Committee Report Sereno Impeachment_as of March 19_for Distribution

Republic of the Philippines HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Quezon City SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS Second Regular Session __________________________________________________________

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COMMITTEE REPORT NO. ___________ Submitted by the Committee on Justice on __________________ Re: House Resolution No. ___________ entitled “RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO” Recommending its adoption, together with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Committee in the matter of the Impeachment Proceedings against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno. Sponsors: Representatives Reynaldo V. Umali, Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Vicente “Ching” S.E. Veloso, Doy C. Leachon, Henry S. Oaminal, Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, Strike B. Revilla, Eugene Michael B. De Vera, Ruwel Peter S. Gonzaga and Rodante D. Marcoleta Mr. Speaker: The Committee on Justice respectfully recommends the adoption of House Resolution No. ___________ entitled: “RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO” together with the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Committee in the matter of the impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno. On August 15, 2017, a complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice Sereno was filed by Mr. Dante LA. Jimenez and Atty. Eligio P. Mallari with the Office of the Secretary General (hereinafter referred to as the “JIMENEZ COMPLAINT”). On August 30, 2017, a verified complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice Sereno was filed by Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon with the Office of the Secretary General (hereinafter referred to as the “GADON COMPLAINT”) and was endorsed by twentyfive (25) House members through a Resolution of Endorsement on even date. The Gadon Complaint was received by the Office of the Speaker also on the same day. The Jimenez Complaint was subsequently endorsed by sixteen (16) House members and was transmitted to and received by the Office of the Speaker on

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September 4, 2017. The Gadon and the Jimenez Complaints were then included in the Order of Business and were simultaneously referred by the Plenary to the Committee on Justice on September 7, 2017. The first meeting to determine sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaints against Chief Justice Sereno was held on September 13, 2017. In that meeting, the Jimenez Complaint was found to be insufficient in form due to its defective verification and was accordingly dismissed by the Committee. On the other hand, the Gadon Complaint was found to be sufficient in form and substance and pursuant to Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings1, the respondent Chief Justice was furnished a copy of the complaint with a written notice to submit her Verified Answer, and the parties were then allowed to submit their respective Verified Reply and Verified Rejoinder. After the submission of the said pleadings, the Committee held a meeting on October 5, 2017 where the Gadon Complaint was found to have sufficient grounds for impeachment. Thus, the Committee conducted fifteen (15) hearings from November 22, 2017 up to February 27, 2018 to determine the existence of probable cause to impeach Chief Justice Sereno. A total of fifty-nine (59) witnesses and resource persons appeared and testified before the Committee during the probable cause hearings, including eight (8) incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, two (2) Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, one (1) Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), three (3) retired Supreme Court Justices, four (4) Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, seven (7) members and officials of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the Secretary of Justice, and seventeen (17) officials and employees of the Supreme Court. The Committee also invited three (3) other Justices of the Supreme Court, who all declined the invitation of the Committee, two (2) of whom submitted pertinent record as required by the Committee. GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT IN THE GADON COMPLAINT The Gadon Complaint listed four (4) grounds for impeachment against Chief Justice Sereno, with each ground supported by several charges totaling twenty-seven (27) alleged impeachable acts committed by Chief Justice Sereno: First Ground: CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUION On the first ground for impeachment, complainant Atty. Lorenzo Gadon alleged in his complaint that Chief Justice Sereno committed culpable violations of the Constitution through the following acts:

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Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice that the respondent shall answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.

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(1)

Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC, on the reopening of the Regional Court Administration Office for Region 7 (RCAO7);

(2)

Falsifying the Temporary Restraining Order of the Supreme Court in the case of Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens Party List) vs. COMELEC;

(3)

Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC (ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs);

(4)

Delaying action on the numerous petitions for retirement and survivorship benefits of Justices and judges and their surviving spouses;

(5)

Manipulating and delaying the resolution of A.M. No. 17-06-02-SC on the request of the Secretary of Justice to transfer outside of Mindanao the cases involving the Maute group;

(6)

Failing to truthfully disclose her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN);

(7)

Manipulating the shortlist of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to exclude then-Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza from the shortlist for personal and political reasons, thereby disgracing then-Solicitor General Jardeleza and curtailing the President’s power to appoint him;

(8)

Manipulating the JBC shortlist through the clustering of nominees for six (6) vacancies in the Sandiganbayan for personal and political reasons, thereby limiting the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the Sandiganbayan;

(9)

Failing to heed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino declaring the clustering of nominees as unconstitutional, and continuing to cluster the nominees for the two (2) vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Mendoza, thereby impairing the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the Supreme Court;

(10)

Lying and making it appear that several Supreme Court Justices requested that the Justice do away with their voting for the nominees to the Supreme Court; and,

(11)

Manipulating the JBC by influencing its four (4) regular members, effectively destroying the JBC as a constitutional body mandated to fairly and impartially screen and nominate applicants to the Judiciary.

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Second Ground: CORRUPTION On the second ground for impeachment, Atty. Gadon alleged that Chief Justice Sereno committed the following acts of corruption: (1)

Using public funds to finance her extravagant and lavish lifestyle by ordering the purchase of a brand new luxurious 2017 Toyota Land Cruiser, amounting to more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00), as her personal vehicle;

(2)

Using public funds to stay in opulent hotels when attending conferences in the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business or first class together with her staff and security; and,

(3)

Using public funds to flaunt her extravagance by unnecessarily bringing a huge entourage of lawyers in her supposed official foreign trips.

Third Ground: OTHER HIGH CRIMES For the third ground, Atty. Gadon alleged that the respondent Chief Justice committed the following acts constituting other high crimes: (1)

Obstructing justice by ordering the Muntinlupa judges not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator Leila M. De Lima;

(2)

Perverting justice by meeting the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals and instructing them not to comply with the processes of the House of Representatives and to immediately question its processes before the Supreme Court;

(3)

Failing to report her extortionate attorney’s fees and pay the appropriate taxes therefor; and,

(4)

Embellishing her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in her application for the Judiciary to overstate her credentials.

Fourth Ground: BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST For the fourth ground, Atty. Gadon alleged that Chief Justice Sereno betrayed the public trust through the following acts: (1)

Hiring an Information Technology (IT) consultant with excessive compensation and without public bidding, in contravention of existing laws, Commission on Audit (COA) rules, and public policy;

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(2)

Sending a strongly-worded but misplaced reply to President Rodrigo Duterte on the Judges linked to drugs thereby inviting a head-on collision between the Presidency and the Judiciary;

(3)

Preventing the Justices of the Court of Appeals to do a courtesy call on President Duterte;

(4)

Attacking the imposition of Martial Law in a commencement address, while a petition challenging the validity of the declaration of Martial Law was still pending before the Supreme Court, and thereafter participating in the SC deliberations on the said petition;

(5)

Issuing a Joint Statement with the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals regarding CA-GR SP No. 151029 (Genedine Jambaro, et. al.vs. Lt. Gen. Roland Detabali (Ret), which can very well be elevated to the Supreme Court;

(6)

Practicing favoritism by allowing key positions in the Supreme Court to remain unfilled for a long period of time in order to wait for her staff to qualify, to the detriment of the service and great demoralization of qualified Supreme Court employees;

(7)

Appointing a key official to the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc;

(8)

Giving her newly-hired staff foreign staff travels and granting them travel allowances for their foreign travels without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc;

(9)

Usurping the mandate of the Supreme Court en banc by arrogating unto herself alone the running of the Supreme Court and the Judiciary, thereby destroying the Supreme Court as a collegial body.

I. PERTINENT RULINGS OF THE COMMITTEE This is the third impeachment proceeding initiated by the House of Representatives in the 17th Congress. In this case, the House of Representatives, through the Committee on Justice, is once again called upon to exercise its exclusive Constitutional power to demand public accountability – the power to initiate impeachment proceedings against impeachable officers under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”

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The first two (2) impeachment proceedings initiated by the Committee were against President Rodrigo Duterte and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Andres Bautista, respectively. While the impeachment complaint against President Duterte was found to be defective as to form, the Committee nevertheless declared the same to be sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. In its Committee Report, it was emphasized that it would be the last time that the Committee would exercise liberality in declaring a defective complaint as sufficient in form. Following this precedent, the impeachment complaint filed against COMELEC Chairman Bautista was found to be insufficient in form due to its defective verification and was consequently dismissed by the Committee2. Applicability of the One-Year Bar Rule to Subsequent Complaints Sec. 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution provides the limitation that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year”. This is commonly referred to as the “One-Year Bar Rule” in impeachment proceedings. In the case of Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives3, the Supreme Court ruled that the “initiation” of impeachment proceedings which is the reckoning period of the one-year bar “takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice”. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Merceditas Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice4 where the Supreme Court held: “The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.” 5 (Emphasis in the original)

In this case, the Jimenez Complaint was filed on August 15, 2017, and was endorsed by sixteen (16) House Members on September 4, 2017, while the Gadon Complaint was filed on August 30, 2017 and was endorsed by twenty-five (25) House Members on the same day. Subsequently, both the Jimenez and Gadon Complaints were simultaneously referred by Plenary to the Committee on Justice on September 7, 2017. Therefore, the one-year bar against the filing of impeachment complaints against Chief Justice Sereno took effect on September 7, 2017.

On a vote of 137-75 (with 2 abstentions), the Resolution of the Committee dismissing the impeachment complaint against COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista was overturned by the House in Plenary, and the Committee was directed to prepare the Articles of Impeachment against Chairman Bautista. However, the resignation of Chairman Bautista was accepted by the President before the Articles of Impeachment were transmitted to the Senate. 3 460 Phil. 830 (2003). 4 G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011. 5 Supra. 2

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Show Cause Orders Issued by the Committee During the course of the hearings, the Committee issued show cause orders to three (3) spokespersons of the Respondent, Atty. Aldwin Salumbides, Atty. Joshua Jerome Santiago, and Atty. Anacleto Rei Lacanilao III, and to Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Commissioner Roberto Eugenio Cadiz, for issuing statements that adversely affected the impeachment proceedings before the Committee. Atty. Salumbides and Atty. Santiago were ordered to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for describing the impeachment proceedings as a “dog and pony show” and for issuing other statements that cast aspersions to the members of Committee and to the integrity of the impeachment proceedings. Commissioner Cadiz was ordered to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for saying that the “law of the jungle” seems to prevail in the House, referring to what he described as the “law of the supermajority. Finally, Atty. Lacanilao was ordered to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for issuing statements to the media that the Respondent took a “wellness leave” for two (2) weeks when in fact the Respondent was “forced to go on an indefinite leave” by the members of the Supreme Court en banc. Atty. Salumbides, Atty. Santiago, Atty. Lacanilao and Commissioner Cadiz submitted their explanations within the prescribed period which were duly noted by the Committee and referred to a subcommittee headed by Senior Vice Chairman Vicente Veloso for the recommendation of appropriate action.

II. DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE THE JIMENEZ COMPLAINT IS INSUFFICIENT IN FORM; THE GADON COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE Section 4, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings provides: Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. – Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant(s) together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.

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Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.

