The policy research paper by Tornike Zurabashvili for The Clarion, with financial support of the Black Sea Trust of the ...
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RUSSIA’S DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND COUNTER-MEASURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC LESSONS FOR GEORGIA
by
Tornike Zurabashvili
August 2016
About the Research The research has been carried out by Tornike Zurabashvili for The CLARION, with the financial support of the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund. The research process was conducted from May 2016 to July 2016 in Prague, the Czech Republic.
About the Organisation The Clarion Brief is a part of the experimental media and research platform The Clarion (www.theclarion.eu), where we look for ways to empower and engage Georgia in an ongoing discussion about Europe. The Clarion is powered by Civil Georgia (www.Civil.ge) – a source of reference on Georgia’s current affairs since 2001. The United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG - www.una.ge) is the institutional parent for these media initiatives. A veteran of Georgia’s non-governmental scene, UNAG works since 1995 to engage youth, protect the rights of the vulnerable, inform the public about the world and strengthen country’s institutions.
Dolidze str. 2, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia Tel.: +995 32 332 516
[email protected] http://www.theclarion.eu/
Introduction In the last few years, pro-Kremlin disinformation
the hell out of you so you tune out. It
campaign has dramatically intensified across
undermines confidence in the media, in
Central and Eastern Europe: “alternative” news
democracy, in the EU, in Nato, in the West.”
websites, social media pages, printed periodicals and TV stations have mushroomed and quickly penetrated the national media markets. While the phenomena traces back to the Soviet era, it has intensified significantly following the Russian aggression in Ukraine and subsequent economic sanctions imposed by the European Union. Unlike its Soviet predecessor however, the campaign does not always aim to present Russia in a positive light; rather, its primary goal is to confuse the audience with deliberate hoaxes and conspiracy theories and demonise the West, its values, institutions and politicians.
Georgia is no exception to this phenomenon. The Media Monitoring Report of the Tbilisi-based Media
Development
Foundation
(MDF),
documented approximately 800 anti-western and pro-Russian messages in major television stations, print and online news media from 2014 to 2015. These messages targeted the European Union, the United States and the West in general and portrayed them as rivals of Orthodox Christianity and traditional values as well as instigators of violence around the world. The report shows that while media outlets dominate as the key sources of pro-Kremlin narratives,
While concrete topics and messages as well as
public figures, politicians, religious leaders and
the mediums of information may differ across
government officials play no less important role
the continent, their underlying purpose remains
as amplifiers of the pro-Kremlin messages to
identical: to create societal divisions along the
Georgian public. More alarmingly, MDF’s
lines of foreign and domestic policies, and by
another
that, undermine the public confidence towards
Budgetary Resources among Media for the
liberal values, democratic institutions and
Release of Information and Advertisement”,
mainstream politics. As Matthew Armstrong,
found that in 2015, government agencies
member of the US Broadcasting Board of
continued to sign service contracts with media
Governors (BBG), said: “Kremlin propaganda
outlets openly voicing pro-Kremlin narratives.
intentionally and wilfully undermines public confidence through lies and propaganda. It questions – not to find answers but to question
Despite
research
the
“Practice
intensity
of
of
Allocating
pro-Kremlin
disinformation campaign, very few researchers and policy-makers in Georgia understand the full
complexity and threats of the phenomenon.
impact on the societal trust towards western
Some sporadic measures have been taken,
institutions.
including the monitoring and myth-debunking efforts by the same Media Development Foundation,
civil
society
organisations’
campaign Defend Liberty, occasional profiling of anti-western websites by mediachecker.ge, collection of foreign articles concerning proKremlin
disinformation
campaign
by
damoukidebloba.com and the detailed study of the ownership of online media outlets (including pro-Kremlin
websites)
by
Transparency
International Georgia. Despite these measures however, the knowledge of best practices in countering
the
pro-Kremlin
disinformation
efforts remains limited, rendering it difficult for policy-makers and civil society activists in Georgia to offer a holistic and systemic solution to the problem.
