UNIVERSITY OF SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS Supplementary Readings : Cases/Jurisprudence EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) RA 6713, Anti-Red Tape Law, etc. Issuances of the Office of the President Rules and Regulations of Administrative Agencies
I.
About Administrative Law
Sir Bacatan: “The power to set the fare rates is not inherent in administrative agencies, it is a delegated power of Congress, that power should be performed by Congress. LTFRB therefore has a delegated power due to the complexities of modern life and the ongoing proliferation of government agencies. That is why we have Administrative law.” a)
b)
Origin 1. Growing complexities of modern life 2. Multiplication of subjects needing government regulation 3. Increased difficulty in administering law Definition In its widest sense: entire system of laws under which the machinery of the State works and by which the State performs all government acts; embrace all the laws that regulate or control the administrative organization and operations of the government including the legislative and judicial branches Broad definition: law which provides the structure of government and prescribes its procedure; law which controls or is intended to control the administrative operations of the government or the law of governmental administration
Law of External Administration concerned with legal relations between administrative authorities and private interests Four parts: a. survey of those powers and duties of administrative authorities that relate directly to private interests b. analysis of the scope and limits of such powers c. some account of the sanctions attached to, or the means of enforcing, official determinations d. examination of remedies against official action KINDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 1. Statutes setting up administrative authorities; 2. The body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect of determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities; 3. Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative authorities in pursuance of the purposes for which administrative authorities were created or endowed; 4. Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields. c)
Classification
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Principal Divisions of administrative law Law of Internal Administration treats of the legal relations between the government and its administrative officers, and of the legal relations that one administrative officer or organ bears to another comprehends topics as nature of public office, de jure and de facto officers, incompatible and forbidden offices considers legal aspects of public administration on its institutional side a. legal structure or organization of public administration; legal aspects of its institutional activities; legal questions in overall management b. legal qualifications for office; legal disqualifications, appointment, removal, tenure, compensation; legal aspects of hierarchical form of department; legal relation of administrative superior and subordinate; legal relation between power of removal and power of direction
Classification of administrative law As to its source draws a line between the law that governs or controls them, and that which is made by administrative agencies a. The law that controls administrative agencies - i.e. constitution, statutes, judicial decisions, executive orders, administrative orders of administrative superiors b. The law made by administrative authorities - includes both general regulations and particular determinations -constitutes an imposing and constantly expanding body of law As to its purpose a. Adjective or procedural administrative law - establishes the procedure which an agency must or may follow in the pursuit of its legal purpose - derived from constitution or statute or agency regulations b. Substantive administrative law - derived from the same sources as procedural but its contents are different in that the law establishes primary rights and duties As to its applicability a. General administrative law - part of administrative law which is of a general nature and common to all, or most, administrative agencies - chiefly but not exclusively procedural law b. Special or particular administrative law
- part of administrative law that pertains to particular agencies - proceeds from the particular statute creating the individual agency Pangasinan Transportation vs. PSC, G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940 FACTS: This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc (Pantranco).The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales .On August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari. ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission: - is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation - constitutes undue delegation of powers HELD: The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only. US vs. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122,
February 27, 1922
FACTS Philippine Legislature – on 1919 it passed ACT NO. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose.” The said Act authorized the Governor-General to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures to prevent the monopoly and hoarding of any palay, rice or corn; to establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself; to fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand On August 1, 1919 – the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold Ang Tang Ho- a complaint was filed against him for violation of Act 2868; on the complaint it was alleged that Ang Tang Ho sold his rice at an excessive price (one ganta for .80 cents) which is higher than the fixed price; trial court was found him guilty; he was sentenced to five months imprisonment and a fine of P500; ISSUE: WON ACT 2868 insofar as it authorizes the Gov-Gen to fix the price at which rice should be sold is a valid law. SC’s Ruling: NO. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
legislative power. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. Compania vs. Board, G.R. No. L-11216 , March 6, 1916 FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippines under the laws of Spain and engaged in the Philippines as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water. On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be reserved an order to show cause why they should not be required to present detailed annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the model attached to the petition. They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each year a detailed report of finances and operations pf such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippines, in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas denied the authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the legislature to delegate its power to the board.
