Compiled Case Digest Admin

Administrative Law Dean Carlota I. HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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A2010 CONSTITUTIONAL

PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION INC. v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 70 PHIL 221 LAUREL; June 26, 1940 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - For the past 20 years, Pangasinan Transport has been engaged in the business of transporting in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called Public Service Commission). - August 26, 1939 – PTI applied for an authorization to operate ten additional Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. This was granted by the Public Service Commission with the following conditions (which are written in a beautiful language called Spanish so you may refer to the original text in the case if there is a lack of confidence in my translation ^_^): - That the certificates of authorization issued to Pangasinan Transport would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of promulgation - That the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the time of it acquisition. - October 9, 1939 – PTI did not agree with the conditions set by PSC so it filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the latter. - November 20, 1939 - The present petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that: - An order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in the case. - After hearing, the Court should render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void - If this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision should be rendered declaring that the provisions are not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. - Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 states that “no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission” and that “the Commission may

prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Commission.” ISSUE WON the conditions set by the Public Service Commission were valid (as mandated by Commonwealth Act 146) HELD YES but a remand of the case was ordered Reasoning - The condition that the Commission can acquire PTI is a restatement of the constitutional provision that the “State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.” - PTI assails the condition that the certificates will be valid only for a period of time. This should be construed with the mandate that the Public Service Commission should issue certifications with the public interest in mind. Thus the period for validity is established in relation to promoting and safeguarding public interest. - Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years." - When it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to this constitutional mandate. - All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." - The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. The Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so requires." This is in accordance with all other previous laws (such as the Jones Law and the

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Philippine Bill) on the matter. - Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation. - Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. - However the Court ordered a remand of the case. - The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public convenience. - On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs.

MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY TRANSPO 57 PHIL 600 MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932 FACTS -Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to Charles M. Swift to “construct, maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." -Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final." - Manila Electric now asks the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies ISSUE/S WON the members of the SC has legal right to act as board of arbitrators HELD

Administrative Law Dean Carlota NO - Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. -The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. -The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court. Disposition The members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.

NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE 23 SCRA 405 REYES JBL; April 29, 1968 NATURE: Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction FACTS: - Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." - On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending

A2010 approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. - On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges." - On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers. ISSUE: WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. HELD: NO - section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary. - petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. - Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the

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Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2). - such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language. - if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. Disposition Writs denied, petition dismissed

GARCIA v MACARAIG 39 SCRA 106 BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971 NATURE Administrative complaint FACTS -Respondent Judge Macaraig was appointed to one of the newly created CFI branches in Laguna, in 1970. At the time of appointment, he was Chief of the Technical Staff of the DOJ, receiving salary therefrom. - After confirmation of his appointment by the COA, respondent judge took his oath of office on June 1970. However, due to several delays in securing the court sala (unavailability of funds for office equipment and supplies, trouble securing the space for the courtroom due to objections and disagreement over price), he never had the chance to actually perform the functions of a district judge. After realizing that it might take sometime before he could actually begin hearing cases in his court, he decided to apply for an extended leave of absence. The Sec. of Justice, however, asked him to forego his leave and, instead, requested him to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, which he accepted. - Having taken his oath as District Judge and, drawing salary as judge but without performing his functions as such, respondent was charged by Paz Garcia for “dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge.. .gross incompetence, violation of RA 296, particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58 thereof. ISSUE WON respondent is guilty of the allegations

Administrative Law Dean Carlota HELD No. Reasoning He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of these laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his making. ***While the SC dismissed the complaint, it nevertheless expressed the opinion that it did not look with favor the long standing practice of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts, stressing the principle of separation of powers. The Court was of the opinion that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty or violation of his oath of office as district judge as it was not altogether his fault that he could not actually perform his functions as presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna. Under the circumstances he was placed in, he made himself available to the DOJ to assist the Secretary, using his experience as technical assistant in said office. Disposition Administrative complaint DISMISSED.

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE 166 SCRA 106 PADILLA; October 5, 1988 NATURE Request for the issuance of a SC Resolution on the appointment of Judge Manzano as a member of the Prov. Committee on Justice FACTS -On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads: …I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice… Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows: (1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position; (2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge and as a member of the Judiciary; and (3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

A2010 - An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are: -- Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; -- Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. - It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. - Furthermore, it is provided that ”The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice”. HELD - Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions - Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. - in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less. - This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as nonmembers of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

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Disposition The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED. SEPARATE OPINIONS GUTIERREZ, dissenting: - The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. - Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned. - "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. - membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation. -The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their work. MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting: - What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions. - The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions.

PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR. 113 SCRA 31

Administrative Law Dean Carlota Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982 NATURE This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 FACTS On May 14,1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Some named on the left list of elected officials may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that: (i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director. (ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date. (iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution HELD

A2010 1. NO. Ratio Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, reads: SEC. 11. No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any administrative body. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Reasoning Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. In brief, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

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II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

THE

ARTICLE VII, 1987 Constitution Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER MACALINTAL v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 405 SCRA 693 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., July 10, 2003 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS -Macalintal as taxpayer avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. -He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators. -It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. [RELATIVE NI JAT?-hehe] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit

Administrative Law Dean Carlota in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion. - The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis-à-vis its rule-making power, to wit: SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions: a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud; b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured. Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. ... ... ... is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions. -The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others. ISSUE Whether or not Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? HELD NO. RATIOOnce a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. -By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under

A2010 such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. REASONING Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation. -However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC. -The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent." -Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that "[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. -The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. -By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law - the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. -The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC. -Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon

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review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.[48] Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC. -During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to ADOPT THE SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO AS PART OF THE PONENCIA ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 17.1, 19 AND 25 OF R.A. NO. 9189 INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO THE CREATION OF AND THE POWERS GIVEN TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;" b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;" c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the same law; for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect. SEPARATE OPINION PUNO, concurring and dissenting:1: 1

I dissent from the majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives after executing the required affidavit. I concur, however, with the majority’s ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189

Administrative Law Dean Carlota The resolution of the issue entails a two-tiered discussion of the: (1) whether Congress has oversight functions over constitutional bodies like the COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether Congress exceeded the permissible exercise of its oversight functions. Separation of powers and checks and balances The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of government. This principle dates back from the time of Aristotle but the "modern" concept owes its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings of political philosophers including Locke and Montesquieu. Their writings were mainly reactions to the ruinous struggle for power by the monarchs and the parliaments in Western Europe. -The Constitution divided the powers of our government into three categories, legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically sealed" from one another, the powers of the three branches are functionally identifiable. In this respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the law; executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the absence of specific provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle of separation of powers that one branch cannot exercise or share the power of the other. -Justce Puno locates the concept of congressional oversight in the grand scheme of checks and balances under the doctrine of separation of power. Concept and bases of congressional oversight -Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. -The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. Among the most quoted justifications for this power are the writings of John Stuart Mill and Woodrow Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative Government, Mill wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers objectionable; and to censure them if found condemnable." Wilson went one step farther and opined that the legislature’s informing with respect to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VicePresident. I also concur with the majority with respect to the unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.