The Czech case has been selected for three reasons. First, the disinformation in both Czech Republic and Georgia primarily targets the majority population whose native language is not Russian, unlike for example, the Baltics, where ethnic Russians are selectively addressed. Secondly, both countries have institutional arrangement with split executive between the Prime Minister and the President that are in competition, where different parts of the executive and legislative branches, exhibit somewhat varied and sometimes diametrically opposed stances towards Moscow. And finally, the Czech Republic is also one of the frontrunners in terms of the volume and depth of counter-disinformation measures undertaken jointly by the civil society, research institutes and
The research will address exactly this lack of
government agencies, which may provide both
information; it will explore the nature of pro-
positive and negative lessons to Georgia.
Kremlin disinformation activities in the Czech Republic, review its characteristics, origins and most common narratives, as well as the countermeasures that government, academia and think tank community take to respond to the mounting disinformation efforts. With that, the author hopes to give the policymakers and civil society activists in Georgia a clear understanding of the phenomenon outside of the country and equip them with necessary knowledge to prevent and manage its potentially harmful
***
Research Methodology A combination of qualitative methods, such as desk research and semi-structured interviews were employed. As part of the desk research, academic works, media monitoring reports, articles, blog entries, videos/audios/minutes of think tank events on pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns in general and in the context of the
Czech Republic and Georgia were retrieved and
studied.
Respekt;
To complement the desk research findings, the author
Ondřej Kundra – Editor and Journalist,
conducted
nine
semi-structured
interviews with local journalists, policymakers and experts in the Czech Republic. Eight face-toface interviews were conducted with the following stakeholders:
Ondřej Soukup - Foreign Desk Reporter, Hospodářské Noviny;
Ival Gabal – Member, Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic;
Ivana Smoleňová - Communications and Outreach Manager, Prague Security Studies Institute.
Jan Šír - Assistant Professor, Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University;
Jakub Janda - Deputy Director, European Values Think Tank;
Roman Máca - Analyst, European Values Think Tank;
Jakub Kalensky - Member, East StratCom Task Force, European External Action Service (via Skype);
Additionally,
email
communication
was
conducted with Lída Součková, PR and Media Coordinator for One World in Schools. ***
The Nature of Pro-Kremlin Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic In the last few years, Czech media scene has
mostly anonymous. Until now however, no
experienced a dramatic rise in the number of
investigative effort has yielded any concrete
pro-Kremlin online platforms. In February 2015,
proof of Moscow’s direct involvement.
Slovak civic activist Juraj Smatana published the list of 42 Czech and Slovak pro-Kremlin websites. Since then, many more websites have appeared. Jakub Kalenski, a member of the European External Action Service East StratCom Task Force, estimates the total number at 70-80 Czech pro-Kremlin websites. Others put the number at 100.1 Some of these sites have been operational for quite a while, but have changed their rhetoric in favour of Moscow, following the Crimea
annexation
and
Russia’s
military
campaign in Eastern Ukraine. In
her
research
According to Smoleňová’s research paper, along with online news portals, pro-Kremlin messages are spread through “informal groups and communities on social media, several printed periodicals,
radio
broadcasts,
and
non-
governmental organizations. Their pro-Kremlin messages are amplified through extensive social media activity, and through the organization of public events and gatherings.” These messages are strongly anti-western, portraying the European Union and the United States, as well as the national politicians and mainstream media
"Pro-Russian
as corrupt and decadent through a combination
Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic
of hoaxes and conspiracy theories. This,
and Slovakia", Ivana Smoleňová (Prague Security
combined with emotionally-charged wording
Studies Institute) writes that although these
and skilfully assembled visual materials, present
outlets claim no association with the Kremlin,
a very grim reality and induce doubt and distrust
they voice very similar narratives: “individual
in the Czech society across the board.
disinformation
paper
campaigns
appear
to
be
spreading in a joint effort, re-posting the same articles, using identical arguments, citing Russian sources, and referring to the same pro-Kremlin public personalities.” Their contributors are
1
Interview with Jakub Janda.
