Civil Law Reviewer Cases IV

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176); RA 9255 Title 1. Grande v. Antonio GR# 206248, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 698 In relation to: Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364380, NCC) RA 9255 – “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father (Amending Art. 176 of the Family Code)”; IRR of 9255; Passport Law (RA 8239)

Facts Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5 On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]." Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present

Issue/s The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

Held Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads: Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father. In the case at bar, respondent xxx wanted: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio. Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit. xxx Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent? Clearly, there is none. xxx Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.

mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. xxx On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances. In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus: The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. xxx The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.) An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of

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2. Salas v.

Whether the trial

the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255. xxx Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. xxx Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress. xxx This Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution. xxx Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity. To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known. At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary. xxx WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows: a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children; b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]: c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis. Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Matusalem GR 180284, Sept. 11, 2013, 705 SCRA 560

and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.) Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.28 As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.30 The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.

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xxx In Lim v. Court of Appeals, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent’s daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals, the Court sustained the appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child. xxx

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano. xxx In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.40 Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010. The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.xxx WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. 3. Uy v. Chua GR 183965, Sept. 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 806

Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. Xxx Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special

Whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTCBranch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. xxx Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all. In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states: ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.) The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, xxx obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. In Advincula v. Advincula, this Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24. It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830CEB, intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each.

4. De La Cruz v. Gracia GR 177728, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 648

In 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents.

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor Christian

of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.23 Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. xxx RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. xxx In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits. Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation. Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondent’s presentation of evidence. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino". Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting. By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent),denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the Article 176 of the Family Code. The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Dela Cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of article 176 of the family code, as amended by RA 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his father’s surname.

paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. xxxx Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signedby the parent concerned. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. xxx In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MYWIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER." xxx The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide: SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, xxx under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. xxx In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein xxx they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s. In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic xxx. It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi children x x x." Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development."xxx 6. People v. Magtibay GR# 142985, Aug. 06, 2002, 386 SCRA 332

On September 15, 1997, at about 8:00 p.m., Rachelle went to the store, about 40 meters from their house. When she got to the store, she saw accused-appellant standing there. She noticed that the latter kept staring at her. On her way home, accused-appellant approached her and pulled her right hand. He covered her mouth and told her that he will kill her if she tried to shout for help. Accused-appellant raped Rachel. Because of accused-appellant’s threat on her life, Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It was not until she became pregnant that she was constrained to tell her mother what happened. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy. On August 5, 1999, the trial court sentenced accused- appellant to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with the accessory penalty provided by law and to pay the cost. Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the victim Rachelle Recto the amount of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment.

Whether or not the accusedappellant should be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child.

The record shows that when Rachelle’s mother, Gaudiosa Recto, discovered about her ordeal, Rachelle was already eight months pregnant. [37] She eventually gave birth to a baby boy.[38] These facts confirm the commission of rape sometime in September 1997. There was no showing that Rachelle has previously been sexually abused or she had sexual relations with other men during that time. Thus, with respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo[39] states: Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

7. Tonog vs. CA GR# 122906, Feb. 07, 2002, 376 SCRA 523

On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. They lived with private respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child.[5] In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents In turn, the parents’ right to custody over their children is enshrined in law. Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides that parents and individuals exercising parental authority over their unemancipated children are entitled, among other rights, “to keep them in their company.” xxx. We explained this

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found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith. OnMarch 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith. Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a related incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her. On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration and granting petitioner’s motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the actuations of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, the appellate court issued a Resolution[3] dated August 29, 1995 modifying its decision granting custody of the child to respondent. Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[4] dated November 29, 1995.

in Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals: [7] The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, “there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.” Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. xxx Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. xxx As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.[8]

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This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents “complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.”[9] Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father’s sense of loss when he is separated from his child xxx. For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. xxx Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.[13] It should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. xxx It shall be only understood that xxx temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with private respondent pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-9211053 8. Aruego v. CA GR# 112193, Mar. 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 711

On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein. In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children” as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint.

Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. xxx

xxx

xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.” Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

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Petitioners denied all these allegations. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian, but not Evelyn Fabian. And granting Antonia Aruego a share equal to ½ portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego

Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines. xxx

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision but was denied.

9. David vs. CA GR# 111180, Nov. 16,1995, 250 SCRA 82

A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed and so was the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he

Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaña v. Gaela, 1 it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent granting the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case. Daisie in turn, filed this petition for review.

who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3 Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. xxx It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. xxx Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto." In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. xxx

CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177-182); RA 9858 Title 1. De Santos vs.

