Civil Procedure Case Digests

 

G.R. No. L-29155 November 5, 1928JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, vs. HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA, VILLANUEVA, OSTRAND, J.:

In G. R. No. 21706, the Court of First Instance ordered the rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Pleantation and the payment by Villanueva of the unpaid balance of the rent with interest. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to Larena. before levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money  judgment was to be satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to Larena of a dwelling house. The agreement was carried out in accordance with its terms. In the meantime, Villanueva had harvested the sugarcane crop produced, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession of the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop. De Larena filed an action wherein she alleged that while first case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Villanueva knew  positively that the aforesaid lease lease was declared rescinded by the Court of First First Instance and that Villanueva, also knew that he thereafter was not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued in such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year. In his answer Villanueva alleges that according to the pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and, therefore, must be considered res judicata. ISSUE: WON this case involved the doctrine of res judicata? HELD: No. Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known and firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent. The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on August 23, 1922, Larena demanding  payment of then sue rent in addition to the rescission rescission of the lease. In 1923, Larena amended the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for rent for years subsequent to 1922. The lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any an y definite time, and it appears that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows that the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 has not  become due at the time of the trial of the case and that consequently the trial court could could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is, therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.

 

BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIO CORPORATIONS NS

Facts: Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that the  price would prevail only so long as the raw materials materials (coal and crude oil) used by the defendants in the manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar. The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of the modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to obtain specific performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar  products and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid. CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the defendants for any subsequent breach of contract. Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defendant breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.Doctrine Divisible contracts (as a general rule)- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach. Entire contract (case at bar)- When the contract is indivisible and the  breach is total, there can only be one action in which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same contract and on account of the continuous breach.- The contract between the parties is an entire contract.- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by absolute refusal. The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final  judgement was rendered, it is a bar to to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter thereafter sustain