Class Digest - Pale (2nd Batch)

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Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

Facts: In the complaint of Dr. Perez, Atty. Perez,  Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez) having married the latter on May 18, 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.  Atty. Catindig told told Dr. Perez that he was in in the process of obtaining obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, Consequently, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.

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Dr. Perez also alleged that she received an anonymous letter  in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter  written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.  Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated. Eventually, their irreconcilable facto separation in 1984.

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 Atty. Catindig likewise admitted admitted that a divorce with Gomez by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.blesvirtuallawlibrary  Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of  Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that  Atty. Catindig Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.  Atty. Catindig Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez Perez knew that their marriage marriage was not valid For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.

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On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. After due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Commissioner. Issue: W/N the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment. Held: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01  –   –  A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7  –   –  A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 – 7.03 – A  A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit In Arnobit

v.

Atty.

Arnobit ,33 the

Court

held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.

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In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus: Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any m isconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino

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citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s  Catindig’s   claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment. disbarment.

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WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, disquisitions, t he Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

Complainant’s withdrawal withdrawal from the case Rule 1.01 Rule 10.01 SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO and AIDA AMATORIO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP and ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.  A.C. No. 5914 March 11, 2015 Reyes, J. Facts: In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the complainants to compel them to pay their indebtedness of 18,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory note. After they filed their answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out the same and to declare them in default on t he ground that the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was however denied. On the other hand, in in Civil  Civil Case No. 2000-321, 2000-321 , the respondents sued the complainants to collect the amount of 94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its filing.

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Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-court settlement. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her first payment of 20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a written document with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents’ assurance, the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness and damages. The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement between the parties. Nonetheless, the c omplainants continued tendering installment payments to the respondents upon the latter’s assurance that they will disregard the decision of the trial court since they already had an out of court settlement before the rendition of said  judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ. Thus, the instant disbarment case. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP – Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Francisco Yap should be suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and Whelma Yap should be exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation with modification as to the penalty and ordered that Francicso Yap be suspended for 3 months. On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation, terminating the services of Atty. Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and

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 Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can no longer afford the services of a private counsel. Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial  Affidavit, disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents. They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not explained to them in a dialect which they understood. They likewise expressed lack of intention to f ile a disbarment case against the respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but  Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them. They claimed that Atty. Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle matters with the respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled date. They also asseverated that most of the statements contained in the complaint for disbarment were false and that they wished to withdraw the said complaint. Issue: Whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Francisco’s absolution. Held: No. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.”23 It follows that the withdrawal of the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer. This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. “The power to discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be,

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especially when we consider that the law profession and its exercise is one impressed with public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof.” The complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof. To be clear, “[i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof r ests upon the complainant.”25 In the present case, it was clearly established that Francisco received P20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms of their out-ofcourt settlement for the payment of the latter’s outstanding obligations. The amount was duly received and acknowledged by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny that they told the complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore and that they will be the one to inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the said agreement to the attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the parties, rendered a judgment by default against the complainants. The respondents even filed a motion for execution of the decision but still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement between them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening event to the trial court, hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

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Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely. For lack of evidence of her participation in the misconduct, Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is hereby EXONERATED of the charges against her.

DISMISSAL OF BASELESS DISBARMENT COMPLAINTS JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. T OLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents. A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015 JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent . A.C. No. 8725 BERSAMIN, J .:

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FACTS: In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of the following respondents: 1. Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., (counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort) 2. Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., (counsel of complainants) 3. Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, (Acting Registrar) 4. Atty. Elbert T. Quilalav (Chief Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City) 5. Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. (Deputy Register of Deeds) for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to his office. They found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that their previous annotations were cancelled based on a letter request filed by Atty. Tolentino as well as the RTC ’s order granting the Motion to W ithdraw Complaint. Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens.  The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.

In their sworn complaint for disbarment, the complainants narrated that they inherited from their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under TCT No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They discovered that said TCT had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort. This led them to file a case for annulment of TCT No. N 290546 and they immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendes on TCT No. N-290546.  Atty. Victorio was the counsel of complainants while Atty. Tolentino was the counsel of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him f or his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. T hey submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

In order to end the dispute, the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case. The complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn by the parties. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008.

 Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted the following: That complainant Robert Torres had been actively involved in the proceedings in the Civil Case, which included the mediation process That the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the

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agreement and could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein That he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants in the Civil Case That he should not be held responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.

 Atty. Tolentino, in his comment: Refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; That although he had notarized the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and That the present complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him. 

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 Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment: That it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the annotations That the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; That no irregularity occurred or was performed in the cancellation of the annotations. 

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 Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.  As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn disbarment complaint alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had f orged the signature of Atty. Cunanan. Such T his disbarment complaint was later on consolidated with the first disbarment cases filed because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on similar allegations against the respondents.  Atty. Quilala belied the allegation of forgery and reiterated his previous arguments. On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent officers in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City unlawfully cancelled the annotations to the prejudice of the complainants 2. Whether or not Atty. Victorio and Atty. Tolentino conspired to guarantee that the parties enter into an amicable settlememt 3. Whether or not Atty. Victorio’s acts constitute abandonment of the case RULING: 1. NO. Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 ( Property Registration Decree) provides that it shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register  an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter

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of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. Such duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature. Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement stands.

In this case, there was no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Att y. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the annotations. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.

3. NO. With respect to the charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., the Court said that with his assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of  Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Property Registration Decree. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal , it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent  jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the Register of Deeds. 2. NO. With respect to the allegation of conspiracy, the Court said that the complainants failed to establish conspiracy based on clear and convincing evidence. On the contrary, the records showed their own active participation in the amicable settlement. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into.

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 Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to the termination of the Civil Case. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had no r ight to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of the Civil Case. The Court DISMISSED the baseless disbarment complaints against respondents.

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Doctrine: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the m oney was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client. A.C. No. 10672, March 18, 2015 EDUARDO A. MAGLENTE v. ATTY. DELFIN R. AGCAOILI, JR.

Facts: Complainant, as President of “Samahan ng mga Maralitang Taga Ma. Corazon III, Incorporated” (Samahan), alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in order to determine the true owner of the land being occupied by the members of Samahan. In connection therewith, he gave respondent the aggregate amount of P48,000.00 intended to cover the filing fees for the action to be instituted, as evidenced by a written acknowledgment executed by respondent himself. Despite the payment, respondent failed to file an action in court. When confronted, respondent explained that the money given to him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, complainant asked for the return of the money, but respondent claimed to have spent the same and even demanded more money. Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told him to shut up because it was not his m oney in the first place. Hence, complainant filed this administrative complaint seeking the return of the full amount he h ad paid to respondent. In his defense, respondent denied spending complainant’s m oney, explaining that he had already prepared the initiatory pleading and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise

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the amount needed. While waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him. In a Report and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation.  Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied. Issue: W/N respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of. Held: YES. The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP. It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR, which reads: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxxx Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable. In the instant case, it is undisputed that complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing a case in court, and in connection therewith, gave the amount of P48,000.00 to answer for the filing fees. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the flimsy excuse that the money he

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received from complainant was not enough to fully pay the f iling fees. Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz .: CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS  AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxxx Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be immediately returned to the client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment, and hence, must be disciplined accordingly. Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty to be imposed. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court meted

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out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. The Court finds it appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Finally, the Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.” Since the aforesaid amount was intended to answer for filing fees which is intimately related to t he lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

NOTARIAL COMMISSION IS A LICENSE HELD P ERSONALLY BY THE NOTARY PUBLIC CRESCENCIANO M. PITOGO VS. ATTY. JOSELITO TROY SUELLO A.M. NO. 10695. MARCH 18, 2015 LEONEN, J. FACTS: A motorcycle, purchased from EMCOR, Inc., was registered in Pitogo’s name based on 3 documents notarized by respondent  Atty. Joselito Troy Suello. The documents indicate that they are registered in Suello’s notarial register. Pitogo obtained a copy of the 3 documents from the Land Transportation Office. He requested Suello to certify the authenticity and veracity of the said documents he obtained from LTO. He wanted to determine if the documents were duly notarized by Suello or were merely fabricated. Pitogo did not receive a reply from Suello.

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Pitogo alleges that there were discrepancies between the 3 documents notarized by Suello and Suello’s entries in his notaria l register such as the discrepancies between the Book Numbers and the Names of parties appearing therein. Suello denies having notarized the said documents. He denies the allegation that he disowned the documents. He admits that he certified the documents as true copies. Suello explains that it was his secretary who certified Pitogo’s documents.

GROSS MISCONDUCT IN PRIVATE CAPACITY IS A GROUND FOR SUSPENSION/DISBARMENT

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his negligence in keeping and maintaining his notarial register.

FACTS:

HELD: YES. Respondent is liable for his negligence as a notarial register. When respondent negligently failed to enter the details of the 3 documents on his notarial register, he cast doubt on the authenticity of complainant’s documents. He also cast doubt on the credibility of the notarial register and the notarial process. He violated not only the Notarial Rules but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect f or law and legal process. Respondent’s secretary cannot be blamed for the erroneous entries in the notarial register. The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for 1 year.

ANTONINA S. SOSA, Complainant, v. ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA, Respondent. A.C. No. 8776, March 22, 2015 BRION, J.:

Ms. Sosa alleged that she extended a loan to Atty. Mendoza. Atty. Mendoza signed a promissory note and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00. Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. The check was subsequently returned or dishonored as it was “Drawn against Insufficient Funds.” Ms. Sosa then obtained the services of Atty. Cabrera to legally address Atty. Mendoza’s failure to pay. Atty. Cabrera sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty. Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt and did not, in any manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay. Ms. Sosa filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging  Atty. Mendoza for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Rule states that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Mendoza liable not only administratively but also civilly. The IBP Board of Governors adopted with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner as to the finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that [the respondent] is guilty of misconduct for his failure to pay a just and valid debt, Atty.

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Manuel V. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months and Ordered to Return the amount of P500,000.00 to the complainant with legal interest.

 Although he initially denied getting this amount and claimed that he only received P100,000.00, he did not present any evidence to prove his claim. He later also admitted the validity of his loan without qualification as to the amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be suspended for gross misconduct, by reason of his non-payment despite the fact that several demands were made. HELD:  YES. This Court has held that any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or in his private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Any wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic: “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The facts of the case show that Atty. Mendoza engaged in improper or wrong conduct, as found under Rule 1.01, as the failure to pay the loan was willful in character and implied a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment. We find it undisputed that Atty. Mendoza obtained a loan in the amount of P500,000.00. He signed the promissory note and acknowledgement receipt showing he received P500,000.00.

