CivProConsolidatedDigest (2).docx

September 13, 2017 | Author: ArmieAlvarezRemolacio | Category: Standing (Law), Complaint, Judgment (Law), Lawsuit, Pleading
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JURISDICTION CASE 1: SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA V. LINDO, MARCH 10, 2014, G.R. No. 208232 FACTS: Alfredo Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free patent land located in Davao covered by OTC. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, including the respondent Lindo via deed of absolute sale. Two months later the OCT was canceled and the TCT’s was issued in favor of the vendees. On 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondent before the RTC. During the pendency of the action Bautista died and substituted by the petitioner, Efipania. Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with the petitioners, whereby they agree to cede to Efipania 3,230 sq.m. portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. RTC approved the compromise agreement. Other respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the complaint was failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered and alleges that the total value of the properties is only P 16,500. RTC dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter? RULING: The petition is meritorious. Jurisdiction of the RTCs is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil cases. – RTCs shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction: 1 In all civil actions which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

2

In civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000 or for civil actions in Metro Manila where the value exceeds 50,000 except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer.

Settled Jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation: 1 Action for specific performance. 2 Actions for support which require the determination of the civil status 3 The right to support of the plaintiff 4 Those for the annulment of decision of the lower courts 5 Those for rescission or performance of contracts 6 Interpretation of a contractual stipulation. In determining if the subject matter is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action must be sought. If it is primarily for recovery of summed of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in RTC would depend on the amount of the claim. In this case, since the total selling price is less than 20,000 it appears that MTC has jurisdiction over the case, however it is incorrect since the reacquisition of the lot is but incidental to and offshoot of the exercise of the right to repurchase the lot in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought.

CASE 2: INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner, vs. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents. Facts: On 5 February 2003, respondents Maria Lim Vda. de Gonzalez, Gaudencia L. Buagas, Ranulfo Y. Lim, Don L. Calvo, Susan C. Santiago, Dina C. Aranas, and Rufina C. Ramirezfiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a Complaint 4 for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and Attorney’s Fees was filed against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog). Respondents alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with light materials on the land and when a strong typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalog’s house was damaged. Thereafter, respondents alleged that Tagalog discontinued payingthe rent and stopped inhabiting the house. Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate the premises asserting that the verbal contract of lease was deemed terminated upon the expiration of the monthly contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was still a lessee.The RTC ruled that, in the complaint, respondents prayed for the recovery of possession of the leased property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which was within the original jurisdiction of the court was primordial and the prayer for eviction was merely incidental there being no written contract of lease between the parties.Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court or the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s decision should be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction over the case. Issue: The main issue for our resolution iswhether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Ruling: The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. In order to determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before it.It is clear that the case involves only the issue of physical possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section 1 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the withholding by a person from another of the possession of a land or building to which the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not possession de jure but physical possession only or possession de facto, where dispossession has lasted for not more than one year. Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before it.1âwphi1 Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In sum, since respondents' complaint should have been filed with the MTC, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought before the appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.

CASE 3: EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D. MONSANTO, JR., Petitioners, vs. LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE GUZMAN, Respondents. September 17, 2014, G.R. No. 178911 Facts: Flordelis Menzon, Regional Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman. According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously acceded to its request to move the date of the auction sale to January 20, 2004; however, to its surprise, the sale proceeded as originally scheduled on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid ofLeoncio Lim in the amount of P500,000.00 was grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that the outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto, was more than the bid amount. Executive Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering that Eduardo is his relative; instead he re-assigned the same to Judge Usman. RTC conducted a hearing; Atty. Cesar Lee argued on behalf of Pag-IBIG; and Pascual Monsanto appeared on behalf of Eduardo. Judge Usman noted that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed which presents a judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of partake of administrative matter. Consequently, Judge Usman referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for further action. Pascual filed with the OCA a Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate. The OCA directed Judge Usman to conduct an investigation and take action on he ‘Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate.’ PagIBIG informed the trial court that the loan of Eduardo had been