ISSUE: Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative, or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law. HELD: In Section 16 of Act 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for its authority, the legislature seems simply o have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the legislature delegated to the Board all of its powers over a given subject matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. In Section 20 of the Commerce Act, Congress has authorized the commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of
In the case at bar, the provision complained of, Sec 16 of Act 2307, does not lay down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed. Nor does it prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon. The legislature by the provision in question, has abdicated its powers and functions in favor of the Board of Pubic Utility Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation to the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the information which the State wants but has authorized the Board to obtain the information which the latter wants. Asuncion vs. de Yriarte, 28 Phil. 67 FACTS: The chief of the division of archives, the respondent, refused to file the articles of incorporation, hereinafter referred to, upon the ground that the object of the corporation, as stated in the articles, was not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of Act No. 1459, they were not registerable. The proposed incorporators began an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to compel the chief of the division of archives to receive and register said articles of incorporation and to do any and all acts necessary for the complete incorporation of the persons named in the articles. The court below found in favor of the defendant and refused to order the registration of the articles mentioned, maintaining ad holding that the defendant, under the Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the sufficiency of the form of the articles and the legality of the object of the proposed corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment. It is strongly urged on the part of the appellants that the duties of the defendant are purely ministerial and that he has no authority to pass upon the lawfulness of the object for which the incorporators propose to organize. ISSUE: Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the Corporation for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the purpose of the proposed corporation. RULINGS: Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows: Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks if the Executive Bureau articles of incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . . .Simply because the duties of an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may not, in the
administration of his office, determine questions of law. We are of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of incorporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as expressed in the articles are lawful.
said residents or inhabitants or property belonging to the whole barrio as such; and (b) to use the natural products of the said property for institutions, foundations, and charitable works of common utility and advantage to the barrio or its inhabitants."
We do not believe that, simply because articles of incorporation presented foe registration are perfect in form, the division of archives must accept and register them and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in the articles. We do not believe it was intended that the division of archives should issue a certificate of incorporation to, and thereby put the seal of approval of the Government upon, a corporation which was organized for base of immoral purposes. That such corporation might later, if it sought to carry out such purposes, be dissolved, or its officials imprisoned or itself heavily fined furnished no reason why it should have been created in the first instance. It seems to us to be not only the right but the duty of the divisions of archives to determine the lawfulness of the objects and purposes of the corporation before it issues a certificate of incorporation. It having determined that the division of archives, through its officials, has authority to determine not only the sufficiency as to form of the articles of incorporation offered for registration, but also the lawfulness of the purposes of leads us to the determination of the question whether or not the chief of the division of archives, who is the representative thereof and clothed by it with authority to deal subject to mandamus in the performance of his duties. We are of the opinion that he may be mandamused if he act in violation of law or if he refuses, unduly, to comply with the law.
The object of the proposed corporation, as appears from the articles offered for registration, is to make of the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel a corporation which will become the owner of and have the right to control and administer any property belonging to the municipality of Pasig found within the limits of that barrio. This clearly cannot be permitted. Otherwise municipalities as now established by law could be deprived of the property which they now own and administer. Each barrio of the municipality would become under the scheme proposed, a separate corporation, would take over the ownership, administration, and control of that portion of the municipal territory within its limits. This would disrupt, in a sense, the municipalities of the Islands by dividing them into a series of smaller municipalities entirely independent of the original municipality.The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
While we have held that defendant has power to pass upon the lawfulness of the purposes of the proposed corporation and that he may, in the fulfillment of his duties, determine the question of law whether or not those purposes are lawful and embraced within that class concerning which the law permits corporations to be formed, that does not necessarily mean, as we have already intimated, that his duties are not ministerial. On the contrary, there is no incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are ministerial and that he has no authority to exercise discretion in receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise judgment — that is, the judicial function — in the determination of the question of law referred to, but he may not use discretion. The next question leads us to the determination of whether or not the purposes of the corporation as stated in the articles of incorporation are lawful within the meaning of the Corporation Law. The purpose of the incorporation as stated in the articles is: "That the object of the corporation is (a) to organize and regulate the management, disposition, administration and control which the barrio of Pulo or San Miguel or its inhabitants or residents have over the common property of
Pimentel vs., COMELEC 101 SCRA 769 FACTS: Petitioners-contestants filed their election protests stating that they were duly certified candidates or mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Diffun, Quirino Province, in the general elections but that they were not considered as such by the Municipal Board of Canvasser who did not count the votes cast in their favor (having considered the same as stray votes) and proceeded of proclaim the contestees as the duly elected officials of Diffun; and contending that had it not been for the said error in the appreciation of the votes cast in their favor, they would have certainly emerged as the winners in said election. The court ordered the opening of the ballot boxes and the counting of the votes as reflected in the ballots and not in the election returns. The contestees filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the CFI from enforcing its orders. Acting on said petition, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9592 which requires the RespondentsContestants to file an answer, not a motion to dismiss and to restrain respondent Presiding Judge from enforcing his order. CFI issued an order postponing the hearing of Election Cases "until such time that a superior Court orders otherwise or after the petition for certiorari, etc., filed by contestees with the COMELEC has been resolved." Thus, the contestants filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to annul Resolution No. 9592 of the Commission on Elections; to prohibit the enforcement of said resolution; and to compel the CFI of Quirino to proceed with the hearing of the election cases. Petitioners alleged, that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by the herein private respondents questioning an interlocutory order issued by the CFI of Quirino, much less to restrain said court from enforcing said order. COMELEC filed its answer to the petition that it had jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 9592 and that being interlocutory in nature, said resolution cannot be challenged in the present petition for certiorari since there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed in its issuance. In support of the contention that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases filed with the CFI by candidates for municipal offices, the respondents argue as follows: That Section 192 of the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296) grants the COMELEC the power to "prescribe the rules to govern the procedure and other matters relating to election contests"; that, accordingly, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1451 prescribing the procedural rules for election contests in the CFI involving elective municipal and municipal district offices; that Section 19 of said Rules provides that the Rules of Court of the Philippines "shall serve as supplementary rules in election contests filed with the Court of First Instance"; that under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus may also be filed with the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"; that since the COMELEC exercise appellate jurisdiction over election cases filed with the Court of First Instance involving municipal offices, pursuant to Section 196 of the 1978 Election Code, said Commission is, thus, vested with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving said election cases, applying by analogy the quoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections had jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 9592. HELD: Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. Thus, it cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court which are neither constitutional provisions nor legislative enactments but mere procedural rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its power to prescribe "rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts" (Sec. 5 (5), Art. X, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution). Accordingly, the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, cannot be construed as a grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it. Much less can such provision be interpreted, by analogy, as a grant to the COMELEC of jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance and appealable to said commission under Sec. 196 of the Revised Election Code.
