. Two months thereafter, another complaint was lodged by Antonio de los Reyes against him this time with the Tanodbayan for the same charges.  1980- The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report recommending appropriate legal action on the matter.  Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied. MR also denied.  By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.  1985- the Tanodbayan approved a resolution recommending that informations be filed against

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petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, five informations were filed against him.  Petitoner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the informations on the follow grounds: 1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the informations; 2. Prescription of the offenses charged 3 of the 5 cases; 3. The facts charged where he allegedly failed to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973 do not constitute an offense; 4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant  Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. MR denied.  Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of

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the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial? Held/Ratio: YES. Antonio de los Reyes‘ original complaint, which was termed a report, was filed in 1974. Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits

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and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. There was such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated. Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced. Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. There was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of

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preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

Inocencio Gonzales v CSC Puno, J. 2 September 1993

Facts:  Gonzales was employed at the Agricultural Training Institute of the Department of Agriculture for 36 years. On his 25th year of service, he received a merit award recognizing his continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the government. On his 30th year, he repeated the feat. His record of service is without any wart of malfeasance or misfeasance in office.  1990- He had to visit his children in the US so he took several leaves of absences.

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 On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay starting from the second week of July to December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical check-up free of charge due to my childrens' medical plan benefits". The letter was personally delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his address in US.  For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not act on the letter-request. It was neither approved nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI started acting adversely on petitioner's request.  ATI's Assistant Director and OIC wrote to petitioner declaring him absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning him that should he not report within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped from the rolls. The letter was addressed at petitioner's house in QC. The letter, however, was returned to sender (ATI).  What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a copy of the order.  When he came back from the US and reported for work on November 19, 1990, he found out that Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his position. By himself, he protested to the Civil Service Commission on December 14, 1990. His letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems

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Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action. On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner was duly notified before he was dropped from the roll. His appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was rejected. Petition to the CSC was denied. Issue: W/N petitioner was accorded due process before he was dropped from the rolls. Held/Ratio: NO. It ought to be self-evident that security of tenure can not be a shield against absences without proper approval by the authorities. Leaves are matters of private convenience and cannot prejudice public service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on the higher needs of public service. Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he invokes the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution should be sustained. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1985 is the governing rule on notice before an employee can be dropped from the rolls due to absence without leave, viz: 4. The agency should notify in writing the employee, who is absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty (30) days, to report within five (5) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, he shall be dropped from the rolls. The Circular does not specifically state where the notice shall be sent. In the case at bar, ATI knew that petitioner was staying in the US. The letter of June 25, 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly

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carried his address in the United States. The records do not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge, however, the letter of ATI's Asst. Director and OIC was inexplicably mailed to his house in QC. The letter was not received by petitioner per certification of the Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City. The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right to continue his employment in the government and unduly dilutes the protection of due process. To be sure, the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36) long years of faithful and dedicated, service to the government of the petitioner. Nothing less than strict compliance with the demands of due process should have been demanded by the respondent Commission from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the case. Nor can we give our concurrence to the further ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial of due process to the petitioner was cured by the publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have been proper if the address of petitioner were unknown. Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru the newspapers. There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show that ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the petitioner. Petitioner filed his request for leave without pay on June 25, 1990 while still in the United States. Though petitioner has no right to presume that his request would be granted, nonetheless it was no less a duty on the part of officials ATI to act immediately on the

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request, if only because petitioner was abroad and needed reasonable time and resources to return to the Philippine on a five (5) day call. The OIC did not explain why all of a sudden the "exigencies of the service" required the immediate return of the petitioner. If the "exigencies of the service" were real why was he allowed to go on leave. Worse still, the order dropping petitioner from the rolls was never sent to him. Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he returned to the Philippines on November.

Alfredo Lim and Rafelito Garayblas v CA Carpio, J. 12 August 2002

Facts:  Bistro filed a petition before the RTC against Mayor Lim who allegedly instructed policemen to inspect and investigate its license as well as work permits and health certificates of its staff,  The inspection resulted in stoppage of work in the night club and restaurant operations.  Later, Mayor Lim refused to accept application for business license and work permits for that year.  Bistro interposes that municipal corporations cannot prohibit operations of nightclubs. They may regulate but not prevent.  RTC- issued preliminary injunction.  Lim, however, issued an order closing Bistro‘s operations.

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 Bistro filed a contempt case against Lim which was later withdrawn in exchange that the preliminary injunction be respected.  Lim- filed a motion to dissolve the injunction alleging that the power of the mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and staff is implicit in Manila‘s revised charter and in the LGC.  RTC- denied motion  CA- denied Lim‘s petition. A writ of PI may issue if the act sought to be enjoined will cause irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the status quo before a full hearing can be held on the merits. Issue: W/N Bistro was denied due process. Held/Ratio: YES. Injunction proper. There was no due process in the order to close the business. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of conditions of its business licenses or permits. He refused to grant the license even without considering whether the legal prerequisites were met. The authority of mayors to issue business permits is beyond question (LGC and Manila Charter). The power to refuse to issue such license and permits is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for issuance of such license and permits. The mayor must observe due process by giving the applicant notice and opportunity to be heard.

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The mayor indeed had authority to inspect and investigate for violations of conditions but does not have power to order a police raid on these establishments on guise of inspection or investigation. Lim acted beyond his authority.

