Combined Arms

MCI 8205

MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS ADVANCED DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAM

COMBINED ARMS MARINE BARRACKS WASHINGTON, DC

COMBINED ARMS (8205) Course Introduction

Scope

MCI 8205, Combined Arms, is the last course you will take in the Staff Noncommissioned Officers Advanced Distance Education Program (8200 Program). This course is designed to enhance your understanding of the theories, methods, and assets related to combined arms. Combined Arms covers many subjects that will enhance your ability to assist junior Marines in their quest to be better Marine leaders. This course is merely a starting point for what a Marine SNCO needs to know concerning combined arms. One key to leadership is knowledge. You must be able to answer junior Marines’ questions on weapons employment, show them how to verify the information, and train them to become knowledgeable leaders.

Prior Reading

You should already have studied examples of combined arms in the Introduction to Warfighting Tactics (8203) course. You learned that a combined arms team has all elements necessary for sustained combat and noncombat operations. However, simply bringing the assets of this team to the battlefield does not constitute the fundamental definition critical to maneuver warfare: Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one, the enemy must make himself vulnerable to another. We pose the enemy not just with a problem, but also with a dilemma—a no win situation. FMFM 1

Purpose

This course will teach you how to fight combined-arms style. As you have seen, the basic concept is simple, but putting it into practice takes some study, thought, and imagination. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

i

Introduction

Course Introduction, Continued

Table of Contents

This course contains the following study units: Study Unit i 1 2 3 4

Title Course Introduction Role of Fire in Modern Tactics Cooperation: “putting the Bull in the Horns” Indirect Fire Anti-armor Assets

Page i 1-1 2-1 3-1 4-1

Estimated Study Time

You will spend about 2 hours, 30 minutes completing this course.

Reserve Retirement Credits

You will earn one retirement credit for completing this course.

MCI Course 8205

Note: Reserve retirement credits are not awarded for the MCI study you do during drill periods if awarded credits for drill attendance.

ii

Introduction

CHAPTER 1 ROLE OF FIRE IN MODERN TACTICS Overview Estimated Study Time

30 minutes

Scope

In your PME studies, you should have learned that a combined arms team has all the elements necessary for sustained combat and noncombat operations. However, simply bringing the assets of this team to the battlefield does not constitute the fundamental definition critical to maneuver warfare. In this chapter, you will have a clear understanding of the essential elements that make combined arms effective and the key elements of combined arms; fire limitations; and effects of fire, techniques, and purpose of combined arms.

Learning Objectives

After completing this chapter, you should be able to •

Identify combined arms tactics.

•

Identify combined arms techniques.

• Identify the three effects of fire. In This Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics. Topic Overview Limitations of Fire Combined Arms Tactics Combined Arms Techniques Effects of Fire Chapter 1 Exercise Appendix A

MCI Course 8205

1-1

See Page 1-1 1-2 1-4 1-5 1-12 1-19 A-1

Chapter 1

Limitations of Fire

Limitations of Firepower

Almost all Marines have witnessed impressive demonstrations of firepower at resident schools, combined arms exercises, or even in combat. However, most do not always remember that the limitation of firepower is generally ineffective when used alone. The most remarkable aspect about modern firepower is not its destructiveness but the ability of humans to counteract their effects.

Success of Expedients

Example such as microterrain, overhead cover, and fighting holes can protect the modern infantryman from almost all types of conventional munitions. Such simple expedients can deprive weapons of their effect. This is well illustrated by the experience of a tiny French village of Fleury.

Fleury Scenario

Fleury was located in the middle of the battlefield at Verdun during World War I. On 22 June 1916, 26 batteries of German heavy artillery reinforced by nine light batteries fired more than 100,000 high-explosive and poison gas shells between the village, German lines, and French batteries supporting the defenders. Note: Johnson, Douglas, Battlefields of the World War: Western and Southern Fronts. A Study in Military Geography. Oxford University Press: New York, 1921, p. 365. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-2

Chapter 1

Limitations of Fire, Continued

Lessons of Fleury

Because of the ferocity of the bombardment, one observer described Fleury as one of the few towns that in the course of the war was literally pulverized and blown off the face of the earth by long-continued, concentrated artillery fire (ibid., p. 366). A large number of French machinegunners, sheltering in cellars beneath the ruins of the village not only survived the bombardment but also retained the will to fight. The Germans had to clear the cellars one by one with hand grenades and flamethrowers before all resistance ceased in the ruins of Fleury. What happened in Fleury has happened repeatedly in modern history. Large amounts of firepower were employed against defenders who were well dugin, succeeded in killing a few of them and wounding others. However, in most cases, the trenches or cellars were strong enough to allow some of the enemy to survive the bombardment and to come out fighting once it stopped. In the words of a Marine who experienced this phenomenon first hand in Vietnam: They may have been bleeding from the ears, but they were still shooting at us (Pers. comm. between Capt Bruce Gudmundsson, USMCR, and LtCol Ray Cole, USMC; June 1989). Note: Gudmundsson, Bruce, Stormtrooper Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918, Chapter 4, Praeger: New York, 1989. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-3

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Tactics

Theory

The phenomenon of men in battle surviving massive bombardments should remind you of a key concept of maneuver warfare. The point of tactics is not just to do enough damage to the enemy to cause him to retrograde but to maneuver the enemy into an inescapable trap that forces him to act to your advantage. The idealist theory of maneuver warfare is that when faced with combined arms and maneuver warfare tactics, the enemy will simply give up the fight! This worked in Desert Storm; however, Iwo Jima and Tarawa should serve as reminders that Desert Storm was the exception, not the rule. It does not matter how difficult a position you place your enemy in, he may never lose his will to fight but fight until the bitter end. Such a trap or dilemma is the key to combined arms warfare. Combined arms is the use of two tactical actions (each of which alone is relatively less effective) that places the enemy in a situation where he is left with no alternative but to submit to your will. Let’s look at some common techniques that achieve this effect.

MCI Course 8205

1-4

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques

Mutual Support

The simplest technique to achieve combined arms tactics is mutual support. Consider the case of an infantry platoon in the attack using squad rushes. One squad rushes while the other two provide support by fire, protecting the advancing squad. For the enemy troops to engage the on-rushing squad, they must expose themselves to the covering fire of the other two squads. If they remain “hunkered” down, they are protected from the supporting fire but will be overwhelmed by the advancing Marines. An even simpler example would be the use of hand grenades or M203s to cover dead space. To return fire, he must face the incoming direct fire. Yet if he remains in his protected position, he is vulnerable to indirect fire. When a foe chooses to counter one action, he exposes himself to another.

Example

The effective nature of these simple examples is well illustrated by the experience of 3rd Platoon, Company A, lst Battalion, 8th Marines, during Operation Desert Storm: ... the 3rd Platoon was ordered to secure a building, surrounded by a chain-link fence, located 800 meters to the east. The platoon was mounted in assault amphibious vehicles. As they came within 300 meters of the building, Iraqi soldiers inside it opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades. The platoon dismounted, and under the cover of the vehicle .50-caliber machine guns, attacked through volleys of grenades. Within 100 meters of the building, the platoon was pinned down by automatic weapons fire. The 3d squad was ordered to attack the building while the rest of the platoon laid down covering fires ...As the squad entered the building, the remaining shaken Iraqi troops f led from it, seeking escape across the desert.

Mutual support creates a dilemma of space; any way the enemy turns, he makes himself vulnerable to fire from the other direction. Note: Mroczkowski, Dennis P. USMC (LtCol), Marines in the Persia Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2nd Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. History and Museums Division, HQMC: Washington, DC, 1993, p. 47. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-5

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Fire and Maneuver

The classic application of combined arms tactics is the technique of fire and maneuver. To apply this technique, a force divides itself into two elements. The first element is called the support by fire element, and the second element is called the maneuver element. The support by fire element takes up a position from which it can deliver enough fire to keep the enemy suppressed. The maneuver element takes advantage of that suppression to move close enough to the enemy's position to deliver a decisive blow. Since the decisive blow almost always takes the form of some sort of fire, whether it’s automatic rifle fire, rocket fire, or hand grenades, the technique of fire and maneuver is really a form of mutual support. If the enemy responds to the action of the supporting fires, either by trying to reply with fire of its own or simply by taking cover, he exposes himself to the action of the maneuver element. On the other hand, if the enemy tries to move into a position from which he can counteract the fire of the maneuver element, he makes himself vulnerable to the fire coming from the support-by-fire position.

Suppression

Suppression fires create a dilemma of time. First used in the Russo– Japanese War (1904–1905) and perfected during the Persian Gulf War, suppressive fire exploits the short period of time that it takes a military unit to switch from one activity to another. To create a dilemma using this technique, the support-by-fire element, which historically in most cases consisted of fire from artillery or mortars, fires on the enemy positions and forces the enemy to take cover. When the maneuver element closes on the enemy position, the base of fire “lifts” its fire by either shifting it to another target or ceasing fire altogether. Then the maneuver element assaults through the enemy’s position. The enemy, who just moments earlier was concerned only with avoiding the fire coming from the supporting element, now tries desperately to get into firing position. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-6

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Timing Is Everything

U.S. forces have used suppressive fires with varying degrees of success since World War I. When the timing was right and the maneuver element literally followed the last salvo of shells into the enemy trench, the technique worked well1. However, when the timing was off and more than a few seconds had passed between the lifting of fire and the break-in of the maneuver element, the maneuver element found itself exposed to the undivided attention of an enemy firing at point-blank range. This timing is best exemplified by the following passage from We Were Soldiers Once... And Young2. The hairiest part of any operation was the air assault. We had to time the flight and the artillery so close. When the choppers were one minute out the last artillery rounds had to be on the way or you get Hueys landing with shells. We always sweated because if you shut down the artillery too soon the enemy could be up and waiting when the choppers came in.

Notes:

1

Wynne, G.C., If Germany Attacks, Greenwood Press: Westport CT, 1976. 2

Moore, Harold G., USA (LtGen) (Ret), and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Solders Once…And Young. Harper Collins: New York, 1993, p. 68. Combining Different Types of Fire

Different types of fire have different effects on the enemy. For example, direct horizontal fire; such as fire from an M-16, forces the enemy to the ground. Plunging shells force him to take cover. By combining different types of fire, you place the enemy on the horns of a dilemma once again. A simple example of this technique is pinning an enemy soldier behind a log or boulder with direct fire weapons while rolling hand grenades down the hill at him. While the boulder may provide frontal cover against your M-16s or M240Gs, it won’t protect the enemy soldier from the grenade if it explodes behind him. With the variety of weapons available to small unit leaders today, you can combine many different types of fires in an almost unlimited number of ways. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-7

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Devastating Effects

Screams, shouts, and whistles split the night as the NVA swept down the mountain, straight into the smoke-clouded killing ground. Now all the mortars of my battalion and Tully’s were turned loose, adding their 81 mm high explosive shells to the general mayhem. Rifleman John Martin, who was in Diduryk’s lines, says: ‘We kept pouring rifle and machine gunfire and artillery on them and then they broke and ran. I don't think we had any casualties but they were catching hell (ibid., p. 219).

Note: Moore, Harold G., USA (LtGen) (Ret), and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Solders Once…And Young. Harper Collins: New York, 1993, p. 219.

Fire and Obstacles

Fire and obstacles are used together to create a combined arms dilemma for the enemy in the same way as fire and maneuver. Consider, for example, a barrier such as a combination of logs and barbed wire covered by machinegun fire. To dismantle the barrier, the enemy must stand up or at least expose the upper part of his body. When he does this he makes himself vulnerable to the fire of the machineguns. If he takes cover, he cannot dismantle the obstacle, which he must do to move forward.

Antitank Minefield Obstacle

Consider the example of an obstacle in the form of an antitank minefield covered by fire from TOWs and Javelins. To avoid the mines, enemy tanks must move slowly and carefully and keep visibility clear. To avoid the fire of the TOWs and Javlins, the tanks need to move rapidly and turn frequently, while making smoke to block the antitank gunner’s vision. Whatever threat the tanks take action against, either the mines or the antitank weapons, they make themselves more vulnerable to the other threat.

Indirect Fire Weapons Obstacles

Another way of combining fire and obstacles is to use obstacles covered by indirect-fire weapons. An excellent example was the dilemma faced by the 2nd Marine Division during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. U.S. intelligence reported that Iraqi brigades to the division’s front and flanks could reach the area of the proposed breach point with about 500 guns. Many out-ranged the 10th Marines’ M198 155mm howitzers, range of which was a little over 30 kilometers using rocket-assisted projectiles. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-8

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Use of One Element

Up to this point, all elements mentioned presented a real danger to the enemy. However, there are cases when one element can exist primarily in the enemy’s mind. An enemy force that has experienced a real minefield once or twice will take the trouble to avoid an area it believes is mined. Thus, in the right circumstances, a dummy minefield might be as good as a real one. General Hermann Balck, Germany's foremost Panzer commander in World War II, explained how he used dummy mines effectively: The minefields consisted of a few real mines and lots of dummy mines. Using the dummy mines, and the otherwise useless troops from the hospital, I was able to keep the whole defense together and to seriously slow down Patton. It all worked beautifully. After all, when a tank moves out and sees signs of mines, he can't know whether they're fake or real. So he's got to stop and get the minefield cleared, even if it has lots of dummy mines. Of course, the dummies have to have a bit of metal in them in order to ring the mine detectors. It worked brilliantly. I would never have been able to slow the American attack--and consequently our own Ardennes offensive would never have taken place--if I had not used mines in this way.

Note: Translation of Taped Conversation with General Hermann Balck Battelle Columbus Laboratories: Columbus Ohio, 1979, p. 11. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-9

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Forms of Deception

Some forms of deception can serve to encourage the enemy to make himself vulnerable to your fire. For example, you might feign a withdrawal, leading the enemy to assault into an ambush that you have prepared for him. You might be able to cause the enemy to shift his reserve by making a demonstration, then call “air” in on his reserve as it moves out in the open. Other forms of deception make the enemy vulnerable to your maneuver. An example of this form of deception is the artillery raids mounted by the Marine Corps before the “G” day invasion of Kuwait. These raids were designed as part of a deception plan aimed at confusing the Iraqis on the position and intentions of allied forces. Anything that causes the enemy to expose himself to your fire can create a combined arms effect. Whenever deception can do that, it is one of the arms you are combining. Deception itself becomes a weapon.

MassedSurprise Fires

There are occasions where fire alone can be effective. One such occasion is massed-surprise fire. Troops caught in the open by such fires suffer horrible casualties. Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., recorded an extreme case of this sort of fire in his report about the effectiveness of the then experimental variable time (VT) fuze. . . . The other night, we caught a German battalion, which was trying to get across the Sauer River, with a battalion concentration and killed by actual count 702.

Note: Baldwin, Ralph B., The Deadly Fuze. Presidio Press: San Rafael, CA, 1980, p. xxxi. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-10

Chapter 1

Combined Arms Techniques, Continued

Summary

This lesson covered many techniques for achieving combined arms. The concept in each case is the same: two or more weapons or tactical actions (including deception and surprise) make the enemy vulnerable regardless of what he does. Whatever action he takes to counter one makes him more vulnerable to the other. This concept should be your guide in every tactical action. Whenever you can achieve combined arms, you get far more effect on the enemy from your weapons and your actions than when you simply “hit” the enemy in an uncoordinated fashion. Your goal should always be to put the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, not simply to give him a problem that he can solve. Remember, in maneuver warfare you always try to achieve a decision not just hurt the enemy. Combined arms turn your combat power into decisions.

MCI Course 8205

1-11

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire

Sufficient Strength

Although combined arms tactics are a powerful idea that is central to combined arms, just merging two arms is not sufficient. If the dilemma or trap created is going to have a decisive effect on the enemy, all elements must be of sufficient strength to make the trap work. Since one or both elements are often made up of fire, you can’t have much of an idea of whether your “trap” will work unless you know what kinds of effects to expect from your fire. In general, fire has three effects. • Physical • Moral • Tactical These effects are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the moral effect of the fire results from fear of its physical effects. Similarly, the tactical effect of fire is often a result of a combination of its physical and moral effects.

Physical Effects

Physical effect of fire, what your fire does to people, vehicles, buildings, ground, and trees results from the interaction of a given projectile with its target and the environment. Different projectiles have different physical effects. • A rifle bullet hitting a vehicle has a different effect from an AT-4 hitting a vehicle. • A grenade bursting on the ground among enemy infantry has a different physical effect from a 155mm howitzer shell bursting above them. • A shell that comes down on top of the enemy from a high angle has a very different result from one that comes at him horizontally.

Learn Effects of Projectiles

To employ combined arms effectively, you need to know the physical effects of each type of projectile you use. You need to know what the projectile can penetrate, what its bursting radius is, and how much damage it will do within that radius. You should know this for each of the weapons you will use or control. You can find this information in various technical manuals (TMs), instructional publications (IPs), school handouts, and other various weaponsrelated publications. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-12

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Target Identity

You also need to know your targets. The ability of a T-80 tank to resist your weapons is different from that of a BMP or a truck. The ability of an enemy soldier in the open to escape the effect of your weapons is different from that of a soldier under cover. Various types of cover also have different effects; a man hastily dug in has different vulnerabilities to your weapons from one who is in carefully prepared entrenchments.

Environmental Factors

The environment also influences the physical effects of your weapons. A shell bursting in the jungle has different physical effects on enemy troops nearby than does a shell bursting in an open area. Terrain plays a major role in the effect of weapons. Irregular terrain makes machinegun fire much less effective than it is in open terrain. The condition of the ground, wet or dry, has a major effect on the results of shell fire. In every engagement, you need to consider these influences on the effect of weapons. What has a strong effect on the enemy in one situation may have only a weak effect in another. You must evaluate weapons’ effect carefully in setting up your combined arms engagement. If the effect of your weapons is less than you expect, the enemy may not suffer decisively from your combined arms, and you may fail in what you are trying to accomplish.

Moral Effects

Moral effect, what your fire does to the enemy’s will to resist, is less obvious but powerful. On June 30,1942, the 3rd South African Brigade, fighting on the side of British Commonwealth forces and reinforced with a 24-gun field artillery regiment, found itself defending the El Alamein station on the coastal railroad to Alexandria, Egypt. The station itself had no great military value, but the land corridor immediately south of El Alamein did. Bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea and on the south by the impassable Quattara Depression, the 40-mile wide corridor was the last place short of the Nile River itself where the British 9th Army could make a stand." Note: Bidwell, Shelford, Gunners at War: A Tactical Study of the Royal Artillery. Arms and Armour: London, 1979, pp. 178-179. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-13

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Moral Effects, continued

The narrow corridor gave the South Africans an unexpected opportunity to rectify the British “habit” of mishandling their artillery. The two sister brigades of the El Alamein garrison (the 1st and 2nd South African Brigades), each reinforced with a 24-gun field artillery regiment, were located less than six miles south of the railroad station. The standard artillery piece--the 25 pounder--had an effective range of 13,500 yards (about 7 miles). Each artillery regiment could effectively cover an arc of 60 degrees, and the overlapping arcs created a 20 square-mile “shooting gallery,” every point of which could be reached by the concentrated fire of 72 field guns. (To add insult to injury, the South Africans were reinforced by a British medium artillery regiment of sixteen 4.5-inch guns, which brought the total number of guns to 88.) Note: ibid., pp. 178-179.