Another research report produced by Milos Gregor and Petra Vejvodova of Masaryk University, which explored four news websites (parlamentnilisty.cz, ac24.cz, svetkolemnas.info a cz.sputniknews.com) has found that the pro-
Kremlin disinformation campaign is using the
almost two years) put it, Aeronet’s news items
refugee crisis to erode public confidence in
are a combination of “speculation and non-
European institutions and politicians.
verifiable gossip.” In the email conversation with
The words of the Czech Security Information Service (Czech national intelligence agency) spokesman Jan Subert neatly summarises the essence of pro-Kremlin disinformation activities in the Czech republic: “the primary goal of any power-hungry regime’s propaganda is to drive a wedge, divide and split, slander institutions and governments, create chaos and destabilize.” The story of aeronet.cz is a case in point. The website was initially registered in 2001 as a platform for aviation enthusiasts. Very soon the website transformed into a platform for illegal downloads of music, films and software. In 2014, just four months from Crimea annexation, the website went through another makeover and started posting pieces critical to the new Ukrainian government. Since then, Aeronet’s audience has expanded. The website owners remain anonymous however. Likewise, articles on the website are mostly unsigned. As Ondřej Kundra (the Czech journalist who has been investigating the website whereabouts for
Ondřej Kundra, the editor-in-chief who also preferred to stay anonymous, said that Aeronet leads “an electronic information war with the enemy that never sleeps. Our enemy is Western media that flood the Czech media platform with pro-American propaganda, pro-American view of the feudal status of Europeans, pro-American interests in the old continent.” In November 2014, Aeronet wrote that the street rallies against the Czech President were organised by the American Embassy in Prague, allegedly, to punish Milos Zeman for his proRussian stances. The story “informed by a reader,” was picked up by mainstream media outlets without checking its origins, prompting a diplomatic request from representatives of allied governments to the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain the matter. ***
Counter-Measures of the interests of the Czech Republic, the NATO
Government Agencies
and the EU.” It adds that these structures
Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign has been reflected in several strategic documents of the Czech Republic, which highlights its importance for the Czech state. Most importantly, the 2015 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic lists “propaganda using traditional and new media,” and “disinformation intelligence operations” of “some states”, as one of the non-military tools to undermine
the
“cooperative
security
mechanism and of political and international legal commitments in the area of security.”
intensified their work following the events in Ukraine and have used a number of instruments: “from
ideologically
manipulated
citizens
supporting Russian propaganda unknowingly, to professionals intentionally working with the Russians.” Aware of the high perceptiveness “to direct Russian (or other foreign) involvement in the
Czech
Republic”,
Russian-language
“propaganda related to the Ukraine crisis spread by Russian (state and non-state) actors did not play a major role in the Czech Republic.”
The Annual Report of the Security Information
However, Czech public was particularly affected
Service for 2014 is far less discreet about the
by home-based “pro-Russian organisations and
matter. According to the report, “Russia and its
individuals using websites to present their
sympathizers engaged in white, grey and black
interpretations of Russian stances.” Their
propaganda” in relation to Ukraine. The
messages lead “Czech citizens to believe they are
document draws parallels to “time-tested Soviet
recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not
practices” of exerting influence and speeding
of Russian propaganda.”
propaganda, i.e. “concealing or covering up own (Russian/Soviet) steps and highlighting or demonizing Western reactions” embedded in “Dugin’s
expansionist
Neo-Eurasianism”
reminiscent of “the concept of the Communist International”. The report states that “Russia has been creating influence and propaganda structures in the Czech Republic over a long period of time … to promote and protect Russian economic and political interest to the detriment
In its quarterly report for the first three months of 2016 on the state of Czech extremist scene, the Ministry of Interior linked the rise of far-right organisations with pro-Kremlin media influence. „Many of these alternative media purposefully published
misinformation
theories.
These
and
alternative
conspiracy media
are
characterized by understating the source of information. In case of proving the falsity of
some of the allegations they do not move to
accreditation of two Russian journalists in the
further explanation. Usually it is enough for
Czech Republic. 2 In May 2016, Czech weekly
them to launch a message to the public.”
newspaper Respekt wrote that 50 pro-Kremlin
As a logical follow up to the elevation of the issue in the country’s strategic documents, in May
websites and projects were being monitored by the Czech police and secret services.
2016, Czech Ministry of Interior has announced
The Czech government’s handling of the growing
the establishment of a special 30-strong team of
pro-Russian media influence can be considered
specialists under the Ministry – the Hybrid
both timely and effective. The government
Threat Centre, specialising on fighting against
prioritises the matter in its strategic documents
terrorism, extremism and foreign propaganda.
and manages it through a combination of
Speaking on the matter, Czech Interior Minister
institutional
Milan Chovanec said that the government needs
Establishment of the Hybrid Threat Centre and
“to react to it (propaganda), and in order to do
the monitoring of pro-Kremlin websites speaks
it, we need to know what they publish.” Little is
to
known about the Center’s activities. Despite
sensitivity to the challenge. It also sends signals
repeated efforts, the Ministry of Interior failed to
about the state’s priorities to the national and
respond
regional political elites.
to
author’s
queries.