Unicraft Industries v CA Ynares-Santiago, J. 26 March 2001

Facts:  Private respondents were employees of Unicraft for at least over a year, performing work necessary and desirable to its operation. Its principal office was in Apao, Mandaue City and when it opened a branch in Lapu-Lapu, private respondents were transferred there.  Unicraft however failed to comply with certain requirements and it was ordered closed by the local government thus effecting the mass dismissal of private respondents.  Private respondents: contended that they were dismissed because of their union activities.  Petitioner: no illegal dismissal, the closure of the branch was virtue of a lawful order of the LG.  Unicraft and its counsel failed to appear before the Voluntary Arbitrator who found in favor of private respondents.  Unicraft filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that they were denied opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before the voluntary arbitrator. CA remanded to the VA.

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 Instead of conducting further proceedings, however, the voluntary arbitrator filed a comment praying, inter alia, that he be declared to have lost jurisdiction over the case upon rendition of the judgment  CA re-examined the stipulation of the parties and thereafter rendered the assailed resolution allowing, among others, the partial execution of the decision of the voluntary arbitrator with respect to the award of separation pay and attorney‘s fees. MR denied. Issue: W/N Unicraft was denied due process. Held/Ratio: NO, it was not accorded due process at the VA level because it was not able to present evidence as can be gleaned from the stipulation entered into by the parties before the CA. This is an acknowledgment by both parties that the proceedings before the VA have not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed resolution ordering the immediate execution of the award of separation pay and attorney‘s fees. Prior to that, the VA filed a comment contending that he had lost jurisdiction over the case after he rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may still be subject to review, such as here where there was a violation of petitioners‘ right to due process and to be heard. In spite of statutory provisions making ―final‖ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, the SC has

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taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantive justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law where brought to our attention. The right of due process is fundamental in our legal system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons of convenience or merely to comply with technical formalities but because of a strong conviction that every man must have his day in court. In its most basic sense, the right to due process is simply that every man is accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Its very concept contemplates freedom from arbitrariness, as what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors all attempts to make an accusation synonymous with liability.

Jane Caras v CA and People of the Philippines Quisumbing, J. 2 October 2001

Facts:  Jane Caras was charge in 15 related cases of violation of the BP22.  When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded ―not guilty‖. Thereafter, trial proceeded.  The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and purchase

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orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the checks in question which were drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank. When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason ―Account Closed‖. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so. The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they were given to Marivic Nakpil,]alleged sister of the complainant, as ―guarantee deposit,‖ that is, for every gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued personal checks to guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor deposited with any bank. With regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35, accused claimed that she entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her signature but without any amount or numerical figures on the face of the check. On May 13, 1994, the Court found her guilty of all charges. MR denied by TC. CA affirmed. Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been dishonored by the drawee bank

Issue: On due process, W/N failure to give notice of dishonor is a denial of due process.

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Held/Ratio: YES. ). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Lao v CA) Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, she cannot be convicted of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be rebutted by the accusedpetitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.

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The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioner‘s actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause.

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Mariveles Shipyard v CA Quisumbing, J. 11 November 2003

Facts:  In October 1993, petitioner corporation, Mariveles Shipyard Corp., engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Longest Force deployed its security guards at petitioner‘s shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan. According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force (LF). However, it found the services unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with LF. In turn, LF

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terminated the security guards (private respondents). Thus these private respondents filed a complaintfor illegal dismissal, underpayment of w ages, nonpayment of overtime pay, premium pay forholiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, and attorney‘s fees against LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Meanwhile, LF filed a crossclaim against petitioner. Petitioner denied liability on account of illegal dismissal, stressing that no employeremployee relationship existed between it and the private respondents. They also wanted the crossclaim be dismissed. The Labor Arbiter declared LF and petitioner jointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of complainants. It also ordered LF to reinstate to former or equivalent positions the respondents without loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages. NLRC affirmed in toto. CA denied petitioner‘s special civil action for certiorari. Petitioner avers that there was denial of due process of law when the Labor Arbiter failed to have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds that the Arbiter did not observe the mandatory language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 0102, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of Procedure which provided that: If the Labor Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting documents, he shall issue an

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Order to that effect and shall inform the parties, stating the reasons therefor… Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process. Held/Ratio: NO, he was given ample opportunity to present his side. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or that such hearing was not necessary. In any event, as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. We find that such opportunity more than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.

VALLADOLID v. INCIONG

FACTS:

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JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu). The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent financial and business information was being leaked from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to be the leak who sends important information to the competitor. Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In response to the application for clearance and Valladolid‘s complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor, in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding ―no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, much less reverse the Order appealed from‖. Contention c/o JRM: The order of Hon. Amado Inciong (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional. Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but it is not encouraged. HELD: The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation

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of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8, section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing anew the issues raised therein.

FERNANDEZ v. NLRC

FACTS: Reynaldo worked as a bus driver for Nelbusco, Inc. On February 28, 1993, the airconditioning unit of the bus which Reynaldo was driving suffered a mechanical breakdown. The company told Reynaldo to wait until the airconditioning unit was repaired. No other bus was assigned to Reynaldo to keep him gainfully employed. Reynaldo continued reporting to his employer‘s office for work, only to find out that the airconditioning unit had not been repaired. More than six months elapsed but Reynaldo was not given work. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal. HELD:

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As earlier noted, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain one‘s side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the case at bar, private respondents were given ample opportunity to do just that but they failed, for unknown reasons, to avail themselves of such opportunity. They themselves moved that they be allowed to present additional affidavits on August 19, 1991, but they never did; no valid reason was given for their failure to do so. Their contention that the labor arbiter failed to rule on their motion deserves scant consideration. It is axiomatic – in fact, it is plainly commonsensical – that when a counsel asks for an extension of time within which to file a pleading, he must be ready with that pleading on the date specified in his motion, even absent a resolution or order disposing of his motion. TORRES v. GONZALES

FACTS: In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres‘ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep‘t erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

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ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts, which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have

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breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who ―having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.‖ Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President‘s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. ZALDIVAR v. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent‘s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in

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the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC‘s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free‖ was publicized in leading newspapers. Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

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ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression. HELD: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society.