restructured and that Eduardo had commenced paying monthly amortizations; that as a result of the restructuring, Pag-IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure; and that it is no longer interested in pursuing an administrative action against De Guzman. Leoncio opposed Pag-IBIG’s manifestation. Leoncio filed a Manifestation with Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming that the reglementary period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming the subject property; as such, he is already entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession. RTC finds that the instant motion to lift writ of execution and notice to vacate the [premises] is devoid of merit, hence denied. The motion for issuance of writ of possession filed by Leoncio Lim through counsel Atty. Labid being meritorious is hereby ordered GRANTED, hence let a writ of possession be issued immediately in favor of Mr. Leoncio Lim purchaser in good faith. CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Ruling: The Petition is dismissed. “Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court.” Moreover, “[e]very ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.” In this case, records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. There being no proper initiatory pleading filed, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that “[u]pon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.”

“It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.”Since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the same. Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and without force and effect. All proceedings, processes and writs emanating therefrom are likewise NULLIFIED and VOIDED for lack of jurisdiction. CASE 5: Spouses De Pedro vs Romasan Development Corp and Manuel Ko, G.R. No. 158002 FACTS:Spouses de Pedro filed a complaint against the respondents Romasan Development Corporation and Manuel Ko for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. The complaint averred that the spouses were the registered owner of a parcel of land, that the respondents started putting up a barbed wire fence on the perimeter of the adjacent property. 



The respondents alleged that they were owners of the land as evidenced by a TCT. Then the trial court issued an order to have a relocation survey of the property to verify its location. The respondent also filed a manifestation motion to dismiss stating that there was no legal or factual basis for the complaint as shown on the survey reports conducted by the survey team. Hence the petitioners had no cause of action against them. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, alleging it was premature for the court to dismiss

the complaint without affording them the right to adduce their evidence on their claim of damages. Petition was denied, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to resolve the issue being raised by the petitioners? RULING: 





The Court of Appeal ruled that the petitioners had every opportunity to question and object the composition of the survey team before the trial court, since they failed to do so, they cannot now allowed to do the same on appeal and according to the CA, it could not take judicial noticed of the alleged cases filed against the chairman of the survey team since this was not one of the matters which the court could take judicial notice of whether mandatory or directory. The Supreme Court in denying the petition held that a Certificate of Title once registered should not thereafter be impugned, altered, change, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. The resolution of the issue is thus not dependent on the report of the survey team filed in the trial court. The action of the petitioners against the respondents based on the material allegations of the complaints is one for recovery of possession of the subject property and damages. However such action is not a direct but a collateral attack of the TCT. Neither did the respondents directly attack the TCT in their answer to the complaint. Although the respondents stated in said answer by way of special and affirmative defenses that the subject

property is covered by a TCT issued in the name of the respondent corporation and as such the said respondent is entitled to the possession thereof to the exclusion of the petitioners such allegation does not constitute a direct attack on the TCT but is likewise a collateral attack thereon. Thus the court a quo had no jurisdiction to resolve the decisive issue raised by the parties in the trial court. CASE 6: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY FACTS: Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc., Isabel Greenland Agribased Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc., Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products, Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo (hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et. al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding consists of a total area of 641.7895 – about 200 hectares thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905 hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657 between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.

On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty Development Corporation, et. al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The DAR filed its Answer and one of their assertions is that the RTC has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in agrarian reform cases, which is vested by Section 54 of RA 6657, in the Court of Appeals (CA). Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et. al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and for Admission of the Amended Petition in order to change the nature of the action from a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment of land titles. The DAR, et. al. opposed the motion in its Opposition. The RTC conducted a hearing and held that it had jurisdiction over the case. LRA and DAR filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but both motions were denied by the RTC. In petition for certiorari filed with the CA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the LRA sought to annul the subject Order of the RTC. The CA reversed and set aside the Order of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the original and amended petitions filed by the Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation, et. al. RULING: The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case. HELD: It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law and cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

CASE 7: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY INTEL PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC.), Respondent. G.R. No. 169778, March 12, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue empowered to perform the duties of said office including, among others, the power to decide, approve and grant refunds or tax credits of erroneously or excessively paid taxes. Respondent Silicon Philippines, Inc., on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged primarily in the business of designing, developing, manufacturing, and exporting advance and large–scale integrated circuits components (ICs). 6 May 1999, respondent filed with the One–Stop Shop Inter– Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF) an application for Tax Credit/Refund of VAT paid for the second quarter of 1998 in the aggregate amount of P29,559,050.44, representing its alleged unutilized input tax. Thereafter, since no final action has been taken by petitioner on respondent’s administrative claim for refund, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on 30 June 2000 docketed as CTA Case No. 6129.