While it is true that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases appealable to it, the grant of jurisdiction is not by virtue of the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but by express legislative fiat, namely, Sec. 30 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296). to wit: SEC. 30. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. — The Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs s and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. No such legislative grant of jurisdiction exists in the case of the Commission on Elections. Consequently, respondents' contention that the Commission on Elections has Jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or man mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Courts of First Instance and appealable to said Commission cannot be sustained. It results, therefore, that Resolution, that Resolution No. 9592 was issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so. GSIS vs. CSC, 202 SCRA 799 FACTS: Respondent Belo held the position of Vice-Governor of Capiz continuously between January 5, 1972 up to February 1, 1988. From January 25, 1972 up to December 31, 1979, she held office by virtue of an election and was paid a fixed salary. 1 From December 31, 1979 up to February 1, 1988, she held the position of Vice Governor of Capiz in a holdover capacity, broken down into two periods: 1. A period in which she was paid on a per diem basis from December 31, 1976 to December 31, 1979; and 2. A period in which she was paid a fixed salary — from January 1, 1980 to February 1,1988. In its June 7, 1989 Resolution 3 on the matter, CSC held that the services rendered for the first holdover period between January 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979 was creditable for purposes of retirement. CSC noted that during the entire holdover period, respondent Belo actually served on a full time basis as Vice Governor and was on call 24 hours a day. Disagreeing with the CSC's insistence that the period in which respondent Belo was paid on a per diem basis should be credited in computing the number of years of creditable service to the government, GSIS subsequently filed a petition for certiorari before this court, questioning the orders of the CSC. Agreeing that per diems were not compensation within the meaning of Section 1(c) of R.A. 1573 which amended Section 1(c) of C.A. No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), we granted the petitions in G.R. Nos. 98395 and 102449, 4 and reversed the CSC Orders and Resolutions in question. ISSUE: Whether or not regular service in government on a per diem basis, without any other form of compensation or emolument, is compensation within the contemplation of the term "service with compensation" under the Government Service Insurance Act of 1987.
RULING: Section 1(c) of R.A. No 1573 provides: (c) Salary, pay or compensation shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations. Since it is generally held that an allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a salary of office, it follows that if the remuneration received by a public official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a mere "allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual base pay, then no amount of categorizing the salary as base pay, a "per diem" would take the allowances received by petitioner from the term service with compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of service in government. Furthermore, it would grossly violate the law's intent to reward the public servant's years of dedicated service to government for us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in taking a purely mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an attached label at face value. In the sense in which the phrase "per diem" is used under the Government Service Insurance Law, a per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee of government is away from his home base. This is its traditional meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. Under this definition the per diem intended to cover the cost of lodging and subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside of their permanent station. Retirement benefits given to government employees in effect reward them for giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially true with those in government service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills because the years they devote to government service could be spent more profitably in lucrative appointments in the private sector. In exchange for their selfless dedication to government service, they enjoy security of tenure and are ensured of a reasonable amount of support after they leave the government. The basis for the provision of retirement benefits is, therefore, service to government. While a government insurance system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of retirement benefits actually received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit system. It cannot be convincingly asserted that petitioners could not avail themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. In
respondent Belo's case, before and after that short interregnum, she was paid a fixed salary. She was not duly informed that short period was not to be credited in computing the length of her service for retirement purposes. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that in fact and in practice the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially involuntary basis. Similarly, had respondent Baradero been informed of the need to pay the required deductions for the purpose of qualifying for retirement benefits, he would have willingly paid the required sums. In a sense, the contract made between the GSIS and the government employee is done on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that is, it is a virtual contract of adhesion which gives the employee no choice but to involuntarily accede to the deductions made from their oftentimes meager salaries. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own choice: contributions were exacted from petitioner before and after the disputed period. To assert that petitioners would have been entitled to benefits had they opted for optional deductions at that point misses the principal fact in issue here, which is the question as to whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as service with compensation for the purposes of retirement. Umandap vs. Sabio, G.R. No. 140244. August 29, 2000 FACTS: Private respondent Domingo Estomo filed against petitioner Joel Umandap an action for damages based on breach of contract. Process Server Marmolejo effected substituted service of the summons and copy of the Complaint upon petitioner, by leaving a copy at petitioner's home and office address to a certain Joseph David who refused to receive and acknowledge the same. Petitioner failed to file his Answer and, on motion of private respondent, was declared in default. Private respondent was allowed to adduce his evidence ex parte. The trial court rendered a judgment against petitioner, a Writ of execution was issued and petitioner's deposit and receivables were garnished. Petitioner filed a motion to set aside judgment by default and quash writ of execution which respondent Court denied in an order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the resolutions of the trial court. Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because there has been no valid service of summons; that the substituted service of summons was improper and invalid since the process server's return failed to show on its face the impossibility of personal service. C A dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the substituted service of summons made on petitioner through Joseph David on was valid and regular. HELD: YES. There can be no dispute that service of summons upon the defendant is necessary in order that a court may acquire jurisdiction over his person. Any judgment without such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null and void.In fine, the two modes for effecting substituted service
of summons are: (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion; and (b) by leaving copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. Among these two modes of substituted service, the sheriff or the process server may choose that which will more likely insure the effectiveness of the service. Central to the instant controversy is the process server's return which petitioner relies upon to show the invalidity of the substituted service of summons.In the instant case, no proof of irregularity in the process server's return was presented by petitioner. On the contrary,a perusal of the process server's return in the instant case shows compliance with the requirements of substitutedservice in accordance with the requirements set forth. The Powers of the President as the Chief Administrative Officer a) Power of control Sec. 17 Art VII of the Constitution: The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. - The President’s power of control means his power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute his judgment with that of the latter. -The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all executive officers from cabinet secretary to the lowliest clerk in the executive department. He is the Chief Executive, the Head of Government and the Chief Administrative officer. -The President in the exercise of the powers of control can do what any of his cabinet secretary can lawfully do as conferred by law. Araneta vs Gatmaitan: “In sustaining the legality of executive order, the SC ruled that since the Sec of Agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban fishing by trawl, the President, in the exercise of his power of control can take over from him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The President’s power of control means that if a Cabinet Secretary or a head of a bureau or agency can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the power has the power not only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.” - Each Head of the department is and must be the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise. - The President’s power of control includes the power to detail an executive officer in the office of the President, or to any executive office without any prior approval from any executive officer, so long as there is no reduction in rank or salary and is not considered as disciplinary action. - The act of the President cannot be countermanded by a department secretary who is a mere subordinate of the
President nor can a subordinate of a department secretary disregard his superior’s altering his action in the performance of his function as the department secretary, who has power of control over him, acts as the President’s alter ego and his action is presumed to be that of the President. DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY: -The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who inturn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. -The acts of a department Secretary are presumed to be the acts of the President. Thus, where the President is granted the authority to sell certain parcels of land, the sale effected by a department secretary has the same effect as if done by the President himself. - Acts or contracts executed by the Executive Secretary or his deputy “By authority of the President”, are presumed valid and performed in behalf of the President and should thus be accorded due respect. Such acts are not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers. - The Executive Sexretary or even a deputy if he acts by authority of the President can modify, alter, or set aside acts or rulings of a department secretary as he acts for and on behalf of the President. LIMITATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF CONTROL: The power of control does not include the following: 1. The abolition or creation of an executive office; 2. The suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees without due process of law; 3. The setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasi-judicial agencies including that of the office of the President on contested cases that have become final pursuant to law or to rules and regulations promulgated to implement the law. - The general rule is that the President’s power of control applies to acts of subordinate official and not to the official who performs the acts. He may not, by his control power suspend or remove the official w/o due process of law, except those officials who serve at his pleasure, such as Cabinet Secretaries. Ang-Angco vs Castillo: “ The power of control merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the president may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties. It added however, that the power of control may to some extent applies to the official himself, when it said: There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend, or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be executed.
