Clarion Brief Zurabashvili Czech Counter-propaganda

August 29, 2017 | Author: The Clarion | Category: Propaganda, Think Tank, Mass Media, News Media, Georgia (Country)
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The policy research paper by Tornike Zurabashvili for The Clarion, with financial support of the Black Sea Trust of the ...

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RUSSIA’S DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND COUNTER-MEASURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC LESSONS FOR GEORGIA

by

Tornike Zurabashvili

August 2016

About the Research The research has been carried out by Tornike Zurabashvili for The CLARION, with the financial support of the Black Sea Trust of the German Marshall Fund. The research process was conducted from May 2016 to July 2016 in Prague, the Czech Republic.

About the Organisation The Clarion Brief is a part of the experimental media and research platform The Clarion (www.theclarion.eu), where we look for ways to empower and engage Georgia in an ongoing discussion about Europe. The Clarion is powered by Civil Georgia (www.Civil.ge) – a source of reference on Georgia’s current affairs since 2001. The United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG - www.una.ge) is the institutional parent for these media initiatives. A veteran of Georgia’s non-governmental scene, UNAG works since 1995 to engage youth, protect the rights of the vulnerable, inform the public about the world and strengthen country’s institutions.

Dolidze str. 2, Tbilisi 0183, Georgia Tel.: +995 32 332 516 [email protected] http://www.theclarion.eu/

Introduction In the last few years, pro-Kremlin disinformation

the hell out of you so you tune out. It

campaign has dramatically intensified across

undermines confidence in the media, in

Central and Eastern Europe: “alternative” news

democracy, in the EU, in Nato, in the West.”

websites, social media pages, printed periodicals and TV stations have mushroomed and quickly penetrated the national media markets. While the phenomena traces back to the Soviet era, it has intensified significantly following the Russian aggression in Ukraine and subsequent economic sanctions imposed by the European Union. Unlike its Soviet predecessor however, the campaign does not always aim to present Russia in a positive light; rather, its primary goal is to confuse the audience with deliberate hoaxes and conspiracy theories and demonise the West, its values, institutions and politicians.

Georgia is no exception to this phenomenon. The Media Monitoring Report of the Tbilisi-based Media

Development

Foundation

(MDF),

documented approximately 800 anti-western and pro-Russian messages in major television stations, print and online news media from 2014 to 2015. These messages targeted the European Union, the United States and the West in general and portrayed them as rivals of Orthodox Christianity and traditional values as well as instigators of violence around the world. The report shows that while media outlets dominate as the key sources of pro-Kremlin narratives,

While concrete topics and messages as well as

public figures, politicians, religious leaders and

the mediums of information may differ across

government officials play no less important role

the continent, their underlying purpose remains

as amplifiers of the pro-Kremlin messages to

identical: to create societal divisions along the

Georgian public. More alarmingly, MDF’s

lines of foreign and domestic policies, and by

another

that, undermine the public confidence towards

Budgetary Resources among Media for the

liberal values, democratic institutions and

Release of Information and Advertisement”,

mainstream politics. As Matthew Armstrong,

found that in 2015, government agencies

member of the US Broadcasting Board of

continued to sign service contracts with media

Governors (BBG), said: “Kremlin propaganda

outlets openly voicing pro-Kremlin narratives.

intentionally and wilfully undermines public confidence through lies and propaganda. It questions – not to find answers but to question

Despite

research

the

“Practice

intensity

of

of

Allocating

pro-Kremlin

disinformation campaign, very few researchers and policy-makers in Georgia understand the full

complexity and threats of the phenomenon.

impact on the societal trust towards western

Some sporadic measures have been taken,

institutions.

including the monitoring and myth-debunking efforts by the same Media Development Foundation,

civil

society

organisations’

campaign Defend Liberty, occasional profiling of anti-western websites by mediachecker.ge, collection of foreign articles concerning proKremlin

disinformation

campaign

by

damoukidebloba.com and the detailed study of the ownership of online media outlets (including pro-Kremlin

websites)

by

Transparency

International Georgia. Despite these measures however, the knowledge of best practices in countering

the

pro-Kremlin

disinformation

efforts remains limited, rendering it difficult for policy-makers and civil society activists in Georgia to offer a holistic and systemic solution to the problem.