SEC OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE RALPH LANTION

FACTS:

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Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: W/N Jimenez is deprived of due process. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refers to an impending threat of deprivation of one‘s property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. GOV’T OF USA v. PURUGANAN

FACTS: This petition is a sequel of the case of Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion.

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HELD: No Violation of Due Process Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness. Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ‘s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge‘s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court‘s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule. It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings

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had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away. In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government‘s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, ―constitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests.‖ GOV’T OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA

FACTS: The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an ―Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. ‖Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent

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Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high ―flight risk.‖ After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denyinghis application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. ISSUE: W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail? HELD: No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to bail. Accordingly, although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee‘s rights to life, liberty, and due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, particularly the

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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed ―clear and convincing evidence‖ should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by ―clear and convincing evidence‖ that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may be granted bail on the basis of ―clear and convincing evidence.‖ ROXAS v. VASQUEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PCINP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract

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was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the respondents. After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process. HELD: It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and

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should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

Ortigas v Lufthansa J. Barredo

Facts: Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which was filled with discrimination. During the trial, there were several postponements of the trial from both sides. Three hearings were postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the request of both parties, and 10 on the request of respondents.

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Due to so many postponements made by the respondent, including the no-show of their European employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list due to his non-appearance in the day that the crossexam on him was to be finished and the judge moved for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no postponements were to be made again) Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a seat change to first class during the stop overs, he wasn‘t given any. He was only given the option when he was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from Manila. Issues: 1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of discretion when it denied the defendant‘s motion for postponement on Sept 24, 1966. 2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his testimony was not finished 3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant pay indemnities Held: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages from 100k to 150k. Ratio: 1. The case had been pending for about three years and had actually suffered during that period even more than the usually permissible number of continuances, quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's

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counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule had been served on counsel the month previous. It must be assumed that due preparations and arrangements were to be made since the receipt of that notice to insure the presence in Manila for the expected witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not leave their respective stations and places of work to attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was enough time and opportunity for defendant to have made the corresponding adjustments in the assignments of its personnel so as to enable its witnesses to be in court. As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed because of the absence of evidence only when such absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to procure it." This means that it must be shown to the court that due diligence had been exercised in either securing the presence of the evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof. Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well justified in denying the requested postponement. We cannot see any reason why, despite its having

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knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month before, defendant did not see to it that its expected witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible." 2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and oppressive and unwarranted harassment and embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule 132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form

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part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the impugned action of the trial court relative to the testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the same, they claimed that even his direct testimony, without taking into account anymore his answers to the cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff, cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses in defendant's answer. However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was but a logical consequence of the previous order denying defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial, the next thing in order was to declare the presentation of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it

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was necessary to determine what evidence could be considered to be for the defendant. And so when counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically no alternative for the court but to grant the same. Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer any objection thereto. 3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered to so dictate. Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the company's self-interest at the expense of, embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part of the plaintiffs. These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.

Emin v. De Leon J. Quisimbing

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Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of eligibility of the teachers. Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. The signature of Civil Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil service eligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the records showed that these certificates were never issued to any one. Two separate investigations were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates, The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and

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gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. His motion to dismiss was denied. Teacher witnesses for the prosecution Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A. 6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas‘ and Delgado‘s testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the fake certificates of eligibility. In its resolution, the CSC found Emin guilty. In his amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over the administrative cases against the public school teachers; and (2) whether petitioner was accorded due process. The CA dismissed the appeal. ISSUE: (1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the present case; (2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process. Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the coverage of the term ―teachers‖ are limited to: (1) public school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities; and (2) school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees

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under the category of ―medical and dental personnel‖. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words following an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Had Congress intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating Committee that should have investigated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC‘s jurisdiction over his case. Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself against charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary. Equally unmeritorious is petitioner‘s contention that he was denied due process. He avers that he was not allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in

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administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Nothing on record shows he asked for crossexamination as most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no crossexamination took place. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Commission. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Neither is there merit in petitioner‘s assertion that he was denied the right to due process when the CSC Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. The report submitted by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely recommendatory in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such procedure is not unusual in an administrative proceeding. Petition is denied. Rodson Phil. v. CA

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Facts: On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson Philippines, Inc., Eurasia Heavy Industries, Inc., Autographics, Inc. and Peter Y. Rodriguez, filed a Complaint for damages against respondent Eastar Resources (Asia) Corporation with the RTC Cebu. The respondent in its Answer, denied all the material averments of the complaint and interposed a compulsory counterclaim amounting to P29,000,000. After the presentation of witnesses, the petitioners filed their formal offer of evidence. The petitioners rested their case after their documentary evidence was admitted by the court. The respondent then presented one witness, Mary C. Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent prayed for time to make their formal offer of evidence. The court granted the respondent‘s motion and gave it a period of fifteen (15) days to do so. The court then granted the petitioners a period of ten (10) days from service of the said formal offer within which to file their comment thereon. The petitioners declared in open court that they would be presenting rebuttal evidence, and prayed that the hearing for the said purpose be set at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 1994. The case was reset to June 1, 1994. The respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and sent a copy thereof to the petitioners on June 1, 1994. When the case was called for the presentation of the petitioners‘ rebuttal evidence on the said date, the new counsel for the petitioners manifested her desire to recall the respondent‘s witness, Mary Maquilan, for further cross-examination. She reasoned that she was not satisfied with the cross-examination of the previous

