Civil Law Reviewer Cases (part 1)

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi MARRIAGE 1.Classification of Marriages/ Relationships. Parties in Interest; NCC; FC; AM 02-11-10 SC Title Facts Issues 1. Whether it was  Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to 1. Lucas v. Lucas necessary to serve Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with summons on Motion for the Submission of Parties to respondent for the DNA Testing). Respondent filed a court to acquire Special Appearance and Comment. G.R. No. 190710, jurisdiction over the  He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did June 6, 2011, 650 case of petition for not receive the summons and a copy of SCRA 667 establishing the petition; (2) that DNA testing illegitimate filiation. cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as Petition to petitioner’s father. establish  Jurisprudence is still unsettled on the illegitimate acceptability of DNA evidence. filiation is an  RTC, acting on respondent’s motion for action in rem. reconsideration, issued an Hence, failure to Order dismissing the case. serve summons  Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for will not deprive reconsideration. This time, the RTC the court of its held that the ruling on the grounds jurisdiction to try relied upon by petitioner for filing the and decide the petition is premature considering that a case. full-blown trial has not yet taken place.  On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no summons had been served on him. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

Ruling 1. The answer is in the negative A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.1 In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. 2. The prima facie case for holding the test must be shown not upon the

1 An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation

1 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi filing of the petition but during the trial. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. 2.

Whether or not a prima facie showing upon filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?

The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained — To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.

Figueroa vs.  Figueroa and Barranco were Barranco, SBC sweethearts since their teens. Case # 519/July  Their intimacy eventually resulted to a 31, 1997, 276 son born out of wedlock. 5CRA 445  Barranco promised Figueroa that he

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. 1. Whether or not the 1. No. The facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent act of the respondent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in in marrying another premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests woman constitute a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute gross immorality, thus grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

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would marry her when he passes the bar examinations. After four takes, he finally passed but did not hold true to his promise of marriage. In 1971, their relationship ended. Years later, he married another woman. When Barranco was about to take his oath to enter the legal profession, Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to the court what happened between her and Barranco. Until 1988, Barranco has filed three motions to dismiss because Figueroa still would not persecute and because for the past years, he has become elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has actively participated in various civic organizations and has acquired a good standing within his community while the case was pending. The court sought the opinion of the IBP which recommended that Barranco be allowed to take his oath. Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the scheduled oath-taking of Barranco which led to its delay.

making him ineligible to take the Lawyer’s Oath.

disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

FC Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of Civil Registrar Facts

Issues

Ruling

3 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 1. Tupal v. Rojo AM # MTJ-14-1842, Feb 24, 2014, 717 SCRA 236

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 which allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. Tupal argues that affidavits of cohabitation, which Judge Rojo notarized are not connected with a judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He was also alleged to have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

Whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of the law.

YES. Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross negligence of law. Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990 provides: Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this power: MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x xx. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07). Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.26 A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.27 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.28

4 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides: Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity: SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – xxxx (b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

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2. Republic v. Albios GR 198780, Oct 16, 2013, 707 SCRA 584

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for citizenship

Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The marriage between the parties is valid In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage. In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reelygivenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective

6 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.

3. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan GR 201061, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 702

4. OCA v. J. Necessario et al AM No. 7-1691, Apr 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 348 Solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married AzucenaAlegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go. Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982. In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin. Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article 3412 of the Family Code. The logbooks of

Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

1. Whether or not Judges, who act as solemnizing officers of marriage, has no duty to ascertain the authenticity of marriage licenses and affidavit of cohabitation for marriages contracted pursuant to Article 34 of the Family Code.

by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal. No. The elements of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and never complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak.

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. The presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face. In People v. Jansen (54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929) as cited in Alcantara v. Alcantara), this Court held that: …the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirementsof law. However, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.

the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. Respondent argues that: (1) it is not their duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents; and (2) marriages solemnized under Article 342 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.

the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas (G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.), that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The fiveyear period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy: The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.