The Czech case has been selected for three reasons. First, the disinformation in both Czech Republic and Georgia primarily targets the majority population whose native language is not Russian, unlike for example, the Baltics, where ethnic Russians are selectively addressed. Secondly, both countries have institutional arrangement with split executive between the Prime Minister and the President that are in competition, where different parts of the executive and legislative branches, exhibit somewhat varied and sometimes diametrically opposed stances towards Moscow. And finally, the Czech Republic is also one of the frontrunners in terms of the volume and depth of counter-disinformation measures undertaken jointly by the civil society, research institutes and

The research will address exactly this lack of

government agencies, which may provide both

information; it will explore the nature of pro-

positive and negative lessons to Georgia.

Kremlin disinformation activities in the Czech Republic, review its characteristics, origins and most common narratives, as well as the countermeasures that government, academia and think tank community take to respond to the mounting disinformation efforts. With that, the author hopes to give the policymakers and civil society activists in Georgia a clear understanding of the phenomenon outside of the country and equip them with necessary knowledge to prevent and manage its potentially harmful

***

Research Methodology A combination of qualitative methods, such as desk research and semi-structured interviews were employed. As part of the desk research, academic works, media monitoring reports, articles, blog entries, videos/audios/minutes of think tank events on pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns in general and in the context of the

Czech Republic and Georgia were retrieved and



studied.

Respekt;

To complement the desk research findings, the author

Ondřej Kundra – Editor and Journalist,

conducted

nine

semi-structured

interviews with local journalists, policymakers and experts in the Czech Republic. Eight face-toface interviews were conducted with the following stakeholders:



Ondřej Soukup - Foreign Desk Reporter, Hospodářské Noviny;



Ival Gabal – Member, Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic;



Ivana Smoleňová - Communications and Outreach Manager, Prague Security Studies Institute.



Jan Šír - Assistant Professor, Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University;



Jakub Janda - Deputy Director, European Values Think Tank;



Roman Máca - Analyst, European Values Think Tank;



Jakub Kalensky - Member, East StratCom Task Force, European External Action Service (via Skype);

Additionally,

email

communication

was

conducted with Lída Součková, PR and Media Coordinator for One World in Schools. ***

The Nature of Pro-Kremlin Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic In the last few years, Czech media scene has

mostly anonymous. Until now however, no

experienced a dramatic rise in the number of

investigative effort has yielded any concrete

pro-Kremlin online platforms. In February 2015,

proof of Moscow’s direct involvement.

Slovak civic activist Juraj Smatana published the list of 42 Czech and Slovak pro-Kremlin websites. Since then, many more websites have appeared. Jakub Kalenski, a member of the European External Action Service East StratCom Task Force, estimates the total number at 70-80 Czech pro-Kremlin websites. Others put the number at 100.1 Some of these sites have been operational for quite a while, but have changed their rhetoric in favour of Moscow, following the Crimea

annexation

and

Russia’s

military

campaign in Eastern Ukraine. In

her

research

According to Smoleňová’s research paper, along with online news portals, pro-Kremlin messages are spread through “informal groups and communities on social media, several printed periodicals,

radio

broadcasts,

and

non-

governmental organizations. Their pro-Kremlin messages are amplified through extensive social media activity, and through the organization of public events and gatherings.” These messages are strongly anti-western, portraying the European Union and the United States, as well as the national politicians and mainstream media

"Pro-Russian

as corrupt and decadent through a combination

Disinformation Campaign in the Czech Republic

of hoaxes and conspiracy theories. This,

and Slovakia", Ivana Smoleňová (Prague Security

combined with emotionally-charged wording

Studies Institute) writes that although these

and skilfully assembled visual materials, present

outlets claim no association with the Kremlin,

a very grim reality and induce doubt and distrust

they voice very similar narratives: “individual

in the Czech society across the board.

disinformation

paper

campaigns

appear

to

be

spreading in a joint effort, re-posting the same articles, using identical arguments, citing Russian sources, and referring to the same pro-Kremlin public personalities.” Their contributors are

1

Interview with Jakub Janda.