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 Also, Ms. Sosa tried to collect the amount due upon maturity but  Atty. Mendoza failed to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa deferred depositing the postdated check upon Atty. Mendoza’s request, and based on his promises that he would pay. Despite all these, he still failed to comply with his obligation. Worse, the check – when finally deposited – was dishonored, a fact that Atty. Mendoza did not dispute.  Atty. Mendoza further claimed he had P600,000.00 on hand during the hearing with the IBP Investigating Officer. He allegedly failed to deliver the amount to Ms. Sosa or her counsel because he arrived late. We find Atty. Mendoza’s excuse to be flimsy. It could have been very easy for him to deliver the P600,000.00 to Ms. Sosa if he had the real intention to pay. In fact, Ms. Sosa wrote, through her counsel, Atty. Mendoza asking him to settle his obligation because of his manifestation that he already had the money. It is unclear to us why Atty. Mendoza ignored Ms. Sosa’s request f or settlement after claiming that he already had the needed funds. He was either lying he had the money, or had no intention of paying in the first place.  Atty. Mendoza was also not candid with the IBP Investigating Officer when he claimed he had P600,000.00 and that he was ready to pay his obligation. What is clear is that his obligation remains outstanding after all these years. Other than his claim that he was disposing of real properties in order to settle his obligation, Atty. Mendoza failed to explain why he failed to pay despite his admission of a just and valid loan. Whatever his reasons or excuses may be, dire financial condition does not justify non-payment of debt, as we have held in Yuhico. [A] lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his

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clients. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. To this end nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, showing him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. The facts and evidence in t his case clearly establish Atty. Men doza’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer as dictated by the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only his personal integrity but his profession as well. To reiterate, his failure to honor his just debt constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct. This dishonest conduct was compounded by  Atty. Mendoza’s act of interjecting flimsy excuses that only strengthened the conclusion that he refused to pay a valid and just debt. While we agree with the punishment meted out by the IBP, we differ with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay the amount of the loan plus legal interest. We take exception to the IBP’s order to pay only because the case before us is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is not a civil action for collection of a sum of money. The quantum of evidence in these two types of cases alone deters us from agreeing with the IBP’s order to pay; the administrative complaint before us only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while

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a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence.  A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. The purpose of disbarment is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. However, in the recent case of Heenan v. Atty. Espejo, this Court sitting en banc did not agree with the IBP’s recommendation to order the erring lawyer to return the money he borrowed from the complainant: In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.

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Because the matter before us is not a civil action for the collection money, we cannot order Atty. Mendoza to pay his outstanding loan. We can only clarify that our ruling in this case is without prejudice to any future civil or criminal action that Ms. Sosa, if she so decides, may file against Atty. Mendoza in the future. Our action likewise is without prejudice to any action we may take that is not based on the violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. KEEPING MULTIPLE NOTARIAL REGISTERS; DUTY TO ACT WITH COURTESY; DOUBLE DEALING WITH CLIENTS A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015

false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ ) in an annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship,  Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019 that one Priscilla Somontan ( Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests. Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her. In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that  Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings. According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings.

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno ( Gimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging  Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.

In his answer dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno f alsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-s equential entries in his notarial registers.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant , v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent . BRION, J. : FACTS:

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annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. On this basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests. Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings. Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules (keeping irregular entries in notarial register), representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his pleadings. The IBP Board of Governors ( Board ) opined that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public. Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution. ISSUE: Whether the IBP board’s decision was proper  The Court's Ruling The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them. As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely superimposed over  Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

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Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it. This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002. This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission. We find that  Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf. Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally administer the notarial acts that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other

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person, other than the notary public, should perform it. On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations. This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and duties are impressed with public interest. A notary public's office is not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform. The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. In Aninon v. Sabitsana, the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients. One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.  Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyerclient relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when  Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any

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way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman. The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where  Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally unrelated. There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests. The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper . Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

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menacing language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)  As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified. WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is foundGUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Burden of proof rests upon the complainant in a disbarment complaint ATTY. ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Complainant , v. ATTYS. E. HANS A. SANTOS AND AGNES H. MARANAN, Respondents. A.C. No. 9868 [formerly CBD Case No. 05-1617], April 22, 2015 FACTS: The complainant related that the respondents initiated Civil Case No. 70251 for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC Pasig ) and used a deceptive ploy to prevent the payment of the proper docket fees. The respondents allegedly disguised the complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction (where the amount involved is incapable of pecuniary estimation) and deliberately omitted to specify the damages prayed for amounting to P68,000,000.00 in the prayer of the complaint in order to avoid paying the proper docket fees.  According to the complainant, this intentional omission to specify the amount of damages was specifically declared by the Court inManchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals as grossly unethical, and thus constitutes a valid ground for disbarment. The respondents denied the allegation, claiming that at the time the complaint in Civil Case No. 70251 was filed on January 13, 2005, twelve (12) out of fifteen (15) checks were not yet due and demandable, clearly indicating that the complaint was really an action for specific performance and injunction, rather than an action for sum of money or damages. IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes found that the respondents did not commit any violation of the code of professional ethics.  According to him, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had been deceived when she assessed the filing fees due on the complaint in Civil Case No. 70251. Moreover, there is no showing that the Clerk of Court had made any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees since the court never issued an order for reassessment or payment of higher docket fees.

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Hence, Commissioner Reyes recommended that the disbarment case be dismissed for lack of merit. The Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, and by the applicable laws and rules. The complainant then filed a petition for review assailing the IBP's findings. ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether the respondents' omission of the specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint is unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. RULING: No. The respondents' omission of the specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint is unethical, and thereby violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant argued that the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation is contrary to the Court's pronouncement in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals . The material portions of the Manchester doctrine provide: "The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel v/ho filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over Seventy-Eight Million Pesos (P78,000,000.00) is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in theassessmentof the filing fee."  In that case, the Court observed that the lawyer's act of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer of the complaint, although the amount was alleged in its body, "was clearly

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intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee."  After a careful study of the import of the Manchester doctrine and the arguments of the parties, the court find as the Investigating Commissioner did -that the respondents did not commit any violation of the Code of Professional Conduct. We stress that the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer has committed serious professional misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows him or her to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether it renders him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.The burden of proof rests upon the complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint with clearly preponderant evidence. Contrary to the complainant's allegation that the respondents had defrauded the court, the element of "deceitful conduct" or "deceit" was not present in this case.

 First, the prayer in the complaint clearly showed that there was a clear and express reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint, which listed and described in detail the date of the checks, the check numbers, and their corresponding amounts.

Second, there was also an express mention in the prayer of the amount of P9.5 Million representing the value of the checks that had already become due. Thus, we find unmeritorious the complainant's claim that the respondents intentionally and deceptively omitted to specify the amount of damages in the prayer.

Third, despite the complainant's move for the dismissal of Case No. 70251 on the ground that the proper docket fees were not paid, the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court neither r eassessed the filing fees, nor required the plaintiff in that case to pay additional filing fees.

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 Fourth, even as of this date, the Court in Civil Case No. 70251 has not issued an order requiring the reassessment, recomputation, and/or payment of additional docket fees, signifying that the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court did not make any mistake in the assessment of the docket fees.

 Fifth, an examination of the allegations of the complaint and the prayer in Civil Case No. 70251 shows that the case is really an action for specific performance and injunction. The complaint sought to judicially require the complainant to deliver the actual and physical checks enumerated in paragraph 2.27 of the complaint; to compel him to account for the checks that he may have had already encashed; and to restrain him from negotiating, transacting, and encashing the checks in his possession. Clearly, the complaint was an action for specific performance, rather than for a sum of money. Even assuming that the respondents' mere reference to paragraph 2.27 of the complaint does not fully comply with the Manchester doctrine, this Court still finds that it is not a sufficient ground for disbarment. There is no clear showing that the respondents defrauded or misled the RTC Pasig Clerk of Court. Neither was there any proof that the respondents have maliciously disguised their complaint as an action for specific performance and injunction so as to evade the payment of the proper docket fees. Clearly, the complainant's allegation is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture, and hence insufficient to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty of disbarment. We are likewise not convinced that the respondents violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The record of the case do not show that the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had misused the rules of procedure. In the absence of such proof, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer remains and the complaint against him must be dismissed.Viewed in these lights, the disbarment complaint against the respondents Attys. E. Hans A. Santos and Agnes H. Maranan should be dismissed for lack of merit.

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GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY Roberto P. Nonato v. Atty. Eutiqio M. Fudolin, Jr. A.C. No. 10138 June 16, 2015 Sereno, CJ Facts: In a verified complaint, the complainant alleged that his father, the late Restituto Nonato, was the duly registered owner of a real property Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represented by Atty. Felino Garcia. However, at the pre-trial stage,  Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the respondent in the present case. The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, the respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case.  After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Since neither party complied with the court’s directive, the MTC dismissed the complaint as well as t he counterclaim on May 26, 2005. The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suit’s dismissal as the respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTC’s dismissal order. T he complainant also asserts that the respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion for reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. The complainant claims that he only found out that the

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case had been dismissed when he personally went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal. In his Answer, the respondent asserted that at the time he received the MTC’s directive to submit a position paper, he was already suffering from “Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease,  Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.”; that he had an undetected stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous months. His health condition led to his loss of concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case folders, among them the records of the ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he focused on his health for self-preservation, and underwent vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate with the late Restituto and the complainant. Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suit’s dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to the point of risking his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order. Because the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to file the position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his client’s case. The Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent’s failure to file the position paper in the ejectment proceedings and to apprise the client of the status of the case demonstrated his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients; and that he failed to promptly inform his clients, including the complainant, of his m edical condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of other lawyers. The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondent’s suspension for one (1) month from the practice of law. Issue: W/N the respondent is guilty of negligence in the performance of duty, and thus, should be held administratively liable?

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Held: Yes. Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.  A lawyer is bound to protect his client’s interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his client’s counsel, a la wyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. The record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of his duties as Restituto’s counsel. He failed to file hi s position paper despite notice. In addition, the respondent failed to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the case. His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty. All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting the court’s imposition of disciplinary action. Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

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Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. We also find the respondent’s excuse – that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from other illnesses – unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous health problems, his medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary court pleadings. The respondent could have requested an extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least, informed his client of his medical condition; all t hese, the respondent failed to do. We, however, find the IBP’s recommended penalty (one (1) month suspension from the practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the infractions committed. Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the respondent's acts and omissions, as well as the consequence of his negligence.