Lure and Trap

On the afternoon of the 1 July 1942, the German 90th Light Division found itself trapped in this “shooting gallery.” True to the German tradition of Lucken and Flachen Taktik (“tactics of gaps and surfaces”), the 90th had been probing for gaps in the South African defense with the intention of bypassing the islands of resistance and cutting off the El Alamein garrison (W.G.F. Jackson, pp. 252–253). However, the veteran Panzergrenadiers failed to realize that the convergence of 88 artillery pieces had turned the gap into a surface far deadlier than the infantry and armored brigades whose direct fire weapons they were trying to avoid. Note: Jackson, W.G.F., The Battle for North Africa. Mason/Charter: New York, 1975, pp. 252-253. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-14

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Germans Devastated

British artillery shells began falling about 1600. At first the fire was desultory, serving mainly to slow down the attacking Germans. However, within an hour all 11 of the British and South African batteries were in action with devastating effect. The artillery of the 90th Light Division was paralyzed1. The infantry was pinned down. Some German units, both infantry and supply troops, were driven to panic2. Energetic leadership by German battle group commanders kept the panic from turning into a rout, but nothing, not even Rommel himself, could induce the men of the 90th Light to resume their forward movement3. Notes:

1

Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel Papers, Harcourt Brace and Company: New York, 1965, p. 246. 2

Von Mellinthin, F.W., Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, Oklahoma, 1978, p. 132.

3

"War Diary of the 90th Light Division. " Quoted in Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War: Year of Alamein 1942. Jonathan Cape: London, 1984, p. 139.

Acting on Their Own

The South African artillerymen had little knowledge of the effect that their fire was having on the unfortunate Germans. Each of the three regiments had been acting on its own without any sort of centralized fire control. Thus, although the battery and troop commanders acting as forward observers could see the sooty smoke produced by the burning German trucks, they failed to realize that their inadvertent cross fire had stopped a whole division Note: Hamilton, John A.I. and L.C.F. Turner, Crisis in the Desert. Oxford University Press: Capetown, 1952, p. 296. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-15

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Moral effects

The history of war is full of similar examples of the moral effect of fire. For instance, sniper teams in Vietnam proved very effective in “destroying” the enemy’s will to fight by presenting a constant threat. Cases range from the South African Brigade example, where the will-to-attack of a whole division was broken, to individual soldiers who were so affected by the enemy’s force that they cowered on the ground, unable to move or even think. Sometimes, the moral effect is direct; soldiers see their comrades being killed by fire and they panic. At other times, it may be indirect. In the 1940 campaign against France, the Germans fitted sirens on their Stuka divebombers. At times, the mere sound of the sirens of the diving Stukas was enough to panic Allied units.

Consider Both Moral and Physical

You must consider both the probable moral and physical effects of fire when you plan an action. Consider the effect of your fire on the enemy and on yourself. Consider the moral and physical effects of his fire on your own Marines. There is no formula for doing this; it varies with such factors as whether the unit is green or veteran, whether the men are tired or fresh, and whether it is day or night. Here you, the leader, must exercise your own judgment.

Tactical effect

The most important effect of fire is its tactical effect. If fire contributes to the trap or if it works as one “horn” of the dilemma, it is tactically effective. If it does not, it has no tactical effect, no matter how much ground it churns up or how much noise it makes. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-16

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Battle of Somme

A good example of the massive use of fire that had no tactical effect were the Allied bombardments that proceeded attacks in World War I. At the battle of the Somme in 1916, the British fired 4,000,000 shells over a seven-day period. It would be difficult to imagine a more massive display of firepower. The tactical effect was zero. The Germans were not destroyed. When the British troops went “over the top” in their attack, 60,000 were killed or wounded on the first day alone, and the attack failed.

Pillboxes and Bunkers

A good example of fire used with tactical effect was the Marine technique for destroying Japanese pillboxes and bunkers in the Pacific campaign in World War II. First, the Marines used smoke to suppress the Japanese in their pillboxes or bunkers so the Marines could maneuver in close to them. Then the Marines used flamethrowers (fire) to force the Japanese defenders away from their firing ports so they could not see or shoot. Finally, using the fire from the flamethrowers to neutralize the enemy, the Marines closed with the pillbox or bunker to where they could throw satchel charges in and kill the Japanese defenders. They effectively used combined arms; the Japanese could not meet one threat, the satchel charge, without making themselves vulnerable to the other, the flamethrower.

Need for All Three

Both physical and moral effects contribute to tactical effect. If your fire has neither physical nor moral effect, it is unlikely to have any tactical effect. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-17

Chapter 1

Effects of Fire, Continued

Summary

From his campaign in North Africa, Rommel tells of courageous Italian antitank gunners vainly firing their guns at British tanks until the tanks rolled over and crushed them. Unfortunately, the Italian guns could not penetrate the British tanks; they had no physical effect. And once the British realized this, the Italian guns also had no moral effect. Therefore, they had no tactical effect either. The British simply continued their attack. To have tactical effect, your fire must have either physical or moral effect, or both. But unless the physical and/or moral effects are used correctly, they will not add up to tactical effect. How you use them as an element within combined arms depends on the situation. You learn by doing. In map problems and field exercises, you must practice calculating the probable effects of your fire, and then see how to best use those effects. There is no formula; there is only practice.

MCI Course 8205

1-18

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Exercise

Directions

Complete the following items. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this chapter. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.

Item 1

The use of two tactical actions that places the enemy in a situation where he is left with no alternative, is the definition of a. b. c. d.

Item 2

What is the simplest technique of combined arms tactics? a. b. c. d.

Item 3

Mutual support Fire and maneuver Suppression Combined assault

What are the individual elements required to achieve fire and maneuver? a. b. c. d.

Item 4

mutual support. combined arms. joint operations. fire and maneuver.

Support-by-fire and maneuver Maneuver and mutual support Support-by-fire and mutual support Suppression and maneuver

What two elements are used to create a dilemma for the enemy in the same way as mutual support? a. b. c. d.

Fire and deception Fire and suppression Time and delay Fire and obstacles Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-19

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued

Item 5

What are the three effects of fire? a. b. c. d.

Physical, moral, and tactical Mutual, psychological, and tactical Combined, maneuver, and destructive Psychological, physical, and moral Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

1-20

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below provides the answers to the exercise items. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5

MCI Course 8205

Answer b a a d a

1-21

Reference 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-8 1-12

Chapter 1

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

1-22

Chapter 1

APPENDIX A Readings

Articles

• Draude, Thomas V. USMC (Col), Charles C. Krulak USMC (Col), Russell E. Appleton USMC (LtCol), Duane V. USMC (Major), William S. Lind, “Combined Arms Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989. • Dearth, Rodney L. USMC (Major), “Microterrain – A Small Unit Leader’s Ally,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1993. • Trainor, Bernard E., USMC (LtGen) (Ret), “The Artillery Raid Technique,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992. • Armstrong, Charles L. USMC (LtCol), “Ambushes – Still Viable as a Combat Tactic,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1990. Note: All articles reproduced courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette.

MCI Course 8205

A-1

Chapter 1 Appendix A

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

A-2

Chapter 1 Appendix A

Combined Arms Warfare by Col Thomas V. Draude, Col Charles C. Krulak, LtCol Russell E. Appleton, Maj Duane V. Hegna, and William S. Lind Modern warfare is combined arms warfare. Many Marines pay lip service to this truth, but few actually understand what the term “combined arms” means. Fewer still are the field exercises in which Marines actually practice combined arms operations. What does the term, “combined arms” mean? It is not merely a matter of using more than one combat arm say, tanks and artillery. Rather, it is a specific way of using them together. Combined arms means using two or more different combat arms in such a way that the actions the enemy must take to avoid one combat arm make him more vulnerable to another. In other words, combined arms puts the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. From the enemy's standpoint, there is no “good answer,” whatever he does, he gets hurt. This means he faces not only physical but also psychological pressure. Combined arms helps destroy the enemy mentally as well as physically. History offers some good illustrations of combined arms. Many have read about Wellington's squares of British infantry standing off the French cavalry at Waterloo. Fewer people are aware of how some Dutch/Belgian squares at Waterloo were chopped to pieces by the French using a standard 18th century combined arms technique. In that technique, cavalry charged the infantry, forcing it to form squares. The cavalry drew off a short distance and horse artillery was brought up to fire into the squares. As Dutch/Belgian forces soon learned, the squares were largely impervious to cavalry, but they were wonderful targets for artillery. The infantry were presented with a dilemma: if they maintained the squares, they were decimated by the artillery; if they broke their squares, the cavalry overran them. That is combined arms warfare. World War I offers another good example. While the Allies, especially the French, relied on artillery to MCI Course 8205

destroy German infantry positions, the Germans used artillery more for suppression. They found that if their infantry arrived at the enemy trenches just as the artillery lifted, the Allied infantry would often still be in their bunkers, from which they could not fight effectively. To avoid the artillery, they had sought refuge in the bunkers, but to fight the German infantry, they had to come out of them. To take best advantage of this effect of combined arms, the Germans were willing to accept some casualties from their own artillery, bringing their infantry in while the last of the artillery was still falling. Combined arms is the reason minefields must be covered by fire to be effective. The actions the enemy must take to avoid the mines-moving slowly in the open-make him more vulnerable to the fire. The actions he must take to avoid fire-moving covertly and rapidly-make him more likely to hit a mine. That is combined arms; the enemy faces not just a problem, but a dilemma. Why are combined arms important? Because they get far more effect per unit of firepower-both physical and psychological effect. In that sense, combined arms is a major “force multiplier.” For example, if you combine artillery and air simply by having both bombard the enemy's positions, you may get some attrition from using both that one alone would not have given you. But that attrition is not likely to be decisive. On the other hand, if you use your artillery to support an assault while the air concentrates on attacking the enemy's reserves as they move up to counter your attack, you get a combined arms effect that may be decisive. If the enemy seeks to avoid your air by keeping his reserves stationary or at least off the roads, you may make a breakthrough because those reserves were not where they were needed. If the reserves are moved forward, especially on roads, they may be

A-3

destroyed from the air. Again, the enemy faces a dilemma. Where does the understanding and practice of combined arms warfare currently stand in the Marine Corps? As noted at the outset, not many Marines understand what the term means. It is used loosely, to mean anything where more than one combat arm is employed. Because of this imprecision in language, Marines usually miss what the term really means, and therefore also miss the powerful effect of combined arms. Combined arms practice is a question of training. The Marine Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms is the principal location for combined arms training. Here, Marines participate in what are called Combined Arms Exercises (CAXs). Unfortunately, until recently, the CAX did not reflect real combined arms warfare. It was too canned, too reflective of arcane techniques. It stifled initiative and forward thinking. However, major and very positive changes in the CAX are now underway. A five-phase program of revision has already begun. The exercise has moved beyond the narrow limits of the Delta corridor. After the first day, the situation is different in each CAX, making it unpredictable for the unit going through. In order to accommodate innovative maneuvers by the unit, the exercise will go non-live fire if and when necessary, for brief periods. Units may now bypass strongpoints if they think it tactically advisable. All orders after the first day are frag orders. Other improvements are also involved. Safety requirements are being changed, permitting firing and clearing by grid square so as to diminish the linear nature of safety rules and thus tactics. Commencing with CAX 2-89, the live fire segment of the CAX has been followed by a non-live-fire, aggressed, free-play segment emphazing MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement systems). Chapter 1 Appendix A

Draude et al., Combined Arms, continued This permits real maneuver, similar to that practiced by Army units at the National Training Center. (See “The Enhanced Combined Arms Exercise,” by LtCol Charles M. Lohman, MCG, Mar89.) All of these changes are moves in the right direction. They deserve and need strong support. The Marine Corps must provide sufficient resources to support the new plan, especially an adequate aggressor force (the current plan is for an operational force of only a mechanized infantry company and a tank platoon, which is insufficient). The control group must be manned by people who understand maneuver warfare and can critique it with a view to maneuver and combined arms. The principle of combined arms must be correctly explained and its application rigorously critiqued. With this support, there is no question that the CAX can become a major force in moving the Marine Corps toward true combined arms warfare. Three other actions are needed to make combined arms a reality in the Marine Corps. First, the term must be understood and used precisely in our schools and in our doctrinal publications. Second, we need to rethink our current approach to fire support coordination. Many doctrinal techniques of fire support coordination are essentially valid. Valid techniques are those that are not overly complex or difficult to employ and that work in a fastpaced, fluid environment. Unfortunately, our overall fire control procedures have become so slow that they make true combined arms warfare difficult or impossible. The fact that the Marine Corps does not yet have a useful automated fire support coordination process in the field is a major hindrance to combined arms. It is not a difficult challenge. Perhaps some day we will learn that hanging every bell and whistle we can think of on a good idea usually dooms that idea to failure. What we need is a simple, robust system that displays real-time fire support coordination information where and when it is needed.

MCI Course 8205

Finally, we need to look at the size of the CAX. The battalion CAX creates a false impression of the role of the infantry battalion commander on the combined arms battlefield. By dedicating a full plate of fire support, assets to a battalion commander, we provide him a combat capability far in excess of what he is likely to have in the “real thing.” This is not just a matter of teaching him more than he needs to know. It fails to teach him how to conduct combined arms warfare with the assets he is likely to have. Battalion CAXs should be scaled back- perhaps battalion special operations exercises would be more productive-and replaced with brigade CAXs. Today, Marines are generally ineffective at combined arms warfare. But they can surely learn. USMC >Cols Draude and Krulak have both been selected for brigadier general. Col Draude is attending CAPSTONE; Col Krulak continues in his assignment to the Military Office at the White House. LtCol Appleton is the deputy executive Secretary in the Office of Secretary of Defense. Maj Hegna is a military aide to President Bush. Mr. Lind, a frequent contributor to these pages, is the director of the Institute for Cultural Conservatism, Free Congress Research and Education Foundation in Washington, DC

A-4

Chapter 1 Appendix A

Microterrain-A Small Unit Leader's Ally by Maj Rodney L. Dearth The outcome of ground combat can easily turn on the use of terrain-on the ability of frontline troops to use the ground to their advantage. Success goes to those who exploit it best. Many years ago, before maneuver warfare was really in vogue, when we spoke of terrain we were mainly concerned with the high ground. As Marines, we were told to occupy it whenever possible, take it from the enemy when he had it, never skyline ourselves when crossing it, and never let the enemy take it from us. In fact, I would say those four maxims just about sum up everything many Marines knew or cared about the military aspects of terrain. With the Corps' adoption of maneuver warfare doctrine, we have become more interested in the military aspects of all terrain, not just the high ground. Marines are more sensitized to the effects of the different types of terrain on our ability to fight and take advantage of enemy weaknesses. We are no longer concerned only with taking the high ground. This interest in terrain extends down to the lowest levels of command, and now we have a new kind of terrain especially for fire team leaders and squad leaders. It's called microterrain. What is microterrain, you ask? As defined in Chapter 3 of MCI 7304, Combat Techniques, microterrain is small folds in the terrain that can provide concealment or cover. It may be a simple depression in the ground only inches deep, or it may be some other irregularity of the terrain or vegetation. It is important because the proper use of it may allow one Marine, a fire team, a squad, or even a whole platoon to go around or through the enemy without being seen or hit by direct fire. This may all be very obvious and simple sounding, but it is not so simple when you try to put it into practice. It is hard to recognize usable microterrain sometimes, and our peacetime training does not require us to use it routinely. Recognition and use of microterrain is a skill that requires considerable practice. Not every little ditch or hill is usable in the fashion that we desire, and only experience will tell us which ones are. MCI Course 8205

In trying to recognize good, usable microterrain it's important to realize it involves much more than just small depressions or elevations. Microterrain can be as simple as a line of thick weeds growing across an opening that must be crossed. It could be small piles of bricks and concrete rubble cluttering the streets of an urban area. It might be something as obvious as a tree filled draw, or it could be more subtle like the small buildup of soil along a fence bordering a plowed field. The key to selecting microterrain is deciding whether or not it will conceal and whether or not it will provide protection from direct fire as well. Obviously, a line of thick weeds may conceal, but it won't prevent the enemy from killing troops if he conducts a reconnaissance with machinegun and rifle fire. In some cases, neither would a berm of earth or even a wall of sandbags. Learning these distinctions is why choosing good microterrain takes practice. Each geographical area will offer different types of microterrain that need to be analyzed according to the tactical situation. It is the "level playing field" available to both sides. The small unit leader and individual Marine must be adaptable, imaginative, and able to identify usable terrain in whatever locale he finds himself. Here in west Texas where I'm stationed, the terrain is gently rolling or flat, interspersed with buttes and minor ridge lines. The vegetation is sparse and consists mostly of grasses and widely scattered, stunted mesquite trees. Stand ing on any significant elevation ("significant" being defined as anything greater than 10 feet) gives one the impression that the terrain is barren of any real cover and concealment. Most casual observers would think a horned toad would have difficulty moving without being detected. Yet, there are enough variations of microterrain to let a Marine move practically anywhere, in

A-5

broad daylight, and not be observed or hit by rifle fire. As an example, immediately in front of my command post is a field a few hundred acres in size. It appears to be pancake flat. What few trees grow there are no taller than a man and have no concealing vegetation. The weeds and grasses are sparse and less than knee high in most areas. A good machinegun crew should easily be able to establish grazing fire across its surface, but what I find most intriguing about this field is the fact that white-tailed deer frequent it. I have never seen one there, but I know they come and go by the proliferation of tracks they leave. Since I have routinely observed this field at all hours of the day and night and have never seen a deer coming or going, I was curious as to how they did it. I couldn't for the life of me figure out how an animal as large as a deer could get in and out of the field without my spotting one of them. I began to examine their tracks and soon found why I never saw their comings and goings. On the south side of the field there was a small draw, no more than 12 inches deep, that originated at the edge of the field and then meandered out towards the middle. It was bordered by somewhat thicker weeds than average and a few sagebrush plants, but not enough to be noticeable unless you knew what you were looking for. I found that the bottom of this little draw was well trampled by the deer. Obviously, this was their route of ingress and egress. When they were in its "depths," the line of their backs was just barely below the tops of the bordering grass and weeds. This coupled with their natural camouflage made them extremely difficult to detect. I'm sure the deer didn't know it, but they were

Chapter 1 Appendix A

R.L. Dearth, Microterrain, continued instinctively using the available microterrain to its best advantage. Now, of course, whitetails aren't like Marines, and what may be good enough for deer could be disastrous for men in combat. Nevertheless, a lot can be learned about the use of microterrain by observing the paths whitetails follow as they go about their daily lives. I'm sure there are many Marines who hunt deer who will heartily agree with me on this point. What this example demonstrates is that casual observation of the ground or a map may not reveal microterrain of value to Marines. Maps do not show minor draws and impressions, although they may reveal small bends in contour lines that can lead to identifying useful microterrain. Also, observing the movements of larger animals can provide hints. Only constant observation and practice will teach individual Marines what to look for and what is usable. I learned my lesson well from the deer, and now I am constantly evaluating different pieces of terrain, searching for those small folds and bumps that could keep a Marine out of the enemy's sight or line of fire. As a result of continuing observations, and strong convictions about the importance of microterrain to small-unit leaders, I have instituted a teaching process within my unit training program that incorporates a study of such terrain and a practical application of what is learned. The process is done in steps as follows: • First, I develop a set of map quizzes that build and test a Marine's basic map reading knowledge. Each quiz has a variety of questions that require a Marine to identify every kind of terrain feature shown on a given map, as well as determine distance, grid coordinates, elevations, water depth, current direction, etc. The quizzes start with basic stuff and grow progressively harder. The more challenging ones involve questions that require considerable map analysis. The quizzes are designed to be done on a Marine's off time and turned in later. • Next, similar map quizzes are provided to test the Marine's ability to analyze the military aspects of terrain. To achieve success on this series of MCI Course 8205

quizzes, a Marine must know the, ranges and terminal effects of weapons and ordnance associated with the infantry company as outlined in the Battle Skills Training Manual. These quizzes are designed to force the student to analyze terrain for its impact or application to various tactical situations. All of the map work up to this point is done in garrison using topographical maps from various sources, not just the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), as experience has shown that DMA maps are not always available during real world operations. After the map work in garrison, we apply what has been learned to our practical land navigation exercises. During these exercises, terrain association is emphasized and Marines will often be given a problem that requires them to navigate between points without a compass using only their map. They may be asked to find a specific terrain feature that could be used by them to move from one area to another without being seen or shot by a notional enemy. I try to reinforce what they have learned via the quizzes, and at the same time, get the Marines to continually compare actual terrain features to what is depicted on their map. • Later, back in garrison again, we have map exercises in the traditional sense, involving notional units and equipment, which must be employed under certain tactical scenarios. • Finally, we go out and do the same thing on the ground, conducting classes that resemble tactical exercises without troops that are used in many Marine Corps schools.

