civpro 2
December 15, 2016 | Author: Danielle | Category: N/A
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Cause of Action (Rule 2, Sec 1-6) G.R. No. 170916 April 27, 2007 CGR CORPORATION herein represented by its President ALBERTO RAMOS, III, HERMAN M. BENEDICTO and ALBERTO R. BENEDICTO vsERNESTO L. TREYES, JR. Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284, to wit: Order[1] dated August 26, 2005 which dismissed petitioners complaint for damages on the ground of prematurity, and Order[2] dated January 2, 2006 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. In issue is one of law whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred. CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners) claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate Fishpond Lease Agreement Nos. 5674,[3] 5694[4] and 5695[5] in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31, 2024. On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.
That on succeeding days, defendants men continued their forage on the fishponds of the plaintiffs by carting and taking away the remaining full grown milkfish, fry and fingerlings and other marine products in the fishponds. NOT ONLY THAT, even the chapel built by plaintiff CGR Corporation was ransacked and destroyed and the materials taken away by defendants men. Religious icons were also stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege, even decapitated the heads of some of these icons; xxxx XIII That the unlawful, forcible and illegal intrusion/destruction of defendant Ernesto Treyes, Jr. and his men on the fishpond leased and possessed by the plaintiffs is without any authority of law and in violation of Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states: Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of the Court.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
and praying for the following reliefs:
On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 1331,[6] 1332[7] and 1333,[8] against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and respondent.
1) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff CGR Corporation the sum of at least P900,000.00 and to plaintiffs Herman and Alberto Benedicto, the sum of at least P300,000.00 each by way of actual damages and such other amounts as proved during the trial;
In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No, 04-12284, alleging, inter alia,
2) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as moral damages;
xxxx
3) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
V That prior to the issuance of the fishpond lease agreement in favor of the plaintiffs, they had already been in open and continuous possession of the same parcel of land;
4) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to reimburse plaintiffs with all such sums paid to their counsel by way of appearance fees.[10] (Underscoring supplied) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] petitioners complaint for damages on three grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.
VI As lessee and in possession of the above[-]described fishpond, plaintiffs have continuously occupied, cultivated and developed the said fishpond and since then, had been regularly harvesting milkfish, shrimps, mud crabs and other produce of the fishponds; VII That the yearly income of the fishpond of the plaintiff corporation is at least P300,000.00 more or less, while the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Herman Benedicto, Sr. is at least P100,000.00 more or less, and the yearly income of the fishpond of plaintiff Alberto Benedicto is at least P100,000.00 more or less; VIII That sometime last November 18, 2000 or thereabout, defendant Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. and his armed men and with the help of the blue guards from the Negros Veterans Security Agency forcibly and unlawfully entered the fishponds of the plaintiffs and once inside barricaded the entrance of the fishpond and set up barb wire fence along the road going to plaintiffs fishpond and harvested the milkfish and carted away several tons of milkfish owned by the plaintiffs; IX
By the assailed Order[12] of August 26, 2005, Branch 43 of the Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been made. Hence, the present petition for review. The only issue is whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises. Petitioners meet the issue in the affirmative. Respondents assert otherwise. The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs
as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied) The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair rental value of the property and attorneys fees and costs.[13] The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas[14] reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x[15] (Emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied; citations omitted)
Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992. xxxx 3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein. 3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands. 3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy. 3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents to plaintiff. xxxx
Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.[16] In asserting the negative of the issue, respondent cites the 1999 case of Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[17] In this case, Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. (Progressive), as lessor, repossessed the leased premises from the lessee allegedly pursuant to their contract of lease whereby it was authorized to do so if the lessee failed to pay monthly rentals. The lessee filed a case for forcible entry with damages against Progressive before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. During the pendency of the case, the lessee filed an action for damages before the RTC, drawing Progressive to file a motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal by Progressive, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC order denying the motion to dismiss. Progressive brought the case to this Court. Citing Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, this Court reversed the lower courts ruling, it holding that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs therefrom. In other words, this Court held that no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof. The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit: 4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A. 5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. xxxx
In thus ruling, this Court in Progressive made a comparative study of the therein two complaints, thus: A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damagesmoral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatoryconstitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative. The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations 2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998. 2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood
7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal high-handed manner of gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows: x x x x 8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent, of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession.
SO ORDERED. xxxx 12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x[19] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Analyzing the two complaints, this Court, still in Progressive, observed: Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee, (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit. On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata. The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. x x x[20] (Italics in the original; Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, however, that as reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred. Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.[21] Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys fees.[22] Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.[23] Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. WHEREFORE, the Orders dated August 26, 2005 and January 2, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 04-12284 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, is directed to REINSTATE Civil Case No. 04-12284 to its docket and to conduct proceedings thereon with dispatch.
G.R. No. 123555. January 22, 1999 PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET, INC. May the lessee which instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court an action for forcible entry with damages against its lessor file a separate suit with the Regional Trial Court against the same lessor for moral and exemplary damages plus actual and compensatory damages based on the same forcible entry? On grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping, petitioner invokes established jurisprudence that a party cannot by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case evade the principle that the same cause of action shall not be litigated twice between the same parties or their privies.[1] Petitioner therefore prays for reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 1995, as well as its Resolution dated 17 January 1996 denying reconsideration, which upheld the denial by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner's motion to dismiss private respondent's damage suit. The antecedents: On 27 May 1991 petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building thereon located at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3) months, i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998, with a monthly rental of approximately P600,000.00. The contract contained, among others, the following pertinent terms and conditions: EFFECT OF VIOLATIONS 25. LESSEE hereby agrees that all the provisions contained in this Contract shall be deemed as conditions, as well as covenants, and that this Contract shall be automatically terminated and cancelled without resorting to court action should LESSEE violate any or all said conditions, including the payment of Rent, CUSA and other charges indicated in the FLP when due within the time herein stipulated and in any such cases, LESSEE hereby irrevocably appoints LESSOR, its authorized agents, employees and/or representatives as his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, even after the termination, expiration or cancellation of this Contract, with full power and authority to open, enter, repossess, secure, enclose, fence and otherwise take full and complete physical possession and control of the leased premises and its contents without resorting to court action and/or to summarily disconnect electrical and/or water services thereof, and that LESSEE hereby irrevocably empowers LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or representatives to take inventory and possession of whatever equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc., found therein belonging to LESSEE, consignors and/or to any other persons and to place the same in LESSORs warehouse or any other place at LESSORs discretion for safekeeping; charging LESSEE the corresponding storage fees therefor; that in case LESSEE fails to claim said equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, appliances, etc. from storage and simultaneously liquidate any liability with LESSOR within seven (7) days from date of said transfer to LESSORs warehouse, LESSOR is likewise hereby expressly authorized and empowered by LESSEE to dispose of said property/properties in a public sale through a Notary Public of LESSORs choice and to apply the proceeds thereof to whatever liability and/or indebtedness LESSEE may have to LESSOR plus reasonable expenses for the same, including storage fees, and the balance, if any, shall be turned over to LESSEE; that LESSEE hereby expressly agrees that any or all acts performed by LESSOR, his authorized agents, employees and/or representatives under the provisions of this Section may not be the subject of any petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Mandatory Injunction in court, and that LESSOR and/or his authorized agents, employees, and/or representatives shall be free from any civil and/or criminal liability or responsibility whatsoever therefor. TERMINATION OF LEASE 26. Upon the automatic termination of this lease contract, as the case may be, LESSEE shall immediately vacate and redeliver physical possession of the leased premises, including the keys appertaining thereto, to LESSOR in good, clean and sanitary condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted, devoid of all occupants, equipment, furniture, articles, merchandise, etc., belonging to LESSEE or to any other person except those belonging to LESSOR; that should LESSEE fail to comply with this provision, LESSOR is hereby given the same rights and power to proceed against LESSEE as expressly granted in the immediately preceding section. Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner. As of 19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66. Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus, pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under the above-quoted Secs. 25 and 26 of the lease agreement, petitioner on 31 October 1992 repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found within and owned by private respondent and scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables on 19 August 1993 with notice to private respondent. On 26 November 1992 private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[2] The case was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Guillermo L. Loja Jr. who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from selling private respondents properties at a public auction. On 9 December 1992 Judge Loja inhibited himself from trying the case and directed its transfer to Branch 34 presided over by Judge Joselito SD Generoso. Soon after, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the inhibition of Judge Generoso and the immediate reraffle of the case arguing that the summary transfer of the case to Judge Generoso was irregular as it was not done by raffle. The motion was granted and the case went to Branch 36 presided over by Judge Francisco D. Villanueva. Thereafter, on 22 December 1992, at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following: (a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the name of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals; (b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived at; (c) petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables and fish, all properly receipted for; (d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant equipment; and (e) the parties shall negotiate for the restoration of the premises to private respondent, and if no settlement be arrived at on or before January 8, 1993, the hearing on the merits of the case shall proceed and the disposition of the amount deposited representing the rental arrearages shall be left to the discretion of the court. This agreement was incorporated in the order of the court dated 22 December 1992[3] which in effect terminated for all intents and purposes the incident on the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction. Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993 another action for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 101 presided over by Judge Pedro T. Santiago.[4] Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis pendencia and forum shopping. On 2 July 1993, instead of ruling on the motion, Judge Santiago issued an order archiving the case pending the outcome of the forcible entry case being heard at the MeTC for the reason that "the damages is (sic) principally anchored on whether or not the defendants (petitioner herein) have committed forcible entry."[5] On 2 August 1993 petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order and reiterated its motion to dismiss the suit for damages. Before petitioner's motion to dismiss could be resolved, private respondent filed with the RTC on 18 August 1993 an amended complaint for damages. On 14 September 1993 it also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for the Grant of a Preliminary Prohibitory and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. On the very same day, Judge Santiago issued an order (a) denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, (b) admitting private respondent's amended complaint, and (c) granting private respondent's application for a temporary restraining order against petitioner. Thus, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of private respondent and issuing a restraining order against petitioner; in allowing private respondent to engage in forum shopping; and, taking cognizance of the action for damages despite lack of jurisdiction.[6] But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of Judge Santiago's order of 14 September 1993 which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. It also found that the elements of litis pendencia were lacking to justify the dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC because despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC the only damages recoverable thereat were those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property and not the kind of damages being claimed before the RTC which had no direct relation to loss of material possession. It clarified that since the damages prayed for in the amended complaint with the RTC were those caused by the alleged high-handed manner with which petitioner reacquired possession of the leased premises and the sale of private respondents movables found therein, the RTC and not the MeTC had jurisdiction over the action of damages.[7]
Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it erred in (a) finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC; (b) ruling that the trial judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the action for damages and injunction despite the pendency of the forcible entry case with the MeTC; and, (c) ruling that private respondent did not commit forum shopping since the causes of action before the RTC and MeTC were not identical with each other. There is merit in the petition. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it[8] this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the circumstances of the case.[9] The filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when the issue raised is one purely of law,[10] or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void,[11] or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court. In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC between the same parties involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any motion for reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise.[12] We now turn to the issue of whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court by the lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of pendency of another action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed by the same lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, indimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs. The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for restoration of possession. This is consistent with the principle laid down in Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for dismissal of an action. Res adjudicata requires that there must be between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action the following elements: (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration.[13] It is likewise basic under Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the other or others. "Cause of action" is defined by Sec. 2 of Rule 2 as the act of omission by which a party violates a right of another.[14] These premises obtaining, there is no question at all that private respondent's cause of action in the forcible entry case and in the suit for damages is the alleged illegal retaking of possession of the leased premises by the lessor, petitioner herein, from which all legal reliefs arise. Simply stated, the restoration of possession and demand for actual damages in the case before the MeTC and the demand for damages with the RTC both arise from the same cause of action, i.e., the forcible entry by petitioner into the leased premises. A comparative study of the two (2) complaints filed by private respondent against petitioner before the two (2) trial courts shows that not only are the elements of res adjudicata present, at least insofar as the claim for actual and compensatory damages is concerned, but also that the claim for damages - moral and exemplary in addition to actual and compensatory - constitutes splitting a single cause of action. Since this runs counter to the rule against multiplicity of suits, the dismissal of the second action becomes imperative. The complaint for forcible entry contains the following pertinent allegations 2.01 On 02 January 1989, plaintiff entered into a contract of lease with defendant PDC over a property
designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner MacArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of ten (10) years from 02 January 1989 to 30 April 1998.
premises by petitioner. Since actual and compensatory damages were already prayed for in the forcible entry case before the MeTC, it is obvious that this cannot be relitigated in the damage suit before the RTC by reason of res adjudicata.
2.02 Immediately after having acquired actual physical possession of the Subject Premises, plaintiff established and now operates thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. Since then, plaintiff had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful physical possession of the Subject Premises until 31 October 1992. xxxx 3.02 Plaintiff, being the lessee of the Subject Premises, is entitled to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment of the Subject Premises to the exclusion of all others, including defendants herein. 3.03 Defendants resort to strong arms tactics to forcibly wrest possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff and maintain possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation by the use of superior number of men and arms amounts to the taking of the law into their own hands. 3.04 Thus, defendants act of unlawfully evicting out plaintiff from the Subject Premises it is leasing from defendant PDC and depriving it of possession thereof through the use of force, threat, strategy and intimidation should be condemned and declared illegal for being contrary to public order and policy. 3.05 Consequently, defendants should be enjoined from continuing with their illegal acts and be ordered to vacate the Subject Premises and restore possession thereof, together with its contents, to plaintiff. xxxx 4.07 Considering that defendants act of forcibly grabbing possession of the Subject Premises from plaintiff is illegal and null and void, defendant should be adjudged liable to plaintiff for all the aforedescribed damages which plaintiff incurred as a result thereof. The amended complaint for damages filed by private respondent alleges basically the same factual circumstances and issues as bases for the relief prayed for, to wit: 4. On May 28, 1991, plaintiff and defendant PDC entered into a Contract of Lease for a period of ten years or from January 2, 1989 up to April 30, 1998 over a property designated as Ground Floor, Seafood Market (hereinafter referred to as Subject Premises) situated at the corner of EDSA corner McArthur Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. A copy of the lease contract is attached hereto as Annex A. 5. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff took over actual physical possession of Subject Premises, and established thereon the now famous Seafood Market Restaurant. xxxx 7. On October 31, 1992 at around 8:30 p.m., defendant PDC, without the benefit of any writ of possession or any lawful court order and with the aid of approximately forty (40) armed security guards and policemen under the supervision of defendant Tejam, forcibly entered the subject premises through force, intimidation, threats and stealth and relying on brute force and in a thunderboltish manner and against plaintiffs will, unceremoniously drew away all of plaintiffs men out of the subject premises, thereby depriving herein plaintiff of its actual, physical and natural possession of the subject premises. The illegal, high-handed manner and gestapo like take-over by defendants of subject premises is more particularly described as follows: x x x 8. To date, defendants continue to illegally possess and hold the Subject Premises, including all the multi-million improvements, fixtures and equipment therein owned by plaintiff, all to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. The actuations of defendants constitute an unlawful appropriation, seizure and taking of property against the will and consent of plaintiff. Worse, defendants are threatening to sell at public auction and without the consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, the multi-million fixtures and equipment of plaintiff and at prices way below the market value thereof. Plaintiff hereby attaches as Annex B the letter from defendants dated August 6, 1993 addressed to plaintiff, informing the latter that the former intends to sell at an auction on August 19, 1993 at 2:00 p.m. properties of the plaintiff presently in defendants possession. xxxx 12. Defendants unlawful takeover of the premises constitutes a violation of its obligation under Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract. Hence, plaintiff has filed the present suit for the recovery of damages under Art. 1659 of the New Civil Code x x x x
The other claims for moral and exemplary damages cannot also succeed considering that these sprung from the main incident being heard before the MeTC. Jurisprudence is unequivocal that when a single delict or wrong is committed - like the unlawful taking or detention of the property of another there is but one single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated, and all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint as constituting one single cause of action . [15] In a forcible entry case, the real issue is the physical possession of the real property. The question of damages is merely secondary or incidental, so much so that the amount thereof does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the unlawful act of a deforciant in taking possession of a piece of land by means of force and intimidation against the rights of the party actually in possession thereof is a delict or wrong, or a cause of action that gives rise to two (2) remedies, namely, the recovery of possession and recovery of damages arising from the loss of possession, but only to one action. For obvious reasons, both remedies cannot be the subject of two (2) separate and independent actions, one for recovery of possession only, and the other, for the recovery of damages. That would inevitably lead to what is termed in law as splitting up a cause of action.[16] In David v. de la Cruz[17] we observed –
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action, namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of which three (3) reliefs (denominated by private respondent as its causes of action) arose: (a) the restoration by the lessor (petitioner herein) of the possession of the leased premises to the lessee; (b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits; and, (c) the claim for attorney's fees and costs of suit.
This Court likewise elucidated in New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[24] that there is forum shopping when the actions involve the same transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances. The reason behind the proscription of forum shopping is obvious. This unnecessarily burdens our courts with heavy caseloads, unduly taxes the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary and trifles with and mocks our judicial processes, thereby adversely affecting the efficient administration of justice. This condemnable conduct has prompted the Court to issue circulars[25] ordering among others that a violation thereof shall be cause for the dismissal of the case or cases without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned. The records ineluctably show that the complaint lodged by private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City contained no certification of non-forum shopping. When petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case raising among others the ground of forum shopping it pointed out the
On the other hand, the complaint for damages prays for a monetary award consisting of (a) moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P500,000.00; (b) actual damages of P20,000,000.00 and compensatory damages of P1,000,000.00 representing unrealized profits; and, (c) P200,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs, all based on the alleged forcible takeover of the leased
Herein tenants have but one cause of action against their landlord, their illegal ejectment or removal from their landholdings, which cause of action however entitles them to two (2) claims or remedies - for reinstatement and damages. As both claims arise from the same cause of action, they should be alleged in a single complaint. A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered in one case and the rest, in another.[18] In Bachrach v. Icarangal[19] we explained that the rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between the same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. What then is the effect of the dismissal of the other action? Since the rule is that all such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, it goes without saying that those not therein included cannot be the subject of subsequent complaints for they are barred forever.[20] If a suit is brought for a part of a claim, a judgment obtained in that action precludes the plaintiff from bringing a second action for the residue of the claim, notwithstanding that the second form of action is not identical with the first or different grounds for relief are set for the second suit. This principle not only embraces what was actually determined, but also extends to every matter which the parties might have litigated in the case.[21] This is why the legal basis upon which private respondent anchored its second claim for damages, i.e., Art. 1659 in relation to Art. 1654 of the Civil Code,[22] not otherwise raised and cited by private respondent in the forcible entry case, cannot be used as justification for the second suit for damages. We note, not without some degree of displeasure, that by filing a second suit for damages, private respondent was not only able to press a claim for moral and exemplary damages which by its failure to allege the same in its suit before the MeTC foreclosed its right to sue on it, but it was also able to obtain from the RTC, by way of another temporary restraining order, a second reprieve from an impending public auction sale of its movables which it could not anymore secure from the MeTC before which the matter of the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction was already closed. The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts committed forum shopping. In Crisostomo v. Securities and Exchange Commission[23] we ruled There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies x x x with respect to suits filed in the courts x x x in connection with litigations commenced in the court x x x in anticipation of an unfavorable x x x ruling and a favorable case where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
absence of the required certification. The amended complaint, as well as the second and third amended complaints, attempted to rectify the error by invariably stating that there was no other action pending between the parties involving the same causes of action although there was actually a forcible entry case pending before the MTC of Quezon City. By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second case. This is a compelling reason to dismiss the second case. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 September 1995 and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 24 September 1993 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-93-16409, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to proceed with the proper disposition of Civil Case No. 6589, "Westin Seafood Market, Inc. v. Progressive Development Corporation, et al.," with dispatch considering the summary nature of the case. Treble costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-41423 February 23, 1989 LUIS JOSEPH vs HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, PATROCINIO PEREZ, ANTONIO SIOSON, JACINTO PAGARIGAN, ALBERTO CARDENO and LAZARO VILLANUEVA Petitioner prays in this appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the order, dated July 8, 1975, dismissing petitioner's complaint, as well as the order, dated August 22, 1975, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista of the former Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III. Petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 50-V-73 entitled "Luis Joseph vs. Patrocinio Perez, Domingo Villa y de Jesus, Rosario Vargas, Antonio Sioson, Lazaro Villanueva and Jacinto Pagarigan", filed before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, and presided over by respondent Judge Crispin V. Bautista; while private respondents Patrocinio Perez, Antonio Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan and Lazaro Villanueva are four of the defendants in said case. Defendant Domingo Villa y de Jesus did not answer either the original or the amended complaint, while defendant Rosario Vargas could not be served with summons; and respondent Alberto Cardeno is included herein as he was impleaded by defendant Patrocinio Perez, one of respondents herein, in her cross-claim.
releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan. On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61. Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner. On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal, petitioner contending that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case. We find the present recourse devoid of merit. The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3 It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person. 4
The generative facts of this case, as culled from the written submission of the parties, are as follows: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from Pangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. 5 In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
The following proceedings thereafter took place: 2 Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.
There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the trial court hold respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary debtors. We cannot accept the vacuous contention of petitioner that said allegations are intended to apply only in the event that execution be issued in his favor. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which would countenance such a procedure.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein respondent Patrocinio Perez.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein impleaded crossdefendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant. On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.