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counsel, and asked for time to file the necessary motion. The court granted the same, and gave her fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the respondent a period of ten (10) days from receipt thereof within which to file its comment or opposition. The court held in abeyance the resolution of the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence until such time that the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan for further cross-examination was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the petitioners filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for further cross-examination. In the meantime, Judge Juaban retired from the government service. Judge Martin A. Ocampo was appointed presiding judge of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 7. The hearing of the petitioners‘ motion to recall the witness was set for hearing on March 26, 1996. During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners called the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan as witness for additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the petitioners‘ recalling the latter as a hostile witness on the presentation of its rebuttal evidence. In the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident despite the denial of the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan for additional cross-examination. On April 1, 1996, the trial court sent a subpoena to Maquilan, requiring her to appear before the court and to testify as a hostile rebuttal witness for the petitioners.

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The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident of Quezon City, which was more than fifty (50) kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled to testify under Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court. In its Order, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself upon motion of the petitioners from further hearing the case. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11, presided by Judge Isaias P. Dicdican. After a review of the records, the trial court discovered that the petitioners‘ motion to recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the petitioners had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of documentary evidence; and, that the said formal offer of evidence had not yet been resolved by the court. The TC issued an Order admitting the respondent‘s documentary evidence for the purposes they were offered. The petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set and prayed that they be given a chance to file their written objection to the formal offer of evidence filed by the respondent. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence did not toll the ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners‘ comment thereon. The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the petition for being devoid of merit.

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ISSUE: WON the court erred when it resolved the respondent's formal offer of evidence and admitted such documentary evidence before they could file their comment or opposition thereto. Petitioners assert that during the hearing of March 26, 1996, the petitioners called the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence, and that the court declared that there was no need for them to do so as yet because of the unresolved motion. They emphasized that even after the court denied their motion to recall Maquilan as witness and ordered them to present her as a hostile witness on rebuttal evidence, the court still failed to resolve the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. SC ruled that the petitioners were amply accorded the chance and/or opportunity to register their objections to the private respondent‘s offer of evidence. For as early as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged with knowledge or notice that they were being required to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that action on the offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the motion to recall a witness. Resultantly, since the disposition of the motion to recall was made the condition sine qua non for further action on the private respondent‘s offer of evidence, the petitioners should have lost no time in submitting their comment to the offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March 29, 1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further cross-examination. Even during the time that the petitioners were supposed to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast

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and loose with court processes. Even then, as correctly argued by the respondent, there was actually no more time to suspend, as it had long expired on June 12, 1997, for which reason the respondent‘s formal offer of documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution. Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing his discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and judiciously. The petitioners failed to append to their petition at bar a copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17, 1997 Order of the trial court, admitting the documentary evidence offered by the respondent. The said pleading is very relevant in this case, because we could there discern if the petitioners had prayed for a chance to file their comment on or opposition to the admission of the respondent‘s documentary evidence, and incorporated therein their objections to the said motion, if any. Even considering the merits of the case, the petition must still fail. Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994 within which to file their comment on the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within which to file such comment was not suspended by the filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioners‘ motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional cross-examination. What was merely suspended by such motion was the trial court‘s resolution of the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence. The petitioners failed to file their comment within the period therefor. Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that the respondent‘s formal offer of evidence was prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet file their comment thereon because of the petitioners‘

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unresolved motion. The respondent had already presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already testified on direct and cross-examination. Hence, the respondent was obliged to formally offer its documentary evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right to adduce rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome the probative weight of the respondent‘s documentary evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware that the respondent had a counterclaim of P29,000,000, it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance in filing their comment without delay. However, by their own negligence, the petitioners failed to file the said comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of certiorari to shield themselves from their own omission and negligence. It must be stressed that he who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with clean hands. AILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar‘s appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position. Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,

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together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent judge issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge gave another time to file her comment again. During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a judge. Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case. 2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process. 3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the

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status quo until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought. 2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trialtype hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process. In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he has availed of the opportunity to present his position. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he was given the opportunity to present his position. 3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner

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that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.

QUINTOS v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos and private respondent Jose T. Villarosa were candidates for Governor of Occidental Mindoro in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was declared winner with 57,136 votes. Petitioner lost to private respondent by 1,093 votes. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an election protest claiming that massive fraud and illegal electoral practices were committed in the contested precincts during the registration, the voting and the counting of the votes. On June 15, 2001, private respondent filed his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim. Private respondent‘s counsel moved that the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao be allowed to take first custody of the Contested Ballot Boxes before their transmittal to the COMELEC. The Comelec denied the motion. From the COMELEC‘s Order, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Private respondent stated that petitioner identified only one (1) ballot box as subject of his protest. Private respondent, however, identified thirteen (13) ballot boxes from the same municipality in his counter-protest. Thus, the total number of Contested Ballot Boxes, both in the protest and counter-protest, is 14. Private

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respondent explained that the Contested Ballot Boxes were also the subject of two municipal election protests both filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, and both handled by counsel of private respondent. The RTC ordered them to be brought before the court the Contested Ballot Boxes. Private respondent averred that if COMELEC Resolution No. 2812 were strictly implemented, the resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of Paluan would suffer undue delay. The COMELEC would take first custody of the 14 Contested Ballot Boxes. The resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of Paluan would have to wait for the COMELEC to complete its revision of the ballots in the Contested Ballot Boxes. On August 27, 2001, the COMELEC rendered the Assailed Order granting private respondent‘s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration subject to guidelines. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the COMELEC dated August 27, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the COMELEC denied petitioner's Motion. TOPICAL ISSUE: Whether the failure to give petitioner the opportunity to comment or oppose private respondent‘s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is a denial of due process. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC issued the Assailed Order of August 27, 2001 without giving him the opportunity to comment or oppose the motion for partial reconsideration. This, bewails petitioner, violates his right to due process.