These efforts are not designed to produce Marines who are geniuses in the tactical use of terrain. They are intended simply to instill an awareness and an appreciation in them for the military aspects of terrain, particularly microterrain. In today's modern world of high technology night observation and heat imaging devices, as well as battlefield surveillance radars and daylight optical devices, the small unit leader needs to know more than ever how to use both macroterrain and microterrain in his operating area. If the fire team or squad leader is to keep himself and his men out of the beaten zone of the enemy's weapons, he will also need to know exactly what effects different weapons will have on a given piece of terrain. Our Marines will lack the necessary skill unless they practice analyzing, selecting, and using microterrain on a regular basis. Only in this fashion will such terrain become their ally, instead of an obstacle. >Maj Dearth is an intelligence/electronic warfare officer. He wrote this article while commanding Marine Corps Detachment, Goodfellow AFB, TX. He is currently a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Throughout all of this study, the Marines are drilled about various terrain features and their impact on the situation and on how those features could be employed to assist in mission accomplishment. Included with this is constant instruction in the recognition and practical use of microterrain. All of our efforts have been oriented, as you might imagine, at the company level and below. Of course, none of the foregoing instruction requires any significant assets only the time involved, an area to train, and a few maps.

A-6

Chapter 1 Appendix A

The Artillery Raid Technique by LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret) "Shoot and scoot" raids by Marine artillery served to demoralize and weaken the numerically stronger Iraqi artillery forces before the launch of the ground war. It is universally acknowledged that air power crippled the Iraqi army's ability to resist in the days leading up to the ground offensive in Operation DESERT STORM. But plain old artillery also played an important role. In conjunction with air strikes, U.S. forces used their outnumbered artillery guns in an innovative way that had a great payoff when the armor and infantry went on the offensive. Known as artillery raids, American gunners would sneak up to the border of occupied Kuwait at night and suddenly pound critical Iraqi targets only to disappear in the darkness before the Iraqis could react. When they did react, attack aircraft waiting in the vicinity for just that purpose, would scream in to drop bombs and fire rockets at the Iraqis involved. The Marines made most use of the technique, because it was their job to occupy the Iraqis along the Kuwaiti border so they would be unaware that the bulk of the allied forces were poised well to the west preparing for Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf's now famous “Hail Mary Pass” around the flank of the Iraqi defenses. The Marines had another incentive for conducting artillery raids. Their job on G-day was to attack into the teeth of the Iraqi defenses, and they were anxious to gain every advantage before they did so. The artillery raid provided them a “force multiplier” as it is euphemistically known. At the time, coalition intelligence sources indicated that the Iraqis were in well prepared defensive positions and outnumbered the Marines. To offset this disadvantage the Marine commander decided to deceive and demoralize his opponent. He would deceive the Iraqis by conducting artillery raids at arbitrary points along the battlefront to confuse the Iraqis as to where he was going to attack. By conducting the raids unexpectedly with maximum speed and

MCI Course 8205

violence in the middle of a quiet night, he hoped to unnerve the Iraqis. Air attacks against Iraqis who attempted to fire artillery at the Marines in return was designed to convince the Iraqis that, manning their guns would be hazardous to their health. The Marine general hoped that when the ground offensive was launched Iraqi gunners would fear being in the vicinity of their artillery and rocket systems. The raids were a huge success, and the Marines suffered no casualties during them. When the Marines went over to the offensive, the Iraqis were thrown into confusion at the points of attack, and their feared massive barrages of artillery ended up being desultory and inaccurate random shots. The first artillery raid was on 23 January, less than a week after the air war started and over a month before the ground campaign began. At this time the bulk of Marine forces was still 75 miles south of the Kuwaiti border. The last thing the Iraqis expected as they watched American aircraft heading north for Baghdad was to be hit by artillery. The initial target was an Iraqi infantry brigade headquarters near Al Manaqish, 10 miles behind their frontlines. The raid was to test the feasibility of the “shoot and scoot” raids before the gunners tackled more formidable targets. A battery of six 155mm selfpropelled guns protected by a company of light armored infantry moved to within 25 miles of their firing position. There they prepared to dash through the desert night for the raid. Radio silence was maintained, and at their assembly point the artillerymen disconnected wires to head, tail and brake lights of their vehicle as well as those to the horns so there would be no accidental light or noise to give them away when they moved forward. The Marines sought first round hits when they fired. Meteorological data was collected to get accurate ballistic data. A combination of satellite global

A-7

positioning, and computer-assisted celestial fixes were taken on the stars to ensure l0-meter accuracy of both the locations of the firing batteries and their target. Silent, pilotless planes, known as remotely piloted vehicles, similar to a model airplane equipped with low light television, flew over the target to confirm its location. An electronic jamming aircraft was also airborne to shut down Iraqi surveillance and counterbattery radars. Attack aircraft and medical evacuation helicopters were on call in case the artillerymen got into trouble. The raid was a complete surprise to the Iraqis and a complete success for the Marines. The small artillery task force and its armored infantry escort dashed across to their firing positions in the dead of night, fired 15 rounds per gun in rapid succession, and were headed south before the Iraqis knew what hit them. Aerial observation at daylight confirmed that the command post had been destroyed. With a victory under their belts, the Marine artillerymen subsequently conducted a series and a variety of artillery raids until the start of the ground offensive. On some raids, the armored infantry would attack an Iraqi strongpoint or border post with machinegun fire in what was known as "drive-by shootings." When the Iraqis responded with their carefully camouflaged artillery, the "shoot and scoot" gunners would pummel them with 155mm shells. At other times, the artillerymen would set themselves up as decoys. They would not jam Iraqi radars. The Marines stayed in position firing for an extended period of time and chattered on their radios so that the Iraqis could get a good fix on their location. All of this was to allow the Iraqis to respond. However, unknown to them, multiple launch rocket systems were positioned nearby,

Chapter 1 Appendix A

B.E. Trainor, Artillery Raid, continued or F/A-18 attack aircraft were loitering overhead. When the Iraqis turned on their electronic systems and unlimbered their guns and rocket launchers, they were hit immediately with overwhelming firepower. By the time the ground war started, this one-two punch of artillery and air attacks had done much to take the fight out of Iraqi frontline units. >Gen Trainer is Director, National Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Article is printed with permission of The New York Times Syndicate.

MCI Course 8205

A-8

Chapter 1 Appendix A

Ambushes – Still Viable as a Combat Tactic by LtCol Charles L. Armstrong The ambush can be one of the most useful combat techniques in low-intensity conflict, but the intelligence collection, planning, Basic skills, and training required for truly successful execution are more difficult to acquire than most people realize. A well-executed ambush is an act of premeditated murder and terrorism against strangers. If an ambush is well planned and executed with the desirable degree of surprise, the victims are not killed in a “fair fight” they do not have the chance to fight at all. The so called “hasty ambush,” which we practiced so diligently in my days at The Basic School, is not really an ambush but a meeting engagement and is something to be avoided by small units. The first criterion in planning an ambush is a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s tactics. The second “must” is a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s terrain. Knowing how and where he operates gives you a good idea of where and how he can be found and surprised. You must also know when he is likely to be located in various portions of his terrain. This information is put together over time using a variety of sources, such as prisoners, deserters, captured documents, friendly patrol and after action debriefs, and experience gained from fighting the enemy. That all sounds too obvious for words, but think for a moment about how you train. Do all of your patrols have a standard debrief procedure they go through every time they get back to the rear? Does every patrol leader give the S-2 a map correction every time he returns from unfamiliar terrain? When you run your Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System against X Battalion/Y Marines, do all your unit leaders down to squad leader level study photographs and background packages on the unit leaders of that battalion? Is your S-2 tasked to research the personalities of those “enemy” leaders? Before you went to a Combines Arms Exercise (CAX) did your unit leaders study the after action reports of the last few units to go through? How about the personalities of the control group officers? Did all your lieutenants pick the brains of the lieutenants who had just come back from CAX? Did they do it with the maps of the Delta corridor in hand? After you got through with these training exercises and evaluations, did you correct maps, flesh out your dossiers on the enemy MCI Course 8205

commanders, and add to your archives for the benefit of the next officers who would rotate through your outfit? Knowing the enemy and his terrain is a process, a complex process, and like so many other factors of small unit combat, you will probably do it the way you have done it in training. Knowledge of the enemy and terrain lets you pick the time and location of the ambush. How you conduct the ambush will be determined by your own resources and imagination. Some characteristics of good ambushes should always apply (such as surprise, mentioned earlier). Ambushes should be firepower intense. Every man in the ambush should have an automatic weapon, and all the weapons should be loaded with tracer ammunition. If your troops do not have night sights on the weapons, put “cat-eye” tape on the front and rear sights to make low light aiming easier. Use claymore mines in series to cover areas of the kill zone. Use hand grenades to saturate the kill zone while shooters are changing magazines. Anchor the flanks of the ambush with machineguns or squad automatic weapons to thwart enemy maneuver and discourage reinforcement/counterattack by other enemy troops who might be nearby. As the ambush is completed and your troops withdraw, drop small mines to cover your movement away from the site. Prerigged booby traps should be left on or near some of the enemy bodies to further delay, surprise, and terrorize the enemy soldiers who recover their dead. The ambush should always be triggered by a prearranged signal that everyone can recognize and that will work regardless of weather or light conditions. There must be a similar signal to cease-fire. If the ambush is set within range of friendly supporting arms, the kill zone and surrounding area should have targets plotted. Every man in the ambush patrol should know the route of withdrawal. Every member of the ambush should wear a distinct field recognition signal (a headband of certain color, for instance, or an arm band or strip of cloth tied around the

A-9

barrel of his weapon) so that in conditions of low light or the confusion produced by the countless things that can go wrong in close combat, the team members can quickly and positively recognize each other. Ambushes should not only be planned in great detail, they should be rehearsed every time. Most of us have read James Webb's Fields of Fire and have seen the movie Platoon. Both these stories have great, early examples of how not to conduct an ambush. None of us would think of making an amphibious landing without rehearsing the landing plan. Every ambush deserves the same painstaking rehearsal. The rehearsals should always be done over terrain similar to the ambush site, using live ammunition, in the same light conditions as the real thing. The best person to critique the rehearsal is an enemy prisoner or deserter. An experienced enemy soldier can tell you how his former comrades are likely to react. Preparations for the ambush should be detailed. All the gear and weapons should be rigged for quiet carrying and should be checked for rattles during the rehearsal. Take the sling swivels off rifles and muffle the hand guards with cloth. Leave digital watches with alarms in the rear. No one in the ambush team should use or carry any tobacco products, and no one should drink alcohol or eat exceptionally spicy food for two days before an ambush mission. Unless you plan to ambush someone who dips the same brand of snuff or drinks the same whiskey, you can give yourself away through poor smell discipline as certainly as through poor noise or light discipline. Leave in the rear everything that could identify your unit’s location or mission. Patrol maps should be “sterile” of all friendly information. Designated team members should have bags in which to carry captured enemy documents, radios, and other items can give yourself away through poor smell discipline as

Chapter 1 Appendix A

C.L. Armstrong, Ambushes, continued certainly as through poor noise or light discipline. Leave in the rear everything that could identify your unit’s location or mission. Patrol maps should be “sterile” of all friendly information. Designated team members should have bags in which to carry captured enemy documents, radios, and other items. The length of time you stay in the ambush site will be determined by the amount of food and water you can take with you, assuming you don’t make enemy contact and are not detected by civilians in the area. If your ambush does not make contact in whatever time period you have planned, you then withdraw, debrief, and start over. Don’t try to improvise or overextend your troops. If you don’t make contact, you will most likely be withdrawing tired, frustrated, and low on chow and water. In other words, you are a likely victim for the enemy’s ambush. Withdraw carefully according to plan and live to fight smart another day. The Basic School probably teaches “actions at the ambush site” pretty thoroughly, but I think some real-world reminders are in order. When the ambush is triggered, every team member needs to shoot according to the rehearsed plan. If everyone runs out of ammunition at the same time, you are vulnerable to counterattack. You need a game plan for changing magazines. If survivors get out of the kill zone, pursue them by fire-don’t chase them into terrain of their choosing and get killed. Pour fire onto the enemy bodies after they are all down, and put a bullet into every head before you search the bodies. The last thing you want is to be stuck in enemy territory with the bad guys alerted to your location and have a couple of wounded Marines who were shot by some tough guy playing possum. Make quick searches of the bodies, while the security team stands guard. Take documents, communications radios, serviceable weapons, and, if feasible, ammunition. Weapons you can’t carry out should be destroyed with prerigged explosive charges on the receivers or barrels. Take photographs of the dead enemy if you know who you took off the opposition’s roster it may affect the enemy’s tactics and your future operations. Work quickly according to the rehearsal and be MCI Course 8205

prepared for a counterattack. Don’t withdraw the same way every time. Having dedicated helicopters to take you out is great if the enemy doesn’t have surface-to-air missiles. Routine kills; vary the routine and stay alive on the way back to the rear. When you get back to base, debrief with the unit commander and the S-2 before you eat, sleep, drink, or clean weapons. You never know which of hundreds of ambushes will yield information of extraordinary importance. A number of these principles and lessons can be illustrated by two examples of ambushes executed by units of the Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) in two different types of terrain. In December 1989 a small reconnaissance team of Salvadoran soldiers from Military Detachment 4 ran an ambush mission into the guerrilla rearguard area of Northern Morazan. The team was partially composed of former guerrillas who had “turned,” so their knowledge of the enemy was sound. They set their ambush above a prominent trail along a traditional withdrawal route used by guerrillas after offensive missions further south. The ambush team rigged a series of claymore mines to cover the kill zone and settled down to wait. In the next few hours they permitted two point elements of guerrillas to pass through the kill zone without triggering the ambush. Their patience paid off. During the night the main body of guerrillas, feeling safe because their point element had passed unmolested, walked into the ambush singing and joking. The ESAF team blew the claymores and opened fire with small arms. The guerrillas tried to fight their way out of the kill zone, shooting and throwing grenades, but the element of surprise was too great. After a few futile minutes of trying to gain control, the enemy unit grabbed what dead and wounded it could and fled. A 20-man ESAF patrol had surprised, terrorized, and defeated an enemy unit which outnumbered it an estimated 7 to 1, at a cost of 2 lightly wounded soldiers. The enemy had at least 19 casualties in a fight that lasted only a few minutes. Follow-on reports indicated the enemy had been shocked and demoralized by the surprise attack in their own backyard. The friendly

A-10

patrol withdrew (using the cover of darkness) overland to link up with another unit in a more secure area. In the spring of 1989 a rifle company commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade was given the mission of securing a 15-kilometer stretch of El Salvador’s littoral highway against enemy roadside ambushes. The commander, 2dLt Roberto Angel Escobar, decided to use counter-ambushes set along likely enemy avenues of approach to catch the enemy moving into position. He decided to employ 10-man ambush patrols that would be firepower heavy and move into position at night. Each ambush would have an M60 machinegun, an M79 grenade launcher, several light antitank assault weapons (LAAWs), and each team member would be issued hand grenades. He set the first ambush by keying on a traditional enemy avenue of approach that led to an area where roadside ambushes were often encountered. The 10-man ambush patrol moved out just before sundown (when they could be seen by any enemy informants using the highway), then moved into their ambush position well after dark. As dawn broke the next morning, an enemy ambush patrol, whose apparent mission was to set a mechanical ambush against early morning traffic, moved into the friendly troops’ kill zone. The patrol leader triggered the ambush. In the next few minutes, nine guerrillas fell dead. The 6th Brigade troops recovered 10 claymore mines from the dead guerrillas. Several guerrillas who were not caught in the kill zone got away and apparently spread the word about the devastating ambush they had escaped. Enemy roadside ambushes stopped while Lt Angel’s men were securing the highway. Key in both examples were planning, surprise, overwhelming fire, shock, and the will to kill an unsuspecting stranger without giving him an even break. The ambush is a tremendous force multiplier and psychological weapon. When executed by well-trained and well-rehearsed professionals, it is the safest of all offensive combat. USMC

Chapter 1 Appendix A

CHAPTER 2 COOPERATION: “PUTTING THE ENEMY ON THE HORNS” Overview

Estimated Study Time

15 minutes

Scope

In chapter 1, you learned the concept of using combined arms to put the enemy in a “damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t” situation. In this chapter, you will learn some ways Marines can cooperate on the battlefield to produce or induce this dilemma. Each element of a battlefield plan must complement or supplement the other. Two basic ways to do this are through decentralized command and unity of effort.

Learning Objective

After completing this chapter, you should be able to identify fundamentals of mission-type orders.

In This Chapter

This chapter contains the following topics: Topic Overview Commands Orders Commander Influence Korean War Example Falklands War Example Chapter 2 Exercise Appendix B

MCI Course 8205

2-1

See Page 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-5 2-7 2-9 2-10 B-1

Chapter 2

Commands

Situation Evaluation

The first step in placing the enemy in a dilemma is thinking through how to do it. In each situation, you must evaluate the situation, determine the desired effect (end state), and arrive at a course of action that will achieve that effect! Do you want to do it by “squeezing” him between two maneuver elements? Do you want to do it by combining fire and obstacles? Do you want to pin him down with fire while you get around behind him?

Harmony Among Elements

Because all situations are unique, you must come up with your concept of how to defeat the enemy in each particular case. Remember, for this to happen, you must make it happen. Each element of your plan must complement or supplement others to achieve the desired effect. If these elements do not cooperate or if they do not work in harmony, you will have only two separate, uncoordinated blows at the enemy, enabling him to deal with each one in turn. Your enemy will face a problem or two but not a dilemma. How do you get harmony between the elements of your plan? There are two basic ways, through decentralized command and unity of effort.