Being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations. One of which is to ensure that the client’s interest is met and protected with utmost diligence. Another is to accord proper respect to the Court’s procedures. TEODULO F. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO B. LAVADIA, JR., Respondent.  A.C. NO. 5686 16 June 2015 FACTS: Teodulo Enriquez filed a letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia Jr for gross negligence and inefficiency in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. This complaint stems from

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actions of Lavadia as the assigned attorney to a forcible entry complaint against Enriquez before the MCTC of Talibon, Bohol. During the handling of the forcible entry case, Lavadia has repeatedly failed to submit on time the position papers and affidavits within the 30 days from the receipt of the pre-trial order. This led to defendants being declared in default and Atty. Lavadia filing for a notice of appeal with sufficient bond. However, such appeal was dismissed due to the failure of Lavadia to submit the appeal memorandum despite being granted a total of no more than 71 days or a total of 4 motions of extensions to file the memorandum. Relatively, great damage and prejudice against Enriquez happened as such the complaint for disbarment. During the Court’s and IBP’s investigation, Lavadia has exhibited the same cavalier attitude shown in handling Enriquez’ case. The Court has granted every opportunity for Lavadia to file his comment to the compliant. However, after a lapse of 8 years, a total of 155 days extension to file his comment and no less than 8 resolutions ordering  Atty. Lavadia to comment: 2 of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and comply with the Court’s resolution, Lavadia still did not file any comment. Lavadia made excuses ranging from heavy case load, to sickness of his wife and close relative to even having “dark beings” in his home causing him misfortunes. Thus, IBP found Lavadia unfit to dispense his duties and responsibilities as an attorney and recommends for his disbarment. ISSUE: WON Lavadia may be held administratively liable. HELD: YES. We cannot stress enough that being a lawyer is a privilege with attached duties and obligations. Lawyers bear the responsibility to meet the profession ’s exacting standards. A lawyer is expected to live by the lawyer ’s oath, the rules of the profession and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The duties of a lawyer may be classified into four general categories namely duties he owes to the court, to the public, to the bar and to his client. A

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lawyer who transgresses any of his duties is administratively liable and subject to the Court ’s disciplinary authority. In the present case, the duties transgressed by Atty. Lavadia fall under those duties to his client and to the court. This Court notes  Atty. Lavadia’s Lavadia’s propensity for filing filing motions for extensio extensio n of time to file pleadings but failing to file the same, in violation of Rule 12.03 of the CPR. Here, Enriquez paid a total of P29,750.00 as acceptance fee and other fees relating to the preparation of pleadings for the case including the appeal. Atty. Lavadia however failed to discharge his duties. He failed to file his client’s position paper rendering his client in default. While he filed a notice of appeal and several motions for extension of time to file the appeal memorandum, all of which were granted by the lower court, he ultimately neglected to file the appeal memorandum. Thus, following our pronouncement in Solidon, Solidon, Atty. Lavadia has clearly transgressed Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the CPR thereby making him administratively liable.  As in Mariveles, Mariveles, Atty. Lavadia requested and was granted extensions of time to file the appeal memorandum after he filed the notice of appeal with sufficient bond. The lower court granted him four extensions totaling 71 days after which time he still failed to file the appeal memorandum. His failure adversely affected the cause of Enriquez, his client. In repeatedly asking for extensions of time without actually filing the appeal memorandum, Atty. Lavadia is liable under Rule 12.03 of the CPR. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).

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The present complaint was filed January 2002. W e granted Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment to the complaint. We issued no less than eight resolutions ordering Atty. Lavadia to comment: two of which ordered him to pay fines of P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 and requiring him to show cause for his failure to file and to comply with the Court’s resolutions. In fine, w e have granted him a total of 155 days extension to file his comment, in response to his repeated pleas contained in his numerous ex parte motions. After  a After  a lapse of eight years years,, this Court referred the case to the I BP where  Atty. Lavadia once again filed a motion motion for extension to file his position paper but nevertheless failed to file the same. While this Court is not unsympathetic to the plight of Atty. Lavadia, we cannot countenance his act of repeatedly pleading for extensions of time and yet not submitting anything to the Court. This reflects his willful disregard for Court orders putting in question his suitability to discharge his duties and functions as a lawyer. As we stated in Vaflor-Fabroa the Court’s Resolution is not a mere re quest. A lawyer’s blatant disregard or refusal to comply with the Court’s orders underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Here, this disbarment case has dragged on for years while we gave Atty. Lavadia every opportunity to file his comment. Despite the extended time granted him, he continued to fail to do so. Such obstinate disobedience to the Court’s orders merits disciplinary action. We said in Figueras v. Atty. Jimenez  that  that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court has imposed the penalties ranging from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment for a lawye r’s failure to file a brief or other pleading. In the present case, we note that this is Atty. Lavadia’s first infraction. However, given his proven propensity for filing motions for extension of time and not filing the required pleading, this Court finds that it should impose the severe sanction lest some other unknowing

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clients engage his services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's nonchalant attitude. Considering Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude towards the Court, we find the penalty of DISBARMENT as recommended by the IBP appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto B. Lavadia, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED for violating Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.

GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY Olvida vs. Atty. Arnel Gonzales A.C. No. 5732, June 16, 2015 FACTS: The complainant engaged the services of the respondent in the filing and handling of a case for Termination of Tenancy Relationship against tenant Alfonso Lumanta who was no longer religiously paying the rentals for a coconut farm in Davao City, owned by his wife and under his administration. The complainant paid the respondent his acceptance fee of P15,000.00 and P700.00 as advance appearance fee. The respondent asked the complainant to provide him with copies of all pertinent documents and affidavits of his witnesses. The case was filed on January 22, 2001. DARAB exerted efforts to resolve the case amicably, but the parties failed to come to an agreement, prompting the Board to require the parties to submit their position papers within 40 days from the date of the hearing. The complainant provided the respondent all pieces of documentary evidence, including his own affidavit, for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, the complainant repeatedly called the respondent's office for information about the position paper. He did this until April 25, 2001, the last day of its submission, but failed to

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contact the respondent. The complainant finally contacted the respondent's secretary, Marivic Romero, about the position paper and Romero told him that the position paper had already been filed. Nine months after the expiration of the period for the filing of the position paper — a copy of the decision of Regional Agrarian Reform  Adjudicator Sinsona Sinsona dismissing the case for lack of merit. merit. When he read the text of the decision, he discovered that the respondent did not file the position paper in the case. The decision stated that the respondent failed to submit a position paper despite ample time to do so.He learned that the respondent already had a copy of the decision even before he received his own, and had not informed him about it. The complainant terminated the respondent's services.  After more than seven seven years after he was was first required by the Court to do so, the respondent filed his comment and prayed for a dismissal of the complaint.The respondent pointed out that the complainant lost the case because there was a difference of opinion between them; the complainant wanted to impose upon him his own view and opinion and would dictate to him what he wanted to be done in the course of the proceedings, while refusing all his advice on how to pursue the case. The complainant in fact failed to submit to him all the pieces of documentary evidence he needed. Commissioner Cachapero found the respondent negligent in discharging his duties as a lawyer in the handling of complainant's case against his former tenant Lumanta. He disagreed with the respondent's assertion that the Position Paper is unimportant and that his client had failed to submit the necessary papers or documents to support his cause of action. Commissioner Cachapero recommended respondent's SUSPENSION SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was negligent in his duty as counsel of the complainant in failing to file the position paper?

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HELD: YES. The respondent, Atty. Arnel C. Gonzales, is liable as charged. He grossly violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Responsibility which provides: A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM . The respondent gave the complainant the run-around for an unreasonably long period of time; the latter had to repeatedly inquire about and follow up the filing of the position paper in the DARAB case. On the matter alone of keeping complainant posted on the status of the case, the respondent failed to comply with his duty under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 states that " a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of the case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information."||Canon information."||Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that "A " A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. DILIGENCE . Accordingly, Rule 18.02 mandates that "a " a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. The respondent kept to himself his receipt of a copy of the DARAB's adverse decision which he received even before the complainant received his own. This failure t o communicate was downright dishonest and unethical and cannot but aggravate the respondent's inexcusable neglect in not filing a position paper in the case. It also showed the respondent's gross lack of professionalism in dealing with his client; worse than this, his office, through his secretary, had even made the complainant believe that the position paper had already been filed. We are appalled at the respondent's boldness in saying that his failure to file the position paper in the tenancy case was due to the complainant's complainant's fault. He lost sight of the f act that he was engaged by the complainant to plead his case in the tenancy dispute in the way he (respondent) believed the case should be handled, not in any other way. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, Responsibility, a lawyer "shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. The respondent should have acted as a lawyer in the

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case, not as a mere agent waiting for the complainant's instructions. instructions. He should not have wasted several months doing nothing about the position paper he knew had to be filed as required by the DARAB  Adjudicator. He should should not have lied to the complainant making him believe that he was doing his work as his lawyer and that he had already filed the position paper. paper. Before the time for filing lapsed, he should have been candid enough to tell the complainant that he could not file the required position paper and that it was time for him to engage another lawyer. The IBP Board of Governors imposed a four-month suspension from the practice of law on the respondent for his negligence in filing the required position paper. The established facts, however, show that the respondent was not only grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as the complainant's lawyer; he was also downright dishonest and unethical in his dealings with the complainant, an aspect of the case glossed over during the IBP investigation. In this light, we deem a three-year suspension from the practice of law an appropriate penalty for the respondent's gross negligence and dishonesty in his handling of the complainant's tenancy case.

GRAVE MISCONDUCT; ENGAGING IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW WHILE UNDER SUSPENSION; DISBARMENT Llunar vs Ricafort AC 6484, June 16, 2015 Per Curiam In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Banez, hired the respondent to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes ( Ard  ( Ard ) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard. The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of

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Malilipot, Albay, was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from the complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's fees. Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC ) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00. The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to the complainant. He argued that a complaint for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case. The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of  Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in  Administrative Case No. 5054,3 which the complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court. The IBP Board of Governors recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to disbarment. It also ordered the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration. In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent argued that his referral of the complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with

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the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he paid Atty.  Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's motion for r econsideration. ISSUE: Was the respondent guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension? Held: YES. The Court finds the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of  DISBARMENT. The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave m isconduct. First , the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR ), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Second , the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00

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for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.  After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession" and to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. chanrobleslaw Third , the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached b y the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor , fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law. Lastly , the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat

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violator of these rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort , we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in character from his previous offense we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely unworthy of membership in our honorable profession. The hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED  from the practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant  Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

Lawyer’s negligence in handling the legal matter entrusted to him

A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015 DOMINIC PAUL D. LAZARETO, Complainant , v. ATTY. DENNIS N. ACORDA, Respondent .

FACTS: In January 2004, Lazareto and his family engaged the respondent’s services to handle the extrajudicial settlement of the

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estate of Lazareto’s father who died intestate. Lazareto gave the respondent the original duplicate copies of TCTs together with the amount of P120,000.00. Since then, Lazareto had followed up the developments with the respondent by phone, but he could not be contacted until he received a fax message from him asking for an additional P88,000.00, which Lazareto gave in installments of P66,000.00 and P20,000. May 2004 passed without the papers for extrajudicial settlement being filed. Lazareto had not heard from the respondent all this time, although the lawyer sent a certain Manny Pacheco, allegedly the liaison officer to get the second installment. Lazareto gave additional funds to respondent consisting of P150,000.00 ; P15,000.00; and another P10,330.00. Since then, Lazareto had not heard from the respondent, until he wrote the family saying that Pacheco had not given an accounting of the monies the family had given him. Meantime, Lazareto and his family entered into negotiations to sell Lot B. The buyers asked the respondent to prepare the deed of sale for the transaction; however, even if the respondent promised to give the matter priority, he failed to attend to it. On August 15, 2005, the family wrote him a letter reminding him of his promise, as well as of his failure to act on the filing of the extrajudicial settlement action which had expired a year ago. Follow ups had been made for the return pf the TCTs but to no avail until the respondent admitted that he had lost one of the TCTs. With this, Lazareto requested for an affidavit of loss but this was unsigned by the respondent. Exasperated with the difficulties he was having with the respondent’s nonchalant a nd negligent attitude and his refusal to provide his f amily a signed affidavit of loss, Lazareto filed the present complaint. Thereafter, Atty. Policarpio, the respondent’s lawyer, proposed an amicable settlement with Lazareto. Lazareto agreed to the proposal and submitted a manifestation on the matter to the IBP Investigating Commissioner. Once again, Lazareto was greatly disappointed. The respondent failed to deliver on his commitments. With this development, Lazareto had no choice but to agree to just accept an affidavit of loss for the receipts and to rely on the word of respondent’s counsel that he was assured by his client that he

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(respondent) had filed the extrajudicial settlement papers with the Register of Deeds of Manila. However, they discovered that no “Extrajudicial Settlement” was filed.  Alarmed and shocked at his discovery, Lazareto moved for the admission of newly discovered evidence, but the motion was denied by Comm. Rico, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration. His affidavit of desistance and respondent’s apology notwithstanding, Lazareto expressed grave concern over respondent’s misrepresentations in performing his tasks as the family lawyer in the settlement of his father’s estate. Nonetheless, he left it to Comm. Rico to resolve the case in the light of his affidavit of desistance and the circumstances of the case. The Case for the Respondent In his position paper, the respondent alleged that upon his engagement as counsel, he advised them that he could not determine the exact date of completion or termination of his assigned task. He denied Lazareto’s submission that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as lawyer for the settlement of the estate of Lazareto’s deceased father. Additionally, the respondent alleged that Pacheco stole a substantial amount of money from the firm, as well as several original documents, and that Pacheco could not be found despite efforts to locate him. He stressed that despite the losses he suffered, “he was able to finalize all d ocuments and transactions and to deliver the certificate of title."