- a decision of quasi-judicial agency which has become final can no longer be set aside or supplanted by the President in his exercise of power of control. This rule also extends to the decision made by the president himself. Therefore, the President can no longer reconsider or modify its final decision as it has lost jurisdiction. PRESIDENT’S POWER OF SUPERVISION: - He may not have the power of control over agencies which are not categorized as executive departments, bureaus and offices, unless the law creating them provides that he shall have that power. - In the absence of such that the President may only have the power of SUPERVISION which is only overseeing or the power to see that the officials concerned perform their duties and if they later fail or neglect to fulfil them, to take such actions or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. - The President have the power of general supervision over local government units. - Rodriguez VS Montinola: “the power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his alter ego, the Secretary of Finance may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties. - Taule Vs Santos: “the Presidential power over local governments is limited by the constitution to the exercise of general supervision to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” - The general supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Governments and the President cannot interfere with the affairs of LGU’s as long as it exercises functions within the scope of its authority. - Although the department of Local Government is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to watch, observe or check. CONTROL, SUPERVISION, AND REVIEW BY OTHER EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS - a head of a bureau or office exercises such powers over his subordinate personnel. - the power of CONTROL in that sense means the power of an officer to alter, modify and nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. - the power of SUPERVISION means overseeing the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfil them, the former may take such actions or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. - the power of REVIEW is the reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. This is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of a subordinate. It correction is necessary it must be dine by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through
the courts unless such subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising power of supervision and review over him. The power to review includes the power to disapprove and does not carry the authority to substitute one’s own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion. Under the 1987 Administrative Code, SUPERVISION AND CONTROL include only the authority to: a. act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; b. direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; c. review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials and units; d. determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; e. prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs; Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: 1. Generally oversee the operations of such agencies and ensure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day to day activities; 2. Require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards, and guidelines of the department; 3. Take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal administration; 4. Review, and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. - Where the law confers upon a department Secretary supervision and control over subordinate officers, the department head can modify, nullify or set aside the decision of the subordinate officers and can even directly exercise the powers granted the latter. - The department secretary’s supervision and control over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction is limited to the bureaus and offices under him, but does not extend to the agencies attached to the department. Their attachment to the department is merely for policy and program coordination. In Phil Gamefoul Commission vs IAC , the issue raised is whether the petitioner(PGC) has the power of control or only of supervision over local municipalities in the grant of cockfighting licenses. Sec 2 of PD 1802 provides that the Commission shall have the power to “issue licenses for the holding of international derbies and to promulgate rules and regulations relative to the holding, methods, procedures, operations and conduct of cockfighting in general as well as accreditation of cockpit personnel and association of cockpit owners, operators and lessees, to elevate the standards of cockfight. On the other hand, PD 1802 as amended provides that the City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commision and subject to its review and supervision. The commission set aside the license granted by the local government officials to an applicant and instead issued the license to another person. The court ruled that the commission has no power of control.
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of powers so enumerated. (Note: This is RESIDUAL POWERS of the PRESIDENT.)
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 POWER OF INVESTIGATION
b)
Ordinance power
c)
Power over aliens
d)
Power of eminent domain
e)
Power of appointment
f)
Other Powers
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 As stated above, the Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e. the powe of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander in chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress and the power to address Congress. Xxx “The inevitable question then arises by enumerating certain powers of the President. Did the powers of the constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the breadth and scope of executive power? Xxx It would not be accurate however, to state that executive power is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such position pertain to the office unless the constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g. his power over the country’s foreign relations. “On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO. RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
ISSUEs: Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-inchief powers” HELD: Power of Administrative Control. NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President. SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.” As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.” The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies. Power of Executive Control Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive department and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The detail of petitioner to the Office of the President is unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination could it be considered a removal. It was not even a transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the same conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable under the Civil Service Act provision then in force, so long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service. Nor is there any merit to the assertion made in the brief of petitioner that the directive of the Executive Secretary, acting upon authority of the President, needed the approval of the Civil Service Commission and the Commissioner of the Budget for its enforcement. Such a thought is repugnant to the very concept of a single, not a plural, executive in whom is vested the whole panoply of executive power. It is not only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require as a prerequisite to its validity the approval of subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the President, who tinder the Constitution is the Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those discharging purely executive function in the national government, he lie gives orders to all and takes orders from none.
Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275 FACTS: Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, was assigned to the Office of the President to assist in the San Fernando Port Project through a directive from the Executive Secretary worded as follows: "Mr. Jose G. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works, is hereby detailed to the Office of the President, effective immediately, to assist in the San Fernando Port Project. Mr. Tecson shall report directly to Commodore Santiago Nuval Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors." It was clearly set forth therein that it was issued "by authority of the President." ISSUE: Whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on temporary detail to the office of Commodore Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors, by the President of the Philippines thru the Executive Secretary, constitutes removal from office without cause. RULING: According to paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
DENR vs. DENR Region 149724. August 19, 2003
12
Employees,
G.R.
No.
FACTS: On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14. Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. On January 14, 2000 , the trial court rendered judgment, ordering the respondents herein(DENR) to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order dated November 15, 1999 relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at Koronadal, South Cotabato for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.