Pursuant thereto, the Committee held a meeting on September 13, 2017 to determine the sufficiency in form and substance of the Jimenez and Gadon Complaints. During the said meeting, a motion to declare the Jimenez Complaint sufficient in form was made but was objected to on the ground that the verification made by the complainants did not comply with the proper form. It was emphasized that the verification in the Jimenez Complaint was substantially the same as the verification in the impeachment complaint against COMELEC Chairman Bautista, which was dismissed by the Committee due to insufficiency in form. The members cited the ruling of the Committee as contained in the Committee Reports dismissing the impeachment complaints against President Duterte and COMELEC Chairman Bautista, where it was held that all subsequent complaints that were found to be insufficient in form shall be dismissed by the Committee. The Committee then voted on the motion to declare the Jimenez Complaint sufficient in form, and with only five (5) voting in favor while twenty-eight (28) voting against the motion, the Jimenez Complaint was declared not sufficient in form and was consequently dismissed. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings, the Committee returned the Jimenez Complaint to the Secretary General on September 20, 2017, with a written explanation as to its insufficiency. In the same meeting, the Committee voted to determine the sufficiency in form of the Gadon Complaint. A motion to declare the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form was made, and an objection thereto was made on the ground that the complainant did not have “personal knowledge” of all the allegations in his complaint. Several members of the Committee noted that the based on the verification of the complaint, the allegations made by the complainant were based either on his personal knowledge or on authentic documents, and that there were original and certified true copies of documents attached to the complaint and submitted to the Committee. Acting on the said motion and its objection, the Committee voted with thirty (30) in favor and four (4) against the motion. Thus, the Gadon Complaint was found to be sufficient in form. After declaring the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form, the Committee then proceeded to determine if the said complaint was sufficient in substance. In determining sufficiency in substance, the Committee was guided by Section 4, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which state that “(t)he requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”. A motion was then made, which was also objected by some members of the Committee. There being an objection to the Page 8

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motion, the Committee proceeded to vote on the motion. With thirty (30) in favor and four (4) against the motion, the Gadon Complaint was declared sufficient in substance. After finding sufficiency in form and substance of the Gadon Complaint, the Committee furnished the respondent Chief Justice Sereno with a copy of the complaint together with a notice to file her answer thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. The parties were also notified that under the Rules, they are given three (3) days from their receipt of each responsive pleading to submit their respective Reply and Rejoinder thereto. Accordingly, the following pleadings were submitted to the Committee: (1) Verified Answer filed by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno through counsels on September 25, 2017; (2) Verified Reply filed by Complainant Atty. Gadon on September 28, 2017; and, (3) Verified Rejoinder filed by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno through counsels on October 2, 2017.

III. DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF THE GROUNDS Upon finding the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Committee then proceeded to determine if the said complaint had sufficient grounds for impeachment. In its meeting held on October 5, 2017, it was agreed that the Committee shall determine if the entire Gadon Complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment, not per allegation in the said complaint as suggested by some members. The Committee noted that in the previous impeachment proceeding against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, the Committee voted and decided on the sufficiency of the grounds based on the totality of the complaint, and not on each and every act enumerated therein. In determining sufficiency of the grounds, Chairman Reynaldo Umali guided the members by saying that they should take into consideration not just the allegations in the complaint, but also those in the verified answer, verified reply, and verified rejoinder. Thus, a motion to declare sufficiency of grounds in the Gadon Complaint was made, and an objection thereto was raised. Acting on the motion and its objection, the Committee proceeded to vote on the motion. With twenty-five (25) in favor and two (2) against, the Gadon Complaint was found to have sufficient grounds for impeachment. Incidentally, the Committee noted that it received two (2) letters from the counsels for Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on September 28, 2017 and October 4, 2017, with the subject “The Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses in the matter of the Impeachment of Chief Justice Sereno”. In the same meeting held on October 5, 2017, the Committee decided not to take action on the said letters

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considering that they were simply letters and not formal motions that should be acted upon by the Committee. Subsequently, between the period when the Committee found sufficient grounds in the Gadon Complaint and the first probable cause hearing, the counsels for Respondent Chief Justice Sereno submitted to the Committee on October 23, 2017 a Motion to Resolve and Request Clarification the issues raised by the Chief Justice in her two (2) previous letters on the matter of cross-examining the witness through counsel. The Committee also received a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from the counsels for Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on November 21, 2017, with a letter stating that the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno has chosen to attend the probable cause hearings through her attorneys-in-fact as indicated in the SPA. Additionally, position papers were submitted by Representatives Edcel Lagman, Tom Villarin, Kaka Bag-ao and Jose Christopher Belmonte on the right of non-members of the Committee to participate in the hearings, the right of the Respondent to counsel, and the right of the Respondent to cross-examine the witnesses through counsel. These letters, motions and position papers were resolved by the Committee in its first hearing on the determination of probable cause in the Gadon Complaint.

IV. DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE As mentioned earlier, fifteen (15) hearings were conducted by the Committee between November 22, 2017 to February 27, 2018 to determine probable cause for impeachment in the Gadon Complaint, with fifty-nine (59) witnesses and resource persons who appeared and testified, under oath, before the Committee, including eight (8) incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, two (2) Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, one (1) Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), three (3) retired Supreme Court Justices, four (4) Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, seven (7) members and officials of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the Secretary of Justice, and seventeen (17) officials and employees of the Supreme Court. Three (3) other Justices of the Supreme Court were also invited by the Committee but declined to attend for valid reasons. However, two (2) of the said Justices, namely Associate Justices Estela Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Leonen submitted pertinent records required by the Committee. The twenty-seven (27) charges alleged in the Gadon Complaint were exhaustively discussed, with testimonies given and documents submitted to the Committee during the course of its three (3)-month hearings. PRELIMINARY ACTIONS TAKEN AND DECISIONS MADE BY THE COMMITTEE During its first hearing on the determination of probable cause held on November 22, 2017, the Committee first discussed the issue on the right of non-members of the Committee on Justice to participate in the impeachment hearings, as raised in the letters and position papers of Reps. Lagman, Villarin, Bag-ao and Belmonte. In his Page 10

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position paper, Rep. Lagman stated that it is an immutable and inherent right of a member of the House of Representatives to participate in any committee meeting, and that such right is part of tradition and parliamentary practice, thus forming part of the Rules of the House pursuant to Section 161, Rule 256 thereof. Non-members have been always allowed to participate in committee meetings and are even allowed to attend executive sessions. The only limitation to non-members is the right to vote, since such right may only be exercised by regular and ex officio members of the Committee. Several members agreed that while non-members of the Committee have the right to attend and observe the hearings on the determination of probable cause, such non-members do not have the right to participate in the discussions or to ask questions to the resource persons, witnesses or guests during such hearings. This is to avoid delay in the proceedings, since the Committee is mandated by the 1987 Constitution to submit its report to Plenary within sixty (60) session days from the referral of the impeachment complaint. Giving all 293 members of the House of Representatives the right to speak during impeachment hearings could unduly hamper the Committee in its work. Majority Leader Rep. Rodolfo Fariñas also highlighted the fact that the proceedings before the Committee are not ordinary committee meetings and are not part of the legislative process, and that the impeachment proceedings are part of a constitutional duty solely vested by the 1987 Constitution in the members of the Committee. After thorough discussions on the matter, a motion was made to only allow members of the Committee to participate, speak and ask questions during the impeachment hearings. The motion was objected to, and the matter was put to a vote. With thirty (30) Members voting in favor of the motion and only three (3) voting against, the motion that only Members of the Committee are allowed to participate, speak and ask questions during impeachment hearings was carried. The next matter discussed by the Committee was the motion filed by Respondent’s counsels to allow them to participate in the hearings and to crossexamine the witnesses, on behalf of the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno. Several members of the Committee opined that the proceedings being conducted by the Committee to determine probable cause is akin to a preliminary investigation, where parties are expressly prohibited from examining and cross-examining any party or their witnesses. It was pointed out that when former Chief Justice Renato Corona was impeached, he was not even given any opportunity to submit an answer or to crossexamine any witnesses before the Committee, since no hearings were conducted by the Committee due to the fact that the Articles of Impeachment against him were directly filed with the Senate via a verified complaint for impeachment signed by more than one-third of all the members of the House. Thus, a motion was made to deny the motion of Respondent’s counsels to allow them to cross-examine the witnesses during the probable cause hearings. The motion Section 161. Suppletory Provisions. - The parliamentary practices of the Philippine Assembly, the House of Representatives, the Senate of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa shall be suppletory to these rules. 6

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was objected to on the ground that the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings explicitly mention “cross-examination” in Section 67 thereof, and that it is the constitutional right of the respondent to impeachment proceedings to be allowed to cross-examine witnesses. Acting on the motion and its objection, the Committee proceeded to a vote. With thirty (30) votes in favor and four votes (4) against, the motion to deny counsels for the Respondent to cross-examine witnesses was granted. Nevertheless, Chairman Umali declared that the Respondent is not deprived of the right to ask questions of the witnesses, but may do so only through members of the Committee. The Chairman also declared that the Respondent’s right to counsel is not being deprived, especially considering that all the pleadings filed by the Respondent were made through counsel and were properly considered by the Committee. HEARING PROPER The Gadon Complaint listed a total of twenty-seven (27) charges against Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on the grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. The Committee proceeded to tackle the charges individually during its hearings. Following are the summary of the charges, the answer of the Respondent, and the testimonies and documents submitted to the Committee: Charge No. 1: Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 12-11-9-SC, on the reopening of the Regional Court Administration Office for Region 7 (RCAO-7) The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Supreme Court Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Geraldine Faith Econg; Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez; and, Former Clerk of Court En Banc Atty. Enriqueta Vidal.

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno unilaterally issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 175-2012 entitled “Designating the Head for the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the Seventh Judicial Region”, and that in an effort to validate this unilateral act, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno made it appear that the Supreme Court en banc ratified her action to revive the RCAO-7 through a “falsified” Resolution dated November 27, 2012 in A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC. Atty. Gadon also alleged that Justice De Castro wrote a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice stating that the Supreme Court en banc did not ratify the revival of the RCAO-7, and that the true consensus was to oppose the reopening of the RCAO-7. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she did not “falsify” any Resolution of the Supreme Court. She claimed that under the Internal Section 6. Submission of evidence and memoranda. – xxx. The Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination and cross-examination. xxx. 7

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Rules of the Supreme Court (SC Internal Rules), the resolutions of the Supreme Court en banc are based solely on the notes of the Chief Justice on what transpired during confidential and executive deliberations. Thus, she could not have “falsified” her own notes; even assuming that there was poor note-taking on her part, it does not amount to a culpable violation of the Constitution. Justice De Castro testified before the Committee and corroborated the allegations made by Atty. Gadon in his complaint. She stated that she only learned of the issuance of A.O. No. 175-2012 when she was invited to attend the ceremonial reopening of the RCAO-7 in Cebu. She was surprised to learn of the reopening of the RCAO-7, which was done without approval from the Supreme Court en banc but merely through an A.O. She further learned upon a cursory look at A.O. No. 175-2012 that what was created in the said A.O. was an entirely different office from the RCAO-7. Under A.O. No. 175-2012, a “Judiciary Decentralized Office” was created, whose head was to report directly to the Chief Justice. According to Justice De Castro, this is contrary to the power of administrative supervision by the Supreme Court en banc over all courts and deprives the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of its authority over lower courts granted by the law creating the OCA – Presidential Decree No. 828 entitled “Creating the Office of the Court Administrator in the Supreme Court and Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”. Justice De Castro further testified that when the matter was deliberated by the Supreme Court en banc, several objections were raised by the Justices with regard to A.O. No. 175-2012 and the reopening of RCAO-7 without approval by the Supreme Court en banc. After deliberating on the issues raised during the en banc session, Justice De Castro stated that the Chief Justice agreed to amend her A.O. to address the said issues. Thus, Justice De Castro was shocked to learn about the issuance of A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC which stated that the Supreme Court en banc “ratified” the action of the Chief Justice to reopen RCAO-7. It was for this reason that Justice De Castro wrote a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice, detailing the objections raised during the en banc session and stating that the Supreme Court en banc did not ratify the actions of the Chief Justice. Justice De Castro also called for the recall or amendment of A.M. NO. 12-11-9-SC to faithfully reflect the agreements made during the said en banc session. Consequently, a corrective Resolution was released by the Supreme Court en banc dated January 22, 2013 which supersedes all prior Resolutions on the matter, including the Resolution purportedly “ratifying” the actions of the Chief Justice, and instead creates a “Needs Assessment Committee” to study and determine the necessity of decentralizing the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, through the OCA, over the lower courts. Atty. Enriqueta Vidal, the Clerk of Court En Banc during that period (and has since retired), submitted to the Committee a copy of the agenda of the en banc session where there were handwritten notes that read “ratify action of CJ Sereno”, “revive RCAO-7 with Phase 1 on a) procurement, b) approval of leave, and c) payroll administration”. She testified that she merely relies on the handwritten notes of the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno when she drafts Resolutions of the En Banc, and that Page 13