ISSUES: 1) whether respondent was negligent in handling the legal matter entrusted to him 2) whether respondent acted in bad faith in dealing with complainant Lazareto and his family.

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HELD: After an objective examination of the facts and the evidence, we find the dismissal of the case unacceptable, notwithstanding Lazareto’s affidavit of desistance and his silence with respect to said dismissal. The IBP Board of Governors misappreciated the gravity and the scope of the respondent’s breach of his contractual obligation with Lazareto and his family. He had been negligent in carrying out the task entrusted to him by Lazareto and his family as found by Comm. Inocencio, a clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He had been grossly dishonest with respect to certain actions he claimed he had taken in relation to his task. We disagree with and cannot accept Commissioner Rico’s conclusion and reason. The filing of the fake deed of sale and the bogus publication of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazareto’s deceased father were very much relevant to the proceedings before Comm. Rico. They were inextricably linked to the charge of negligence against respondent in his handling of the extrajudicial settlement matter entrusted to him by Lazareto and his family.  After the family gave him his acceptance fee and provided him with the necessary funds for the undertaking, respondent became inaccessible and unheard of with respect to his task until the agreed deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement papers expired. For some time, he could not even produce the title to one of the lots and when pressed to produce it, he admitted he could not find it.

While the respondent might have manifested, in good faith, his intention to complete the task referred to him at the earliest possible time, the results proved otherwise. He did not complete the legal matter referred to him. Necessarily also, the respondent committed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, cited in Lazareto’s complaint. Rule 1.01, in particular, requires that [a] lawyer shall not

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engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct . The IBP Board of Governors completely disregarded this particular aspect of the complaint against the respondent which, to our mind, should have been given proper consideration, if only to remind the members of the Bar to always keep faith with the tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility and as importantly, with their oath. Further, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of his practice of law. Stated differently, any member of the legal fraternity should do nothing that would lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Considering the foregoing, we find the dismissal of the administrative case improvident. What to us comes out in bold relief in reading through the records of this case is a web of deceit and negligence perpetrated by the respondent against the complainant and his family, to their prejudice and to the prejudice of the profession that now has been brought to disrepute by the respondent’s “sharp” practices. How the respondent was able to extricate himself for what he did is reprehensible and casts doubt on the integrity of the IBP and its Commissioners. Thus, the respondent should be m ade to answer for his dishonest dealings with Lazareto and his family, as well as for his negligence in the handling of the task Lazareto had entrusted to him. We say this notwithstanding the layman Lazareto’s desistance, as the respondent’s action was a t ransgression not only of what is due Lazareto as a client but also of the profession and the nation that expect its lawyers to live up to the highest standards of performance in this noble profession. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2012-196, dated June 9, 2012, of the IBP Board of Governors is SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Dennis N. Acorda is ORDERED suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years from and after notice of this Decision. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

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 A lawyer who thrice moved for extension of time to file appellant’s brief FRANCISCO CAOILE v. ATTY. MARCELINO MACARAEG A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015 DEL CASTILLO, J.: FACTS: Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent them in Civil Case No. 11119, an action for recovery of ownership filed before the CFI of Lingayen, Pangasinan.  After the CFI rendered judgment against them, Francisco and his codefendants decided to appeal their case before the CA. Accordingly,  Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension of time to file appellants' brief. In his last motion for extension, he alleged that he was already in the process of doing the finishing touches on the brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief. Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became final and executory on December 13, 1963. Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they were served with the CFI's writ of execution and a notice of sale at public auction of their property in 1965. After confirming with the CA that they indeed lost the case, F rancisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case because they failed to pay him in full. Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and dereliction of duty. In his Answer, Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his codefendants did not pay in full for his services in filing the appeal.  Anent the pacto de retro sale which Francisco and his wife executed in his favor supposedly to cover t he balance of his pr ofessional fees,  Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco who insisted on its execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was intended as

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payment for his services while representing Francisco before the CFI, and not as payment for his services in filing the appeal. Atty. Macaraeg also claimed that, in any case, Francisco did not honor the said pacto de retro sale as the possession of the lot was never turned over to him.Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco's accusation that he neglected their case. He pointed out that to push through with the appeal he even advanced some of the appeal expenses. While he admitted that he failed to submit an appellants' brief, he averred that the same was actually the fault of his clients who failed to provide the necessary funds to file said brief. On September 22, 1966, this Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. From March to November 1967, the Solicitor General conducted several hearings. In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again summoned the parties to appear before it. Notably, the return of the subpoena served upon Atty. Macaraeg contained a notation that  Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now deceased. Subsequently, this case was transferred to the IBP. On October 19, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP came up with a Report and Recommendation. The commissioner noted the long period of time that the Complaint has been pending. Anent the merits of the Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that Atty. Macaraeg neglected the cause of his clients when he thrice moved for extension of time within which to file his brief. However, he did not file any, reasoning out that the non-filing was due to his clients' failure to give him the necessary funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to file the appellant’s brief on b ehalf of his client.

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RULING: YES. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.  A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty. Macaraeg' filed the notice of appeal on August 30, 1962 up to the time he filed the third motion for extension of time to file brief on October 5, 1963. Despite the passage of such time, however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which resulted in the dismissal of his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to file an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the applicantlawyer will file the pleading within the requested extended period. Failure to dojo without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of Professional Responsibility. While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients' failure to give the amount necessary for filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero, shown a more mindful and caring attitude towards the cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case show that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with their obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they enter into a pacto de retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered in connection with their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed that the necessary funds from his clients were not f orthcoming, he could have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a counsel to withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client's failure to comply with the retainer agreement. Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03. Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty, supervening circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case. Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the hearings in this disbarment case were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108 years old by this time.

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It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died. Thereafter, nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these circumstances, it is safe to assume that the complainant had already lost interest in pursuing this disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the handwritten notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already passed away. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.

Attorney’s fees need not be returned after counsel’s dismissal due to loss of trust and confidence. Dalupan v. Gacott | June 29, 2015  A.C. No. 5067 | Villarama, Jr., J. Facts: The complainant engaged the legal service of respondent where the latter charged an acceptance fee of P10,000. She paid the respondent P5,000 as initial payment for his acceptance fee. During the course of the retainer agreement, complainant asked respondent to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond but the latter refused as it was beyond the scope of his retainer services. The complainant paid the remaining balance of the acceptance fee but the respondent refused to issue a receipt. It was alleged by complainant that respondent neglected his duties as counsel and failed to attend any of the hearings before the MTC prompting Judge Dilig to issue an Order appointing a counsel de oficio to represent her. Aggrieved, the complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. The respondent denied all the allegations of the complaint. The Investigating Commissioner opined that respondent cannot be held liable for abandonment or neglect of duty because it was the complainant who discharged the respondent for loss of trust and

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confidence. This was confirmed by the act of the complainant in withdrawing all her records from the law office of the respondent. Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner said that absent evidence showing that the respondent committed abandonment or neglect of duty, the presumption of regularity should prevail in favor of the respondent.  Although there was no evidence to support the claim of the complainant that she paid the respondent the remaining balance of P5,000 as acceptance fee and an appearance fee of P500, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to an Official Receipt dated August 20, 1996 which proved that the complainant indeed paid the respondent an amount of P5,000. However, the Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent did not perform any substantial legal work on behalf of the complainant. For this reason, and in the interest of justice, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the respondent return the amount of P5,000 to the complainant. The said report and recommendation was adopted in toto by the IBP Board of Governors. The respondent filed this present petition which raises the sole issue of whether he should return the payment of the attorney’s fee to the complainant in the amount of P5,000.

Issue: WoN the order to return the attorney’s fee is proper.

Held: NO. A simple reading of the Official Receipt, the parties clearly intended the payment of P5,000 to serve as acceptance fee of the respondent, and not attorney's fee. Moreover, both parties expressly claimed that they intended such payment as the acceptance fee of the respondent. Absent any other evidence showing a contrary intention of the parties, we find that the Investigating Commissioner gravely erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the respondent as attorney's fee.

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Firstly, the Investigating Commissioner seriously erred in referring to the amount to be returned by the respondent as attorney's fee. Relevantly, we agree with the respondent that there is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept , attorney's fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. In this case, the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorney's fee in its ordinary concept. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, he incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. Since the Investigating Commissioner made an erroneous reference to attorney's fee, he therefore mistakenly concluded that the respondent should return the same as he did not perform any substantial legal work on behalf of the complainant. The payment of acceptance fee does not depend on the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. Secondly, the respondent did not commit any fault or negligence which would entail the return of the acceptance fee. The retainer agreement was willfully terminated by the complainant on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. As held by the Investigating Commissioner, the evidence on record shows that the respondent is not liable for abandonment or neglect of duty. The.

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Once a lawyer receives the acceptance fee for his legal services, he is expected to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion. In this case, the complainant alleged that she requested the respondent to draft a Motion to Reduce Bail Bond which was denied by the latter. She also claimed that the respondent failed to attend any of the hearings before the MTC. Thus, the complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment on the ground of abandonment or neglect of duty. On the other hand, the respondent denied the allegation that he failed to draft the Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and submitted a copy of the MTC Order granting the motion to reduce bail. He also justified his failure to attend the hearings before the MTC to the failure of the process server to provide him with a Notice of Hearing. Other than her bare allegations, the complainant failed to present any evidence to support her claim that the respondent committed abandonment or neglect of duty. Absent any fault or negligence on the part of the respondent, we see no legal basis for the order of the Investigating Commissioner to return the attorney's fee (acceptance fee) of P5,000.

Undue delay in court proceedings; misleading the court as to the identity of his client.

VICTOR D. DE LOS SANTOS II, Complainant , v. ATTY. NESTOR C. BARBOSA, Respondents. A.C. No. 6681, June 17, 2015

FACTS: A complaint for Falsification of Public Document was filed by Melba D. De Los Santos Rodis ( Rodis) against her father, Ricardo D. De Los Santos, Sr. (De Los Santos, Sr.) and Rosie P. Canaco (Canaco). Rodis alleged that Canaco made untruthful statements in the certificate of live birth of her son, Victor Canaco De Los Santos. Canaco indicated in her son's certificate of live birth that she was

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married to De Los Santos, Sr. on September 1, 1974 in San Fernando, Camarines Sur when no such marriage took place. Respondent was the counsel de parte of Canaco.