A2010 function should be preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that "[E]ven more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion." Categories of congressional oversight functions The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision. a. Scrutiny Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved. -Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress. Under the Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to Congress. The President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the final say on appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear every year before the appropriation committees of Congress to report and submit a budget estimate and a program of administration for the succeeding fiscal year. During budget hearings, administrative officials defend their budget proposals. -The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded. Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the usual means of reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous appropriation to ascertain whether they have been disbursed for purposes authorized in an appropriation act. The consideration of the budget is also an opportunity for the lawmakers to express their confidence in the performance of a Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their disgust or disfavor of the continuance in office of a bureaucrat. Congress can even curtail the activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds. -But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. -This provision originated from the Administrative Code and was later elevated to the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in the work of the legislature." -Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of confirmation. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides

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for the organization of a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations registered under the party-list system. Consent of the Commission on Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the following positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b) ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose appointments are vested with the President under the Constitution. -Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the appointing power of the executive. Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political considerations in the appointment of officials in sensitive positions in the government. It also provides Congress an opportunity to find out whether the nominee possesses the necessary qualifications, integrity and probity required of all public servants. b. Congressional investigation While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, viz: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. -But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution, congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. -American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of Congress to conduct investigation has been adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v. Nazareno, decided in 1950, when no provision yet existed granting Congress the power to conduct investigation. Upholding the power of the Senate to punish Arnault for contempt, the Court ruled as follows: -Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . The fact that the Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota -The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session. -The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a witness can not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But the Court explained that "the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation." The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question. -Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault invoked the right against self-incrimination "is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety." It noted that since Arnault himself said that the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, there is therefore no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person would incriminate him. It held that it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his liability, thus: . . .[T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. . . The fact that the testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.[ -As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c) the persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights. -In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, this Court held that the senate committee exceeded the permissible exercise of legislative investigation because there was nothing in Senator Enrile’s speech which indicate that it is in aid of legislation. -The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each House. In the House of Representatives, an inquiry may be initiated or conducted by a committee motu proprio on any matter within its jurisdiction upon a majority vote of all its Members or upon order of the House of Representatives through: (1) the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a request or demand for the conduct of an inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon motion of the Majority Leader or his deputies; or

A2010 (2) the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an inquiry reported out by the Committee on Rules after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an inquiry by such committee: Provided, That all resolutions directing any committee to conduct an inquiry shall be referred to the Committee on Rules; or (3) the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee, after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of inquiry by such committee, of a petition filed or information given by a Member of the House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker: Provided, That such petition or information shall be given under oath, stating the facts upon which it is based, and accompanied by supporting affidavits. -The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or information requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint sub-committees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the committee as a whole is authorized to perform, except to punish for contempt. In case a privilege speech is referred to two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said committees shall be conducted. The inquiries are to be held in public except when the committee or sub-committee deems that the examination of a witness in a public hearing may endanger national security. In which case, it shall conduct the hearing in an executive session. -The Rules further provide that "the filing or pendency of a case before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies shall not stop or abate any inquiry conducted to carry out a specific legislative purpose." In exercise of congressional inquiry, the committee has the power "to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker." Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish for contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after being duly summoned, to obey such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant inquiry; (d) refuses to produce any books, papers, documents or records that are relevant to the inquiry and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a disrespectful manner towards any member of the Committee or commits misbehavior in the presence of the committee; or (f) unduly interferes in the conduct of proceedings during meetings. -Nevertheless, any person called to be a witness may be represented by a counsel and is entitled to all rights including the right against selfincrimination. c. Legislative supervision The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

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-Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it. -The legislative veto was developed initially in response to the problems of reorganizing the U.S. Government structure during the Great Depression in early 20th century. When U.S. President Hoover requested authority to reorganize the government in 1929, he coupled his request with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint Committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its consideration." Congress followed President Hoover’s suggestion and authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. Although the reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has since been renewed several times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Various American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115 Reorganization Plans, 23 of which were disapproved pursuant to legislative veto provisions. -Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains: It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota -Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any postenactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.] They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the President’s veto authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute." -Given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight, the next level of inquiry is whether congress exceeded its permissible exercise in the case at bar. But before proceeding, a discussion of the nature and powers of the Commission on Elections as provided in the 1987 Constitution is decisive to the issue. Congressional Oversight and COMELEC The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body exclusively charged with the enforcement and administration of "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall," and is invested with the power to decide all questions affecting elections save those involving the right to vote. -Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage, the COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Originally, the power to enforce our election laws was vested with the President and exercised through the Department of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco, however, the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC. -Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of the COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of government. While the President appoints the Commissioners with the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not accountable to the President in the discharge of their functions. They have a fixed tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To ensure that not all Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one time, a staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners first

A2010 appointed, three shall hold office for seven years, three for five years, and the last three for three years. Reappointment and temporary designation or appointment is prohibited. In case of vacancy, the appointee shall only serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. The COMELEC is likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure,] and to appoint its own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service laws. -The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the judiciary. This Court has no general power of supervision over the Commission on Elections except those specifically granted by the Constitution. As such, the Rules of Court are not applicable to the Commission on Elections. In addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of discretion. -The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially during budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can in case of other agencies under the executive branch. The reason is obvious. The COMELEC is not a mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from the Constitution. -Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto power or congressional oversight power over the authority of COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election laws is unconstitutional. The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our scheme of government. As the constitutional body charged with the administration of our election laws, it is endowed with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our election laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers. DOUBTLESS, IF ITS RULE-MAKING POWER IS MADE TO DEPEND ON STATUTES, CONGRESS MAY WITHDRAW THE SAME AT ANY TIME. INDEED, THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION ENVISIONS A TRULY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED TO ENSURE FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS, AND TO SERVE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PEOPLE'S SACRED RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE — THE CITIZENRY'S VITAL WEAPON IN EFFECTING A PEACEFUL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AND IN ACHIEVING AND PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY. [ BSJ: This statement of Puno supports the notion that in the Philippines, there is such thing as a legislative veto albeit there is no express constitutional provision using the term LEGISLATIVE VETO. He limits the notion of legislative veto to powers conferred by statute or delegated powers. When a power is conferred by the Constitution itself such as the COMELEC’s rulemaking power, it is already beyond the ambit of legislative veto] The elevation of the COMELEC’s power to promulgate rules and regulations in the 1987 Constitution is suffused with significance. Heretofore, it was Congress that granted COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and hence, Congress can withdraw or restrict it by the exercise of its veto or oversight power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been directly granted by the Constitution and no longer by Congress.

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Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review and approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred power because Congress can veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known as subordinate legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional. Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it cannot be subject to review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise of its oversight power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive power, the Commission must be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered with.

C. Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Decision Making; Salvador T. Carlota Administrative agencies have proliferated in recent years. Administrative agencies are endowed with significant rulemaking and adjudicative powers and make decisions that affect both public interest and private rights. To confer both rule making powers and adjudicatory powers seem to run counter the principle of separation of powers. But recent developments and the complexities of contemporary society has left us with no choice but to adopt a more hospitable interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers that can accommodate the existence of administrative agencies within our constitutional system. -Their creation is directed towards the regulation of sensitive areas in social and economic relations but the exercise of the powers vested upon them is constantly attended by arbitrariness or abuse of discretion, thus the need and the development of mechanisms of control over these agencies. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES Power of Creation, Appropriation, and Investigation Creation - (In theory) Congress can create, divide, merge modify and abolish agencies. - (In reality) Congress creates rather than abolish (evidenced by the multiplication of regulatory agencies) as society becomes more complex.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota -the state is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change. Appropriation -have potential for checking arbitrariness in the administrative process but in reality these have no appreciable effect in controlling administrative discretionary power. -Congress has the power to withhold funds for these agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in wielding this power because it recognizes that if it does, it will affect public interest. So what happens is, during budget hearings, these agencies undergo strict scrutiny but receive their appropriations just the same. Investigation -has limited value as a tool to provide as effective regular control of the improper exercise of administrative power -effective only as an aid in legislation The non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards -traditional legal thinking places considerable emphasis on the nondelegation doctrine and the prescription of legislative standards to control administrative agencies in the exercise of their powers -the rule is for delegation of powers to an administrative agency to be valid, the legislature must not only declare the policy to be executed but it must likewise fix a standard to guide the agency in the exercise of its delegated power -for this doctrine to be effective, the legislature must be able to provide sufficient or definite standards every time it decides to delegate powers to an administrative agency, the more specific the standards the greater the chances of confining administrative discretion within its proper limits If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is allowed to exercise uncontrolled discretion -Non-delegation cases shows that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable to provide for definite or specific standards because there are numerous areas of regulation which are of different nature, subject to variable conditions and policy considerations with varying degrees of susceptibility to definite standards. Stone stresses that in providing definite standards the following must be considered (a) the number, vagueness and degree of potential conflicts among policy indications which the legislature wants to be accommodated, and (b) the rate of change and movement in the facts concerning such policies -this inability has not caused the Supreme Court to shy away from assuming a liberal posture I resolving challenges regarding the sufficiency of standards, the Court is generally unwilling to strike down the validity of the delegation for broadness or vagueness of the standards. -Interest of law and order, public interest, justice and equity and substantial merits of the case have been considered as sufficient standards to sustain the constitutionality of the delegation of powers. -the SC recognizes that delegation to administrative agencies is a compelling necessity on a modern complex society. -this combination (inability of congress to provide sufficient standards and reluctance of SC to strike down the constitutionality of such delegation) undermines the efficacy of the non-delegation doctrine. Thus, the administrator’s discretion is virtually unconfined and the