CTA denied respondent’s claim for refund of input VAT on domestic purchases of goods and services attributable to zero– rated sales on the ground that the export sales invoices presented in support thereto do not have Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) permit to print, while the sales invoices do not show that the sale was “zero–rated,” all in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997. RULING: It should be recalled that the CTA is a court of special jurisdiction. As such, it can only take cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction.22 In view thereof, although the parties have not raised the issue of jurisdiction, nevertheless, this Court may motu proprio determine whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over respondent’s judicial claim for refund taking into consideration, the factual and legal allegations contained in the pleadings filed by both parties and found by the court a quo. Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125,23 which was thereafter amended by RA No. 9282,24 defines the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. The said provision, in part, reads:chanRoblesvirtualL Section 7. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided. (1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

CASE 9: CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 184203 JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER FACTS: The City of Lapu-Lapu demanded from the PEZA P32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property taxes. The trial court held that all privileges, benefits, advantages, or exemptions granted to special economic zones created under the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 apply to special economic zones created under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. Since these benefits include exemption from payment of national or local taxes, these benefits apply to special economic zones owned by the PEZA. ISSUES: I. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief. HELD: Yes, The RTC of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief. The City was objecting to the venue of the action, not to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay. In essence, the City was contending that the PEZA’s petition is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real property,

and, therefore, the PEZA should have filed the petition with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City where the real

properties are located. The venue of an action depends on whether the action is a real or personal action. Should the action affect title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, it is a real action. The action should be filed in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. If the action is a personal action, the action shall be filed with the proper court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. However, whatever objections the City has against the venue of the PEZA’s action for declaratory relief are already deemed waived. Objections to venue must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. The City did not file a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the venue was improperly laid. Neither did the City raise this objection in its answer. In any event, the law sought to be judicially interpreted in this case had already been breached. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City.

CASE 10: Villagracia v. 5th Sharia District Court (GR. No. 188832; April 23, 2014)

FACTS: February 15, 1996 – the respondent (Roldan E. Mala), who is a Muslim, bought a parcel of land from Ceres Canete. March 3, 1996 – A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to the respondent but the petitioner (Villagracia), who is a Christian, occupied the land. The respondent filed an action against the petitioner to recover the possession of the parcel of land before the 5th Sharia District Court, which took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of the respondent (Roldan E. Mala). ISSUE: Did the 5th Sharia District Court have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (Villagracia), who is a Christian? RULING: No, the 5th Sharia Distrit Court did not have the jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (Villagracia), who is a Christian. The Court ruled that jurisdiction over the person is the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action. A court acquires the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by voluntary appearance or valid service of summons. The law (Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines) which confers jurisdiction to the Sharia District Court, provides that the same has concurrent original jurisdiction with existing civil actions over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein

the parties involved are Muslims. In this case, the 5 th Sharia District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of

the petitioner (Villagracia) because he is not a Muslim who can participate in the proceedings as provided by the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. CASE 14: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014 FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank, entered into a Subsidiary Loan Agreement and with the City Government of Iligan to finance the development and expansion of the city's water supply system. Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), conducted a public bidding wherein respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated, however was disqualified. Atlanta decided to have its disqualification reconsidered by the BAC, however opted, instead, to participate in the re-bidding of the project.

Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the rebidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan, the BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC. 1. Manila RTC rendered a decision in favor of Atlanta and declared the subject bidding null and void.