Decentralized Command

MCI Course 8205

A commander’s intent represents a unifying idea that allows decentralization of command within centralized, overarching guidance. An obvious way to achieve unity is by means of command.

2-2

Chapter 2

Orders

Mission Orders

As a form of mission control, the commander uses mission orders as a tool to decentralize execution. Mission orders direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without specifying how to accomplish it. The senior leaves the details of execution to the subordinate, allowing him the freedom and obligation to take whatever steps are necessary to deal with the changing situation. This freedom of action encourages the initiative needed to exploit the volatile and disorderly nature of combat.

Direct Orders

The command might be a direct order. For example, a squad leader might set up a single envelopment by pointing out the target and commanding, “First and second fire teams put suppressive fire on the machinegun in the farmhouse; third team follow me!” Alternatively, the command could be a code word that triggers a preset battle drill. The drill might be to envelope a machinegun using the first and second fire teams as a base of fire to suppress the machinegun, while the third fire team maneuvers around it. In the same situation described above, the squad leader might have said, I'm taking the 3rd fire team closer to the farmhouse so that we can destroy the machinegun. 1st and 2nd fire teams: Keep that machinegun and any other enemy forces in the area off my back.

Intended Orders

However, if a leader has subordinates that have worked with him (and each other) for some time, it might even be possible to dispense with mission orders. The squad leader who tells his squad, I’m taking the 3rd fire team closer to the farmhouse so that we can destroy the machinegun, may not have to tell his other fire teams what to do. They know, from first-hand experience, that the 3rd fire team won’t get far unless the enemy machinegun (and all other weapons that can bring fire to bear) is suppressed. In other words, the squad leader only needs to express his intent. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

2-3

Chapter 2

Orders, Continued

Commander’s Intent

The common element in all three of the above situations is the intent. The commander’s intent represents the vision of an operation. It describes the desired outcome while allowing subordinates to exercise initiative in consonance with his overall goals. The intent enables subordinates to act in a changing environment in the absence of additional orders. During execution the situation may change, possibly making some assigned tasks obsolete, but the commander's intent is overarching and usually remains unchanged. The commander's intent is the primary way you decentralize execution while maintaining unity of effort.

Need for Specificity

The squad leader clearly indicated what needed to be done—eliminate the enemy machinegun. The difference is how restrictively the order is phrased. If his subordinates are green or inexperienced, the squad leader has to be very specific about what needs to be done and how to do it. If the subordinates are relatively well trained, the squad leader needs only to tell them what has to be done. However, if his Marines work together well, the squad leader can get away with a simple declaration of his intent.

Ability to Adapt

Commands and battle drills that are not tied to intent or end state can deny subordinates the flexibility they need to adjust to their immediate surroundings. However, they can act as a point of departure from which subordinates can adapt their actions to the changing tactical situation. This ability to adapt and take necessary steps based on the situation is the fundamental key to mission orders.

MCI Course 8205

2-4

Chapter 2

Commander Influence

No Common Commander

There will be times when the elements that create the dilemma are not under the direct control of a common commander. In such cases, the dilemma is established by mutual agreement, by working together.

Concept of Gung Ho

In the early stages of World War II, LtCol. Evans Carlson formed his famous Marine Raider battalion. Their motto was gung ho, a phrase that Carlson had taken from the Red Chinese army, with which he had worked. Gung ho translates as “work together.” Carlson had been impressed with the gains of the Red Chinese in opposing the Japanese, results achieved by a strong spirit of working together. Each Chinese soldier looked for ways he could support his comrades in whatever they were doing. This attitude made cooperation and mutual support common and easy. Gung ho, working together is one of the keys to making combined arms work when there is no common commander who can simply give an order. It is not a process but an attitude. It is an attitude that leads every Marine to look for ways he can support the mission as well as his fellow Marines.

Formal Agreement

Sometimes, working together leads to a formal agreement: Okay, sir, my mortars will keep their heads down. We know you’ll be bringing your platoon in from the east on their right flank. We’ll watch for you and lift our fire in that sector when you get near them. If Marines are really working together, no formal agreement will be necessary. Marines will see other Marines who need their help and they will just give it. All elements will act with unity of purpose, without even communicating, because they understand the intent and desired end state. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

2-5

Chapter 2

Commander Influence, Continued

Initiative

Initiative at all levels must be taught and encouraged. Initiative is an essential component of mission control, which is based on the willingness of the subordinates to act without instruction. The Marine Corps command and control concept energetically seeks and rapidly exploits opportunities at all levels. Discipline is not imposed from above; rather there is self-discipline throughout the organization.

Freedom to Act

Not only must subordinates be free to act on their own authority, they must view it equally as their responsibility to act. This freedom to act with initiative thus implies a greater obligation to act in a disciplined and responsible manner. Armed with an understanding of their commander’s intent, subordinate commanders must recognize and react to enemy actions and vulnerabilities without waiting for direction from the chain of command.

MCI Course 8205

2-6

Chapter 2

Korean War Example

Ordeal at Chosin

The following example from the Korean War demonstrates what can be achieved through cooperation and initiative. While elements of Taplett's headquarters company built up a base of fire on the verge of the roadway, a platoon from Captain Sam Jaskilka's Easy/5 moved toward the Chinese strong point by way of a ridgeline to the north. Then, while the Easy/5 platoon in the hills was trudging across the skyline in the gathering light, Chinese sappers blew the repaired bridge once again. Drivers, who had been calm up to that point, started to panic, pressing on their accelerators, hoping to run the gauntlet of fire by crossing the ice-covered stream. Bob Taplett was trying to halt the column when he heard the heaviest streak of profanity he had heard in his decade in uniform. Commissioned Warrant Officer Allen Carlson, of the 1st Battalion, 11th, had had enough insubordination, and he was thundering his emotions at the fleeing drivers. Clomping down the road after the nearest truck, Carlson disappeared from Taplett’s view around a bend. But he returned a few moments later leading a truck that had a 105mm howitzer in tow. As the Easy/5 platoon moved against the Chinese flank on the snowcovered skyline, Gunner Carlson dragooned the nearest warm bodies and formed a scratch gun crew. Nearby, Bob Taplett helped haul a 75mm recoilless rifle into place. Carlson aimed his 105 over the open sights and blasted the Chinese strong point. Another 105 under the control of Maj Bud Schlesinger, exec of the 1st Battalion, 11th, was wheeled into place beside Carlson’s gun, and a .30-caliber heavy machine gun donated by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Stevens was soon spraying Hill 1226. High up on the road, well out of the action, 2nd Lieutenant Pat Roe, who was with the 3rd Battalion, 7th's trucks, watched through his binoculars as Hal Roise shook out several of his platoons and put them into motion. Private First Class Bob Kennedy, a Dog/BAR-man, found himself wheeling off the road into a long field in the company of bayonet-wielding riflemen. The thin skirmish line of parka-clad Dog/5 Marines moved rapidly up the slope, prying PLA infantrymen from their fighting holes, sending others fleeing into the guns on the road. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

2-7

Chapter 2

Korean War Example, Continued

Ordeal at Chosin, continued

The first break in the overcast sky was filled with Navy ADs, which spread rockets and napalm across the face of Hill 1226. Each attack bomber waggled its wings in salute as it pulled back up into the mists. Marine heavy tanks coming up from the south turned their 90mm guns on the Chinese atop a small hill across the road from the main event, neutralizing a troublesome machinegun.

Note: Hammel, E. Chosin: Heroic Ordeal of the Korean War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990, pp. 294–295.

Summary

MCI Course 8205

The excerpt shows formal cooperation in the supported attack by the platoon of “Easy/5.” It also illustrates something else. Working together in nonstandard ways, with no agreement, no central commander; just an understanding, based on an estimate of the situation of what must be done. The leaders of these scrambled units understood that the total tactical effect was important. They fully grasped the concepts of combined arms and working together.

2-8

Chapter 2

Falklands War Example

Milan Antitank Weapons

The British in the war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands provided another example of working together in nonstandard ways. They brought with them numerous Milan antitank weapons, similar to the Marine Corps Dragon. The Argentines had no serious armor capability. However, the Milan gunners used their missiles to fire at and destroy the Argentine army’s .50-caliber machinegun positions that were well dug in and protected from British machinegun fire. The suppression provided by the Milans, which were used in a nonstandard way, enabled the British infantry to attack successfully. Again, working together to create a dilemma was more important than employing the weapon the way it was supposed to be used.

Conclusion

In seeking to establish unity of effort, you should remember that teamwork is rarely achieved by imposing conformity from above; rather, it is best achieved through the spontaneous cooperation of all elements of the force. Whether the weapon is a 155mm howitzer or a modern ATGM, the principle is the same. The combined arms effect can only be achieved through cooperation. Sometimes this is explicit—by command, by mission order, by intent, or by agreement. At other times, when two units work together to produce a dilemma without even talking to each other, cooperation is implicit. In any situation, the common element must be working together to put the enemy in a dilemma. That is the goal! Any way you can achieve it is good.

MCI Course 8205

2-9

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Exercise

Direction

Complete the following items. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this chapter. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.

Item 1

Which of the following direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without specifying how to accomplish it? a. b. c. d.

Item 2

General orders Special orders Mission orders Tactical orders

Which of the following allows a subordinate to act in a changing environment in the absence of additional orders? a. b. c. d.

Centralized command Battle drills Commander’s intent Situation Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

2-10

Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below lists the answers to the chapter examination items. If you have questions about these items, refer to the reference page. Item Number 1 2

MCI Course 8205

Answer c c

2-11

Reference 2-3 2-4

Chapter 2

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

2-12

Chapter 2

APPENDIX B Readings

Articles

• Ettore, Michael L. USMCI (Capt), “Commander's Intent Defined,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1993. • Silva, John L. USA (LtCol), “Auftragstaktik, Its Origin and Development,” Infantry, September-October 1989. • Sexton, Martin J. USMC (Col) (Ret), “Raider Response,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1991. Note: All articles reproduced courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette and Infantry.

MCI Course 8205

B-1

Chapter 2 Appendix B

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

B-2

Chapter 2 Appendix B

Commander’s Intent Defined by Capt Michael L. Ettore In a move to standardize and clarify a key concept of maneuver warfare, the Marine Corps University has issued guidelines on commander’s intent. Several years ago the U.S. Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its primary warfighting philosophy. The general concepts of this philosophy were outlined in FMFM 1 Warfighting, a publication intended to provide broad guidance on how the Marine Corps prepares for and conducts combat operations. While most of the content of FMFM 1 can legitimately be labeled as purely common sense, there are several concepts which at the time of publication were new, unfamiliar ideas. One of these new concepts was that of commander’s intent. While most Marines have heard of this concept, it is extremely rare to find two individuals with the same perspective as to what commander’s intent really is. Any student of maneuver doctrine will agree that to be successful in this style of warfighting, subordinate leaders must be encouraged to use initiative during the execution of any mission. Commander’s intent is designed to provide these leaders with the ability to deviate from a specific plan of attack if necessary, yet still accomplish the ultimate desires of their commander. This initiative is properly focused by a crystal-clear expression and understanding of the commander’s intent. Recently, the Marine Corps University conducted a Quarterly Curriculum Review Board which was attended by representatives of the various schools within the University system, as well as from other commands. One of the topics discussed was the concept of commander’s intent and the need for a standard definition of the subject as well as specific guidance for its use during the conduct of Marine Corps operations worldwide. The following definition of commander’s intent was forwarded to the President of the Marine Corps University and has subsequently been approved: • The commander’s intent statement will be depicted in a formal operations order in paragraph 3a (1) followed by the concept of operations in paragraph 3a (2). The higher unit commander’s intent will be depicted in paragraph lb. MCI Course 8205

• The commander’s intent statement must include a statement of the end state of the battlefield as it relates to his force, the enemy force, and the terrain. Additionally, this statement may include: - The purpose of the operations. - The enemy’s actions and intentions. - An identification of the enemy’s critical vulnerability or center of gravity.∗ Currently, the entire Marine Corps University is adopting this definition of commander’s intent. Once implemented, these changes will result in the substantial enhancement of the orders process and will reduce confusion as units and individuals are reassigned. Graduates of the staff noncommissioned officer academies, The Basic School, Infantry Officers Course, Amphibious Warfare School, Command and Control Systems Course, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, and the Marine Corps War College will have the same understanding and will utilize the same techniques. Some important points to remember: • Every Marine must know the commander’s intent two levels up. • During most infantry battalion operations order briefs, the battalion S-3 actually issues the majority of the order. It is highly encouraged that the battalion commander issue his intent statement for clarity and emphasis. • The commander’s intent statement is intended to be written in narrative form, not by listing elements 1 through 5. It is a statement, not a format. • During the preparation of the vast majority of operations orders, whether formal or fragmentary, the shortage of time usually will result in the commander’s intent statement being limited to the statement of the end state of the battlefield as it relates to friendly forces, the enemy forces, and the terrain. • A technique used to describe the end state of the battlefield is to begin the

B-3

statement with, “Final result desired is.” The following are some examples: - Final result desired is to block the enemy north of Route 1 in order to allow the unimpeded movement of Company C to BLT Objective Alpha. - Final result desired is to destroy the enemy radar equipment at Objective Bravo in order to prevent early detection of subsequent coalition air attacks. • The commander’s intent statement is not a duplication of the scheme of maneuver paragraph; not where missions or tasks are assigned to subordinate units; and not the place for useless statements such as “we will attack vigorously,” “we will utilize supporting arms to stun the enemy,” or “try not to get bogged down.” • A short, concise commander’s intent statement is easier to send via radio or messenger and is more easily remembered by subordinates once they come under extreme stress. The most important thing for a young lieutenant to remember if he must suddenly assume command of a rifle company in a rapidly changing combat situation is the concept of commander’s intent. Finally, it is incumbent upon every leader to adopt and enforce these changes with enthusiasm. The result will be the standard interpretation and usage of this key concept throughout the Marine Corps. Additionally, it will put an end to the friction and confusion that happens all too often today. ∗Center of Gravity. The characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, military power, or will to fight. (FMFM 2-1 Draft) Critical Vulnerability. A weakness in an opposing military force’s assets, tactics, or strategy that can result in that force’s defeat if that weakness is exploited. (FMFM 2-1 Draft) Chapter 2 Appendix B

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

B-4

Chapter 2 Appendix B

Auftragstaktik Its Origin and Development by Lieutenant Colonel John L. Silva Since FM 100-5, Operations, was published in August 1982, the U.S. Army has made much of the mission order and mission-oriented command. In fact, we seem to have elevated the mission order to the level of a quasisacrament and have almost made it an end in itself. In the absence of a clear understanding of the context in which the mission order developed, we may see its adoption as the single solution to our perceived command and control problems. In doing so, we may believe we are using mission-oriented command when we are really using only the mission order. If this is the case, we will have adopted the form while ignoring the substance. Mission-oriented command, or what the Germans call Auftragstaktik, is a decentralized leadership and command philosophy that demands decisions and action at the lowest level of command where there is an intimate knowledge of the situation and the commander's intention in beginning of an operation. (See also "Auftragstaktik," by Captain Frank A. Kerkemeyer, INFANTRY, NovemberDecember 1987, pages 28-30.) The mission order is merely a technique that is used to implement and execute mission-oriented command. Missionoriented command is based on a belief in the ability of an individual's creative action to solve a problem without recourse to higher authority; the mission order is only the small component of mission-oriented command that we see in the field. But there are other components of mission-oriented command that must also work before an army takes the field: • Mutual trust among leaders based on each leader's intimate personal knowledge of the capabilities of the others. • Training and organization in everything the army does to reinforce MCI Course 8205

the primacy of the judgment of the man on the scene (decentralization). • A willingness to act on the part of all leaders and those who aspire to be leaders. • Simple, commonly accepted and understood operations concepts. The success of the AirLand Battle concept depends on the initiative of our junior leaders to act in the spirit of their commander's intent in the absence of orders. The only historically proved method of giving subordinates the freedom to act on their own is mission-oriented command. This concept cannot be adopted, however, by simple doctrinal decree. If we unthinkingly rush to impose mission orders upon ourselves without fully understanding the whole of mission-oriented command, we risk adding more confusion to an already chaotic environment. When used out of its proper context, the mission order alone is not mission-oriented command and creates more problems than it solves. The German Army of 1800 to 1945 is widely believed to be the most consistently successful modern army at using mission-oriented command. The following brief outline of its development and components may broaden our understanding of Auftragstaktik as an organic whole. With the advent of Napoleonic open-order tactics, the Germans saw a need to take advantage of the potential for individual creativity at every level to solve common military problems, instead of relying on the native brilliance of one individual in command to solve all problems. They were quick to realize that almost every man in a battle could contribute more than just his physical prowess. They were among the first to institutionalize the harnessing of collective creativity within a generally

B-5

accepted pat-tern (doctrine) of military action. Mission-oriented command, as practiced by the German Army, accepted a lack of absolute control over events on the battlefield. Instead of trying to dictate the actions of each subordinate, the Germans realized that there was much more profit in trying to ensure that, when the need arose, their subordinates would act without waiting for orders. The Germans believed that it was better to know that each man would act on his own to contribute something than to have him wait for orders to do the “right” thing. The idea of the commander's intent as a normal part of the mission statement was important, of course, because it provided a framework within which an isolated subordinate could act in the spirit of that mission. As a corollary to the notion of the commander's intent, the German Army established a simple conceptual framework that provided a common basis for action in the absence of orders. This framework was based on the idea that a successful defense depended on the rapid destruction of an enemy army through maneuver so the defenders could turn and face other potentially aggressive armies. The German military leaders believed that offensive maneuver offered the best chance to shock and dislocate an enemy force so it could be destroyed at the least cost to them. It became the preferred German method of war, even within a defensive strategy, and a staple in the German military tradition

Chapter 2 Appendix B

J.L. Silva, Auftragstaktik PREJUDICE The Germans' approach clearly reflected their prejudice that there was more art than science to battlefield operations. They accepted that battle is marked by confusion and ambiguity and consciously traded an assurance of control for an assurance of self-induced action on the part of subordinates. They apparently embraced the confusion of battle as an unending source of potential opportunity and built a command and control philosophy in which that potential could be realized through decentralized decision- making. They seem to have faced and solved the extraordinarily difficult problem of motivating men to take independent action in the midst of battle without orders or supervision. Over the course of about 150 years, they developed a professional tradition that was founded on a belief in the ability of the man on the spot to act-within this broad but well understood and accepted conceptual framework-to solve the many tactical and operational problems that face an army in action. And then they acted on that belief by institutionalizing the concept. EDUCATION Critically important to this institutionalization of Auftragstaktik in the German Army was the superior military education offered to selected officers in the Kriegsakademie. The academy originated with the officer education reform activities of Prussian general Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst at the start of the 19th Century. It was an effort to raise the level of military and liberal arts education for regimental and staff officers. The academy was somewhat exclusive, initially, because the faculty and the facilities were limited. Later, though, this exclusive nature was maintained by design, because an applicant had to have his regimental commander's specific recommendation and had to undergo an exhausting, competitive entry examination. MCI Course 8205