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she had no reason to doubt the veracity of the handwritten notes considering that it was written by the Chief Justice herself. Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Econg testified that she was surprised to learn that she was designated as head of the JDO pursuant to A.O. No. 175-2012, since she was already holding a plantilla position as head of the Project Management Office (PMO) in the Supreme Court. She also stated that she was more surprised that the supposed Resolution that “ratified” the revival of RCAO-7 also “appointed” her as Officer-incharge of RCAO-7 for a period of two (2) months, despite her holding the position of head of the PMO. She surmised that her designation as head of an office in Cebu might be a subtle way of easing her out of the PMO, since there have been rumors that the Chief Justice wanted one of her loyal personnel to head the PMO. Members of the Committee noted that the creation of an office through an Administrative Order, as was done by the Chief Justice in designating the head of the JDO, violates the principle of separation of powers since under this principle, only Congress has the power to create new government offices that would entail the creation of new positions and require funding. It also violates the collegiality of the Supreme Court since under the Constitution, the administrative supervision of the courts is a function of the Supreme Court en banc and is not lodged in the Chief Justice alone. It was also noted that A.O. No. 175-2012 is in conflict with P.D. No. 828 which provides for the functions of the OCA. Charge No. 2: Falsifying the Temporary Restraining Order of the Supreme Court in the case of Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens Party List) vs. COMELEC The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3)

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Mr. Jomar Canlas – Senior Reporter, Manila Times; and, Atty. Enriqueta Vidal – Former Clerk of Court En Banc.

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno tampered with and altered the draft temporary restraining order (TRO) prepared by Justice De Castro, who was the member-in-charge in the case filed by two (2) factions within the Senior Citizens Party List against the COMELEC. He claimed that the Respondent issued a blanket TRO affecting other Party Lists that were not parties to the case. He also alleged, based on a news article written by Mr. Canlas, that the Respondent received a “harsh tongue-lashing” from Justice De Castro due to this tampering. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the TRO issued was not falsified, and that she merely exercised her sound discretion in acting on a recommendation from the member-in-charge. Mr. Canlas testified that he wrote the article cited by Atty. Gadon in his complaint based on information he gathered from confidential sources within the Supreme Court. He categorically denied that the source was Justice De Castro. He also denied that he Page 14

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intimated to Atty. Gadon that the source for his article was Justice De Castro, contrary to what was earlier claimed by Atty. Gadon. In her testimony, Justice De Castro confirmed and corroborated the material allegations made by Atty. Gadon on this particular ground. She stated that the cases filed by the members of the Senior Citizens Party List were indeed raffled to her, and as member-in-charge she immediately drafted a TRO to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its resolution disqualifying the Senior Citizens Party List from the 2013 national elections, insofar as the said party list is concerned, and forwarded her recommendation to the Office of the Chief Justice. She was therefore very surprised when the TRO was finally issued which restrained the COMELEC from further proclaiming all the winners from among the party list candidates. The said TRO stated that it was issued by authority of the Chief Justice, upon recommendation by the member-in-charge, who, in this case, was Justice De Castro. Justice De Castro then wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice notifying her of the glaring difference in the issued TRO from her draft and recommendation. When the matter was later raised before the Supreme Court en banc, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a status quo ante order, so as not to embarrass the Chief Justice by calling out the error in the issued TRO, according to Justice De Castro. Atty. Vidal testified that she wrote and signed the TRO based on the notes of the Chief Justice. She stated that she never received the draft and recommendation of Justice De Castro, and that she only received the draft as prepared by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno. Some members of the Committee noted that what Justice De Castro submitted was merely a draft and a recommendation, and that the Chief Justice may either accept, modify or reject the same. However, Justice De Castro stated that while the internal rules of the Supreme Court do not prohibit the Chief Justice from modifying any draft or recommendation made by a member-in-charge in similar cases, the same internal rules do not give the Chief Justice absolute authority to set aside such draft or recommendation without discussing with the member-in-charge who, having been assigned the case, has thoroughly studied the case assigned. Justice De Castro also noted that the TRO issued by authority of the Chief Justice contained a statement that it was “upon the recommendation of the member-in-charge”, when in fact the TRO issued is entirely different from the one recommended by Justice De Castro. Atty. Vidal testified that she no longer confirmed with Justice De Castro if the draft was indeed based on her recommendation as the member-in-charge, since the instruction to issue the subject TRO came from the Chief Justice herself. Charge No. 3: Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 1608-04-SC (ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs) The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; (2) Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Mendoza; (3) Atty. Theodore Te – Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office (PIO), Supreme Court.

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Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno unilaterally ordered the release on August 9, 2016 of a supposed en banc Resolution in A.M. No. 16-08-04, ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation on the alleged involvement of four (4) judges in illegal drugs as mentioned in a speech by President Duterte, stating that the Supreme Court resolved to “DIRECT Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea to submit Complaint-Affidavits against the four (4) judges within seven (7) days”, which was released through the Twitter account of the SC-PIO. After discovering the tweet, the Supreme Court Justices “chastised” the Respondent Chief Justice since no such Resolution was approved by the En Banc. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the Resolution in A.M. No 16-08-04 was not falsified, that a draft was duly circulated among and adopted by the Supreme Court en banc, and that the final version of the Resolution did not anymore contain a “directive” to the Executive Secretary to submit complaintaffidavits. Justice Perez recalled that they discussed the matter during the en banc session, and that there was no consensus at that time to “direct” the Executive Secretary to file complaint-affidavits as contained in the tweet of the SC-PIO. He added that the subsequent Resolution dated August 16, 2016 reflected the correct agreement among the Justices in the En Banc. Justice De Castro confirmed and corroborated the testimony of Justice Perez and the allegations of Atty. Gadon. Atty. Te testified that as part of standard procedure, he met with Respondent Chief Justice Sereno right after the en banc session held on August 9, 2016, and he was instructed by the Chief Justice to disseminate information regarding the motu proprio fact-finding investigation on the alleged involvement of the four (4) judges in illegal drugs. He confirmed the contents of the tweet that he sent out, as found in the attachments to the Gadon Complaint, and further confirmed that it was, verbatim, based on what the Respondent Chief Justice told him was agreed upon by the En Banc, including the part on “directing” the Executive Secretary to file complaint-affidavits. Charge No. 4: Delaying action on the numerous petitions for retirement and survivorship benefits of Justices and judges and their surviving spouses The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Supreme Court Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta; Supreme Court Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin; Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Martires; Court Administrator Marquez; Atty. Anna Li Papa-Gombio – Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc and Chairperson, Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits (SC-RCSB); (6) Atty. Jocelyn Fabian – Court Attorney V, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) and Member, SC-RCSB; (7) Ms. Charlotte Labayani – Member, SC-RCSB; (8) Atty. Regina Ignacio – Assistant Court Administrator; Page 16

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(9) Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court. In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Supreme Court had previously acted promptly on Petitions for Retirement and for Survivorship Benefits, considering the urgency of such matters. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno then created a Technical Working Group (TWG) to which were referred all such petitions. According to Atty. Gadon’s complaint, the TWG hardly convened, and that practically all Petitions for Retirement and for Survivorship Benefits were shelved and remained unacted upon for two (2) years. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she did not delay any petition for retirement or survivorship benefits. She stated that the Supreme Court, through the Division Chairpersons8, created the SC-RCSB in order to improve the efficiency, speed and consistency in the approval of petitions for retirement benefits. The SC-RCSB then created a TWG (TWG-Screening) to screen applications for retirement and other benefits, and another TWG (TWG-Legal) to study the legal concerns with regard to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9946, which is the latest law amending the special law on retirement for members of the Judiciary. She further claimed that under the new system, there has been a significant improvement in the efficiency, speed and consistency in the processing of retirement benefits. Assuming that there was delay, such delay does not amount to culpable violation of the Constitution, as alleged in the Gadon Complaint. Court Administrator Marquez testified that prior to the creation of the SC-RCSB, all petitions for retirement benefits were processed by the OCA (for judges in the lower courts) and the respective Office for Administrative Services (OAS) of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals. The OCA and the OAS would then issue their recommendations for each petition, for approval by the Supreme Court en banc. Under this process, petitions for retirement benefits are usually resolved in two (2) to three (3) weeks, on the average. However, upon the creation of the SCRCSB on November 15, 2015, all petitions for retirement benefits remained unacted upon because the TWG-Legal raised the question of whether or not spouses of judges and Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 may receive the survivorship benefits under the said law. He noted that since the enactment of RA 9946 in 2010, the Supreme Court en banc had granted survivorship benefits to such spouses in 271 cases before the SC-RCSB was created. It was therefore very unfortunate that the SC-RCSB had to halt the processing of applications pending the resolution of the TWG-Legal on a question that had already been resolved by the Supreme Court in several cases. He cited the case of the spouse of retired CA Justice Jose Colayco, who kept following-up her petition for survivorship benefits since November 2016. Unfortunately, the said spouse of Justice Colayco passed away before the decision of the Supreme Court was promulgated reaffirming the retroactive application of RA 9946, and which would have allowed the spouse of Justice Colayco to receive such survivorship benefit in the first place. Court Administrator Marquez noted that there are other similar cases to that of the spouse of Justice Colayco, and many have also died without receiving the benefits that were supposedly due to them. The members of the SC-RCSB (Atty. Papa-Gombio, Atty. Fabian, Atty. Labayani) submitted to the Committee the two (2) memoranda that it sent to the Office of the Chief Justice after the TWG-Legal completed its study on the retroactive application of The Division Chairpersons are as follows: First Division – Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno; Second Division – Senior Associate Justice Antonio Caprio; Third Division – Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco 8