2. Hence, Land Bank's petition, asserting among others, that the case is dismissible for improper venue. ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the instant prohibition case and eventually issue the writ prayed for. RULING: No. While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person," the petition must be filed "in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Court." Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court corresponds to Section 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP 129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein are enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Undoubtedly, the writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void. Moreover, the necessity for the complaining bid participant to complete the protest process before resorting to court action cannot be overemphasized. It is a condition precedent to the court's taking cognizance of an action that assails a bid process.

When precipitately taken prior to the completion of the protest process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction CASE 16: Rubio vs Alabata (G.R. No. 203947; February 26, 2014) Parties:  Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata (Petitioners)  Lourdes Alabata (Respondent) Nature of Action:  Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 for annulment of the November 16, 2011 Decision and the September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497.  The CA decision affirmed the February 28, 2008 resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dumaguete City denying the petitioner’s plead for revival of judgment. Facts:  The parties in this case were involved earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dumaguete City.  The case was decided in favor of petitioner.  In its October 31, 1995 Decision, the trial court declared the “Declaration of Heirship and Sale" void and ordered the respondent to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners.  As a matter of course, the respondent appealed to the CA. She, however, later withdrew her appeal.

 The Decision of the trial court eventually lapsed into finality which paved the way for the RTC-43 Decision to lapse into finality.  The respondent’s motion to withdraw was granted by the CA and eventually became final and executory on June 20, 1997.  Judgment was later on issued and recorded in CA Book of Entries of Judgments.  Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed within five (5) years from the date of its entry.  A copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to their SACPAO (Special Appealed Cases Division of PAO) counsel, Atty. Lourdes Naz. However, they were never informed about the entry of judgment.  Atty Naz failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with PAODumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent was still pending.  It was only in November 2007 (or more than 10 years after the RTC-43 became final), when petitioners actually learned that the favorable decision became final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from the trial court.  Petitioners eventually filed for an action for revival of judgment through PAO-Dumaguete.  Respondent filed for an Answer with Affirmative Defense and Motion to Dismiss.  RTC Branch 42 granted her Motion to dismiss.  Petitioners appealed before the CA. The appeal and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.  Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

Is the RTC correct in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription and dismissing the action for revival of judgment filed by the petitioners?

and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners. The Public Attorney’s Office, specifically the Special Appealed Cases Division, failed to

Legal Principles:  Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.  Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: xxxx (3) Upon a judgment  Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of judgment. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still pending on appeal. Furthermore, the respondent’s withdrawal of her appeal means that she respected RTC Branch 43’s Decision, which declared void the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale” and ordered to reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners. Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a technicality.

RULING: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for appropriate action.” The lower court erred in strictly applying the procedural rules on prescription. To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court deems it proper to exercise its equity jurisdiction. The Court decided to relax the rules and allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by petitioners. The strict enforcement of the rules on prescription will not serve the ends of justice in this case as the petitioners stands to lose property which they rightfully own. The Court also added that, the rule stating that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.

CASE 17: INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. VICTOR M. CREER III, G.R. No. 18192, September 17, 2014 FACTS: InterOrient hired Victor as Galley Boy on board the vessel M/V MYRTO owned by Calidero Shipping Company, Ltd. (Calidero) for a period of nine months, which may be extended for three more months upon mutual consent of the parties. As 2nd Cook, Victor was tasked to get provisions from the cold storage which is kept at its coldest temperature to maintain freshness of the food stored therein. Victor alleged that when he was about to get provisions from the cold storage, he felt a sudden pain in his chest that radiated to his back. Since then, he experienced incessant cough, nasal congestion, difficulty in breathing, physical weakness, chills and extreme apprehension. Dr. Fernando G. Ayuyao (Dr. Ayuyao), found Victor to be suffering from Community-Acquired Pneumonia 1 and Bronchial Asthma. After conducting a medical examination and evaluation, Dr. Vicaldo issued a medical certificate indicating that Victor was diagnosed with Hypertension, Stage II, and Pulmonary Tuberculosis. Victor contended that during the course of his treatment, he regularly informed InterOrient of his sickness. However, he was neither apprised of his rights to nor paid sickness allowance amounting to US$940. InterOrient negated Victor’s claim for disability benefits averring that the same has no factual, contractual or legal basis. It argued that his discharge from the vessel was not occasioned by any illness or injury sustained or contracted on board but was simply due to completion or expiration of his contract; that he voluntarily executed a Receipt and Release document wherein he acknowledged that he had not contracted any illness while on board. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of