2 Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 5. Abbas v. Abbas GR 183896, Jan 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 646 Certification issued by the civil registrar, stating that no marriage license was issued, enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria. At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan. Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to ArlindoGetalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been

1. Whether or not a person may rely on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license as against the certification issued by the Civil Registrar that such license was issued to another person.

In that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

9 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

6. Alcantara v. Alcantara GR 167746, Aug 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446 The use of marriage license issued in a city or municipality which is not the residence of either contracting parties is a mere irregularity that will not invalidate a marriage celebrated using such license.

The CA reversed the decision of the trial court on the following grounds: (1) that petitioner had admitted that he had sign the marriage contract; (2) marriage ceremony took place with witnesses to prove the same; (3) the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona failed to state therein that due diligence was done in searching for a marriage license but to no avail. A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.

1. Whether or not the issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication will invalidate the marriage celebrated using such license.

The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely RestitutoAlcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere

10 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issuedto the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

7. Arañes v. Occiano AM 02-1390, Apr 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 402 A judge may only solemnized marriages within its territorial jurisdiction. Violation of this rule will warrant a disciplinary action against the judge who solemnized marriage outside his jurisdiction

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges 1. respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. 2. Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the

Whether or not a judge may solemnize marriage outside their territorial jurisdiction on account of the request of the contracting parties. Whether or not the subsequent issuance of marriage license will validate the marriage solemnized without license.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." 1. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. 2. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara (C.A. O.G. 4079.), we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a

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8. Cariño v. Cariño GR 132529, Feb 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127 The nullity of the first marriage does not make the second marriage valid. There must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 1. Whether or not the Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two second spouse may marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, invoked the invalidity of with petitioner Susan NicdaoCariño and the first marriage by the second was on November 10, 1992, reason of lack to with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with marriage license to whom he had been cohabiting with prove the validity of the starting way back in 1982. former’s marriage. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”

marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.

1. No. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 257, 261262), the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the

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But for any other purposes, other than remarriage, judicial declaration for nullity is not required.

On December 14, 1993, respondent 2. Whether the second Susan Yee filed the instant case for spouse, who married collection of sum of money against the deceased without petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter judicial declaration of alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to the latter’s first her at least one-half of the one hundred marriage, may collect forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) from the first spouse collectively denominated as “death the half of the death benefits” which she (petitioner) received benefits of the from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, deceased. NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. 2. Yes. For any other purposes, other than remarriage, judicial declaration for nullity is not required. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. deConsuegra v. Government Service Insurance System (37 SCRA 316, 1971) where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that: “... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of onehalf in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (226 SCRA 572, 579, 1993), however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a

13 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained: [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

9. Ty v. CA GR 127406, Nov 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 86

Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. However, on August 4, 1980, the Court declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979. On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married.

1. Whether or not a marriage may be declared invalid when the marriage license previously use in a civil ceremony was subsequently used in a church ceremony years after its validity.

Hence decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 is affirmed. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first.

14 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Petitioner pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. The said marriage license was use during their civil marriage and was later on used in their church wedding

10. Sy v. CA GR 127263, Apr 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 350 A marriage celebrated based on a marriage license issued a year after the ceremony is VOID.

The Pasig RTC declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. On appeal, Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of issue of the

1. Whether or not a marriage celebrated based on a marriage license issued a year after the ceremony is valid.

The answer is in the negative. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.

15 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract . While the date of celebration of their marriage is on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. 11. Navarro v. Domogtoy AM 96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129 The lack of authority of solemnizing officer does not invalidate the marriage solemnized by such officer. NB: In this case, marriage was judicially declared as void in an action for gross misconduct filed against the solemnizing officer.

This is an administrative case filed by the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro against MTC Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Navarro contends that on two occasions Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law, to wit: (1) On September 27, 1994, Respondent solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. (2) he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage

1. Whether or not the court the marriage solemnized by a person who exceeded or is without authority is considered void.

The marriage remains valid.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

16 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxxxxxxxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office

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of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. 4. Declaration of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil Code; Muslim Code (PD 1083)

1.