A2010 possibility of abuse in the exercise of such discretionary power becomes a real problem -In the US this doctrine has long been regarded as unsatisfactory -Davis suggests that the non-delegation doctrine should be altered to turn it into an effective and useful judicial tool. The focus should no longer be exclusively on standards; it should be on the totality of protections against arbitrariness, Including both safeguards and standards. The key should no longer be statutory words; it should be protections and the administrators in fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of judicial inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards to administrative safeguards and standards. Administrative Procedure as a Mode of Control -the legislature can, although indirectly exert control over the activities of administrative agencies through the prescription of rules or principles of administrative procedure -these rules of procedure serve to maximize fairness in the administrative process -in prescribing rules of procedure the following must be considered (a) administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts (b) administrative agencies are designed to act with dispatch and flexibility to enable them to speedily accomplish their objectives. This does not however exempt them from the fundamental requirements of procedural due process (see Ang Tibay v CIR).(c)Administrative agencies are created to deal with specific problems, with different objectives and under varying conditions, thus a uniform rule of procedure for all is out of the question. There is a need to grant them enough leeway to come up with rules particularly suited to their areas of concern. The ideal situation is to provide them with minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed in the performance of their rulemaking and adjudicative functions. -for a long time there was no law that prescribed common procedural guidelines for all administrative agencies, thus they adopted their own rules of procedure which resulted in a bewildering variety of rules and regulations promulgated by the agencies which in turn caused confusion and was prejudicial to the persons affected especially when the rules were not made easily available to them. -The Administrative Code of 1987 was a significant legislative measure that answered this problem; it contains provisions which are applicable to all agencies. It provides for the minimum procedural standards which in their totality strike a harmonious balance between the fundamental requirements of procedural due process and the demands of administrative flexibility. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING -Judicial review of agency decisions is given special emphasis in administrative law. -that there should be judicial review is not contested, the debate is on the purpose of such review. -A radical view would subject not only the agency conclusion of law but its determinations of fact policy as well.

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-the controlling principles frown upon a wide-ranging or freewheeling type of judicial review. -The courts, traditionally, have been confined to the role of seeing to it that administrative agencies stay within the limits of their power as defined in their enabling statutes and protecting private rights by checking arbitrariness in the administrative process. -Even if the enabling statutes of these agencies are silent with regard to judicial review, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this does not foreclose the possibility of such review. In one case it held that it is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on the question of law ad jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protects substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of a system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion (San Miguel v Sec of Labor). -note that the Supreme Court made no mention of judicial review of agency determination of fact and policy. -The judiciary recognizes that its traditional role is deeply rooted to the idea of judicial deference to administrative expertise and the now well entrenched substantial evidence rule in administrative law. -Questions of law belong to the domain of the judiciary, questions of fact and policy on the other hand are better resolved by administrative agencies which posses expertise or experience in their respective areas of specialization. -While deference to administrative expertise is the rule the courts nevertheless is not precluded from reviewing agency determination of fact and policy. When the substantiality of the evidence supporting the factual findings of the agency is challenged, the issue assumes a judicial character. And the lack of substantial evidence to support agency finding causes the overturning of such by the courts. -The courts generally avoid intervention in cases involving policy considerations, however there are occasions when in the course of resolving questions of law which are intimately linked to policy matters, the courts are unable to exclude the consideration of such matters in the review. CONCLUSION The rise of administrative power has generated a host of problems regarding controls over the exercise of such power. Legislative Controls Appropriation – Power of the purse; but is generally not wielded in consideration of public interest Fixing of Standards- Has been proven to be of little value Prescription of Rules-prescription of minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be commonly observed by agencies can help maximize fairness in the administrative process.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota  Administrative Code of 1987 – strikes a harmonious balance between the fundamental requirements of fairness and the need for administrative flexibility Judicial Review –important instrument to control agency behavior through the court’s actual policing of agency behavior to ensure that it is confined within the limits set by law

D. THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY E. CASES CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS v VASQUEZ, PLDPPMA 240 SCRA 502 VITUG; January 25, 1995 NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction FACTS - MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water distribution system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers’ Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the projects with the Office of the Ombudsman (Vasquez), charging an “apparent plan” on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes) through the technical specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: “set aside the recommendation of an MWSS committee to award the contact to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes”, and “award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder” - the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with the SC, contending that the ombudsman acted beyond the competence of his office when he assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the same is clearly among the excepted cases enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS ISSUE 1. WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by the PLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders

A2010 HELD 1. NO Ratio The Reasoning On the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the Ombudsman, Solicitor-General insists that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted by the MWSS - “The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Consti and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.” - the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement. This case concerns the investigatory power and Public Assistance Duties of the Ombudsman - the Ombudsman, in resolving the complaint, considered 3 issues: (1) WON the technical specifications prescribed by MWSS in the projects have been so designed as to really favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/ Bidders; (2) WON the MWSS has the technical knowledge and expertise with fiberglass pipes; and (3) WON the contractors and local manufacturers of fiberglass pipes have the experience and qualification to undertake the projects. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which "xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It seems that the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the MWSS Committee to award the contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law. Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and set aside.

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LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ 243 SCRA 497 MENDOZA; April 6, 1995 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings: complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt. FACTS - February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. After an investigation, the investigating officer found no prima facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman, Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.” The case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. - Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. - Mojica issued an order placing Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months as approved by Ombudsman Vasquez - September 6, 1994 > Lastimosa filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders directing them to file of the action (for Attempted Rape) against the Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and Kintanar to explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against the Mayor; stating that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against the Mayor in recognition of the authority of said Office; approving of the placement of Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay; directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor to implement preventive suspension; and designating Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu - Petitioner claims: Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case

Administrative Law Dean Carlota against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. In any event, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. Therefore the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. ISSUES 1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo 2. WON Office of the Ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt and impose preventive suspension HELD 1. YES Ratio When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. Reasoning - Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. Obiter - The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute. 2. YES - Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein." - Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or

A2010 dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN 380 SCRA 424 de Leon, Jr., J; April 11, 2002 NATURE Special civil Action . Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS - The Office of the Ombudsman received information from an informant for reward regarding the anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco and La Tondena Distilleries. On the basis of this information, the Ombudsman directed via a subpoena duces tecum, Atty. Mansequiao of the legal department of the BIR to appear before him together with the complete case dockets of the two companies. - BIR resisted this summons on the grounds that the grant of the tax refund had already been decided by the Sandiganbayan in People vs Larin, that the BIR had exclusive authority to grant a tax credit, that the proper authority to review is with the Court of Tax Appeal, that there must be a pending action before the issuance of a subpoena can be made, and that the subpoena did not specifically described the documents sought to be produced. - The Ombudsman denied the motion of the BIR and reiterated it instructions to the BIR to produce the documents sought. - The BIR filed this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary injunction, and temporary restraining order with the SC ISSUE/S 1. WON the Ombudsman could validly exercise its power to investigate only when there exist an appropriate case 2. WON it violated due process in issuing subpoena without first giving BIR the summary of complaint and requiring it to submit a written reply HELD 1. No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The 1987 Constitution provides that the “Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof”. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee… during his tenure.