On February 22, 2005, the complainant, Victor de los Santos II filed a Petition for Disbarment with the Court, charging the respondent with multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and delaying the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152 against Canaco. The complainant alleged that the respondent's act of sending out the letters dated May 24, 2004 to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke’s Hospita was criminally and maliciously done to delay, impeded, obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of Canaco, who is the respondent's client and were made to suppress and conceal the subject birth record to impair its availability, authenticity, verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No. 111152 before the MeTC. Compalinant further alleged that the acts of respondent constituted multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer, of the Canons of Professional Ethics, and of his duties as an attorney under the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the respondent argued that the complainant is a disgruntled litigant whose series of cases, filed together with his group, had all been dismissed and the respondent was the opposing counsel in these dismissals. The respondent further asserted that this case is a violation of the rule on forum shopping since it is the tenth case pending on the same set of facts.

The Investigating Commissioner found the defendant guilty of gross violation of his oath as a lawyer and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the said

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findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the IBP Commissioner's recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year to six (6) months. Atty. Barbosa moved to reconsider the BOG resolution. In a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the BOG denied the motion but modified the respondent's suspension from the practice of law to a period of only three months.

committed willful disobedience to a lawful order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the proceedings in the criminal case.

Misleading the Court as to th e Identity of his Client 

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is guilt of unduly delaying the proceedings?

Under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. Particularly, Rule 10.01 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

COURT’S RULING:

 A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. A lawyer's first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.

Unduly Delaying the Proceedings 

Yes. Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.  As an officer of the court, a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice.A lawyer should not only help attain the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and prompt satisfaction of final judgments, but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that may impede, obstruct, or prevent the realization of a speedy and efficient administration of  justice. In the present case, in disregard of the METC's intent to expedite the proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke's Hospital to prevent the prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24, 2004 was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this certified true copy. Thus, the respondent

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In this case, the respondent deliberately misled the MeTC, the Commission and this Court into believing that Victor Canaco De Los Santos (Canaco's son whose birth certificate is at issue in the criminal case) and Victor P. De Los Santos (named in the Information) are different persons. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Commissioner that the difference in the middle initial is a m e r e t y p o g r a p h i c a l e r r o r  on the part of the City Prosecutor. The criminal case involved one and the same Victor Canaco de los Santos whose birth certificate has been at issue. Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission, that might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent  Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law,

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effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

MCLE compliance requirement; Insulting and offensive language against a fellow lawyer

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015 MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant , v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent .

get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong  polpol ." Furthermore, records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise Agreement, both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

FACTS: In the complaint for damages filed by Orlando against his brother Marcelo (represented by Maximino) and several defendants, Orlando provided data regarding his IBP dues payment and MCLE Compliance. Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second. This is one of the bases of this administrative complaint against Orlando for being in violation of Bar Matter 1922. On the other hand, upon receipt of a copy of the complaint for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando, Maximino discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hitrack lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage, x x x

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The above is the other basis for this administrative complaint for being in violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Respondent’s contention: Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith. Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust vexation, which Orlando voluntarily pleaded guilty consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x x . IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

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ISSUE/s: (1) W/N the transgression to the MCLE compliance requirement is a ground for disbarment.

(2) W/N the insulting and offensive private messages of Orlando are violative of the CPR.

HELD: (1) NO. The failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the records.

(2) YES. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency and m orality. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides: Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

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Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

The IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word " polpol " (stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation was an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure f rom the judicial decorum which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them,  whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.

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WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O.  Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Failure of lawyer to deliver to his client the settlement proceeds he received after entering into a Compromise Agreement entered into without the latter’s consent Jun B. Luna vs Atty, Dwight M. Galarrita  AC 10662, July 07, 2015 Leonen, J. Facts: Luna filed an Affidavit-Complaint against his lawyer, Atty. Galarrita before the IBP. He alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita’s legal services in filing a foreclosure complaint against Jose Calvario who allegedly owed him P100,000 secured by a Real Estate Mortage. After his formal offer of evidence, Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party without informing him and without delivering to him the settlement proceeds. When Luna learned of the settlement, he wrote to the respondent stating that the settlement is beyond what they discussed. Atty. Galarrita replied that he entered into the settlement because he was certain that it was better than winning the case and asked for understanding since he had not received any appearance fee for numerous hearings. Luna mentioned that delay in retainer’s fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita’s negligence in handling the case. The respondent explained that the reason why the case was archived was because he could not attend several hearings for lack

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of meal and transportation allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon, but such fact is moot because the case was not dismissed by the court. Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma Tayag, and again from Lutchiare Calvario, regarding the delivery of title since they paid the P100,000 settlement amount. In his answer, Atty. Glarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment case, claiming that he entered into the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. Also, he added that under their General Retainership Agreement, Luna shall pay him P4,000 monthly and after 4 years, the client owes him an unpaid balance of P208,000. He argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien. The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Galarrita guilty of violation Rule 16.03 of the CPR and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 1 year. The IBP board of Governors modified the recommendation, recommending the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for 6 months and ordered to return the amount of P100,000.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for entering into a Compromise Agreement without his client’s consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement proceeds received.

Held: Yes. Complainant Luna entrusted Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in Quezon Province, however, without his consent, the latter settled the case with the other party. There are compelling reasons to believe that Luna had not given any authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement: firstly, Luna was not a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the agreement was executed; secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount

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of P100,000; thirdly, he was not seasonable informed of the execution of the Compromise Agreement.

Even if such authority was given, the SPA still cannot justify the Compromise Agreement on February 14, 2006. The SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 before the filing of the complaint. The conclusion seems to be that the authority given was to enter into a possible settlement during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.

Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall deliver t he funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.

The respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement without the client’s consent and continued to act in bad fait b y refusing to turn over the P100,000 settlement amount received. It is not amiss to state that he entered into the said agreement with the motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorney’s fees. In doing so, he violated the trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03.

The CPR allows the lawyer to apply the money retained to satisfy his lawful fees. However. This provision assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to t he amount of the attorney’s fees and as to the application of the client’s fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements.

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 Atty. Galarrita is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years, with a stern warning. He is ordered to return to the complainant Luna the amount of P100,000 with legal interest of 6% per annum from February 2006 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer’s fee against complainant Luna. Violations of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and which enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients. MABINI COLLEGES v. ATTY PAJARILLO A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Mabini Colleges, Inc. had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions - the Adeva Group and the Lukban Group(complainant) while the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary.

On March 29, 1999, t he Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant. Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application because the  Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties. In reply, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 (later on raised to P400,000) which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. Complainant then filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.

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On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. Respondent’s 3 defenses: 1. That complainant’s cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. 2. That he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of interest because he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve as its legal counsel. 3. That there was no conflict of interest when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage because all the documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant. Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. The Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed such findings. ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed b y complainant against RBP. HELD: Yes. 1. The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to show any written

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consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests. We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client. Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest. 2. A complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. The complainants can institute the complaint for disbarment even without authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

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 A LAWYER SHOULD ALWAYS PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF HIS CLIENTS CELINA ANDRADA VS ATTY RODRIGO CERA AC 10187, JULY 22, 2015 || BRION, J. FACTS: Celina hired the services of Atty. Rodrigo Cera to represent her in an annulment of marriage pending before the RTC of Baguio City. She gave P3,000.00 to respondent for the processing and issuance of her children’s birth certificates which were not registered because her husband failed to accomplish the certificates. These documents were needed in her case for annulment of marriage. She also gave the amount of P10,000.00 as advance payment for the hiring of a psychologist. When she asked from the NSO the release of her children’s birth certificates, she was requested to provide the receipt for the request. Knowing it was with respondent, she called him up but she failed to get even the receipt number; respondent assured her that the payment for the request had been made. When she failed to get the receipt or receipt number, she requested confirmation of payment with the NSO; thereat, she found out that respondent never paid nor filed the applications for birth certificates. Through her father Freddie J. Farres, she requested surrender of the NSO receipt and return of the P10,000.00 she gave to respondent; despite receipt, respondent failed to heed the demand letter. Celina then filed an administrative case against Atty. Cera, alleging deceitful, irresponsible and unprofessional conduct on the part of the latter, resulting in the unwarranted delay of her case and forcing her to file anew an annulment case against her husband. Respondent did not appear in the mandatory conference nor filed his answer to the complaint. In April, 2012, respondent returned the amount of P17,000.00 to the complainant pursuant to a compromise agreement in exchange for the dismissal of the case for estafa she filed against respondent. He also promised to secure the birth certificates of her children, an undertaking he has yet to fulfil. In its report and recommendation, the IBP Commissioner recommended the imposition of three years suspension from the practice of law of respondent, upon a finding that he engaged in

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unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct against his client’s interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR, as well as misappropriation of funds entrusted to him and failing to account and return his client’s money upon demand. The IBP Board of Governors modified the recommended penalty to one year suspension. I s s u e :  Whether or not respondent is guilty of the administrative charge against him. R u l i n g :   YES. When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will

exercise due diligence in protecting his client’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society. It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client’s case and completely reneged on the obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant’s children. Despite the complainant’s repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further d elay in the proceedings of the complainant’s annulment case. Clearly, these actions show the respondent’s negligence and lack of zeal in handling the complainant’s case, for which he should be made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the complainant’s money. The money given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes, as

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could be gleaned from the NSO’s non-issuance of birth certificates of the complainant’s children, and by the non -administration of psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. The respondent, likewise, violated Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 (which provides that “a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand”) when he failed to return the complainant’s money upon demand. We note that it was only after a year that the respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him, returned the complainant’s money. The respondent’s rest itution cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned the complainant’s money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal liability. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

 ABUSE OF COURT PROCESSES IN VIOLATIONS OF CANON 10  AND 12 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PATROCINIA H. SALABAO v. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR. A.C. No. 8084 August 24, 2015 DEL CASTILLO, J .: FACTS: Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent conduct of taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.

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Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant complained that Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as a litigant.In 2002, the Regional Trial Court Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory. Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for  Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City.