Title Garcia-Quiazon vs. Belen In relation to: b. Retroactivity of Laws. Vested Rights. Arts. 3

Facts Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise) represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), common law wife and daughter, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial

Issue/s I. Whether or not Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las Piñas and therefore, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed

Held 1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. xxx In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the

18 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi & 4, NCC. Arts. 105 & 256 FC. Art. 40, FC & SC AM 02-‐11-‐10 g. Domicile; Arts 50 & 51 NCC; Arts. 68 & 69, FC; Residence v. Domicile; Annulment or Nullity of Marriages – AM 02-‐11-‐10 SC; Settlement of Estate; Election laws 10. Art. 40, FC; AM -‐02-‐10-‐11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108

Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage. Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, married to Eliseo, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise. Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. It also upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

with the RTCof Las Piñas; II. Whether Amelia GrciaQuiazon was not legally married to eliseo quiazon due to preexisting marriage; and III. Whether Elise Quiazon has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of administration.

personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. xxx 2. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code.xxx Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. xxx Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. xxx Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. xxx The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage. xxx We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50

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2.

Ilupa vs. Abdulla

The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal "Kapasadan" or Agreement. He claims that the agreement was executed under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce itself is defective and unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug — originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao

Whether or not the the entry of the Divorce Decree by Clerk of Court is merely a ministerial duty.

years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 3. Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus: xxx An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28 In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. xxx It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondent’s duties, as defined by law. (Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines). The OCA’s Report stated that respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. xxx It is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint. Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of any authority to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding. xxx It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. xxx

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3.

Juliano-Llave vs. Republic In relation to: b. Retroactivity of Laws. Vested Rights. Arts. 3 & 4, NCC. Arts. 105 & 256 FC. Art. 40, FC & SC AM 02-‐11-‐10

culture, and later renewed through a civil wedding before a judge — the complainant filed a petition for restitution of marital rights with the SCC, Marawi City. To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons to him. The respondent’s comment: He explains that as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept and register marriage contracts, conversions to Islam and divorce certificates. When he performs this duty, he assumes no responsibility with respect to the entries made by the applicants or owners of the documents to be registered. The administrative investigation: Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of the RTC investigated the complaint, and submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2010. Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge.In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’ Sen. Tamano died after 11 months. On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita

1.

2.

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.

xxx The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity. xxx PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53 Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain

21 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided. xxx The xxx provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 xxx enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment. An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states: A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect. Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage. xxx Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said: xxx Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the

22 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." xxx The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58 Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60 Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.

23 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 4.

Bolos vs. Bolos

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied. On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA granted the petition and stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It stated that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. xxx The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10 xxx In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution.

24 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

5.

Ablaza vs. Republic In relation to: b. Retroactivity of Laws. Vested Rights. Arts. 3 & 4, NCC. Arts. 105 & 256 FC. Art. 40, FC & SC AM 02-‐11-‐10 And 10. Art. 40, FC; AM -‐02-‐10-‐11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108

took effect on August 3, 1988." On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to onehalf of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. The RTC and CA dismissed the petition on the ground that he was not the proper party to file.

Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. xxx xxx Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC; and 2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise: Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the

25 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. xxx xxx According toCarlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. xxx Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a

26 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

6.

Carlos vs. Sandoval ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.

1.

Whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.

2.

Whether or not the brother of one spouse may initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code. xxx Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact. Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.: SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses. (2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied) xxx By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion

27 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment. In relation to: 10. Art. 40, FC; AM -‐02-‐10-‐11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108

Petitioner and respondent entered into compromised agreements to divide the land equally. In August 1995, petitioner filed an action with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. xxx Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied) The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. xxx The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. xxx While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.19 It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became

28 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. xxx The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage? We respond in the negative. A person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. xxx Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27 xxx Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively. Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. xxx xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate. xxx Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for.

5. Arts. 15 –17, 50 – 5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino; Foreigner; Parenting; Children, Property Rights; Succession rights]; Declaratory Relief; Rule 108;; Art. 412 NCC 1.