Petitioner maintains that the assailed DAO-99-14 and the implementing memorandum were valid and that the trial court should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 6734, otherwise known as “An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” and its implementing Executive Order 429, as the legal bases for the issuance of the assailed DAO-99-14. Moreover, the validity of R.A. No. 6734 and E.O. 429 were upheld in the case of Chiongbian v. Orbos. Thus, the respondents cannot, by means of an injunction, force the DENR XII Regional Offices to remain in Cotabato City, as the exercise of the authority to transfer the same is executive in nature. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 20, 2001. Hence, this instant petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated May 31, 2000 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari and its Resolution dated August 20, 2001, which denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: (1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and (2) Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR. RULING: (1) The trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the President’s power to reorganize the executive department, specifically those administrative regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. Then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 E.O. 429, “Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.” Section 4 thereof provides: SECTION 4. REGION XII, to be known as CENTRAL MINDANAO, shall include the following provinces and cities: Provinces: Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato, South Cotabato; Cities: Cotabato, General Santos. The Municipality of Koronadal (Marinduque) in South Cotabato shall serve as the regional center. In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is PD No. 1772 which amended PD No. 1416 which expressly granted the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President – through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary – may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same. Petition for review is GRANTED. Taule vs. Santos, 200 SCRA 512 Cariño vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 FACTS An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
(2) It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional
Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court.
a)
ISSUES: 1. Does the respondent Santos have jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC? 2. Does the respondent Verceles have the legal personality to file an election protest? RULING 1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it. 2) Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision. Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
III. Creation, Abolition and Reorganization of Administrative Agencies
Meaning of Administrative Agency agency exercising some significant combination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers charged with administering and implementing particular legislation Sir: LGU may not be strictly included as administrative agency. -
b)
Their creation, reorganization and abolition CREATION: some are created by or receive their powers from constitutional provisions which may be selfexecuting, but most of them have their source in legislative enactments. executive may also create administrative agencies REORGANIZATION / ABOLITION administrative agencies of statutory origin are subject to expansion or contraction of their powers and functions, or to reorganization or abolition at the will of Congress Sir Bacatan: POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: 1. Quasi-Legislative – rule making power 2. Quasi Judicial – adjudicatory power 3. Determinative powers 4. Licensing 5. Price/Rate fixing 6. Implementing or Executing c)
Classification of Administrative Agencies
a. function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege - i.e. GSIS, SSS, PAO b. function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain functions of government - i.e. BIR, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Immigration, LRA c. function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public - i.e. Philippine Postal Corporation, Philippine National Railways, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, NFA, NHA d. function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest - i.e. LTFRB, HLURB, Energy Regulatory Board, NTC e. function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private businesses and individuals - i.e. SEC, MTRCB, DDB f. function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved - i.e. NLRC, ECC, SEC, DAR, COA **an administrative agency may fall under more than one type Sir Bacatan:Shortcut CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: 1. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (NGA’S) 2. STATE UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (SUC’S)
3.
GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS AND ITS SUBSIDIARY (GOCC’S)
2 Kinds of GOCC’s: PUBLIC: Created pursuant to operation of law. PRIVATE: created through the Corporation Code. Note: Elementary and highschool institutions are not SUC’s they are City or Municipal Schools. Agencies created by the constitution: 1. COMELEC 2. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 4. OMBUDSMAN 5. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – cannot adjudicate, they can only investigate (toothless tiger) 6. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS 7. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS 8. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 9. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
*All these Constitutional Commissions and bodies cannot be abolished by any legislative or judicial fiat. It is only through amendment and alteration of the Constitution that can abolish these Constitutionally created administrative bodies. NOTE: EO 292 (ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987) ***Government of the Republic of the Philippines – refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philipppines whether pertaining to Autonomous regions, the provincial, city or municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of government. BACANI VS NACOCO “The term ‘Government of the Republic of the Philippines’ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.” “While it (NACOCO) was organized with the purpose of ‘adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States’ and of providing ‘facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products’, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the
coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, ‘The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation.’ National government – National Agency – Local agency – REORGANIZATION: Note: Agencies created by the Constitution (COA, COMELEC, OMBUDSMAN, CSC, JBC, SET, HRET, CHR etc) cannot be abolished by subsequent laws. However, those agencies created pursuant to a law, can be abolished by another law. It is only through amendment or repeal through the act of Congress that can change the nature of those agencies created pursuant to a law. Note: While it is true that Congress can create and abolish these administrative agencies, the power to reorganize these agencies is vested to the President. -EO 366 (Reorganization) was created in order to rationalize the operation of the government. -Reorganization may be expressed or implied -The President has the continuing authority to reorganize the office of the Philippines. RULES IN REORGANIZATION: 1. Affected employees must be prioritized and be assigned into a similar or comparable position. If not possible, the next in rank. 2. If reassignment is not possible, he will be terminated with one month salary for every year of service.