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The Solicitor General correctly stated that there was no denial of due process since petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted on, albeit unfavorably, in the Order dated September 12, 2001. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one‘s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process since the COMELEC gave petitioner the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC, in issuing the Assailed Orders allowing the Regional Trial Court to take prior custody of the Contested Ballot Boxes, did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In giving the Regional Trial Court first access to the Contested Ballot Boxes, the COMELEC sought to prevent delay in the resolution of the two protest cases pending before the trial court. However, first access by the Regional Trial Court is only limited to the period of time when the COMELEC is still revising other protested ballot boxes. The primary concern for such arrangement is the expeditious disposition of protest cases, which is underscored in Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2812.

VILLARUEL, JR. v. FERNANDO

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FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (―ATO‖), Department of Transportation and Communication (―DOTC‖). Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (―Abarca‖), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (―CATC‖). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific region. Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary Cal at DOTC. Without acting on respondents‘ request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under ―preventive suspension‖ for 90 days without pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already

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lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit. Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner which the TC granted. For petitioner‘s continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial court‘s order of 26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (―OSG‖), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court‘s order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The TC declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.The TC ordered Villaruel to pay. Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a nonextendible extension until 13 December 1996 within

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which to file petitioner‘s memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner‘s appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. The OSG, through Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The Resolution became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition. On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Suspend Sheriff‘s Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial court‘s decision never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioner‘s memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998. ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process. The negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In short, the OSG‘s negligence binds petitioner. The petition has no merit.

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Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioner‘s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory. In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents‘ allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages. Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG‘s failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE v. GARCIA

FACTS: On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De Andrada (Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple) over Lot No. 6-H-2.

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On September 28, 1938, Patricia sold the property to petitioner. The Deed of Sale contained a provision that ―the purchase of Lot No. 6-H-2 was subject to the right of way granted by me (Patricia Ruedas Vda. de Andrada) to the spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia.‖ On April 17, 1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu and moved for the annotation of the August 17, 1938 document executed by Patricia on TCT No. RT-3972. Petitioner retained ownership over Lot No. 6-H-2 whereas the estate of the late Garcia couple (Garcia Estate) was inherited by Vicente E. Garcia and Jose E. Garcia from whom respondent acquired his title in 1996. Sometime after acquiring the Garcia Estate, respondent came across the 1952 documents that granted to the deceased Garcia couple a road right of way through petitioner‘s Lot No. 6-H-2. Thus, on May 19, 1997, respondent filed, before the RTC of Cebu, a cadastral court, a petition captioned “Engineer Edgar John A. Garcia v. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City G.I.R.O. Rec. No. 5988, Lot No. 6-H-2.” They want to inscribe and annotate in the TCT No. RT-3972 a road right of way. The cadastral court issued on June 6, 1997 an Order requiring the Register of Deeds ―to inform this [c]ourt regarding the status of the aforementioned title.

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In its Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds informed the cadastral court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under herein petitioner‘s name and that it ―appears to be clean and devoid of any encumbrance/annotations.‖ On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an Order granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner received a copy of the Order of July 23, 1997. Petitioner entered its special appearance and filed a ―Motion for Reconsideration and Recall‖ and expressed ―caution‖ that it was not necessarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Petitioner contended that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due process, that the petition of respondent was for specific performance of a private agreement cognizable only by an ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to enforce a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the statute of limitations and prescription. The cadastral court denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. The court held that firstly, there was no violation of substantial or procedural due process as the court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, it heard petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration in open court, and allowed both parties to submit their respective memoranda including documentary exhibits prior to its ruling on the motion. Secondly, the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree of 1979 eliminated the

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distinction between the general jurisdiction of the RTC and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a Land Registration Court. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record shows the existence of an easement of right of way in favor of respondent. On July 9, 1999, petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it in its Resolution of August 9, 1999. ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. NO The SC finds against petitioner. The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right to due process of the law. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence in support of one‘s defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. The records reveal that the cadastral court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the cadastral court heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in open court wherein both parties presented their respective arguments to defend their rights and the

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court likewise allowed the parties to file their respective memoranda prior to ruling on the motion for reconsideration. Indeed, deprivation of the right to due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his Motion for Reconsideration[20] as what happened in the instant case. Suntay v. People

FACTS: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner. On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs

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On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the

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respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition. Petitioner‘s Claim:  while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law. Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing Ruling: The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him. True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the

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petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious

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criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. Co v Barbers 290 SCRA 717

1. Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov Castillo-Co and Engr Ringor alleging that in the course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the HoR Committee on Good Government chaired by him uncovered some irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor & the Provincial Engineer 2. The equipment purchased was not brand new as required, there was overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment prior to delivery and an attempt to cover up the irregularities. 3. Co and Ringoer were then placed under preventive suspension for 6 months, a week after the complaint was filed. It was signed by the director and approved by the deputy

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Ombudsman. Both filed for motions for reconsideration contending they were deprived of due process because they weren‘t afforded the opportunity to controvert the evidence against them before the suspension order was issued. It was rejected thus this petition for review. Issue: W/N they were deprived of due process NO 1. A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. 2. Lastimosa case: suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. 3. The immediate issuance of such order is required in order to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to: xxx give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.