However,
the
and
operational
government’s
measures.
understanding
and
interviewees affirm that the work is underway and the establishment of the unit will be finalised by the end of the year. The Czech government has resorted to other measures as well. The Czech Ministry of Culture which allocates state funds for the cultural initiatives of ethnic minorities living in the Czech Republic, has suspended the subsidies to the Russian youth association in 2015, on the grounds that its magazine Artek engaged in outright pro-Kremlin propaganda relating to the events in Ukraine. Along with that, in 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended the 2
No details were provided on the grounds of the decision.
Civil Society Organisations and Research Institutions Only a single non-governmental organisation works on countering pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic at the grassroots level. Jeden svět na školách or the One World in Schools (OWIS) is one of the educational programmes of the People in Need foundation
(Člověk
v
tísni).
Since
its
establishment in 2001, the program has helped develop civic-minded and responsible young citizens in primary and secondary schools of the
Czech Republic. Using discussions, audio-visual
when you read or watch a news item and
lessons, documentary films and other learning
internet security advice.
activities, OWIS brings important human rights, historical, civic engagement, media-related and other topics into the classrooms. 3300 school teachers across the country are provided with audio-visual lessons, documentary films and methodological
materials
free-of-charge
(available at the educational platform jsns.cz) on these topics.
A collection of seven propagandistic videos (i.e. songs on Vladimir Putin, TV talk shows for kids) was also compiled under the frames of the project. Součková explained that the teachers do not tell the students “what they should think” or “where the truth is.” The lessons lead the students
to
“seek
out
the
information
themselves, discuss and form their own
Media literacy training has been among the
opinion.” Similarly, teachers are free to choose
program’s core learning areas for around 10
the specific themes, films and activities for their
years. More recently, under the media literacy
students. Two workshops involving the total of
component, OWIS has added a new training
50 teachers have been organized up to this
module on contemporary Russian propaganda.
moment.
Lída Součková, the co-author of these lessons,
Numerous research institutions and individual
explained that the materials were developed
researchers have worked on documenting and
after the increase of pro-Kremlin propaganda in
monitoring the pro-Kremlin disinformation
the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and
campaign in the Czech Republic. The research
are designed to equip the students with skills to
reports of the Prague Security Studies Institute
approach information “in an open and critical
(Smoleňová) and the Masaryk University (Gregor
manner and to verify informational sources.”
and Vejvodova) are good examples of these
As part of the initiative five audio-visual lessons
efforts.
were developed and published on jsns.cz in
European Values Think Tank, a Prague-based
November, 2015. These lessons focus on
non-partisan research institute, is the only
Kremlin’s propaganda within the Russian
organisation that systematically engages in daily
Federation and abroad. Each lesson contains the
monitoring, fact-checking and myth-busting
main video or film or report, three-four
exercises
activities, working sheets, Q&As, list of terms,
disinformation campaign. Its Kremlin Watch
diagram of controlling mechanism of media,
Program
basic questions which are needed to be asked
disinformation trends in the Czech Republic and
concerning
produces
the
weekly
pro-Kremlin
reports
on
in Europe in English and Czech languages. Along with monitoring and debunking efforts, the European Values Think Tank develops case studies,
in-depth
reports
and
policy
recommendations on matters of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign.
Media Outlets Media coverage of the activities of pro-Kremlin media is not scarce in the Czech Republic. Numerous media outlets and journalists have reported on the issue in the last few years. Among
them,
hlidacipes.cz,
As the official consulting body for Czech Review
echo24.cz,
of National Security, the organisation has
(Czech public broadcaster) and news magazine
successfully lobbied for the establishment of the
Respekt are some of the most active ones.
new Hybrid Threat Centre at the Czech Interior
Among these outlets, neovlivni.cz (a project of
Ministry.