Title Fujiki vs. Marinay

Facts Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), petitioner, Japanese, married Maria Paz Galela

1.

Issue/s Whether the Rule on Declaration of

Held 1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a

29 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

In relation to: d. Arts 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (NCC); Art 26 FC; Rules 103/108; Civil Register (Arts. 407-‐413 NCC) 11. Arts. 40 (35 (4) & 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil & Criminal Bigamy; Art. 83, NCC; Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY; See RA 6809; 2176 & 2180 NCC Title XVI. CIVIL REGISTER (Articles 407‐ 413) See RA 10172 (amending RA 9048; Expanded Clerical Error Law) & IRRs See Rules 103 & 108, Revised Rules of Court

Marinay (Marinay), respondent, Filipina in 2004. However, Fujiki went back to Japan and lost communication with Marinay. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekera, and married the same within the same year. Maekera brought Marinay to Japan.

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC) is applicable. 2.

Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3.

Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekera. She contacted Fujiki. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."

petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in JulianoLlave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. xxx A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. xxx Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to

30 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. xxx II. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.. xxx Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. xxx The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage. Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the

31 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi husband or the wife of the union recognized by law. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. xxx The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. xxx Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry. III. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. xxx a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. xxx A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither

32 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court. Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." xxx The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. xxx The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. xxx If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. xxx Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. xxx In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the

33 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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2.

Catalan vs. Catalan In relation to: d. Arts 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (NCC); Art 26 FC; Rules 103/108; Civil Register (Arts. 407-‐413 NCC)

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein. On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 228. While Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of

Whether or no petitioner

rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines .xxx Tthe trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando. Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce. xxx Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

34 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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3.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas In relation to: d. Arts 15, 16, 17,

litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending. On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner. The RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.4 After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship in 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this

35 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 50, 51 (NCC); Art 26 FC; Rules 103/108; Civil Register (Arts. 407-‐413 NCC)

Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines in April 2005, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair. Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has found another Filipina to love. He wanted tomarry his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines so he went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled

petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

provision. xxx The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. Additionally, xxx if the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction xxx The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. xxx To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. xxx Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself

36 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy.

or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. xxx Every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. xxx As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper. xxx Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status.xxx A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry. xxx The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing

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4.

Rep. vs. Orbecido Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a

On 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the

Whether or not respondent can remarry under article 26 of the family code.

the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. xxx Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. xxx The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. ART. 26. xxx Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) On its face, xxx it seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to

38 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? In relation to: d. Arts 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (NCC); Art 26 FC; Rules 103/108; Civil Register (Arts. 407-‐413 NCC)

United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (O0SG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A. xxx Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The Van Dorn case xxx held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization? xxx In Quita, the Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. xxx xxx In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. xxx Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,

39 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. 6. Article 36, FC; AM 02 – 11 – 10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68 – 71, 220 – 221 & 225 FC 1.

Title Baccay vs. Baccay

Facts Noel courted Maribel, but it was only after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noel’s proposal and the two became sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he found attractive Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family, so to bring her closer to them he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive occasions. Whenever she attended those occasions with Noel’s family, he observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Around 1997, Noel decided to break up but Maribel. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had several romantic moments together. Sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Noel married Maribel on November 23, 1998 before Judge

Issue/s Whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the phrase "psychological incapacity" refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code xxx. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

40 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Gregorio Dayrit. Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel’s family. Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She never contributed to the family’s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel’s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel. Maribel left Noel’s house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition7 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to

41 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribel’s supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. The CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.

procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.1avvphi1 (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. xxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date

42 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.) The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."25Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26 Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x. 2.

Republic vs. De Gracia

Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 and had two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of

"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly

43 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza). On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Rodolfo testified that he first met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits. When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter. Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza. He exerted earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17 Natividad and Rodolfo submitted themselves for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos). Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and

psychological incapacity.

incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. xxx In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).xxx Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. xxx In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature." Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity. The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage.

44 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

3.