Another research report produced by Milos Gregor and Petra Vejvodova of Masaryk University, which explored four news websites (parlamentnilisty.cz, ac24.cz, svetkolemnas.info a cz.sputniknews.com) has found that the pro-

Kremlin disinformation campaign is using the

almost two years) put it, Aeronet’s news items

refugee crisis to erode public confidence in

are a combination of “speculation and non-

European institutions and politicians.

verifiable gossip.” In the email conversation with

The words of the Czech Security Information Service (Czech national intelligence agency) spokesman Jan Subert neatly summarises the essence of pro-Kremlin disinformation activities in the Czech republic: “the primary goal of any power-hungry regime’s propaganda is to drive a wedge, divide and split, slander institutions and governments, create chaos and destabilize.” The story of aeronet.cz is a case in point. The website was initially registered in 2001 as a platform for aviation enthusiasts. Very soon the website transformed into a platform for illegal downloads of music, films and software. In 2014, just four months from Crimea annexation, the website went through another makeover and started posting pieces critical to the new Ukrainian government. Since then, Aeronet’s audience has expanded. The website owners remain anonymous however. Likewise, articles on the website are mostly unsigned. As Ondřej Kundra (the Czech journalist who has been investigating the website whereabouts for

Ondřej Kundra, the editor-in-chief who also preferred to stay anonymous, said that Aeronet leads “an electronic information war with the enemy that never sleeps. Our enemy is Western media that flood the Czech media platform with pro-American propaganda, pro-American view of the feudal status of Europeans, pro-American interests in the old continent.” In November 2014, Aeronet wrote that the street rallies against the Czech President were organised by the American Embassy in Prague, allegedly, to punish Milos Zeman for his proRussian stances. The story “informed by a reader,” was picked up by mainstream media outlets without checking its origins, prompting a diplomatic request from representatives of allied governments to the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain the matter. ***

Counter-Measures of the interests of the Czech Republic, the NATO

Government Agencies

and the EU.” It adds that these structures

Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign has been reflected in several strategic documents of the Czech Republic, which highlights its importance for the Czech state. Most importantly, the 2015 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic lists “propaganda using traditional and new media,” and “disinformation intelligence operations” of “some states”, as one of the non-military tools to undermine

the

“cooperative

security

mechanism and of political and international legal commitments in the area of security.”

intensified their work following the events in Ukraine and have used a number of instruments: “from

ideologically

manipulated

citizens

supporting Russian propaganda unknowingly, to professionals intentionally working with the Russians.” Aware of the high perceptiveness “to direct Russian (or other foreign) involvement in the

Czech

Republic”,

Russian-language

“propaganda related to the Ukraine crisis spread by Russian (state and non-state) actors did not play a major role in the Czech Republic.”

The Annual Report of the Security Information

However, Czech public was particularly affected

Service for 2014 is far less discreet about the

by home-based “pro-Russian organisations and

matter. According to the report, “Russia and its

individuals using websites to present their

sympathizers engaged in white, grey and black

interpretations of Russian stances.” Their

propaganda” in relation to Ukraine. The

messages lead “Czech citizens to believe they are

document draws parallels to “time-tested Soviet

recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not

practices” of exerting influence and speeding

of Russian propaganda.”

propaganda, i.e. “concealing or covering up own (Russian/Soviet) steps and highlighting or demonizing Western reactions” embedded in “Dugin’s

expansionist

Neo-Eurasianism”

reminiscent of “the concept of the Communist International”. The report states that “Russia has been creating influence and propaganda structures in the Czech Republic over a long period of time … to promote and protect Russian economic and political interest to the detriment

In its quarterly report for the first three months of 2016 on the state of Czech extremist scene, the Ministry of Interior linked the rise of far-right organisations with pro-Kremlin media influence. „Many of these alternative media purposefully published

misinformation

theories.

These

and

alternative

conspiracy media

are

characterized by understating the source of information. In case of proving the falsity of

some of the allegations they do not move to

accreditation of two Russian journalists in the

further explanation. Usually it is enough for

Czech Republic. 2 In May 2016, Czech weekly

them to launch a message to the public.”

newspaper Respekt wrote that 50 pro-Kremlin

As a logical follow up to the elevation of the issue in the country’s strategic documents, in May

websites and projects were being monitored by the Czech police and secret services.

2016, Czech Ministry of Interior has announced

The Czech government’s handling of the growing

the establishment of a special 30-strong team of

pro-Russian media influence can be considered

specialists under the Ministry – the Hybrid

both timely and effective. The government

Threat Centre, specialising on fighting against

prioritises the matter in its strategic documents

terrorism, extremism and foreign propaganda.

and manages it through a combination of

Speaking on the matter, Czech Interior Minister

institutional

Milan Chovanec said that the government needs

Establishment of the Hybrid Threat Centre and

“to react to it (propaganda), and in order to do

the monitoring of pro-Kremlin websites speaks

it, we need to know what they publish.” Little is

to

known about the Center’s activities. Despite

sensitivity to the challenge. It also sends signals

repeated efforts, the Ministry of Interior failed to

about the state’s priorities to the national and

respond

regional political elites.

to

author’s

queries.