Facts On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married

Issue/s Whether or not only

Held Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: “Only natural children can be

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Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. Antonio fell in love with Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio obtained a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. She argued inter alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967. On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The court declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order dated January 9, 1992. Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural

natural children can be legitimized and the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.” In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child." In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. xxx It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")? xxx In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter. xxx Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing the substantive provisions of the law in force. Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid on the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law. xxx The well-ordered delineation of such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.

the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children. xxx On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without such marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does. A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it is the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child. Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There is no marriage — valid or otherwise — which would give any semblance of legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching those of his legitimate counterparts. The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and support. Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they "shall principally use the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced." 6 Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally use the surname of the father. 7 If a natural child is recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such recognizing parent. 8 Both types of children are entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them. 9 They also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate. 10 Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi their minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally, take the latter's surname. 11 The only support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, 12 and their legitime, also to be taken from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child. 13 It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured by law, 14 the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it is from the free portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said portion. 15 Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned. 16 These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary rights are concerned. It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children. It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal fiction. xxx Legitimation is not a "right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents. The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife? Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. xxx Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from the outset, an intent to

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2. Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr A.M No. MTJ-92716., Oct. 25, 1999, 249 SCRA 447

The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge." In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Respondent contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita Banzuela. Furthermore, respondent falsely represented

Whether or not respondent is culpable for gross immorality for scandalously and openly cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan.

exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share. xxx The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction. We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran. xxx it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B.

Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi himself as "single" in the marriage contract and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years. Earlier, respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son. In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered as legitimate. Respondent declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986. Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts: After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those of succession. (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.) The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee is to

Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690). As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code. With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. xxx. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:” Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.” Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision. The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi respondent's mind, a case in point. He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption

scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v. Sempio Diy). It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. xxx It was also in the same case where respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.

TITLE VII. ADOPTION See also: See Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA 8552) as amended by RA 9523 (March 2009); A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic Adoption; Inter country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043); Amended IRR (January 8, 2004) Title 1. Adoption of Michelle Lim GR# 168992, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 98

Facts Petitioner, on 23 June 1974, married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Issue/s Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Held xxx It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the

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Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband, Michael, and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. The DSWD issued a certification that Michelle and Michael were considered as an abandoned children and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied.

age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi spouses. (Emphasis supplied) The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. xxx Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. xxx Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15 It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption. Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights. xxx We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. xxx Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. xxx Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner. Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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2. Lahom vs. Sibulo GR#143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135

Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to brought him up as their own. The couple treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." In December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. In her petition, she averred — 7. That x x x respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption; 10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner; 13. That respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year; 14. The times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son. Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition.

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552? 2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

xxx The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. xxx Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. Xxx Since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory. xxx R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child xxx. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption. Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force. The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process15 that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, xxx the Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. xxx In Republic vs. Miller, the xxx Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28 While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, xxx an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court dismissed the petition.

3. Republic vs. Miller GR#125932/Apr. 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 183

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in representation of the Solicitor General, respondents adduced evidence showing that: Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both American citizens, are husband and wife, having been married on June 21, 1982. They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their union on account of a medical problem of the wife." "The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985." "The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the

Whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code, [4] effective on August 3, 1988[5] when the petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code[6] which allowed aliens to adopt.

This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." "Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested." "As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents. The Department of Social Welfare and Development recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare."

force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."[10] Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court. Cang v. CA Written consent of the natural parent as a requirement in a petition for adoption may be dispensed with if such parent have abandoned his child.

Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.

Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation which was granted by virtue of the spouses joint manifestation that they had agreed to live separately. Herber then left for the United States and custody of the children was granted to Anna Marie. The trial court granted the petition and disregarded the necessary written consent from the father (Herbert) on the ground that the latter had already abandoned his children.

Whether or not minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.

Yes. The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.

In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

However, In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

Herbert filed an appeal alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code. Republic v. Vergara An alien who is married to a former Filipino is not allowed to adopt in the Philippines pursuant to Article 184 (3) of the Family Code

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. After trial, the lower court granted the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.

Whether or not an alien married to a former Filipino may adopt in the Philippines.

No. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states:

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: xxx xxx xxx (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does

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not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 185 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Republic v. Toledano

Exceptions provided

for

On February 21, 1990, spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On

Whether or not an alien married to a former Filipino may adopt in the Philippines.

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi under Article 184 (3) regarding the capacity of a former Filipino to adopt a relative by consanguinity must be interpreted in the light of Article 185 which requires that spouses must adopt jointly. NB: similar to Republic v. Vergara

August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Republic v. CA and Hughes Pursuant to Article 185 in relation to the exceptions set forth in Article 184, an alien who is a former Filipino may adopt a relative by consanguinity provided he/she must adopt jointly with his/her spouse who must also be capacitated to adopt in

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

Whether or not making the alien spouse a nominal party to a petition for adoption filed by his/her spouse who is previously a Filipino to adopt the latter’s relative by consanguinity

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. No. The view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties. Hence, compliance to the requirement of joint adoption by spouses is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by making the alien spouse, a person not capacitated to adopt under Philippine Laws, as nominal party in a petition for adoption.

On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi accordance with law. Thus, an alien spouse of a former Filipino may not be considered as a nominal party in a petition for adoption for purposes of compliance with Article 185 of the Family Code Republic v. CA/Wong

While the law provides that the adopted child shall use the surname of his adopters, the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceeding. Therefore the adopted child is not prohibited to have his surname change back to his biological parent’s surname. Republic v. CA and Bobiles

On appeal, CA affirm the decision of the trial court. CA has theorized that as Article 185 of the Family Code mandates joint adoption by the spouses, James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings.

Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old, he was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.

: Whether or not an adopted child may revert back to the use of the surname of his biological parents.

Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein Maximo filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.

Yes. Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for adoption. On this point, there is unanimous agreement. The law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he

Whether or not a spouse who was not named as one

Yes. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in

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An affidavit of consent showing explicit intention the spouses to adopt jointly is sufficient compliance to the requirement of joint adoption regardless if the spouse who executed such affidavit was not named as petitioner in a petition for adoption. In the case of In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim, affidavit of consent executed by an alien spouse who seeks to adopt was not considered for purposes of complying with the joint adoption rule on the ground that such alien must, other than give its consent, meet the qualifications set forth in Section 71

was four (4) months old. Zenaida’s husband, Dioscoro Bobiles was not name as one of the petitioners in the pleasding. However, his affidavit of consent is attached to the petition. The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

of the petitioners in a petition for adoption but merely attaches his affidavit of consent is deemed to have jointly adopt with his spouse named in the petition.

the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child.

The pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows: xxx xxx xxx 2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;

The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.

We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi of RA 8552 NB: Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, Zenaida had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

A petition for adoption cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. TITLE VIII. SUPPORT RA 9262; Contracts, Quasi-Contracts; Rule 61, Rules of Court; A.M. 02-11-12 SC Title Lim-Lua v. Lua

Facts On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing,RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from the timeplaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand,and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00 (x 7 corresponding to the 7months

Issue/s W/N the CA erred in deducting said amount from the current total support in arrears

Held The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. As a matter of law, theamount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generallyobliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, inkeeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the effect thatwhen a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for thesupport of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not haveallowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accruedsupport pendente lite.

1 An Alien Spouse must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

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Calderon v. Roxas

The grant of support pendente lite is an interlocutory order which cannot be

that lapsed). Respondent filed an MFR asserting that petitioner is not entitled tospousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwellingfrom their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and wellbeing in accordance with family’s social and financial standi ng. Asto the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as wellas the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable andbeyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of therespondent. The MFR was denied. His second MFR also having been denied,respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA nullified RTC’s ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. The appellate court said that the trial court should not havecompletely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the purchaseand maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and thecredit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inuredto the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thusordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total supportin arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted thelack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed. Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an

Whether or not an order granting support pendent lite is an interlocutory order and is therefore not appealable by ordinary appeal.

Yes. an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory" e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi appealed by way of ordinary appeal. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Order granting Calderon’s application for support pendente lite. On February 11, 2003, Roxas filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even higher than his then P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor. Motion for reduce support was granted. Calderon filed an ordinary appeal contesting the grant of motion to reduce support. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to avail of the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order.

Gotardo v. Buling

On September 6, 1995, Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the Charles Gotardo is the father of her child Gliffze. The Divina testified for herself that her intimate sexual relations with the Gotardo started on March 1993.

Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of

The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. CA departed from the RTC's appreciation. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the

be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

Whether or not filiation may be proven by testimony of the mother that she had sexual relations with the putative father at the time of conception of the child.

Yes. In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in September

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze.

1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support

Once the issue on filiation is settled, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Lim v. Lim The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued her husband, Edward Lim and grandparents-in-law, Chua Giak and Mariano Lim for support. The grandparents theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s minority. Because

Whether or not the wife has the right to seek support from her husband’s ascendants in case of the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support

No. The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.

at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. NB: Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under

However, the wife may not seek spousal support from the ascendants of her husband. Such obligation extends only to her husband, arising from their marital bond.

Uy v. Chua A compromise agreement which denies filiation and has the effect of waiving any action for future support and succession is void.

The application of Article 204 which provides that — The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against JOSE NGO CHUA. Jose filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the instant petition is barred by by res judicata as the issues involve was already resolve in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB wherein Joanie filed a similar petition in 2000 which ended up in a compromise agreement duly approved by the court. In the said compromise agreement, Joanie admitted that she is not an illegitimate child of Jose Chua. Joanie opposed the Demurrer and argued that the question on the civil status, future support and future legitime cannot be subject to compromise.

Whether or not a judicially approved compromise agreement denying filiation may serve as proof to deny filiation and consequently bar any future action for recognition, support or succession.

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a wellprovided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application. No. Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; and (6) Future legitime. The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

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Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.

Sy v. CA

A person convicted of rape is liable to three kinds of civil liability under Article 345 of the RPC: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring.

Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering petitioner to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother. After trial, the trial court caused the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and awarded custody of the children to respondent. Court further orders the Wilson to pay by way of monthly support for the minors, the amount of P50,000.00. Wilson contest the award and argued that the court had no jurisdiction to award support in a habeas corpus case as support was neither alleged nor prayed for in the petition.

Whether or not support may be granted in a habeas corpus proceeding even though not prayed for by the petitioner.

Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation. No. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. The case of Jocson v. The Empire Ins. Co. and Jocson Lagniton (103 Phil. 580, 1958) explains the rationale for this rule: x x x Support does include what is necessary for the education and clothing of the person entitled thereto (Art. 290, New Civil Code). But support must be demanded and the right to it established before it becomes payable (Art. 298, New Civil Code; Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil. 215). For the right to support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship, even from the relationship of parents and children, but "from imperative necessity without which it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is demanded (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p. 181, citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it does not appear that support for the minors, be it only for their education and clothing, was ever demanded from their father and the need for it duly established. The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed, and especially must this be true in the present case where it

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Lacson v. Lacson

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.

Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, filed a complaint and averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edward’s failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. The trial court ruled in favor of Maowee and Maonaa and ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.

Whether or not a parent may be required to pay support in arrears.

However, support even if not pleaded may still be awarded if such issue was properly tackled during the trial. Applying Section 52, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since there was implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue. Yes. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads: When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

Edward contests the award and contends that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point: Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance,

2 Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon Mangonon v. CA

The person obliged to give support may either provide a fix allowance in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.

On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina with Federico, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite against the latters’ father, Frederico and grandfather, Francisco. Ma. Belen concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. She contends, however, that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent Federico’s inability to give the support needed for Rica and Rina’s college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica and Rina. Frederico and Francisco both denied filiation to Rica and Rica. They further argued that assuming the minors are indeed their descendants who are entitled to support, they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina. Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA.

1

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Whether or not a grandfathe r, in lieu of his son who is still alive, may be required to provide support to his grandchildr en. Whether or not the right of the person obliged to give support to exercise option as to how support will be given is absolute.

1) Yes. ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. According to Arturo Tolentino, an eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (2) Anent respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina. Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered.

Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option.

People v. Magtibay

A person convicted of rape is liable to three kinds of civil liability under Article 345 of the RPC: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. Gan v. Reyes Unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately

On September 15, 1997, accused Magtibay with lewd and unchaste design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one RACHELLE RECTO y Rafal, by means of force and threats to kill, to the irreparable damage of the said Offended Party. As a consequence of the said offense, Rachelle got pregnant and eventually gave birth to a baby boy.

Bernadette S. Pondevida instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S.

Whether or not a court which tackles a rape case may accord the status of illegitimacy and grant support to the child conceived thru rape.

Whether or not an order granting a petition for support pendente lite may be immediately be executed even if judgment has yet to attain finality.