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RA 9946. Memorandum “A” proposed that the application of RA 9946 should apply to spouses of judges and Justices who died prior to its enactment, especially since the Supreme Court had already resolved in similar cases that such spouses are entitled to survivorship benefits. This Memorandum “A” was signed and concurred in by five (5) out of the eight (8) members of the SC-RCSB. The three (3) other members, namely Atty. Papa-Gombio, Atty. Fabian and Atty. Czarina Samonte-Villanueva, wrote a separate dissenting opinion which was denominated as Memorandum “B” wherein they recommended that the applications for survivorship benefits of spouses of judges and Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 be denied, and that the survivorship benefits already granted by the Supreme Court to surviving spouses falling in the same category be revoked. They based this recommendation on prudence and on their interpretation of the letter of the law. Justice Martires stated that he was not aware of any delay in the grant of retirement and survivorship benefits when he handled the case in A.M. No. 17-08-01. His only concern then was to resolve the question of law raised by the three (3) members of the SC-RCSB in its Memorandum “B” the soonest possible time considering the parties affected. He said that his Resolution in A.M. No. 17-08-01 speaks for itself; in the said Resolution, he categorically stated that the position of the TWG-Legal was incorrect, and that survivorship benefits should be granted retroactively, since RA 9946 is a social legislation, and that prior Resolutions by the Supreme Court had already granted survivorship benefits under RA 9946 retroactively. Justices Peralta and Bersamin testified that the TWG-Legal had no authority to look into or question decisions of the Supreme Court outside of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court. They noted that the members of the TWG-Legal acted like Justices themselves, with their own separate and dissenting opinions. When asked by members of the Committee, both Justices said that the TWG-Legal and the SC-RCSB should be scrapped, since there are several Resolutions and Decisions issued by the Supreme Court to serve as guidelines in the issuance of retirement and survivorship benefits. Members of the Committee noted that while the SC-RCSB took almost eight (8) months to submit the two (2) memoranda, Justice Martires only took a little over a month to resolve the issue, since he merely based his decision on the law and existing resolutions of the Supreme Court. Committee members highlighted the fact that the creation of the TWG-Legal empowered the members therein to practically challenge the Resolutions of the Supreme Court en banc in all the 271 petitions for retirement benefits granted during the effectivity of RA 9946. It was noted that the members of the TWGLegal had no authority to interpret the retroactivity of the law, much less to recommend a different application of the law that is contrary to what was being applied by the Supreme Court en banc in previous cases. The recommendation of the TWG-Legal to revoke the survivorship benefits granted by the Supreme Court to spouses of judges and Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 was also beyond its functions, since only the Supreme Court may revisit its own rulings and only upon a proper case filed in court. This led some members of the Committee to conclude that the members of the TWG-Legal, who were all lawyers, could not have acted in such a brazen manner without the blessing of or instructions from someone in power, such as the Chief Justice. Another issue was raised on the possibility that the delay was intentional considering that the retirement benefits are already budgeted for the calendar year since the year of retirement of judges and Justices are easily determined, and therefore any unused or unexpended budget for the payment of such benefits may be realigned Page 18

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for other purposes. However, Atty. Fabian stated that any undisbursed budget for retirement benefits programmed for the year are not realigned, and are used solely for the payment of retirement benefits of judges and Justices. Charge No. 5: Manipulating and delaying the resolution of A.M. No. 17-06-02SC on the request of the Secretary of Justice to transfer outside of Mindanao the cases involving the Maute group The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Secretary of Justice Vitaliano Aguirre II; Supreme Court Associate Justice Noel Tijam; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Justice Lucas Bersamin; Court Administrator Midas Marquez; and, Atty. Felipa Anama – Clerk of Court En Banc.

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Secretary Aguirre wrote a letter to Respondent Chief Justice Sereno requesting the transfer of Maute and similar cases outside of Mindanao. Without following the ordinary procedure in such cases, the said letter was not raffled to any member-in-charge and was never discussed in the en banc session. Instead, it was discussed over lunch, where Respondent Chief Justice Sereno suggested that the Maute cases may be heard in Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, a Resolution dated June 6, 2017 was issued designating the courts in Cagayan de Oro City to hear and decide the Maute cases. Secretary Aguirre then moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution. Justice Tijam circulated a draft resolution granting the request of Secretary Aguirre. However, the matter was not included in the agenda for the en banc session of June 20, 2017 and was only included on the agenda for the en banc session in June 27, 2017, where it was agreed that the cases should be transferred to Taguig City. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno allegedly took the responsibility of writing the draft resolution, which was released only on July 20, 2017. According to Atty. Gadon, the 52-day period from the time Secretary Aguirre submitted his initial letter to the issuance of the resolution granting the request was an undue delay given the urgency of the matter. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she did not cause any delay in the resolution of the letter-request of Secretary Aguirre. She stated that the initial decision to transfer the Maute cases to Cagayan de Oro City was a decision reached by the Supreme Court as evidenced by its Resolution dated June 6, 2017. Further, any supposed “delay” in the final resolution of the request was due to the need to coordinate among the Supreme Court, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the DOJ with respect to the security and logistics issues. Secretary Aguirre testified that he initially sent a letter to the Chief Justice requesting the Supreme Court to transfer the Maute and other related ISIS cases outside of Mindanao on May 29, 2017. However, a Supreme Court resolution was issued Page 19

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on June 6, 2017 designating the courts of Cagayan de Oro City, merely 2 hours away from Marawi City, as special courts to try and decide the Maute cases. He then sent another letter on June 13, 2017 asking for reconsideration of the said resolution, this time particularly requesting the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Taguig City to be the venue where trial in the said cases should be held, and the Special Intensive Care Area (SICA) in Camp Bagong Diwa as the detention facility for apprehended members of the Maute group and for all other high-profile and dangerous individuals relative to the Marawi Siege. He then wrote another letter dated June 14, 2017, attaching a resolution from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental Chapter strongly opposing the transfer of the Maute cases to Cagayan De Oro City. Secretary Aguirre also testified that he was requested to meet with Chief Justice Sereno on June 19, 2017, where he said he was asked to tone down his letter requesting for the transfer of the cases to Taguig City and that his letter should not mention the dangers faced by prosecutors and judges, and instead to simply mention that the transfer of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao would help the military focus more on fighting the terrorists in Marawi City. Secretary Aguirre acceded to the request of Respondent, but the revised letter was still not included in the agenda of the en banc session the next day. He was thereafter informed that his request was granted, but no resolution was released yet. Ultimately, when the resolution was received by Secretary Aguirre on July 18, 2017, more than fifty (50) days had passed since his urgent request to transfer the Maute cases outside of Mindanao. Justice Tijam stated in his sworn statement and in his testimony before the Committee that the Respondent did not circulate among the Justices of the Supreme Court the other letters of Secretary Aguirre, aside from the initial March 29, 2017 letter. He also stated that he received a call from the Chief Justice on June 6, 2017, who informed him that the Supreme Court en banc agreed to transfer the Maute cases to Cagayan de Oro City. According to Justice Tijam, this was an act of “mental dishonesty” since there was no deliberation made by the Supreme Court en banc and no decision was made during the en banc session, and that the matter was only discussed during lunch after the en banc session. Justices De Castro and Bersamin confirmed that the original letter of Secretary Aguirre was not included in the agenda of the Raffle Committee on June 5 and was therefore not raffled to any Justice of the Supreme Court. However, the matter was suddenly included in the June 6 supplemental agenda as item No. 53 but was never discussed in the en banc session. They also stated that the Supreme Court en banc does not make decisions during lunch time, and all decisions and agreements are made during en banc sessions. Court Administrator Marquez stated that he received several letters from local government units, concerned groups and stakeholders in Cagayan De Oro City stating their objections to the proposed transfer therein of the Maute cases. Among the objections are its close proximity to Marawi City, which is merely two (2) hours away and the lack of infrastructure to handle such magnitude of cases, considering that the Hall of Justice has just recently burned down and there are no adequate detention facilities large and secure enough to detain more than 200 arrested individuals. He then issued a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice reiterating the objections of the said groups and recommending the transfer of the Maute cases to Taguig City given its close proximity to the SICA in Camp Bagong Diwa. He was therefore very surprised to Page 20

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learn that Assistant Court Administrator Theodore Te, the Spokesperson of the Supreme Court, also issued a memorandum recommending the transfer of the Maute Cases to Cagayan de Oro City, which apparently became the basis for the first Resolution dated June 6, 2017. Atty. Anama confirmed that the letter of Secretary Aguirre dated May 29, 2017 was not raffled, and it was only included in the supplemental agenda of the June 6, 2017 en banc session with a note stating “MS”, which meant it was already designated to Chief Justice “Meilou Sereno” as member-in-charge. Thus, the June 6 Resolution was based on the unilateral decision of Respondent Chief Justice Sereno and the draft that the Respondent prepared. Charge No. 6: Failing to truthfully disclose her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

Justice Diosdado Peralta; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Justice Lucas Bersamin; Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Mendoza – Regular Member, Judicial and Bar Council (JBC); Atty. Maria Milagros Fernan-Cayosa – Regular Member, JBC; Atty. Annaliza Ty-Capacite – Executive Officer, JBC; Atty. Socorro D’Marie Inting – Chief, Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination (ORSN), JBC Judge Richard Pascual – Former Chief, ORSN, JBC Dr. Angela Escoto – Director, University of the Philippines Human Resources Development Office (UP HRDO); Ms. Rosalia Cases – UP College of Law; Administrator Renato Bermejo – Land Registration Authority (LRA).

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno failed to disclose in her SALN the exorbitant lawyer’s fees she received as counsel for the Philippine government in its arbitration case against Philippine Air Terminals Company Inc. (PIATCO) amounting to more than Thirty-seven million pesos (₱37,000,000.00). In response, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she fully disclosed her investments and assets she acquired from the remainder of the fees she received as legal counsel in the PIATCO cases, that she paid all the applicable taxes on her legal fees, and that she truthfully disclosed all her assets, liabilities and net worth. In preparation for the hearing on this particular charge, the Committee issued subpoenas to the UP College of Law and the Office of the Ombudsman for the submission of the SALNs of Respondent Chief Justice Sereno, who was a professor in the UP College of Law at the time, for the years 2000-2010. Surprisingly, the UP HRDO submitted a letter stating that only the 2002 SALN of the Respondent was available in the records of the UP. There were no SALNs filed by Page 21

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the Respondent for the years 2000-2001, and 2003-2006. The letter also noted that the Respondent resigned from her position as professor on June 1, 2006, and that she was on leave for most of the time. There was also no record of her having been granted authority to engage in a limited practice of profession during the period she was a professor in the UP College of Law.

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The Office of the Ombudsman submitted a letter stating that only a copy of the 1998 SALN of the Respondent is found in their files, and that the said SALN was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by the UP HRDO to the Office of the Ombudsman in December 2003. It also issued a certification that there is no SALN filed by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno for the years 1999-2009, except the said 1998 SALN filed in 2003. For this reason, the Committee issued a subpoena to the JBC for the submission of the SALNs filed by the Respondent Chief Justice when she applied for the position of Chief Justice in 2012, since the Committee was informed that one of the requirements for applying to the said position is the submission of SALNs for the past ten (10) years prior to application. However, the JBC ORSN submitted a letter to the Committee stating that the Respondent only submitted her SALNs for the years 20069, 2009, 2010 and 2011, and that she submitted a letter to then-ORSN Chief Atty. Pascual explaining that it was infeasible to retrieve all of her SALNs considering most are more than fifteen (15) years old. Judge Pascual, Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Capacite all testified that the original announcement for the opening of the applications to the position of Chief Justice in 2012 required the submission of all previous SALNs for those in the public service. According to Atty. Capacite, Senator Francis “Chiz” Escudero – then-ex officio member of the JBC – moved to relax such requirement and recommended that an “attempt to comply” with the SALN requirement be sufficient. In the end, the JBC en banc agreed to only require the past ten (10) SALNs for applicants to the Chief Justice position, or from 2002-2012. However, the Committee observed that the Respondent only filed four (4) SALNs, and that the explanation letter and attached “clearance” from the UP HRDO that she submitted to the JBC did not substitute for the submission of the remaining SALNs. It was also noted that the Respondent’s explanation that her records are irretrievable for being more than fifteen (15) years old is not particularly truthful, since Atty. Capacite had records showing that former Associate Justice Roberto Abad was able to submit his SALNs from the 1980’s, or nearly thirty (30) years ago. In fact, out of all the applicants who were shortlisted for the position of Chief Justice in 2012, only the Respondent was not able to comply with the SALN requirement. Justice Peralta, who was acting Chief Justice and ex officio Chairman of the JBC at the time, testified that he never learned about the non-submission of the SALNs by then-applicant Sereno, and that he also never saw the letter submitted by the The Chief Justice later explained in a letter to the JBC that her 2006 SALN contains a typographical error, since the year “2006” was already printed on top of the form. However, based on the date of signing and notarization, it is clear that the said SALN is supposed to be as of June 2010, since such SALN was required upon her assumption as Associate Justice in 2010. 9