However,

the

and

operational

government’s

measures.

understanding

and

interviewees affirm that the work is underway and the establishment of the unit will be finalised by the end of the year. The Czech government has resorted to other measures as well. The Czech Ministry of Culture which allocates state funds for the cultural initiatives of ethnic minorities living in the Czech Republic, has suspended the subsidies to the Russian youth association in 2015, on the grounds that its magazine Artek engaged in outright pro-Kremlin propaganda relating to the events in Ukraine. Along with that, in 2016 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended the 2

No details were provided on the grounds of the decision.

Civil Society Organisations and Research Institutions Only a single non-governmental organisation works on countering pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns in the Czech Republic at the grassroots level. Jeden svět na školách or the One World in Schools (OWIS) is one of the educational programmes of the People in Need foundation

(Člověk

v

tísni).

Since

its

establishment in 2001, the program has helped develop civic-minded and responsible young citizens in primary and secondary schools of the

Czech Republic. Using discussions, audio-visual

when you read or watch a news item and

lessons, documentary films and other learning

internet security advice.

activities, OWIS brings important human rights, historical, civic engagement, media-related and other topics into the classrooms. 3300 school teachers across the country are provided with audio-visual lessons, documentary films and methodological

materials

free-of-charge

(available at the educational platform jsns.cz) on these topics.

A collection of seven propagandistic videos (i.e. songs on Vladimir Putin, TV talk shows for kids) was also compiled under the frames of the project. Součková explained that the teachers do not tell the students “what they should think” or “where the truth is.” The lessons lead the students

to

“seek

out

the

information

themselves, discuss and form their own

Media literacy training has been among the

opinion.” Similarly, teachers are free to choose

program’s core learning areas for around 10

the specific themes, films and activities for their

years. More recently, under the media literacy

students. Two workshops involving the total of

component, OWIS has added a new training

50 teachers have been organized up to this

module on contemporary Russian propaganda.

moment.

Lída Součková, the co-author of these lessons,

Numerous research institutions and individual

explained that the materials were developed

researchers have worked on documenting and

after the increase of pro-Kremlin propaganda in

monitoring the pro-Kremlin disinformation

the wake of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and

campaign in the Czech Republic. The research

are designed to equip the students with skills to

reports of the Prague Security Studies Institute

approach information “in an open and critical

(Smoleňová) and the Masaryk University (Gregor

manner and to verify informational sources.”

and Vejvodova) are good examples of these

As part of the initiative five audio-visual lessons

efforts.

were developed and published on jsns.cz in

European Values Think Tank, a Prague-based

November, 2015. These lessons focus on

non-partisan research institute, is the only

Kremlin’s propaganda within the Russian

organisation that systematically engages in daily

Federation and abroad. Each lesson contains the

monitoring, fact-checking and myth-busting

main video or film or report, three-four

exercises

activities, working sheets, Q&As, list of terms,

disinformation campaign. Its Kremlin Watch

diagram of controlling mechanism of media,

Program

basic questions which are needed to be asked

disinformation trends in the Czech Republic and

concerning

produces

the

weekly

pro-Kremlin

reports

on

in Europe in English and Czech languages. Along with monitoring and debunking efforts, the European Values Think Tank develops case studies,

in-depth

reports

and

policy

recommendations on matters of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign.

Media Outlets Media coverage of the activities of pro-Kremlin media is not scarce in the Czech Republic. Numerous media outlets and journalists have reported on the issue in the last few years. Among

them,

hlidacipes.cz,

As the official consulting body for Czech Review

echo24.cz,

of National Security, the organisation has

(Czech public broadcaster) and news magazine

successfully lobbied for the establishment of the

Respekt are some of the most active ones.

new Hybrid Threat Centre at the Czech Interior

Among these outlets, neovlivni.cz (a project of

Ministry.