Republic vs. Encelan

Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct."22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage. Tthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an opposition to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code. RTC and CA declared the marriage void on the ground of Psychological Incapacity. On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny. Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in

Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis xxx. Verily, although expert furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence. xxx To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.xxx In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case.

Whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. xxx xxx We have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal,

45 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez and allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity. Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";1 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."16 RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC’s verdict. Cesar sought reconsideration of the

incapacity.

neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23 In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. xxx In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. The psychological evaluation established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. xxx Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support. xxx Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.

46 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi CA’s decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC’s decision. The OSG then filed the present petition. 4.

Republic vs. De Quintos

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The couple was not blessed with a child. On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour. Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests, Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically

Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16 xxx The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. xxx Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported psychological incapacity. xxx To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior were not even established.. Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. The report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’s supposed psychological incapacity. xxx Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic

47 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. Catalina admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’s consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one livein partner. The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. On appeal, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity.

marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity." Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.26We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, stating: xxx The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report lacked depth and objectivity.. xxx Her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.31 Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz: xxx Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx Abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was

48 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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5.

Mendoza vs. Republic To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on June 24, 1991, after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support. When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the family’s needs and she shouldered all of the family’s expenses. Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in 1994. He spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship. In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday

1.

Whether or not the evidence presented and findings of the expert in this case are sufficient to establish psychological incapacity (Whether or not expert's testimony are indispensable evidence in determining the merits for psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage)

2.

Whether AM No. 02-11-10 SC rendered appeals by OSG no longer required and that could be deemed to be functus officio if not totally disregarded

not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. xxx In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. xxx In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samson’s findings. xxx In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband." But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose. In Hernandez, we ruminated that: xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. In contrast, the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.

49 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her fatherin-law to pay part of the cost of the car. To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. Other criminal charges ensued. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode. A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him. On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness was not conclusive upon

The Court in Pesca observed that: Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21 By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. xxx To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows: The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be

50 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi the court, and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.

dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. xxx What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos. xxx We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. xxx The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. 2. The Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit: a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.26 b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other

51 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.27 c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.28 d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.1âwphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29 e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30 The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacitythose sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.

ARTICLE 36 FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; ARTICLES 48, 68- 71, 220-221 & 22

52 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

6. Kalaw Fernandez

vs.

G.R. No. 166357/ September 19, 2011 A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts.

Petitioner Tyron and respondent Malyn met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children.Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn. Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him children. Tyrone went to the United States with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. 1. She left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night 2. She left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and 3. She committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto. He saw Malyn with another man half naked in Hyatt Hotel.

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Civil

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

Tyrone presented a psychologist Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. However, observation is based only by their interview with Tyrone and on the transcript only. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). That this may have been evident Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) even prior to her marriage” because it ison the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi Based rooted in her family background.

53

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 7.

DECLARATION OF NULLITY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; SEC 7, RULE 117, RULES OF PROCEDURE

1.

Pimentel Pimentel

vs

GR no. 172060/ September 13, 2010

Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC ruled that it not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

1. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. Respondent’s petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. 2. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed

54 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

2.

Jarillovs People

GR No. 164435/ September 29, 2009 The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage tohad no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

8.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony. Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City. On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 9993582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Petitioner moved for suspension of proceeding based on prejudicial question but RTC denied it. The court a quo promulgated the assailed decision finding him guilty of bigamy. On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto.

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. Peoplewhere it was held thus: The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.

DECLARATION OF NULLITY; ARTS. 36, 40, 45; SSECTION 19 (1) AM 02-10-11 SC; ARTS. 147 & 148 1.

BeumervsAmo res

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March

Whether the foreigner can recover his property after

In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller It held that Helmut Muller

55 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

GR No. 195670/ December 03, 2012 In pari delicto

"MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another)

29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal praying for the distribution of 6 Lots. In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefitsince respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. RTC dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership. CA promulgated a Decisionaffirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC . The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.

dissolution of marriage

cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.

56 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 2.

Dino vs Dino

GR No. 178044/ January 19, 2011

Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. On 14 January 1998, they were married each other. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity.. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The RTC ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.

Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. xxx.” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage

.

57 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

3.

CamachoReyes Reyes

vs

GR No. 185286/ August 18, 2010

4.

MBTC vsPascual

GR no. 163744/ February 29, 2008 Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption of conjugal partnership.

Termination of Conjugal Property regime does not ipso facto end the nature of conjugal ownership.

During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains. Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank . To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including the above mentioned lot. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April

a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article 116 of the Family Code.

b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and FlorenciaNevalgaipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.

1. First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobank’s submission, the Court did not, in Manongsong, add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. Second,Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank’s theory. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. 2. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of

58 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 9, 1995. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated a foreclosure. At the auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder. Nicholson filed before the RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.

5.

Valdes vs RTC Br. 102, QC

GR No. 122749/ July 31, 1996

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The Trial court,in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that: "I "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated. "II "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to

Whether property should be based ownership

regime on co-

the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides: "ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly

59 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void abinitio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses. "III "Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

6.

AtienzavsBrilla ntes

AM MTJ 92-706/ March 29, 1995 Article 40 is a rule of procedure.

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes. Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, that he stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one ZenaidaOngkiko with whom he has five children. Respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went

if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."[ Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the coownership.

Whether Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable in this case despite that marriage is contracted before enactment of Family Code

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.

60 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

9.

RA 9262- Law on Violation against Women and their Children; Support; Art. 213 Family Code

Title 1. Tua v. Mangrobang

Facts Issues Ruling 2. The answer is in the negative  Respondent RossanaHonrado-Tuafiled a3. W/N Section 15 of RA 9262 violates the due process Section 15 of RA 9262 provides: verified petition for issuance of GR No. 170701, Jan. clause of the Constitution. SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary protection order for herself and her 4. W/N RA 9262 grants an invalid 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 428 Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by children, against her husband delegation of powers by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte RalphTua. Congress to the Courts. determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant  Acting on the verified petition, the trial in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and court issued a Temporary Protection shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a Order good for 30 days and required hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO Ralph to comment on the petition. prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall  In his comment questioning the propriety order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the of the temporary protection order, he respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of maintained that Rosanna had been law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include staying with another man; she notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a surreptitiously moved her children out PPO. of their abode despite their written In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section agreement; and Rosanna is

61 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi psychologically, emotionally and mentally unfit to keep the children in her custody.  Without waiting for his Comment to be resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, with a prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. In order not to render the petition moot, the CA issued a temporary restraining order for the parties to enjoin them implementing the temporary protection order. Ralph later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, to restrain the RTC from conducting proceedings therein.  The CA later dismissed his petition for certiorari. It ruled that the petition is still pending with the RTC, hence the factual matters could be raised thereon.  The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to Ralph’s contention that RA 9262 is unconstitutional, since the issue raised in the CA was the alleged grave abuse of disruption by the RTC in issuing the TPO, the issue could be resolved without ruling on the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262, which is not the very lismota of the petition.  Ralph thus filed his petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act 9262. According to him, RA 9262, particularly Section 15 thereof which allows the grant of protection orders, is unconstitutional, since it deprives the respondent of due process before issuance. It is also an invalid delegation

15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even

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of powers by Congress to the courts.

death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x xx. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.” x xx “Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress

63 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.”

Dabalos v. RTC Br. 59  Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego was charged with violation of GR NO. 193960, 688 Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the SCRA 64, Jan.7, 2013 RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59  After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner.  Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to quash because he averred that at the time of the alleged incident, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.  The RTC denied petitioner’s motion.It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

1. whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner3. No. Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries that will favor the accused; to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its and proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he 2. whether the RTC has claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries jurisdiction over the offense; under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: what has been admitted should be quashed. SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x xx. The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:

64 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6 Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship. Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 8 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

65 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi 2. Yes. Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads: SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. No. The Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.1âwphi1 Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.