With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them. Yes. With respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano Glabo (G.R. No. 129248, 7 December 2001) states: Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no "further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child’s status." Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To

Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000.

consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. When words of a legal provision are plain, we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget.

Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. Part 3 and 4 – missing 11. De Asisvs CA GR# 127578/ Feb 15, 1999

Vircel D. Andres, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis is the father of subject minor and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity. Case was dismissed because of the Manifestation executed by both parties. Another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same

Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.

In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support. The admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support. The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation. In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus: Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of. This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought,

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her cause for action is accrues. .

12. David vs CA TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLES 209-215)

1.

Becke tt vs. Sarmi ento

AM RTJ-122326/ January 30, 2013

Beckett, an Australian national, was previously married to Eltesa a Filipina. Out of the marriage was born Geoffrey Jr. Beckett. They eventually separated and, worse still, they sued each other. Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Violence against Women and Children Act, followed by a suit for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both cases ended in the sala of Judge Sarmiento. The couple’s initial legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento, rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement. They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have full and permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) years old, subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa. Thereafter, Beckett left for Australia, taking Geoffrey, Jr. with him. Moreover, as agreed upon, they would come and see Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas. In the 2010 visit, Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January 9, 2011. January 9 came and went but Geoffrey, Jr. remained

Whether or not respondent Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, "is not permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and adjusted." And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata. Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals,We held that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides

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2.

Lim vs Lim

GR# 1632029/ October 30, 2009

with Eltesa, prompting Beckett to file a petition against Eltesa for violation of RA 7610, this petition was again raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. And because Geoffrey remained in the meantime in the custody of Eltesa, Beckett later applied for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett. Eltesa moved for reconsideration of the court’s, praying that it be set aside insofar as it directed her to return the custody of Geoffrey, Jr. to Beckett. Beckett moved for the reconsideration of the judge’s Order, on the main contention that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement. Cheryl married Edward Lim the son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. They resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano. Edward’s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife. Cheryl, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000pendente lite.

that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise, the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to reiterate, permanent. As Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu in Espiritu, Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay. Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

The governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void. However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.

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3.

Syvs CA

4.

Madrin anvsM adrina n

GR# 159374/ July 12, 2007

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married and their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter quarrel, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis Angelo, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. They initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of heart and decided to file a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. CA rendered a decision asserting that respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Whether FC has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case

RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. (emphases supplied) The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors: In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within

Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxx x xx x xx The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA 8369]. Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.

5.

Viesca vs. Glinsk y

GR#171698/ July 04, 2007

Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met at the Makati Shangri-La. After a few months, a relationship blossomed between the two.Respondent executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternityof the child. Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and they parted ways. Respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any given day. During the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise agreement. On 5 April 2005, respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.” It was

Whether it is proper for the trial court to alter the compromise without the consent of the parties

A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed. To reiterate, a compromise judgment has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgerywhich private respondent does not allege in this case. More importantly and as correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is settled that

Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi alleged in said motion that petitioner had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the week. Atty. Manuel received the copy of the Writ of Execution but informed the court sheriff that they would not comply with the court’s order and would challenge the writ. As expected, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution that said writ was issued with “indecent haste” violative of her right to due process, and that the writ varied the terms of the Compromise Agreement since it failed to take into consideration the parties’ understanding that in the enjoyment of respondent’s visitorial rights, petitioner “shall have the right to designate any person of suitable age to accompany the child.” The court ruled to deny the motion to quash the writ of execution The parties disagreed in some part of the Compromise agreement. Especially Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding the appointment of the child’s accompanying guardian. The court then altered the provisions in the Compromise Agreement to fix the conflict. However, petitioner argues, that court should not be permitted since a compromise agreement, once it was approved by the court, has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. The court is not allowed to impose a judgment different from the terms of the agreement.