Complainant then complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10  and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had centered on the legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title

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of Lumberio in such ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for cancellation of title before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground to cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio. In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client" 5 which he considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment." He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.In its Resolution the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Issue: Should respondent be held administratively liable? Ruling: YES. While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, it cannot be emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of  justice." Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms: Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court: Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as

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appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law; xxxx (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause,  from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied ) Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice . Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions  arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes. (Emphasis supplied ) Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005. Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts subsequent to the Entry of Judgment.From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a

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mockery of Our judicial system. We take exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31 July 2002 which has long become final and executory. This is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive respondent of the fruits of her victory.It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months. GROSS MISCONDUCT RESULTING TO INEXCUSABLE DELAY OF CLIENT’S CAUSE

Mary Ann T. Flores, Complainant, vs. Atty. Jovencio LL. Mayor, Jr., Respondent  A.C. NO. 7314, August 25, 2015 Per Curiam FACTS: Jose Roberto Flores, herein complainant’s husband, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JMJB International Services, Inc. before the NLRC. Flores’ case was raffled to respondent Labor  Arbiter Mayor Jr. Respondent ruled that there was no illegal dismissal as Flores voluntarily resigned from employment. Flores appealed the case to the NLRC, but the appeal was dismissed for having filed out of time. Flores thereafter elevated the case to the CA

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and the latter reversed the ruling of the NLRC finding that the appeal was timely filed. The CA declared the NLRC ruling null and void and granted monetary award to Flores. Consequently, counsel of Flores then filed a motion for execution of the CA’s decision. Counsel of Flores received from the CA a Notice of Transmittal of Records of Case addressed to the Clerk of Court of the NLRC. As respondent was not acting on the Motion for Execution, the counsel of Flores filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation praying that the motion be resolved with dispatch. Flores’ counsel subsequently learned that the records of the case were still being requested from the Records Section of the NLRC. The Records Officer of the NLRC likewise disclosed that case records had been sent for archiving and were difficult to retrieve. Two years after this reception of information, respondent Mayor, Jr. finally issued a W rit of Execution against JMJB International Services, Inc. By that t ime, the corporation had not yet been dissolved, but had already amended its name to F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc. This amendment prompted the counsel of Flores to file a Motion to Amend Writ of Execution. Respondent, however, refused to act on the motion, reasoning that F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc. was not a party to the case.  Accordingly, complainant filed an administrative case against respondent, citing that the latter's act of archiving the records of the labor case and refusal to amend the Writ of Execution constituted a violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards. IBP Commisioner recommended that respondent be disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and affirmed IBP Commisioner’s recommendation but modified the penalty of disbarment to suspension for 3 years. Respondent moved to reconsider, but the IBP Board of Governors denied the same and instead reinstated the penalty of disbarment. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and other ethical standards. HELD:  YES. Respondent was clearly neglectful of duty and ignorant of the law in failing to immediately act on the Motion

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for Execution, as well as his refusal to amend the Writ of Execution despite having been informed of the amendment of the name - but not the dissolution — of the corporation against which the writ was issued.

severe penalty. In light of respondent's previous suspension from the practice of law in an earlier administrative case as above-mentioned, the recommendation of the IBP Board to disbar respondent is only proper.

Respondent’s justification canno t be countenanced, as it was through his fault that the records of the case were lost. That he archived the case records at the NLRC Records Section, not on the basis of official or sanctioned guidelines but only because it was the common practice in his office, reflects his lack of due diligence and care in the custody of official documents.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MCLE

While delay in the processing of documents normally occurs, it was inexcusable and out of the ordinary for respondent to allow a period of more than two years to lapse before acting on the motion. This omission amounts to gross misconduct as the unnecessary delay has caused prejudice to complainant. Respondent also erroneously interprets jurisprudence when he insists that the writ could not have been issued against F.O. Maidin International Services, Inc., because it was not a party to the case. His argument contravenes the pronouncement of the Court in Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals, in which it said that "a change in the corporate name does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act or under general law, has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities." 

FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A.  Adaza for his failure to comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.

 As a Labor Arbiter, respondent is a public officer who must at all times be accountable to the people, whom he must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The unjustified delay in his actions and his failure to act according to law constituted a breach of his accountability not only to complainant, but also to the public in general. With respect to the imposable penalty, herein respondent was already suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months in another case, Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr., in which he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. For that offense, he was warned that the commission of the same or a similar offense in the future would result in the imposition of a more

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SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent. A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015 CARPIO, J.

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado called the attention of this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes,  Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation. In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation, the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14

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January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. In his Compliance and Comment, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for himself. Respondent further claimed that he had written five books. Thus, he asked f or a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE requirements. The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption. The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid. The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of noncompliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to comply with t he requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.

HELD: YES. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012 to the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office. He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period. Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period. The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed

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that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still asking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office. Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period; (2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013; (3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

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Violation of the Notarial Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Sappayani vs. Gasmen AC No. 7073, September 1, 2015 FACTS: In his Complaint-Affidavit, Sappayani alleged that Atty. Gasmen notarized documents which he purportedly executed, particularly, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Newtrade Goodwill Corporation (NGC) through Romeo N. Maravillas (Maravillas) and an Application for Loan and Promissory Note (loan application) with Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AMWSLAI). The SPA, which was notarized by Atty. Gasmen on March 29, 2000, authorized NGC through Maravillas to complete the loan application with AMWSLAI and thereafter, receive its proceeds. Thus, by virtue of said notarized documents, AMWSLAI released to Maravillas, as representative of NGC, a loan amounting to P157,301.43.

However, Sappayani denied executing said documents, claiming that his signature found on the SPA was forged as he did not know Maravillas. Neither did he authorize Maravillas to enter into any transaction on his behalf. Sappayani added that it was physically impossible for him to personally appear before Atty. Gasmen and execute the documents at the AMWSLAI office in Quezon City, as he was then training as a new recruit at the Bureau of Fire Protection at General Santos City.  After more than two (2) years, Atty. Gasmen filed his Comment dated May 26, 2008 and claimed, among others, that the notarization of the SPA and loan application was done only after the release of the proceeds of the loan to Maravillas, who then released the same to one Zenaida C. Razo (Razo), the marketing representative of NGC for Region V. According to Atty. Gasmen, Razo was also the one responsible for taking the purported loan of Sappayani, the proceeds of which the latter never received. Moreover, he asserted

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that prior to notarization, Sappayani's signature on the SPA was compared with his signature specimen cards with AMWSLAI, of which he was an honorary m ember. Finally, he claimed that by practice, notarization of loan applications at AMWSLAI was done "on a ministerial basis" albeit with "proper safeguards," and that documents were notarized only after the loan is released and the  AMWSLAI President has approved the same. As such, notarization was merely a way of completing the loan documentation requirements of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP correctly found Atty. Gasmen liable for violation of the Notarial Rules and the CPR.

HELD: The Court notes that both the SPA and the loan application subject of this case were notarized in 2000, during which Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Chapter 11, otherwise known as the "Notarial Law," in addition to Act No. 2103, governed the rules on notaries public.

Section 1 (a) of Act No. 2103 provides:

Section 1. x x x

(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if

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he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

One of the obligations of a notary public is to authenticate documents acknowledged before him, certifying the truth thereof under his seal of office. When acknowledging a document, it is required that the person who signed or executed the same, appears in person before the notary public and represents to the latter that the signature on the document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the document, declaring the same as his free and voluntary act and deed. Thereafter, the notary public affixes his notarial seal on the instrument which certifies the due execution of the document, and resultantly, converts a private document into a public document which on its face, is entitled to full faith and credit.clawrednad

In the discharge of his powers and duties, the notary public's certification is one impressed with public interest, accuracy and fidelity such that he owes it to the public to notarize only when the person who signs the document is the same person who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to his knowledge of the contents stated therein. Thus, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of an affiant's personal appearance and makes the failure to observe such rule punishable. In fact, such necessity has been further stressed in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, which provides:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -

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(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan application were notarized, the proceeds were already released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was merely done on a ministerial  basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to require the personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications brought to him for signing.

subject documents, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well f or violation of the pertinent rules of the CPR, particularly Rule 1.01, Canon 1 which provides: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. I t is impressed with substantial public interest, and only those who are qualified or authorized may act as such. It is not a purposeless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay fees for notarization. 23 Moreover, notarization of a private document, such as an SPA in this case, converts the document into a public one which, on its face, is given full faith and credit. Thus, the failure of Atty. Gasmen to observe the utmost care in the performance of his duties caused not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and tainted the function of notarization.

 As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to modify the penalty recommended by the IBP. The Court has ruled that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is meted out the following penalties: (7) revocation of notarial commission; (2) disqualification from being commissioned as notary public; and (3) suspension from the practice of law - the terms of which vary based on the circumstances of each case. In this case, while the IBP Commissioner found the absence of bad faith and considered Atty. Gasmen as a first time offender, the Court finds that the penalties of disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year are proper. 26 On this score, the Court observes that  Atty. Gasmen did not deny notarizing the documents without the presence of Sappayani and indirectly admitted doing the same with other similar documents and affiants. Thus, such practice, he evidently countenanced fraud.

Further, as a lawyer, Atty. Gasmen is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. By notarizing the

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Renato G. Gasmen GUILTY of violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective

The Court is not persuaded.

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immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

DECEITFUL CONDUCT AND VIOLATING THE LAWYER’S OATH Intestate Estate of Jose Uy, and Administrator Wilson Uy v. Atty. Pacifico Maghari III  A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015 LEONEN, J.: Facts: On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-241. Hofileña was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children. In its Order dated June 9, 1998, the Regional T rial Court designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate. Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution dated September 14, 2007. In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose Uy. In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy. In its Order dated April 20, 2010, the Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy.

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Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy. In signing the motion, Atty. Maghari indicated the same professional details, aside from his name, as those found in Atty. Natu- el’s motion for a Subpoena ad Testificandum; the IBP O.R. number, PTR Number, Roll Number, and MCLE Compliance Number were all copied with slight additions. On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition. Maghari then indicated a different set of IBP O.R., PTR and MCLE numbers, whilst keeping the same Bar Roll Number previously used. The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash. Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated a wholly different set of IBP O.R., PTR, Roll, and MCLE numbers in the professional details.  As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum dated March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated once again, a completely different set of professional details as before.  At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations. This prompted W ilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El. Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to explain why he had

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been usurping the professional details of another lawyer. The Regional Trial Court declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified petition asking that she be so cited had been filed. Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment. Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Maghari engaged in unethical conduct.

Ruling: Yes. Atty. Maghari III engaged in deceitful conduct violating not only the lawyer’s oath, but every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court and client. Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were mere overlooked errors. He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He faults complainant for "nitpicking" and calls him a "sore loser" and a "disgruntled litigant" who is merely "making a mountain out of a molehill" and is predisposed to "fault-finding. He even provides his supposedly correct professional details for “the satisfaction of the complainant”. Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail to impress.

The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and respondent admits their existence. No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking violation of statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the legal profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as a possible result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client. Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility. LAWYER’S SIGNATURE; PURPOSE:  As per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere m eans for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, under Canon 9.01: “A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. “  A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause. IBP O.R. NUMBER, PROFESSIONAL TAX RECEIPT NUMBER, AND BAR ROLL NUMBER; PURPOSE:

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The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. W ith the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information, in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus lawyers." Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government units. MCLE NUMBER; PURPOSE: The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law." ADDRESS AND CONTACT DETAILS; PURPOSE: Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better representation of a client's cause. There have been in the past when, because of failure to inform the court of the change of address, litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the other parties and the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a setback in a

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legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure to receive notice because the latter has changed the place of his law office without giving the proper notice therefor. These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the profession that one brandishes. Facts proving Intent to Deceive: Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are products of mere inadvertence. To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow found their way into respondent's own pleadings. Certainly, these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer themselves from a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must have actually performed the act of copying and transferring; that is, someone must have intended to copy and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for this could have only been respondent or someone acting under his instructions; the pleadings on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings. Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el. T he facts of m odification and addition show active human intervention to make something more out of m arkings that could otherwise have simply been reproduced.