WHEREFORE, the challenged orders of the respondent judge are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-16797 February 27, 1963 RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL vs SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its Civil Case No. Q-4232. The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate. Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer. After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24 February 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90) days. Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of appellee's cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure. We find no merit in the appeal. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply. On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract that the obligation for P96,000.00 was to be — without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided that in case of default it shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum, clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve per cent in case of default being nothing more than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay on or before the expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call upon the court to set another due date. Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with costs against appellants. G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010 ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, CONSORICIA O. PENSON, RADITO V. PADRIGANO, JEAN R. DE MESA,
LEAH P. DELA CRUZ, ANDY V. MACASAQUIT, SENEN B. CORDOBA, ALBERT BRILLANTES, GLORIA BISDA, JOVITA V. CONCEPCION, TERESITA G. CARVAJAL, ROSANNA T. MALIWANAG, RICHARD ODERON, CECILIA ESTERNON, BENEDICTO CABRAL, MA. VICTORIA E. LAROCO, CESAR ANDRA, FELICISIMO GALACIO, ELSA R. CALMA, FILOMENA A. GALANG, JEAN PAUL MELEGRITO, CLARO G. SANTIAGO, JR., EDUARDO FRIAS, REYNALDO O. ANDAL, NEPHTALIE IMPERIO, RUEL BALAGTAS, VICTOR R. ORTIZ, FRANCISCO P. REYES, JR., ELISEO M. BALAGOT, JR., JOSE C. MONSALVE, JR., ARTURO ADSUARA, F.C. LADRERO, JR., NELSON PADUA, MARCELA C. SAYAO, ANGELITO MALAKAS, GLORIA RAMENTO, JULIANA SUPLEO, MANUEL MENDRIQUE, E. TAYLAN, CARMELA BOBIS, DANILO VARGAS, ROY-LEO C. PABLO, ALLAN VILLANUEVA, VICENTE R. VELASCO, JR., IMELDA ERENO, FLORIZA M. CATIIS, RANIEL R. BASCO, E. JALIJALI, MARIO C. CARAAN, DOLORES M. AVIADO, MICHAEL P. LAPLANA, GUILLERMO G. SORIANO, ALICE E. SOJO, ARTHUR G. NARNE, LETICIA SORIANO, FEDERICO RAMOS, JR., PETERSON CAAMPUED, RODELIO L. GOMEZ, ANTONIO D. GARCIA, JR., ANTONIO GALO, A. SANCHEZ, SOL E. TAMAYO, JOSEPHINE A.M. COCJIN, DAMIAN QUINTO, JR., EDLYN MARIANO, M.A. MALANUM, ALFREDO S. ESTRELLA, and JESUS MEL SAYO vs EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO). The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285[1] which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads: SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction over the following: a. Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and municipal governments, including government corporations; b.
Printing of officials ballots;
c. Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis. The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive Order. The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency. On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions of Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide: SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987. SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services
outside NPO provided that: 2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than what is offered by the NPO; and 2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the target completion time of the government agency. SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for the programs, projects and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional financial support from the government. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. We dismiss the petition. Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must first delve into a procedural matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,[2] we held that [c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows: Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company,[3] the Court held that: An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Emphases ours.) Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected
by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO.[4] The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition,[5] ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people close to the seat of power.[6] Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case. Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. ,[7] we observed that an element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. Previously, we held in Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church[8] that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper. It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance,[9] to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of Desistance[10] was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWAs opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the contention of petitioners counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit. As to the merits of the case, the petition raises two main grounds to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378: First, it is contended that President Arroyo cannot amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order (Executive Order No. 378). Petitioners maintain that former President Aquinos Executive Order No. 285 is a legislative enactment, as the same was issued while President Aquino still had legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;[11] thus, only Congress through legislation can validly amend Executive Order No. 285. Second, petitioners maintain that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 would lead to the eventual abolition of the NPO and would violate the security of tenure of NPO employees. Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[12] the Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.) Interpreting the foregoing provision, we held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, thus: But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President . In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.[13] (Emphasis ours.) It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.[14] Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa. Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require. In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms. [15] There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987. However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis ours.) Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws. In the oft-cited Larin v. Executive Secretary,[16] the Court likewise adverted to certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7645, the general appropriations law for 1993, as among the statutory bases for the Presidents power to reorganize executive agencies, to wit: Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that: Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil [service] rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62, which provides that: Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act. The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned. The contention of petitioner that the two provisions are riders deserves scant consideration. Well settled is the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[17] (Emphases ours) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[18] where the Court upheld as valid then President Joseph Estradas Executive Order No. 191 deactivating the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) of the Department of Finance, hewed closely to the reasoning in Larin. The Court, among others, also traced from the General Appropriations Act[19] the Presidents authority to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure, thus: We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President. x x x.[20] (Emphasis ours) Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the
Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act provides: Section 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act. Section 78. Institutional Strengthening and Productivity Improvement in Agency Organization and Operations and Implementation of Organization/Reorganization Mandated by Law. The Government shall adopt institutional strengthening and productivity improvement measures to improve service delivery and enhance productivity in the government, as directed by the President of the Philippines. The heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other entities of the Executive Branch shall accordingly conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; identify areas where improvements are necessary; and implement corresponding structural, functional and operational adjustments that will result in streamlined organization and operations and improved performance and productivity: PROVIDED, That actual streamlining and productivity improvements in agency organization and operations, as authorized by the President of the Philippines for the purpose, including the utilization of savings generated from such activities, shall be in accordance with the rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM, upon consultation with the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the implementation of organizations/reorganizations, or specific changes in agency structure, functions and operations as a result of institutional strengthening or as mandated by law, the appropriation, including the functions, projects, purposes and activities of agencies concerned may be realigned as may be necessary: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That any unexpended balances or savings in appropriations may be made available for payment of retirement gratuities and separation benefits to affected personnel, as authorized under existing laws. (Emphases and underscoring ours.) Implicitly, the aforequoted provisions in the appropriations law recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation of the NPOs appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily authorized by the above provisions. In the 2003 case of Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration,[21] we upheld the streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration through a reduction of its personnel and deemed the same as included in the power of the President to reorganize executive offices granted under the laws, notwithstanding that such streamlining neither involved an abolition nor a transfer of functions of an office. To quote the relevant portion of that decision: In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D. Zamora, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No. 292 and the power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. x x x xxxx The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency and vice-versa. In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the
authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.[22] (Emphases and underscoring supplied.) In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court Appeals,[23] which involved a structural and functional reorganization of the Department Health under an executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the President reorganize agencies under the executive department by executive or administrative order constitutionally and statutorily recognized. We held in that case: This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads: SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: xxxx In Domingo v. Zamora [445 Phil. 7 (2003)], this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies. The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code: Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department. xxxx The power of the President to reorganize the executive department is likewise recognized in general appropriations laws. x x x. xxxx Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.[24] (Emphases supplied.) Subsequently, we ruled in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary[25] that:
of of to is
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize. In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.[26] The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. Sections 2 and 3, Chapter 2, Title I, Book III of the said Code provide: Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. (Emphases supplied.) To reiterate, we find nothing objectionable in the provision in Executive Order No. 378 limiting the appropriation of the NPO to its own income. Beginning with Larin and in subsequent cases, the Court has noted certain provisions in the general appropriations laws as likewise reflecting the power of the President to reorganize executive offices or agencies even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose. Petitioners contention that the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 is an invalid exercise of legislative power on the part of the President has no legal leg to stand on. In all, Executive Order No. 378, which purports to institute necessary reforms in government in order to improve and upgrade efficiency in the delivery of public services by redefining the functions of the NPO and limiting its funding to its own income and to transform it into a selfreliant agency able to compete with the private sector, is well within the prerogative of President Arroyo under her continuing delegated legislative power to reorganize her own office. As pointed out in the separate concurring opinion of our learned colleague, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the objective behind Executive Order No. 378 is wholly consistent with the state policy contained in Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act to encourage competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to private contracting parties who are eligible and qualified.[27] To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. In this regard, we are mindful of the previous pronouncement of this Court in Dario v. Mison[28] that: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it
is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Emphasis ours.) Stated alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith. If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[29] we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.[30] This brings us to the second ground raised in the petition that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government agencies to secure their printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the budget of the NPO to its income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of the NPO and the loss of security of tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the reorganization of the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. [31] A careful review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim. They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPOs budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency. In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyos issuance of Executive Order No. 378. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS (RULE 3 SEC 1-22) G.R. No. 165142 December 10, 2007 EDUARDO L. RAYO vs METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY AND BRANCH 223 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY Before us is a petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated June 15, 2004 [1] and August 23, 2004[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83895 for annulment of judgment. The pertinent facts are undisputed. Midas Diversified Export Corp. (Midas), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, obtained six (6) loans from private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), amounting to P588,870,000 as evidenced by promissory notes. To secure the payment of an P8,000,000 loan, Louisville Realty & Development Corporation (Louisville), thru its president, Mr. Samuel U. Lee, executed in favor of Metrobank, a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated at No. 40 Timog Ave., Brgy. Laging Handa, Quezon City, with all the buildings and improvements thereon. The properties are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. N-163455, N-166349 and N-166350 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When the debtor-mortgagor failed to pay, Metrobank extra-judicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135,[3] as amended. Thereafter, in a public auction, Metrobank was the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale[4] dated December 11, 2000 was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on December 13, 2000. When Louisville refused to turn over the real properties, on March 17, 2001, Metrobank filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 223,
Quezon City, an ex parte petition[5] for the issuance of a writ of possession docketed as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01). After presentation of evidence ex parte, the RTC granted the petition in an Order[6] dated July 5, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]100,000.00), let a Writ of Possession over the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N-163455, N-166349 & N-166350 issue in favor of the petitioner METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY to be implemented by the Deputy Sheriff of Branch 223, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City by placing the petitioner in possession over the parcels of land with all its improvements. SO ORDERED.[7] On September 24, 2001, Metrobank posted the required bond. Consequently, a writ of possession was issued on October 9, 2001. This was partially implemented as to TCT No. N-163455, as evidenced by the Turn-Over Receipt[8] dated December 13, 2002. The writ over the two remaining properties, under TCT Nos. N-166349 and N-166350, were subsequently implemented as evidenced by the Turn-Over Receipt[9] dated December 3, 2003. Meanwhile, on April 3, 2002, petitioner Eduardo L. Rayo filed a complaint[10] docketed as Civil Case No. Q02-46514 against Metrobank for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage Contract(s) and Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, in the RTC, Branch 99, Quezon City. On May 13, 2004, petitioner Rayo filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition[11] for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of absolute lack of due process. Petitioner alleged that his predecessor, Louisville, was not notified of the proceedings and that Section 7[12] (ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of possession) of Act No. 3135 is unconstitutional. On June 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner is neither the registered owner nor the successor-in-interest of the registered owner; hence, not a real party-in-interest. It also ruled that there is no basis to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended as it constitutes a collateral attack against said provision. Further, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No. Q0246514. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but was likewise denied. Petitioner now comes before us raising the following as primary issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF ACT NO. 3135 IS CONTRARY TO THE DUE PROCESS PROVISION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERING THAT SUCH SECTION 7 OF THE LAW PROVIDES OR ALLOWS, ACCORDING TO THIS HONORABLE COURT, FOR AN EX-PARTE PROCEEDING WHICH IS A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING BROUGHT FOR THE BENEFIT OF ONE PARTY ONLY, AND WITHOUT NOTICE TO, OR CONSENT BY ANY PERSON ADVERSELY INTERESTED OR A PROCEEDING WHEREIN RELIEF IS GRANTED WITHOUT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THE RELIEF IS SOUGHT TO BE HEARD, AS HELD IN THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 169 SCRA 244 @ 255, JANUARY 20, 1989.[13] He also raises the following as secondary issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IN [THE] SUBJECT LRC CASE NO. Q-13915(01). II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUMSHOPPING WHEN IT DID NOT INFORM THE HONORABLE BRANCH 223 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY REGARDING THE FILING OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-02-46514 FOR NULLIFICATION OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACT AND THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE SAME SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES AND THE PENDENCY OF THE SAME BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRANCH 99 OF THE SAME REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. [14] Stated simply, the issues raised are: (1) Does petitioner have the legal personality in the annulment of judgment proceedings? (2) Is Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, unconstitutional? (3) Is respondent guilty of forum-shopping? Petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, he has the legal personality to institute the annulment of judgment case against Metrobank, considering that the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment he entered into with Louisville and Winston Linwy L. Chua makes him a
co-assignee over the subject real properties. For its part, Metrobank claims that it was not a party to the deed of assignment among Louisville, Chua and petitioner, hence, it has no privity of contract with petitioner Rayo. Moreover, Metrobank points out that the real properties had already been extrajudicially foreclosed when petitioner and his assignors executed the deed of assignment. Under Section 2,[15] Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.[16] A real party-in-interest is one with a present substantial interest which means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand.[17] Now, is petitioner Rayo a real party-in-interest? Initially, we recognized herein petitioner as the co-assignee of the subject real properties as shown in the March 25, 2002 deed of assignment. However, while petitioner would be injured by the judgment in this suit, we find that petitioner has no present substantial interest to institute the annulment of judgment proceedings and nullify the order granting the writ of possession. First, there was no violation of petitioners right to constitutional due process. In a long line of cases,[18] we have consistently ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale of a mortgaged property under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended is a ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period and with more reason, after the expiration of the redemption period. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a judicial process as contemplated in Article 433[19] of the Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of ones right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, and is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject property.[20] Second, in the deed of assignment, petitioner also acknowledged that the subject real properties were already sold at various extrajudicial foreclosure sales and bought by Metrobank. Clearly, petitioner recognized the prior existing right of Metrobank as the mortgagee-purchaser over the subject real properties.[21] Actual knowledge of a prior mortgage with Metrobank is equivalent to notice of registration[22] in accordance with Article 2125[23] of the Civil Code. Conformably with Articles 1312[24] and 2126[25] of the Civil Code, a real right or lien in favor of Metrobank had already been established, subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal obligation, whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. [26] As petitioner is not a party whose interest is adverse to that of Louisville, there was no bar to the issuance of a writ of possession to Metrobank. It does not matter that petitioner was not specifically named in the writ of possession nor notified of such proceedings. Third, we also note that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in filing Civil Case No. Q02-46514, for nullification of real estate mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale, more than six (6) months after the issuance of the writ of possession considering the mandate of Section 8 [27] of Act No. 3135, as amended. Hence, even petitioners action for annulment of judgment cannot prosper as it cannot be a substitute for a lost remedy. Now, petitioner is challenging the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. He avers that Section 7 violates the due process clause because, by the mere filing of an ex parte motion in the proper cadastral court, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is allowed to obtain possession of the foreclosed property during the redemption period. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners attempt to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, constitutes a collateral attack that is not allowed. We fully agree with the appellate courts ruling. For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot be attacked collaterally.[28] With regard to forum-shopping; forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[29] The issuance of the writ of possession being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits. It is only an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata.[30] Clearly, insofar as LRC Case No. Q-13915(01) and Civil Case No. Q02-46514 are concerned, Metrobank is not guilty of forum-shopping. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolutions dated June 15, 2004 and August 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83895 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. Nos. 121662-64. July 6, 1999 VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DURAPROOF SERVICES, represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr. Summons to a domestic or resident corporation should be served on officers, agents or employees, who are responsible enough to warrant the presumption that they will transmit to the corporation notice of the filing of the action against it. Rules on the service of motions should be liberally construed in order to promote the ends of substantial justice. A rigid application that will result in the manifest injustice should be avoided. A default judgment against several defendants cannot affect the rights of one who was never declared in default. In any event, such judgment cannot include an award not prayed for in the complaint, even if proven ex parte. The Case These principles were used by this Court in resolving this Petition for Review on Certiorari before us, assailing the July 19, 1993 Decision[1] and the August 15, 1995 Resolution,[2] both promulgated by the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:[3] ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, all the three (3) consolidated petitions for certiorari are hereby GRANTED. THE assailed Order of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated April 5, 1991, in the first petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 24669); the assailed Order of Judge Bernardo Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated July 6, 1992, in the second petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28387); and finally, the assailed order or Resolution en banc of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals Judges Ernesto Acosta, Ramon de Veyra and Manuel Gruba, under date of October 5, 1992, in the third petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 29317) are all hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE thereby giving way to the entire decision dated February 18, 1991 of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 89-51451 which remains valid, final and executory, if not yet wholly executed. THE writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court on March 6, 1992 and reiterated on July 22, 1992 and this date against the named respondents specified in the dispositive portion of the judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8 in the first petition for certiorari, which remains valid, existing and enforceable, is hereby MADE PERMANENT without prejudice (1) to the [private respondents] remaining unpaid obligations to the herein party-intervenor in accordance with the Compromise Agreement or in connection with the decision of the respondent lower court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669 and (2) to the government, in relation to the forthcoming decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals on the amount of taxes, charges, assessments or obligations that are due, as totally secured and fully guaranteed payment by the [private respondents] bond, subject to the relevant rulings of the Department of Finance and other prevailing laws and jurisprudence. The assailed Resolution ruled: ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, as well as considering these clarifications, the three (3) motions aforementioned are hereby DENIED. The Facts Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama, a Panamanian company, (hereafter referred to as Omega), requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. The request was approved by the Bureau of Customs.[4] Despite the approval, the customs personnel boarded the vessel when it docked on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country.[5] The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to Section 2301, Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU Seizure Identification No. 3-89 was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd. of Thailand. While seizure proceedings were ongoing, La Union was hit by three typhoons, and the vessel