Before he could graduate, he had to receive a favorable faculty recommendation (based on the continual evaluation of each student's creativity, objectivity, and mental stamina, as well as course grades) and to complete a comprehensive series of written and oral examinations. The graduate also had to serve a one-year apprenticeship with the General Staff before he could become a permanent member. Appointment to the General Staff was not automatic-the apprenticeofficer had to earn it. Officers who failed to graduate stayed at the Academy to complete the same military education as the graduates, and they took their skills back to their regiments to teach others. There was no stigma attached to not being selected for General Staff duty, and no thought seems to have been given to relaxing the demanding studies and tough evaluations simply for the sake of turning out more graduates. If his performance of duty in the regiment was consistently outstanding, an officer who had completed the Academy but had not been selected for an apprenticeship could be called later to join the General Staff and to serve that apprenticeship. As mentioned above, the basic German concept was simple: Maneuver to shock the enemy in order to destroy him. If a junior NCO or officer acted in some way to do this, he was always "right." This conceptual framework was promulgated throughout the army in the General Staff training, in professional journals, and in all unit training. The unit commander was charged to an extraordinary degree with the training, education, and development of his juniors. (Until fairly recently, in fact, there were few schools in the German Army, and the personnel system was highly decentralized.) This decentralization was merely a natural extension and reinforcement of decentralized decision making. INEXCUSABLE Because German doctrine was regulatory, therefore, a subordinate's

B-6

failure to act in the absence of orders was "illegal" and, at the very least, inexcusable in the eyes of his superiors and peers. An NCO or officer knew he was expected to act on the situation as he saw it, and he knew his action would be supported. As a result, action in the face of uncertainty and responsibility for that action was developed into a social norm. Trust between superior and subordinate was the cornerstone of missionoriented command. The superior trusted his subordinate to exercise his judgment and creativity and to act as the situation dictated to reach a specified goal. And the subordinate trusted that his superior would support whatever action he took in good faith to contribute to the good of the whole. The superior's level of confidence in his subordinates could be high or low as a result of the intimate knowledge he had gained through his personal responsibility for their training and development. He knew which of them could be trusted to execute a mission on the basis of broad orders and which needed more detailed instructions. But he knew that each would act. The subordinate was willing to exercise his judgment during periods of great stress with no additional instructions once the action started. The superior constantly nurtured this willingness by allowing for mistakes of detail or method and by permitting errors of judgment during training. The idea that "everything short of war is training" was held to be valid: Every action taken by an officer in the field or in garrison was important to the process of inculcating a preference for solutions. If a subordinate erred while acting in good faith, he did not suffer anything more than corrective coaching. His solution might be constructively critiqued, but the result of his action-and the reason he took that action-were considered far more important. The role of corrective advice was to teach and coach the subordinate so that his future action would make a more positive contribution to the unit's Chapter 2 Appendix B

J.L. Silva, Auftragstaktik success in combat. This idea was based on the premise that one learned more from a well-meaning mistake that was constructively critiqued than from a mediocre performance that was hardly noticed. Initially, the superior was not so much concerned with what a subordinate did or how he did it. Rather, his emphasis was on seeing that his subordinate gained and then maintained an instinctive willingness to act and that he analyzed why he acted as he did and the effect his action had on the overall operation. Hearing the subordinate's view of his reasons for a certain course of action helped the superior evaluate the adequacy of his own original communication of the mission and his intention. The German Army's training system used two very simple criteria to judge whether the junior leader did well: the timeliness of his decision and; is own justification for it. The first criterion impressed him with the need to act quickly while the second required him to reflect on his action and gain insight into his own thought process. Since he had to justify the decision in his own mind before implementing it, imprudent decisions and rash actions were less likely. In training, what he decided to do was relatively unimportant. The emphasis was on the effect of his action on the whole, not on the method he may have chosen. In an environment where there were no formulas, this technique solicited creative solutions. Through mission orders, therefore, mission-oriented command brought the collective creativity of subordinates into the decision and action processes. The subordinate had a personal stake in the outcome of battle, because he knew he contributed to it intellectually and independently. Mission-oriented command was based on the idea that undue criticism, after the fact, of the man on the scene-who was in a confused, dangerous, and pressured situation and who had the best command of immediate information was MCI Course 8205

unwarranted. Anything beyond a constructive critique would only destroy the subordinate's willingness to act and might even lead him to withhold adverse information or provide falsely optimistic reports simply to avoid his superior's wrath. This idea recognized there was little in mission-oriented command that was "systematic" and made allowances for this. In mission-oriented command, both superior and subordinate shared the burden of mission accomplishment. Of course, the greater burden obviously rested with the superior, because he had to teach, trust, support. and correct well intentioned but possibly errant actions. The subordinate was required to report accurately and to act when the situation demanded it. Inaction, not "wrong" action, was the cardinal sin. The heart and soul of Auftragstaktik was the desired result, not the way the result was achieved. It rejected as counter-productive any attempt to control the type of action initiated during combat. It concentrated instead on instilling in subordinates the will to act as they deemed appropriate in their situations to attain the desired result. The cultivation of initiative required special effort. It was so central to mission-oriented command that it applied to squad leaders as well as to division or corps commanders. A leader had to make a truly gross error to be reprimanded, and then the reprimand would not forever haunt him throughout his service or unduly penalize him for an honest mistake. In brief, the function of missionoriented command was to bring the collective creativity of an army to bear in solving tactical problems. It rewarded the soldier who acted and penalized the one who did not. The mission order, the battlefield technique through which mission-oriented command was practiced, included the mission's objectives and a clear articulation of the commander's intent. The order not only left the subordinate free to determine how to complete his

B-7

mission but also relied on him to decide on new courses of action as events unfolded that altered the assumptions made in planning. Auftragstaktik was a product of German social and cultural tradition, and it was adapted by the German Army for its purposes. It depended on a relatively simple but well understood and accepted operational concept to generally guide commanders in deciding how to accomplish their missions. It demanded and provided adequate training and education both in the Kriegsakademie and in the units to make its execution reliably sure. It recognized and compensated for differences in the temperament and ability of its officers and NCOs through personalized unit training, and professional development, and in the details each was given in orders in the field. It provided a gigantic support structure to infuse and sustain the subordinates' initiative in battle. This concept worked so well, however, that we in the U.S. Army now idolize it without fully comprehending the totality of what it was, why or how it developed, or how it worked as a system. We must understand that issuing mission orders is not practicing mission-oriented command. To use this command concept successfully, subordinate leaders must be adequately prepared for it, and the entire organization of an army must be prepared to support, sustain, and reinforce it. Our AirLand Battle doctrine is right in demanding that decentralized decisions be made by the man on the spot. Our challenge is to find a method of decentralized decision making that fits our culture and our Army. Lieutenant Colonel John L. Silva previously served in the G-3 section of the 3d Infantry Division and in the G-3 section of Headquarters, Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land). He has returned to the 3d Infantry Division as assistant chief of staff, force modernization. He served as a Ranger patrol platoon leader in Vietnam, and is a member of the 18th Infantry Regiment. His article "Improving CP Survivability" appeared in the NovemberDecember 1987 issue of INFANTRY.

Chapter 2 Appendix B

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205

B-8

Chapter 2 Appendix B

Raider Response by Col Martin J. Sexton, USMC (Ret) As the light infantry debate continues, a look at past history and the employment of Marine Raider battalions in World War II will help illustrate some of the strengths and limitations of the concept In the wake of all the furor created by the articles on light infantry, I remain amazed that there has been no mention of Marine combat units or organizations that brilliantly played such a role in the past. I make reference to the Marine Raider battalions of World War II fame. The U.S. Marine Raiders were the first American ground forces to take the offensive to the Japanese and to stem the tide that threatened to engulf the Pacific. In February 1942, the United States was still reeling from the offensive operations of the Japanese in the Pacific Theater. The Japanese were rolling unchecked throughout the Pacific. Their military forces were winning victory after victory, and the myth of their superior fighting grew even greater. It wasn't that no one had stopped them; no one had even slowed them down. American, British, Dutch, and French interests were all being pushed out of the Pacific. This background provided the setting and requirement for lightly equipped amphibious raiding units that could be employed in hit-and-run attacks against island bases. This was the genesis of the Raider battalions. The missions assigned the Raiders were these: • As the spearhead of a larger force, to seize a beachhead by surprise attack over beaches ordinarily regarded as inaccessible. • To conduct amphibious raiding operations relying on the element of surprise and operating from submarines, destroyers (APDs), air transport, or any other available transport. • To carry out guerrilla operations behind enemy lines for protracted periods, sustaining themselves without access to an established line of communications. An example of one of the Raiders' first missions was the assault landing at Tulagi on 7 August 1942 by the 1st Raider Battalion under the command of LtCol Merritt A. "Red Mike" Edson. The assault elements landed unopposed over MCI Course 8205

the coral reefs and rapidly moved inland. As soon as the bulk of the 1st Raiders were ashore, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines landed in trace. The 1st Marine Parachute Battalion attacked the harbor islet of Gavutu against strong resistance. Tulagi's defenders also presented a tenacious defense from approximately 1120 on D-day until all organized resistance was overcome by nightfall of 8 August 1942. Still another example of the first type of Raider mission was Vangunu Island prior to the New Georgia Campaign. Elements of the 4th Marine Raider Battalion landed and secured a beachhead, and then elements of the 1034 Army Infantry followed. This was typical of the Raiders' employment throughout the New Georgia operation. The overall operation was predominantly Army, and the Marines' role included small raids and surprise attacks over a large area of operations. An example of a raid mission was Makin Island. The raiding force was under the command of LtCol Evans F. Carlson and totaled 13 officers and 208 enlisted. The main elements were Companies A and B, each minus one rifle section. (It will be recalled that Companies C and D had taken part in the defense of Midway Island.) .The Raiders embarked aboard the USS Nautilus and the USS Argondut on 8 August 1942 and proceeded individually to the target area. The Nautilus made landfall at 0300 on 16 August, and both subs rendezvoused at 2116 the same date. The overall operation was of historic proportions. It was the first time that such a raid had been conducted by American forces over such a tremendous distance. The objective was within the inner circle of Japanese island bastions, and both the approach and withdrawal were extremely hazardous. The landing was accomplished without too much difficulty, but the element of surprise was lost due to an accidental discharge immediately after landing. From that point on, the difficulties and critical

B-9

decisions mounted. In spite of all the misfortune that befell Carlson's men, by improvisation and ingenuity, the force overcame a succession of setbacks and finally completed a withdrawal by 2308 on 18 August. Overall results were "mixed." The Raiders had destroyed two ships and killed all the troops onboard, shot down two seaplanes with reinforcements, torched a fuel depot, destroyed command and radio facilities, killed approximately 83 Japanese on Makin, and caused the enemy to divert elements of a relief force that had formed on Truk intended to reinforce Guadalcanal. Total Raider dead, however, numbered 30-14 killed in action, 7 drowned, and 9 inadvertently left on the island. Those left were later captured by the Japanese forces reoccupying the island and were executed after a brief period of captivity. There was also a large loss of equipment due to the difficulty encountered in retrogressing through an extremely high and rapid surf zone. An unexpected bonus of the, raid occurred when the news media released details of the operation upon the Raiders' return to Pearl Harbor. A wave of patriotic exuberance and a tremendous lift in morale swept the country as details of the audacious raid became public knowledge. The entire nation was hungry for good news, and this was truly one of the first that had been announced. An additional contributing factor was the mystique of the Marines' "gung ho" aura. A textbook example of the third type of mission assigned to the Raiders was the one assigned to the 2d Raider Battalion on Guadalcanal during the period of 4 November-4 December 1942. LtCol Carlson and his men landed from APDs on 4 November at Aola Bay, about 40 miles east of Lunga. They were met by Martin Clemens, British

Chapter 2 Appendix B

M.J. Sexton, Raider Response, continued District Officer and coast watcher. He supplied the Raiders with native scouts and patrols under the command of SgtMaj Jacob Vouza. It is considered that the following citation, presented on 7 December 1942 by MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift is eloquent testimony to the battalion's actions: From the operational records of this Division it appears that the 2d Raider Battalion, which attached to this division, took the field against the enemy at Aola Bay on 4 November 1942. For a period of 30 days this battalion, moving through difficult terrain, pursued, harried and by repeated attacks destroyed an enemy force of equal or greater size and drove the remnants from the area of operation. During this period the battalion, as a whole or by detachments. attacked the enemy wherever and whenever he could be found in a repeated series of carefully planned and well executed surprise attacks. In the latter phase of these operations the battalion destroyed the remnant of enemy forces and bases on the upper Lunga River and secured valuable information of the terrain and the enemy line of operations. In this battle the enemy suffered 488 killed and the loss of his artillery, weapons, ammunition, and supplies whereas the battalion losses were limited to 15 killed. For the consumate skill displayed in the conduct of operation, for the training, stamina and fortitude displayed by all members of the battalion and for its commendable aggressive spirit and high morale the Commanding General cites to the 1st Marine Division the Commanding Officer, Officers and Men of the 2d Raider Battalion.

withdrawal from Bougainville, the Raiders were disbanded and the majority of the personnel became members of the reactivated 4th Marine Regiment. In view of the foregoing historical illustrations, and with the current light infantry arguments in mind, we should take heed of two separate comments made in the September Marine Corps Gazette. Been Jean Louis DeLayen commented: "Young men, stay the best in your specialty, your raison d'etre; don't become a "Jack-of-all-trades." Capt Mark S. Murphy, in part, states, "We must maintain the capability to adjust to a variety of combat environments." Line infantry must remain the bulwark of Fleet Marine Force ground forces. >Col Sexton, who served with the 2d Raider Battalion throughout the War in the Pacific, now.~s retired and living in Carlsbad, CA.

The 2d Raider Battalion was withdrawn from Guadalcanal on 14 December 1942 to return to Espirtu Santo, New Hebrides. The organization was then moved to Wellington, New Zealand, on 4 February 1943 for a brief period of rest. Then back to Espirtu Santo, where on 25 April, it sailed for Noumea, New Caledonia. The Bougainville operation that commenced on 1 November 1943 proved to be the last one the Raiders would participate in. They were soon to be disbanded. The tempo of the war had changed dramatically. The Allied effort in the Pacific Theater had developed such a tremendous offensive thrust that there was no longer a tactical requirement for Raiders. An avalanche of new units, new weapons, and a buildup of logistical support dictated the application of massive firepower on all objectives. There were no legitimate targets left for the Raiders. In less than a month from the time of their MCI Course 8205

B-10

Chapter 2 Appendix B

CHAPTER 3 INDIRECT FIRE Overview

Estimated Study Time

30 minutes

Scope

If you have ever seen the movie Apocalypse Now, you probably remember the beach scene where Col Kilgore calls in a napalm strike along a tree line. Calling for the napalm strike is an example of indirect fire. In this chapter, you will examine the indirect fire element of combined arms. You will learn why indirect fire is called the “combat multiplier” and about the links in the chain of command that produce indirect fire.

Learning Objectives

In This Chapter

After completing this chapter, you should be able to •

Identify indirect fire weapons used by the Marine Corps

•

Identify the capabilities and limitations of the weapons associated with combined arms.

This chapter contains the following topics:

Topic Overview Combat Multiplier Fire Support Limitations Links in the Chain Marine Artillery Mortars Close Air Support Naval Surface Fire Support Chapter 3 Exercise Appendix C

MCI Course 8205A

3-1

See Page 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-5 3-7 3-10 3-11 3-17 3-20 C-1

Chapter 3

Combat Multiplier

Initial Intent of Indirect Fire

Until World War I, there was little indirect fire on battlefields. Artillery was designed to shoot direct fire, aiming at targets gunners could see. Indirect fire was considered something used only in sieges of fortresses or cities. This was probably due to its inability to launch projectiles high and far.

Understanding Indirect Fire

Since the beginning of World War I (1914), indirect fire has become a major force on most battlefields. In fact, in most wars, it has been the single greatest killer. With indirect fire, you reinforce the success of maneuver. Through use of long-range artillery, aviation, and naval gunfire, Marine platoons, squads, or fire teams can generate the equivalent “combat power” of a battalion or even regiment. Even a lone Marine manning a radio in an observation post (OP) can command enough indirect fire to halt the attack of an entire armored brigade. But you also face a new challenge. You must know the central concepts behind how to use these powerful tools.

MCI Course 8205A

3-2

Chapter 3

Fire Support Limitations

Communicating With Firing Unit

What is indirect fire? It is fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director. It may come from mortars, heavy machineguns, 155mm howitzers, or a destroyer 20 miles off the coast. Because the gunner cannot see the target, someone else must guide the fire onto the target. Someone that can see the target (or predict its position) must communicate with the firing unit, telling it where to shoot. This is referred to as “the fire support gunnery problem.”

CommunicaIn principle, this is simple. Someone near the actual fighting sees a target. tion Breakdown He communicates with a gunner who can fire indirectly to hit that target. He

asks for fire. When the fire comes, he sees if the shell or bomb has had effect on target. If not, he adjusts the fire: right or left, add or drop, and by the necessary distance. He keeps doing this until he has effect on target. However, as anyone with combat experience or a good knowledge of combat history knows, many things can go wrong in this simple process. Most often the communication link breaks down. The person who sees the target finds he cannot communicate with the firing unit or the agency controlling fires. He calls for fire, but gets no response.

Demand for Immediacy

Also, speed of response is frequently a problem. Perhaps the Marine who sees the target communicates the request, but the guns are either displacing or already firing on a different target. Perhaps his fire request must be approved by a coordinating agency, such as the fire support coordination center (FSCC), which coordinates all forms of fire support, in an effort to “deconflict” the battlefield and avoid incidents of fratricide. Simply stated, in today’s dynamic battlefield, the fire often comes too late to have the desired effect on the enemy. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-3

Chapter 3

Fire Support Limitations, Continued

Adequate Amount of Fire

Sometimes fires are delivered but not in the required amount. The gunners are responding to many requests for fire and cannot amass sufficient fire on a particular target to make a difference. The amount of fire is not sufficient to generate tactical effect and therefore cannot be considered an effective employment of combined arms.

Demand for Accuracy

At other times, the fire comes in time and in sufficient amounts, but it is not accurate or specifically designed for the task at hand. For example, you might call for air support and two F/A-18s, each carrying 6,000 pounds of bombs to respond to your call. They respond quickly and are carrying a large quantity of ordnance. But because most armor the Corps potentially faces requires a “near” direct hit from an “iron” bomb to do anything more than superficial damage, the tanks emerge from the smoke still coming at you. The aircraft did not necessarily miss their targets. Those bombs created an enormous explosion. But the enemy tanks took no direct hits.

Indirect Fire Disadvantages

To some degree, these problems are inherent in war. Nothing makes them go away completely. At times, communications break down. Artillery or air is too busy to support you, FSCCs delay fire missions, or bombs miss their targets. That is one reason why you should use your own weapons as much as possible. Indirect fire is powerful, but it is not always accurate or available!