***PSPCA v. COA (G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007) We cannot apply the Charter test in this case. Chater test came only after the 1935 Constitution, so we cannot apply this to agencies created after the 1935 Constitution. Buklod vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802. July 10, 2001
Bagaoisan vs. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003
Domingo vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003
Liban et al. vs. Gordon, PNRC (G. R. No. 175352, Jan. 18, 2011) EO 366 Whether Philippine National Red Cross is a private or public government owned or controlled corporation? SC: Red Cross is a National Society under International Law and therefore it is SUI GENERIS. It is not a public nor a private GOCC.
shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress. “detailed report” – this is undue delegation of legislative power because the Public Utility Commission did not provide for specifics pertaining to its request for detailed report.
IV. Organization of Administrative Agencies a)
Distribution of Powers of Government
b)
The Office of the President
c)
The Cabinet
d)
The Departments and their mandates
e)
The Organization of Bureaus
f)
Relationships between Administrative Agencies
V.
f) US vs. Ang Tang Ho ( G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922) FACTS Philippine Legislature – on 1919 it passed ACT NO. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose.”
Separation of Powers and Delegation of Powers
a)
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
b)
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers
c)
Allowable delegation
d)
Sufficiency of standards
e) Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (G.R. No. L-11216, March 6, 1916 The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of legislative power, it said: The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission
The said Act authorized the Governor-General to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures to prevent the monopoly and hoarding of any palay, rice or corn; to establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself; to fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand On August 1, 1919 – the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold Ang Tang Ho- a complaint was filed against him for violation of Act 2868; on the complaint it was alleged that Ang sold his rice at an excessive price (one ganta for .80 cents) which is higher than the fixed price; trial court was found him guilty; he was sentenced to five months imprisonment and a fine of P500; ISSUE: WON ACT 2868 insofar as it authorizes the Gov-Gen to fix the price at which rice should be sold is a valid law. SC’s Ruling: NO. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorize the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. g)
People vs. Vera (65 Phil. 56)
There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial bo ards must act in carrying out a system of probation. Th e provincial boards are given absolute discretion which i s violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the n on delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equ ity so protected by the constitution. The challenged sect ion of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follo ws: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in whic h the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than tho se now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation off icer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office . This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a syste m of probation within their locality. This would mean t o say that convicts in provinces where no probation of ficer is instituted may not avail of their right to probat ion. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitu tional.
h)
Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for being unreasonable and arbitrary, are not tenable. It will be noted that R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2. It thus appears that the delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers, is not in violation of the Separation of Powers so far as that principle is recognized by the Federal Constitution nor is it in violation of due process of law. The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws
i)
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569)
Q: Can the power to create a municipality be delegated? No. Read Pelaez case. Before Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration, it is essential that said law: (1) be COMPLETE in itself. It must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (2) fix a STANDARD. The limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law.
Lovina vs. Moreno (9 SCRA 557)
The objections of the appellees to the constitutionality of
IF the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment
to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive
j)
Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481)
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and 44 England but in practically all modern governments." He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the 45 courts." Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority nonlegislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed
k)
Agustin vs. Edu (88 SCRA 195)
g)
Toledo vs. CSC, 202 SCRA 507
l)
Chiongbian vs. Orbos (245 SCRA 253)
Q: Merging of administrative regions – Can it be delegated? No. Merging of administrative region is not an administrative matter. It cannot be delegated. m) Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
n) Tatad vs. Secretary of DOE (281 SCRA 330) VI. The Functions and Powers of Administrative Agencies
a) Ministerial Powers - No exercise of discretion. But it can exercise judgment on questions of law.
b) Discretionary Powers - either way the decision will be correct in both ways may it agree or not his decision is still the correct decision. -this is a decision making power c) Determinative Powers Note: The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate or prosecute. d)
Quasi-legislative Power
Note: Just because an office is a department, it does not follow that the position of the Secretary thereof will not be the same to that of a Cabinet member.
BASIS As to procedural Standards As to TIME
As to Application
PUBLICATION HEARING NOTICE
QUASI LEGISLATIVE Normally observed in rule making. Rule making is prospective for it only governs future acts. Legislative rules are of general application. QUASILEGISLATIVE INDISPENSABLE NO NEED NO NEED
QUASI - JUDICIAL Based on cardinal rules. Adjudication retrospective character.