merit. Victor appealed to the NLRC but was denied. The CA granted the same. ISSUE: Whether or not Victor Creer III’s illness is compensable under the POEA contract? RULING: NO, Victor’s illness is not compensable. For an illness to be compensable, Section 20(B)(6) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions), deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract, requires the concurrence of two elements: first, that the illness must be work-related; and second, that the work- related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. He failed to comply with both. Victor submitted no proof that his illness was contracted during the term of his contract with InterOrient. As this Court has reiterated in a number of cases, it is well aware of the principle that, consistent with the purposes underlying the formulation of the POEA Contract, its provisions must be applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into effect. This exhortation cannot, however, be taken to sanction the award of disability benefits and sickness allowance based on flimsy evidence and/ or even in the face of an unjustified non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA Contract. "Liberal construction is not a license to disregard the evidence, or lack thereof on record; or to misapply the laws." While we sympathize with Victor's plight,

the Court is constrained to deny his claims for disability benefits absent substantial evidence on record to justify such grant. CASE 18: Paranaque Kings vs. CA Facts: Catalina L. Santos is the owner of parcels of land located at Parañaque. Frederick Chua leased the subject property from defendant Catalina L. Santos, the said lease was registered in the Register of Deeds. On 1979, Chua assigned all his rights and interest and participation in the leased property to Lee Ching Bing, by virtue of a deed of assignment and with the conformity of defendant Santos, the said assignment was also registered. On August 6, 1979 Bing also assigned all his rights and interest in the leased property to Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Incorporated by virtue of a deed of assignment and with the conformity of defendant Santos. Sometime in 1988 Catalina Santos sold the eight parcels of land subject of the lease to defendant David Raymundo for a consideration of 5M. Upon learning of this fact, the representative of PKE wrote a letter to defendant Santos, requesting her to rectify the error and consequently realizing the error, she had it reconveyed to her for the same consideration of P5M.Only 2 days after Catalina Santos sold her properties did she reply to PKE’s letter saying period has lapsed. The counsel for defendant Santos informed the petitioners PKE that the new owner is RAYMUNDO. From the preceding facts, it is clear that the sale was simulated and that there was collusion between the respondents Santos and Raymundo in the sales of the leased

properties. Petitioner Paranaque demanded from the defendants to rectify their unlawful acts that they committed, but defendants refused and failed to comply with plaintiffs just and valid demands. RTC issued the order dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. CA affirmed in toto. Issue: Is such right of first refusal enforceable by an action for specific performance?YES(WON the complaint filed by Paranaque Kings states a valid cause of action. YES) Ruling: The basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer. Only after the optionee fails to exercise its right of first priority under the same terms and within the period contemplated, could the owner validly offer to sell the property to a third person, again, under the same terms as offered to the optionee.With respect to the contention of respondent Raymundo that he is not privy to the lease contract, not being the lessor nor the lessee referred to therein, he could thus not have violated its provisions, but he is nevertheless a proper party. Clearly, he stepped into the shoes of the ownerlessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed all the obligations of the lessor under the lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in the form of rental payments. Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for the annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both pleadings also alleged collusion between him and respondent Santos which defeated the exercise by petitioner of its right of first refusal. In order then to accord complete relief to petitioner, respondent Raymundo was a necessary, if not indispensable, party to the case. A favorable judgment for the

petitioner will necessarily affect the rights of respondent Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which petitioner would like to assert its right of first option to buy. CASE 20: JAMES IMBONG v OCHOA GR NO. 204819 ACTIONS: CLASS SUIT FACTS: RA No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and productive health Act of 2012 (RH law) was enacted by congress on Dec. 12, 2012. Shortly after the passage of the law, challengers from various sectors of society filed 14 petitions and 2 petitions in intervention assailing the constitutionality of the RH law. The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. The petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite of locus standi ISSUE: whether the petitioners have locus standi? RULING: Locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.in relation to locus standi, the as applied challenge embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own right. In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public but also to the bench and bar, the issuance raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, RH law drastically affects the constitutional provisions of the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and

expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and fact that the issues of contraception and reproduction health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the court entertains no doubt that the petitions raised issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication, more importantly, considering that it it’s the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for life to be taken away before taking action. The Court cannot and should not exercise judicial restraint at this time when the rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences. CASE 21: ARIGO v. SWIFT FACTS A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs on January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition against the respondents on their corresponding capacities. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi?

Ruling:

FACTS:

Yes. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Xxx. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature."

On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8, Davao City rendered its decision in favor of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in a collection case, against defendants Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. The defendants were directed to transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were then eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok. A year thereafter, Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15, Davao City against the same defendants. Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. After the issuance of writ of execution, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction the properties covered by TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM. To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action before RTCBr. 14 for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a

CASE 22: JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners, vs. JEWM AGROINDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, respondent. G. R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014

permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. The counsel then of spouses Crisologo questioned the authority of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. But JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene

was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane Does named in the complaint of JEWM. ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Crisologo are considered as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien. RULING: In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. In Southwestern University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title. Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The reason behind this compulsory

joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule. CASE 25: MAGALLANES VS PALMER ASIA FACTS: Gerve was a Sales Agent of Andrews International, a corporation engaged in manufacture and sale of fire extinguishers. When three prospective buyers who issued checks to Gerve cancelled their purchase, Angel, the president of Andrews, returned to Gerve the bum checks. Because he wants to get his commission, Gerve agreed to sign Sales Invoices and to issue several checks as payment for the fire extinguishers. However, the checks he issued when presented to the drawee bank were dishonoured. In 1995, Andrews International and Palmer Asia Inc. merged whereby all the business of Andrews were to be handled by Palmer Asia. The purpose according to Angel was to appeal to a larger market. Being a family corporation, the legal niceties were dispensed with. Andrews remained existing, though not operational. It was neither dissolved nor liquidated. Palmer Asia simply took over the business of Andrews International. Andrews then sent demand letters to Gerve to pay the face value of the checks, but the same were all unheeded. Thus, Andrews filed several cases for violation of BP 22 against Gerve, which Informations were filed before the MTC of Makati City. The counsel of Palmer then filed an entry of appearance in the case; however, the docket numbers were

for a different case and a different court, Branch 67; no copy of the motion was furnished Gerve. Angel, the president of Andrews explained that Andrews transferred all its business to Palmer. Thus Gerve filed an Omnibus Motion To Disqualify Private Prosecutor And Strike Out Testimony of Angel. According to him, since all the business of Andrews were taken over by Palmer it should be the latter who is the real party in interest and must file the case, not Andrews. In its opposition, Angel averred that the two corporations share the same set of officers, same offices, had the same set of customers and had the same products, thus for all intents and purposes, Palmer should be regarded as an agent of Andrews. ISSUE: Whether or not Palmer Asia is the real party in interest and must be the one who should file the case. RULING: Palmer Asia is not the real party in interest; it was never a party to the proceedings at the trial court. Under our procedural rules, “a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-ininterest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.” In the instant case, Magallanes filed a motion to dismiss in accordance with the Rules of Court, wherein he claimed that: x x x the obvious and only real party in interest in the filing and prosecution of the civil aspect impliedly instituted with x x x the filing of the foregoing Criminal Cases for B.P. 22 is Andrews International Products, Inc.

The alleged bounced checks issued by x x x Magallanes were issued payable in the name of Andrews International Products, Inc. The [n]arration of [facts] in the several Informations for violation of B.P. 22 filed against Magallanes solely mentioned the name of Andrews International Products, Inc.The real party in this case is Andrews, not Palmer.