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2. Yes. The SC held that the procedure of immediately issuing the subpeona duces tecum was violative of the right to due process and did no comply with Section 26, paragraph 2 of the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770). The law clearly provides that if there is reasonable ground to investigate further, the investigator shall first furnish the respondent public official or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within 72 hours from receipt of said complaint. As noted, the BIR was never given a copy of the complaint but was summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted to the two companies. Clearly, the Ombudsman failed to afford BIR with the basic due process in conducting the investigation. Disposition Petition is granted. Ombudsman is prohibited from proceeding with the case and its orders are annulled and set aside.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v ENOC G.R. Nos. 145957-68 MENDOZA; January 25, 2002 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27. - They were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification, based on alleged purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural community members, and one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e), in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding/canvass. - Respondents moved to quash the informations saying that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. This motion was granted by the RTC and the cases were dismissed without prejudice, however, to their refiling by the appropriate officer. - The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition. ISSUE WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases before the regular courts. HELD - YES. Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the

Administrative Law Dean Carlota Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. - The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. - The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770. Disposition WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same.

FUENTES v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR NO. 124295 PARDO; October 23, 2001 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - Pursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the RP represented by the DPWH filed an expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project (namely, Tessie Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo). The case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. - The gov’t won the expropriation case. - The properties subject of the levy as described as all scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the DPWH. An auction was conducted wherein Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. However, Bacquial together with Sheriff Norberto Paralisan attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but they were prevented from doing so because many of these were still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation. (as opposed to their classification as scrap iron/junk) - So Alex Baquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break through' order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes that

A2010 same day. Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot, including the repairable equipment within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the depot for five successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to implement the writ. The lower court issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of execution - On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, the SC directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, the DPWH filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No. 807. - After considering the facts, the SC ordered the sheriff’s dismissal. From this order, the office of the Court Administrator was also directed to conduct an investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the investigation so warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of the serviceable or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial. - Thus, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge. Fuentes. filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The motion was dismissed hence this petition. ISSUE 1. WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court. HELD NO. The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. No other entity or official of the

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Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and refer the complaint against petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

LEDESMA v CA (DESIERTO) G.R. No. 161629 YNARES-SANTIAGO; July 29, 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari to reverese and set aside CA decision FACTS - Atty Ronaldo Ledesma is the chaiman of the 1 st division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). Agusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint requesting for an investigation on alleged anomalies durrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreigners. The FIIB investigation revealed 7 other cases of TRV extensions with similar irregularities. - The FIIB, as nominal complainant filed with Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against the petitioner. Atty. Artherl Caronongan (board member) and Ma. Elena Ang (exec asst) were also charged administratively. The case against the petitioner was treated as both criminal and administative for 9 countsof violationof the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for falsification of public documents and 9 counts of Dishonesty, grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty. - The complaint alleged the ff illegal acts: (a) irregularily in granting TRVs beyond the prescbed period and (b) using photocopied applications for a TRV extension wthout the applicants fixing their signatures to validate the correctness of the information. Ladesma and Coarongan allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable. - Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes resolved the administrative cases in a resolution recommending that Ledesma be suspended from the service for 1 year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service, that Caronongan be dismissed for being moot and academic and the case against Ang be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. - Asst Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera reviewed the joint resolution which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota - Pending the approval by Desierto, he approved the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou Ancheta-Mejica dismissing criminal charges for insufficiency of evidence. - Petitioner filed an MFR in the administrative case alleging that the BOC which reviewed the applications for extension approved theTRVs in question thereby effectively declared the applicationd regular and in order and waived any infurmity thereon. - Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the MFR which was approved by Desierto but reduced the suspension from 1yr to 9mos without pay. - Petitionerfiled a petition for review with the CA with a preliminary prohobitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin public respondents from the implementation of the order of suspension. CA issued the TRO. - CA affirmed the suspension but reduced it to 6mos and 1day without pay. MFR was denied. ISSUE/S 1. WON CA manifestly overlooked relevant facts which would have justified a conclusion in favor of the petitioner 2. WON CA erred in finding that the ombudsman is not merely advisory on the Bureau of Immigration 3. WON CA failed to consider that the Ombudsmand's resolution finding Ledesma administratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment intot he power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters HELD 1. NO Reasoning Petitioner undermines his position in the BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, executes a Memorandum of Tranmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity of the application. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinated. He cannot feign good faith when the irregularities of the TRV extention application were patently clear on its face. The contention that the BOC's approval of the defective application for TRV extension cured any infirmaties absolved petitioner's administrative lapse. The main thrust of the case is to determine whether petitioner committedany misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or mal feasance in the performance of his duties. 2and3. NO Ratio The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employeed of the Government. Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute public officers and employees. Reasoning Ledesma argues that to uphold CA's ruling expands authority granted by the constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.

A2010 The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 providesa that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which: (a) Are contrary to law or regulation; (b) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (c) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law; (d) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (e) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (f) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word “recommend” must be taken in conjunction with the phrase “and ensure compliance therewith” and not its literal meaning. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted. Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

ESTARIJA v RANADA 492 SCRA 652 QUISUMBING; Jun 26, 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), was found guilty by the Ombudsman of dishonesty and grave misconduct for having been demanding monies for the approval and issuance of berthing permits and monthly contribution from the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI). He was dismissed from the service. ISSUES 1. WON there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct 2. WON the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials is unconstitutional since the under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely recommendatory HELD 1. YES. Reasoning:

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a. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation. When Estarija went to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime. b. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 2. NO. Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Reasoning a. Jurisprudence - In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary. b. intent of the framers of the Constitution - Based on the record of the Constitutional Commission, they clarified that the powers of the Ombudsman are not exclusive. They are not foreclosing the possibility that in the future, the Assembly may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman. 3. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. DISPOSITION The petition is DENIED.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION 1. NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISIONERS G.R. NO. L-11216 Moreland, J.: March 6, 1916 NATURE Petition for review of an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners (the Board) FACTS -petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Phils. as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water. The Board dictated an order requiring petitioner to present a detailed report of its finances and operations of its vessels in the Phils. in the form of annual reports, upon hearing and service of an order for petitioner to show cause why such reports should not be required of them. -The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its authority which states that: “the board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined – (e) to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Boars may from time to time by order prescribe. -petitioner questioned the Board’s authority on the ground that Act No. 2307 was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to delegate legislative power to the Board. ISSUE WON there was a delegation of legislative power to the Board HELD YES. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general rules of action under which the Board was to proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents of the reports it required. Everything was left to the judgment and discretion of the Board rendering the Act arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the constitution. It did not indicate what specific information the State required and instead authorized the Board to require whatever information it wanted. This amounted to the Legislature’s abdication of its powers and functions to the Board—as held in Birdsall vs Clark: if discretion and judgment are to be exercised, either as to time or manner, the body entrusted with the duty must exercise it, and cannot delegate it to another. -As stated in Interstate Commerce Commission vs Goodrich Transit, “The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under

A2010 which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress”. Here, the general rules had been laid down for the guidance of the commission, the latter only having to carry out the details. This case illustrates the conferring of authority as to the execution of the law, which is completely valid, as opposed to the delegation of the power to make the law. Dowling vs Lancashire Insurance Co. furthers that the law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro. As held in Merchants Exchange vs Knott, in essence, the delegation of legislative power is pure and simple despotism. The order appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the Board with instruction to dismiss

US v ANG TANG HO 43 Phil 1 Johns; February 27, 1922 FACTS - In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868. The Act 1) makes unlawful the monopoly and hoarding of palay, rice or corn and provides penalty for such violations; and 2) authorizes the GG to fix the quantities of sais products that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand. - The GG thus issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. - A complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine. Hence this appeal. ISSUE WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GG to fix the price at which rice should be sold, is unconstitutional. HELD. YES It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GG, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GG. The Legislature does not undertake reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define

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what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say the Legislature itself has no in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the GG to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the GG issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the GG found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GG, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the GG to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the GG, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. Supreme Court of Wisconsin: "That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. "Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended. The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend." It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the GG, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not crime.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the GG which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the GG issued the proclamation.