Tank

Dead Line Media funded by the Open Society

contributes to GLOBSEC Policy Institute’s (a

Fund Prague) is the only portal that deals

think-tank

specifically with the Kremlin influence in the

European

based

Values

in

Think

Bratislava,

Slovakia)

manipulatori.cz,

neovlivni.cz,

Czech

of propaganda and disinformation attempts in

documenting Russia’s political and business

conventional and social media of the Czech

connections in the in the Czech Republic, as well

Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.

as

The civil society response to the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign is multifaceted. While OWIS aims at raising the media literacy in one of the most exposed segments of the Czech population, the European Values Think Tank contributes to better public understanding of the daily operations of the pro-Kremlin media. No less important is the lobbying efforts that the latter undertakes to influence the government agencies.

Combined

together,

these

organisations offer long-term and innovative solutions to the growing influence of Kremlinsympathetic Czech media.

media

Neovlivni

televize

Information War Monitor, a bi-weekly overview

the

Republic.

Česká

exposure

to

on

pro-Kremlin

propaganda. The website does this through investigative reports, analytical articles and profiling of pro-Kremlin news outlets. Another web portal manipulatori.cz analyses specific hoaxes and fake news as well as technics of manipulation, including that of the pro-Kremlin media outlets. The portal is not focused on proRussian propaganda only, it covers much wider set of media-related themes in the Czech Republic. Overall, reporting of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign in the Czech Republic is extensive. Much of this work is reflective however. Only a handful of these outlets produce investigative work.

***

focuses

Conclusions and Recommendations for Georgia Overall, the counter-measures of the Czech state

with these caveats, there still are several

agencies, civil society organisations and media

important

outlets, can be considered as timely and

stakeholders could replicate to curb the

efficient.

influence of pro-Kremlin propaganda:

The government prioritises the matter in its

To the government agencies:

strategic documents and manages it through a



combination of institutional and operational measures.

The

civil

society



Georgian

Spell out the threat to state cohesion posed

Monitor

media

outlets

spreading

propaganda regularly; 

the pro-Kremlin media outlets. Reporting of proKremlin media influence is also extensive.

the

strategic documents;3

younger generation and add to the improved public understanding of the daily operations of

that

by propaganda and prioritise this issue in

organisations

contribute to the increased media literacy in the

takeaways

Suspend direct or indirect state funding for advocates of pro-Kremlin opinions;



Centralize the counter-measures under a

Combined together, these individual measures

single governmental entity, while involving a

offer the possibilities of long-term impact as well

wide spectrum of state and civil agencies in

as innovative solutions to the growing influence

discussing and analysing the phenomenon.

of Kremlin-sympathetic Czech media. Problems exist however. Much of these work is uncoordinated. Only a handful of outlets produce investigative work. Still, much of the

To CSOs and think-tanks: 

Contribute to the increased media literacy among the most vulnerable segments of the population;

work is reactive, rather than pro-active. But even

3

The government has prioritised the issue in its strategic documents, albeit with a rather different angle. Here, the focus is not domestic, but foreign – countering the antiGeorgian propaganda and disinformation abroad. For instance, the Threat Assessment Document for 2010-2013 spoke of Moscow’s open opposition to Georgia’s western aspirations and noted that the Kremlin “spends considerable resources on the international stage to conduct an anti-Georgian informational and diplomatic campaign … to create an image of Georgia as a nondemocratic, unstable and aggressive nation and to hinder realization of Georgia’s sovereign choice.” The document

predicted that the Russian Federation would “continue its intensive and large-scale anti-Georgian informational and diplomatic campaign to hinder Georgia’s integration into European and Euro-Atlantic organizations.” In a much similar manner, the Foreign Policy Strategy for 2015-2018 briefly touches upon the topic of “countering negative propaganda and disinformation.” According to the document, “counter-measures will be implemented against propaganda, disinformation and inaccurate stereotypes against Georgia’s national interests, through diplomatic means.”





Monitor

the

narratives,

trends

and

modus operandi of pro-Kremlin media, as

the wider public on a regular basis;

well as the personalities that stand behind

Link Georgia to international monitoring and

them and their connections to Kremlin; 

Build expertise on web research and web

Task Force Disinformation Digest&Review;

forensics based on best practices (e.g.:

Information War Monitor; Information

Bellingcat, InformNapalm), including work

Warfare Initiative);

on social media networks to identify the

Lobby the government agencies to prioritise

propaganda nods, and debunk the emerging

the matter in their work.

myths early on;

To media: 

Engage in investigative works to disclose the

techniques of pro-Kremlin media and inform

debunking projects (e.g.: EU East StratCom





Keep the issue at the centre of public discussion through regular media coverage of myths and who spreads them;



Compile all subject-related media reports under one format.

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