ran aground and was abandoned. On June 8, 1989, its authorized representative, Frank Cadacio, entered into a salvage agreement with private respondent to secure and repair the vessel at the agreed consideration of $1 million and fifty percent (50%) [of] the cargo after all expenses, cost and taxes.[6] Finding that no fraud was committed, the District Collector of Customs, Aurelio M. Quiray, lifted the warrant of seizure on July 16, 1989.[7] However, in a Second Indorsement dated November 11, 1989, then Customs Commissioner Salvador M. Mison declined to issue a clearance for Quirays Decision; instead, he forfeited the vessel and its cargo in accordance with Section 2530 of the Tariff and Customs Code.[8] Accordingly, acting District Collector of Customs John S. Sy issued a Decision decreeing the forfeiture and the sale of the cargo in favor of the government.[9] To enforce its preferred salvors lien, herein Private Respondent Duraproof Services filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus[10] assailing the actions of Commissioner Mison and District Collector Sy. Also impleaded as respondents were PPA Representative Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Philippines, Inc. On January 10, 1989, private respondent amended its Petition[11] to include former District Collector Quiray; PPA Port Manager Adolfo Ll. Amor Jr; Petitioner Vlason Enterprises as represented by its president, Vicente Angliongto; Singkong Trading Company as represented by Atty. Eddie Tamondong; Banco Du Brasil; Dusit International Co., Inc.; Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd.[12] In both Petitions, private respondent plainly failed to include any allegation pertaining to petitioner, or any prayer for relief against it. Summonses for the amended Petition were served on Atty. Joseph Capuyan for Med Line Philippines: Angliongto (through his secretary, Betty Bebero), Atty. Tamondong and Commissioner Mison.[13] Upon motion of the private respondent, the trial court allowed summons by publication to be served upon the alien defendants who were not residents and had no direct representatives in the country.[14] On January 29, 1990, private respondent moved to declare respondents in default, but the trial court denied the motion in its February 23, 1990 Order,[15] because Mangaoang and Amor had jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss, while Mison and Med Line had moved separately for an extension to file a similar motion.[16] Later it rendered an Order dated July 2, 1990, giving due course to the motions to dismiss filed by Mangaoang and Amor on the ground of litis pendentia, and by the commissioner and district collector of customs on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[17] In another Order, the trial court dismissed the action against Med Line Philippines on the ground of litis pendentia.[18] On two other occasions, private respondent again moved to declare the following in default: petitioner, Quiray, Sy and Mison on March 26, 1990;[19] and Banco Du Brazil, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. and Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd. on August 24, 1990.[20] There is no record, however, that the trial court acted upon the motions. On September 18, 1990, petitioner filed another Motion for leave to amend the petition,[21] alleging that its counsel failed to include the following necessary and/or indispensable parties: Omega represented by Cadacio; and M/V Star Ace represented by Capt. Nahon Rada, relief captain. Aside from impleading these additional respondents, private respondent also alleged in the Second (actually, third) Amended Petition[22] that the owners of the vessel intended to transfer and alienate their rights and interests over the vessel and its cargo, to the detriment of the private respondent. The trial court granted leave to private respondent to amend its Petition, but only to exclude the customs commissioner and the district collector.[23] Instead, private respondent filed the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition against Singkong Trading Company; and Omega and M/V Star Ace,[24] to which Cadacio and Rada filed a Joint Answer.[25] Declared in default in an Order issued by the trial court on January 23, 1991, were the following: Singkong Trading Co., Commissioner Mison, M/V Star Ace and Omega.[26] Private respondent filed, and the trial court granted, an ex parte Motion to present evidence against the defaulting respondents.[27] Only private respondent, Atty. Tamondong, Commissioner Mison, Omega and M/V Star Ace appeared in the next pretrial hearing; thus, the trial court declared the other respondents in default and allowed private respondent to present evidence against them.[28] Cesar Urbino, general manager of private respondent, testified and adduced evidence against the other respondents, including herein petitioner. As regards petitioner, he declared: Vlason Enterprises represented by Atty. Sy and Vicente Angliongto thru constant intimidation and harassment of utilizing the PPA Management of San Fernando, La Union x x x further delayed, and [private respondent] incurred heavy overhead expenses due to direct and incidental expenses xxx causing irreparable damages of about P3,000,000 worth of ship tackles, rigs, and appurtenances including radar antennas and apparatuses, which were taken surreptitiously by persons working for Vlason Enterprises or its agents[.][29]
On December 29, 1990, private respondent and Rada, representing Omega, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement stipulating that Rada would write and notify Omega regarding the demand for salvage fees of private respondent; and that if Rada did not receive any instruction from his principal, he would assign the vessel in favor of the salvor.[30] On February 18, 1991, the trial court disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, based on the allegations, prayer and evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced, that, indeed, defendants/respondents are liable to [private respondent] in the amount as prayed for in the petition for which it renders judgment as follows: 1. Respondent M/V Star Ace, represented by Capt. Nahum Rada, [r]elief [c]aptain of the vessel and Omega Sea Transport Company, Inc., represented by Frank Cadacio[,] is ordered to refrain from alienating or [transferring] the vessel M/V Star Ace to any third parties; 2. Singkong Trading Company to pay the following: a. Taxes due the government; b. Salvage fees on the vessel in the amount of $1,000,000.00 based on xxx Lloyds Standard Form of Salvage Agreement; c. Preservation, securing and guarding fees on the vessel in the amount of $225,000.00; d. Maintenance fees in the amount of P2,685,000.00; e. Salaries of the crew from August 16, 1989 to December 1989 in the amount of $43,000.00 and unpaid salaries from January 1990 up to the present; f. Attorneys fees in the amount of P656,000.00; 3. [Vlason] Enterprises to pay [private respondent] in the amount of P3,000,000.00 for damages; 4. Banco [Du] Brazil to pay [private respondent] in the amount of $300,000.00 in damages; and finally, 5. Costs of [s]uit. Subsequently, upon the Motion of Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and private respondent, the trial court approved a Compromise Agreement[31] among the movants, reducing by 20 percent the amounts adjudged. For their part, respondents-movants agreed not to appeal the Decision.[32] On March 8, 1991, private respondent moved for the execution of judgment, claiming that the trial court Decision had already become final and executory.[33] The Motion was granted[34] and a Writ of Execution was issued.[35] To satisfy the Decision, Sheriffs Jorge Victorino, Amado Sevilla and Dionisio Camagon were deputized on March 13, 1991 to levy and to sell on execution the defendants vessel and personal property. On March 14, 1991, petitioner filed, by special appearance, a Motion for Reconsideration, on the grounds that it was allegedly not impleaded as a defendant, served summons or declared in default; that private respondent was not authorized to present evidence against it in default; that the judgment in default was fatally defective, because private respondent had not paid filing fees for the award; and that private respondent had not prayed for such award.[36] Private respondent opposed the Motion, arguing that it was a mere scrap of paper due to its defective notice of hearing. On March 18, 1991, the Bureau of Customs also filed an ex parte Motion to recall the execution, and to quash the notice of levy and the sale on execution.[37] Despite this Motion, the auction sale was conducted on March 21, 1991 by Sheriff Camagon, with private respondent submitting the winning bid.[38] The trial court ordered the deputy sheriffs to cease and desist from implementing the Writ of Execution and from levying on the personal property of the defendants.[39] Nevertheless, Sheriff Camagon issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale on March 27, 1991.[40] On April 12, 1991,[41] private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify the cease and desist orders of the trial court.[42] Respondent Court issued on April 26, 1991 a Resolution which reads:[43] MEANWHILE, in order to preserve the status quo and so as not to render the present petition moot and academic, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER is hereby ISSUED enjoining the respondent Judge, the Honorable Arsenio M. Gonong, from enforcing and/or implementing the Orders dated 22 March 1991 and 5 April 1991 which ordered respondent Sheriff to cease and desist from implementing the writ of execution and the return thereof, the quashing of the levy xxx on [the] execution [and sale] of the properties levied upon and sold at public auction by the Sheriff, for reason of grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction, until further orders from this Court. WITHIN ten (10) days from notice hereof, respondents [petitioner included] are also required to SHOW CAUSE why the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. On May 8, 1991, petitioner received from Camagon a notice to pay private respondent P3 million to satisfy the trial court Decision. Not having any knowledge of the CA case to which it was not impleaded, petitioner filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss ex abutandi ad cautelam on the grounds that (1) the Petition of private respondent stated no cause of action against it, (2) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case, and (3) litis pendentia barred the suit.[44]
On May 10, 1991, Camagon levied on petitioners properties, which were scheduled for auction later on May 16, 1991. Specific descriptions of the properties are as follows:[45] a) Motor Tugboat DEN DEN ex Emerson-I Length: 35.67 ms. Breadth: 7.33 ms. Depth: 3.15 ms. Gross Tons: 205.71 Net tons: 67.78 Official Number 213551 Material: Steel Class License: CWL License No. 4424 b) Barge - FC99" ex YD-153 Length: 34.15 ms. Breadth: 15.85 m.s. Depth: 2.77 m.s. Gross Tons: 491.70 Net Tons: 491.70 Official Number 227236 Material: Steel Class License: CWL License No. 83-0012 c) Barge LAWIN ex Sea Lion 2 Length: 66.92 ms. Breadth: 11.28 ms. Depth: 4.52 m.s. Gross Tons: 1,029.56 Net Tons: 1,027/43 Official Number 708069 Material: Steel Class License: Coastwise License No. 81-0059 Petitioner also filed a special appearance before the CA. It prayed for the lifting of the levy on its properties or, alternatively, for a temporary restraining order against their auction until its Motion for Reconsideration was resolved by the trial court.[46] Acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court reversed its Decision of February 18, 1991, holding in its May 22, 1991 Resolution as follows:[47] xxx [T]hat xxx Motion For Reconsideration [of the petitioner] was filed on March 14, 1991 (See: page 584, records, Vol.2) indubitably showing that it was seasonably filed within the 15-day time-frame. Therefore, xxx said default-judgment ha[d] not yet become final and executory when the Writ of Execution was issued on March 13, 1991 xxx The rules [provide] that [the e]xecution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period of appeal from a judgment if no appeal has been duly perfected (Sec. 1, R-39, RRC). That being the case, VEC has all the right to file as it did xxx the aforementioned reconsideration motion calling [the] attention of the Court and pointing therein its supposed error and its correction if, indeed, any [error was] committed. It is in this light that this Court made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the premises or reasons raised by [petitioner], and after a re-examination of the facts and evidence spread on the records, it has come to the considered conclusion that the questioned default-judgment has been improvidently issued. By the records, the claim of [private respondent] that his January 29, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Declare Defendants In Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1) including VEC had been granted is belied by the February 23, 1990 Order (pp. 214-215, records, ibid) par. 2, thereof, reading to wit: By the foregoing, for reasons stated thereunder respectively, this Court, in the exercise of its judicious discretion, in the sense that the rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties, resolves to DENY petitioners Motion to have the Commissioner of Customs AND OTHER ENUMERATED RESPONDENTS DECLARED IN DEFAULT. [Emphasis ours]. Not even [private respondents] November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present [Evidence] Against Defaulting Defendants (page 489, records, Vol.2) [can] be deemed as a remedy of the fact that there never was issued an order of default against respondents including [petitioner] VEC. Having thus established that there [had] been no order of default against VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18, in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, there could not have been any valid defaultjudgment rendered against it. The issuance of an order of default is a condition sine qua non in order [that] a judgment by default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this Court never had authorized [private respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [petitioner] VEC. In sum, the February 18, 1991 decision by default is null and void as against [petitioner] VEC. With this considered conclusion of nullity of said default judgment in question, this Court feels there is no more need for it to resolve Arguments I-A & I-B, as well as III-A & III-B, of the March 14, 1991 Motion for Reconsideration. The Court agrees, however, with said discussions on the non-compliance [with] Sec. 2, Rule 7 (Title of Complaint) and Sec. I, Rule 8 on the requirement of indicating in the complaint the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim of defense [--] which is absent in the January 9, Amended Petition (pp. 122-141, records, Vol. I) [--] for it merely mentioned [petitioner] VEC in par. 5 thereof and no more. It abides, likewise, with [Argument] III-B that the Decision in suit award[ed] amounts never asked for in instant petition as regards VEC (Sec. 5, Rule 18, RRC). xxx. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, and as prayed for, the February 18, 1991 Judgment by Default is hereby reconsidered and SET ASIDE. On June 26, 1992, then Executive Judge Bernardo P. Pardo[48] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an Order[49] annulling the Sheriffs Report/Return dated April 1, 1991, and all proceedings taken by Camagon.
The CA granted private respondents Motion to file a Supplemental Petition impleading petitioner in CA-GR 24669.[50] In view of the rampant pilferage of the cargo deposited at the PPA compound, private respondent obtained from the appellate court a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated March 6, 1992. The Writ reads:[51] ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the urgent verified motion for preliminary injunction dated February 11, 1992 is hereby GRANTED. Therefore, let a writ of preliminary injunction forthwith issue against the respondents and all persons or agents acting in their behalf, enjoining them not to interfere in the transferring of the aforementioned vessel and its cargoes, or in removing said cargoes xxx from [the] PPA compound. On September 15, 1992, Sheriff Amado Sevilla seized petitioners motor tugboat Den Den by virtue of the Order[52] dated April 3, 1992, issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 26.[53] On August 6, 1992, the CA consolidated CA-GR SP No. 28387[54] with CA-GR SP No. 24669. [55] The Court of Tax Appeals issued on October 5, 1992, a Resolution in CTA Case Nos. 4492, 4494 and 4500, which disposed as follows: Confirming the order in open court on October 5, 1992, the Court hereby RESOLVES to: 1. Order Respondent Commissioner of Customs to assign or detail [a] sufficient number of customs police and guards aboard, and around the vicinity of, the vessel M/V Star Ace now in anchor at Mariveles, Bataan or elsewhere, in order to ensure its safety during the pendency of these cases; 2. Direct him to assign personnel and/or representatives to conduct an inventory of part of the vessels cargo now in the possession of Mr. Cesar S. Urbino, Sr. at 197 Heroes del 96 Street, Caloocan City, which inventory may be participated in by all the parties interested in said cargo. To enjoin the CTA from enforcing said Order, private respondent filed before the Court of Appeals another Petition for Certiorari,[56] which was later also consolidated with CA-GR SP No. 24669. On July 19, 1993, the CA rendered the assailed Decision. Petitioner filed (1) a Motion for Clarification, praying for a declaration that the trial court Decision against it was not valid; and (2) a partial Motion for Reconsideration, seeking to set aside the assailed Decision insofar as the latter affected it. On July 5, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued the following Resolution:[57] Pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration, filed by Vlason Enterprises Corporation and Banco [Du] Brazil, and considering [private respondents] Motion for Entry of Judgment with respect to respondent PPA having already been granted by this Court as far back as June 17, 1994, pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 8, 1993 in G.R. No. 111270-72 (Philippine Ports Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) informing the parties in said case that the judgment sought to be reviewed has now become final and executory, the lower court may now take appropriate action on the urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution, filed by [private respondent] on July 15, 1994. On August 28, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, issued a Writ of Possession which resulted in private respondent taking possession of petitioners barge Lawin (formerly Sea Lion 2) on September 1, 1995.[58] Hence, this Petition.[59] Ruling of the Respondent Court As already adverted to, Respondent Court granted the Petition for Certiorari of the private respondent, which was consolidated with the latters two other Petitions. The court a quo issued the following rulings: 1. The trial court had jurisdiction over the salvors claim or admiralty case pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. 2. Since the Decision of the trial court became final and executory, never having been disputed or appealed to a higher court, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling the Writ of Execution and in quashing the levy and the execution of the sale of M/V Star Ace and its cargo. 2. Such acts constituted an alteration or a modification of a final and executory judgment and could never be justified under law and jurisprudence. 3. Civil Case 59-51451 dealt only with the salvors claim without passing upon the legality or the validity of the undated Decision of the Commissioner of Customs in the seizure proceeding. 4. Petitioner and his co-respondents could not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against their opponent and, after failing to obtain such relief, question the courts jurisdiction.
5. Petitioner had no recourse through any of the following judicially accepted means to question the final judgment: a. a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, b. a direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the questioned judgment, and c. a collateral attack against the questioned judgment which appears void on its face. 6. A court which has already acquired jurisdiction over a case cannot be ousted by a coequal court; the res in this casethe vessel and its cargowere placed under the control of the trial court ahead of the CTA. 7. The admiralty Decision had attained finality while the issue of the validity of the seizure proceedings was still under determination. In the assailed Resolution, Respondent Court clarified that there was no need to serve summons anew on petitioner, since it had been served summons when the Second Amended Petition (the third) was filed; and that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was defective and void, because it contained no notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of private respondent in violation of Rule 16, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. To this second motion, [private respondent] contends that there was no need to serve summons anew to VEC when the second amended petition was filed impleading VEC, pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Asiatic Travel Corp. vs. CA (164 SCRA 623); and that finally, the decision of the court a quo o[n] February 18, 1991 became final and executory, notwithstanding the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration of VEC for the reason that the said motion for reconsideration was defective or void, there being no notice of hearing addressed to the counsel of petitioner. In fact, no motion such as this instant one can be acted upon by the Court without proof of service of the notice thereof, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. xxxxxxxxx Finally, we should never lose sight of the fact that the instant petition for certiorari is proper only to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or of fact which is a mistake of judgment, appeal is the remedy (Salas vs. Castro, 216 SCRA 198). Here, respondents failed to appeal. Hence, the decision dated February 18, 1991 of the lower court has long become final, executory and unappealable. We do not and cannot therefore review the instant case as if it were on appeal and direct actions on these motions. While the proper remedy is appeal, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Indeed, certiorari is not a substitute for lapsed appeal. At any rate, the decision dated July 19, 1993 of this Court on the main petition for certiorari is not yet final (except with respect to respondent PPA), the Bureau of Customs having filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with the Supreme Court, necessitating prudence on Our part to await its final verdict.[60] Assignment of Errors Before us, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of Respondent Court:[61] I The Court of Appeals committed serious error in ruling that the entire decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 89-51451 dated 18 February 1991 became final and executory because it was never disputed or appealed. A. VEC filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision two days before deadline, which motion was granted by the trial court. B. The trial court correctly granted VECs motion for reconsideration and set aside the 18 February 1991 decision xxx against VEC, for: 1. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of VEC as to enable it to render any judgment against it: (i) VEC was not impleaded as a respondent in Civil Case No. 89-51451; (ii) Summons was not served on VEC; 2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment by default against VEC; (i) The trial court never issued an order of default against VEC; (ii) The trial court never authorized ex-parte presentation of evidence against VEC. 3. The Judgment by default was fatally defective because: (i) No filing fee was paid by [private respondent] for the staggering amount of damages awarded by the trial court. (ii) The 18 February 1991 decision violates the Revised Rules of Court, which prescribe that a judgment by default cannot decree a relief not prayed for. II Since the 18 February 1991 Decision in Civil Case No. 89-51451 is void as against VEC, the recall of the writ of execution was valid, as far as VEC is concerned. The Court believes that the issues can be simplified and restated as follows: 1. Has the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision become final and executory in regard to petitioner?
2. 3. 4. 5.