CASE 26: ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC., and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 203775 August 5, 2014

FACTS: On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011, cancelling the certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns

(ABC) Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the 2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC PartyList resulted in the re-computation of the party-list allocations in the House of Representatives, in which the COMELEC followed the formula outlined in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections. The COMELEC then issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859, in which it resolved:

xxx On 25 October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez, are a real party in interest. RULING: We dismiss the petition. Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue. Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in

interest. In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and non-partisan organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of which is for the benefit of the common or general interest of many flood victims who are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties," and that petitioner Hernandez "is a Tax Payer and the Lead Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims." Clearly, petitioner Association of Flood Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be considered a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil action. An unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of

the association.5 Such unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from its members. If an association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in the civil action CASE 28 : RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, vs. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, and the legitimate heirs of JOSE A. ROJAS, namely: JOSE FERDINAND M. ROJAS II, ROLANDO M. ROJAS, JOSE M. ROJAS, JR., CARMELITA ROJAS-JOSE, VICTOR M. ROJAS, and LOURDES M. ROJAS, all represented by JOSE

FERDINAND M. ROJAS II, Respondents. G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014 FACTS: Alfredo Guido Jr. applied before the Land Registration Authority for Reconstitution of Title of a huge parcel of land that he inherited in Morong, Rizal. Five months after he received the approval of his for Reconstitution of Title, petitioner Rodolfo Francisco applied for Application of Registration of Title of the same parcel of land which overlapped with the property of respondent Emiliana Rojas etc. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting on the land registration court decision, declared petitioner as true and absolute owner of the said property. Thereafter petitioner filed with the same court petition for the issuance of decree of registration. Then herein respondents - the Rojases – filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA] claiming that they came to know of the existence of petitioner’s application for registration only "sometime in June 2000" when a real estate agent by the name of Florentina Rivera who discovered the same and brought it to their knowledge. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s land title was valid? HELD: NO. On the assumption that what is being applied for formed part of a bigger parcel of land belonging to the Guidos

and Rojases, then, as registered owners thereof, they (Guidos and Rojases) should have been mentioned in the Application for Registration as adjoining owners conformably with Section 15 of PD 1529, which requires in the application for registration the inclusion of the full names and addresses of the adjoining owners. Contrary to the mandatory requirement of the law, there is nothing in the application for registration alleging that the Rojases and Guidos are adjoining owners. As adjoining owners, respondents are indispensable parties entitled to actual and personal notice of the application for registration. A valid judgment cannot be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties like respondents who hold subsisting Torrens title to the property in question.

CASE 29: NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION v. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), G.R. No. 156208 INDISPENSABLE PARTIES FACTS: Pursuant to Section 63[4] of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33[5] of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization.

Petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted Board of Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section 48[6] of the EPIRA Law, were present.

This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.

Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled principle that delegated power cannot be further delegated. Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and vote.

Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted.

ISSUES: 1. whether or not there is undue delegation of delegated power when only the representatives of certain members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed and signed the questioned Resolutions. HELD: Yes, there is undue delegation of delegated powers. According to the Court, the rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally authorized official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal judgment. In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.

Hence, there being only three valid votes cast out of the nine board member, the NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect.

CASE 30: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN, G.R. NO. 180654; APRIL 21, 2014 FACTS: March 28, 2003 – the petitioner (NPC) received a notice from the respondent to pay the unpaid taxes for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003. But the petitioner assails the computation of taxes since there was a pending case between

the petitioner and City of Cabanatuan. May 12 and 14, 2003 – the respondent sent notices of tax to the petitioner but the latter argued that there was a law passed which transfers the function (such as generating and supplying electricity), its properties and all its existing liabilities to PSALM (Powers Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation) and TRANSCO (National Transmission Company) so they (petitioner) are not liable to the taxes demanded by the respondent since its effectivity (June 26, 2001). ISSUE: Is the petitioner the indispensable party in this case? RULING: No, the petitioner is not the indispensable in this case.The Court ruled that an indispensable party is one who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter and in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or

equitable. In this case, the subject properties were transferred to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO by operation of law so they are the indispensable parties that must be included before it may properly go forward.

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