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Respondent explaining why she could not submit her SALNs. He stated that had he known about these matters, he could have raised these issues during the en banc meeting of the JBC. Atty. Cayosa likewise stated that she never saw the letterexplanation, and that she merely relied on the matrix prepared by the JBC Secretariat which stated that the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno had already submitted her complete requirements. Based on these findings regarding the non-submission of SALNs to the JBC, the Committee sent a letter to the Supreme Court en banc, considering that the JBC is under its supervision, in order for it to take appropriate action on the significant issues and concerns raised before the Committee in relation to the selection and nomination process of the JBC that may involve the validity and legality of certain actions made by the JBC, its Secretariat and its Executive Committee. With respect to the real properties under the name of the Respondent and/or her immediate family, records from the LRA show that there are at least two (2) properties that were not declared in the SALN of the Respondent: a 2.2-hectare property located in Mariveles, Bataan under the name of spouses Mario Sereno and Ma. Lourdes Sereno with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3896, and another property located in Davao10. The alleged non-declaration of her earnings as counsel in the PIATCO cases will be discussed in Charge No. 17 below. Charge No. 7: Manipulating the shortlist of the JBC to exclude then-Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza from the shortlist for personal and political reasons, thereby disgracing then-Solicitor General Jardeleza and curtailing the President’s power to appoint him The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Arturo Brion; and, Atty. Jose Mejia – Regular JBC Member

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent manipulated the JBC process to exclude then-SolGen Jardeleza from the shortlist to the position vacated by retired Justice Roberto Abad. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno made a last-minute objection and questioned Justice Jardeleza’s integrity, which brought into play the “unanimity rule”, i.e. the voting must be unanimous instead of a simple majority.

10

In her SALNs, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno only lists one (1) property located in Davao, whereas the LRA has records of two (2) titles registered in the names of Sps. Mario Jose Sereno and Maria Lourdes Sereno (TCT Nos. 300419 and 300420). Page 23

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In her answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that as ex officio Chairperson of the JBC, she acted in accordance with JBC Rules when she voted to exclude then-SolGen Jardeleza from the shortlist. She claimed that at the time, she had genuine concerns about the integrity of then-SolGen Jardeleza, which she simply brought to the attention of the JBC. Justice Jardeleza testified that after his public interview for the position of Associate Justice, he was informed that in the executive sessions conducted by the JBC on June 5 and 16, 2014, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno questioned his integrity because of his handling of the arbitration case involving the West Philippine Sea when he was still the Solicitor General. He said he was described as “disloyal to the Republic”. Having his integrity questioned means that then-SolGen Jardeleza would need a unanimous vote from among the members of the JBC in order to be included in the shortlist of nominees. This is known as the “unanimity rule” under the JBC Rules of Procedure (JBC Rules). Of course, gathering a unanimous vote would be impossible since it was the Chief Justice herself, who is also the ex officio Chairman of the JBC, who questioned his integrity in the first place. Having learned of this, Justice Jardeleza submitted a letter-petition to the Supreme Court asking that the JBC be directed to provide a written statement of the sworn charges against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine witnesses in a public hearing, that the JBC reset its next scheduled hearing pending resolution of his letter-petition, and that the JBC be directed to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting for the vacant Associate Justice position. However, the JBC still proceeded with its scheduled hearing, and transmitted to the Office of the President the shortlist of nominees, without the name of thenSolGen Jardeleza. The Supreme Court then declared Justice Jardeleza’s letter-petition moot and academic, which prompted Justice Jardeleza to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a TRO11 seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees. In the end, the Supreme Court granted the petition and then-SolGen Jardeleza was included in the shortlist and was, subsequently, appointed as Associate Justice. Justice Jardeleza then stated that when Respondent Chief Justice Sereno described him as disloyal to the Republic, it was she who was disloyal and who committed treason when she used a highly confidential document, one that could affect the chances of the country in a pending international arbitration proceeding, for personal reasons – i.e. to disqualify him from being nominated as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Jardeleza also described the actions of Respondent as “inhuman” and not the acts of a “normal person”, and that what he went through in his ordeal against the Chief Justice was a “career killer” and a “near-death experience”. Justice Brion stated that then-SolGen Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist, had the Respondent not raised the question of integrity against him. He also testified that he stands by his separate concurring opinion, where he stated that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno manipulated the JBC processes to exclude Justice Jardeleza as nominee. Justice De Castro stated that when the Respondent did not inhibit herself from participating during the discussions on the nomination for the

11

Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, et al. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

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Associate Justice position where she raised the objection against Justice Jardeleza, she acted as the complainant, prosecutor, and judge against him. Justices Jardeleza, Brion and De Castro all agreed that there was malice and bad faith on the part of the Respondent in her attempt to exclude Justice Jardeleza from the shortlist. Atty. Mejia stated that the rule on unanimity was already deleted in the Revised Rules of the JBC, possibly because of what transpired in the case of Justice Jardeleza. Charge No. 8: Manipulating the JBC shortlist through the clustering of nominees for six (6) vacancies in the Sandiganbayan for personal and political reasons, thereby limiting the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the Sandiganbayan The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3)

Justice Diosdado Peralta; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Justice Lucas Bersamin

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent unilaterally and arbitrarily introduced a new practice of clustering nominees by sorting them into six (6) clusters, or one for each vacancy, when in the past the JBC only submitted one list from which the President may choose to fill multiple vacancies in a collegial court. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino12 where it was observed that the practice of clustering may be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee since a favored one may be included in a cluster with no other strong contender, while a disfavored one may be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she did not manipulate the shortlist for the six (6) vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, and that the practice of clustering nominees was agreed upon by the JBC members and is not expressly prohibited under the Constitution. Justice Peralta testified that he was with the Supreme Court since 2009 and clustering of nominees for a vacant position in the Supreme Court was never practiced before. He also said that seniority is important, and if clustering is done, the President cannot choose anymore from the other nominees who could be the most senior to be appointed. He said that seniority is very important in a collegial body like the Supreme Court. Clustering is unjustified especially if there are several vacancies because seniority will not be observed. Clustering would limit or restrict the President’s constitutional authority to appoint members in the Judiciary. He concluded that clustering would favor a particular candidate by putting him or her in the same cluster with those who have the least chance to be appointed. Such practice happened only during the term of the respondent. 12

G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016.

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Charge No. 9: Failing to heed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino declaring the clustering of nominees as unconstitutional, and continuing to cluster the nominees for the two (2) vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Mendoza, thereby impairing the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the Supreme Court In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that even after the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino (supra), the JBC, upon instructions of the Respondent, still proceeded with the clustering of the shortlist for the two (2) vacancies, instead of submitting only one (1) shortlist. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that each vacancy for the positions left by retired Justices Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Mendoza had a separate and distinct set of applicants and nominees. Attached to the verified answer of the Respondent were the two (2) separate announcements for the opening of vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Justices Reyes and Mendoza. It appears that there was no clustering done since the vacancies were opened separately and were at least thirty-five (35) days apart, as compared to the six (6) simultaneous vacancies in the Sandiganbayan under the previous charge which was covered by a single announcement by the JBC. Charge No. 10: Lying and making it appear that several Supreme Court Justices requested that the Justice do away with their voting for the nominees to the Supreme Court The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Retired Justice Arturo Brion; Justice Diosdado Peralta; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; and, Justice Lucas Bersamin

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent distributed a letter among the Justices of the Supreme Court stating that several Justices requested that they do away with the voting for their recommendees to vacancies in the Supreme Court. However, when later confronted by the Justices themselves, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno could not name a single Justice who she claimed made such request. This also shows another attempt to mislead the members of the Supreme Court and shows the state of mind of the Respondent that is unfit to run the entire Judiciary. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she did not lie, and that the Associate Justices who made such request approached her in confidence thereby precluding her from naming them.

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Justice Brion also testified that prior to the interview of applicants for the vacancy left by retired Justice Abad, the Respondent prepared a letter addressed to all members of the Supreme Court en banc stating that several colleagues asked her to forego or to do away with their votes, so they need not make their recommendations to the said position. Honoring the principle of collegiality, they did not vote. Justice De Castro said that in her conversation with fellow Justices, nobody would own up to the alleged request and she made it of record during the en banc session that she never made such a request. During the said en banc session, the Respondent could not mention a single name until she said “Because I don’t like your recommendees. I don’t think you are making the proper choice.” Justice De Castro said that based on the acts of the Chief Justice, it would seem that she was finding ways to exclude SolGen Jardeleza. She added that the Respondent took away the right of the incumbent Supreme Court Justices to be heard with respect to the nominees in their chamber, and that in doing so, only the voice of the Chief Justice will have weight during the JBC deliberations as regards the nominees to the Supreme Court. Justices Peralta and Bersamin said that they, too, did not request to do away with the voting for their recommendees to the vacancies in the Supreme Court, and that this was another deceitful act done by the Respondent. They both lamented that the Respondent took away a privilege that they would have never voluntarily surrendered, since it was the only way that the Justices could voice their opinion on potential candidates for Associate Justice in the Supreme Court. By removing the right of Justices to vote for their recommendees, Respondent ensured that the Chief Justice, as ex officio Chairperson of the JBC, will be the only voice of the Supreme Court in the JBC with respect to vacancies in the Supreme Court. Charge No. 11: Manipulating the JBC by influencing its four (4) regular members, effectively destroying the JBC as a constitutional body mandated to fairly and impartially screen and nominate applicants to the Judiciary The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Justice Diosdado Peralta; Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; Atty. Jose Mejia – Regular member, JBC; and, Atty. Maria Milagros Fernan-Cayosa – Regular member, JBC

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent has clearly influenced the four (4) regular members of the JBC to vote with her for the nominees in the Judiciary. He further claims that the Respondent has transformed into a mafia-like organization that adheres to her unquestionably. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she has never manipulated any member of the JBC, and that the JBC has always acted as a collegial body. She only expresses her views, opinions and preferences on applicants, and that she has the right to do so as ex officio Chairperson of the JBC. Page 27

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Justice Peralta testified that as the ex officio Chairperson of the JBC, the Respondent has moral ascendancy over its four (4) regular members, since the latter’s travel authorities, allowances, perks and other requests are approved by the Respondent. Justice De Castro noted that there are numerous instances where the regular members and the Chief Justice had voted as a block, and a simple look at the voting for nominees to vacancies would reveal a pattern where there are at least five (5) votes for certain nominees. Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Mejia both denied having been influenced by the Chief Justice, and they testified that the JBC is a collegial body and any decisions made by the JBC reflect the deliberations conducted by the JBC en banc. Charge No. 12: Using public funds to finance her extravagant and lavish lifestyle by ordering the purchase of a brand new luxurious 2017 Toyota Land Cruiser, amounting to more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00), as her personal vehicle The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Supreme Court Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo; Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Villanueva – Chairperson, Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) for Goods and Services; DCA Thelma Bahia – Member, BAC for Goods and Services; Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-Office of Administrative Services; Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO); Atty. Ma. Carina Cunanan – Procurement Head; and, Atty. Michael Ocampo – Court Attorney-VI, Office of the Chief Justice

Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser as vehicle for the Chief Justice is still exorbitant, and shows her injudiciousness, lack of economy and propriety. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claims that the acquisition of the Land Cruiser was neither illegal nor extravagant, and that the Supreme Court En Banc itself approved the said acquisition in a Resolution in A.M. No. 17-03-06-SC. The Land Cruiser was purchased to ensure the safety and security of the Chief Justice, who was exempted from the prohibition against the acquisition of luxury vehicles by government officials since such purchase was for security reasons and purposes, for the Chief Justice. Based on the hearings of the Committee, the following facts were discovered: •

There was no purchase request approved by the Supreme Court En Banc for the acquisition of a vehicle for the Chief Justice. Page 28

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•

•

• •

The certification of availability of funds specified the amount of ₱5,263,815.00, which was the ACTUAL PRICE for a Toyota Land Cruiser, instead of the actual ₱6,000,000.00 as provided in the Annual Procurement Plan (APP). The original 1st Indorsement from the Procurement Planning Committee showed the actual brand name Toyota Land Cruiser. Subsequently, the said Indorsement was pulled out and replaced by an amended Indorsement that no longer mentioned the brand name Toyota Land Cruiser (and only the specifications for a Toyota Land Cruiser in its place). Atty. Cunanan and Atty. Bahia admitted that the procurement of the Toyota Land Cruiser was predetermined as to the brand. There were no security threats to the Chief Justice before and during the time the procurement for a Toyota Land Cruiser was being worked.