7 is in
Adjudicative rulings apply only to parties. QUASI-JUDICIAL NO NEED INDISPENSABLE INDISPENSABLE
NOTE: There is a need for hearing when when the law is applicable or addressed to a specific person. If it is applicable to everybody (public) no need for hearing. Fixing Rates – always needs hearing (EO 292) Legislative and Interpretative rules distinguished - substance, not form, determines nature of regulations - Legislative rules: in the nature of subordinate legislation; product of the power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law; may embody new law; may be issued only under express delegation of law; have force and effect of law, unless they are ultra vires
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Interpretative rules: product of interpretation and previously existing laws; merely clarify or provide guidelines to the law they interpret; may be issued as a necessary incident of the administration of a regulatory statute; statutory interpretations, no statutory sanction
**No vested right can be acquired on a wrong construction of the law by administrative officials and such wrong interpretation does not place the government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same PUBLICATION IN OG VS PUBLICATION IN UP CENTER. What is the operative act? - the law will still take effect even without application in UP Law Center. The publication in the OG still prevails because UP law publication is only administrative in nature. e)
Quasi-Judicial Power
f)
Administrative Procedure
g)
Due process
h)
Sec. 2, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2 EO 292
i)
impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute. The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislations” calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law". Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Sec. 2(8), Book VII, EO 292 Cruz vs. Youngberg (56 Phil 234)
j)
Publication of Requirement
k)
Chapter 2, Book VII, EO 292
l)
Presumption of Legality
KMU vs. Garcia (239 SCRA 386) RATE FIXING: “May not delegate to a mere constituent unit the rule making authority legislatively vested in the head of an executive department such being an abdication of responsibility by the latter. American Tobacco vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287
m) Res Judicata
Abejo vs. Dela Cruz ,149 SCRA 654 · Donato vs. CSC, G.R. No. 165788, February 07, 2007
n)
Contemporaneous Construction Lupangco vs. CA, 60 SCRA 848
People vs. Maceren (79 SCRA 450) Q: Can an administrative agency define a crime? Only if the enabling law provides a penal nature of a statute. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not
We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors
Santos vs. NLRC, 254 SCRA 675 Matanguihand vs. Tengo, 95 SCRA 478 NPC vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 704 Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Dev. Corp. vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA 312 Auyong vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110 Medenilla vs. CSC, 194 SCRA 278 Alejandro vs. CA, 191 SCRA 700 Masangcay vs. COMELEC, 6 SCRA 27 Manalo vs. Roldan-Confesor, 215 SCRA 808 Velasquez vs. Nery, 211 SCRA 28 Zambales Chromite Mining vs. CA, 94 SCRA 261 Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 Zacaria vs. Napolcom, et al., G.R. No. 119847. October 24, 2003 Simpao vs. CSC, 191 SCRA 396 Almario vs. COA, 233 SCRA 690 Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 Period to Render Decision Jamil vs. COMELEC, 283 SCRA 349 Mison vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445 Uy vs. COA, 328 SCRA 607
Tolentino vs. SSS, 138 SCRA 428 Victorias Milling Co, Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 317 Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal , 177 SCRA 72 Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Oil Industry Commission, 145 SCRA 433
Cansino vs. CA, 204 SCRA 449 VII. Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative remedies a) Villaflor vs. CA, 280 SCRA 292 b) Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426 c) Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 d) De los Santos vs. Limbaga, 4 SCRA 224 e) Factoran vs. CA 320 SCRA 530 f) Exceptions to the Rule
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA 237 SCRA 519 Police Commission vs. Lood, 127 SCRA 757 Sec 2(1) Book VII, EO 292
VIII. a) b) c) d) e)
Judicial Review What are subject to review Methods of Judicial Review Limitations Garcia vs. BOI, 191 SCRA 288 Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board, 204 SCRA 767
f) g)
In Re: Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709 Petition for Review under Rule 43
IX. Law on Public Officers a) Public Office b) Who are Public Officers c) Appointment d) Nature e) Qualifications f) Civil Service Law and Rules g) Coverage h) PD 807 i) Kinds/Nature/Status of Appointment in the Civil Service j) Personnel Actions k) De Facto Officer/De Jure Officer l) Compensation m) Benefits in General n) Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292 o) Retirement Benefits p) Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards q) Security of Tenure and Disciplinary Actions r) Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service s) Criminal/Civil Liability of Public Officers t) Impeachment u) Backwages v) Executive Clemency/Removal of Administrative Penalties Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251 Cabagnot vs. CSC, 223 SCRA 59 City of Manila vs. Subido, 17 SCRA 231 Aquino vs. CSC, 208 SCRA 240 Debulgado vs. CSC, 237 SCRA 184 Garces vs. CA, 259 SCRA 99 CSC vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 185766, Nov. 23, 2010) N.B. The above listed cases will be updated as the need arises. Some of the cases that are no longer relevant may be replaced with current jurisprudence.
BASIC POLICIES Students are reminded of the following policies of the UniversityWearing of proper school attire. Wearing of I.D. inside the school. No smoking inside school premises pursuant to City Ord. No. 1895. All cellular phones must be in silent mode during the entire class period. Observance of cleanliness/orderliness within the school premises and inside the classroom. Students are expected join the FB group and to regularly check the same and their email for any updates. Attendance will be checked. Any student who exceeds the maximum allowed number of absences will not be given any credit. Written and oral examinations will be conducted regularly. No special quiz/exam will be given. Cheating will not be tolerated. Make up classes may be held on a preagreed time and date Consultation may be done by appointment. My email address is
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