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner? Was the RTC default judgment binding on petitioner? Was the grant of damages against petitioner procedurally proper? Was private respondent entitled to a writ of execution? This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. First Issue: Finality of the RTC Decision A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Its finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected within such period.[62] The admiralty case filed by private respondent with the trial court involved multiple defendants. This being the case, it necessarily follows that the period of appeal of the February 18, 1991 RTC Decision depended on the date a copy of the judgment was received by each of the defendants. Elsewise stated, each defendant had a different period within which to appeal, depending on the date of receipt of the Decision.[63] Omega, Singkong Trading Co. and M/V Star Ace chose to enter into a compromise agreement with private respondent. As to these defendants, the trial court Decision had become final, and a writ of execution could be issued against them.[64] Doctrinally, a compromise agreement is immediately final and executory.[65] Petitioner, however, is not in the same situation. Said Decision cannot be said to have attained finality as to the petitioner, which was not a party to the compromise. Moreover, petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court, thirteen days after it received the Decision or two days before the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. A motion for reconsideration tolls the running of the period to appeal.[66] Thus, as to petitioner, the trial court Decision had not attained finality. Exception to the Rule on Notice of Hearing Respondent Court and private respondent argue that, although timely filed, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper, because (1) it did not contain a notice of hearing addressed to the current counsel of private respondent, and (2) the notice of hearing addressed to and served on private respondents deceased counsel was not sufficient. Admittedly, this Motion contained a notice of hearing sent to Atty. Jesus C. Concepcion who, according to private respondent, had already died and had since been substituted by its new counsel, Atty. Domingo Desierto. Therefore, the appellate court ruled that the said Motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal and that the trial court Decision became final. This Court disagrees. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 4. Notice.Notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion. SEC. 5. Contents of notice.The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion. [67] Ideally, the foregoing Rule requires the petitioner to address and to serve on the counsel of private respondent the notice of hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration. The case at bar, however, is far from ideal. First, petitioner was not validly summoned and it did not participate in the trial of the case in the lower court; thus, it was understandable that petitioner would not be familiar with the parties and their counsels. Second, Atty. Desierto entered his appearance only as collaborating counsel, [68] who is normally not entitled to notices even from this Court. Third, private respondent made no manifestation on record that Atty. Concepcion was already dead. Besides, it was Atty. Concepcion who signed the Amended Petition, wherein petitioner was first impleaded as respondent and served a copy thereof. Naturally, petitioners attention was focused on this pleading, and it was within its rights to assume that the signatory to such pleading was the counsel for private respondent. The Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective.[69] However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are as follows:[70] xxx Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in cases (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice;[71] especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;[72] (3)
where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;[73] and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[74] The present case falls under the first exception. Petitioner was not informed of any cause of action or claim against it. All of a sudden, the vessels which petitioner used in its salvaging business were levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it. To allow this to happen simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement which, as already said, was satisfactorily explained would be a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. Circumstances in the case at bar show that private respondent was not denied procedural due process, and that the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been served. On the day of the hearing, Atty. Desierto did not object to the said Motion for lack of notice to him; in fact, he was furnished in open court with a copy of the motion and was granted by the trial court thirty days to file his opposition to it. These circumstances clearly justify a departure from the literal application of the notice of hearing rule.[75] In other cases, after the trial court learns that a motion lacks such notice, the prompt resetting of the hearing with due notice to all the parties is held to have cured the defect.[76] Verily, the notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding.[77] For the foregoing reasons, we believe that Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper. Second Issue: Jurisdiction Over Petitioner Service of Summons on a Corporation The sheriffs return shows that Angliongto who was president of petitioner corporation, through his secretary Betty Bebero, was served summons on January 18, 1990.[78] Petitioner claims that this service was defective for two reasons: (1) Bebero was an employee of Vlasons Shipping, Inc., which was an entity separate and distinct from Petitioner Vlason Enterprises Corporation (VEC); and (2) the return pertained to the service of summons for the amended Petition, not for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition, the latter pleading having superseded the former. A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation.[79] This is based on the rationale that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer of the corporation being sued. [80] The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however, that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there be an assurance that the secretary will bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the action against it. In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when serving summons.[81] Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains. Effect of Amendment of Pleadings on Jurisdiction Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition. In the records, it appears that only Atty. Tamondong, counsel for Singkong Trading, was furnished a copy of the Second Amended Petition.[82] The corresponding sheriffs return indicates that only Omega, M/V Star Ace and Capt. Rada were served summons and copies of said Petition.[83]
We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are alleged.[84] After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them.[85] It is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is required. In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new service of summons for the amended Petitions. Impleading a Party in the Title of the Complaint Petitioner further claims that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction to render judgment against it because (1) the title of the three Petitions filed by private respondent never included petitioner as a party-defendant, in violation of Rule 7; and (2) the Petitions failed to state any allegation of ultimate facts constituting a cause of action against petitioner. We disagree with petitioner on the first ground. The judicial attitude has always been favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings. Pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and to determine speedily and inexpensively the actual merits of the controversy with the least regard to technicalities.[86] The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading. The averments in the complaint, not the title, are controlling. Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not fatal to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating that a defendant was made a party to such action. Private respondent claims that petitioner has always been included in the caption of all the Petitions it filed, which included Antonio Sy, field manager of petitioner. We checked and noted that in the caption and the body of the Amended Petition and Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition, Antonio Sy was alleged to be representing Med Line Philippines, not petitioner. Because it was private respondent who was responsible for the errors, the Court cannot excuse it from compliance, for such action will prejudice petitioner, who had no hand in the preparation of these pleadings. In any event, we reiterate that, as a general rule, mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of a complaint is not fatal by itself. Stating a Cause of Action in the Complaint The general rule is allegata et probata -- a judgment must conform to the pleadings and the theory of the action under which the case was tried.[87] But a court may also rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it, even though the relevant pleading has not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice to the adverse party is thereby caused.[88] In the case at bar, the liability of petitioner was based not on any allegation in the four Petitions filed with the trial court, but on the evidence presented ex parte by the private respondent. Since the trial court had not validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, there was no way for the latter to have validly and knowingly waived its objection to the private respondents presentation of evidence against it. Third Issue: Judgment By Default The trial court Decision holding petitioner liable for damages is basically a default judgment. In Section 18, judgment by default is allowed under the following condition:[89] SEC. 1. Judgment by default.If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. xxxx. Thus, it becomes crucial to determine whether petitioner was ever declared in default, and whether the
reception of evidence ex parte against it was procedurally valid. Petitioner Was Never Declared In Default Petitioner insists that the trial court never declared it in default. We agree. The trial court denied the January 29, 1990 Motion of private respondent to declare all the defendants in default, but it never acted on the latters subsequent Motion to declare petitioner likewise. During the pretrial on January 23, 1993, the RTC declared in default only Atty. Eddie Tamondong, as well as the other defendants Hon. Salvador Mison, M/V Star Ace, Omega Sea Transport Co., Inc. of Panama and Sinkong Trading Co., [but] despite xxx due notice to them, [they] failed to appear.[90] Even private respondent cannot pinpoint which trial court order held petitioner in default. More important, the trial court, in its Resolution dated May 22, 1991, admitted that it never declared petitioner in default, viz.: xxx It is in this light that this [c]ourt made an in-depth reflection and assessment of the premises or reasons raised by [petitioner] VEC[;] and after a re-examination of the facts and evidence spread on the records, it has come to the considered conclusion that the questioned default-judgment has been improvidently issued. [Based on] the records, the claim of [private respondent] that [its] January 29, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants In Default (pp. 174-177, records, Vol. 1) including VEC had been granted is belied by the February 23, 1990 Order (pp. 214-215, records, ibid) par. 2, thereof, xxx xxxxxxxxx Not even petitioners November 23, 1990 Ex-Parte Motion To Present Evidence Against Defaulting Defendants (page 489, records, Vol. 2) [can] be deemed as a remedy [for] the fact that there never was issued an order of default against respondents including [petitioner] VEC. Having thus established that there ha[d] been no order of default against VEC as contemplated by Sec. 1, Rule 18, in relation to Sec. 9, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered against it. The issuance of an order [o]f default is a condition sine qua non in order [that] a judgment by default be clothed with validity. Further, records show that this [c]ourt never had authorized [private respondent] to adduce evidence ex-parte against [Petitioner] VEC. In sum, the February 18, 1991 decision by default is null and void as against [Petitioner] VEC. xxxx. The aforementioned default judgment refers to the February 18, 1989 Decision, not to the Order finding petitioner in default as contended by private respondent. Furthermore, it is a legal impossibility to declare a party-defendant to be in default before it was validly served summons. Trial Court Did Not Allow Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte Against Petitioner The Order of December 10, 1990, which allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte against the defaulting defendants, could not have included petitioner, because the trial court granted private respondents motion praying for the declaration of only the foreign defendants in default. So too, private respondents ex parte Motion to present evidence referred to the foreign defendants only.[91] Furthermore, the reception of evidence ex parte against a non-defaulting party is procedurally indefensible. Without a declaration that petitioner is in default as required in Section 1, Rule 18, the trial court had no authority to order the presentation of evidence ex parte against petitioner to render judgment against it by default. The trial judge must have thought that since it failed to appear despite summons and was in default, it effectively waived any objection to the presentation of evidence against it. This rule, however, would have applied only if petitioner had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. The latter correctly declared, in the Resolution just cited, that the default judgment against the former had been improvidently rendered. Fourth Issue: Awards Not Paid and Prayed For Additional Filing Fees as Lien on the Judgment Had the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, nonpayment of docket fees would not have prevented it from holding petitioner liable for damages. The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[92] ruled that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, not upon the amendment of the complaint or the payment of the docket fees based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. This ruling, however, was modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,[93] which added: 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim [through] the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial court. Their nonpayment alone is not a ground for the invalidation of the award. Judgment by Default Cannot Grant Relief Not Prayed For
A declaration or order of default is issued as a punishment for unnecessary delay in joining issues. In such event, defendants lose their standing in court, they cannot expect the trial court to act upon their pleadings, and they are not entitled to notice of the proceeding until the final termination of the case.[94] Thus, the trial court proceeds with the reception of the plaintiffs evidence upon which a default judgment is rendered. Section 1 of Rule 18 provides that after the defendant has been declared in default, the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. The reliefs that may be granted, however, are restricted by Section 5, which provides that a judgment entered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for. In other words, under Section 1, a declaration of default is not an admission of the truth or the validity of the plaintiffs claims.[95] The claimant must still prove his claim and present evidence. In this sense the law gives defaulting parties some measure of protection because plaintiffs, despite the default of defendants, are still required to substantiate their allegations in the complaint. The judgment of default against defendants who have not appeared or filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their rights, except their right to be heard and to present evidence in their favor. Their failure to answer does not imply their admission of the facts and the causes of action of the plaintiffs, because the latter are required to adduce evidence to support their allegations. Moreover, the trial court is not allowed by the Rules to receive evidence that tends to show a relief not sought or specified in the pleadings.[96] The plaintiff cannot be granted an award greater than or different in kind from that specified in the complaint.[97] This case should be distinguished, however, from that of defendants, who filed an answer but were absent during trial. In that case, they can be held liable for an amount greater than or different from that originally prayed for, provided that the award is warranted by the proven facts. This rule is premised on the theory that the adverse party failed to object to evidence relating to an issue not raised in the pleadings. The latter rule, however, is not applicable to the instant case. Admittedly, private respondent presented evidence that would have been sufficient to hold petitioner liable for damages. However, it did not include in its amended Petitions any prayer for damages against petitioner. Therefore, the trial court could not have validly held the latter liable for damages even if it were in default. Fifth Issue: Execution of Final Judgment Section 1 of Rule 39 provides that execution shall issue only upon a judgment that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal it, if no appeal has been duly perfected.[98] In the present case, however, we have already shown that the trial courts Decision has not become final and executory against petitioner. In fact, the judgment does not even bind it. Obviously, Respondent Court committed serious reversible errors when it allowed the execution of the said judgment against petitioner. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they affect petitioner. The levy and the sale on execution of petitioners properties are declared NULL and VOID. Said properties are ordered RESTORED to petitioner. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005 NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO
executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.[3] According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as Attorney-inFact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their predecessors.[4] Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No. 53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of respondent.[5] OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondents mother, Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other individuals, pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13 February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago (formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently, OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was issued exclusively in the name of Isabel Manahan Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the property to her son, respondent herein, who subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270 in his own name.[6] Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. Among the defects of OCT No. 670 pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670 was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2) Material data therein were merely handwritten and in different penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the Official Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It failed to indicate the Survey Plan which was the basis of the Technical Description of the property covered by the title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670 was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670 was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree No. 10248 was issued over a property other than the one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in the Province of Rizal.[7] Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996. According to respondent, [t]he allegations in the Complaint would readily and patently show that the same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in law and in fact[8] As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.[9] Citing the consolidated cases of Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, et al. and Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation v. Hon. Macario Peralta, Jr., et al.,[10] respondent argued that the Spanish title, on which petitioners based their claim, was neither indefeasible nor imprescriptible. Moreover, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took effect on 16 February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,[11] within six months from effectivity of the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. [12] Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription. He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law. [13]
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957,[1] affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220,[2] dismissing petitioners Complaint for declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioners entered and occupied the Subject Property, they did so as mere intruders, squatters and illegal occupants, bereft of any right or interest, since the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest.[14]
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994,
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less, threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before the same trial court against squatters
occupying the Subject Property. In its decision, dated 01 July 1992, the trial court held that there is no doubt that the plaintiff (respondent herein) is the owner of the land involved in this case on which the defendants have built their houses and shanties Although the decision in Civil Case No. 783 was appealed to the Court of Appeals, it had become final and executory for failure of the defendantsappellants therein to file their appellants brief.[15] In the instant case, the trial court held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses as prayed for by the respondent. During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far submitted to the trial court.[16] After the preliminary hearing, the trial court issued the questioned Order, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. Pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court read: After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, this Court is inclined not to grant plaintiffs (sic) prayer. Finding credence and giving weight to plaintiffs (sic) lone but expert witness, it is crystal clear that, to quote: 1. a parcel of land titled illegally will revert to the State 2. it is the State who must file the corresponding case of annulment of title through the Office of the Solicitor General, and 3. a land illegally titled in the name of private individual, the State through the Office of the Solicitor General should file the corresponding case for cancellation of title. (TSN August 26, 1997). The above quoted testimony is straight from horse (sic) mouth so to speak as this was the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) expert witness. And judging from the said testimony alone aforecited, plaintiffs (sic) cause [of action] is bound to fail. Plaintiffs (sic) own testimony wrote finis to their case. From the record, this case was initiated and filed by private individuals, Nemencio Evangelista, et. al., contradicting their witness (sic) testimony. To reiterate, this Court finds credence to the testimony of the plaintiffs (sic) witness, i.e., is (sic) the State through the Office of the Solicitor General who must initiate and file a case of this nature when title to a land is being claimed to be obtained through fraud and allegedly spurious. The opinion of this Court anent the testimony of the witness is not without basis. Explicit is the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals, to wit: An action for reversion has to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101, Commonwealth Act No. 141. (282 SCRA 43). As to the documentary evidence, having gone through with the Deed of Assignment/s purportedly executed by and between a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez and the plaintiffs, which is the principal if not the only basis of plaintiffs claim ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land, the same does not hold water in a manner of speaking, for being self-serving. Assignor Ismael Favila y Rodriguez claimed in said Deed that he is the Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of an alleged Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by his mga kapatid on February 23, 1965, but said Special Power of Attorney was not presented before this Court, thus there arises a doubt as to its existence and execution not to mention doubt on the existence of his mga kapatid who as alleged executed said Special Power Attorney (sic) in his favor. Even if this Court granting arguendo would admit the authenticity of said Deeds of Assignment/s, that will not alter the outcome of the pending incident/s before this Court. Why? Because the said Deed of Assignment/s which were based on Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 892 i.e. DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. There is no need to elaborate on the above-cited provisions of PD 892 as they are self-explanatory. Suffice it to say that there is no showing, that plaintiffs complied with the said law i.e. to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February 16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System. This being the case and likewise being clear that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint
Moreover, the principal issue in this case is for the declaration of nullity of defendants title, which has nothing to do with plaintiffs (sic) claim of ownership and possession even if we set aside, albeit momentarily, the truth that plaintiffs (sic) claim were based on barred Spanish Title/s, and thus plaintiffs were never the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case. Further, defendants (sic) title especially so with the mother title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly sealed their fate [17] After the trial court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Order, dated 20 July 1999,[18] petitioners appealed both Orders of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 July 2002,[19] affirmed the Order of the trial court, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution, dated 14 February 2003.[20] Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for Review [21] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues and praying for the reversal of the aforementioned Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of dismissal of the trial court: I. Whether the lower courts dismissal of the petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being based inter alia on Engr. Navals testimony, which was indisputably not based on facts but conclusion of law. II. Whether the lower courts dismissal of petitioners complaint should be proscribed by the rules of evidence it being done sans ample evidence except bare allegations of respondent. III. Whether the provision of P.D. 892, i.e., Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system, holds of an exception. IV. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription. In his Comment,[22] the respondent, for the most part, reiterated the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners Complaint, but for reasons different from those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. According to the respondent, petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint filed before the trial court stated no cause of action. Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue[23] and the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action[24] are two different grounds for a motion to dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses. Failure to distinguish between the lack of legal capacity to sue from the lack of personality to sue is a fairly common mistake. The difference between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[25] Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. In the present case, this Court may assume that the respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-interest. It is the respondents contention that only the State can file an action for annulment of his certificates of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of the ownership of the Subject Property to the State. The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
Complaint. In the case of Garcon v. Redemptorist Fathers,[26] this Court laid down the rules as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or affirmative defense is concerned: It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion. In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of owners, had been in actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession of the Subject Property against the whole world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject Property was part of the vast tract of land called Hacienda Quibiga awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, executed Deeds of Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed the Subject Property, on which their houses were erected, when they discovered that the Subject Property was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the Complaint to prevent their eviction by the respondent. To determine whether these allegations are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is important for this Court to establish first the nature of petitioners action. Indeed, petitioners Complaint filed before the trial court was captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title. However, the caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations therein should determine the nature of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and the evidence introduced.[27] The trial court believed that petitioners action was ultimately one for reversion of the Subject Property to the public domain. Based on the testimony of Engineer Naval and the case of Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[28] it declared that the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is the party-in-interest in an action for cancellation of a certificate of title illegally issued in the name of a private individual, because the eventual effect of such cancellation is the reversion of the property to the State. The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial court, and calls for a far closer review of its decision in Nagao v. Court of Appeals,[29] wherein the Court held that It is then clear from the allegations in the complaint that private respondents claim ownership of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner, openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an assertion that the lot is private land, or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, private respondents had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942 Under Section 48, a subject lot is, for all legal intents and purposes, segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. Consequently, merely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence, dismissal of private respondents complaint was premature and trial on the merits should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters.
It would have been entirely different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141, which provides: Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines. In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut,[30] the difference between an action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed as follows: An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence, in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of the defendants title because even if the title were canceled or amended the ownership of the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain, we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands. On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendants fraud or mistake, as the case may be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly, petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property, and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion. In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that rather than an action for nullity of respondents certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property. Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, provides that: Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Respondents certificates of title over the Subject Property appeared valid or effective; but according to the petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent, and a cloud on their title to the same property that needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been defined as follows: Cloud on Title. A cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property. The matter complained of must have a prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by extrinsic evidence[31] Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[32] Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property.[33] In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.[34] If the Subject Property was already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone. The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the same Spanish title. Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. [35] Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property. P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners Complaint that petitioners predecessors-ininterest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings. Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested.[36] By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form of action brought before them ( i.e., removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate. Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads: WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . . Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. [37] This Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. Actual proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive period.[38] Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also
submit proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of prescription. Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions of the statute.[39] The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute.[40] Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership. All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual possession. Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree[41] or the Public Land Act.[42] Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property. Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action. Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999, dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 161065. April 15, 2005 EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, CELSO D. GANGAN, PACASIO S. BANARIA, SOFRONIO B. URSAL, ALBERTO P. CRUZ, MARIA L. MATIB, RACHEL U. PACPACO, ANGELO G. SANCHEZ, and SHERWIN A. SIP-AN vs. HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, in his capacity as Chairman, Commission on Audit, HON. EMMANUEL M. DALMAN and HON. RAUL C. FLORES, in their capacities as Commissioners, Commission on Audit Judicial power is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue in courts of law and equity.[1] Corollary to this dictum is the principle of locus standi of a litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf. Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The above-named petitioners basically alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law authorizing COA to undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and parameters. Petitioners further alleged that in initiating such Organizational Restructuring Plan without legal authority, COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
At this point, it is pertinent to state that the COA is a quasi-judicial body and that its decision, order or ruling may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party.[2]
matter of public concern, imbued with public interest. Second, the individual petitioners, as taxpayers, asserted a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly used.
Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan, Pascasio S. Banaria are retired Chairmen, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA. All claim to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA,[3] especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.
Here, petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. Clearly, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. Maria L. Matib and Angelo G. Sanchez are State Auditor III and State Auditor II, respectively, assigned to the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). Prior to the implementation of the questioned COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, they were Resident Auditors and later Audit Team Leaders. Petitioner Rachel U. Pacpaco is a State Auditor III assigned to CAR and a Team Supervisor, while petitioner Sherwin A. Sipian is a State Auditor I also assigned at the CAR. These petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, and Team Leader upon implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in violation of Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice. Petitioners now invoke this Courts judicial power to strike down the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal. Initially, for our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition. Petitioners invoke our ruling in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[4] Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[5] and Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[6] that where the subject matter of a case is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, then this fact alone gives them legal standing to institute the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a spillover effect upon its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance. Consequently, petitioners legal standing should be recognized and upheld. Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counter that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present petition since following our ruling in Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, Jr.,[7] they have not shown a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. Petitioners themselves admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the said respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. It is clear then that petitioners failed to show any present substantial interest in the outcome of this case, citing Kilosbayan v. Morato.[8] Nor may petitioners claim that as taxpayers, they have legal standing since nowhere in their petition do they claim that public funds are being spent in violation of law or that there is a misapplication of the taxpayers money, as we ruled in Dumlao v. Comelec.[9] Petitioners reliance upon our rulings in Chavez,[10] Agan, Jr.,[11] and Information Technology Foundation[12] is flawed. In Chavez, we ruled that the petitioner has legal standing since he is a taxpayer and his purpose in filing the petition is to compel the Public Estate Authority (PEA) to perform its constitutional duties with respect to: (a) the right of the citizens to information on matters of public concern; and (b) the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of Government lands worth billions of pesos, as mandated by the Constitution and statutory law. The thrust of the second is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain, thereby compelling it to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation. We held that these matters are of transcendental public importance.[13] In Agan, Jr., we held that petitioners have legal standing as they have a direct and substantial interest to protect. By the implementation of the PIATCO contracts, they stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right zealously protected by the Constitution. Such financial prejudice on their part is sufficient to confer upon them the requisite locus standi.[14] In Information Technology Foundation, there were two reasons why petitioners standing was recognized. First, the nations political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections. Accordingly, the award for the automation of the electoral process was a
We are well aware of the averments of petitioners Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An that they were demoted and unceremoniously divested of their previous designations as Unit Head, Team Supervisor, or Team Leader; that they were deprived of their RATA; that they were relegated to being mere Team Members, entitled to only a reimbursable transportation allowance; and that they were denied due process. Such averments lack merit. Actually, they were not demoted. Under Section 11, Rule VII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, a demotion is the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank which may or may not involve reduction in salary.[15] A demotion by assigning an employee to a lower position in the same service which has a lower rate of compensation is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it.[16] Here, there have been no new appointments issued to Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An under the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. Thus, their contention that they have been demoted is baseless. Moreover, the change in their status from COA auditors (receiving monthly RATA) to COA auditors (receiving only reimbursable RATA) cannot be attributed to the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan but to the implementation of the Audit Team Approach (ATAP), pursuant to COA Resolution No. 96-305 dated April 16, 1996. Under the ATAP, an audit team, not a resident auditor, is deployed to conduct an audit. An audit team may be composed of two (2) or more members under an Audit Team Leader. Whenever practicable, an Audit Team Supervisor supervises at least three (3) audit teams. The composition of an audit team is not permanent. Hence, an Audit Team Member may be designated or assigned as an Audit Team Leader for one assignment and subsequently as a Team Member in another engagement. The designation depends upon the position or rank of the one who is designated as an Audit Team Leader. Thus, a State Auditor III who may have been assigned as an Audit Team Leader in one engagement may find himself relegated to being an Audit Team Member in another engagement, if a State Auditor IV or State Auditor V is designated as the Audit Team Leader. Pursuant to the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, the COA issued Memorandum No. 2002-034[17] providing for the guidelines regarding the payment of RATA, thus: 1. All holders of State Auditor IV position shall be entitled to fixed commutable RATA wherever they are assigned. 2. Henceforth, only State Auditors IV shall be assigned as new Unit Heads or Team Leaders. 3. State Auditors below State Auditor IV assigned as Unit Heads or Team Leaders who have been receiving fixed RATA shall continue to be designated as such and to receive the RATA until relieved of the designation for incompetence, inefficiency, or misconduct. All others who collect RATA on reimbursable basis, including those paid on a daily basis under COA Resolution No. 99-007 dated June 7, 1999, are likewise entitled thereto. Matib, Pacpaco, Sanchez, and Sipi-An are not qualified to be Audit Team Leaders or to receive fixed monthly RATA since none of them holds the rank or position of State Auditor IV. But this does not mean that they are not entitled to receive reimbursable RATA if they are designated as Audit Team Leaders. It is clear from the text of the said COA Memorandum that the principle of non-diminution of benefits has been upheld. Thus, in the implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan, we fail to see how petitioners could have sustained personal injury as they have not shown to have a personal stake therein. Accordingly, they are wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. Corollarily, we find no reason to delve into the constitutionality or legality of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INCvs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66 In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5 The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six