Justice Del Castillo testified that he was the member-in-charge for this particular administrative matter, and that he referred the matter to the Supreme Court En Banc which subsequently approved the Notice of Award to Toyota-Makati. Justice Del Castillo also testified that former Chief Justices Reynato Puno and Renato Corona did not use luxury vehicles during their tenure. He added that he never saw the 1st Indorsement that indicated the brand name Toyota Land Cruiser. Atty. Flores testified that there was a directive from the Office of the Chief Justice, through Atty. Ocampo, to specifically purchase a Toyota Land Cruiser for the Chief Justice. Atty. Ocampo, on the other hand, stated that they merely stated the preference of the Chief Justice upon the query of the procurement planning committee. Charge No. 13: Using public funds to stay in opulent hotels when attending conferences in the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business or first class together with her staff and security The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4)

Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Zaldy Trespeses; Atty. Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-FMBO; Ms. Meriam Ansama – Audit Team Leader, Commission on Audit (COA); Ms. Melissa Ann Santiago – Director of Sales, Shangri-La Boracay

Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that the Respondent committed corruption when she used public funds to finance her extravagant lifestyle by staying in opulent hotels when attending conferences in the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business or first class together with her staff and security. He cited one instance where the Respondent billeted herself in the Presidential Villa in Shangri-La Boracay during an international conference. In her answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the approved budget for the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices Meeting (ACJM) in Boracay specifically included Page 29

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the use of the “Presidential Villa” in Shangri-La Boracay as a meeting area for 24 hours as part of the package offered by the resort. It was also the only resort that had the facilities to ensure the security and safety of the ASEAN Chief Justices. She further claimed that instead of booking additional rooms, she and her staff and some of the secretariat were allowed to stay in the Presidential Villa at no additional charge. As to travels on business class, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claims that she is allowed under the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual to travel on full business class. COA Audit Team Leader Meriam Ansama noted that bidding is not required for the rental or use of venues, but the procurement law still requires that there must be quotations from at least two (2) venues. Justice Trespeses, who was the Judicial Staff Head at the time and in charge of booking the venue for the 3rd ACJM, testified that he and the Respondent conducted ocular inspections and submitted quotations from multiple venues in Boracay. However, based on the documents submitted to her office, Ms. Ansama stated that no such quotations were submitted. Hence, there is a possibility that an audit observation memorandum (AOM) may be issued on this particular expenditure. The Committee also noted that contrary to the allegation of the Respondent in her verified answer that the choice of Boracay as the venue for the 3rd ACJM was made by the ASEAN Chief Justices “by unanimous acclaim”, the minutes of the 2nd ACJM revealed that it was the Respondent herself alone who declared that Boracay would be the venue for the 3rd ACJM. Charge No. 14: Using public funds to flaunt her extravagance by unnecessarily bringing a huge entourage of lawyers in her supposed official foreign trips. In his complaint, Atty. Gadon simply stated that the Respondent would bring her “clique of relatively newly hired lawyers” on foreign trips. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that out of her sixteen (16) official foreign trips, she was assisted without any lawyer in four (4) of those trips, by one lawyer in nine (9) of those trips, by two (2) lawyers in two (2) trips, and by three (3) lawyers in one trip. Other members of the delegation would consist of fellow Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court and senior court officials. Atty. Flores submitted to the Committee lists of official foreign and domestic travels of the Respondent and the officials and employees of the Office of the Chief Justice. In her summary report, Atty. Flores stated that the Chief Justice travelled abroad fifteen (15) times (with one continuous two-leg trip to the United Kingdom and Switzerland) for a total cost of ₱3,727,460.28. Out of these fifteen (15) trips, only three (3) trips were made by the Respondent without any companion. Charge No. 15: Obstructing justice by ordering the Muntinlupa judges not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator Leila M. De Lima The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: Page 30

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(1) (2) (3) (4)

DCA Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino; Judge Juanita T. Guerrero – RTC Muntinlupa Branch 204; Judge Amelia Fabros-Corpus – RTC Muntinlupa Branch 205; Judge Patria Manalastas-De Leon -RTC Muntinlupa Branch 206.

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent instructed a Supreme Court official to call Judges Guerrero, Fabros-Corpus and Manalastas-De Leon and order them not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator Leila De Lima after three (3) information were filed against her and raffled to the said judges. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that this allegation is a barefaced lie. DCA Delorino categorically denied instructing the three (3) judges not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator De Lima. She, however, called Judge Corpus and Judge De Leon as part of her duties as DCA, to ask them if they needed assistance in handling such a high-profile case. DCA Delorino also said she tried to call Judge Guerrero, but the latter was on leave. Both Judges Corpus and De Leon denied having received instructions from DCA Delorino or any official not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator De Lima. Judge Guerrero likewise denied having received any phone call from any Court official instructing her to do the same. Charge No. 16: Obstructing and perverting justice by meeting the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals and instructing them not to comply with the processes of the House of Representatives and to immediately question its processes before the Supreme Court The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2)

Supreme Court Associate Justice Andres Reyes, Jr; and Court of Appeals Associate Justice Remedios Salazar Fernando

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent met with the Presiding Justice and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals and instructed them to ignore and defy the show cause order issued by the House of Representatives in relation to the issue on the detention of the six (6) Ilocos Norte provincial officials. She also ordered the CA Justices to immediately file a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she advised then-CA Presiding Justice Andres Reyes, Jr. that the CA Justices who were issued show cause orders should consider their own legal remedies. She did not instruct or direct them to do or defy any lawful order. Justice Fernando testified that then-CA Presiding Justice Reyes called an emergency meeting on June 21, 2017 with other CA Justices and told them that he was Page 31

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told by the Respondent that they (the three CA Justices13 who were served show cause orders by the House Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability) should just file a petition for prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court, and that Respondent said, “Ako bahala.” When asked if the act of the Chief Justice can be considered as intervention, Justice Fernando refused to say so, but personally, she finds it inappropriate. She also stated that Justices and judges should refrain from giving legal advice not only because they are precluded from doing so but also because they may be accused of prejudging a particular case. Justice Reyes confirmed that the Respondent asked him to relay to the thee (3) CA Justices that if they had concerns or worries about the show cause order issued by the House of Representatives, they can file a petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court will take care of it (“Supreme Court na ang bahala”). He then relayed this message from the Respondent to the Justices of the Court of Appeals during the same meeting described by Justice Fernando. Charge No. 17: Failing to report her extortionate attorney’s fees and pay the appropriate taxes therefor The allegations in the Gadon Complaint and in the verified answer were discussed in Charge No. 6 above. During the initial meetings on the said charge (failure to truthfully disclose her SALN), Deputy Commissioner Arnel Guballa of the BIR was instructed to investigate the allegation that the Respondent failed to pay the appropriate taxes on her fees she collected from being the government counsel in the arbitration case against PIATCO. In his summary report, Deputy Commissioner Guballa stated that the Respondent substantially declared all income from the PIATCO case in her income tax returns from 2004 to 2009, but there were certain discrepancies observed. Based on their preliminary findings, the Respondent is estimated to have a basic tax amounting to ₱2,014,233.20 but paid only ₱1.6 million. He further stated that there are six (6) possible violations for tax evasion, noting that Respondent failed to file value added tax (VAT) returns as a professional, since she was registered in multiple revenue districts while she was a professor in UP and engaged in private practice as a lawyer, and thus she failed to pay the appropriate amount of taxes due thereon. Such failure to file the VAT returns and to pay the taxes due amount to tax fraud under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Based on the documents submitted by the BIR, the Respondent received a total of ₱32,494,805.27 as legal fees for her work as government counsel in the PIATCO case. As compared to the admission by the Respondent in her verified answer, where she stated that she received only a total of ₱30,300,000.00 as legal fees, there appears to be more than ₱2,000,000.00 undeclared income by the Respondent with respect to the said fees.

13

CA Justices Stephen Cruz, Edwin Sorongon and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela

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Charge No. 18: Embellishing her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in her application for the Judiciary to overstate her credentials In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent misstated the following in her PDS when she applied for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: (1) (2) (3) (4)

“Deputy Commissioner” of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR); Lecturer at the “Hague Academy of International Law”; Lecturer at the “University of Western Australia”; and, Lecturer at “Murdoch University”.

According to Atty. Gadon, the Supreme Court had previously dismissed from service court personnel who made misrepresentations in her PDS for “dishonesty by misrepresentation and falsification of a public document”. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno responded to the above allegations in the following manner: (1)

She possessed the “functional title” of Deputy Commissioner of the CHR, when she acted as Deputy or Alternate Member to Commissioner Abelardo Aportadera. Thus, in her subsequent 2012 PDS, she specifically stated “Technical Consultant/Deputy Commissioner (Functional Title)”.

(2)

She was a lecturer for the Cambodia Extension Program of the Hague Academy of International Law. She never claimed she actually lectured in the Netherlands.

(3)

She was a lecturer of both University of Western Australia and Murdoch University under their Manila Extension Programs.

The documents attached to the complaint, the 2010 PDS and the 2012 PDS of the Respondent, are both subscribed under oath. All the material allegations of Atty. Gadon are borne by said documents. It appears that based on the documents attached: (1)

The Respondent never stated that the position of “Deputy Commissioner” was just a “functional title”;

(2)

She never mentioned that she delivered lectures to the “Cambodia Extension Program” of the Hague Academy of International Law; and

(3)

She never mentioned that she delivered lectures to the “Manila Extension Programs” of either the University of Western Australia or Murdoch University.