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Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natuel were discarded while some were retained. The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no longer his IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number. This gradual act of segregating information —discarding some while retaining others, and retaining less over time —reveals that the author of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded from those that were to be retained. Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim that the error was committed by a secretary is inconsequential. In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his correct professional details. We emphasize, however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies of the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other supporting documents. All that he relies on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but respondent, himself, was in a better position to produce the documents that could prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well mean that they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from producing them. The latter would be more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation the basic presumption "[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." In any case, even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a false IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of  Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a total of seven (7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times. It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of the very same badges —his place in the Roll of  Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing training and competence—that are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason

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for preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these badges signify. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.

DISBARMENT; MOCKERY OUT OF THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE  Atty. Roy Ecraela vs Atty. Ian Raymond Pangalanan  A.C No. 10676, September 8, 2015

FACTS: Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. Aside from the illicit relations, rrespondent as a lawyer of Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, represented the interest of Manila International  Airport Authority against Kendrick Dev’t Corporation. However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA’s case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government. In return for his “earnest efforts” in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allege dly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL by Atty. Espejo. In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant

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faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019. Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator where respondent induced his male students to engage in “nocturnal preoccupations” and entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades.

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.

In his undated Answer, respondent opted not to present any counterstatement of facts in support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him.

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicitrelations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007,including complainant’s own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to establish respondent’s illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution disbarring respondent and striking off his name in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether respondent committed gross immoral conduct which would warrant his disbarment

HELD: Yes. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one’s good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

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This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to havenot only failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by m aintaining illicit affairs.

 Aside from respondent’s illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid’s findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS  AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

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 ALLEGED DECEITFUL ACTS AGAINST CLIENT; NEGLIGENCE IN HANDLING THE CASE

Felicisima Mendoza Vda de Robosa vs. Atty Juan Mendoza and Atty. Eusebio Navarro  AC No. 6056, September 9, 2015 Villarama, J. FACTS: Eladio Mendoza applied for original registration of t wo parcels of land situated in Calamba, Laguna before the CENRO and LMB. While his application was pending, Eladio died, leaving all his children as heirs to his estate. The children pursued the application and executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of herein complainant. Their relative (cousin of complainant), Atty. Mendoza, prepared and notarized the said SPA. They also engaged the latter’s services as their counsel in the proceedings before the CENRO and LMB. On February 20, 1993, upon the behest of Atty. Mendoza, Felicisima signed a Contract for Service, wherein it was stipulated that should a favorable judgment be rendered by the CENRO or LMB, Felicisima shall convey to Atty. Mendoza 1/5 of the lands subject of the application or 1/5 of the proceeds should the same property be sold. The CENRO and the LMB proceedings resulted in the dismissal of the application for Lot No. 2489 and a partial grant for Lot No 3771. One-third of the latter parcel of land was registered in the name of the Mendoza heirs and was later on sold to Greenfield Corporation for P7, 120,800.00. Subsequently, Atty. Mendoza filed a Complaint (Civil Case No. T 1080) before the RTC against Felicisima and her siblings, claiming that except for the amount of P40, 000.00, the latter refused to pay his attorney’s fees equivalent to 1/5 of the proceeds of the sale of the land as stipulated in the Contract for Service. In their Answer with Counterclaim, Felicisima and her siblings vehemently denied the “existence and authenticity of the Contract of Service”, adding that it

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did not reflect the true intention of the parties. They also asserted that based on quantum meruit, Atty. Mendoza is not entitled to the claimed attorney’s fees because they lost in one case and he failed to accomplish the titling of the land awarded to them, which would have enhanced the property. In this Civil Case, Felicisima and her siblings engaged the services of Atty. Navarro as their counsel. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Mendoza, stating that Felicisima failed to substantiate her claim that she did not enter into a contingency contract for legal services with Atty. Mendoza. They were ordered to pay Atty. Mendoza P1, 258,000.00, representing attorney’s fees, as well as cost of suit. Atty. Navarro then filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Felicisima. However, Atty. Mendoza moved for an execution pending appeal with the RTC and since no opposition was filed, the RTC granted the said motion and issued a writ of execution, resulting in the levy and eventual transfer of Felicisima’s properties in favor of Atty. Mendoza as the highest bidder in an execution sale. The CA ordered Felicisima to file an appellant’s brief but Atty. Navarro  failed to file the same within the reglementary period, consequently leading to its dismissal for noncompliance with Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. On June 3, 2003, Felicisima filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment before the Supreme Court against Atty. Mendoza for allegedly deceiving her into signing a Contract for Service by taking advantage of her illiteracy and against Atty. Navarro for dereliction of duty in handling her case before the CA, causing her properties to be levied and sold at public auction. In his Comment, Atty. Mendoza avers that he has been a lawyer since 1954 and retired sometime in 1983 due to partial disability. He went back to practicing his profession in 1996 on a selective basis due to his disability but completely stopped a year after. Being 82 years of age at the time of filing his comment, Atty. Mendoza admits that he is now totally disabled, cannot walk on his own, cannot even write and sign his name, and can only move about with the help of his family for he has been suffering from a severe case of "acute gouty arthritic attack" which causes extreme difficulty in moving

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virtually all his joints. He points out that he had previously handled  pro bono a concubinage case filed by Felicisima against her husband, having yielded to her repeated pleas as she was then financially hard-up and psychologically distraught. For the application with the CENRO and LMB, he agreed to be paid for his legal services on a contingent basis, which contract was subsequently found by the RTC to be valid. When it was time to collect his attorney's fees, Felicisima and her siblings refused to pay him without any justifiable reason and even threatened to shoot him if he continued to press for his compensation. This left Atty. Mendoza with no other recourse but to avail of the judicial process to enforce his claim. On his part, Atty. Navarro asserts that he did his best to win Felicisima's case although he was unsuccessful. He explains that even before handling Felicisima's case, he had been saddled by many cases involving politicians and sympathizers, having previously served as councilor in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Batangas for two consecutive terms. He thus emphasized to Felicisima that in order to "keep the case alive", he could file the Notice of Appeal in her behalf, and instructed her to look for another lawyer who has the time to attend to her case and that she would return to him only when she failed to get one. However, Atty. Navarro admits that since he was too preoccupied with so many cases in the local courts, he had altogether forgotten about Felicisima's case, not having seen her again as per their agreement. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) submitted her Report and Recommendation finding  Atty. Mendoza guilty of taking advantage of Felicisima's ignorance  just to have the Contract for Service signed. She held that Atty. Mendoza violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, as well as Rule 20.04, Canon 20 which exhorts lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning matters of compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.  As to Atty. Navarro, the Investigating Commissioner held that his

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participation in politics affected his law practice and caused him to forget about Felicisima's case. Having failed to file the appellant's brief as ordered by the CA, Atty. Navarro even filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance at a very late stage, leaving no time for Felicisima to secure the services of another lawyer. His infraction caused the eviction of Felicisima and her children from their residence by virtue of the writ of execution and public auction of her real properties. The Investigating Commissioner further said that  Atty. Navarro's acts showed lack of diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the CPR and his Lawyer's Oath. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that both Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro be suspended for two (2) years from the practice of law. The IBP Board of Governors modified the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, lowering the period of suspension to six months.

ISSUE: Are Atty. Mendoza and Atty. Navarro administratively liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING: 1.

Atty. Mendoza is NOT guilty of allegedly deceiving his client.

It appears that Felicisima raised the issue of voluntariness of her signing the Contract for Service only during the hearing when she supposedly testified that, having reached only Grade IV and trusting completely her lawyer cousin, Atty. Mendoza who told her that the document will protect her from the claims of her siblings, she actually signed the Contract for Service. The RTC, however, found the evidence adduced by Felicisima as insufficient to defeat Atty. Mendoza's claim for attorney's fees. Said judgment had attained finality and even pending appeal was already executed on motion by

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 Atty. Mendoza. It bears to stress that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this  jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The validity of contingent fees depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party.  Apart from the allegations in her affidavit-complaint, Felicisima failed to establish by clear and satisfactory proof of the deception allegedly committed by Atty. Mendoza when she agreed in writing for the latter's contingent fees. Fraud and irregularity in the execution of their contingency fee contract cannot be deduced from the fact alone that Atty. Mendoza filed suit to enforce their contract.

2.

from the said premises. Worse, he failed to file an appellant's brief despite receipt of the order from the CA directing him to do so within the period specified therein, and to file a motion for reconsideration when the appeal was dismissed due to non-filing of such brief. His motion for extension of time to submit an appellant's brief was filed 93 days late and was thus denied by the CA. Barely a week after, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance bearing the conformity of his clients which was granted. It is evident from the foregoing that  Atty. Navarro failed to inform Felicisima of the status of the case so that the latter was surprised upon being served the eviction order of the court and eventual dismissal by the CA of their appeal. Canon 18 of the CPR mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Navarro is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 6 months. The charges against Atty. Mendoza are dismissed.

Atty. Navarro is guilty of dereliction of duty.

Lawyers engaged to represent a client in a case bear the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with warmth, zeal and utmost diligence. 36 They must constantly keep in mind that their actions or omissions would be binding on the client. 37 In this case, Atty. Navarro agreed to represent Felicisima and her siblings in Civil Case No. T-1080 and as their counsel he filed the  Answer with Counterclaim. He likewise attended the hearings of the case until the RTC rendered an adverse judgment. However, after filing the Notice of Appeal, nothing was heard of again from him. He did not file any opposition when Atty. Mendoza moved for execution pending appeal, which resulted in the sale of Felicisima's properties at public auction and eventual eviction of Felicisima and her children

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WILLFUL AND DELIBERATE FORUM SHOPPING HAS BEEN MADE PUNISHABLE EITHER AS DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT

DAVID WILLIAMS, Complainant, v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent. A.C. No. 8319, September 16, 2015 Facts: Spouses Williams filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 for disbarment, dated June 26, 2009, against Atty. Enriquez for 1] violation of the

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rule on forum shopping; and 2] purposely filing a groundless, false and unlawful suit. Spouses Williams alleged that in December 2002, a complaint for forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 390,8 was filed against them before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC), by Desiderio Briones Ventolero, Francisco Briones Ventolero, Ramon Verar, Martin Umbac, and Lucia Briones (plaintiffs), where Atty. Enriquez acted as their counsel. The case involved a parcel of land, Lot No. 2920, situated in San Miguel, Bacong, Negros Oriental. The MCTC resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs, and on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 44, in Dumaguete City (RTC-Br.44) affirmed the decision.9 While the case was under reconsideration, Judge Candelario V. Gonzales of RTC-Br. 44 inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled and assigned to RTC, Branch 32 (RTC-Br. 32), presided by Judge Roderick A. Maxino (Judge Maxino). On November 8, 2006, RTC-Br. 32 reversed and set aside the MCTC decision and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry against Spouses Williams. Spouses Williams also alleged that during the pendency of Civil Case No. 390, Atty. Enriquez instructed Paciano Ventolero Umbac (Paciano) to use death threats to chase off their caretaker and then to illegally invade Lot 2920 and destroy an old house owned by their predecessor/vendor, Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (Orlando); that as a result, Marisa Williams (Marisa) and Orlando filed Civil Case No. 502-B for forcible entry against Paciano where a decision was rendered in their favor and a writ of execution was issued ordering Paciano to vacate the property. According to Spouses Williams, Atty. Enriquez, who was representing himself as the counsel of the plaintiffs, was nothing more than the leader of a group of usurpers, squatters and would be extortionists who were trying to punish them because they refused an earlier demand for a cash payoff. Spouses Williams further claimed that Atty. Enriquez subsequently drafted a new complaint for f orcible entry, falsely alleging that Marisa and Orlando together with two hired goons forcibly entered Lot 2920