MCI Course 8205A

3-4

Chapter 3

Links in the Chain

Field Artillery Team

The coordinated efforts of the field artillery team serve as an excellent example of how to solve the “fire support gunnery problem.” This team consists of the forward observer (FO), the fire direction center (FDC), the fire support coordination center (FSCC), and the firing unit, all linked by an adequate communications system. Doctrine requires team members to operate with a sense of urgency and to continually strive to reduce the time required to execute an effective fire mission. Note: FM 6-30, Observed Fire, Headquarters, Department of the Army: Washington D.C., 1991, p. 1-1.

Forward Observer

FO serves as the “eyes” of all indirect fire systems. He detects and locates suitable indirect fire targets within his zone of observation. To attack a target the observer transmits a request for indirect fires and adjusts the fires onto the target as necessary. An observer provides surveillance data pertaining to his fires.

Fire Direction Center

FDC serves as the “brain” of the system. It receives calls for fire from the FSCC or the observer, determines firing data, and converts to fire commands (technical fire direction; see Note). FDC transmits the fire commands to the gun sections designated to fire the mission. Note: FM 6-30, Observed Fire, p. 1-1.

Fire Support Coordination Center

The fire support coordination center (FSCC) monitors all calls for fire from observers from a single location. The mission of the FSCC is to allow the fire support planning and coordination of a unit to respond to and support the scheme of maneuver. Its centralized communication facilitates the coordination of all forms of fire support on the battlefield. Note: MCDP 3-16, pg. G-14 Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-5

Chapter 3

Links in the Chain, Continued

Firing Unit

MCI Course 8205A

The firing unit serves as the brawn of the system. It consists of a firing unit headquarters (FDC in the case of artillery and 81mm mortars) and the firing sections. The normal function of the firing section is to deliver fires as directed by the FDC or unit headquarters.

3-6

Chapter 3

Marine Artillery

Artillery Mission

Known by its nom de guerre, the “king of battle,” field artillery primarily supports the maneuver of infantry and armor units, providing a flexible and powerful complement to those units. The mission of Marine artillery is To furnish close and continuous fire support by neutralizing or destroying targets which threaten the success of the supported unit.

MCWP 3-16

Distinct Capabilities

Marine artillery has several distinct capabilities that when maximized provide the supported commander with responsive and effective firepower. The ability to mass fires simply means that Marine artillery can mass or concentrate the fires of many artillery weapons on a single target without physical displacement. To achieve this, as a general rule, the smallest artillery unit used to attack a target is the battery. All six guns in the battery are fired simultaneously, which provides a degree of massed fires on proposed targets. For suitable and highly lucrative targets, other batteries or even battalions could be added to mass on the target if they were within range of the target.

Mass Fire

The massed fires of several units are far more efficient than engaging targets with a single battery. To maintain the ability to rapidly mass fires, artillery targets must be under the centralized control of the artillery commander. Surprise fires provide you with a very potent element of combat power through the delivery of a large volume of fire with minimal or no prior adjustment. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-7

Chapter 3

Marine Artillery, Continued

High Accuracy

The traditional approach of adjusting fires onto a target has been outstripped by the both the fluid nature of today’s battlefield and the highly accurate nature of modern artillery fire. Today, the Corps has the ability to deliver large volumes of fire without prior adjustment, allowing the enemy to be attacked while they are relatively unprepared. Statistically, this method is at least twice as effective in producing casualties as adjusted fire. However, to fire in this manner the firing unit is required to know exact target location, accurate target description, exact weapon location, complete ammunition and weapon information, thorough meteorological data, and precise computation procedures.

All-Weather Capable

Unlike close air support (CAS), modern field artillery systems can fire accurately in all conditions of weather and visibility. They are limited only by the effect that reduced visibility may have on the acquisition of targets by visual means.

High Angle Fires

The high trajectories of artillery weapons allow them to attack enemy targets in defilade. These high-trajectory artillery weapons can also fire from positions of defilade, concealing them from enemy direct fire and observation and thereby increasing their survivability.

Continuous Support

One of the salient points in the mission statement of Marine artillery is to provide “continuous” support of the maneuver elements. The all weather capability stated above augments this continuous support. Most important, field artillery can displace in a timely manner by echelon to ensure that weapons are in position and ready to fire in support.

MCI Course 8205A

3-8

Chapter 3

Marine Artillery, Continued

Limitations

Understanding a system’s limitations as well as its capabilities is critical to correct employment of that system. Although field artillery is a powerful tool, it does have limitations.

Displacement

When on the move, field artillery is less responsive to requests for fire. Ideally, artillery is most responsive when it is permanently emplaced. However, this is a highly unlikely scenario on the modern battlefield. To accomplish its mission of furnishing close and continuous fire support, “the king” must move; and as in chess, moving the king takes time.

Close Combat

Artillery support is significantly reduced when artillery unit personnel have to engage in close combat to defend themselves and their weapons against ground attack. In this situation, artillery personnel will be less responsive to your call.

Air Attack

The necessity for artillery to fire from relatively fixed positions without overhead cover makes artillery extremely vulnerable to air attacks. Artillery units have no organic air defense weapons other than automatic weapons.

Ammunition Resupply

Resupplying artillery ammunition is a major logistics consideration. The basic allowance of artillery ammunition for an artillery battalion weighs approximately 99 tons and could easily be expended in a single preparation fire of 20 minutes (FMFM 6-9, p. A-1).

Firing Signature

Artillery firing units are extremely attractive targets, and their distinctly audible, visible, and electromagnetic signatures make them highly vulnerable to enemy detection and attack. Therefore, measures to counter this problem may degrade the firing unit’s ability to respond.

MCI Course 8205A

3-9

Chapter 3

Mortars

Integrating Fires

Affectionately referred to as the commander’s “hip-pocket artillery,” infantry mortars provide the most responsive form of indirect fire available for maneuvering companies and battalions. Surprisingly versatile, infantry mortars fire smoke missions, mark targets, and provide battlefield illumination. However, their most important and traditional role is firing in support of the maneuver units to which they belong. Mortar fires inhibit enemy fire and movement, allowing you to maneuver your unit to a position of tactical advantage. Effectively integrating these fires is key to the successful application of combined arms at the company and battalion level.

Advantages of Mortar

As discussed previously, each fire support agency has inherent advantages and disadvantages. The infantry mortar is no different. Mortars have similar advantages to those of artillery and naval surface fire support. However, being an organic asset, they have some specific advantages no other agency can claim. Because they are organic to both the battalion and company, infantry mortars travel relatively near the units they support and can displace much faster than their “big brother” artillery. Therefore, it is easier to correct communication problems, as well as redirect the firing priorities of the mortars. These advantages provide a highly responsive indirect fire asset, capable of delivering a large volume of fire either into or out of defilade.

Mortar Limitations

MCI Course 8205A

The “light” nature of the mortar is also its primary failing. These weapons have a relative short range, which is easily outrun in today’s fluid battlefield. Their demand and high rate of fire fuel their consumption of large amounts of ammunition; possibly exceeding the organic means of resupply. Moreover, they do not have the diverse types of ammunition found with other systems. Finally, their high-angle fire makes mortars susceptible to counter battery fire.

3-10

Chapter 3

Close Air Support Origins

The Marine Corps pioneered the concept of close air support (CAS) in the closing weeks of World War I. Improved and refined, the theory met its acid test on the ground and in the skies above Okinawa, where CAS played its most critical role of World War II. Later, CAS was used extensively during the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and most recently in the Persian Gulf. CAS consists of close action by attack helicopters (rotary wing) or fixed-wing aircraft against enemy targets to support tactical operations ground forces are conducting. The sophisticated electronics equipment developed during the Vietnam War allowed the Marine Corps to employ CAS during all weather conditions, including under the cover of darkness, significantly increasing the ability of Marine aviation to support you, the “ground-pounder!”

Advantages

Aside from obvious speed, shock, and violence of action, CAS has several capabilities and advantages that set it apart from other supporting arms. CAS allows you to hit targets that other supporting arms cannot hit because of range or defilade position. Fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft can deliver munitions of great destructive power, destroying heavily fortified positions and point targets. And probably most important, CAS builds significant morale in friendly forces. Conversely, the attack of an aircraft as part of a combined arms effort destroys the enemy’s will to fight.

Loiter Time

The amount of fuel on board determines the time an aircraft can “stay-onstation.” The type and quantity of ordnance carried determines the fuel consumption rate which, in turn, determines the aircraft’s ability to “hang around” waiting for a mission. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-11

Chapter 3

Close Air Support, Continued Communications

Radio communications are very important to CAS, especially during immediate strikes. Coordinating strikes with airspace coordination measures and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) requires positive control and reliable radio communications. Because of the speed at which missions are executed and the ability of enemy jamming systems, lengthy conversations between you and the attacking aircraft are not possible. The proliferation of such jamming technology has led the Marine Corps to develop and employ jam-resistant, burst-transmission radios and automated target hand-over systems.

Target Identification

Identifying and locating the target is a “show-stopper” for CAS. Without positive identification, the attacking aircraft cannot effectively engage the target. A target description is a standard element of the nine-line brief and should always attempt to paint a “mental” picture of what the target will look like for the pilot. Together with the “marking” of the target, this description should bring positive results.

Weather

Bad weather in the target area makes visual location of the target difficult and limits the types of attacks that can be made. With low ceiling and poor visibility, the effectiveness of close visual support decreases. As weather conditions improve, your ability to employ CAS improves. However, improving weather conditions also help the enemy defend the target.

MCI Course 8205A

3-12

Chapter 3

Close Air Support, continued

Preplanned

Preplanned missions can be either scheduled or on-call. And as one might imagine, these missions are to some degree anticipated. Preplanned scheduled missions permit detailed planning and coordination. They are executed at a specific time-on-target (TOT) and place (see Note). After launch of the aircraft, the TOT can be “slid” slightly to accommodate changes; however, for the most part they are executed as planned. These missions require a minimum of communication. Note: FMFM 5-70 MAGTF Aviation Planning (being revised to MCWP 511.1), Headquarters, Marine Corps: Washington D.C., 1995, p.10-2.

Preplanned OnCall

Preplanned on-call missions consist of aircraft preloaded with specific ordnance for a specific type of target within an assigned area of the battlefield (FMFM 5-70, p. 10-2). These aircraft can be either staged on the ground—called “strip alert”—or they can be airborne in the “CAS stack.” These missions are launched or directed at your request. While some level of detailed planning has taken place, final coordination is usually not completed until immediately before the aircraft attacks, in the form of a CAS target briefing form or nine-line brief.

Immediate

Immediate CAS consists of strikes against “pop-up” targets not previously identified (FMFM 5-70, p. 10-2). These missions do not permit detailed planning or coordination and are launched at your request. The quick response of the aircraft in these missions is the critical requirement. Aircraft from other missions, such as preplanned on-call, may be diverted to immediate missions, depending on the urgency. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-13

Chapter 3

Close Air Support, Continued

Control

Air control of CAS is at best a complicated task. Controlling preplanned CAS is less complex. In missions of this type, the nine-line brief is prebriefed or reviewed. Immediate CAS is another story. Coordination is literally done “on the fly,” with the nine-line brief delivered electronically to the attacking aircraft immediately before its attack. This is known as the “frantic 15 seconds.” This is the most difficult time for the ground controller of CAS. During the actual attack, you are trying to acquire the mark, maintain sight of the target, acquire the aircraft, and hopefully make it all work. It is unrealistic to expect a perfect operation every time. A lot of experience is required to “smooth” this process. As the controller on the ground, you normally see only a small fraction of the land area visible to the pilot. Your field of view may be severely restricted by vegetation, weather, enemy fires, and terrain features.

CAS Target Designation

The critical requirements for successful employment for CAS are adequate marking of the target, identification of friendly positions, and identification of surface-to-air threats. Of these three, the most difficult to accomplish is the adequate/timely marking of the target. Therefore you must be aware of the resources at your command to achieve this. At the battalion and company level, the most responsive method for marking CAS targets is the infantry mortar. However, other means such as artillery or laser designator, if available, provide a more visible mark. In unique situations, less conventional methods may be employed, such as tracer rounds, rockets, or grenades. Remember, however you mark the target, the pilot(s) must be able to distinguish between friend and foe from the air.

Nine-Line Brief

The CAS target briefing form, also known as the nine-line brief, is designed to allow the forward air coordinator to give the aircrew all the essential information for executing a CAS mission against a high-threat target. Against a lesser threat, this form provides more detailed control. The nine-brief is reviewed in detail in MCI 8203, Warfighting Tactics. See that course for complete information on the nine-line brief.

MCI Course 8205A

3-14

Chapter 3

Close Air Support, continued

Rotary Wing

Rotary wing aircraft perform many tasks to support ground elements. Here we will focus on their role in CAS. The principal rotary wing platform for CAS in the Marine Corps is the AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter. It has a range of 256 miles and can travel at 150 knots. It is best suited for attacking point targets, such as tanks, personnel carriers, and bunkers (FMFM 5-70, p. 10-2). Four of these aircraft can be found in the aviation combat element (ACE) with each MEU(SOC). The AH-1 can operate at night and in virtually any condition of visibility. The AH-1W can carry a diverse mix of weapons as follows: 20mm cannon GPU-2/A gun pod 2.75-inch rockets 5.00-inch rockets TOW antitank missiles

Fixed Wing

Hellfire missiles AIM-9 Sidewinder missile AGM-122 Sidearm missile CBU-55 fuel air explosive LUU-2 parachute flares

Marine Corps fixed wing aviation has a variety of weapons systems and munitions capable of supporting maneuver elements, including cluster bomb units (ROCKEYE and APAM), laser-designated ordnance (Maverick and Hellfire), general purpose bombs (MK 80 series), and airdelivered scatterable mines (GATOR). The primary fixed wing platforms for delivering such weapons in the Marine Corps are the AV8B Harrier and the F/A-18 Hornet. The AV8-B is a single-seat, transonic, vectored-thrust, light attack aircraft employed by Marine attack squadrons. The aircraft has a GAU-12 25mm gun system and an external ordnance payload of 9,200 pounds. Its forwardlooking infrared (FLIR) system and night vision goggles (NVG)-compatible cockpit lighting allows the AV8-B to attack at night and under weather. Six AV8-Bs deploy as an element of the ACE with each LHD/LHA-configured MEU(SOC). Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-15

Chapter 3

Close Air Support, Continued

Fixed Wing, continued

MCI Course 8205A

The F/A-18 is a single-seat, twin-engine strike fighter. It has an internal 20mm M-61 gun and can carry over 17,000 pounds of ordnance. The F/A18D is the two-seat variant of the F/A-18, which Marine fighter attack squadrons–all weather (VMFA–AW) use. A FLIR system and NVGcompatible cockpit lighting allow this aircraft to perform ground attacks at night under the weather. This aircraft has replaced the venerable A-6 Intruder as the “all-weather” attack aircraft for the Marine Corps.

3-16

Chapter 3

Naval Surface Fire Support

NSFS and Amphibious Operations

All amphibious operations rely on fire support from the sea. Historically, naval surface fire support (NSFS) has been the single most important supporting agency for allowing Marines to get off the beach. In the initial phases of such an operation, NSFS may be the only supporting agency available. The mission of NSFS for the amphibious assault is to provide responsive fires destroying or neutralizing defenses that oppose the approach of ships, aircraft, the landing force (LF), and the post-landing advance of the LF. As with all other agencies discussed in this chapter, NSFS has several distinct capabilities that set them apart from other supporting arms. When maximized, these capabilities provide responsive and effective firepower. Note: FMFM 2-7 Fire Support in Marine Air Ground Task Force Operations (being revises to MCDP 5-11.1), Headquarters, Marine Corps: Washington D.C., 1991, p. 2-11.

Rate of Fire

The active fleet is armed with NSFS ships equipped with 5”/54 MK42 and 45, and 5”/38 guns. The 5”/54 MK45 naval gun is found on all newer classes of NSFS ships. It fires a 70-lb. projectile at a range of 23,000 meters and can fire at a rate of 35 rounds per minute. Naval guns in use today have the ability to deliver an extremely high rate of fire. This rate of fire permits the delivery of a large volume of explosives against a target in a short period of time. This provides a greater effect on target than the same number of rounds fired over a longer period of time.

High Velocity/Flat Trajectory

The high velocity and flat trajectory of naval guns make naval surface fire support particularly suitable for penetrating hardened targets, especially those presenting a vertical face to the gun target line. These ballistic characteristics, with the automated fire control system for calculation of firing data, increase the accuracy and effectiveness of the round. However, these characteristics also make it extremely difficult to deliver fire against targets in defilade. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-17

Chapter 3

Naval Surface Fire Support, Continued

Dispersion Pattern

Mobility

The dispersion of rounds from naval guns is a narrow elliptical pattern. The range dispersion (long/short) along the gun target line (GTL) is about four times the deflection (left/right) dispersion (FMFM 2-7, p. 2-12). This range dispersion allows for delivering close fires, provided the GTL is parallel to friendly positions. It also allows for excellent coverage of targets with a long axis, such as roads and runways.

NSFS ships are capable of considerable mobility along a coastline within the limits imposed by hydrography and hostile action. In operations on peninsulas, islands, and inland areas, where ground movement is often restricted, NSFS can reach targets beyond that of other indirect fire assets. Mobility allows the firing ship to be positioned for optimum support of the maneuvering unit. Remember, the most favorable position causes the GTL to fall parallel to the forward line of troops (FLOT). Each NSFS ship operates from a defined area called a fire support area (FSA). At times these ships take up specific positions within the FSA. These positions are known as fire support stations. The fire support station is generally used when a specific GTL is required or when maneuvering room is restricted.

Vulnerability and Continuity

Enemy defenses, such as attacks by enemy aircraft, surface-delivered fires, and minefields limit the availability of NSFS to the LF. Gunfire ships may be withdrawn from supporting the LF to resume their primary mission of anti-air warfare (AAW) or antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in defense of the amphibious task force (ATF).

Weather

Adverse weather may affect the delivery of naval gunfire. Hydrographic conditions for the ship and visibility conditions at the target restrict the ship’s ability to place accurate fires onto a target.

Ammunition Resupply

The quantity of ammunition available on board an individual platform depends on the ship’s magazine capacity and the quantity required for selfdefense. Ships can be rotated for replenishment; however, during this resupply, they cannot provide support. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-18

Chapter 3

Naval Surface Fire Support, Continued

Conclusion

The process of calling for and adjusting indirect fire may intimidate Marines. Many are afraid of what seems to be a very complicated, highly technical process for getting fire support. They fear they do not know how to do it. But as we have seen, indirect fire is simple. It requires a gunner on one end and an observer on the other, someone who can see the target and call for and adjust the fire. They have to communicate, but nothing says the procedure must be complex. As a fire team, squad, or platoon leader, you can talk a gunner or a pilot through hitting the target. You can tell him where it is and guide him onto it. If he is a “gung ho” Marine or if he believes in working together, he will help you give him the information he needs. He will “go the extra mile” to provide the support that gets you the tactical effect that you want.

MCI Course 8205A

3-19

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Exercise

Direction

Complete the following items. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this chapter. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.

Item 1

Which of the following does this statement best fit, “Transmits the fire commands to the section designated to fire the mission”? a. b. c. d.

Item 2

“To furnish close and continuous fire support by neutralizing or destroying targets which threaten the success of the supported unit”’ is the mission of which of the following? a. b. c. d.