Charge No. 19: Hiring an Information and Communications Technology (ICT) consultant with excessive compensation and without public bidding, in Page 33

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contravention of existing laws, Commission on Audit (COA) rules, and public policy The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro – Head, Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL); Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Geraldine Faith Econg; DCA Raul Villanueva – BAC; DCA Thelma Bahia – BAC; Atty. Regina Ignacio – Assistant Court Administrator; Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court, OAS; Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, FMBO; Atty. Ma. Lourdes Oliveros – Chief Justice Staff Head (Chief of Staff); Atty. Michael Ocampo – Court Attorney VI, Office of the Chief Justice; Atty. Carlos Garay – Acting Chief, Management Information Systems Office; and Ms. Helen Macasaet – Consultant

In addition, the Committee also invited Supreme Court Associate Justices Estela Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Leonen as members of the Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL). However, both Justices submitted a letter respectfully declining the Committee’s invitation, and instead submitted pertinent documents to the Committee regarding the establishment and functions of the CCL. In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent unilaterally, without public bidding and with abuse of discretion hired Ms. Macasaet as ICT Consultant with a compensation of Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱250,000.00) a month to review, assess and update the implementation of its Enterprise Information Systems Plan (EISP). He claims that the hiring was done without public bidding, and violated provisions of Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the hiring of Ms. Macasaet was through negotiated procurement because her services are “highly technical in nature”, and therefore exempt from public bidding. She stated that Ms. Macasaet’s initial 6-month service contract entitled her to receive a monthly salary of ₱100,000.00, and that such contract was evaluated by the Procurement Planning Committee (PPC), the BAC on Consulting Services, and the MISO of the Supreme Court. After the review of the implementation of the EISP conducted by Ms. Macasaet under the said contract, a 5-year work plan for the implementation of the updated EISP was formulated, which required the services of a technical and policy consultant. Thus, Ms. Macasaet was hired as such consultant after being recommended by the appropriate officials for a new 6-month contract of services renewed several times until November 2017. According to the Respondent, the fee of ₱250,000.00 per month paid to Ms. Macasaet was relatively lower than the cost of earlier ICT-related consultancies

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proposed by the Supreme Court Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL) in 2012, and such fees are justified by the result of Ms. Macasaet’s work. During the course of the hearings, it was revealed that Ms. Macasaet indeed had an initial 6-month contract for the review of the EISP, and that she received a compensation of ₱100,000.00 per month for the said contract. She then entered into another contract, this time for the implementation of the updated EISP which was the product of her initial contract. This second contract was also for six (6) months, and she received compensation of ₱250,000.00 per month. Pursuant to the 5-year work plan, the contract for the implementation of the updated EISP was renewed six (6) times until November 2017, when the said contract was subjected to review by the Supreme Court en banc following allegations of irregularity and the filing of the instant impeachment complaint. The period of engagement of Ms. Macasaet and her compensation under each contract are summarized below: PERIOD OF ENGAGEMENT

TOTAL COMPENSATION

October 1, 2013 – April 1, 2014 May 23, 2014 – November 23, 2014 November 23, 2014 – May 23, 2015 May 24, 2015 – November 24, 2015 November 24, 2015– May 24, 2016 May 24, 2016 – November 24, 2016 November 24, 2016 – May 24, 2017 May 24, 2017 – November 24 , 2017 TOTAL

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

600,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,500,000.00 11,100,000.00.00

AVERAGE MONTHLY COMPENSATION 100,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 250,000.00 11,100,000.00

For the second to eighth contract, the Terms of Reference for each contract are exactly the same, with only minor differences on the Scope of Work for each succeeding contract. DCA Villanueva and DCA Bahia testified that only the first and second contracts of Ms. Macasaet passed through the BAC-Goods and Services for review. The succeeding contracts were no longer subject to review since they were renewals. DCA Villanueva also stated that the hiring of Ms. Macasaet was done through negotiated procurement, since the contract involved work that was “highly technical in nature”. Atty. Ignacio testified that the “renewal” contracts should still have passed through the BAC processes since each renewed contract is a separate contract with a different cause, object and consideration. She stated that the hiring of a consultant by the head of office should be done based on the recommendation of the BAC. Atty. Ocampo testified that he and the late Mr. Edilberto Davis, then-Acting Chief of MISO, issued a memorandum recommending the hiring of Ms. Macasaet after they reviewed the qualifications of three (3) consultants. He also stated that the renewal of

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contracts is not prohibited under existing laws, and that the renewals of contracts through negotiated procurement no longer needed to undergo BAC Processes. Atty. Oliveros testified that she and Ms. Macasaet are very good friends, and that she introduced Ms. Macasaet to the Respondent sometime in 2012. However, Ms. Oliveros emphasized that she did not in any way influence the hiring of Ms. Macasaet, since she was not involved in the procurement of services of consultants. Sandiganbayan Justice Econg testified that she was approached by Atty. Oliveros who told her that the Respondent did not like people who oppose her actions or have opposing views (“does not like iyung taong kumokontra”), referring to her reaction to the hiring of Ms. Macasaet. Justice Econg stated that she did not object but only wanted to hold in abeyance the hiring of Ms. Macasaet in order to further study the need of hiring a consultant. Atty. Garay testified that Ms. Macasaet was supposed to upgrade the Judicial Data Center but from the time she was hired, there was no substantial effect on the system. He also testified that he had no direct supervision and control over Ms. Macasaet, and that he merely signed the accomplishment reports of Ms. Macasaet as a ministerial task because the reports were already prepared for his signature. He said that if he were the head of the MISO at the time of the hiring of Ms. Macasaet, he would have objected to the hiring because of the extremely high compensation compared to the nature and scope of the work, since he himself was also hired as a consultant with a monthly compensation of ₱30,000.00 prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court. He also stated that it was more feasible to hire a number of consultants who are experts in their field rather than award the entire contract for the implementation of the 5-year work plan to a single consultant. Justice De Castro testified that when she was the head of the CCL at the time, the hiring of Ms. Macasaet as ICT Consultant did not pass through her committee. She also stated that she only met Ms. Macasaet once, and that was after she was already hired as consultant. Justice De Castro said that she felt like the Respondent did not want her to continue as head of the CCL, and she later informed the Respondent that she would step down from her position, which relieved the Respondent who then took over as head of the CCL. In their letter to the Committee, Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen stated that as members of the CCL, they had no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the hiring of Ms. Macasaet, and that they are not privy to any information regarding the functions of the CCL at the time. The members of the Committee noted that after the initial review of the EISP under the first contract, it was already established that the implementation of the updated EISP would take five (5) years as envisioned in the 5-year work plan. However, the contracts for Ms. Macasaet as consultant were broken down into 6-month contracts, with each succeeding contract simply being renewed. Questions were raised as to the propriety of the separate 6-month contracts, since it may be considered as “splitting” of a contract which is prohibited by the Procurement Law. The Committee also noted that the splitting of Ms. Macasaet’s contract into piece-meal contracts worth ₱1.5 million Page 36

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each might have been done to put such contracts below the threshold of value of contracts that should be approved by the Supreme Court en banc, thereby making such contracts reviewable only by the Chief Justice. There was also an unusual interest by the Respondent on contracts involving the EISP as she eagerly took over as head of the CCL upon the resignation of Justice De Castro. Throughout the hearing on this charge, the Committee was notified that there is a pending review being conducted by the Supreme Court en banc on the subject contracts of Ms. Macasaet. The witnesses and resource persons invited by the Committee were all barred from discussing or answering questions on the validity of the contracts of Ms. Macasaet, or the contents of the Report of the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAt) dated November 6, 2017, a copy of which was received by the Office of the Chairman through an anonymous source. According to the said OCAt Report, there were several irregularities in the hiring of Ms. Macasaet under the abovementioned contracts: (1) (2) (3)

(4)

(5)

The determination of the most qualified consultant was conducted by Atty. Ocampo and Mr. Davis, and not by the BAC; There was no Notice of Award issued by the BAC; The consultancy contracts for Ms. Macasaet provided for reimbursable costs for travel and accommodation, violating the “fixed price” rule under the implementing rules and regulations of the Procurement Law that states that consultancy contracts should not entail additional costs to the procuring entity; The compensation awarded to Ms. Macasaet was unreasonable, since the “market research” conducted by Atty. Ocampo compared the compensation of Ms. Macasaet vis-à-vis consulting firms, and not individual consultants. The proper benchmark should have been the basic monthly salary of the MISO Chief, which amounted to ₱73,099.00. Allowing for the maximum consultancy fees of 120% as allowed in the National Budget Circular, Ms. Macasaet should have been compensated by ₱87,718.80 only; and, Based on all the contracts and its Terms of Reference, procurement of services of Ms. Macasaet is for the 5-year implementation of the EISP, and therefore public bidding for the procurement of such services was more feasible. To split the implementation of the 5-year plan into short-term 6month contracts may be disadvantageous to the government. It may also fall under the prohibition against the splitting of contracts under RA 9184.

Charge No. 20: Sending a strongly-worded but misplaced reply to President Rodrigo Duterte on the Judges linked to drugs thereby inviting a head-on collision between the Presidency and the Judiciary In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent sent a stronglyworded letter to President Duterte stating that she would caution judges very strongly Page 37

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against “surrendering” absent any duly-issued warrant of arrest. However, according to Atty. Gadon, the President did not tell the judges he named in his speech to surrender to the police, and that the President did not accuse anybody. Thus, the letter of the Respondent addressed to the President invited a head-on collision between two separate branches of government. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that in her letter, she merely demonstrated genuine concern for the welfare of all members of the Judiciary and her willingness to cooperate and work with the President in his campaign against illegal drugs. The letter of Respondent and the speech of the President being matters of public record, the Committee no longer invited resource persons to testify on the matter. Charge No. 21: Preventing the Justices of the Court of Appeals to do a courtesy call on President Duterte In his complaint, Atty. Gadon testified that in response to a publicized courtesy call of thirty-six (36) CA Justices to the President Malacañang and four (4) Sandiganbayan Justices in Davao City, the Respondent prevented then-Presiding Justice Andres Reyes from pushing through with the courtesy call. In doing so, she drove a wedge between the Judiciary and the Executive Departments. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she cannot prevent any member of the Judiciary, much less the CA Presiding Justice, from visiting the President. However, she merely reminded the magistrates of the Canon of “Independence” of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Justice Reyes testified that the Respondent instructed him to cancel the scheduled courtesy call to the President and to submit a written explanation to the Supreme Court en banc regarding his letter to the President which he copy-furnished the Respondent. In his letter, Justice Reyes stated that he wished to discuss with the President certain issues and problems hounding the Court of Appeals. When the Respondent received the letter, she immediately had Justice Reyes come to her office, where she said that she felt insulted by the letter he wrote to the President since according to her, he made it appear that the Supreme Court was not doing anything about the problems he mentioned in her letter. Justice Reyes then apologized, but the Respondent replied that this incident might end his career. He then cancelled the courtesy call. He also stated that he became sick for more than a week due to extreme stress and anxiety caused by the threats of the Respondent that the courtesy call might be career-ending for him. Members of the Committee noted the admission of Justice Reyes that he was prevented by the Respondent from paying a courtesy call to the President, in contrast to the assertion made by the Respondent in her verified answer that she cannot prevent any member of the Judiciary from visiting the President, and that she merely reminded Page 38

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them of the Canon of Independence. It was also noted that the Respondent’s statement that she was offended by the letter sent by Justice Reyes to the President reflects negatively on the mental and psychological temperament of the Respondent. Charge No. 22: Attacking the imposition of Martial Law in a commencement address, while a petition challenging the validity of the declaration of Martial Law was still pending before the Supreme Court, and thereafter participating in the SC deliberations on the said petition In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that during her commencement speech to graduating students of Ateneo de Manila University, the Respondent imparted prejudicial statements pertaining to the imposition of Martial Law in Mindanao, despite the existence of pending cases before the Supreme Court challenging its proclamation. After doing so, she still continued to participate in the oral arguments of the said cases and thereafter, and unsurprisingly, dissented from the majority view upholding the imposition of Martial Law. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she gave the speech referred to in the complaint before the filing of the first of three (3) petitions questioning the imposition of Martial Law in Mindanao. She did not attack the imposition of Martial Law, and expressly recognized the power of the President to do so under the 1987 Constitution. She emphasized that the commencement address was an exercise of her right to free speech. The commencement speech of the Respondent subject of the allegation being a matter of public record, the Committee no longer invited resource persons to testify on the same. However, the Committee also noted that despite her public pronouncements highlighting the evils of Martial Law thereby showing her prejudice and bias on the subject, she still participated in the deliberations of the Supreme Court on the abovementioned petitions. Charge No. 23: Issuing a Joint Statement with the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals regarding CA-GR SP No. 151029 (Genedine Jambaro, et. al.vs. Lt. Gen. Roland Detabali (Ret), which can very well be elevated to the Supreme Court The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2)

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; and, Justice Andres Reyes, Jr.;

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon claimed that the Joint Statement issued by the Respondent and then-CA Presiding Justice Andres Jr. was disowned by other Justices in the Supreme Court, since courts should not give advisory opinions on cases pending before it.