PEOPLE v VERA 65 Phil 56 LAUREL; November 16, 1937 FACTS -1931: information for criminal case against Mariano Cu Unjieng, et. al was filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the offended party, intervened. -1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng -1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu Unjieng, modified duration of imprisonment. After MFR and motions for new trial which were denied by SC, final judgment was entered. Cu Unjieng now sought to elevate case to US SC. US SC denied petition for certiorari. -1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjieng’s petition for leave to file MFR or new trial, remanded the case to CFI Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng applied for provation under Act No. 4221, which was referred to the Insular Probation Office (IPO) -1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu Unjieng’s application for probation. Petition for probation heard before Judge Vera’s court. HSBC attacked constitutionality of Act No. 4221 based on the following: equal protection of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows prov’l boards w/ power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces). Judge Vera eventually promulgates resolution finding Cu Unjieng innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latter’s petition for probation. Counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of alternative motions for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.”) HSBC filed opposition to motion for intervention. The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed motion w/

A2010 TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said judgment. -19 August 1937: hearing on the various motions for CFI’s consideration. On this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla. - Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. ISSUE NOTE: There were many issues in this case regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 but for purposes of Admininstative law, the focus of the digest is the non delegation doctrine – WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute Undue Delegation of Legislative Power, and is therefore unconstitutional and void HELD YES. Section 11 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards, therefore, unconstitutional and void. Reasoning. Under the Consti, gov’t powers are distributed among 3 coordinate and substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Each department derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere. - The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. - The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whom the Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before us does not fall under any of these exceptions. - Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative

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officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. - In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. - The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. - It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. - The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. - While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted. - True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and

Administrative Law Dean Carlota absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. - A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara case) Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL G.R. L-23285 CONCEPCION; December 24, 1965 NATURE Special civil action (for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction) against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of contested EOs FACTS - Emmanuel Pelaez, in his capacity as Vice President and as a taxpayer instituted this civil action alleging validity of EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129. These executive orders created 33 municipalities, and were issued by the President in virtue of Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code. - Pelaez alleged that such are null and void, since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." - Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" - Auditor General answered that this can be done, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. ISSUE/S

A2010 1. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 682 of the Revised Admin Code amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power 2. WON Sec. 68 is deemed repealed HELD 1.YES Ratio The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Reasoning Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. - "Public welfare" and "public interest," are sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in Calalang v Williams must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved - grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question " or a political question. NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE - If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.

- Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion BUT this power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. The President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. 2. YES Reasoning Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Sec 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. Disposition The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent (Auditor General) permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

BENGZON [concur & dissent] - The issue is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power. The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result. - The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted.

2

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.

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EDU v ERICTA 35 SCRA 481 FERNANDO; October 24, 1970 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS -Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. -This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge

Administrative Law Dean Carlota would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. -On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. -SolGen filed MFR -On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. HELD No. -It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions -It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. -What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. -To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. -A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. -The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. -To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

A2010 -The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. -Justice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." -Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " -Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." -The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code, Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law and the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof are sustained.

AGUSTIN v EDU

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88 SCRA 195 FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979 NATURE Petition for prohibition FACTS -Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 (1976) required every motor vehicle owner to procure and use one pair of a reflectorized triangular early warning device whenever any vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street, or highway, including expressways or limited access roads. -The implementing rules and regulations prepared by the respondent Land Transportation Commissioner on December 10, 1976 were not enforced as President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a sixmonth period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device (EWD) as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned. Letter of Instruction No. 716, issued on June 30, 1978 lifted such suspension and in pursuance thereof, the rules and regulations prepared by respondent Commission were approved for immediate implementation by respondent Minister of Public Works and Communication. -Petitioner came to court alleging that Letter of Instruction 229, as amended, clearly violates the provisions of the New Constitution on due process, equal protection and delegation of police power. That it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society. -The respondents' Answer demonstrated that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power; that the implementing rules and regulations of respondent Land Transportation Commissioner do not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power and that the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals of which Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified and the United Nations Organization. ISSUE 1. WON the implementing rules and regulations of respondent Land Transportation Commissioner constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power HELD 1. NO. Reasoning The Court dismissed the petition for prohibition ruling that the Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the State's police power intended to promote public safety; that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power as a standard has been set; and that the country cannot repudiate its commitment to international bodies and the accepted principles of international law. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic

Administrative Law Dean Carlota have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; . . ." It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality. Disposition Petition DISMISSED

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 108 SCRA 757 FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979 NATURE Petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court FACTS -Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of strike for unfair labor practices allegedly committed by private respondent company inviolation of their existing collective bargaining agreement, particularly the unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment and interest of its members. -Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed. Thereafter, the Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and the holding of any strike at private respondent establishment was enjoined. Hearing was subsequently conducted whereas private respondent agreed to the indefinite preventive suspension of the provisions of the Code of Conduct, the principal cause of the controversy. -In a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner union submits that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers and is contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self organization and collective bargaining. Such power, according to petitioner union, is within the competence of the President who can best determine national interests when a strike is in progress. ISSUE

A2010 2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative powers and hence unconstitutional HELD 2. NO. Reasoning the unconstitutional of the act has not been demonstrated and that any ruling on the question of unconstitutional application would be premature in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor and the NLRC. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is not on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative power. It stressed further that compulsory arbitration must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. To repeat, there is no ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. Disposition Petition DISMISSED

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION v ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218 REGALADO; Dec 18, 1989 NATURE Petition to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission FACTS By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the certain activities and established the various installations:

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By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company; 2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc. or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988. The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT argues that the enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service

Administrative Law Dean Carlota communications does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. ISSUE WON Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 are unconstitutional on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred. HELD NO. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered,among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Dispositive Petition granted

CHIONGBIAN v ORBOS 245 SCRA 253

A2010 MENDOZA; June 22, 1995 NATURE: PROHIBITION AND CERTIORARI Facts: - These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (or R.A. No. 6734 which was passed pursuant to Art. X, Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the AR, and the EO No. 429 issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." - Pursuant to Art. XIX, Sec 13 of R.A. No. 6734(which provides for the authority of merging upon administrative determination the other regions), Pres. Aquino issued the questioned EO No. 429 joining provinces from other regions to another region (eg. Misamis Occidental, wast part of Region X, became part of Region IX etc.) - Herein petitioners in the first case, wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. - They contended that the transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX etc are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. And that her authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. - Jaldon, a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer also contends that Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. - SOLGEN: the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec, and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X Sec 16 and Art. VII Sec 17 of the Constitution. - He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. - Also, he justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it. - He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.

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Issues: 1. WON the merging of admin regions is an administrative matter 2. WON Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and 3. WON the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. 4. WON the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found pursuant to Art. 13 Sec 13 HELD: 1. YES. The power conferred on the President to MERGE Admin Regions is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature." (while the CREATION of municipalities is purely a legislative matter.) 2. YES. The standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435. - A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. - Nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation: * Basis: R.A. No. 5435 granted authority to the Pres, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, etc. * The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. * Purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." - The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. - Abbas v. COMELEC: "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." - There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. 3. YES. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute

Administrative Law Dean Carlota are germane to that subject. Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. 4. YES. The questioned EO No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. - Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the plebiscite. - While Art. XIX, Sec 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." - This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. - The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. - There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. - The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. - To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, Sec 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. - E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socioeconomic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities. Dispositive: The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

A2010 PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN 293 U.S. 388 HUGHES; January 7, 1935 FACTS - EO 6199, which prohibited the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, was enacted, pursuant to sec 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 193, which states that “'The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the Pres issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1k, or imprisonment for not to exceed 6 months, or both.” - EO 6204, based on sec 10(a) of the NIRA, authorizing the Pres 'to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes' of title 1 and providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed 6 months, or both,' authorized the Sec of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the Pres for the purpose of enforcing Sec 9(c), including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary. - Sec of Interior issued the regulations which included the requirement for every producer, purchaser or shipper of petroleum to file a monthly statement under oath, giving information re: their residence and post office address, and other information regarding the sale, purchase, production of petroleum (Regulations IV, V and VII) - EO 6256 approved Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry. - Thru EO of August 28, 1933, the Pres designated the Sec of the Interior as Administrator, and the Dept of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise on his behalf all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Sec 3(f), title 1 of the NIRA, provides that, when a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the Pres under that title, 'any violation of any provision in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense.'

SANTIAGO v COMELEC

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- By EO No. 6284-a, the 2nd par of sec 4 of art III 3 was eliminated. It was reinstated by EO 6855. - Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and its coplaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, and Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate properties, sued to restrain officials from enforcing the laws promulgated by the Sec of Interior and questioned the constitutionality of the EOs. ISSUE WON the EOs are constitutional HELD NO, because of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power Ratio The Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon the agent a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of its function. Reasoning - The Constitution has never been regarded as denying the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. - Authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy. - Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited. - Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It leaves to the states and to their constituted authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the President's authority by reference to the basis or extent of the state's limitation of production. It does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the 3

'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade practice and in violation of this code.'

Administrative Law Dean Carlota President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no creterion to govern the President's course. It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action.The Congress in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment. - The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the functions of a Legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative officer executing a declared legislative policy. We find nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the authority conferred by section 9(c). - When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation. Disposition EO Nos. 6199, 6204, and the regulations issued by the Sec of the Interior, are without constitutional authority.

SEPARATE OPINION CARDOZO [dissenting] - To uphold the delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be governed. Such a standard is not lacking in respect of the prohibitions permitted by this section when the act with all its reasonable implications is considered as a whole. What the standard is becomes the pivotal inquiry. - The Pres has choice, though within limits, as to the occasion, but none whatever as to the means. The means have been prescribed by Congress. There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases. If we look to the whole structure of the statute, the test is plainly this, that the President is to forbid the transportation of the oil when he believes, in the light of the conditions of the industry as disclosed from time to time, that the prohibition will tend to effectuate the declared policies of the act-not merely his own conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, but the policies announced by section 1. - The President has the privilege of choice between one standard and another. What he does is to inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from time to time. These being ascertained, he is not to prefer one standard to another in any subjective attitude of mind, in any personal or willful way. He is to study the facts objectively, the violation of a standard impelling him to action or inaction according to its observed effect upon industrial recovery-the ultimate end, as appears by the very heading of the title, to which all the other ends are tributary and mediate. - Congress was aware that for the recovery of national well-being there might be need of temp restriction upon production in one industry or

A2010 another. When it clothed the Pres with power to impose such a restriction-to prohibit the flow of oil illegally produced-it laid upon him a mandate to inquire and determine whether the conditions in that particular industry were such at any given time as to make restriction helpful to the declared objectives of the act and to the ultimate attainment of industrial recovery. - A reference, express or implied, to the policy of Congress, is a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. Discretion is not unconfined and vagrant. The separation of powers between the Executive and Congress is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor. There must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government, which cannot foresee to-day the developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety. - The President was not required either by the Constitution or by any statute to state the reasons that had induced him to exercise the granted power. It is enough that the grant of power had been made and that pursuant to that grant he had signified the will to act. - The President, when acting in the exercise of a delegated power, is not a quasi judicial officer, whose rulings are subject to review upon certiorari or appeal, or an administrative agency supervised in the same way. Officers and bodies such as those may be required by reviewing courts to express their decision in formal and explicit findings to the end that review may be intelligent. Such is not the position or duty of the President. He is the Chief Executive of the nation, exercising a power committed to him by Congress, and subject, in respect of the formal qualities of his acts, to the restrictions, if any, accompanying the grant, but not to any others.

ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC. ERMITA GR No. 168207 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005 NATURE Petitions for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law. - NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new law in its Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 and 4/5% or the national government deficit as

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a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 and 1/2%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. ISSUE WON the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power HELD NO. Ratio Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. Reasoning The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. - Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. - In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. - There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. Disposition Petition is DENIED.

Administrative Law Dean Carlota A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States 295 U.S. 495 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ; May 27, 1935 FACTS - Schechter was found to have violated the “Live Poultry Code” promulgated under NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act) but written by industry groups then approved by the President through the Ag Sec’y. NIRA gave President the authority to approve “codes of fair competition” applied by a trade or industrial group. - Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act provides that "codes of fair competition," which shall be the " standards of fair competition" for the trades and industries to which they relate, may be approved by the President upon application of representative associations of the trades or industries to be affected, or may be prescribed by him on his own motion. Their provisions [p496] are to be enforced by injunctions from the federal courts, and "any violation of any of their provisions in any transaction in or affecting interstate commerce" is to be deemed an unfair method of competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and is to be punished as a crime against the United States. Before approving, the President is to make certain findings as to the character of the association presenting the code and absence of design to promote monopoly or oppress small enterprises, and must find that it will "tend to effectuate the policy of this title." Codes permitting monopolies or monopolistic practices are forbidden. The President may "impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees and others, and in the furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such exceptions and exemptions from the provisions of such code," as he, in his discretion, deems necessary "to effectuate the policy herein declared." A code prescribed by him is to have the same effect as one approved on application. ISSUE WON the Live Poultry Code is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative powers. (YES.) HELD RATIO: Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested. Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the policy, as declared by Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the policies and establish standards. REASONING: - The delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President by § 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is unconstitutional and the Act is also unconstitutional, as applied in this case, because it exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States - This code was found to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because:

A2010 1) private groups were given lawmaking function and discretion to make the policies. Authority wasn’t really delegated to the President. 2) It covered every sector of the economy (not like the FCC, which just deals with communications). It was an overbroad delegation of authority. There was no limitation on things that could be subject to the “codes of fair competition.” 3) no formal procedures constraining the President when he decides to approve/disapprove the codes. No deliberation was required in acting to promulgate the codes. - Furthermore, there were no statutory standards or procedural safeguards for promulgating the codes. + Cardozo wrote a strong concurrence saying that this was a situation of “delegation run riot”, that although Congress delegating power to executive can sometimes be ok, congress delegating power to industrial or trade associations was out of the question.

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v AL GONQUIN SNG, INC. WHITE V ROUGHTON 530 F.2d 750 PER CURIAM; February 27,1976 NATURE Appeal from order denying application for preliminary injunction to prevent termination by defendant of general assistance granted to plaintiffs. FACTS - Roughton is supervisor of the town of the City of Champaign Township. In this capacity he administers the general township assistance program which provides locally collected taxes for distribution as welfare to needy township residents. - Plaintiff White received assistance in the form of food orders. Plaintiff Walker was provided food order and rent. Subsequently, assistance to both were terminated and they received neither notice, explanation nor information as to the right of appeal. - Plaintiff Silagy aplied for assistance at least thrice but was always denied without informing her of the reasons supporting her rejection or the right to appeal. - Defendant admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their own unwritten personal standards. ISSUE/S 1. WON the injunction must issue HELD 1. YES Ratio Welfare recipients must be provided with adequate notice and an

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evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discontinued. (Goldberg v Kelly) Reasoning General assistance welfare grants are clearly state action under provisions of statute relating to public aid and are therefore subject to due process protection. Defendant as administrator of the general assistance program has the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such requirements requires that Roughton establish written standards and regulations. Disposition Reversed and remanded with directions

2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION a. ASCERTAINMENT OF FACT PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN 293 U.S. 388 HUGHES; January 7, 1935 FACTS: -Based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 which states that: “The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.”, the President by Executive Order No. 6199, prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.' -Under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, authorizing the President “to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.” the President, by Executive Order No. 6204, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President 'for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order' of July 11, 1933, 'including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.' - On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out the President's orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. the regulations and the orders of the President were questioned by oil companies

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

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affected by the Orders. They question the basis of the power of the President to make such orders as an undue delegation of legislative powers.

standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited”

ISSUE: WON there was an undue delegation of legislative powers when the Legislature, through section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, allowed the President to issue the Orders complained of.

DISSENTING Cardozo supra

HELD: Yes the delegation of such power was undue. (AS TO PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS) -The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility -the Court cited several cases wherein the Congress delegated the power of ascertaining facts for the implementation of orders. First of which was Aurora v US wherein the Congress left the power to determine whether Great Britain modified her edicts so as not to violate the Neutral Commerce Act of the US. It gave the President the power to suspend trade relations with Great Britain until such determination by the President. The Court ruled that it could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of 1809, 'either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.' -Field v Clark where the case was about an Act which gave the President the power to suspend the introduction of products from different countries which imposed duties or other exactions on agricultural produce of the US. The Court found that the act before it was not inconsistent with the principle of delegation of powers; that it did not 'in any real sense, invest the president with the power of legislation.' As 'the suspension was absolutely required when the president ascertained the existence of a particular fact,' it could not be said 'that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.' 'He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.' -authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy -examples for the allowing of the Congress to authorize instrumentalities to fix standards were the Radio Act of 1927 and Hampton Jr. & Co. v United States -in the present case the Court ruled that “section 9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no

LOVINA v MORENO b. FILLING IN OF DETAILS ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS 53 PHIL 394 JOHNS; August 27, 1929 NATURE Appeal from the decision of CFI FACTS - The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and void. Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers. Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standards shall go into effect. Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient

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to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. - CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by defs. ISSUE/S 1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the law for its more efficient administration HELD - The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law. - The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission. - The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its enforcement. The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality. Disposition The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

c. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING BOOK VII ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges. Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book: (1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions

Administrative Law Dean Carlota regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the

A2010 revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. 1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. CHAPTER 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

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Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

1. LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER OLSEN v ALDENESE 43 Phil 259 JOHNS; March 29, 1922 NATURE Petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus FACTS - The Tariff Act of 1913, conferred legal right on Olsen and Co. to export from the Phil. Islands into the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown in the Phil. Islands In 1916, Phil. Legislature enacted Act. No. 2613 entitled "An Act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein," The Collector of Internal Revenue then promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations." - Olsen applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) for such a certificate re the 10,00 cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown and produced in the Philippine Islands. - Olsen alleged that CIR wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate of origin "on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya." Despite such refusal, Olsen applied to the Insular Collector of Customs for the certificate of origin, and that officer wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate "on the ground that the petitioner had not obtained and

Administrative Law Dean Carlota presented with the application the certificate of the said respondent Collector of Internal Revenue. Preliminary Notes: - The important question here involved is the construction of Secs. 6, 7, and 11 of Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, and Sec. 9 of the "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," promulgated by Administrative Order No. 35. - Clause B of Sec 6 of Act No. 2613 empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States. Portion of Sec. 7 of said Act provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall have been in inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue, etc." Portion of Sec. 11 of the Act requires the certificate of origin of the Collector of Internal Revenue to show that the tobacco to be exported is standard. And, portion of Sec. 9 of Administrative Order No. 35 limits the exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. ISSUE WON the CIR exceeded his rule-making powers as shown in Sec.9 of the Adm. Order 35. HELD YES. Ratio The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make any rules and regulations must be founded upon some legislative act, and that they must follow and be within the scope and purview of the act. Reasoning - It will be noted that the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is confined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and that such power is further limited to the making of such rules for the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only that the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make any rules or regulations. - Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the legislative act are NOT limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands. The only power conferred is to establish general and local rules for the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco and the standard and the type of tobacco which may be exported to the United States. By Sec. 9 of Admin Order 35, Cir went beyond its authority of rule-making power as limited by law. Limting the exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya is invalid. *There was a long discussion on the inapplicability of and difference of this case with Buttfield vs. Stranahan (192 U. S., 525). See original. Disposition.Petition GRANTED.

A2010 SYMAN v JACINTO 93 Phil 1093 Montemayor; 31 Oct 1953 Nature Appeal against the decision of CFI Facts -Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila ordered the seizure of two shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines, consigned to the petitioner (Sy Man). -Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, after due hearing, rendered a decision that the articles covered are delivered to the importer after payment of the necessary customs duty, sales tax and other charges except the sewing machines which are hereby declared forfeited to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to be sold at public auction in conformity with law if found saleable, otherwise, to be destroyed. -Sy Man received a copy of the decision of the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila. Asking for the execution of the decision, in view of the fact that it had become final and could no longer be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of notification thereof was given to the herein petitioner who did not appeal from said decision to the Commissioner of Customs within the aforesaid period of time. -Counsel for the petitioner requested that the goods be released because of the decision. -Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila responded and said that such was endorsed to the Commissioner of Customs, requesting information whether the merchandise may now be delivered to the owner upon showing that the decision has become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a copy of the same by the claimant. -Sy Man sought (1) to declare null and void that portion of the Memorandum Order promulgated by the Insular Collector of Customs dated August 18, 1947, which provides that as in protest cases, decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, whether appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector (now commissioner); that such decisions and their supporting papers be submitted to his office, and that pending action by him on such decisions, final disposal of the goods involved shall not be made; and (2) to order the Collector to deliver to the petitioner the shipments of textiles claimed to be final and executory. -TC granted the petition. Issue WON this supposed power of revision by the Commissioner of unappealed decisions of the Collector in seizure cases, is supported by law Held Yes.

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-Let us now see if there is any law giving authority to the Commissioner of Customs to review and revise unappealed decisions in seizure cases. In cases involving assessment of duties, even when the importer fails to protest the decision of the Collector of Customs, the Commissioner may order a reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector was erroneous and unfavorable to the Government; and the Department Head in his turn if he believes that the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case of assessment of duties is erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may require the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may direct the Commissioner to certify the case to the CFI. "SEC. 1393. Supervisory authority of Commissioner and of Department Head in certain cases. - If in any case involving the assessment of duties the importer shall fail to protest the decision of the collector of customs and the Commissioner shall be of the opinion that the decision was erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, the latter may order a reliquidation; and if the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in the opinion of the Department Head, be erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, the Department Head may require the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public interest requires, direct the Commissioner to certify the cause to the Court of First Instance of Manila, in the manner provided in section one thousand three hundred and eighty-six hereof, there to be reviewed by the court as other customs cases removed thereto. "Except as in the preceding paragraph provided, the supervisory authority of the Department Head over the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the administrative revisal of the decisions of the Commissioner in matters removable into court." It will be noticed that the section is entitled "supervisory authority of the Commissioner and of the Department Head in certain cases." We find no similar legal provision in seizure cases. The logical inference is that the lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for this supervisory authority or power of revision by the Commissioner and the Department Head on unappealed seizure cases; and it is highly possible that up to and until 1947, when the memorandum order of August 18th of that year was issued, it was not the practice of the Bureau of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases sent up by Collectors to the Commissioner's office for review and revision. This we may gather from the memorandum order itself, where the Commissioner observes that in seizure cases some collectors of customs merely submit to him their reports of their seizure and the subsequent final disposition thereof without transmitting the records of their proceedings, and he therein asserts the right of the Commissioner of Customs to review decisions of Collector of Customs in seizure cases though unappealed. If that right and that practice had existed from the beginning, it is not likely that Collectors would disregard and ignore it, to the extent that it was necessary to remind them of it by means of a memorandum order. -It would seem that in a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the papers in the cause to the Commissioner only when and after the importer notifies him in writing signifying his desire to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. The section does not say that without the notice of appeal, the Collector is called upon to transmit the papers

Administrative Law Dean Carlota of the case to the Commissioner. If this be true, then legally, a case of seizure unappealed ends right in the office of the Collector, without prejudice of course to the Collector subsequently making a report of his action to the Commissioner. Furthermore, section 1388 of the Revised Administrative Code provides thus:. "SEC. 1388. Settlement of cause by payment of fine or redemption of forfeited property. - If, in any seizure case, the owner or agent shall, while the cause is yet before the collector of the district of seizure, pay to such collector the fine imposed by him or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, or if, after removal of the cause, he shall pay to the Commissioner the amount of the fine as finally determined by him, or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property, such property shall be forthwith surrendered, and all liability which may or might attach to the property by virtue of the offense which was the occasion of the seizure and all liability which might have been incurred under any bond given by the owner or agent in respect to such property shall thereupon be deemed to be discharged. "Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law." If under the above provisions, in a seizure case the owner or agent may, while the cause is yet before the collector, pay the fine imposed, or in case of forfeiture, pay the appraised value of the property, and thereafter such properties shall be surrendered and all liability which may attach to said property by virtue of the offense causing the seizure is to be deemed discharged, the conclusion to be drawn is that it is within the power and right of an importer, owner or agent to end the case in the office of the Collector, thereby precluding any intervention by the Commissioner in the way of reviewing and revising the decision of the Collector. Again, under section 1389 immediately following which reads "SEC. 1389. Right of protest in such cases. - Where payment is made or redemption effected as allowed under the preceding section, the party making payment or effecting the redemption may, if he desires to test the validity of the proceedings, make formal protest at the time of making such payment or affecting such redemption, or within fifteen days thereafter, and make claim for the repayment of the whole or any part of the sum so paid by him; whereupon the proceedings shall take the same course as in ordinary cases of protest against customs duties and charges generally." The importer or owner of goods seized, after payment is made or redemption effected, is allowed if he desires to test the validity or correctness of the decision of the Collector, to appeal the same to the Commissioner of Customs presumably, to decrease the amount of his liability or annul the seizure altogether and have all the amounts paid by him refunded. The inference follows that by making payment and redeeming the property seized under the decision of the Collector of Customs, the owner may terminate the case right there, although notwithstanding his payment he still has the right to have the case elevated to the Office of the Commissioner of Customs. It would seem that the elevation of the case and the transmittal of the papers thereof to the Commissioner lies within the owner's exclusive power and discretion. This argues against the pretended power of the