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Equitable Banking Corporation v Calderon GR 156168 (DISHONOR OF CALDERON’S CREDIT CARD, NOT TO EXCEED HIS APPROVED CREDIT LIMIT

1. Calderon, a businessman engaged in several business activities here and a broad, and a stockholder of PLDT is a seasoned traveler. He was issued an Equitable International Visa card which can be used for both peso and dollar transactions. Credit limit: 20,000 pesos and 3000 US dollars 2. He went to Hong Kong in 1986 and bought several Gucci items which amounted to 4,030 HK dollars = 523 US dollars. He paid with his card. 3. The saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors. 4. Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBC‘s wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed a complaint for damages against EBC. 5. Answer: card in excess of credit limit already, Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase.

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6. TC: "defendant bank was negligent if not in bad faith, in suspending, or ‗blacklisting‘ plaintiff‘s credit card without notice or basis, thus it was ordered to pay damages. CA affirmed the decision. Issue: W/N EPB was negligent/in bad faith for suspending the card without notice N 1. Question: Was moral damages proper despite its finding that petitioner‘s actions have not been attended with any malice or bad faith? NO 2. Moral damages - include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. 3. Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. 4. Here, the CA ruled that no malice or bad faith attended petitioner‘s dishonor of respondent‘s credit card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states: a. xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges shall

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be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof. 5. As to the suspension without notice, prior to the incident, Calderon made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong in the previous year amounting to 14 thousand US dollars while having only a deposit of 3,639 US dollars but even though they exceeded his limit, these purchases were accommodated. He was even late in his payment. 6. Although he deposited 14,000 US dollars the day he left for Hong Kong, he did not bother to request the bank for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension." 7. As issuer of the card, the bank has the option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the bank deemed proper, not the least of which are the cardholder‘s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any additional requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states: ―The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holder‘s privileges which have been terminated for any reason whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and upon payment of an additional processing fee equivalent to annual fee‖

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8. tThe provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad. Housing Authority v Evangelista GR 140945 2005

1. Petitioner filed a case for recovery of real property originally awarded to a certain Adela Salindon. After Salindon‘s death, her heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement where the property was transferred to the Florendos. However, the award in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and thus petition was declared the owner of the property. 2. Despite the decision, the property was auctioned off by the QC Treasurer‘s Office for unpaid real property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was a certain Sarte. 3. Because the Register of Deeds refused to register the final deed of sale issued by the City Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of title and confirmation of sale, which was granted by the RTC. Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name of Sarte who divided the property into two lots. 4. Now, petitioner filed a case against Sarte. While it was pending, Sarte executed in favor of

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Evangelista (respondent), a Deed of Assignment covering the 1st lot. TCT was then issued in his name. 5. Although it was annotated that there was an adverse claim. Petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint seeking to include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star Agri-Business and BPI as defendants but the trial court denied the motion. Thus it instead filed a complaint for ANNULMENT of the Deed of Assignment. 6. TC: auction issued in the name of Salindon where Sarte was the buyer is null and void thus TCT in favor of Sarte should be cancelled. Any transfer (including any assignment) is also declared null and void. 7. Evangelista (respondent/assignee) then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court‘s judgment particularly the nullity of the transfer alleging extrinsic fraud as ground. Since he wasn‘t a party to the civil case, he was prevented from ventilating his cause, right or interest over the property and thus the judgment was NOT binding upon him. ISSUE: W/N the judgment declaring void the assignment bound Evangelista No 1. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and resolution are void. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and

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his submission to its authority or by service of summons. In this case, it is undisputed that Evangelista was never made a party to the Civil Case. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court‘s decision decreed that ―(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are hereby declared null and void. , together with any transfer certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.‖ It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent‘s title to be nullified without being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. It was already after Evangelista acquired the property and after TCT No. 122944 was issued in his name that petitioner‘s adverse claim (Entry No. 7159) and a notice of lis pendens (Entry No. 1367) were annotated.

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7. It should also be pointed out that it was in petitioner‘s Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated, not the judgment. As records show, at the time the notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already been entered into by respondent and Sarte, and TCT No. 122944 was already issued in Evangelista‘s name on December 21, 1994. Insular Life Assurance Co v Young GR 140964 2002

1. Young acquired by purchase Insular Savings Bank from the Licaros family for 65,000,000.00. Young et al obtained 55% equity while Jorge Go et al owned 45%. The bank then granted them loans (153000000) secured by promissory notes. 2. Araneta, a stockholder of the Bank, wanted to purchase 99.82% of its outstanding capital stock for 340M on the condition that the ownership of the hsares will be consolidated in Young‘s name. Araneta paid Young 14M as downpayment. Young then bought from Go et al their 45% equity in the Bank for 153M. to pay this, he obtained a short-term loan of 170M from the International Corporate Bank to finance the purchase. 3. However, Araneta backed out and demanded the return of the downpayment. Meanwhile, Young‘s loan from Interbank became due. Young entered into a Credit Agreement with Insular Life for 200M. To secure the loan, he executed a deed of Pledge of 1,324,864 shares which represented

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99.82% of the outstanding capital stock of the bank. 4. He likewise executed a promissory note in favor of Insular Life in the same amount. The Credit Agreement provides that Insular Life shall have the prior right to purchase the shares owned by young and those owned by other stockholders. Thereafter, Insular Life and Insular Life Pension Fund informed Young of their intention to acquire 30% (Young‘s) and 12% (other SHs) of the Bank‘s outstanding shares 5. Insular Life and Young then entered into a MOA where Insular Life and its Pension Fund agreed to purchase common shares for a total consideration of 198M. However, it had discovered some irregularities in the Bank‘s ―kiting operations‖. Young took the responsibility and offered to the bank the 45% of his holdings as security. 6. Young admitted that due to business reverses, he shall not be able to pay his obligations under the Credit Agreement between him and Insular thus he unconditionally and irrevocably waive the benefit of the period of the loan. Thereafter, Insular Life instructed its counsel to foreclosure the pledge constituted upon the shares. IL then informed Young. A public auction was conducted wherein Insular Life appropriated to itself, not only the original 1,324,864 shares, but also the 250,000 shares subsequently issued by the Bank and delivered to Insular Life by way of pledge because there only IL submitted its bid for the first auction sale and a subsequent auction sale.