66 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Title Dolina v. Vallecera

Facts  CherrylDolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary GR No. 182367, protection order against Glenn December 15, 2010, 638 Vallecera before the RTC for violation SCRA 707 of RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint, Cherryl added a prayer for This case is about a support for their supposed child. mother’s claim for  Vallecera opposed the said petition and temporary support of claimed that Dolina’s petition was an unacknowledged essentially one for financial child, which she sought in an action for the support rather than for issuance of a protection against woman and child temporary protection abuses, that he was not the child’s order that she brought father and that the signature in the birth against the supposed father. certificate was not his. Furthermore, that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.  The RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support.

Issues whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.

Ruling Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.

Ocampo v. ArcayaChua AM OCA 07-2630, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 59,

67 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Ang v. CA/ Saguid GR No. 182835, April 20, 2010

 The public prosecutor charged petitioneraccused RustanAng (Rustan) before the RTC of violation of RA 9262 in an information that reads: On or about June 5, 2005, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service using his mobile phone a pornographic picture to Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is pecited in the said obscene and pornographic picture, thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.  The RTC foundRustan guilty of violation of Sec. 5(h) of RA 9262.  The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The issues are:

subordinate

1. Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262; 2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262; 3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x xxx Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: x xxx h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

68 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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x xxx 5. or violence;

Engaging in any form of harassment

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a “dating relationship” with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: (e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.) Here, Rustan claims that, being “romantically involved,” implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, “romance” implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word “romance” used as a verb, i.e., “to make love; to make love

69 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi to” as in “He romanced her.” But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb “romance” that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have “romanced” the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun “romance” to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., “a love affair.”[9] R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women x xx refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x xx with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines “dating relationship” while Section 3(f) defines “sexual relations.” The latter “refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.” The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the “on-and-off” variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed “over time and on a continuing basis.” But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love. An “away-bati” or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what “away-bati” meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.[10] Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him

70 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them. But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 27). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them. Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.[11] And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony. Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the

71 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference. Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. [12] Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages. Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.[13] His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

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Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.[14] Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.[15] In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Go Tan v. Tan

 On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. GoTan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise.On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracywith respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)

Whether or not Perfecto and Juanita Tan, Parents-in-Law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order in accordance with RA. 9262.

YES!! (1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

73 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."  Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioner GoTan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorilyapplied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.  Respondent’s Contention:Spouses Tan’s were contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. They submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review. The Court Granted respondent’s Motion To Dismiss and issued a

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another. (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x xx

(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus: SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x xx The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x xx (4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

74 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressiouniusestexclusioalterius."

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressiouniosestexclusioalterius" finds no application here.

11. Arts. 40 and 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil and Criminal Bigamy; Art 83, NCC;

75 Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

Title

1. People v Odtuhan

Facts



On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On October 28, 1993, he also married Eleanor Alagon. He later filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The RTC granted respondent’s petition and declared his first marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina and thus filed a ComplaintAffidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.



Respondent moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.

GR NO. 191566, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 506





Capili v People GR No. 183805, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 443



The RTC held that the facts constitute the crime of bigamy. There was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon. It further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent appealed to the CA on certiorari and it concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.

Issues 1. Whether or not the motion to quash by respondent is proper Civil 2. Whether or not the court’s judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio extinguished respondent’s criminal liability

Ruling . No. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi defects which are apparent in the face of the information. In this case however, there is sufficiency of the allegations in the information to constitute the crime of bigamy. It contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning should not be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. 2. No. Respondent’s claim that there are more reasons to quash the information against him because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him is without merit. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, there is already liability. The time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.

It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. The petition on review on ceritorari is granted. The CA’s decision is set aside and the case is remanded to the RTC.

Whether or not the No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s Petitioner James Walter Capili was subsequent declaration of second marriage had no bearing upon the determination of charged with bigamy. There is a nullity of the second petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, 76 pending civil case for declaration of marriage is a ground for because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) nullity of the second marriage before Based on the outline of of Atty. dismissal the Domingo criminal Legaspi that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second the RTC of Antipolo City filed by the first case for bigamy. marriage is contracted.