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In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the Joint Statement did not comment on the proceedings pending before the CA. It focused only on the unprecedented issuance of show cause orders against three (3) members of the Special Fourth Division of the CA. The Respondent also inhibited herself when the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court. Justice Reyes testified that he was approached by the Respondent and shown a prepared draft of the statement. He said that the Respondent asked him to read and sign the statement, and that he did so only after the Respondent signed it first. Justice Reyes said that at the time, he believed that the Respondent was acting as a “mother” to the Judiciary, and that he thought that the statement was appropriate for the situation. However, Justice Reyes also stated that he would not have signed such a statement on his own, since he would have first consulted with the Justices of the CA being a collegial and consultative body. Justice De Castro stated that the joint statement was highly inappropriate, considering that it was asking a co-equal branch of government to “reconsider” an action taken by it, and through a mere letter at that. She further stated that the statement was issued without the approval, much less the knowledge, of the Supreme Court en banc, considering that such statement issued by the Chief Justice and the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals may be construed as a statement issued by the Supreme Court and the CA itself. Charge No. 24: Practicing favoritism by allowing key positions in the Supreme Court to remain unfilled for a long period of time in order to wait for her staff to qualify, to the detriment of the service and great demoralization of qualified Supreme Court employees The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2)

Justice Teresita Leonardo De-Castro; Court Administrator Midas Marquez.

In his verified complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Supreme Court had a number of high-ranking key positions that have remained vacant since 2013: (a) (b) (c)

Two (2) Assistant Court Administrator positions, with salary grade 30; One (1) Deputy Clerk of Court position, with salary grade 29; and, One (1) Chief Attorney position, with salary grade 29.

Atty. Gadon further alleged that the Respondent refused to fill-up the said vacancies because she does not have the majority vote. Her failure to act upon and fillup the vacancies despite the urgent need for them shows her incompetence and unfitness to the position of Chief Justice.

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In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the matter of unfilled positions is already pending before the Supreme Court en banc. She added that the vacancies were deferred to await the resolution of a number of issues related to the organizational development of the Supreme Court, such as the updating of salary grades and benefits of certain key positions. Justice De Castro testified that the Respondent was not being truthful in her verified answer since the updating of salary grades and benefits may proceed even if the vacancies are already filled and new officials are appointed. She does not see the logic of leaving the vacancies unfilled while updating the salaries and benefits of Court personnel, since the vacant positions mentioned by Atty. Gadon are important positions for the orderly function of the offices in the Supreme Court. She also noted that after more than four (4) years of inaction, the Respondent suddenly opened the vacancies after the impeachment complaint was filed which included this particular ground. Court Administrator Marquez echoed the observation of Justice De Castro that the positions left unfilled for a long time were important positions that needed to be filled immediately even pending the implementation of a holistic plan on organizational development. Both Justice De Castro and Court Administrator Marquez lamented that there have been several highly qualified and loyal employees in the Supreme Court who were not promoted due to the inaction of the Respondent, and this also prevented other employees from being promoted as well since the vacant positions left unfilled were among the highest positions in the Supreme Court and the cascading effect of promotion among the rank-and-file was stymied. Justice De Castro and Court Administrator Marquez also stated that initially, only one (1) position was opened, with Atty. Oliveros (Respondent’s Chief-of-staff) included among the applicants. However, after the filing of the instant impeachment complaint which included this particular charge, Atty. Oliveros was no longer included as an applicant and all the other vacant positions were opened for application. Charge No. 25: Appointing a key official to the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2) (3)

Retired Justice Adolfo Azcuna – Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJA); Sandiganbayan Justice Geraldine Faith Econg; Court Administrator Midas Marquez

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent appointed the Chief of the PMCO on June 28, 2016 without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc, in stark contrast to the appointment of then-judge Geraldine Faith Econg as Chief of PMCO which was approved by the Supreme Court en banc.

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In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the appointment of Atty. Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of Office of the PMCO is the subject of a pending administrative matter before the Supreme Court en banc. She also claimed that based on the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual, the position of “Chief of Office” shall be filled through the appointment of the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Chairmen of the Divisions. A Supreme Court Resolution also provides that the Chairpersons of the three (3) Divisions have the power to appoint personnel in the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJA), including the Chief of Office of the PMCO. She also alleged that the appointment of Atty. Mendoza as PMCO Chief was a collegial act concurred in by Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. Retired Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Chancellor of the PhilJA, testified that based on a Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Chief of Office of the PMCO is appointed by “the Supreme Court upon recommendation of the Philippine Judicial Academy”. In the case of Atty. Mendoza, which is the subject of this charge in the complaint, Justice Azcuna stated that he recommended to the Respondent the appointment of Atty. Mendoza as PMCO Chief. However, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno referred his recommendation to the three (3) Chairpersons of the Supreme Court Divisions, and not to the Supreme Court en banc. According to Justice Azcuna, the best practice based on established precedent is that the recommendation of the PhilJA should be approved by the Supreme Court en banc. Justice Econg and Court Administrator Marquez both confirmed that the appointment of Justice Econg as Chief of PMCO in 2015 was with the approval of the Supreme Court en banc. Justice Econg opined that she was recommended and appointed as Chief of PMCO, even though she did not apply for and was not interested in the said position, in order for her to be relieved as Project Management Office Head after she voiced her objections to the appointment of Helen Macasaet as consultant. She also stated that she was informed by Respondent’s Chief-of-staff Atty. Oliveros that she should just accept this new position because the Respondent Charge No. 26: Giving her newly-hired staff foreign staff travels and granting them travel allowances for their foreign travels without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee: (1) (2)

Court Administrator Midas Marquez; Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief, FMBO;

In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent circumvented the rules of the Supreme Court when she unduly delegated unto herself the approval of foreign travel on official business of staff from the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ), when such travel must be approved by the Supreme Court en banc. Respondent allegedly made it appear that her staff was travelling on official time funded by partner or host Page 42

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organizations, but would grant them travel allowances charged against Supreme Court funds. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the matter of foreign travel of OCJ personnel on “official time” or “official business” is likewise subject of an administrative matter pending before the Supreme Court en banc. She alleged that foreign travels and related travel expenses of court personnel do not need the approval of the Supreme Court en banc. Atty. Flores submitted to the Committee a list of official foreign travels of the Respondent and the officials and employees of the Office of the Chief Justice. In her summary report, Atty. Flores stated that for the period 2012-2017, the Chief Justice and her staff travelled abroad a total of thirty-one (31) times for a total cost of ₱8,726,688.64 charged against Supreme Court funds. Charge No. 27: Usurping the mandate of the Supreme Court en banc by arrogating unto herself alone the running of the Supreme Court and the Judiciary, thereby destroying the Supreme Court as a collegial body. In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent mismanaged the Supreme Court and the Judiciary by granting huge allowances, purchasing vehicles, distributing foreign travels, and doing other acts all by herself. She also ruled with extreme bias, obvious favoritism and with utmost disregard for existing policies, rules and tradition. In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno simply stated that by her conduct, she has been zealously protecting the independence of the Judiciary as the third branch of government. During the course of the hearings, the issue of the Respondent’s personality surfaced. A Manila Times news report broke an exclusive story on August 4, 2012, the same day that Respondent Sereno was appointed as Chief Justice, where it was revealed that the Respondent received a grade of “4” (with “5” being the lowest) in tests given by psychologists and psychiatrists of the JBC. She was also described in that report as “dramatic and emotional”. The news report continued: “She appears energetic and all smiles and agreeable, but with religious preoccupation in all significant aspects of her life. She projects a happy mood but has depressive markers. There is a strong tendency to make decisions based on current mood thus, outcome is highly subjective and self-righteous.” Acting on this information, the Committee invited the psychiatrists who conducted the interview of then-applicant Sereno, and the JBC psychologists who prepared the report. The psychiatrists, Dr. Dulce Lizza Sahagun-Reyes and Dr. Genuina Ranoy, and the psychologists, Ms. Bernaden De Leon-Jamon and Ms. Maria Caguingin, Page 43

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all invoked the privileged nature of the information sought from them. Upon the request of the resource persons, the Committee voted unanimously to grant them all legislative immunity in exchange for their testimony, and conducted an executive session where they may reveal the privileged information. Subsequently, the Committee agreed, without objection, to declassify the information revealed during the executive session. Based on the testimonies of Dr. Sahagun-Reyes, Dr. Ranoy, Ms. Jamon and Ms. Caguingin, it appears that the description in the Manila Times report quoted above was an exact verbatim quotation of the psychological report submitted by the JBC. The report also included the IQ score of the Respondent, which was 109 and described as “average”. Dr. Geraldine Tria, a licensed clinical psychologist, was requested by the Chairman to give an interpretation of the psychological report based on the testimonies of the psychiatrists and psychologists given during the executive session as well as the findings of the Committee so far, including the allegations in the verified complaint and verified answer. According to Dr. Tria, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno exhibited five (5) of the nine (9) symptoms of dramatic and emotional type of individual as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5): 1. Interpersonally exploitative – Respondent’s actions of arrogating upon herself the powers of the Supreme Court as a collegial body reveal her propensity to take advantage of others to achieve her own ends; 2. Preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power and brilliance – Respondent has the tendency to usurp duties, disrespect other members of the Supreme Court and substitute her own ideas and opinions; 3. Lacks empathy – Respondent failed to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others, especially with respect to the surviving spouses of deceased judges and Justices; 4. Has sense of entitlement on unreasonable expectation of favorable treatment as automatic compliance with her expectation – Respondent appears to believe that she is always correct and should be treated as such; 5. Has grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. expects to be recognized as superior without commensurate to achievement) – Respondent’s grandiosity to show self-importance manifests in her staying in opulent hotels and occupying business class when traveling abroad. Finally, based on the grade of “4” given to Respondent and her IQ of 109, Dr. Tria stated that she would not have recommended Respondent since there could very well have been other, more qualified applicants. This was echoed by Dr. Reyes and Dr. Ranoy, who said that they were very surprised to have learned that despite their report and negative recommendation, the Respondent was included in the shortlist and was even appointed as Chief Justice. Ms. Jamon and Ms. Caguingin also testified that it was a matter of practice that those who received a grade of “4” were not recommended to Page 44

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be included in the shortlist, except under very exceptional circumstances based on the extraordinary achievement or qualifications of the applicant who received such grade. The Committee noted that no such circumstance, achievement or qualification was present in the case of the Respondent. The Committee duly noted the observations of Dr. Tria based on her evaluation of the records and the psychological report as described in the Manila Times report (which was a verbatim reproduction of the said psychological report), and emphasized that the description fits well into possible explanations as to the actions committed by the Respondent as alleged in the complaint and discovered by the Committee during the course of its hearings.

V. FINDINGS After fifteen (15) hearings spanning a period of four (4) months, the Committee conducted its final meeting to determine if probable cause exists to impeach Respondent Chief Justice Sereno. Thus, by a vote of thirty-eight (38) in favor and only two (2) against, the Committee determined that PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS to impeach the Respondent.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Committee on Justice finds PROBABLE CAUSE TO IMPEACH RESPONDENT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, corruption, and other high crimes It is recommended that this Committee Report and its accompanying Resolution Setting for the Articles of Impeachment Against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno be approved in a Plenary Roll Call vote pursuant to Section 3(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. March 19, 2018. Constitution Hills, Quezon City.

Respectfully submitted,

REYNALDO V. UMALI Chairman Committee on Justice Page 45