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7. Young and his associates filed with the RTC a complaint against the bank, IL for annulment of notarial sale, specific performance and damages alleging that the notarial sale conducted is void as it does not comply with the requirement of notice of the second auction sale. 8. RTC: dismissed the complaint and ordered the respondents to pay the Bank their respective loans. They appealed to the CA which reversed the decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the MOA executed is not enforceable considering that Young committed fraud, misrepresented on the warranties and failed to comply with his obligations. Dismissed. Hence this petition. 9. The CA reversed the decision ruling that the MOA is binding because it was not validly rescinded. Insular failed to notify Young in exercising its option to rescind the MOA. The Appellate Court then concluded that Young's loan with Insular Life is deemed fully paid based on the representation and warranty in the MOA that "the entire proceeds of the sale shall be used to pay off the outstanding debt of Robert T. Young to Insular Life. Likewise, it also concluded that the loans of the other respondents have been fully paid. Issue: W/N the MOA was enforceable and that the loan have been fully paid upon foreclosure of the pledge NO. 1. The CA construed the MOA as a contract of sale. But contrary to the findings of the CA, the MOA provisions negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. The MOA is merely a contract to

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sell since the parties therein specifically undertook to enter into a contract of sale if the stipulated conditions are met and the representation and warranties given by Young prove to be true. The obligation of petitioner Insular Life to purchase, as well as the concomitant obligation of Young to convey to it the shares, are subject to the fulfillment of the conditions contained in the MOA. 2. Once the conditions, representation and warranties are satisfied, then it is incumbent upon the parties to perform their respective obligations under the contract. Conversely, in the event that these conditions are not met or complied with, no obligation on the part of either party arises. 3. Since no sale transpired between the parties, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Insular Life purchased 55% of the total shares of the Bank under the MOA. Consequently, its findings that the debt of Young has been fully paid and that Insular Life is liable to pay for the remaining 45% equity have no basis. It must be emphasized that the MOA did not convey title of the shares to Insular Life. If ever there was delivery of the said shares to Insular Life, it was because they were pledged by Young to Insular Life under the Credit Agreement. 4. The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that the auction sale is void since petitioners failed to send a separate notice for the second auction. Based on Article 2112 of the Civil Code, there is no prohibition in the law against the sending of ONE NOTICE for the 1st and 2nd public auction.

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5. Petitioners contend that the CA likewise erred when it declared in its decision that the unpaid accounts of the other respondents have been fully paid. 6. There is no showing how the CA reached such conclusion. In doing so, the Court of Appeals violated the constitutional mandate that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 7. Indeed, due process demands that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. It must be observed that those respondents did not contest petitioners' counterclaim against them. Lorbes v CA GR 139884

1. petitioners mortgaged their land to the Carloses. A year later, the mortgage obligation had increased and fearing foreclosure of the property, they asked their son-in-law for help. Delos Reyes agreed to rdeem the property but because he didn‘t have money at the time, he asked his family friend, Cruz, an employee of Land Bank for help. 2. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Landbank using the subject property as collateral.

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3. Landbank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses informing them that the loan has been approved. TCT was cancelled and transferred in the name of Cruz. Years later, petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the property but the offer was refused. Thus it filed a complaint for reformation of instrument and damages claiming that the deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of the bank for the loan. 4. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon private respondents on August 1, 1994. Cruz/Delos Reyes filed their answer beyond the reglamentary period, or only on September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5, 1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private respondents in default, which the trial court granted in an order dated September 16, 1994. On September 30 of the same year, petitioners presented their evidence ex parte before the trial court 5. TC: in favor of the petitioners upon finding that the deed of absolute sale didn‘t reflect the true intention of the parties. 6. CA reversed the decision: Cruz/Delos Reyes were denied due process by the refusal of the trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based. The reformation of the Deed of Absolute

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Sale is improper because there is no showing that such instrument failed to express the true intention of the parties by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the execution thereof. ISSUE: (topic) W/N there was denial of due process YES W/N there the deed of absolute sale is an equitable mortgage YES 1. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. 2. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 3. In this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying private respondents‘ motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented by petitioners ex parte, especially considering that an answer was filed, though out of time. 4. The default order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of private respondents‘ due process rights. However, the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for by private respondents, and second, because the affirmative defenses and evidence that private respondents would have presented

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before the RTC were capably ventilated before respondent court, and were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the correctness of the evaluation of petitioners‘ evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the RTC. 5. Applying the foregoing considerations to the instant case, the Court finds that the true intention between the parties for executing the Deed of Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the property in question but merely to secure the housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to be immediately applied to their outstanding mortgage obligation to the Carloses. 6. Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and its supporting documents do not reflect the true arrangement between the parties as to how the loan proceeds are to be actually applied because it was not the intention of the parties for these documents to do so. The sole purpose for preparing these documents was to satisfy Land Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to Cruz‘s application for a housing loan was met. Tanada v Tuvera (ratio copied from a digest! )

On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. 

