Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan

COJUANGCO, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Quisumbing, December 21, 1998) no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own determination — independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts, if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of the investigators and the special prosecutor should be examined by the court FACTS: 1. January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner, former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and the former members of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for having conspired and confederated together and taking undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence, connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the Philippines. 2. Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG were null and void and the PCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action. 3. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. 4. Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for review and if warranted, for the preparation of the criminal information. 5. In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June 2, 1992. 6. August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed by respondent Lobregat. 7. In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigators recommended that the motion to suspend proceedings be granted. 8. On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez referred for comment to the Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1,

1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicial question. 9. On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent Sandiganbayan. 10.On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he likewise filed, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bail without prejudice to the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest with Motion For Leave To File a Motion For Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Resolution which he filed. 11.In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court. 12.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty to the Information. 13.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, Special Prosecution Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner and recommended the dismissal of the case. The recommendation for dismissal was approved by the Honorable Ombudsman on November 15, 1996. 14.On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent Motion To Dismiss alleging that with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of probable cause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondent Sandiganbayan which would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the assumption of jurisdiction over the instant case. ISSUES: 1. WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null and void, or should now be lifted if initially valid? YES 2. WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner? YES RATIO: 1. Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider when it resolved to issue the warrant of arrest against the accused: a. the Resolution dated June 2, 1992 of the Panel of Investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the Information and b. the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor denying the existence of a prejudicial question which will warrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan had nothing more to support its resolution. 2. The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan.

3. In Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, the Court struck down as invalid an order for the issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "the information, amended information and Joint Resolution", without the benefit of the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.

4. In Ho vs. People, the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuse

of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.

5. With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.

6. In La Naval Drug vs. CA , Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person.

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion; As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner. The posting of a bail bond by the petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest should not be equated with "voluntary appearance" as to cloak the respondent court with jurisdiction over his person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted that immediately upon learning of the filling of the Information and the issuance of the warrant, petitioner filed an "Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrest with Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Ombudsman['s] Resolutions." Said Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondent court's basis for determining probable cause. It was essentially an express and continuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person. When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same time that such was "without prejudice” to his Opposition.