Tank
Dead Line Media funded by the Open Society
contributes to GLOBSEC Policy Institute’s (a
Fund Prague) is the only portal that deals
think-tank
specifically with the Kremlin influence in the
European
based
Values
in
Think
Bratislava,
Slovakia)
manipulatori.cz,
neovlivni.cz,
Czech
of propaganda and disinformation attempts in
documenting Russia’s political and business
conventional and social media of the Czech
connections in the in the Czech Republic, as well
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
as
The civil society response to the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign is multifaceted. While OWIS aims at raising the media literacy in one of the most exposed segments of the Czech population, the European Values Think Tank contributes to better public understanding of the daily operations of the pro-Kremlin media. No less important is the lobbying efforts that the latter undertakes to influence the government agencies.
Combined
together,
these
organisations offer long-term and innovative solutions to the growing influence of Kremlinsympathetic Czech media.
media
Neovlivni
televize
Information War Monitor, a bi-weekly overview
the
Republic.
Česká
exposure
to
on
pro-Kremlin
propaganda. The website does this through investigative reports, analytical articles and profiling of pro-Kremlin news outlets. Another web portal manipulatori.cz analyses specific hoaxes and fake news as well as technics of manipulation, including that of the pro-Kremlin media outlets. The portal is not focused on proRussian propaganda only, it covers much wider set of media-related themes in the Czech Republic. Overall, reporting of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign in the Czech Republic is extensive. Much of this work is reflective however. Only a handful of these outlets produce investigative work.
***
focuses
Conclusions and Recommendations for Georgia Overall, the counter-measures of the Czech state
with these caveats, there still are several
agencies, civil society organisations and media
important
outlets, can be considered as timely and
stakeholders could replicate to curb the
efficient.
influence of pro-Kremlin propaganda:
The government prioritises the matter in its
To the government agencies:
strategic documents and manages it through a
combination of institutional and operational measures.
The
civil
society
Georgian
Spell out the threat to state cohesion posed
Monitor
media
outlets
spreading
propaganda regularly;
the pro-Kremlin media outlets. Reporting of proKremlin media influence is also extensive.
the
strategic documents;3
younger generation and add to the improved public understanding of the daily operations of
that
by propaganda and prioritise this issue in
organisations
contribute to the increased media literacy in the
takeaways
Suspend direct or indirect state funding for advocates of pro-Kremlin opinions;
Centralize the counter-measures under a
Combined together, these individual measures
single governmental entity, while involving a
offer the possibilities of long-term impact as well
wide spectrum of state and civil agencies in
as innovative solutions to the growing influence
discussing and analysing the phenomenon.
of Kremlin-sympathetic Czech media. Problems exist however. Much of these work is uncoordinated. Only a handful of outlets produce investigative work. Still, much of the
To CSOs and think-tanks:
Contribute to the increased media literacy among the most vulnerable segments of the population;
work is reactive, rather than pro-active. But even
3
The government has prioritised the issue in its strategic documents, albeit with a rather different angle. Here, the focus is not domestic, but foreign – countering the antiGeorgian propaganda and disinformation abroad. For instance, the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 spoke of Moscow’s open opposition to Georgia’s western aspirations and noted that the Kremlin “spends considerable resources on the international stage to conduct an anti-Georgian informational and diplomatic campaign … to create an image of Georgia as a nondemocratic, unstable and aggressive nation and to hinder realization of Georgia’s sovereign choice.” The document
predicted that the Russian Federation would “continue its intensive and large-scale anti-Georgian informational and diplomatic campaign to hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic organizations.” In a much similar manner, the Foreign Policy Strategy for 2015-2018 briefly touches upon the topic of “countering negative propaganda and disinformation.” According to the document, “counter-measures will be implemented against propaganda, disinformation and inaccurate stereotypes against Georgia’s national interests, through diplomatic means.”
Monitor
the
narratives,
trends
and
modus operandi of pro-Kremlin media, as
the wider public on a regular basis;
well as the personalities that stand behind
Link Georgia to international monitoring and
them and their connections to Kremlin;
Build expertise on web research and web
Task Force Disinformation Digest&Review;
forensics based on best practices (e.g.:
Information War Monitor; Information
Bellingcat, InformNapalm), including work
Warfare Initiative);
on social media networks to identify the
Lobby the government agencies to prioritise
propaganda nods, and debunk the emerging
the matter in their work.
myths early on;
To media:
Engage in investigative works to disclose the
techniques of pro-Kremlin media and inform
debunking projects (e.g.: EU East StratCom
Keep the issue at the centre of public discussion through regular media coverage of myths and who spreads them;
Compile all subject-related media reports under one format.