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Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.  The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.  Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity 

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Issue: W/N publication is still required in the light of the clause "unless otherwise provided" 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. 2. The legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to 1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; 2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; 3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; 4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; 5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. 3. Further publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. 4. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their

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approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the OG, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

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Republic v Express Telecommunications

1. On December 29, 1992 – BAYANTEL filed an application with the NTC (Nati‘l Telecomm Comm) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System. Prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel‘s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-pate motion to admit an amended application. Subsequently hearings were conducted. 2. Before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order (Dec 1993) stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR Inc., which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. 3. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On February 1, 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel‘s motion to revive the latter‘s application and set the case for hearings on February. EXTELCOM filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of Bayantel‘s application arguing

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6.

7.

that Bayantel‘s motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago thus all evidence are outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity. May 3, 2000 – NTC issued an Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service applying Rule 15 Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the order reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS. CA granted and dismissed Bayantel‘s amended application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. MR filed by the NTC and Bayantel. Meanwhile, Extelcom filed a motion for partial reconsideration, praying that NTC Memo Circular (allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS) be also declared void. CA dismissed all the motions. In the present petition, Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules of 1993 because these Revised Rules deleted the phrase ―on its own initiative‖, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of

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general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. ISSUE: W/N the 1993 Revised Rules should be applied NO 1. The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. 2. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. 3. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

354

4. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order. 5. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. 6. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. 7. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. 8. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and which states that:Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided 9. Citing Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the

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rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 10. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. 11. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.

Tropical Homes Inc v NHA 152 SCRA 540 (appeal)

1. Tropical Homes entered into a contract with Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better Living Subdivision. A 10% downpayment upon the execution of the contract was required and the balance payable monthly. The contract provided that upon default in payment of any installment within 90 days from its due date, the contract will be automatically cancelled. 2. Since there was non-payment for a period of 7 months already, the contract was cancelled and all earlier payments were considered forfeited in favor of the corporation. Cordova then filed a letter complaint with the Investigating Committee of the Dept of Trade asking for a refund 3. The case was then referred to the NHA which issued the resolution: refund Cordova. MR filed by Tropical, but denied.

355

4. In the meantime, PD 1344 was passed providing that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases covering unsound real estate business practices, claims involving refund, specific performance, etc. The decision of the NHA shall be final after the lapse of 15 days from date of receipt. It is only appealable to the President and if there is no appeal within 30 days, the decision is deemed affirmed. 5. Tropical, availing of this decree, appealed to the President. No copy of the appeal was furnished to respondent NHA. 6. Cordova then filed a motion for execution, to which NHA issued a Writ of Execution. The President failed to act on the appeal thus this petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE: W/N PD 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds that it deprives Tropical access to courts of law and the manner of appeal is violative of due process NO 1. The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in any way affect the correctness of the decision rendered against him. There is no discussion whatsoever on the merits of the original case. As far as the records show, the NHA decision appears to be fair and correct. 2. Moreover, the resolution promulgated by respondent NHA, was issued before the passage of the questioned decree. The writ of execution it issued, as admitted by the petitioner in its memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D. No. 1344.

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356

3. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. 4. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not constitutional origin. 5. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically provide for judicial review of NHA decisions affirmed or reversed by the President, does not necessarily preclude judicial review. 6. On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure on the part of the President to act upon an appeal does not necessarily mean that the appealed decision automatically becomes final and executory. Access to the courts of law may still be made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such decision is far from being final and executory. DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE DEPUTY NITORREDA, et al., respondents. FRANCISCO, J.:

OMBUDSMAN,

CESAR

Nature: motion for reconsideration 1. Respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI). They sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school arising from the implementation of certain school policies.

Y.

2. On their scheduled meeting, private respondents and the other complaining students travelled all the way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City. Their presence in the said office was duly noted by DECS Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with them. However, instead of conferring with the aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly did not even have a previous appointment. 3. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter, petitioner presided over the conference between the Arriesgados and the aggrieved students. 4. March 29, 1994 - petitioner submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman a report wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement between the parties. However, private respondents‘ affidavit-complaint attested that as a result of the said dispute, they were barred from taking the final examinations and participating in the graduation rites. 5. The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713, Complaints‘ averments were confirmed by the school itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that the complaining student were not allowed to take the final examination until and unless they agree to the withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against herein respondent .

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6. When petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied, he filed an ―Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction‖ with this Court. Issue: W RA 6770 is unconstitutional for failure to provide the right to appeal - NO. Held/ Ratio: 1. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.7 for their failure to provide for the right of appeal in certain cases from the decision of the Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that: ―The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with‖ the provisions of the law.‖ 2. Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one‘s case. The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative cases manifest sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

357 [G.R. No. 142888. June 6, 2001] EVELIO P. BARATA, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR., OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Nature: Petition for Review in Certiorari 1. Petitioner heads the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners' Association, Inc. whose members have occupied a certain parcel of land in Mandaluyong City. 2. Sometime in March 1995, the City Government of Mandaluyong initiated the construction of medium size condominiums and row houses for the benefit of qualified members of the said homeowners' association. 3. To give way to the construction, the members of the said homeowners' association had to vacate the area which they were occupying as the medium size housing project and row houses were supposed to be completed within 540 days from June 1995. 4. When the period for construction lapsed, petitioner and the members of the homeowners' association demanded the completion of the said housing project but the same allegedly fell on deaf ears. 5. Alleging that the demands have been ignored, petitioner filed on May 17, 1999 an administrative complaint against Mayor Abalos, Jr. for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials