Compilation of Case Digest

SECTION 1: Due Process In People v. Larrañaga G.R No. 138874-75, January 31, 2006, Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedoms; it is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise. In evaluating a due process claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or property interest exists, and if so, what procedures are constitutionally required to protect that right. Otherwise stated, the due process clause calls for to separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged violation. For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to appellants the trial of these cases. Section 14 states that “no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.” The accused shall be presumed innocent until contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However the arraignment, trial nay proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. In Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005, the Supreme Court states that-- Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review his decision on appeal. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to refuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the investigation. This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutor powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.” Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

In Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, the equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The nonidentical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between men and women. RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.

Equal Protection of the Law Clause: In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, the Supreme Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. SECTION 2 In Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014, the Supreme Court states that-- Cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel. But the Supreme Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyber libel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print. The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything goes writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. On Section 19, it merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime has and taking Section 6 into consideration, it can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal law. It does not take consideration any of the three tests generally evaluated on restraints on free speech, making searches and seizure unreasonable.

In Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, APRIL 21, 2014, the warrantless arrest conducted on accused was valid. Section 5, Rule 113of the rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the situations the situations when a person may be arrested a warrant, this: “SECTION 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Paragraph (a) of section 5, is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of arresting officer. In the instant case, the prosecution completely and fully established that accused was arrested in flagrante delicto. Accused failed to raise any objection to the manner of her arrest before arraignment. In fact, she participated in the trial. She even took the witness stand and testified in her own behalf. She is now stopped from assailing the legality of her arrest as she waived any irregularity, if any, that may have tainted her arrest. Significantly, the proof of an in flagrante delicto arrest, removes whatever credibility there may have been about the testimony of the accused of the alleged circumstances that made her go with the police to the DEU unit. Her version that she was a frame-up victim cannot stand against the testimony of the police, supported by the evidence of corpus delicti. In Ocampo v. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014, Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested." Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judge's personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor's report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. In Antiquera v. People, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that-- There was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Therefore, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.” In People vs Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest,

there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The apprehension of Cogaed was not affected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113 of Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present and was made. At the time of his of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, “two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of arresting officer. Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within the plain view of the police officers suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest. The constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be in admissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This was known as fruit of poisonous tree doctrine, it prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expedition. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and affects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. If the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Accordingly, the letter and check are admissible in evidence. The letter is inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the employer who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to been forced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from the court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SECTION 3 In People of the Philippines v. Albofera, G.R. No. L-69377, July 20, 1997, the Supreme Court reiterated that-- The right of privacy of communication and correspondence is a right embodied in the Constitution. During illegal search, documents taken from you cannot be used against you and it is inadmissible in any courts in any proceedings. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability. In Waterous Drug Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997, the Supreme Court ruled that-- The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable upon lawful order of the court and when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Hearsay evidence carries no probative value. The evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is set aside. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment. SECTION 4 Freedom of Expression: In Chavez vs Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Feb 15, 2008, stated that any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen. The government action may chill into silence those to whom the action is directed. Any citizen must be allowed to take up the cudgels for those who have been

cowed into inaction because freedom of expression is a vital public right that must be defended by everyone and anyone. Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity. x x x Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression is an indispensable condition to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. No society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of expression. Freedom of expression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentious discussion of all social, economic and political issues. To survive, a free and democratic society must zealously safeguard freedom of expression. Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office. Freedom of expression crystallizes important public policy issues, and allows citizens to participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom of expression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of claims and counterclaims, from which the truth will likely emerge. Freedom of expression allows the airing of social grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginalized groups who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of expression provides a civilized way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his fist instead. Freedom of expression is the freedom to disseminate ideas and beliefs, whether competing, conforming or otherwise. It is the freedom to express to others what one likes or dislikes, as it is the freedom of others to express to one and all what they favor or disfavor. It is the free expression for the ideas we love, as well as the free expression for the ideas we hate. xxx Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity. The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restraint. As stated in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission, "[T]he First Amendment (Free Speech Clause), subject

only to narrow and well understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private individuals." Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution. Prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny content-based restraint. If the content-based prior restraint is directed at protected expression, courts will strike down the restraint as unconstitutional because there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. The analysis thus turns on whether the prior restraint is contentbased, and if so, whether such restraint is directed at protected expression, that is, those not falling under any of the recognized categories of unprotected expression. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. x x x The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top. In any event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open. The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim

here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected expression. The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the AntiWiretapping Law.

Freedom of the press: In MTRCB vs ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 155282, Jan. 17, 2005, respondents sought exemption from the coverage of the term "television programs" on the ground that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial" protected under Section 4,31 Article III of the Constitution. Albeit, respondent’s basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo,32 but freedom of expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x." Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power. Respondents claim that the showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.

Freedom of Expression and of Association: In Ang ladlad LGBT party vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, further explained Freedom of Expression and of Association, thus, Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. XXX With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. XXX As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections. This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances: In Bayan vs Ermita, G.R No. 169838, April 23, 2006, states that the first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v. Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows: There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. x x x Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies.21 A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the

words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

SECTION 5 Freedom of Religion: In Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R No. 164785, March 15, 2010, Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom, submitting that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like "putang babae" were said in exercise of his religious freedom. The argument has no merit. The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom. The section reads as follows: No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the

level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road. The Policy on benevolent neutrality was adopted in Estrada vs Escritor, A.M. No. P-021651, Aug. 4, 2006, on the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and practice are beyond serious doubt.147 Thus, having previously established the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective. A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. x x x Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself. Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or even "in the sound administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. x x x Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state

interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. Boundary on religious expression In Diocese of Bacolod vs COMELEC, G.R No. 205728, Aug 21, 2015 Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation.The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law. The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ." x x x In Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No 204819, April 8, 2014, the intertwining of the guarantee of religious freedom and right to free speech was discussed, stating that With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. x x x In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny. In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tugof-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened

as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

SECTION 6 Limitation to Right to Travel In OCAD v. Judge Macarine, A.M No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012, the limitation to right to travel was tackled, True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.1âwphi1 However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.

In Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 115132, August 9, 1995, the rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same: justice delayed is justice denied. Violation of either section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused. There are other reasons why the case should not be remanded to the court a quo. Three justices of the Special Division, namely Justice Atienza, Balajadia and Amores have already retired. Presiding Justice Garchitorena is still with the respondent court but his impartiality has been vigorously assailed by the petitioner. Mr. Justice Francisco of the Third Division of this Court noted that Presiding Justice Garchitorenas undue interference in the examination of witness Cuervo revealed his bias and prejudice against petitioner. As Mr. Justice Francisco observed the court questions were so numerous which as per petitioner Dans count totaled 179 compared to prosecutor Querubins questions which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy, however, is that the court propounded leading, misleading, and baseless hypothetical questions rolled into one. Mr. Justice Franciscos opinion was concurred by Mr. Justice Melo. Truly, even Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, Madam Justice Romero and Mr. Justice Panganiban who voted to convict petitioner did not refute Mr. Justice Franciscos observations on the lack of impartiality of Presiding Justice Garchitorena. They disregarded Mr. Ramon F. Cuervos testimony and based the conviction of petitioner purely on the documentary evidence submitted by the People. Moreover, all the evidence in the case at bar are now before this Court and to avoid further delay, we can evaluate the

evidence. In fact, the same evidence has been passed upon by the Third Division of this Court in formulating its judgment of affirmance sought to be reconsidered. Certainly, it will be sheer rigmarole for this Court to still remand the case for a Special Division of five of the Sandiganbayan to render another decision in the case, with respect to the herein petitioner.

SECTION 7 In Chavez v. PEA & AMARI, G. R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations. In PMO v. Strategic Alliance Development Company, G. R. No. 200402, June 18, 2014, the courts a quo held that because of the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, 23 petitioners has a duty to disclose the derivation of the indicative price to respondent. The failure to disclose the information allegedly entitles respondent to the issuance of the Notice of Award. Therefore, whether or not the people’s right to information has been violated by APT’s failure to disclose the basis of the indicative price, that right cannot be used as a ground to direct the issuance of the Notice of Award to Dong-A Consortium. Under the ASBR, respondent must at least match the indicative price in order to win.

SECTION 8 In GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G. R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust. Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the governments right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of public concern speech which is protected by their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York Citys mass transit service, issued a

rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the governments right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTAs rule was unconstitutionally overboard. In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District, it was held that, A county hospital employees wearing of a Union Yes lapel pin during a union organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the countys proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was outweighed by the employees interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button.

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion. In in re Edillon, 84 SCRA 554, the Supreme Court states that-- in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.

SECTION 9 In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Sec. of DILG, G. R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003, Petitioners lament the difficulties they face in complying with the implementing rules and regulations issued by the CDA for the conversion of electric cooperatives under P.D. No. 269, as amended, to cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. They allege that because of the cumbersome legal and technical requirements imposed by the

Omnibus Rules and Regulations on the Registration of Electric Cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938, petitioners cannot register and convert as stock cooperatives under the Cooperative Code. The Court understands the plight of the petitioners. Their remedy, however, is not judicial. Striking down Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional or declaring them inapplicable to petitioners is not the proper course of action for them to obtain their previous tax exemptions. The language of the law and the intention of its framers are clear and unequivocal and courts have no other duty except to uphold the law. The task to re-examine the rules and guidelines on the conversion of electric cooperatives to cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938 and provides every assistance available to them should be addressed by the proper authorities of government. This is necessary to encourage the growth and viability of cooperatives as instruments of social justice and economic development. In Goldenway Merchandising. Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G. R. No. 15540, March 13, 2013, the Supreme Court states that-- the right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Further, as with other individual rights to contract and to property, it has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest. In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, G. R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009, PICOP’s ground for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is the supposed contract entered into by the government in the form of a Presidential Warranty, dated 29 July 1969 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to PICOP. The DENR Secretary refutes this claim, and alleges that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Presidential Warranty a valid and subsisting contract under the Constitutions Non-Impairment Clause.

Also, The argument that the Presidential Warranty is a contract on the ground that there were mutual considerations taken into account consisting in investments on PICOPs part is preposterous. All licensees put up investments in pursuing their businesses. To construe these investments as consideration in a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence that a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitted and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may extend. Neither shall we allow a circumvention of such doctrine by terming such permit as a warranty.

SECTION 12 In People v. Escordial, G. R. Nos. 138934- 35, January 16, 2002, Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides that [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. He contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of accused-appellants rights under this provision. While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accusedappellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him. In People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, it is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with

the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

In People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA, the Supreme Court said: In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence: (a) before the case is filed in court, or with public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation, but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected and inadmissible; (b) After the case is filed in court; to refuse to be a witness; not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross examination; and while testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than for what he is being prosecuted. In People v. Maingan, G.R. No. 170470, the Court held that when the accussedappellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of January 2, 2001, he was already a suspect in the fire that destroyed several houses and killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr., and thus, the confession of appellant given to the Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag, is inadmissible in evidence. But the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza, a neighbour of Roberto Separa, Sr., on the same confession is admissible in evidence and is not covered by the exclusionary rules.

In NBI v. Judge Reyes, A.M. –MTJ-97-1120, the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation is relevant and material only where an extrajudicial confession of admission from the accused becomes the basis of conviction.

Section 13 In Trillanes v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of

guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." In Government of U.S. v. Judge Puruganan and Mark Jimenez, G.R. No. 1848571, the Supreme Court denied with finality Mark Jimenez’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s earlier decision to declare null and void the order of Judge Puruganan granting bail to Mark Jimenez. The court said that, as suggested by the use of the word “conviction”, the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favour of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case of extradition where the presumption of innocence is not an issue. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition courts.

Section 14 In Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, the law is not vague as it defines with sufficient particularity unlawfully acquired property of a public officer or employee as that which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. It also provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Based on these parameters, the public is given fair notice of what acts are proscribed. The law, therefore, does not offend the basic concept of fairness and the due process clause of the Constitution.

Neither is the presumption of innocence clause violated by Sec. 2 of RA 1379 which states that property acquired by a public officer or employee during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The constitutional assurance of the right against self-incrimination likewise cannot be invoked by petitioners. The right is a prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.[45] In this case, petitioners are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting the presumption established by law. They may present documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market placements and other fund sources in their defense.

In People v. Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. This is not only the right but duty of the judge who feels the need to elicit information to the end that justice will be served.

In People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, the Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s condition that he was denied the right to an impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to a fair trial.

In JAYLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, the Supreme Court reiterated that-- If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

SECTION 15 In SPO2 GERONIMO MANALO v. PNP CHIEF CALDERON, a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully. A restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or

whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.

SECTION 16 In PAYAKAN G. TILENDO v. OMBUDSMAN,the Supreme Court ruled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

In CAPT. WILFREDO G. ROQUERO v. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA, the Supreme court likewise ruled that-- the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

SECTION 17 In PEOPLE v. RONDERO,the Supreme Court held that the psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is inherently coercive in nature. Compulsion does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.

In PEOPLE v. GERRICO VALLEJO, The mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. Extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused.

SECTION 18 In IMBONG v. OCHOA, the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. The imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right. It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people.

SECTION 19 In ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the Supreme Court discussed that-- In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities. -Clarence Darrow Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.

In PEOPLE v. BAWAY, the Supreme Court held on the issue whether or not the death penalty should remain in our penal laws is a question which should be addressed to the Legislature, for the courts are not the proper fo ra for a protracted debate on the morality and propriety of capital punishment where the law itself provides for specific and well defined criminal acts.

In People v Sta. Teresa, G.R No. 130633, March 20, 2001, the court ruled that the RTC gravely erred in not entering a plea of not guilty for the accused-appellant and innot affording the latter the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence in blatant violation of his right to due process. The appellant initially entered a plea of "not guilty”, however, after the victim and the medico-legal officer testified against him, his counsel de Officio manifested that his client wanted to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty." The trial judge fell short of the exacting standards set forth in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the trial judge then conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of the change of plea and appellant's full comprehension of its consequences. “SEC. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.”

The trial court must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, Conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; requires the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. A searching inquiry occurs when the plea of guilt is based on a free and informed judgment, focusing on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences

The SC held that “the abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant's improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a human being”

According to the ruling of People vs. Bermas “The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.” The defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely 9 days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, did his counsel de officio made a manifestation in open court that his client is changing his plea to that of "guilty."As for the the proceedings in the court a quo, it failed to observe the exacting standards of constitutional due process, the SC remands the case to the court a quo for further and appropriate proceedings conformably with what we have heretofore expressed. WHEREFORE, the decision of RTC of Cabanatuan City is SET ASIDE and remanded for further proceedings. SECTION 20 In Lozano v Martinez,146 SCRA 323, the Supreme States that the gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. In Arceta v Judge Mangrobang, G.R No. 152895, the Supreme Court reiterated that-When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the

exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel is spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the constitutional question raise to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere. SECTION 21 In People vs Lacson, G.R No. 149453, April 1, 2003, the Supreme Court states that Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1) prosecution with the express consent of the accused or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2) offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal, which is the defendants burden to prove, which in this case has not been done a). The defendant never filed and denied unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. b). No notice of motion for provisional dismissal, hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the heirs of the victims. 2. Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein

provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. In People vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003 Respondent Panfilo M. Lacsonas Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes. The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioner’s contention that while Sec.8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive application. The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. In Villareal v Aliga, G.R No. 166995, January 13, 2014, the Supreme Court states that-A judgment of acquittal may be assailed only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Appeal is not an appropriate remedy if an accused is acquitted because that would put the accused in double jeopardy. It does not mean, however, that the State has no more remedy at all. It is a well-settled rule that if the remedy of appeal is not available, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of. The petitioner, however, must prove that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in acquitting the accused and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should be filed instead of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated (People v. Sandiganbayan (First Div.), 524 Phil. 496, 522 [2006] In People v Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246, the Supreme Court states that the plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the approval of the court. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the

counts of multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Section 2: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense - The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. A conviction under the plea of guilty to a lesser offense, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court held that the rules allow such plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. The counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No 4625, as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated. Such disposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Section 7, Rule 117 is more applicable. However the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily included the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances.. 1. ...., 2. ...., 3. The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and the offended party. Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA No 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party. SECTION 22 In PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA, G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994, applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining

the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. In People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241, G.R No. 101724; 3 July 1992, the Supreme Court held that the RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed. In Fajardo v CA, G.R. No. 128508, February 1, 1999, Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the State the time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads; Sec. 4: Grant of Probation: “Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, it was clear that when petitioner filed his appeal before the appellate court, what he was questioning was the merit of the decision convicting him and not the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it within probational range. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner, therefore, ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he

can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus, rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse. Considering that the prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner opted to appeal his conviction, he, therefore, deemed to relinquish his right to the benefits of probation.