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and ejected Paciano by throwing rocks at him and hitting various parts of his body; that the two goons wrecked the old house; and that Paciano was the owner of Lot 2920 by way of successional rights from his grandparents, Aurea and Ceriaco Ventolero. Spouses Williams added that Atty. Enriquez, in order to prevent another administrative case, instructed Paciano to file the case f or forcible entry on his own and he would thereafter take over as counsel of record; and that Paciano, under the direction of Atty. Enriquez, filed the complaint for forcible entry, docketed as Civil Case No. 521-B. On May 27, 2008, the MCTC dismissed the subsequent suit on the ground of litis pendentia. It found that in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil Case No. 521-B, there was an "almost word-for-word similarity" in the two complaints; that both involved the same subject matter; that the plaintiffs in the two suits shared the same cause of action as both claimed prior physical possession; and that the parties in the two cases shared a community of interest. Spouses Williams asserted that although Atty. Enriquez did not sign the complaint in Civil Case No. 521-B, there was proof that he drafted it and participated in the filing of the case considering that (1) Paciano was illiterate, spoke no English, and could not possibly draft the complaint without the help of Atty. Einriquez; (2) the complaints in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil Case No. 521-B were identical, (3) the person who marked the annexes in Civil Case No. 390 and Civil Case No. 521-B had identical handwriting with that of Atty. Enriquez; and (4) the Answer to Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 521-B was prepared, verified and filed by Atty. Enriquez. Lastly, Spouses Williams informed the Court that they previously filed an administrative case, docketed as A.C. No. 7329, against  Atty. Enriquez for knowingly making untruthM statements in the complaint in Civil Case No. 390 and that the IBP suspended him for a period of one (1) year. The Court, however, in its Resolution, dated November 27, 2013, set aside the IBP Resolution and dismissed the administrative case.

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In his Comment, Atty. Enriquez countered that he was merely representing the heirs of Aurea Briones V entolero who were defending their title over Lot 2920. In its Report and Recommendation, dated August 4, 2011, the IBPCBD found that Atty. Enriquez failed to squarely refute the charge of forum shopping and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar f or six (6) months.

In its Resolution, dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD finding Atty. Enriquez liable for violation of the rule on forum-shopping.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Enriquez is guilty of forum shopping.

Ruling: YES. As correctly observed by the IBP, Atty. Enriquez did not deny the allegation that he engaged in forum-shopping. Atty. Enriquez knew that in Civil Case No. 390, the MCTC decision was reversed and set aside on appeal and the complaint for forcible entry was dismissed against Spouses Williams. He, nonetheless, drafted another complaint for forcible entry involving Lot 2920 and prodded Paciano, also an alleged heir of Aurea and Ceriaco Ventolero, to file Civil Case No. 521-B, against Spouses Williams. Even if Atty. Enriquez did not sign the complaint in Civil Case No. 521, he could still be held administratively liable because he obviously wrote the complaint as could be gleaned from the similarity of the words and phrases used in the complaint in Civil Case No. 390. Atty. Enriquez likewise prepared and verified the answer to the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 521-B, another proof that he knew and actively participated in the litigation of Civil Case 521-B. Doubtless, this undesirable practice violated his oath as a member of the Bar and transgressed the known virtues and values which the legal profession demands from its members.

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 As a retired judge, Atty. Enriquez should know that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.  Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation.19 In engaging in such malpractice, Atty. Enriquez violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey t he laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and the legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice,20 and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes.21 For all his reprehensible actions, the Court deems it appropriate to suspend  Atty. Enriquez for six (6) months from the practice of law.

A notary public must observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.

Bartolome vs Basilio  AC No. 10783 | October 14, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe. J.: Facts: Bartolome alleged that Basilio, a notary public in Tarlac City, notarized a document entitled "Joint Affidavit of Non-Tenancy and  Aggregate Landholdings” purportedly subscribed and sworn to before him by Tanedo and Lim despite the fact that Tañedo had already passed away three years before the signing. In his Answer, Basilio admitted having notarized the Joint Affidavit but claimed that, prior to the notarization, he verified the identities of the persons who appeared before him through their respective Social Security System (SSS) identification cards and driver's licenses. He further denied any knowledge that the one who appeared before him

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misrepresented himself as T añedo and that the latter was already dead.

personally known to the notary public or has not identified himself through competent evidence of identity.

During the clarificatory hearing, Basilio, who undisputedly notarized the Joint Affidavit, admitted his failure to: ( a) record the subject document in his notarial book; (b) submit a copy of the same to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City (RTC); and ( c ) have the notarization revoked or recalled.

The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

IBP – found Basilio to have manifested gross negligence and a complete disregard of Notarial Rules. And recommended that Basilio's notarial commission, if still existing, be revoked; he be disqualified from obtaining a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Issue: whether or not the IBP correctly found Basilio liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.

Held: YES. As the records bear out, Basilio affixed his official signature and seal on the notarial certificate of the Joint Affidavit without properly identifying the person/s who signed the same. His claim that he verified the identities of the affiants through their respective SSS identification cards and driver's licenses cannot be given any credence considering the ostensible lack of their details on the face of the certificate. Neither was he able to provide the fact of identification in any way. On the other hand, it has been established that one of the named signatories to the Joint Affidavit was already dead when he notarized the aforesaid document. Hence, it is sufficiently clear that Basilio had indeed affixed his official signature and seal on an incomplete, if not false, notarial certificate. Moreover, by the same account, Basilio the Notarial Rules that prohibits the notarization of a document if the person involved is not

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GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT (ILLICIT RELATIONS) AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

NELSON P. VALDEZ v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR. AC NO. 7353 November 16, 2015 SERENO, C.J. FACTS: Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intim idation. Nelson averred, among others, that his wife, Sonia was employed as Court Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her resignation on May 15, 2006; and that she admitted to have had an adulterous and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006. He came to know of the relationship after receiving an anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair between the two and that initially, Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when confronted with a text message he received from Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the respondent. Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her infidelity and described her extramarital affair with Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual

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assaults and maintained through intimidation and threats of exposure, humiliation and em barrassment.

Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship with Att y. Dabon started sometime in November 2000 and ended in March 2006 when she, bothered by her conscience, decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued her for years and even admitted that he fell in love with her the first time he laid eyes on her; that on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug into her food or drink causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep silent about the incident for fear of its adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her and her family; that she pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had happened, but the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a week through intimidation and threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that he would tell everyone that she had been playing around with him, if she would not yield to his lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in silence for years and submitted herself to the bestial desires of  Atty. Dabon, until she even thought that she was in love with him. Sonia further claimed that after years of living in deception and infidelity, she decided to call it quits with Atty. Dabon sometime in March 2006 but he could not let go of their relationship; that Atty. Dabon started pestering and threatening her through phone calls and handwritten messages in vile attempts to persuade her to continue their illicit affair; that despite their break -up, Atty. Dabon still pursued his lustful quest by bringing her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue on March 10, 2006, but she foiled his plan when she went ballistic prompting the respondent to drive her back to the CA; that on March 13, 2006, Atty. Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded for forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained firm in her resolve to end the affair; that she had to seek the assistance of her off icemates,  just to convince Atty. Dabon to alight from her car as the said

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incident had already drawn the attention of several employees within the vicinity of the CA parking lot; that Atty. Dabon used the members of his staff to relay his messages and deliver his handwritten letters to her; that Atty. Dabon, angered by her repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a letter which stated, among others, that he could no longer stand her constant avoidance of him and that he would divulge their illicit relationship to her husband; that it numbed her with fright, so she called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity, and told her that Atty. Dabon was harassing an employee at the CA; that Atty. Dabon sent a text message to Nelson telling him of the extramarital affair; that Atty. Joy called up Nelson and informed him that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had confessed to her the illicit relationship; and that when she was asked by Nelson, she initially denied the affair for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the truth and explained to him that she was merely a victim of Atty. Dabon's threat and intimidation which led to their illicit relationship. Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon' s willful, flagrant and shameless conduct was in gross defiance of the customs, values and sense of morality of the community. He prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral acts showed his lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass, annoy and besmirch his reputation. Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to malign his name and honor. . He contended that it was highly improbable for him, a married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn crazy and abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia, "an ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with two (2) teen aged children. The filing of the complaint for disbarment was motivated by

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vengeance against him as Nelson was consummed by his suspicion that he had seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of their marriage. He was a victim caught in the crossfire between the troubled couple, Nelson and Sonia. There was no truth to Sonia's allegation that he was attracted to her from the first time he saw her much less pursued her relentlessly. He and Sonia were just close friends. He was Sonia's confidante. She would usually confide in him her personal woes and problems especially those concerning her husband, Nelson. It was Sonia who aggressively sought his companionship and frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and other goodies. His friendship with Sonia turned sour when she learned of his plan to settle for good in the Unites States with his family. Sonia began to avoid him. He exerted efforts to make her understand his decision, but to no avail. He presented cards expressing Sonia's affection towards him as well as the expensive gifts she gave him which belied her claim that she was sexually assaulted and that she resisted his alleged sexual advances. Further, he denied sending Nelson the alleged text messages and that all were part of an elaborate scheme to force him to immediately resign as Division Clerk of Court from the CA. Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia through text messages and phone calls. It was he who was the victim of harassment from Nelson, who orchestrated a series of events that compelled him to leave the country earlier than scheduled for fear that an untoward incident might happen to him.

IBP Commissioner: Found Atty. Dabon guilty of gross immoral conduct and, accordingly, be disbarred and dropped from the Roll of  Attorneys. IBP Board of Governors: ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. (MR, denied)

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dabon is guilty of violating the CPR.

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HELD: YES. After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain m embership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's legal wife. Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself. In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia. More telling of the existence of a romantic relationship are the notes and cards that Sonia sent to Atty.

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Dabon containing personal and intimate messages in her own handwriting. The messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards him as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey." There were also gifts she gave him on special occasions such as signature shoes, watch and shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently visited him in his office either to bring him food, fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch which apparently displayed her emotional attachment to him. Curiously, the foregoing was never refuted by Sonia. Such "egoboosting admissions" of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a consensual relationship between him and Sonia existed. It has not escaped the Court's attention either that Atty. Dabon really tried hard to win back Sonia because he could not let go of their r elationship, even to the point of pestering her with his persistent pleas for reconciliation.

Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said harassments, he offered only denials which was self-serving and weak under the law on evidence. In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was made possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidations, to be untrue. Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words of endearment. The natural reaction of a victim of a sexual molestation would be to avoid her ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that Sonia continually remained in the company of Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to bring food whenever the latter was preoccupied with his workload and could not go out with her to eat. Verily, Sonia's actuations towards  Atty. Dabon are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one who had been repeatedly sexually abused.

Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if such was the truth. She could have placed the respondent behind bars and put an end to her

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claimed misery. The Court is left with the most logical conclusion that Sonia freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any threat and intimidation.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.  A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and r espectable members of the community. In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of