per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect." Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial. As their cause of action, they specifically allege that: CAUSE OF ACTION 7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations. 8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass. 9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area. 10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests. 11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A". 12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier. 13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults. 14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. 15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae. 16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B". 17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with. 19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State — (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other; (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and; (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and wellbeing. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977) 20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to — a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution); b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid); c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.); d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.) 21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation. 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6 On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8 On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition. After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant. Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government. The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11 We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question: MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution? MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12 The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy: Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations. (2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides: Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources. Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18 It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties. The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, distinguished member of this Court, says:
22
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary. In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated: The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit: Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that: The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides: . . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . . Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held: . . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26 . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27 cannot be invoked. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J., concurring I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying. The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction
of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics: (a) air quality management; (b) water quality management; (c) land use management; (d) natural resources management and conservation embracing: (i) fisheries and aquatic resources; (ii) wild life; (iii) forestry and soil conservation; (iv) flood control and natural calamities; (v) energy development; (vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water (vii) mineral resources Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code. As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here. My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Section 1. . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene. My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist. I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination. # Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J., concurring I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying. The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics: (a) air quality management; (b) water quality management; (c) land use management; (d) natural resources management and conservation embracing: (i) fisheries and aquatic resources; (ii) wild life; (iii) forestry and soil conservation; (iv) flood control and natural calamities; (v) energy development; (vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water (vii) mineral resources Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and subheadings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code. As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here. My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Section 1. . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene. My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist. I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination. G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004 COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION vs. HERBERT MARKUS EMIL SCHEER This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094 granting the respondents petition for certiorari and prohibition annulling the order of arrest issued by the petitioner, and permanently enjoining her from deporting the respondent from the Philippines. Through its decision, the CA virtually reversed the Summary Deportation Order[2] of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and its Omnibus Resolution[3] denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of said Order, and enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent. The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor of the Philippines. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted. [4] The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued in favor of the respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-396907 dated September 16, 1987[5] and Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 256789 dated February 24, 1988.[6] The Commissioner stated that the granting of the petition would redound to the benefit of the Filipino people.[7] During his sojourn in the Philippines, the respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes[8] with whom he had two daughters. They had a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away on November 13, 1995.[9] They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where the respondent established and managed the Bavaria Restaurant. On May 21, 1991, he was appointed Confidential Agent by then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim.[10] In a Letter dated June 29, 1995, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany, that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany.[11] The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995, informing it that the respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him; and that the respondent will be served with an official document requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy which was invalidated on July 2, 1995.[12] The Embassy requested the Department of Foreign Affairs to inform the competent Philippine authorities of the matter. The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1997. The penultimate paragraph of the Order reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Board of Commissioners hereby orders the following: 1. Cancellation of respondents permanent residence visa; 2. Respondents summary deportation and permanent exclusion from the Philippines; and 3. Inclusion of his name on the Bureaus Blacklist. PROVIDED, however that said summary deportation should be held in abeyance in case said alien has a pending final and executory criminal conviction where the imposed penalty is imprisonment, in which case, he has to serve first such imposed penalty, and/or has a pending criminal, civil or administrative action and a Hold Departure Order has been issued or that his presence in said action is indispensable. In such instances, the alien should remain in the custody of the Bureau until his turnover to the proper authorities in case he has to serve imprisonment or in case of pendency of civil or criminal administrative action, he shall remain in the custody of the Bureau until such time that his pending cases shall have been decided, terminated or settled, as the case may be, unless circumstances demand the immediate implementation of this summary deportation. ... SO ORDERED.[13] In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice Consul on its speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan.[14] The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but an undesirable alien as well. When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German Embassy. [15] Then Presidential Assistant Teodorico K. Imperial wrote a Testimonial dated November 24, 1995, in behalf of the respondent addressed to Commissioner Verceles. Nonetheless, the respondent, through counsel, filed on December 5, 1995 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC.[16] In his motion, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that: 1. The elementary rules of due process require notice and opportunity to be heard before a person can be lawfully deprived of his right (Ute Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132). In the instant case, although it is acknowledged that the Honorable Office may conduct summary deportation proceedings, respondent was not given notice and opportunity to be heard before said Summary Deportation Order was issued. Respondents right to procedural due process was therefore violated. Consequently, the Summary Deportation Order is invalid. 2. In issuing, the Summary Deportation Order, this Honorable Office relied on Note Verbal No. 369/95 issued by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Manila, notifying the Department of Foreign Affairs and this Honorable Office about the warrant of arrest against respondent for alleged illegal insurance fraud and illegal activities. However, a close scrutiny of said note verbal shows that nowhere therein does it state that respondent was involved in insurance fraud or in any kind of illegal activities in Germany or anywhere else in the world, such as in Palawan. Therefore, the main basis of the Summary Deportation Order is incompetent as evidence against respondent who is, like every Filipino, presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 3. The power to deport alien is a police power measure necessary against undesirable alien whose presence in the country is injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the country (Board of
Commissioner Commission on Immigration vs. De la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853). It is respectfully submitted that respondent is not an undesirable alien. He has stayed in the Philippines for more or less than (10) years. He has married a Filipina and has three (3) minor children. He has established his business in Palawan and he has no police record whatsoever. Respondent has considered the Philippines his second home and he has nowhere else to go back to in Germany. Under the circumstances and for humanitarian considerations, respondent is not an undesirable alien whose deportation is warranted. Likewise, the mere fact that his passport was not renewed by the German Embassy does not also automatically justify the deportation of respondent.[17] However, the BOC did not resolve the respondents motion. The respondent was neither arrested nor deported. Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries.[18] The German Embassy in Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent. In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995 and the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006. The BOC still failed to resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the respondents March 1, 1996 Letter. The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20, 1997, the Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City. In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police. On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted.[20] At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office and there held in custody while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the respondents wife[21] and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent.[22] Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer. The latter filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondents temporary liberty. On June 11, 2002, the respondents counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondents deportation.[23] The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law[24] and that his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved despite the lapse of more than six years. The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-abiding citizen. He, thus, prayed as follows: PRAYER WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that: 1. Upon the filing of this Petition, this Honorable Court issue a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondent Commissioner from enforcing any order to deport petitioner; 2. After due hearing, a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction be correspondingly issued to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the Petition on the merits. 3. After hearing, judgment be rendered: a) Directing and mandating respondent Commissioner and the body she heads to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration filed in 1995, in his favor, and nullifying or suspending the implementation of any order, oral or written, she may have issued or issue to deport petitioner; and b) Making the injunction in petitioners favor permanent. Petitioner likewise prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises, such as directing respondent, if Herbert Scheer is deported before the matter is heard on notice, to authorize his return.[25] The BOC ruled that its September 27, 1995 Order had become final and executory after the lapse of one year, citing our rulings in Sy vs. Vivo,[26] and Lou vs. Vivo.[27] The BOC also held that it was not competent to reverse the September 27, 1995 Order, citing our ruling in Immigration Commissioner vs. Fernandez.[28] It declared that the respondent may seek the waiver of his exclusion via deportation proceedings through the exceptions provided by Commonwealth Act No. 613,[29] Section 29 (a)(15), but that his application for the waiver presupposes his prior removal from the
Philippines. In a parallel development, the respondent procured a letter from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Puerto Princesa City certifying that he had no pending criminal record.[30] The Puerto Princesa City Philippine National Police (PNP) also issued a certification that the respondent had no pending criminal or derogatory records in the said office.[31] Meanwhile, on June 26, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond of P100,000.00.[32] On July 18, 2002, the BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance, and the Letter dated June 11, 2002. The decretal portion of the resolution reads: Wherefore, in view of the foregoing circumstances, we deny the prayers of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of 5 December 1995, the Motion for Bail/Recognizance dated 7 June 2002 and the Letter of 11 June 2002. Further, we hereby order the following: 1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, the summary deportation order the respondent Herbert Scheer, German, under BI Office Memorandum Order No. 34 (series of 1989) and the BOC Summary Deportation Order of 27 September 1995; 2. Permanent exclusion of Herbert Scheer from the Philippines under C.A. No. 613, Section 40 (a)(15). 3. Inclusion of the name of Herbert Scheer in the Immigration Black List; and 4. Forfeiture of the bail bond, if any, of Herbert Scheer under C.A. No. 613, Section 40 (a)(15). ... IT IS SO ORDERED.[33] During the hearing of the respondents plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction before the CA on July 22, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that the State had no opposition to the respondents re-entry and stay in the Philippines, provided that he leave the country first and re-apply for admission and residency status with the assurance that he would be readmitted.[34] The respondents counsel manifested to the appellate court that he had just been informed by the OSG of the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC dated June 14, 2002. In her Comment on the Petition, the petitioner (the respondent therein) alleged, inter alia, the following: 1) that the BOC was an indispensable party to the petition; 2) the petitioners failure to implead the BOC warranted the denial of the petition; 3) the allowance by then Immigration Commissioner Leandro Verceles for the petitioner therein to renew his passport and secure clearances, even if proved, was not binding on the BOC; 4) the September 27, 1995 Order of the BOC was already executory when the respondent filed her petition in the CA; 5) the German Embassys issuance of a new passport did not legalize the respondents stay in this country, which became illegal on July 2, 1995 when his passport expired; 6) the respondent therein did not act with abuse of discretion in causing the arrest and detention of the respondent based on the BOCs Summary Deportation Order; and 7) the BOC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution and such order and resolution were not mooted by the German Embassys issuance of a new passport in favor of the respondent. In view of the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC, the respondent (petitioner therein) in his Memorandum prayed for the nullification of the BOCs Order, as well as its Omnibus Resolution denying his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration considering that with the issuance of a new passport, there was no more basis for his deportation, thus: RELIEF WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that: 1. Upon the filing of this Memorandum, this Honorable Court forthwith direct and authorize the immediate release of petitioner, even on undersigneds recognizance, until further orders from this Honorable Court; 2. The Summary Deportation Order of September 27, 19[9]5, affirmed by respondent allegedly on June 14, 2002 and made known only yesterday, be nullified to the extent that it directs the deportation of petitioner, who has removed the very basis of said Order of not having a valid passport, and that the Resolution of June 14, 2002 be nullified in toto; and, 3. The Temporary Restraining Order of June 26, 2002 be converted into a permanent injunction or writ of prohibition. Petitioner likewise prays for such other and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.[35]
Surprisingly, the respondents counsel received on July 24, 2003 a Letter from the petitioner dated July 16, 2002 stating that, the BOC was in the course of reviewing the deportation case against Mr. Scheer, and that its findings would be given in due time.[36]
Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo was impleaded as the sole respondent was not enough, as she is only one of the four Commissioners. Furthermore, the assailed Orders were issued by the Board, and not by the Immigration Commissioner alone.
On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner from deporting the respondent. The decretal portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, any order, oral or written, issued by respondent Commissioner Domingo against petitioner, in relation to his deportation, is hereby ANNULLED, and respondent Commissioner Domingo is hereby permanently enjoined/prohibited from deporting petitioner, in so far as this case is concerned. It is likewise ordered that petitioner be released from his confinement/detention in the Bureau of Immigration UNLESS there is/are fresh new grounds/cases that will warrant his continued detention. SO ORDERED.[37]
The respondent counters that the petitioner is already estopped from raising this issue. He argues that In quite a number of jurisprudence, only the Immigration Commissioner is impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay here or not. The bottom line is petitioner, head of the Bureau of Immigration, was more than fully heard on its institutional position, a Bureau which speaks with a single voice in this case. She is in estoppel for not raising the issue earlier, either in a timely Comment or during the oral argument[41] In Caruncho III v. Comelec, it was held that[O]rdinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or real party in interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the German Embassys subsequent issuance of passport to the respondent before the BOCs issuance of its Omnibus Resolution had mooted the September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order, as well as the arrest and detention of the respondent. According to the court, it made no sense to require the respondent to leave the country and thereafter re-apply for admission with the BOC. Furthermore, since the grounds cited by the BOC in its Summary Deportation Order no longer existed, there was no factual and legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country. On the issue of whether the members of the BOC were indispensable parties, the CA ruled as follows: a) There are quite a number of cases in relevant jurisprudence wherein only the Immigration Commissioner was impleaded to decide whether an alien may stay or be deported, such as in the case of Vivo vs. Arca (19 SCRA 878) and Vivo vs. Cloribel (22 SCRA 159). b) In the case of Caruncho III vs. COMELEC (315 SCRA 693), it was pronounced that: Ordinarily, the nonjoinder of an indispensable party or the real party interest is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of the petition. The court before which the petition is filed must first require the joinder of such party. It is the noncompliance with said order that would be a ground for the dismissal of the petition. thus, c) respondent may be estopped for not raising such issue earlier.[38] Aggrieved, the respondent therein, now the petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to us for relief. The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in granting the respondents petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71094.[39] In support of his contention, the Solicitor General has submitted the following arguments: I. THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENTS URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE SAID RESOLUTION. II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, CONSIDERING THAT IT IS THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, AND NOT THE COMMISSIONER ALONE, WHICH ISSUED THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION. III. THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, PROHIBITING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094. IV. ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS PROPERLY IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094, NEVERTHELESS, THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION WERE NOT ISSUED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. V. FURTHER ASSUMING BUT WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS WAS PROPERLY IMPLEADED AS PARTY-RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 71094, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DID NOT ACT WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN IMPLEMENTING THE SUMMARY DEPORTATION ORDER AND THE OMNIBUS RESOLUTION.[40] Elucidating on his first three arguments, the petitioner maintains that the respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed because he failed to implead the real party-in-interest as mandated by Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended; in this case, the BOC. According to the Solicitor General, this was a fatal procedural error. The inclusion of the BOC as respondent in the case was necessary in order that its actions could be directly attacked and for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it. The fact that Immigration
But even as the Court of Appeals did not require respondent of such joinder of parties, the respondent, in fact, begged leave, ad cautelam, in its Reply Memorandum dated July 31, 2002 to implead the Board which speaks with a single voice anyway in this case, and therefore, no claim can be made that a valid point of view has not been heard[42] Moreover, according to the respondent, the petitioner is clearly the BIDs chosen instrumentality for the relevant purpose. What the respondent ultimately questioned are the acts or orders of the petitioner for the arrest and immediate deportation of the respondent by way of implementing the BOCs Summary Deportation Order. By way of reply, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that the Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution were collegial actions of the BOC and not of the petitioner alone. Although its Chairperson, the petitioner, is merely a member thereof, her decisions and actions are still subject to the collective will of the majority.[43] The Ruling of the Court The BOC is an Indispensable Party We agree with the petitioners contention that the BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent in obedience to the said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latters Omnibus Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents immediate release. The respondent also prayed that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.[44] Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.[45] Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court.[46] The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present.[47] The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.[48] However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just.[49] If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.[50] The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.[51] In this case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner therein) to implead the BOC as respondent, but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo v. Arca,[52] and Vivo v. Cloribel.[53] The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the aforecited cases. The Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is not a Ground for the Dismissal
of the Petition The Court may be curing the defect in this case by adding the BOC as party-petitioner. The petition should not be dismissed because the second action would only be a repetition of the first.[54] In Salvador, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[55] we held that this Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-interest. The Court has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, to order its amendment as to implead the BOC as partyrespondent. Indeed, it may no longer be necessary to do so taking into account the unique backdrop in this case, involving as it does an issue of public interest.[56] After all, the Office of the Solicitor General has represented the petitioner in the instant proceedings, as well as in the appellate court, and maintained the validity of the deportation order and of the BOCs Omnibus Resolution. It cannot, thus, be claimed by the State that the BOC was not afforded its day in court, simply because only the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC,[57] was the respondent in the CA, and the petitioner in the instant recourse. In Alonso v. Villamor,[58] we had the occasion to state: There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty. The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus We do not agree with the petitioners contention that the issue before the CA, as to the power of the President to determine whether an alien may remain or be deported from the Philippines, is beyond the appellate courts competence to delve into and resolve. The contention of the petitioner is based on a wrong premise. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relation is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except in so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene.[59] The judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of the measures executed by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred on it,[60] by statute or as required by the Constitution. Congress may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the President of the Philippines or by the courts, on the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the Court of Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,[61] the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v. I.F. Wixon,[62] the United States Federal Supreme Court reversed an Order of Deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v. Nagh,[63] the United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fairminded men; hence, are arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump,[64] the Court ruled that courts may supervise the actions of the administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or by the Rules of Court, as amended.[65] In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There was no factual or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a law-abiding citizen; the respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition before the CA did not involve the act or power of the President of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien from the country. This being so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the respondent with that of the judgment of the CA.
Irrefragably, the CA had jurisdiction over the petition of the respondent. The BOC Committed a Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting To Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction In Issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution; The Petitioner Committed a Grave Abuse Of Her Discretion Amounting to Lack or Excess of Jurisdiction in Causing the Arrest and Detention Of The Private Respondent On the Solicitor Generals fourth and fifth arguments, we are convinced that the BOC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Summary Deportation Order and Omnibus Resolution, and that the petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and detention of the private respondent. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute nor permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[66] we held, thus: Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law a part of the law of Nation. And in a resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights (Art. 1); that Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status (Art. 2); that Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9); etc. In this case, the BOC ordered the private respondents deportation on September 27, 1995 without even conducting summary deportation proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the June 29, 1995 Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the German Embassys Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July 26, 1995. It issued the Summary Deportation Order on September 27, 1995 allegedly under paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 which reads: 3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann vs. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461, 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory. However, as gleaned from the Summary Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered deported not only because his passport had already expired; the BOC speculated that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new passport. This, in turn, caused the BOC to conclude that the respondent was an undesirable alien. Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides that: No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation or without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is given a chance to be heard in a full deportation hearing, with the right to adduce evidence in his behalf, thus: 4. All other cases shall be tried in full deportation hearing, with due observance of the pertinent provisions of Law Instruction No. 39. 5. In all cases, the right of the alien to be informed of the charges against him, to be notified of the time and place of hearing, when necessary, to examine the evidence against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf, where appropriate, shall be observed. The respondent was not afforded any hearing at all. The BOC simply concluded that the respondent committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan without any evidence. The respondent was not afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot, thus, be arrested and deported without due process of law as required by the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. In Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals,[67] we held that: Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings. It must be noted that the respondent was a permanent resident before his passport expired on July 2, 1995. In Chew v. Colding,[68] the United States Federal Supreme Court ruled: It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Although it later may be established, as respondents contend, that petitioner can be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard. As Mr. Justice Murphy said in his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon:[69] The Bill of Rights belongs to them as well as to all citizens. It protects them as long as they reside within the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the exercise of the great individual rights necessary to a sound political and economic democracy. According to Vattal,[70] an alien who is a permanent resident in a country is a member of the new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of inferior order from the native citizens; but is, nevertheless, limited and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. Sir Robert Philconse called them de facto, though not de jure citizens of the country of their domicile.[71] Such permanent resident[72] may be classified as a denizen, a kind of middle state between alien and a natural-born subject and partakes of both. Paraphrasing Justice Brewer in his dissenting opinion in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,[73] when the right to liberty and residence is involved, some other protection than the mere discretion of the petitioner or the BOC is required. We recall the warning of the United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States:[74] Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to a gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. In sum, the arrest and detention of the respondent and his deportation under the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and illegal activities in Palawan violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due process. The Respondents Arrest and Detention was Premature, Unwarranted and Arbitrary We agree that the Immigration Commissioner is mandated to implement a legal and valid Summary Deportation Order within a reasonable time. But in this case, the arrest of the respondent in his house, at near midnight, and his subsequent detention was premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. Like a thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines arrested the respondent on June 6, 2002, on orders of the petitioner based on the September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order. Under the basic rudiments of fair play and due process, the petitioner was required to first resolve the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, which was filed more than six years before or on December 5, 1995. It may be argued that respondents filing of an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration did not ipso facto suspend the efficacy of the BOCs deportation order. However, such an argument cannot be sustained in this case because of the extant and peculiar factual milieu. It bears stressing that more than six years had elapsed, from the time the Summary Deportation Order was issued, until the respondent was finally arrested. Supervening facts and circumstances rendered the respondents arrest and detention unjust, unreasonable, barren of factual and legal basis. The BOC should have set the respondents motion for hearing to afford him a chance to be heard and adduce evidence in support thereon. It was bad enough that the BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without a hearing; the BOC dealt the respondent a more severe blow when it refused to resolve his motion for reconsideration before causing his arrest on June 6, 2002. As aforestated, the BOC ordered the deportation of the respondent after a summary
proceeding without prior notice on the following grounds: (a) the respondents German passport had expired; (b) there was a pending criminal case for physical injuries against him in Germany; (c) the respondent indulged in illegal activities in Palawan; (d) that in all likelihood, the respondents passport will not be renewed by the German Embassy as he was wanted for insurance fraud in Germany; and, (e) he was an undesirable alien. But then, in response to the written query of no less than the petitioner herself, the German Embassy declared that the respondent was not wanted by the German police for any crime, including insurance fraud. This could only mean that the warrant of arrest issued by the German Federal police mentioned in Note Verbale No. 369/95 had been lifted, and that the respondent was not involved in any illegal activities in Germany. The criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries, which does not involve moral turpitude, was dismissed by the German District Court. Furthermore, there was no evidence of insurance fraud against the respondent. The BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the respondent the right to be heard on his motion and adduce evidence thereon. It merely concluded that the respondent was involved in illegal activities in Palawan. What made matters worse was that the BOC indulged in sheer speculation, that the German Embassy is unlikely to issue a new passport to the respondent. The deportation of aliens should not be based on mere speculation or a mere product of procrastinations as in this case. As it turned out, the German Embassy re-issued the respondents passport; he was issued a temporary passport, and, thereafter, a regular passport, yet to expire on March 12, 2006. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this matter because the respondent himself, six years before he was arrested, informed then Immigration Commissioner Verceles in a Letter dated March 1, 1996. The respondents letter forms part of the records of the BOC. There is no evidence on record that the respondent committed any illegal activities in Palawan. He was even designated as special agent of the NBI, and was, in fact, issued clearances by the PNP and the NBI no less. Despite all the foregoing, the petitioner ordered and caused the arrest and detention of the respondent. What is most nettlesome is the apparent antedating of the BOC Omnibus Resolution. The records show that the petitioner sought to assuage the respondents concern on the belated resolution of his pending urgent motion for reconsideration in a Letter to the latters counsel dated July 18, 2002 in which the petitioner assured the respondent that the BOC will provide him of its action on the said motion: Dear Atty. Sagisag, We respond to your letter of 17 June 2002 by informing you that the case of Mr. Herbert Scheer is being evaluated by the Board of Commissioners (BOC). The BOC will provide you of the results of its collegial action in due time. V ery truly yours, ( Sgd.) ANDREA D. DOMINGO C ommissioner [75] However, the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC was dated June 14, 2002, although on its face it was filed with the Records Division of the BID only on July 18, 2002. The foregoing gave reason for the CA to suspect that the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC was antedated.[76] The petition of the respondent in the CA must have jolted the petitioner and the BOC from its stupor because it came out with its Omnibus Resolution on July 18, 2002, which was, however, dated as early as June 14, 2002. The respondent had to wait in anxiety for the BOC to quench his quest for justice. The BOCs wanton acts amounted to an abdication of its duty to act and/or resolve cases/incidents with reasonable dispatch. To recall our ruling in Board of Commissioners v. De la Rosa, [77] citing Sheor v. Bengson,[78] thus: This inaction or oversight on the part of the immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor herein involved. The petitioner and the BOC should have taken to heart the following pronouncement in Commissioner of Immigration v. Fernandez:[79] In the face of the disclosure that Teban Caoili had been all along working in the Avenue Electrical Supply Co. (Avesco), located at No. 653 Rizal Avenue, Manila, until his arrest, and the documentary evidence showing that he had been issued a Philippine Passport; had regularly paid his Residence Tax Certificates (A & B), and filed Income Tax Returns, a finding of fact is necessary whether the Commissioner really had intended to notify Teban Caoili of the exclusion proceedings the Board had conducted in his absence. While it may be true that the proceedings is purely administrative in nature, such a circumstance did not excuse the serving of notice. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of administrative character, the first of which is the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.[80] ... Since the proceedings affected Caoilis status and liberty, notice should have been given. And in the light of the actuations of the new Board of Commissioners, there is a necessity of determining whether the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry and the old Board of Commissioners are correct or not. This calls for an examination of the evidence, and, the law on the matter.[81]
We agree with the petitioner that a foreign embassys cancellation of the passport it had issued to its citizens, or its refusal to issue a new one in lieu of a passport that has expired, will result in the loss of the aliens privilege to stay in this country and his subsequent deportation therefrom. But even the BOC asserted in its Summary Deportation Order that an embassys issuance of a new passport to any of its citizens may bar the latters deportation, citing the resolution of this Court in Schonemann v. Commissioner Santiago.[91]
Apparently, the BOC did not bother to review its own records in resolving the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It anchored its Omnibus Resolution only on the following: the membership of the BOC had changed when it issued its September 27, 1995 Summary Deportation Order and under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 27(b); the BOC is precluded from reversing a previous order issued by it;[82]and, the September 27, 1995 Order of the BOC had become final and could no longer be reviewed and reversed by it after the lapse of one year.[83] However, the rulings cited by the petitioner are not applicable in the instant case, as the said cases cited involve appeals to the BOC from the decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI). In Sy v. Vivo[84] and Lou v. Vivo, [85] we ruled that under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, the Decision of the BOC on appeal from the decision of the BSI becomes final and executory after one year: (b) A board of special inquiry shall have authority (1) to determine whether an alien seeking to enter or land in the Philippines shall be allowed to enter or land or shall be excluded, and (2) to make its findings and recommendations in all the cases provided for in section twenty-nine of this Act wherein the Commissioner of Immigration may admit an alien who is otherwise inadmissible. For this purpose, the board or any member thereof, may administer oaths and take evidence and in case of necessity may issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum. The hearing of all cases brought before a board of special inquiry shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The decision of any two members of the board shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio, of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the decision.