A2010 Commissioner of automatic review and revision of decisions of Collectors in unappealed seizure cases. It is argued that if this power of review and revision by the Commissioner of unappealed seizure cases is not conceded, then in cases where the Collector in his decision commits a blunder prejudicial to the interests of the Government, or renders a decision through fraud or in collusion with the importer, the Government cannot protect itself. The argument is not without merit; but we must bear in mind that the law is promulgated to operate on ordinary, common, routine cases. The rule is and the law presumes that in seizure cases Collectors of Customs act honestly and correctly and as Government officials, always with an eye to the protection of the interests of the Government employing them. If mistakes are committed at all more often than not they are in favor of the Government and not against it, and that is the reason why when the importer feels aggrieved by their decision, he is given every chance and facility to protest the decision and appeal to the Commissioner. Cases of erroneous decisions against the interest of the Government of decisions rendered in collusion and connivance with importers are the exception. To protect the Government in such exceptional cases, we find that in every seizure case, section 1378 of the Revised Administrative Code requires the Collector to immediately notify the Commissioner and the Auditor General. It may be that this requirement has for its main purpose the recording of and accounting for the articles seized so that in case of confiscation the Commissioner and the Auditor General will know what articles have become government property. But the notice will also inform the Commissioner and the Auditor General of the seizure. If the seizure is important or unusual, the Commissioner may, if he so desires, order the Collector as his subordinate to withhold action on the seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a reasonable time, the promulgation of his decision until after he had conferred with the Commissioner or the latter had studied the case and given suggestions. At that stage of the proceedings before definite action is taken by the Collector, and a decision rendered by him, it would seem that any action by him as a subordinate is still subject to the supervisory authority and control of the Commissioner as his Chief, and the latter may still influence and direct the Collector's action if he finds occasion for doing so. But if the Government deems it necessary to provide for review and revision by the Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the decisions of the Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases, the Legislature may be requested to insert a section in the Revised Administrative Code similar to Section 1393 which applies to unprotested cases of assessment duties. The defect in said section however is that it does not fix the period within which the automatic review and revision or reliquidation to be ordered by the Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance must be effected. This defect should be remedied. In conclusion, we find and hold that under the present law governing the Bureau of Customs, the decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case if not protested and appealed by the importer to the

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Commissioner of Customs on time, becomes final not only as to him but against the Government as well, and neither the Commissioner nor the Department Head has the power to review, revise or modify such unappealed decision. We also find and hold that the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only because it has not been duly approved by the Department Head and duly published as required by section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code but also because it is inconsistent with law. Disposition For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

PEOPLE v MACEREN 79 SCRA 450 AQUINO; October 18, 1977 FACTS - Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. - The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. - Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that they engaged in electro fishing. - Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. ISSUE/S 1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 HELD 1. YES. Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily

Administrative Law Dean Carlota embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Disposition Decision affirmed

TOLEDO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (COMELEC) 202 SCRA 507 PARAS, J.; October 4, 1991 NATURE Petition for certiorari from a Resolution of the CSC FACTS - Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec. At the time of his appointment, petitioner was already more than 57 years old. However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office. - Public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under the CSRPAP, issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledo’s appointment void ab initio. Petitioner appealed the foregoing Resolution to public respondent CSC. CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which disposed of the appeal, declaring the appointment merely voidable and not void ab initio, and declaring Toledo a de facto officer from the time he assumed to office to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 2066. ISSUE WON Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP is valid HELD NO Ratio The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules cannot be accorded validity. It is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no basis in the law which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the CSC.

A2010 Reasoning RA 2260, establishing the CSC and authorizing it to prescribe and enforce rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the law, contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government service of any person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment in the Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of the CSC. The power vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it.

express terms of the executive order’s intention—qualified availers of the amnesty may pay an amnesty tax in lieu of said unpaid taxes which are forgiven. - CA affirmed the decision of CTA. It said that a “tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intention overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it xxx” ISSUES 1. WON the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning and intent of EO 41.

Disposition The petition is GRANTED

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v CA (R.O.H. AUTO PRODUCTS) 240 SCRA 368 VITUG; January 20, 1995 NATURE Petition for review of a decision of the CA. FACTS - August 22, 1986: EO 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor’s taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. - R.O.H. Auto Products availed of the amnesty, and filed in October 1986 and November 1986 its Tax Amnesty Return and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. - Prior to this, petitioner CIR assessed R.O.H. deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 Sept 1981 and 30 Sept 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1.41 M. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the Commissioner on the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order 4-87 implementing EO 41 had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the BIR after promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made. 1.02. A certification by the Tax Amnesty Implementation Officer of the fact of availment of the said tax amnesty shall be a sufficient basis for: 1.02.3. xxx the cancellation/ withdrawal of assessment notices and letters of demand issued after August 21, 1986 for the collection of income, business, estate or donor’s taxes due during the same taxable years. - Court of Tax Appeals ruled for the taxpayer. It said that the Commissioner failed to present any case or law which proves that an assessment can withstand or negate the force and effects of a tax amnesty. This burden of proof on taxpayer was created by the clear and

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HELD YES. Ratio All issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. The authority of the Minister of Finance (Secretary of Finance) in conjunction with the CIR to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and regulates, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Reasoning - If EO 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in it exclusionary clauses. It did not. The executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. - There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns and due payments made by the taxpayer did not conform with the conditions expressed in the amnesty order.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v CA (Yap) 249 SCRA 149 FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995 NATURE Consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the CA decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. FACTS -Private respondents (Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, AMADCOR) are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed with this Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) and DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990), and

Administrative Law Dean Carlota sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. -SC referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. CA found the following facts undisputed. Respondents’ Arguments: -Admin Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in GADALEJ because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. Petitioners’ Arguments: -DAR: Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657. -Landbank: the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds 2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation. HELD 1. NO. -Section 16(e) of RA 6657: Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. -It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". Ratio The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.

A2010 The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 2. YES. -The ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred. -To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. -It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision affirmed.

GMCR, INC. v BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC. 271 SCRA 790 HERMOSISIMA, JR.; April 30, 1997 NATURE Consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision] of the respondent Court of Appeals FACTS - Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise - BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system.

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- The CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum manifesting his findings and recommending that “based on technical documents submitted, BellTel’s proposal is technically feasible.” - Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of private respondent BellTel. Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years. - Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval -In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. - While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar. - Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority. - No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motionreiterating its earlier prayer. -In an Order signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset. - On the day of the hearing, BellTel filed a motion, prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. - NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. - BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the Order - The SC issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution

Administrative Law Dean Carlota

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- The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which set aside NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex ‘J’ of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex ‘K’ of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex ‘L’ of the Petition and directed . NTC to meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft Order - Petitioners filed with this court separate petitions for review. ISSUE WON the CA’s act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the court’s power to nullify administrative regulations. HELD NO. Ratio Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. Reasoning Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power. Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations. Disposition Petitions DISMISSED

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