Item 3

Forward observer Fire direction center Fire support coordination center Firing unit

Fixed wing aircraft Rotary wing aircraft Artillery Mortars

Which is a limitation of artillery? a. b. c. d.

Close combat All weather capability High angle of fire Continuous support Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-20

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Exercise, Continued

Item 4

Which weapon system provides the most responsive indirect fire available to the company and battalion? a. b. c. d.

Item 5

Aircraft Naval gunfire Artillery Mortars

What are the two types of missions for close air support? a. b. c. d.

Scheduled and on-call Preplanned and immediate Direct and indirect Immediate and on-call Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205A

3-21

Chapter 3

Chapter 3 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below lists the answers to the chapter examination items. If you have questions about these items, refer to the reference page. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5

MCI Course 8205A

Answer b c a d b

3-22

Reference 3-7 3-8 3-10 3-11 3-15

Chapter 3

APPENDIX C Readings

Articles

• Cronin, William R. USMC (Maj), “The Future of Marine Close Air Support,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1992. • Sullivan, Stephen M. USMC (Capt), “The Missing Link: Company Fire Support Coordinator,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994. • Medeiros, Scott J. USMC (Capt), “Anyone Can Call In Air,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 1995. Note: All articles reproduced courtesy of Marine Corps Gazette.

MCI Course 8205A

C-1

Chapter 3 Appendix C

(This page intentionally left blank.)

MCI Course 8205A

C-2

Chapter 3 Appendix C

The Future of Marine Close Air Support by Maj William R. Cronin The Marine Corps needs to rethink its approach to close air support. It can ill afford to ignore the capabilities of its attack helicopters or limit the scope of its fixed-wing aircraft. During the past few years, numerous articles in the Gazette and other professional journals have explored the best methods for conducting close air support (CAS) for infantry units in contact with the enemy. The focus of these articles has been whether to continue using the current generation of fixed-wing strike fighters, such as the F/A-18 and AV-8B, or to develop a slower and cheaper “mud fighter” such as the A-10 for the conduct of CAS. I believe strongly that the future of CAS belongs to neither of these alternatives but rather to the attack helicopter. Although this approach will require a radical change in the philosophy and conduct of fixed-wing support of ground troops, it will improve the overall effectiveness of the Marine air ground task force (MAGTF). The long and illustrious history of CAS by Marine aviation has served as a shining example of our commitment to provide the finest support possible for our ground forces. This commitment to effective and responsive CAS has in fact been one of the features that set the Marine Corps apart from our sister Services and forged the air ground team so vital to the MAGTF concept. It is in this spirit that I propose this rethinking of our approach to CAS. The use of attack helicopters in the CAS role is not without precedent. The Israeli Air Force has used their AH-1’s with great success to support their ground forces, most notably during the Peace for Galilee Campaign in 1982. The Iranian and Iraqi Air Forces employed their attack helicopters with varying degrees of success against each other after their fixed-wing forces proved equally adept at killing friendlies as they did killing the enemy while attempting to conduct CAS during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Finally, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army employed attack helicopters with smashing success against Iraqi forces during Operation “DESERT STORM.” MCI Course 8205A

Before discussing the merits of the attack helicopter in the CAS role, an examination of the practical and doctrinal considerations of fixed-wing CAS is in order. As the Iranian and Iraqi Air Forces discovered and as any fixed-wing aviator will tell you, dropping bombs and shooting rockets at targets in close proximity to friendly forces is risky business. By their very nature, the acquisition of CAS targets from the cockpit of a high performance strike fighter is difficult under the best of conditions. Distinguishing friend from foe can delay or preclude the delivery of ordnance and diminish the effectiveness of CAS by fixed-wing aircraft. The use of fire support coordination measures, such as a fire support coordination line, can provide some level of safety to friendly forces but tends to take the close out of close air support. Like all fire support assets, fixedwing aircraft have capabilities that must be considered prior to using them in the support of ground forces. Two of the biggest assets of fixed-wing aircraft are speed and ordnance capacity. The ability to range out ahead of friendly forces and disrupt the enemy prior to him coming in contact with friendly forces contributes greatly to the success of the campaign. Unfortunately, by doing this, fixed-wing aircraft are removed from the watching eyes and ears of the forces they are committed to support. Forcing fixed-wing aircraft to operate only where they can be seen and heard not only limits the use of other more appropriate fire support assets for close-in fire support but also limits the use of fixed-wing assets in more effective roles forward of the near battle. One argument against removing CAS as the primary job of Marine fixed-wing aircraft is that it will spell the end of Marine fixed-wing aviation and force Marine ground commanders to rely on the Navy for fixed-wing support much

C-3

like the Army relies on the Air Force for their fixed-wing support. Another argument stems from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omnibus Agreement of 1986, which states in part that all excess sorties (i.e., perhaps all non-CAS sorties) must be turned over to the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) for his use. Some believe that Marine fixed-wing aviation, if not committed to CAS, will be used for non-Marine related missions. Although neither of these arguments is without some logic, both have already proven false. The first argument assumes that the Navy possesses the assets and the ability to provide the support needed by Marine ground units. Unfortunately, a majority of Navy fixed-wing aviation is tied up defending the aircraft carriers that would be in support of any operation where Marine ground foes might be committed. Deck space aboard the aircraft carriers presently available is simply too limited to embark the numbers of aircraft required to provide support for Marine ground forces. The second argument assumes that the JFACC would willfully misuse Marine fixedwing assets under his control. The air war during Operation DESERT STORM was conducted with a great deal of concern for fairness and evenhanded assignment of the fixed-wing assets of all coalition forces, including those of the Marine Corps. Once battlefield preparation began, Marine fixed-wing aviation was free to conduct Marine tasks.

Chapter 3 Appendix C

W.R. Cronin, Close Air Support, continued Although the politics present during inter-Service rivalries are always a concern, one must realize that the Marine Corps does not possess a monopoly on leadership and that the JFACC must be trusted to exercise sound judgment in the use of his assigned assets. Since neither of these arguments can be used as a rationale to preclude using fixed-wing aircraft in roles other than CAS, the question now remains whether attack helicopters can be used in this role. As was mentioned earlier in this essay, the Israeli Air Force relies heavily on its attack helicopters for close-in fire support of its ground forces. This reliance is so complete that they rarely use their fixed-wing assets for CAS, preferring to use them for interdiction of enemy forces away from the near battle and for strategic strikes on political and logistical targets. When questioned on their employment tactics, the typical Israeli officer will often express his disbelief that the Marine Corps continues to ignore the capabilities of the attack helicopter for fulfilling the needs for rapid and effective close-in fire support while limiting the scope of employment of our fixed-wing assets. The capabilities required of an effective CAS platform can generally be broken down into two categories. The first is responsiveness. The second is firepower. The ability of the attack helicopter to follow ground forces to the battle area and to remain in close proximity to the battle area negates its inferior speed when compared to fixedwing assets. Fueling and rearming points (FARPS) require little more than a fuel bladder and extra ordnance. In comparison to the logistical burden required for even the AV-8B, the requirements for attack helicopters are small indeed. The extremely short transit time from a FARP to an attack position and the ability of attack helicopters to remain on station either in a low hover or at ground idle provides the ground commander with the type of responsiveness needed in the CAS role. Smart weapons, such as the wire-guided TOW and the laserguided Hellfire, have given the attack helicopter a quantum leap in firepower MCI Course 8205A

and the ability to successfully engage CAS targets while retaining an acceptable level of survivability. The incorporation of night imaging devices into our attack helicopters gives them the ability to be employed round-theclock to maintain pressure on the enemy. The successes enjoyed not only by Marine AH-1 Cobras during the drive forward to Kuwait City but also by Army AH-64 Apaches against the Republican Guard demonstrate the capabilities of attack helicopters. Where is the Marine Corps in the process of realigning its aviation assets based on the lessons learned by the Israeli Air Force during their recent combat experience? After the successes of Operation “DESERT STORM” which saw fixed-wing assets used primarily for battlefield preparation forward of friendly forces and attack helicopters used primarily for close-in fire support of friendly forces, a move toward the use of these assets in these roles might have been expected. Unfortunately, recent combined arms exercises (CAX’s) at Twenty-nine Palms have proved this assumption to be incorrect. Just. as it had been prior to the war, fixed-wing aircraft use during the CAX is still focused on CAS while attack helicopters are allowed to practice close-in fire support only during lulls in fixed-wing CAS attacks. Marine aviation and the Marine Corps in general must not ignore the capabilities of its attack helicopters, nor can it afford to limit the scope of its fixed-wing aircraft for fear of losing control of them to other Services. We must continue to improve our Warfighting capabilities during the years of peace we may be about to enjoy because the next war can always be a little tougher than the last one. >Maj Cronin, a naval flight officer with VMFA(AW)-121, was also the winner of last years “DESERT STORM” Essay Contest for field grade officers.

C-4

Chapter 3 Appendix C

The Missing Link: Company Fire Support Coordinator by Capt Stephen M. Sullivan It's time for the Marine Corps to acknowledge that combat efficiency improves when company commanders have some help with fire support coordination. As the reinforced company rolls towards its final coordination line, the company commander observes his final preparation fires. He notices that heavy automatic weapons fire is coming from a bunker several hundred meters west of his objective. As he decides to orchestrate his fire support assets, he becomes immersed in instructing his forward air controller on how he wants to use the close air support on his “pop up” target on grid 903678 at 0205, coordinating the artillery forward observer to mark the target with illumination on the deck on grid 903678 at 0204: 30 and instructing the naval gunfire forward observer that he needs to call for additional prep fires on the objective at 903678 from 0204 to 0209. Additionally, he tells the 81 mm mortars forward observer to be prepared to call in support to suppress potential enemy air defenses. After several minutes of supervising the intricacies of initial points, run-in headings, and timing, he gives the bunker target and the objective another look. A knot forms in his stomach as he sees one of his assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) rolling dangerously close to the intended bunker target and realizes that fratricide is a very real possibility. The unfolding of battlefield events and the momentum of his maneuver elements have gotten away from the company commander as he was preoccupied with synchronizing his fire support. Several years after the Marine Corps adopted maneuver warfare as its doctrine, there remains a problem at the company level worthy of our professional attention. Maneuver warfare hinges on our ability to employ combined arms rapidly and effectively. Moreover, our doctrine allows for the lowest element leaders to make the appropriate battle decisions in order to achieve greater tempo. However, our present policy towards fire support coordination at the lowest level is flawed. Present Marine Corps policy in Operational Handbook (OH) 6-2A states: MCI Course 8205A

Assisted by his artillery forward observer, mortar forward observer, forward air controller, and naval gunfire spotter, a company commander can perform the fire support planning and coordination necessary at the company level.

Although necessity can prove this true, it is at best inefficient. The growing demands for integrating fire support with maneuver warfare threaten to present the company commander with a workload that diverts his focus of energies away from driving tempo and could make him a victim of tactical events rather than the initiator. A designated fire support coordinator (FSC) at the company level would correct a vital flaw in our present policy. A company FSC is needed to assist the company commander in his conduct of offensive operations, defensive operations, and fire support training requirements. Some may argue that because it is the company commander's responsibility to integrate fire support assets into his fight, a company FSC is unnecessary. Delegating authority does not mean that responsibility is abdicated. Moreover, delegating authority does not connote that authority is lost. Marine Corps doctrine in Fleet Marine Force Manual 2-7 (FMFM 2-7) states that the commander is “responsible for all that happens or fails to happen within his command. This is especially true regarding the planning and coordination of fire support.” Marine Corps doctrine also provides commanders at every echelon above company with a FSC who is delegated the necessary authority to assist the commander in fire support planning and coordination. His duties as described in OH 6-2A are “to integrate fire support effectively into battle plans to optimize combat power.” Individuals opposed to designating a company FSC should understand that this assignment would not change the company commander’s responsibility or authority. The company commander would still have to train his FSC to

C-5

ensure a high degree of implicit communication and a clear understanding of commander’s intent in order to integrate him as a valuable asset. The Marine Corps’ compliance with maneuver warfare principles combined with continuously growing technology has resulted in increasing demands for the company commander regarding fire support. Maj Brian D. Cadin, of the Marine Corps’ Tactical Exercise Evaluation Control Group in 1992, explained why it has become necessary to provide a company FSC in these terms: The company FSC was simply not necessary historically because the tempo of operations did not detract from the company commander's ability to integrate his supporting arms, however, the Marine Corps' increased use of battlefield mobility combined with the growing variety of fire support assets continues to make his job more demanding than ever.

The first area in which a company FSC would provide the commander with badly needed assistance is offensive operations. Although a company FSC should be collocated with the company commander whenever possible, maneuver warfare doctrine in FMFM 1 states that: “A commander should command from well forward . . . this allows him to see and sense firsthand the ebb and flow of combat.” Additionally, it recognizes the advantages of recon pull through enemy gaps to maintain momentum and initiative. However, the commander traveling well forward causes substantial problems: Accompanied by the fire support group, the commander creates an obvious signature problem. Moving for survivability in a forward area, puts fire support personnel at a distinct disadvantage in seeing the

Chapter 3 Appendix C

S.M. Sullivan, Fire Support, continued battlefield and performing their functions effectively. A current example in handling this problem is illustrated in light armored reconnaissance’s use of the company executive officer’s vehicle as the company fire support coordination asset rather than the company commander’s vehicle. Another example is the technique of placing the FSC in the support position of a raid. This puts the FSC in the most advantageous position to control fire support while the company commander remains with the assault element of a raid in order to oversee the main effort. Maneuver warfare has generated a greater demand for rapid planning in the offense. Battalion commanders continue to give an increasing number of fragmentary orders to their company commanders. The company FSC could attend operation order briefings with his company commander and use the occasion to accomplish essential coordination. The Army’s fire support team concept makes use of this technique. While the battalion commander gives guidance to his company commanders, the battalion FSC briefs the company FSCs on the battalion’s fire support plan. Defensive operations is the second area where the assignment of .a company FSC would provide needed assistance to the company commander. Maneuver warfare advocates that we remain on the offense whenever possible. Marines normally assume a defensive posture in order to rearm, resupply, and prepare for subsequent offensive operations. Company commanders must be prepared to submit their defensive plan to the battalion and receive the next offensive order shortly after assuming the defense. In the short span of time prior to reporting to the battalion, myriad tasks must be accomplished. One possible solution is to have the weapons platoon commander act as a company FSC and develop supporting arms targets, supporting arms final protective fires, and preplanned targets for the company’s local security patrols. Each plan is prepared on its appropriate overlay for approval by the company commander and submission MCI Course 8205A

to the battalion FSC. Meanwhile, the company commander is able to focus on supervising priorities of work, walking the lines, compositing fire plan sketches, and issuing security patrol warning orders. Experience has shown that the delegation of fire support planning and targeting to the weapons platoon commander, acting as a company FSC, can be an extremely valuable asset to a company commander in defensive operations. The final area in which the designation of a company FSC would provide the company commander much needed assistance is fire support training. Maneuver warfare doctrine encourages using better technology whenever possible to increase combat effectiveness. Today’s company commander possesses more assets and potential to employ combined arms in maneuver warfare than ever before. In order to stay abreast of fire support’s maximum potential and our continuously developing procedures, an individual must be fully committed to this vital role. Assigning a company FSC would give the battalion FSC a better asset for training companies in standing operating procedures and new techniques. His assignment would produce a direct company point of contact focused on fire support concerns. The weapons platoon commander is a logical choice for this job because each separate weapons system section in weapons platoon is assigned a dedicated “section leader” by the table of organization. Providing the company commander with an FSC would improve the unit’s proficiency and ability to remain current in fire support techniques. Our stunning success in DESERT STORM and the Marine Corps’ use of maneuver warfare and combined arms will continue. Maneuver warfare doctrine calls on us to exploit all advantages possible in order to increase our tempo of operations and maintain the initiative. Some may question how a company commander could delegate a tremendously important duty like fire support coordination. It’s simple. He can’t afford not to. It’s time that the Marine Corps acknowledges that we

C-6

could improve our combat efficiency by providing a company FSC. USMC

Chapter 3 Appendix C

Anyone Can Call In Air by Capt Scott J. Medeiros The current requirement that forward air controllers be aviators unnecessarily limits the number of Marines available to direct close air support. The efficient use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire assets is essential for success on the battlefield. Artillery liaison teams, shore fire control parties, and tactical air control parties (TACPs) provide expertise in controlling supporting arms, but the procedures are not difficult and can be executed by any trained Marine. Standardized procedural methods have been developed to efficiently get rounds or bombs on target. You do not have to possess an artillery military occupational specialty (MOS) or be a naval officer to control artillery or naval guns, but you must be an aviator to call in air. Why? Are the terminal control procedures for aircraft so difficult that only an aviator can understand and execute them? Of course not; anyone can call in air once properly trained. The answer to the aviator requirement lies in the MOS manual. Terminal control of aircraft providing close air support (CAS) to ground units is provided by a forward air controller (FAC). FACs are trained at a formal school and are assigned an additional MOS of 7207. However, only aviators can be designated 7207s. The MOS Manual states: “This MOS is to be assigned as an additional MOS only to naval aviators and naval flight officers (NFOs) upon completion of the Amphibious Tactical Air Control Party Course at NAB, Coronado or NAB, Little Creek.” This requirement is unnecessary. A FAC can coordinate and run artillery, yet he does not have an artillery MOS. He can coordinate and run naval gunfire, yet he is not a Navy officer and doesn't have a naval gunfire MOS. Why do Marines have to be aviators to coordinate and run air? Are aviator FACs essential? I don't think so. Each year 24 Marine Corps aviators are assigned to serve with infantry MCI Course 8205A

battalions. Eight serve as battalion air officers (AOs) and the remaining 16 as FACs. Each battalion gets two FACs and one AO. It is common knowledge however, that two FACs are insufficient to effectively fight the battalion. Should a course of action require three or more maneuver elements, there are not enough FACs to augment each element. If a FAC becomes a casualty, the air control capability of the battalion’s maneuver elements will be cut in half: The easy solution to this problem is to increase the number of FACs in the battalion. A quota of 146 students is available each year for the TACP course. Removing the aviator prerequisite would allow more Marines to attend the TACP course, thus allowing company commanders, platoon commanders, and squad leaders to become qualified FACs. The battalion would then have enough organic FACs and increase its operational capability. Combat service support (CSS) elements are not normally assigned FACs. If they need air support to protect vital rear areas, who is qualified to control it? Once again, removing the aviator prerequisite would be beneficial by allowing CSS Marines to qualify as FACs. Will removing the aviators only requirement from the FAC billets reduce the battalion's organic airexpertise? Some argue that having FACs who are pilots and NFOs ensures air ground integration and education. I disagree; the experience level of the aviators serving in a majority of FAC billets is "basic" at best. One-third of those currently filling billets are relatively "green" first lieutenants with only one overseas deployment. These officers have not had the opportunity to fully understand their aircraft’s capabilities, let alone all those of the Marine air ground task force. It is also safe to say that the captains filling the