Irrefragably, Commissioner Verceles was mandated to cause the arrest of the respondent preparatory to his deportation from the Philippines. However, there was no fixed period in the Order within which to comply with the same. The Commissioner is not mandated to deport an alien immediately upon receipt of the BOCs deportation order. It is enough that the Commissioner complies with the Order within a reasonable time, which, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[92] we held to connote as follows: The meaning of reasonable time depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away; but the Court warned that under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
In Commissioner of Immigration v. Fernandez,[86] we held that the BOC composed of new members is precluded from reversing, motu proprio, the decision of the BOC on appeal from a BSI decision. But not to be ignored was our ruling that at any rate, the issue of authority should be made in accordance with the procedure established by law, with a view to protecting the rights of individuals. [87] In this case, the Summary Deportation Order was issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority under Office Memorandum Order No. 34, and not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction of BSI decisions. There is no law nor rule which provides that a Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes final after one year from its issuance,[88] or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC. The Rules of Court may be applied in a suppletory manner to deportation proceedings[89] and under Rule 37, a motion for reconsideration of a decision or final order may be filed by the aggrieved party. Neither is there any law nor rule providing that the BOC, composed of new members, cannot revise a Summary Deportation Order previously issued by a different body of Commissioners. The BOC that issued the Summary Deportation Order and the BOC which resolved the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration are one and the same government entity, with the same powers and duties regardless of its membership. Similarly, an RTC judge who replaces another judge who presided over a case may review the judgment or order of his predecessor as long as the said judgment or order has not as yet become final or executory. The act subject of review is not the act of the judge but the act of the court. The petitioners contention that it failed to resolve the respondents motion for reconsideration because of the change of administration in the BOC was branded by the CA as flimsy, if not bordering on the absurd: Firstly, it was issued three days (June 14, 2002) after petitioner filed this instant petition on June 11, 2002 or almost seven years from the time the motion for reconsideration was filed; Secondly, respondents counsels excuse that it took such time to resolve it because it was only later that the motion for reconsideration was discovered because of change of administration, is flimsy, if not bordering on the absurd;[90] The Issuance of a New and Regular Passport to the Respondent Rendered the Summary Deportation Order Moot and Academic, and the Omnibus Resolution of the BOC Lacking in Legal Basis
In this case, the BOC had yet to act on the respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent was also given a chance to secure a clearance and a new passport with the German Embassy. After all, the possibility that the German Embassy would renew the respondents passport could not be ruled out. This was exactly what happened: the German Embassy issued a new passport to the respondent on March 12, 1996 after the German District Court dismissed the case for physical injuries. Thus, the respondent was no longer an undocumented alien; nor was he an undesirable one for that matter. The petitioner even admits that there is no longer a legal or factual basis to disqualify the respondent from remaining in the country as a permanent resident. Yet, the OSG insists that he has to be deported first so that the BOCs Summary Deportation Order could be implemented. This contention was rejected by the CA, thus: During the hearing of petitioners prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before Us, respondents counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General had the occasion to manifest in open court that the State has no opposition to petitioners stay in the country provided he first leave and re-enter and re-apply for residency if only to comply with the Summary Deportation Order of 1995. That, to Our mind, seems preposterous, if not ridiculous. An individuals human rights and rights to freedom, liberty and self-determination recognize no boundaries in the democratic, free and civilized world. Such rights follow him wherever he may be. If presently, there is no factual or legal impediment to disqualify petitioner in his stay in the country, other than allegedly those relied upon in the Summary Deportation Order of 1995 (as hereinbefore discussed, had ceased to exist), requiring petitioner to leave the country and re-enter and re-apply for residency makes little sense or no sense at all, more so, in the case of petitioner who, for many years past, had lived herein and nurtured a family that is Filipino. Thus, opined, We, therefore, believe and hereby rule, that there is presently every reason to enjoin/prohibit the Bureau of Immigration, respondent Commissioner Domingo in particular, from presently deporting petitioner.[93] We agree with the Court of Appeals. The Summary Deportation Order had been rendered moot and academic upon the German Embassys issuance of a new passport to the respondent. The respondent had been in the Philippines as a permanent resident since July 18, 1986, and had married a Filipino citizen, with whom he has two children. He is not a burden to the country nor to the people of Palawan. He put up, and has been managing, the Bavaria Restaurant with about 30 employees. He has no pending criminal case; nor does he have any derogatory record. The respondent was allowed by then Immigration Commissioner Verceles to renew his passport and was given time to secure a clearance from the German Embassy. The respondent was able to do so. The case against him for physical injuries was dismissed by the German District Court. Thus, the inceptual basis for the respondents deportation had ceased to exist. The power to deport is a police matter against undesirable aliens, whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good. We believe that the deportation of the respondent late in the day did not achieve the said purpose. The petitioner admitted that there is no longer a factual and legal basis to disqualify the respondent from staying in the country. He is not an undesirable alien; nor is his presence in the country injurious to public good. He is even an entrepreneur and a productive member of society. Arrest, detention and deportation orders of aliens should not be enforced blindly and indiscriminately, without regard to facts and circumstances that will render the same unjust, unfair or illegal.[94] To direct the respondent to leave the country first before allowing him re-entry is downright iniquitous.[95] If the respondent does leave the country, he would thereby be accepting the force and effect of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order with its attendant infirmities. He will thereby lose his permanent resident status and admit the efficacy of the cancellation of his permanent resident visa.
Moreover, his entry into the country will be subject to such conditions as the petitioner may impose. The deportation of an alien is not intended as a punishment or penalty. But in a real sense, it is. In Bridges v. Wixon,[96] Mr. Justice Murphy declared that the impact of deportation upon the life of an alien is often as great if not greater than the imposition of a criminal sentence. In dealing with deportation, there is no justifiable reason for disregarding the democratic and human tenets of our legal system and descending to the practices of despotism. As Justice Brewer opined in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,[97] deportation is a punishment because it requires first, an arrest, a deprivation of liberty and second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from property. To be forcibly taken away from home, family, business and property and sent across the ocean to a distant land is punishment; and that oftentimes is most severe and cruel. It would be putting salt on the respondents woes occasioned by the BOCs ineptitude. Considering the peculiar backdrop and the equities in this case, the respondents deportation and the cancellation of his permanent resident visa as a precondition to his re-entry into this country is severe and cruel; it is a form of punishment. Our ruling in Vivo v. Cloribel,[98] has no application in this case, precisely because the factual milieu here is entirely different. In that case, the Commissioner of Immigration required the respondents to leave the country on or before September 12, 1962, because their stay in the country as approved by the Secretary of Justice had been cancelled. Our ruling in Bing v. Commission on Immigration,[99] even buttresses the case for the respondent since we ruled therein that an alien entitled to a permanent stay cannot be deported without being accorded due notice and hearing. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013 REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA vs ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P. ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 4 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision2 dated January 27, 2005 and the resolution3 dated June 6, 2005 of the Courts of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71551. The CA set aside the orders dated February 28, 2002 4 and April 1, 20025 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Cebu City, which denied the motion to dismiss for reconsideration respectively, of respondents Rovila Water Supply, Inc. (Rovilla, Inc.), Earl U. Kokseng, Lialia Torres, Dalla P. Romanillos and Marissa Gabuya. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages.6 The petitioners claimed that their family has long been known in the community to be engaged in the water supply business; they operated the "Rovila Water Supply" from their family residence and were engaged in the distribution of water to customers in Cebu City. The petitioners alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in the family business who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files. Lilia also allegedly posted security guards and barred the members of the Pacaña family from operating their business. She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." (Rovila Inc.) Upon inquiry with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with the respondents as the majority stockholders. The respondents did so by conspiring with one another and forming the respondent corporation to takeover and illegally usurp the family business’ registered name.7
amended complaint remained the same.12 On October 10, 2000, Luciano also died.13 The respondents filed their Answer on November 16, 2000. 14 The petitioners’ sister, Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzales, filed a motion for leave to intervene and her answerin-intervention was granted by the trial court. At the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested to the RTC that a substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and Luciano. They further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the complaint because the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case. The pre-trial pushed through as scheduled and the RTC directed the respondents to put into writing their earlier manifestation. The RTC issued a pre-trial order where one of the issues submitted was whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 15 On January 23, 2002,16 the respondents again filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action against the respondents. THE RTC RULING The RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss. It ruled that, save for the grounds for dismissal which may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a motion to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may only be filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the amended complaint. Thus, even granting that the defenses invoked by the respondents are meritorious, their motion was filed out of time as it was filed only after the conclusion of the pre-trial conference. Furthermore, the rule on substitution of parties only applies when the parties to the case die, which is not what happened in the present case. 17 The RTC likewise denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration. 18 The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss. They argued that the deceased spouses Luciano and Lourdes, not the petitioners, were the real parties in interest. Thus, the petitioners violated Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the substitution of parties. 19 Furthermore, they seasonably moved for the dismissal of the case 20 and the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners as heirs of Lourdes and Luciano. 21 THE CA RULING The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, they are not the real parties in interest and cannot bring an action in their own names; thus, the complaint should be dismissed22 pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Casimiro v. Roque and Gonzales. 23 Neither are the petitioners suing as heirs of their deceased parents. Pursuant to jurisprudence, 24 the petitioners should first be declared as heirs before they can be considered as the real parties in interest. This cannot be done in the present ordinary civil case but in a special proceeding for that purpose. The CA agreed with the respondents that they alleged the following issues as affirmative defenses in their answer: 1) the petitioners are not the real parties in interest; and 2) that they had no legal right to institute the action in behalf of their parents.25 That the motion to dismiss was filed after the period to file an answer has lapsed is of no moment. The RTC judge entertained it and passed upon its merit. He was correct in doing so because in the pre-trial order, one of the submitted issues was whether the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, in Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 26 the Court held that the ground of lack of cause of action may be raised in a motion to dismiss at anytime. 27
In forming the respondent corporation, the respondents allegedly used the name of Lourdes as one of the incorporators and made it appear in the SEC documents that the family business was operated in a place other than the Pacaña residence. Thereafter, the respondents used the Pacaña family’s receipts and the deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of the respondent Rovila Inc. Using this scheme, the respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments. 8
The CA further ruled that, in denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC judge acted contrary to established rules and jurisprudence which may be questioned via a petition for certiorari. The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" which was traditionally confined to "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment" has been expanded to include any action done "contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence[.]" 28
The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA). The respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy.9
THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS The petitioners filed the present petition and argued that, first, in annulling the interlocutory orders, the CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss which did not conform to the rules. 29
The RTC denied the motion. On September 26, 2000, Lourdes died 10 and the petitioners amended their complaint, with leave of court, on October 2, 2000 to reflect this development. 11
Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the amended complaint, nor were the grounds raised in the answer. Citing Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the respondents are deemed to have waived these grounds, as correctly held by the RTC. 30
They still attached to their amended complaint the sworn declaration with SPA, but the caption of the
Second, even if there is non-joinder and misjoinder of parties or that the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest, the remedy is not outright dismissal of the complaint, but its amendment to include the real parties in interest. 31 Third, the petitioners sued in their own right because they have actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as heirs or co-owners, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 32 Their declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is not necessary, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Marabilles, et al. v. Quito.33 Finally, the sworn declaration is evidentiary in nature which remains to be appreciated after the trial is completed.34 The respondents reiterated in their comment that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest. 35 They likewise argued that they moved for the dismissal of the case during the pre-trial conference due to the petitioners’ procedural lapse in refusing to comply with a condition precedent, which is, to substitute the heirs as plaintiffs. Besides, an administrator of the estates of Luciano and Lourdes has already been appointed.36 The respondents also argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss were timely raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the nature and purposes of the pre-trial include, among others, the dismissal of the action, should a valid ground therefor be found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. Finally, the special civil action of certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing the order of the RTC. 37 THE COURT’S RULING We find the petition meritorious. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion In Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City,38 the Court held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The history and development of the ground "fails to state a cause of action" in the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court Preliminarily, a suit that is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is dismissible on the ground that the complaint "fails to state a cause of action." 39 Pursuant to jurisprudence,40 this is also the ground invoked when the respondents alleged that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest because: 1) the petitioners should not have filed the case in their own names, being merely attorneys-in-fact of their mother; and 2) the petitioners should first be declared as heirs. A review of the 1940, 1964 and the present 1997 Rules of Court shows that the fundamentals of the ground for dismissal based on "failure to state a cause of action" have drastically changed over time. A historical background of this particular ground is in order to preclude any confusion or misapplication of jurisprudence decided prior to the effectivity of the present Rules of Court. The 1940 Rules of Court provides under Section 10, Rule 9 that: Section 10. Waiver of defenses- Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; except the defense of failure to state a cause of action, which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of as provided in section 5 of Rule 17 in the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the action. [underscoring supplied] This provision was essentially reproduced in Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules of Court, and we quote: Section 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; except the failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; but in the last instance, the motion shall be disposed of as provided in section 5 of Rule 10 in the light of any evidence which may have been received. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it shall dismiss the action. [underscoring supplied] Under the present Rules of Court, this provision was reflected in Section 1, Rule 9, and we quote:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. [underscoring supplied] Notably, in the present rules, there was a deletion of the ground of "failure to state a cause of action" from the list of those which may be waived if not invoked either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Another novelty introduced by the present Rules, which was totally absent in its two precedents, is the addition of the period of time within which a motion to dismiss should be filed as provided under Section 1, Rule 16 and we quote: Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx [underscoring supplied] All these considerations point to the legal reality that the new Rules effectively restricted the dismissal of complaints in general, especially when what is being invoked is the ground of "failure to state a cause of action." Thus, jurisprudence governed by the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court to the effect that the ground for dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action may be raised anytime during the proceedings, is already inapplicable to cases already governed by the present Rules of Court which took effect on July 1, 1997. As the rule now stands, the failure to invoke this ground in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver. According to Oscar M. Herrera, 41 the reason for the deletion is that failure to state a cause of action may be cured under Section 5, Rule 10 and we quote: Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. With this clarification, we now proceed to the substantial issues of the petition. The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the dismissal of a civil case, the respondents’ grounds for dismissal fall under Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly, failure to state a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent (substitution of parties), respectively. The first paragraph of Section 1, 42 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated. Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Equally important to this provision is Section 1,43 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4) prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within which they were raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before the filing of the answer, the respondents should then have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer. The RTC’s assailed orders did not touch on this particular issue but the CA ruled that the respondents did, while the petitioners insist that the respondents did not. In the present petition, the petitioners reiterate that there was a blatant non-observance of the rules when the respondents did not amend their answer to invoke the grounds for dismissal which were raised only during the pre-trial and, subsequently, in the subject motion to dismiss. 44 The divergent findings of the CA and the petitioners’ arguments are essentially factual issues. Time and again, we have held that the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, such as the present case, is limited only to questions of law, save for certain exceptions. One of these is attendant herein, which is, when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.45 In the petition filed with the CA, the respondents made a passing allegation that, as affirmative defenses in their answer, they raised the issue that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest. 46
On the other hand, the petitioners consistently argued otherwise in their opposition 47 to the motion to dismiss, and in their comment48 and in their memorandum49 on the respondents’ petition before the CA. Our examination of the records shows that the CA had no basis in its finding that the respondents alleged the grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer. The respondents merely stated in their petition for certiorari that they alleged the subject grounds in their answer. However, nowhere in the petition did they support this allegation; they did not even attach a copy of their answer to the petition. It is basic that the respondents had the duty to prove by substantial evidence their positive assertions. Considering that the petition for certiorari is an original and not an appellate action, the CA had no records of the RTC’s proceedings upon which the CA could refer to in order to validate the respondents’ claim. Clearly, other than the respondents’ bare allegations, the CA had no basis to rule, without proof, that the respondents alleged the grounds for dismissal as affirmative defenses in the answer. The respondents, as the parties with the burden of proving that they timely raised their grounds for dismissal, could have at least attached a copy of their answer to the petition. This simple task they failed to do. That the respondents did not allege in their answer the subject grounds is made more apparent through their argument, both in their motion to dismiss 50 and in their comment, 51 that it was only during the pre-trial stage that they verbally manifested and invited the attention of the lower court on their grounds for dismissal. In order to justify such late invocation, they heavily relied on Section 2(g) and (i), Rule 1852 of the Rules of Court that the nature and purpose of the pre-trial include, among others, the propriety of dismissing the action should there be a valid ground therefor and matters which may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. The respondents are not correct. The rules are clear and require no interpretation. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in their answer. On the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. The purpose is to obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties are expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matter."53 The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern the trial proper. The dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are deemed waived. The Dabuco ruling is inapplicable in the present case; the ground for dismissal "failure to state a cause of action" distinguished from "lack of cause of action" To justify the belated filing of the motion to dismiss, the CA reasoned out that the ground for dismissal of "lack of cause of action" may be raised at any time during the proceedings, pursuant to Dabuco v. Court of Appeals.54 This is an erroneous interpretation and application of Dabuco as will be explained below. First, in Dabuco, the grounds for dismissal were raised as affirmative defenses in the answer which is in stark contrast to the present case. Second, in Dabuco, the Court distinguished between the dismissal of the complaint for "failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action." The Court emphasized that in a dismissal of action for lack of cause of action, "questions of fact are involved, [therefore,] courts hesitate to declare a plaintiff as lacking in cause of action. Such declaration is postponed until the insufficiency of cause is apparent from a preponderance of evidence. Usually, this is done only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present all relevant evidence on such questions of fact."55 In fact, in Dabuco, the Court held that even the preliminary hearing on the propriety of lifting the restraining order was declared insufficient for purposes of dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. This is so because the issues of fact had not yet been adequately ventilated at that preliminary stage. For these reasons, the Court declared in Dabuco that the dismissal by the trial court of the complaint was premature. In the case of Macaslang v. Zamora, 56 the Court noted that the incorrect appreciation by both the RTC and the CA of the distinction between the dismissal of an action, based on "failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action," prevented it from properly deciding the case, and we quote: Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction: xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last
mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. [italics supplied] Based on this discussion, the Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot also dismiss the case based on "lack of cause of action" as this would require at least a preponderance of evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court. Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not resolve the merits of the respondents’ grounds for dismissal which are considered as waived. Other heirs of the spouses Pacaña to be impleaded in the case. It should be emphasized that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the respondents have waived the dismissal of the complaint based on the ground of failure to state a cause of action because the petitioners are not the real parties in interest. At this juncture, a distinction between a real party in interest and an indispensable party is in order. In Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, et al., 57 the Court clarified these two concepts and held that "[a] real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. xxx If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit." At the inception of the present case, both the spouses Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of Rovila Water Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination of the present case. They possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.58 Jurisprudence on the procedural consequence of the inclusion or non-inclusion of an indispensable party is divided in our jurisdiction. Due to the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court dismissed the case in Lucman v. Malawi, et al.59 and Go v. Distinction Properties Development Construction, Inc.,60 while in Casals, et al. v. Tayud Golf and Country Club et al., 61 the Court annulled the judgment which was rendered without the inclusion of the indispensable parties. In Arcelona et al. v. Court of Appeals 62 and Bulawan v. Aquende, 63 and Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo et al. 64 the Court ruled that the burden to implead or order the impleading of an indispensable party rests on the plaintiff and on the trial court, respectively. Thus, the non-inclusion of the indispensable parties, despite notice of this infirmity, resulted in the annulment of these cases. In Plasabas, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 65 the Court held that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. However, in the cases of Quilatan, et al. v. Heirs of Quilatan, et al. 66 and Lagunilla, et al. v. Monis, et al.,67 the Court remanded the case to the RTC for the impleading of indispensable parties. On the other hand, in Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 68 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, 69 and Valdez Tallorin, v. Heirs of Tarona, et al.,70 the Court directly ordered that the indispensable parties be impleaded. Mindful of the differing views of the Court as regards the legal effects of the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,71 that the failure to implead indispensable parties is a curable error and the foreign origin of our present rules on indispensable parties permitted this corrective measure. This cited case held: Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural aberration xxx, slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under
applicable adjective rules – e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties." Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3 on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief. Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable. In Galicia, et al. v. Vda. De Mindo, et al.,72 the Court ruled that in line with its policy of promoting a just and inexpensive disposition of a case, it allowed the intervention of the indispensable parties instead of dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer,73 the Court cited Salvador, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 74 and held that the Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which are inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party in interest. The Court has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, and to order its amendment in order to implead an indispensable party. With these discussions as premises, the Court is of the view that the proper remedy in the present case is to implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect. To do so would serve proper administration of justice and prevent further delay and multiplicity of suits. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with a lawful court order.75 The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case. 76 Obviously, in the present case, the deceased Pacañas can no longer be included in the complaint as indispensable parties because of their death during the pendency of the case. Upon their death, however, their ownership and rights over their properties were transmitted to their heirs, including herein petitioners, pursuant to Article 774 77 in relation with Article 77778 of the Civil Code. In Orbeta, et al. v. Sendiong, 79 the Court acknowledged that the heirs, whose hereditary rights are to be affected by the case, are deemed indispensable parties who should have been impleaded by the trial court. Therefore, to obviate further delay in the proceedings of the present case and given the Court’s authority to order the inclusion of an indispensable party at any stage of the proceedings, the heirs of the spouses Pacaña, except the petirioners who are already parties to the case are Lagrimas PacañaGonzalez who intervened in the case, are hereby ordered impleaded as parties-plaintiffs. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 27, 2005 and the resolution date June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71551 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The heirs of the spouses Luciano and Lourdes Pacaña, except herein petitioner and Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzalez, are ORDERED IMPLEADED as parties plaintiffs and the RTC is directed tp proceed with the trial of the case with DISPATCH. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 187714 March 8, 2011 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO
The Case Before the Court is a petition for prohibition1 with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S. Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. The Antecedents On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!2 In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the second appropriation covers the same stretch from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to Senator Villar, then the Senate President. On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706,3 the full text of which reads: WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly advocated (sic) the construction of the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in Paraaque City to the South Luzon Expressway; WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act; WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President; WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he was member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Pias would be financially benefited by the construction of the new road; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the same properties affected by the projects he proposed; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of his landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the area, the government, and the Filipino people; WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced sale of another property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the profit made from the overprice by the Villar owned corporations; WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers; WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his personal interests thereby sacrificing the peoples welfare;
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate;
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars constitutional right to equal protection; 2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution; and 3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication.13
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the peoples trust and confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not go unpunished; WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST. Adopted, (Sgd.) M.A. MADRIGAL4 On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members: Sen. Sen. Sen. Sen. Sen. Sen. Sen.
Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal Joker Arroyo - Member Alan Peter Cayetano- Member Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member Gregorio Honasan - Member Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.5 After consultation with the members of the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee.6 On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee.7 Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final.8 Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.9 On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech10 where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27 April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech11 where he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.12 Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009, petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted. On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was set on 26 May 2009. Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
In its Comment, respondent argues that: 1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party. In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard; 2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee; 3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole; 4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld; 5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort; 6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior; 7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which exclusively pertains to Congress; 8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave abuse of discretion; [and] 9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.14 The Issues The issues for the Courts resolution are the following: 1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable party in this petition; 2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort; 3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to equal protection; 4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and 5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity. The Ruling of this Court Indispensable Party Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 7 Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows: An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward. A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.15 In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigals interest. The nature of Senator Madrigals interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved without her participation. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction simply calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies rather than by courts of justice.16 Citing Pimentel v. HRET,17 respondent avers that primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008, the Ethics Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senates attention to the alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson. On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minoritys decision on the matter is final but the records did not show that a caucus was convened. On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It was because of the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case that Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges.22 However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate. Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled: x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x18 The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve.19 As regards respondents invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.20 Thus, it has been held that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers.21 The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee on the Whole Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villars recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a body.
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to due process. We do not agree. Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus: First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.23 The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
We do not agree with petitioners. Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,24 the Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates: Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) The Court explained in the Resolution25 denying the motion for reconsideration: The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity. Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.26 (Emphasis supplied) In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,27 the Court further clarified: x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera. Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making known the issuances.28 The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides: Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.29 Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with the
publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole30 is an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges31 which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole32 is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges33 which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondents allegation in its Comment that eight members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.34 However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.35 Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 152272 JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.--- repeated
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986 NEWSWEEK, INC. vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion for Reconsideration. It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad, and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to the complaint. On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state,
much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply. On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982. On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406) seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such a grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17, 1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time. Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition. The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within fifteen days from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the same as a petition for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation. We agree with petitioner. In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760). This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384). In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows: Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part. (supra p. 628). It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be. We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters. We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.) The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied. As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal. This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule. In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case. In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case. In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same. In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case. In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint. In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same. In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court. Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated, necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy. Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text. The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in question may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who do not have. On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 140954 HEIRS OF BERTULDO--- repeated
G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005 Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be substituted as parties to a litigation. This requirement is necessitated by due process. Thus, when the rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due process had thereby been satisfied. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 26, 2003 Decision[2] and the March 9, 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 34702. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision accordingly AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.[4] On the other hand, the trial courts affirmed Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. D) and Kasunduan (Exhibit B), to be a sale with right of repurchase; b) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P9,000.00 by way of repurchasing the land in question; c) ordering the defendants to execute a deed of reconveyance of said land in favor of the plaintiff after the latter has paid them the amount of P9,000.00 to repurchase the land in question; d) ordering the defendants to yield possession of the subject land to the plaintiff after the latter has paid them the amount of P9,000.00 to repurchase the property from them; and e) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages; the amount of P5,000[.00] as exemplary damages; the amount of P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation and the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees.[5] The Facts The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.[6] Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-111802. The parties also executed another document entitled Kasunduan. [7] Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable
mortgage.[8] Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he failed to exercise.[9] On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his favor. The trial court declared that the parties had entered into a sale with a right of repurchase.[10] It further held that respondent had made a valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase.[11] Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his payment.[12] Ruling of the Court of Appeals Sustaining the trial court, the CA noted that petitioners had given respondent the right to repurchase the property within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until June 29, 1979. Accordingly, the parties executed the Kasunduan to express the terms and conditions of their actual agreement.[13] The appellate court also found no reason to overturn the finding that respondent had validly exercised his right to repurchase the land.[14] In the March 9, 2004 Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of respondents death on December 24, 1988.[15] Hence, this Petition.[16] The Issues Petitioners assign the following errors for our consideration: I. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. SD-838; II. Public Respondent Twelfth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals likewise erred in denying [petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration given the facts and the law therein presented.[17] Succinctly, the issues are whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin, and whether respondent was guilty of forum shopping.[18] The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Jurisdiction Petitioners assert that the RTCs Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction.[19] They claim that respondent died during the pendency of the case. There being no substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction over the litigation.[20] Rule on Substitution When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,[21] the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads thus: Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. [22] The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative.[23] Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.[24] The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments.[25] In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.[26]
This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. [27] These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated. The Court is not unaware of Chittick v. Court of Appeals,[28] in which the failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial courts Decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership. The children who allegedly substituted for her refused to continue the case against their father and vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties.[29] Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguished the obligation being sued upon.[30] Clearly, the present case is not similar, much less identical, to the factual milieu of Chittick. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.[31] Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process. Substitution in the Instant Case The records of the present case contain a Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff dated February 15, 2002, filed before the CA. The prayer states as follows: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Heirs of the deceased plaintiff-appellee as represented by his daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-plaintiff for the said Pedro Joaquin. It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel[32] for the heirs of Pedro Joaquin be furnished with copies of notices, orders, resolutions and other pleadings at its address below. Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case. We stress that the appellate court had ordered[33] his legal representatives to appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the interests of the deceased.[34] After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.[35] Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial courts Decision. Second Issue: Forum Shopping Petitioners also claim that respondents were guilty of forum shopping, a fact that should have compelled the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.[36] They claim that prior to the commencement of the present suit on July 7, 1981, respondent had filed a civil case against petitioners on June 25, 1979. Docketed as Civil Case No. SD-742 for the recovery of possession and for damages, it was allegedly dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for lack of interest to prosecute. Forum Shopping Defined Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[37] Forum shopping may be resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.[38] Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets.[39] Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt of court.[40] The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another.[41] We note, however, petitioners claim that the subject matter of the present case has already been litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine is res judicata.[42] Applicability of Res Judicata Under res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and on all points
and matters determined in the previous suit.[43] The term literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.[44] The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. Public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time. The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered on the merits of the controversy; (3) the court that rendered it must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must have been -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.[45] Failure to Support Allegation The onus of proving allegations rests upon the party raising them.[46] As to the matter of forum shopping and res judicata, petitioners have failed to provide this Court with relevant and clear specifications that would show the presence of an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the present and the earlier suits. They have also failed to show whether the other case was decided on the merits. Instead, they have made only bare assertions involving its existence without reference to its facts. In other words, they have alleged conclusions of law without stating any factual or legal basis. Mere mention of other civil cases without showing the identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought is not enough basis to claim that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, or that res judicata exists.[47] WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 150135 October 30, 2006 SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA G.R. No. 150135 and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA vs THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR. Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor. James Baldwin The Constitution affords litigantsmoneyed or poorequal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts.[1] Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision. As such, filing fees, though one of the essential elements in court procedures, should not be an obstacle to poor litigants opportunity to seek redress for their grievances before the courts. The Case This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the annulment of the September 11, 2001 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 99-4403 entitled Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, et al. , dismissing the case for failure of petitioners Algura spouses to pay the required filing fees.[2] Since the instant petition involves only a question of law based on facts established from the pleadings and documents submitted by the parties,[3] the Court gives due course to the instant petition sanctioned under Section 2(c) of Rule 41 on Appeal from the RTCs, and governed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Facts On September 1, 1999, spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J. Algura filed a Verified Complaint dated August 30, 1999[4] for damages against the Naga City Government and its officers, arising from the alleged illegal demolition of their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived from fees paid by their boarders amounting to PhP 7,000.00 monthly. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants,[5] to which petitioner Antonio Alguras Pay Slip No. 2457360 (Annex A of motion) was appended, showing a gross monthly income of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Four Pesos (PhP 10,474.00) and a net pay of Three Thousand Six Hundred Sixteen Pesos and Ninety Nine Centavos (PhP 3,616.99) for [the month of] July 1999.[6] Also attached as Annex B to the motion was a July 14, 1999 Certification[7] issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga City, which stated that petitioners had no property declared in their name for taxation purposes. Finding that petitioners motion to litigate as indigent litigants was meritorious, Executive Judge Jose T.
Atienza of the Naga City RTC, in the September 1, 1999 Order,[8] granted petitioners plea for exemption from filing fees. Meanwhile, as a result of respondent Naga City Governments demolition of a portion of petitioners house, the Alguras allegedly lost a monthly income of PhP 7,000.00 from their boarders rentals. With the loss of the rentals, the meager income from Lorencita Alguras sari-sari store and Antonio Alguras small take home pay became insufficient for the expenses of the Algura spouses and their six (6) children for their basic needs including food, bills, clothes, and schooling, among others. On October 13, 1999, respondents filed an Answer with Counterclaim dated October 10, 1999,[9] arguing that the defenses of the petitioners in the complaint had no cause of action, the spouses boarding house blocked the road right of way, and said structure was a nuisance per se. Praying that the counterclaim of defendants (respondents) be dismissed, petitioners then filed their Reply with Ex-Parte Request for a Pre-Trial Setting[10] before the Naga City RTC on October 19, 1999. On February 3, 2000, a pre-trial was held wherein respondents asked for five (5) days within which to file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. On March 13, 2000, respondents filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment of Filing Fees dated March 10, 2000.[11] They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00 net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the Philippine National Police, spouse Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence along Bayawas St., Sta. Cruz, Naga City. Also, respondents claimed that petitioners second floor was used as their residence and as a boarding house, from which they earned more than PhP 3,000.00 a month. In addition, it was claimed that petitioners derived additional income from their computer shop patronized by students and from several boarders who paid rentals to them. Hence, respondents concluded that petitioners were not indigent litigants. On March 28, 2000, petitioners subsequently interposed their Opposition to the Motion[12] to respondents motion to disqualify them for non-payment of filing fees. On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC issued an Order disqualifying petitioners as indigent litigants on the ground that they failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and to comply with the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 of the Revised Rules of Courtdirecting them to pay the requisite filing fees.[13] On April 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order. On May 8, 2000, respondents then filed their Comment/Objections to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order[14] giving petitioners the opportunity to comply with the requisites laid down in Section 18, Rule 141, for them to qualify as indigent litigants. On May 13, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance[15] attaching the affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura[16] and Erlinda Bangate,[17] to comply with the requirements of then Rule 141, Section 18 of the Rules of Court and in support of their claim to be declared as indigent litigants. In her May 13, 2000 Affidavit, petitioner Lorencita Algura claimed that the demolition of their small dwelling deprived her of a monthly income amounting to PhP 7,000.00. She, her husband, and their six (6) minor children had to rely mainly on her husbands salary as a policeman which provided them a monthly amount of PhP 3,500.00, more or less. Also, they did not own any real property as certified by the assessors office of Naga City. More so, according to her, the meager net income from her small sari-sari store and the rentals of some boarders, plus the salary of her husband, were not enough to pay the familys basic necessities. To buttress their position as qualified indigent litigants, petitioners also submitted the affidavit of Erlinda Bangate, who attested under oath, that she personally knew spouses Antonio Algura and Lorencita Algura, who were her neighbors; that they derived substantial income from their boarders; that they lost said income from their boarders rentals when the Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, through its officers, demolished part of their house because from that time, only a few boarders could be accommodated; that the income from the small store, the boarders, and the meager salary of Antonio Algura were insufficient for their basic necessities like food and clothing, considering that the Algura spouses had six (6) children; and that she knew that petitioners did not own any real property. Thereafter, Naga City RTC Acting Presiding Judge Andres B. Barsaga, Jr. issued his July 17, 2000[18] Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Judge Barsaga ratiocinated that the pay slip of Antonio F. Algura showed that the GROSS INCOME or TOTAL EARNINGS of plaintiff Algura [was] ₧10,474.00 which amount [was] over and above the amount mentioned in the first paragraph of Rule 141, Section 18 for pauper litigants residing
outside Metro Manila.[19] Said rule provides that the gross income of the litigant should not exceed PhP 3,000.00 a month and shall not own real estate with an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00. The trial court found that, in Lorencita S.J. Alguras May 13, 2000 Affidavit, nowhere was it stated that she and her immediate family did not earn a gross income of PhP 3,000.00. The Issue Unconvinced of the said ruling, the Alguras instituted the instant petition raising a solitary issue for the consideration of the Court: whether petitioners should be considered as indigent litigants who qualify for exemption from paying filing fees. The Ruling of the Court The petition is meritorious. A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant) is necessary before the Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses claim to exemption from paying filing fees. When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper litigants was found in Rule 3, Section 22 which provided that: SECTION 22. Pauper litigant.Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority[,] once given[,] shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case [favorable] to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides. From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did not contain any provision on pauper litigants. On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly G.R. No. 64274), approved the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of Rates and Charges of Court Fees, through its Chairman, then Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise the fees in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to generate funds to effectively cover administrative costs for services rendered by the courts.[20] A provision on pauper litigants was inserted which reads: SECTION 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.Pauper-litigants include wage earners whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a month or P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila, and P1,500.00 a month or P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila, or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than P24,000.00, or not more than P18,000.00 as the case may be. Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the pauper-litigant. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute an affidavit that he does not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the assessed value afore-mentioned [sic], supported by a certification to that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer. When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (inclusive of Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, which became effective on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: SECTION 21. Indigent party.A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
attached to the litigants affidavit. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No. 803, however, there was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper litigants. On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, whereby certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141, making it Section 18, which now reads: SECTION 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.Pauper litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 18. On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative Matter No. 04-204-SC, which became effective on the same date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:
SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.INDIGENT LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES. The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigants affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Emphasis supplied.) Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to implement RA 9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16, 2004 amendment, the ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their immediate family was increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a month outside Metro Manila, to double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum value of the property owned by the applicant was increased from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a maximum market value of PhP 300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants and promote easier access to justice by the poor and the marginalized in the wake of these new increases in filing fees. Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no amendment or recall of Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants. With this historical backdrop, let us now move on to the sole issuewhether petitioners are exempt from the payment of filing fees. It is undisputed that the Complaint (Civil Case No. 99-4403) was filed on September 1, 1999. However, the Naga City RTC, in its April 14, 2000 and July 17, 2000 Orders, incorrectly applied Rule 141, Section 18 on Legal Fees when the applicable rules at that time were Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party which took effect on July 1, 1997 and Rule 141, Section 16 on Pauper Litigants which became effective on July 19, 1984 up to February 28, 2000. The old Section 16, Rule 141 requires applicants to file an ex-parte motion to litigate as a pauper litigant by submitting an affidavit that they do not have a gross income of PhP 2,000.00 a month or PhP 24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila and PhP 1,500.00 a month or PhP 18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 24,000.00 or not more than PhP 18,000.00 as the case may be. Thus, there are two requirements: a) income requirementthe applicants should not have a gross monthly income of more than PhP 1,500.00, and b) property requirementthey should not own property with an assessed value of not more than PhP 18,000.00. In the case at bar, petitioners Alguras submitted the Affidavits of petitioner Lorencita Algura and neighbor Erlinda Bangate, the pay slip of petitioner Antonio F. Algura showing a gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00,[21] and a Certification of the Naga City assessor stating that petitioners do not have property declared in their names for taxation.[22] Undoubtedly, petitioners do not own real property as shown by the Certification of the Naga City assessor and so the property requirement is met. However with respect to the income requirement, it is clear that the gross monthly income of PhP 10,474.00 of petitioner Antonio F. Algura and the PhP 3,000.00 income of Lorencita Algura when combined, were above the PhP 1,500.00 monthly income threshold prescribed by then Rule 141, Section 16 and therefore, the income requirement was not satisfied. The trial court was therefore correct in disqualifying petitioners Alguras as indigent litigants although the court should have applied Rule 141, Section 16 which was in effect at the time of the filing of the application on September 1, 1999. Even if Rule 141, Section 18 (which superseded Rule 141, Section 16 on March 1, 2000) were applied, still the application could not have been granted as the combined PhP 13,474.00 income of petitioners was beyond the PhP 3,000.00 monthly income threshold. Unrelenting, petitioners however argue in their Motion for Reconsideration of the April 14, 2000 Order disqualifying them as indigent litigants[23] that the rules have been relaxed by relying on Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure which authorizes parties to litigate their action as indigents if the court is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. The trial court did not give credence to this view of petitioners and simply applied Rule 141 but ignored Rule 3, Section 21 on Indigent Party. The position of petitioners on the need to use Rule 3, Section 21 on their application to litigate as indigent litigants brings to the fore the issue on whether a trial court has to apply both Rule 141, Section 16 and Rule 3, Section 21 on such applications or should the court apply only Rule 141, Section 16 and discard Rule 3, Section 21 as having been superseded by Rule 141, Section 16 on Legal Fees. The Court rules that Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 16 (later amended as Rule 141, Section 18 on March 1, 2000 and subsequently amended by Rule 141, Section 19 on August 16, 2003, which is
now the present rule) are still valid and enforceable rules on indigent litigants. For one, the history of the two seemingly conflicting rules readily reveals that it was not the intent of the Court to consider the old Section 22 of Rule 3, which took effect on January 1, 1994 to have been amended and superseded by Rule 141, Section 16, which took effect on July 19, 1984 through A.M. No. 83-6-389-0. If that is the case, then the Supreme Court, upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Revision on Rules, could have already deleted Section 22 from Rule 3 when it amended Rules 1 to 71 and approved the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. The fact that Section 22 which became Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigant was retained in the rules of procedure, even elaborating on the meaning of an indigent party, and was also strengthened by the addition of a third paragraph on the right to contest the grant of authority to litigate only goes to show that there was no intent at all to consider said rule as expunged from the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, Rule 141 on indigent litigants was amended twice: first on March 1, 2000 and the second on August 16, 2004; and yet, despite these two amendments, there was no attempt to delete Section 21 from said Rule 3. This clearly evinces the desire of the Court to maintain the two (2) rules on indigent litigants to cover applications to litigate as an indigent litigant. It may be argued that Rule 3, Section 21 has been impliedly repealed by the recent 2000 and 2004 amendments to Rule 141 on legal fees. This position is bereft of merit. Implied repeals are frowned upon unless the intent of the framers of the rules is unequivocal. It has been consistently ruled that: (r)epeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute[,] it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.[24] (Emphasis supplied). Instead of declaring that Rule 3, Section 21 has been superseded and impliedly amended by Section 18 and later Section 19 of Rule 141, the Court finds that the two rules can and should be harmonized. The Court opts to reconcile Rule 3, Section 21 and Rule 141, Section 19 because it is a settled principle that when conflicts are seen between two provisions, all efforts must be made to harmonize them. Hence, every statute [or rule] must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes [or rules] as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[25] In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enunciated that in the interpretation of seemingly conflicting laws, efforts must be made to first harmonize them. This Court thus ruled: Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi, that is, to interpret and to do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.[26]
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after hearing, that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions, aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement. Thus, the trial court should have applied Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income and ownership of real property under Rule 141. Instead of disqualifying the Alguras as indigent litigants, the trial court should have called a hearing as required by Rule 3, Section 21 to enable the petitioners to adduce evidence to show that they didnt have property and money sufficient and available for food, shelter, and basic necessities for them and their family.[27] In that hearing, the respondents would have had the right to also present evidence to refute the allegations and evidence in support of the application of the petitioners to litigate as indigent litigants. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, it will have to remand the case to the trial court to determine whether petitioners can be considered as indigent litigants using the standards set in Rule 3, Section 21. Recapitulating the rules on indigent litigants, therefore, if the applicant for exemption meets the salary and property requirements under Section 19 of Rule 141, then the grant of the application is mandatory. On the other hand, when the application does not satisfy one or both requirements, then the application should not be denied outright; instead, the court should apply the indigency test under Section 21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in determining the merits of the prayer for exemption. Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Action Program for Judicial Reforms (APJR) itself, initiated by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., placed prime importance on easy access to justice by the poor as one of its six major components. Likewise, the judicial philosophy of Liberty and Prosperity of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban makes it imperative that the courts shall not only safeguard but also enhance the rights of individualswhich are considered sacred under the 1987 Constitution. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the underprivileged, and the marginalized. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 14, 2000 Order granting the disqualification of petitioners, the July 17, 2000 Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, and the September 11, 2001 Order dismissing the case in Civil Case No. RTC-99-4403 before the Naga City RTC, Branch 27 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the Naga City RTC is ordered to set the Ex-Parte Motion to Litigate as Indigent Litigants for hearing and apply Rule 3, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether petitioners can qualify as indigent litigants. No costs. SO ORDERED.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141that is, the applicants gross income and that of the applicants immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is a matter of right.
G.R. No. 122846 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM
However, if the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, then it would set a hearing to enable the applicant to prove that the applicant has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. In that hearing, the adverse party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant; after which the trial court will rule on the application depending on the evidence adduced. In addition, Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may later still contest the grant of such
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[1] the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or wash up rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
This Petition[2] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision[3] in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance).
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention[7] on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.[8] The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.[9] On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.[10] The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.[11]
I. The facts are as follows: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.[4] The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled. SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed. SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval. Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992. Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)[5] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.[6] MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.[12] The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.[13] The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.[14] On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.[15] A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional. During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.[16] On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.[17] The RTC noted that the ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.[18] Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.[20] The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.[21] Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power: [To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.[22] The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus: to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.[23] Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.[24] First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law. TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.[25] In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power. II. We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering wash-up rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,[26] sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government. The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.[27] The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.[28] In this jurisdiction, the extancy of a direct and personal interest presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.[29] In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.[30] Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.[31] For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,[32] the United States Supreme Court wrote that: We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."[33] Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.[34] American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,[35] the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their patients. The Court held that: The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."[36] An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,[37] wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of
a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function."[38] Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.[39] In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a wash-rate time frame. III. To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.[40] Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in ErmitaMalate was sustained by the Court. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.[41] The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause. A. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.[42] Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.[43] Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,[44] movie theaters,[45] gas stations[46] and cockpits.[47] The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism. Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same
passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day. B. The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.[48] The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.[49] Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
[64] If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those trivial yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others. D.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.[50]
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus: Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[[65]] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[[66]] The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
C. The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.[51] Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a discrete and insular minority or infringement of a fundamental right.[52] Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender[53] and legitimacy.[54] Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,[55] after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.[56] While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.[57] Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.[58] Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.[59] Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.[60] Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.[61] The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,[62] judicial access[63] and interstate travel.
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.[67] [Citations omitted] It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.[68] Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected[69] will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes: The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated: Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built
out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free. Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.[70]
charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. IV. We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.[77] The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.[78] The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.[79]
E.
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that you cannot legislate morality is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.[80] Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.[71] It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.[72] Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.[73] However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. [74] Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.[75] The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home,[76] and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fairminded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.[81] Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008 THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf vs THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. 1 The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOAAD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2 Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4 The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.5 Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6 In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain 7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 10 This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void. By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. 13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15 Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD. On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal. Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-inintervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies. Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners. The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24 The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time. III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA. The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF. Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others. The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device." During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations. As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and intergovernmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28 It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29 The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines " Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30 Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only " Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. 32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33 The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense. 34 The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.35 The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term. The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37 B. TERRITORY The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38 More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39 Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. 40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41 The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. 43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint." The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation
agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE. C. RESOURCES The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements. 46 The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47 With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.48 The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49 The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50 The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51 D. GOVERNANCE The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOAAD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. 52 The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision. The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In
addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008. Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES A. RIPENESS The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. 55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.56 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.62 The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x xxxx In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD: TERRITORY xxxx 2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations: xxxx d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD. xxxx GOVERNANCE xxxx 7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held: x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. xxxx By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. 66 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. 68 That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences. 70 The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74 The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." 76 The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOAAD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later. As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77 B. LOCUS STANDI For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 78 Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81 For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83 In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 84 An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86 As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.87 Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, 88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties. In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure. 91 In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt. In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions. With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3 rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated . Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing. B. MOOTNESS Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA." 92 In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93 In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98 Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 99 The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo 100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding. Petitions not mooted Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE. In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD, 102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding. Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy. The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Need to formulate principles-guidelines Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain. Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved. 105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD. V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz: 1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD? 2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109 In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x 111 In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113 The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, 117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis and italics in the original) Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. 124 The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125 The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people. 127 Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose: MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it. MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128 The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the
Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement? MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law" MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest? MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied) Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader 130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. 131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms. MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways. xxxx MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence? I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied) The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. 133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."135 Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136 Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process." 137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138 In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.139 Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue. AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is welltaken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy: Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and underscoring supplied) In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs. Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section. Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. 149 ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence. 152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence . Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states. 153 Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention ,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. The MOA-AD, moreover, would notcomply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157 Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states: 1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows: "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are: (a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and (b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region." Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof: SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures: xxxx b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned; d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents: 1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions; 2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution; 3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages; 4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs; 5) Survey plans and sketch maps; 6) Anthropological data; 7) Genealogical surveys; 8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds; 9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and 10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community. e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein; f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP; g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below. xxxx To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general principle of international law." Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external selfdetermination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive: "(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination 126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added) 127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states. x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external selfdetermination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein. The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows: x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish , any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to
an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations. Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada. As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, 165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination. In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit: Article 3 Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Article 4 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. Article 5 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination." 166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder: Article 8 1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21 1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities. Article 26 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. Article 30 1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. 2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. Article 32 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. Article 37 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. 2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. Article 38 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States. There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of
the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary. It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: 7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution. Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below. The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations. It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states: SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a). The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the
present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-inChief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. 169 As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as farreaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit: x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies. The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.170 In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. 171 In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari. MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions. I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new? MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy.173(Emphasis supplied) The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the
credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side. Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined: "Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." 176 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177 "The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their ‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative." It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179 The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact." Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that, By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation. What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework. Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional. A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive. As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM. The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law." Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however. The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status
of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion. The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN. On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began. In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law , not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction. "37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. xxxx 40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement. 41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes. 42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international
organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective. Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz: 43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made. 44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. xxxx 51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso. Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit: 40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not
express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States. In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision. SUMMARY The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of
the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
The facts: On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City, published in its front page the news article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal," and in its Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 3
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.
On 2 September 1991, the City Prosecutor's Office dismissed the criminal case thus 5 — "WHEREFORE . . . this investigation in the light of Agbayani vs. Sayo case finds that it has no jurisdiction to handle this case and that the same be filed or instituted in Cotabato City where complainant is officially holding office at the time respondents caused the publication of the complained news item in the Mindanao Kris in Cotabato City, for which reason it is recommended that this charge be dropped for lack of jurisdiction."
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.
In the interim, the civil complaint for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 385-91 and raffled to Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City, was set for Pre-Trial Conference. The defendants therein had already filed their respective Answers with Counterclaim.
VENUE OF ACTIONS
On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi City. 6
G.R. No. 106847. March 5, 1993 PATRICIO P. DIAZ vs. JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Br. 8, Marawi City, SULTAN MACORRO L. MACUMBAL, SULTAN LINOG M. INDOL, MACABANGKIT LANTO and MOHAMADALI ABEDIN SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; VENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. — From the provision of Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published. 2. ID.; ID.; IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A NOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE PLEADING. — Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR BY FILING ANSWER. — Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived. 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATES TO TRIAL AND NOT TO JURISDICTION. — Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J p: VENUE in the instant civil action for damages arising from libel was improperly laid; nonetheless, the trial court refused to dismiss the complaint. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, assailing that order of denial 1 as well as the order denying reconsideration. 2
On 22 July 1991, the public officers alluded to, namely, private respondents Sultan Macorro L. Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol, Atty. Macabangkit M. Lanto and Atty. Mohamadali Abedin, instituted separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the City Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the Mindanao Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz, and Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a sworn statement attesting to the alleged corruption, were named respondents in both complaints. 4
Pending action on the motion, the presiding judge of Branch 10 inhibited himself from the case which was thereafter reraffled to the sala of respondent judge. On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. Diaz thereafter moved for reconsideration of the order of denial. The motion was also denied in the Order of 27 August 1991, prompting petitioner to seek relief therefrom. Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not be rightfully filed in Marawi City as none of the private respondents, who are all public officers, held office in Marawi City; neither were the alleged libelous news items published in that city. Consequently, it is petitioner's view that the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil action for damages. The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City: respondent Macumbal was the Regional Director for Region XII of the DENR and held office in Cotabato City; respondent Indol was the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Lanao del Norte and held office in that province; respondent Lanto was a consultant of the Secretary of the DENR and, as averred in the complaint, was temporarily residing in Quezon City; and, respondent Abedin was the Chief of the Legal Division of the DENR Regional Office in Cotabato City. 7 Indeed, private respondents do not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although they had sub-offices therein. Apparently, the claim of private respondents that they maintained sub-offices in Marawi City is a mere afterthought, considering that it was made following the dismissal of their criminal complaint by the City Prosecutor of Marawi City. Significantly, in their complaint in civil Case No. 385-91 respondents simply alleged that they were residents of Marawi City, except for respondent Lanto who was then temporarily residing in Quezon City, and that they were public officers, nothing more. This averment is not enough to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City and may be properly assailed in a motion to dismiss. The Comment of private respondents that Lanto was at the time of the commission of the offense actually holding office in Marawi City as consultant of LASURECO can neither be given credence because this is inconsistent with their allegation in their complaint that respondent Lanto, as consultant of the Secretary of the DENR, was temporarily residing in Quezon City. Moreover, it is admitted that the libelous articles were published and printed in Cotabato City. Thus, respondents were limited in their choice of venue for their action for damages only to Cotabato City where Macumbal, Lanto and Abedin had their office and Lanao del Norte where Indol worked. Marawi City is not among those where venue can be laid. The third paragraph of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, specifically requires that — "The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, that
where one of the offended parties is a public officer . . . (who) does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published . . . . " (emphasis supplied) From the foregoing provision, it is clear that an offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published. Private respondents thus appear to have misread the provisions of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, when they filed their criminal and civil complaints in Marawi City. They deemed as sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City the allegation that "plaintiffs are all of legal age, all married, Government officials by occupation and residents of Marawi City." 8 But they are wrong. Consequently, it is indubitable that venue was improperly laid. However, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. 9 Petitioner Diaz then, as defendant in the court below, should have timely challenged the venue laid in Marawi City in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court. Unfortunately, petitioner had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he filed his Answer to the Complaint with Counterclaim. 10 His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may be waived and such waiver may occur by laches. 11 Petitioner was obviously aware of this rule when he anchored his motion to dismiss on lack of cause of action over the subject matter, relying on this Court's ruling in Time, Inc. v. Reyes. 12 Therein, We declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 10403 because the complainants held office in Manila, not in Rizal, while the alleged libelous articles were published abroad. It may be noted that in Time, Inc. v. Reyes, the defendant therein moved to dismiss the case without first submitting to the jurisdiction of the lower court, which is not the case before Us. More, venue in an action arising from libel is only mandatory if it is not waived by defendant. Thus — "The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant . . . . " 13 Withal, objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived; it does not, after all, involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. 14 Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is LIFTED. This case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION VS HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN, Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 146; CIRCLE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, AVELINO E. DEATO, JR., MIGUEL F. VIOLAGO, BENJAMIN F. SANTIAGO, SOCORRO R. GOMEZ, NERISSA T. GLORIA, FILEMON C. MARQUEZ, DOMINGO SANTIAGO AND HILARIO P. LOPE
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner asks us to review and set aside the Order of Judge Salvador A. Tensuan dated 3 August 1992, dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 91-2220 entitled "Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Circle Financial Corporation, et al." Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a commercial banking corporation with
principal office at Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money, with a prayer for preliminary attachment, at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It appears from the allegations of the Bank's complaint that respondent Circle Financial Co. (hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through its representatives, obtained several loans aggregating P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. Respondent Circle, for value received, delivered to petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes, each of which contained the stipulation that: I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note. As security for the re-payment by respondent Circle of the sums loaned by petitioner Bank, eight (8) individuals, who were impleaded as defendants in the complaint — namely, Avelino Deato, Miguel Violago, Benjamin Santiago, Socorro Gomez, Nerissa Gloria, Filemon Marquez, Domingo Santiago and Hilario Lopez — executed a Continuing Surety Agreement and undertook topay jointly and severally respondent Circle's obligations. Only five (5) out of eight (8) individual obligors are respondents in present case, namely: Domingo Santiago, Hilario Lopez, Avelino Deato, Benjamin P. Santiago and Socorro Gomez. On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations under the promissory notes. Thereupon, petitioner Bank demanded payment from the eight (8) individual sureties conformably with their promises contained in the Continuing Surety Agreement; the individual obligors, however, also failed to pay. Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, alleging that respondent Circle had become insolvent and had been placed under receivership by the Central Bank. The trial judge granted the motion and issued a writ of preliminary attachment. The sheriff's return indicated, however, that no properties belonging to the respondent Circle and the individual obligors could be found. Per sheriff's return, summons was served upon Domingo Santiago, 1 Hilario P. Lopez, 2 Avelino Deato, 3 Benjamin P. Santiago, 4 and Socorro Gomez. 5 The sheriff failed to serve summons on (a) Miguel Violago, who had died; (b) Nerissa T. Gloria 6 and Filemon Marquez, 7 whose whereabouts were unknown; and (c) Circle, which had ceased to engage in business at the address given by petitioner and could not be located. A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle and the five [5] individual sureties served with summons) and averred that the venue of the action was improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only. Respondents called the trial court's attention to the stipulation contained in the promissory note, quoted in limine. Acting upon respondent's motion, respondent Judge Tensuan issued the challenged Order which read as follows: Acting on defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of improper venue in relation with actionable promissory notes which stipulate that the parties "expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila any legal action which may arise", and, Finding said motion to be impressed with merit consistent withSec. 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as well as in line with the doctrinal rule in Bautista vs. Hon. Juan de Borja, et al. (18 SCRA 474) that the proper venue for an action is that stipulated in a document "in case of any litigation herefrom or in connection herewith" upon a rationale that had the parties intended to reserve the right to choose venue under Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, such reservation should have been reflected in the document as against the rationale in Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco (30 SCRA 187) which should allow choice of venue where an actionable document does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words in point, and In order to more clearly define the parameters of the rule on proper venue vis-a-vis a clear perception that a stipulation to "expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila" amount to unequivocal agreement to sue and be sued in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the motion to be meritorious, same is hereby granted and the above-entitled case is accordingly dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 8 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above Order of the trial court, without success. Hence, this Petition. We consider that the Petition is meritorious. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement, may change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to another. 9 We have many times sustained the validity and enforceability of contractual stipulations concerning venue, it is, of course, the tenor of their agreement which is of critical relevance. The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such words are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the will of the contracting parties. Petitioner Bank contends that the stipulation contained in the promissory notes is merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to the tribunals to which the parties may resort. Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation set out in the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions
arising out of those notes to the courts of Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the other courts recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted under the Rules of Court. Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the place where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, Metropolitan Manila. Private respondents, in opposition, aver that the words used in the stipulation here involved are clear and unambiguous. A promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a specific court, without an express reservation of the right to resort to one or more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the Rules of Court, is an agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place, i.e., Valenzuela, to the exclusion of other competent courts. A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation — "I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory note" — shows that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts. Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably received judicial approval and we have declared that either of the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court named in the stipulation. The stipulation her does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect, or option to have resort to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation here merely operated to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals envisaged by the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and Bulacan. 10 In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be distinguished from stipulations which purport to require or compel the parties to lay venue of an action in a specified place, and in that particular place only. The lattertype of venue stipulation must clearly indicate, through qualifying and restrictive words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from the operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, 11 and that they intended contractually to designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other court also competent and accessible to the parties under the ordinary rules on the venue of actions. Stipulations of this exclusionary nature may, under certain circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as contrary to public policy 12 and, accordingly, not judicially enforceable. In practice, the task, as noted earlier, of this Court when confronted with issues of this kind is always basically that of contract interpretation. In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., "must," "only" or "exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory notes to the courts of Valenzuela only. Private respondents suggest that the use of words "any legal action" expressed a supposed agreement to bar actions before any court other than a Valenzuela court. We do not agree, for we see no necessary or customary connection between the words "any legal action" and an intent strictly to limit permissible venue to the Valenzuela courts. Intent so to establish an inflexible restriction of otherwise permissible venue to one single place is not lightly to be presumed or inferred from stipulations which, like that here before us, include no qualifying or exclusionary terms. Express reservation of the right to elect venue under the ordinary rules was, accordingly, unnecessary in the case at bar. Such is the thrust of the great bulk of the caselaw of this Court where this issue was directly raised and discussed. In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 13 the stipulation on venue there involved read: The parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila The Court, in upholding that stipulation and ruling that venue had been properly laid in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (the place of defendant's residence), speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, said: . . . An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or
transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitir. 14 (Emphasis supplied) In Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, 15 the stipulation on venue provided that: All legal actions arising out of this contract . . . may be brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila. 16 This Court read the above stipulation as merely permissive, relying upon and reinforcing Polytrade: . . . the venue in personal actions is fixed for the convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the interests of justice may be served by confining the situs of the action to Manila, considering that the residences or offices of all the parties, including the situs of the acts sought to be restrained or required to be done, are all within the territorial jurisdiction of Rizal. While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the Manila courts, there is nothing in the language used . . . which clearly shows that the intention of the parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila only. Such agreements should be construed reasonably and should not be applied in such a manner that it would work more to the inconvenience of the parties without promoting the ends of justice. 17 (Emphasis supplied) In Lamis Enterprises v. Lagamon, 18 the promissory note sued on had the following stipulation: In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the courts of Davao City. 19 The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Tagum, Davao. The Supreme Court rejected the defense of improper venue and held: . . . it is alleged that the proper venue for Civil Case No. 1395 should be Davao City where the plaintiff resides and as stipulated in the promissory note dated February 26, 1979 and in the chattel mortgage dated February 27, 1979. However, the respondent judge found that Maningo has not only legal residence but also physical and actual residence in Busaon, Tagum, Davao and we are not inclined to disturb this finding. Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the parties. The stipulation did not deprive Maningo of his right to pursue remedy in the court specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Courts, Renuntiatio non praesumitir. . . . 20 In Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, 21 the clause on venue read: The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in Section 12.01 [Article XII of the Agreement] shall be in the City of Manila. The initial action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. This Court took the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade doctrine: . . . In any event, it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine that stipulations in a contract, which specify a definite place for the institution of an action arising in connection therewith, do not, as a rule, supersede the general rules on the matter set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, but should be construed merely as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. It is not necessary top pretend that the decisions of the Supreme Court have been absolutely consistent in this regard. There have been a few decisions notably Bautista v. de Borja 23 and Hoechst Philippines v. Torres 24 — which are not easy to reconcile with the line of cases beginning with Polytrade discussed above. It is useful therefore to make clear that to the extent Bautista and Hoechst Philippines are inconsistent with Polytrade (an en banc decision later in time than Bautista) and subsequent cases reiterating Polytrade, Bautista and Hoechst Philippines have been rendered obsolete by the Polytrade line of cases. We note, finally, that no one of the private respondents has claimed to have been put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result of the institution of the action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance or merits of thecase. 25
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Orders dated 3 August 1992 and 28 August 1992 of public respondent Judge Salvador S. Tensuan are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for resolution on the merits, with all deliberate dispatch. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.
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