C-7

remaining two-thirds of the FAC billets do not have a thorough understanding of the six functions of Marine air, unless they are weapons and tactics instructors (WTIs). It is common knowledge in the aviation community that unless a pilot volunteers to be a FAC, the majority of billets are filled by inexperienced aviators or those who the commander, for one reason or another, would rather not have in the cockpit. The knowledge base the FACs bring to the battalion is limited. Keeping the battalion commander abreast of aviation employment is the AO's responsibility. The AO serves as the air "guru" for the battalion and ensures air ground integration and education. Having nonaviator FACs would not seriously degrade the battalion's air knowledge or the effectiveness of the air-ground team. Furthermore, the skills required to be a FAC do not require an aviation background. The procedural methods necessary to control air are taught at the TACP course and can be mastered by a sharp Marine of any grade or MOS. The FAC's responsibilities center around the procedural control of CAS aircraft; little knowledge of the employment of air assets is necessary. Fixed-wing or helicopter transport pilots receive no formal instruction on attack aircraft profiles or procedures during their aviation training; yet can become qualified FACs. The requisite FAC knowledge is garnered from the formal course of instruction at the TACP course. The required skills are merely procedural methods of

Chapter 3 Appendix C

S.J. Medeiros, Call In Air, continued designating a target and employing air for its destruction. Marine air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) teams routinely use enlisted Marines to perform this function. Further, since the primary method of marking targets is either mortars or artillery, there is no special advantage in employing an aviator as a FAC. A non-aviator can be taught the required knowledge to become an effective and efficient FAC. Removing the requirement for an aviation MOS would also benefit the squadrons. Today, first tour pilots and NFOs tend to be removed from the tactical squadrons at a point that is detrimental to their maturation and learning process. This hurts the readiness of their squadrons. On average, 4 to 6 FAC quotas are received by each squadron during the 18 month lapse between overseas deployments. Combined with officers leaving the squadron on permanent change of station orders, one-fifth of the squadron is lost each year. This high personnel turnover reduces the squadron's cohesion and readiness. To retain as high a readiness as possible, most squadron commanders will not assign their experienced and talented pilots to be FACs. Aviators should not be prevented from becoming ground FACs, but easing the aviator requirement would allow the tactical squadrons to build and maintain unit cohesiveness and readiness. Unit cohesion and readiness at the battalion is also hampered by the aviator requirement. FACs currently serve in a battalion for 1 year (up to 18 months if assigned to ANGLICO). If the FAC arrives when the unit returns from an overseas deployment, another will replace him prior to the battalion's next deployment. Valuable training and cohesion will be lost. The only formal ground operations training an aviator receives, if he has not attended Amphibious Warfare School, is at The Basic School. During his ground tour with the battalion he will need to be educated in ground tactics. Without a solid knowledge of how the battalion MCI Course 8205A

fights, a FAC cannot control CAS assets effectively enough to support it. The time spent getting the FAC "up to speed" on ground tactics and the unit cohesiveness built over the year will be lost when the FAC leaves. The battalion will then be faced with having to recoup the loss by educating a new FAC in the 6 months prior to its next deployment. Having FACs who are ground officers will reduce, if not eliminate, this problem. The aviator prerequisite for FAC certification is unnecessary and in my opinion unsupported. As a qualified forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)) and WTI, I have trained numerous pilots to be FAC(A)s and understand the skills necessary to be successful. The skills required to be a ground forward air controller do not require an aviation MOS. The old way of producing FACs is no longer the right way. A change should be made to match the needs of the Corps. Experienced aviators must continue to be assigned as AOs, but the aviation MOS prerequisite for FACs should be removed. The quotas are available and the formal course of instruction is already in place to train ground MOS Marines as FACs. I believe a bold move is necessary-abolish the naval aviator/NFO requirement. But to satisfy the skeptics, I recommend that the aviation MOS requirement be removed on a "trial basis." If the reports from the commanders in the Fleet Marine Force are favorable, then revise the MOS manual to benefit the tactical squadrons, the infantry battalions, and the Marine Corps. >Capt Medeiros is a UH-1N WTI and designated FAC(A), with 6 years fleet experience in light/attach helicopter squadrons. He is a 1994 graduate of lice B Warfare School.

C-8

Chapter 3 Appendix C

CHAPTER 4 ANTI-ARMOR ASSETS Overview

Estimated Study Time

15 minutes

Scope

This chapter provides a brief description of the anti-armor weapons typically found in an infantry organization. These weapon systems are generally employed using one or more of the combined arms methods discussed earlier. Understanding the capabilities of such weapon systems will enable you to better utilize such assets in the accomplishment of your mission.

Learning Objective

Upon completing this chapter, you should be able to

In This Chapter

•

Identify the various types of anti-armor weapons in the Marine Corps.

•

Identify the characteristics of anti-armor weapons.

This chapter contains the following topics. Topic Overview AT-4 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon Dragon Javelin Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire-Guided Missile Chapter 4 Exercise

MCI Course 8205

4-1

See Page 4-1 4-2 4-4 4-7 4-9 4-12 4-14

Chapter 4

AT-4

Features

The M136 AT-4 is the Marine Corps’ primary light antitank weapon. The M136 AT-4 is a recoilless rifle used primarily by infantry forces for engagement and defeat of light armor. The recoilless (negligible recoil) rifle design permits accurate delivery of an 84mm high-explosive anti-armor warhead. The M136 AT-4 is a lightweight, self-contained anti-armor weapon consisting of a free flight, fin-stabilized, rocket-type cartridge packed in an expendable, one-piece, fiberglass-wrapped tube. Subsequent to the initial fielding of the weapon, a reusable night sight bracket was developed and fielded. It permits utilization of standard night vision equipment. The system’s tactical engagement range is 250 meters and has been used in multiple combat situations. The round of ammunition is selfcontained in a disposable launch tube. The system weighs 15 lbs. and can be utilized effectively with minimal training.

Operation

The M136 AT-4 is portable and is fired from the right shoulder only. The launcher is watertight for ease of transportation and storage. Unlike the M72series LAW, the M136 AT-4 launcher need not be extended before firing. Although the M136 AT-4 can be employed in limited visibility, the operator must be able to see and identify the target and estimate the range to it.

Warhead

The M136 AT-4 warhead has excellent penetration ability and lethal afterarmor effects. The extremely destructive, 440-gram shaped-charge explosive penetrates more than 14 inches (35.6 cm) of armor. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-2

Chapter 4

AT-4, Continued

General Characteristics

Item Primary Function Manufacturer Launcher

Rocket

Characteristic(s) Light anti-armor weapons • FV Ordance, Stockholm, Sweden • Alliant Techsystems, Edina, MN Length: 1,020mm (40 inches) Weight (complete system): 6.7 kg (14.8 lbs) Rear Sight: Range indicator, graduated in 50-meter increments Caliber: 84mm Muzzle Velocity: 290 mps (950 fps) Length: 460mm (18 in) Weight: 1.8 kg (4 lbs) Minimum Range Training: 30 meters (90 feet) Combat: 10 meters (33 feet) Arming: 10 meters (33 feet) Maximum Range: 2,100 meters (6,890 feet) Maximum Effective Range: 300 meters (985 feet) Penetration: 400mm of rolled homogenous armor Time of Flight (to 250 meters): less than 1 second Operating temperature: -104 to +140oF (-40 to +60oC) Ammunition: Rocket with shaped charge warhead

Illustration

MCI Course 8205

4-3

Chapter 4

Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon

Mission

The mission of the shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW) is to destroy bunkers and other fortifications during assault operations, as well as other designated targets such as light armored vehicles (using dual-mode rocket) and main battle tanks (using the high-explosive anti-armor [HEAA] rocket).

Features

The SMAW is a 83mm man-portable weapon system consisting of the MK153 Mod 0 launcher, the MK3 Mod0 encased HEDP rocket, the MK6 Mod0 encased HEAA rocket, and the MK217 Mod0 spotting rifle cartridge. The launcher consists of a fiberglass launch tube, a 9mm spotting rifle, an electro-mechanical firing mechanism, open battle sights, and a mount for the MK42 Mod0 optical and AN/PVS-4 night sights. The high explosive, dual-purpose (HEDP) rocket is effective against bunkers, masonry and concrete walls, and light armor. HEAA rocket is effective against current tanks without additional armor. The 9mm spotting rounds are matched ballistically to the rockets and increase the gunner’s first-round hit probability. Training is accomplished with the MK7 Mod0 encased common practice rocket and the MK213 Mod0 noise cartridge.

Ancillary Elements

The design of the SMAW MK153 Mod0 launcher is based on the Israeli B300 and consists of the launch tube, the spotting rifle, the firing mechanism, and mounting brackets. The launch tube is fiberglass/epoxy with a gel coat on the bore. The spotting rifle is a British design and is mounted on the right side of the launch tube. The firing mechanism mechanically fires the spotting rifle and uses a magneto to fire the rocket. The mounting brackets connect the components and provide the means for boresighting the weapon. The encased rockets are loaded at the rear of the launcher. The spotting cartridges are stored in a magazine in the cap of the encased rocket.

MCI Course 8205

4-4

Chapter 4

Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon, Continued

Background

The SMAW system (launcher, ammunition and logistics support) was fielded in 1984 as a Marine Corps-unique system. At that time, the SMAW included the MK153 Mod0 launcher, the MK3 Mod0 HEDP encased rocket, the MK4 Mod0 practice rocket, and the MK217 Mod0 9mm spotting cartridge (spotter round). The MK6 Mod0 encased HEAA rocket is being added to the inventory. The Mod0 has demonstrated several shortcomings. A series of modifications is currently planned to address the deficiencies. They include a resleeving process for bubbled launch tubes, rewriting/drafting operator and technical manuals, a kit that will reduce environmental intrusion into the trigger mechanism, and an optical sight modification to allow the new HEAA rocket to be used effectively against moving armor targets. Recently fielded were new boresight bracket kits that, when installed, will solve the loss of boresight problem between launch tube and spotting rifle. During “Operation Desert Storm,” 150 launchers and 5,000 rockets were provided to the U.S. Army. Since then, the Army has shown increased interest in the system. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-5

Chapter 4

Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon, Continued

General Characteristics

Item Primary Function Length to Carry

Characteristic(s) Portable anti-armor rocket launcher To Carry: 29.9 inches (75.95 centimeters) Ready-to-Fire: 54 inches (137.16 cm) To Carry: 16.6 pounds (7.54 kg) Ready-to-Fire (HEDP): 29.5 pounds (13.39 kg) Ready-to-Fire (HEAA): 30.5 pounds (13.85 kg) 83mm 1 x 2 Meter Target: 250 meters Tank-Size Target: 500 meters 1984

Weight

Bore diameter Maximum effective range Introduction date

Illustration

MCI Course 8205

4-6

Chapter 4

Dragon

Missions

The primary mission is to engage and destroy armored and light armored vehicles. The secondary mission defeat hard targets such as bunkers and field fortifications.

Features

The warhead power of Dragon makes it possible for a single Marine to defeat armored vehicles, fortified bunkers, concrete gun emplacements, or other hard targets. The launcher consists of a smoothbore fiberglass tube, breech/gas generator, tracker and support, bipod, battery, sling, and forward and aft shock absorbers. Non-integral day and night sights are required to utilize the Dragon. The complete system consists of the launcher, the tracker and the missile, which is installed in the launcher during final assembly and received by the Marine Corps in a ready to fire condition. The launch tube serves as the storage and carrying case for the missile. The night tracker operates in the thermal energy range.

Background

The first-generation Dragon, a 1,000-meter effective range system requiring 11.2 seconds flight-to-target time, was developed for the US Army and fielded in 1970. The Marine Corps initiated a product improvement program (PIP) in 1985. The PIP, designated Dragon II, was designed to increase warhead penetration effectiveness by 85%. The Dragon II missile is actually a retrofit of warheads to the first generation missiles already in the Marine Corps inventory. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-7

Chapter 4

Dragon, Continued

General Characteristics

Item Primary Function Manufacturers/Builder

Length Weight

Maximum Effective Range Time of Flight: Armor Penetration:

Characteristic(s) Anti-armor weapon system • McDonnell Douglas Aerospace and Missile Systems • Raytheon Corporation Launcher: 45.4 inches (115.32 cm) Missile: 33.3 inches (84.58 cm) Ready-to-Fire: 33.9 lbs. (day tracker) 48.7 lbs. (night tracker) Day Tracker (Sights): 6.75 lbs. Thermal Night Tracker (w/1 bottle and battery): 21.65 lbs. 3,281 feet (1,000 meters) 11.2 seconds Will defeat T-55, T-62, or T-72 w/o added armor

Illustration

MCI Course 8205

4-8

Chapter 4

Javelin

Mission

The Javelin is a man-portable, fire-and-forget antitank missile employed by dismounted infantry to defeat current and future threat armored combat vehicles. Javelin is intended to replace the Dragon system in the Army and the Marine Corps.

Features

Javelin has significant improvements over Dragon. The Javelin’s range of approximately 2,500 meters is more than twice that of its predecessor. The Javelin has secondary capabilities against helicopters and ground fighting positions. It is equipped with an imaging infrared (I2R) system and a fireand-forget guided missile. The Javelin’s normal engagement mode is topattack to penetrate the tank’s most vulnerable armor. It also has a directattack capability to engage targets with overhead cover or in bunkers. Its “soft launch” allows employment from within buildings and enclosed fighting positions. The soft launch signature limits the gunner’s exposure to the enemy, thus increasing survivability. Javelin is also much more lethal than Dragon. It has a top-attack, dual-warhead capability that can defeat all known enemy armor systems.

Background

A January 1978 Anti-Armor Mission Need Statement identified the deficiencies of the Army's current man-portable, anti-armor weapon, the Dragon. The Joint Service Operational Requirements document for the Javelin was approved in 1986 and amended in 1988. The contract for Javelin EMD was awarded in 1989. The IOT&E, which was completed in December 1993, resulted in the conclusion that the Javelin was effective but required further assessment for suitability, necessitating follow-on testing in the form of a Limited User Test (LUT) beginning in April 1996. LRIP was approved by the DAB in July 1994. There are several Javelin enhanced producibility program (EPP) changes that are being incorporated in the system to enhance producibility and reduce cost. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-9

Chapter 4

Javelin, Continued

General Characteristics

Item Primary Function Manufacturer

System Components General Command Launch Unit

Round Missile

Round Missile: Launch Tube Assembly (LTA):

Characteristic(s) Portable anti-armor weapon Primary contractors: • Raytheon Corporation • Lockheed Martin Command Launch Unit (CLU), Round Carry Weight: 49.5 pounds (22.3 kg) Type: Passive target acquisition/fire control, with integrated day/thermal sight Carry weight: 14.1 pounds (6.4 kg) Magnification: Day sight = 4x, Thermal sight = 4x and 9x Operation time: 4 hours/battery (hot) Battery type: BA5590 lithium battery Type: Passive imaging infrared (IIR) Guidance: Lock-on before launch, automatic self-guiding Weight: 21.6 pounds (11.8 kg) Length: 42.6 inches (1081.2 mm) Diameter: 5.0 inches (126.9 mm) Range: 2,500 meters Warhead: Tandem shaped charge Propulsion: 2-stage solid propellant Type: Expendable, container/launch tube Weight: 9.0 pounds (4.1 kg) Length: 47.2 inches (1198 mm) Diameter: 5.6 inches (142.1 mm) Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-10

Chapter 4

Javelin, Continued

Illustration

MCI Course 8205

4-11

Chapter 4

Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire-Guided Missile

Mission

Primary mission of TOW is to engage and destroy enemy armored vehicles, primarily tanks. Secondary mission is to destroy other point targets, such as non-armored vehicles, crew-served weapons, and launchers.

Features

The basic TOW weapon system was fielded in 1970. This system is designed to attack and defeat tanks and other armored vehicles. It is primarily used in antitank warfare and is a command to line-of-sight, wire-guided weapon. The system will operate in all weather conditions and on the “dirty” battlefield. The TOW 2 launcher is the most recent launcher upgrade. It is compatible with all TOW missiles. The TOW 2 weapon system is composed of a reusable launcher, a missile guidance set, and sight system. The system can be tripod mounted. However because it is heavy, it is generally employed from the HMMWV and LAV-AT. The missile has a 20-year maintenancefree storage life. All versions of the TOW missile can be fired from the current launcher. TOW 2B, the newest member of the TOW family, is a flyover, shoot-down missile, with its explosively formed penetrator (EFP) warheads and is designed to defeat the next-generation advanced armor threat well into the 21st century. The TOW 2B features a dual-mode sensor and a new armament section equipped with two warheads substantially different from those used in other TOW versions.

Background

The original TOW missile had a diameter of 5 inches and a range of 3000 meters. Considerable improvements have been made to the missile since 1970. The improved TOW (ITOW) was delivered in 1982. This missile has a 5-inch diameter warhead and includes an extended probe for greater standoff and penetration. An enhanced flight motor was included in the ITOW, increasing the missile's range to 3,750 meters. The TOW 2 series of improvements includes TOW 2 hardware, TOW 2 missile, TOW 2A missile, and TOW 2B missile. The TOW 2 hardware improvements included a thermal beacon guidance system enabling the gunner to more easily track a target at night and numerous improvements to the missile guidance system (MGS). The TOW 2 missile has a 6-inch diameter warhead and the extended probe first introduced with ITOW. The TOW 2B missile incorporates new fly-over, shoot-down technology. Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-12

Chapter 4

Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire-Guided Missile, Continued

General Characteristics

Item Primary Function Manufacturer

Size: TOW 2A Missile TOW 2B Missile Max Effective Range Armor Penetration Time of Flight to Max Effective Range Weight

Introduction Date

Characteristic(s) Guided missile weapon system • Hughes Aircraft (missiles) • Hughes and Kollsman (night sights) • Electro Design Mfg. (launchers) Diameter: 5.87 inches (14.91 cm) Length: 50.40 inches (128.02 cm) Diameter: 5.8 inches (14.9 cm) Length: 48.0 inches (121.02 cm) 2.33 miles (3.75) T-80 + 2A: 20 seconds 2B: 21 seconds Launcher w/TOW 2 Mods: 204.6 lbs (92.89 kg) Missile Guidance Set: 52.8 lbs (23.97 kg) TOW 2 Missile: 47.4 lbs (21.52 kg) TOW 2A Missile: 49.9 lbs (22.65 kg) TOW 2B Missile: 49.8 lbs (22.60 kg) 1970

Illustration

MCI Course 8205

4-13

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Exercise

Directions

Complete the following items. Check your answers against those listed at the end of this chapter. If you have any questions, refer to the reference page listed for each item.

Items 1 Through 5

Matching: For items 1 through 5, match the anti-armor weapon in column1 with its characteristic in column 2. Column 1

Column 2

Anti-armor weapon

Characteristic

____ 1. ____ 2. ____ 3. ____ 4. ____ 5.

a. b. c. d. e.

AT-4 SMAW Dragon Javelin TOW

Fire-and-forget guided missile Spotter round Heavy anti-armor weapon system Recoilless rifle. 1,000 meter maximum effective range Continued on next page

MCI Course 8205

4-14

Chapter 4

Chapter 4 Exercise, Continued

Answers

The table below lists the answers to the chapter examination items. If you have questions about these items, refer to the reference page. Item Number 1 2 3 4 5

MCI Course 8205

Answer d b e a c

4-15

Reference 4-2 4-5 4-8 4-9 4-12

Chapter 4