6.

neither the courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment different from their compromise agreement or against the very terms and conditions of their agreement without contravening the universally established principle that a contract is the law between the parties. The courts can only approve the agreement of parties. They can not make a contract for them. Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for having granted respondent’s Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to finally put to rest the bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to prevent future disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw the wisdom, as this Court does, in providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion of the Compromise Judgment. As we previously held in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco This is not the first unfortunate instance that a compromise judgment of a trial court has given rise to subsequent prolonged controversy, only because the trial judge failed to exercise the required degree of care in seeing to it that neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details should characterize the agreement, much less the judgment rendered on the basis thereof. The expressed desire of the parties to end their judicial travails by submitting to a compromise deserves the utmost attention from the court, and no effort should be spared in helping them arrive at a definite and unequivocal termination of their problems and differences. It is high time that the matter-of-fact treatment usually accorded by trial courts to motions to approve compromises were abandoned in favor of the more positive activist attitude the situation demands. In acting in such a situation, the judge should bear in mind that the objective is to end the disagreement between the parties, not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and their counsel are unable to do it, the judge is expected to assist them in attaining precision and accuracy of language that would more or less make it certain that any disputes as to the matters being settled would not recur, much less give rise to a new controversy.

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7.

Laxam anavs Laxam ana

GR# 144763/ Sept 03, 2002

Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983. After a whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31 years old and respondent, 33, got married on June 6, 1984. Respondent quit her job and became a full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a living. The union was blessed with three children – twin brothers Joseph and Vincent. All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. In October 1991, he was confined at the Estrellas Home Care Clinic in Quezon City. He underwent psychotherapy and psychopharmacological treatment and was discharged. On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner “already drug-free” and directing him to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro “for out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1) year.” Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable Petitioner filed with the RTC, the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND showed an individual who presented himself in the best situation he could possibly be.

Whether or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent.

In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely stated that: “The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.” There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampo’s report and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts. In Lacson v. Lacsoncase,It is clear that … every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children. Besides, at least one of the children — Enrique, the eldest — is now eleven years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. xxx.

8.

Vancil vsBel mes

GR# 132223/ June 19, 2001

Petitioner, BonifaciaVancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. BonifaciaVancil commenced before the RTC a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2year old child. On July 15, 1987, petitioner, BonifaciaVancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship. After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. irement to become guardian.”

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

“Art. 211 FC. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx.” Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. InSagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held: “Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.” In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: “The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.” Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

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Silva vsCa

10. Perez vs CA GR# 118870/ March 29, 1996

Ray Perez and Nerissa were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who began working in the United States, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She became a resident alien in February 1992. Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. She longed to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by her husband. Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the oneyear old child to his mother. The Court of Appeals, on September 27, 1994, reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to his father.

Sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now three years old.

When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It provides: “ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” ( Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean “legal separation” decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. The rationale for awarding the custody of children younger than seven years of age to their mother was explained by the Code Commission: “The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.” The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old should not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) which reduced the child’s age to five years. The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison d’etrein the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment,unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. The mother’s role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mother’s love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy but in reality.

11. Santos Sr. vs CA GR# 113054/ March 16, 1995

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia Bedia were married and beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States to work. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. The trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents and not to himself. The Bedias argue that although the law

The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein, has shown little interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully employed in the United States. We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.

the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.

CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (ARTS. 216-219); ARTS. 2176. 2180

St. Mary’s Academy vsCarpitanos GR# 143363/ Feb. 6, 2002

Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. Respondents

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before RTC.

Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 220-224)

Obedenciovs Murillo A.M No. RTJ03-1753/ Feb 5, 2004

Capistrano Obedencio, Jr., charged respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000) for rape, entitled “People v. Dexter Z. Acenas.” Complainant averred that he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old daughter, LicelAcenasObedencio, in filing with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. To his great surprise, respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier on May 22, 2001. According to respondent judge, LicelObedencio had come to court, accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance. Then, Licel took the witness stand and was asked on matters contained in her affidavit. She recanted the allegations in her affidavit-complaint and denied having been molested by her uncle, Dexter. She explained that her mother forced her to file the rape charge because of family inheritance problems. Complainant claims that the dismissal was marred by serious irregularities.

Whether the dismissal of the criminal case is proper despite lack of consent of maternal parents

Article 220(6) of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with the cases pending before him. He should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint with the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians. It was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their nonappearance before the court instead of simply relying on the bare explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not find Licel’s parents. Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her maternal grandparents, and not her parents, on the day she was examined to affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted respondent judge to be more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance. Given her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit influence and undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing her complaint.

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CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN (ARTICLES 225-227)

1.

Neri vs. Heirs of HadjiY usop

GR# 194366/ October 10, 2012

During her lifetime, Anunciacion had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo, namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters. Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children executed an ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Saleadjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses spousesUy. On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches. ong period of time.

Whether sale of property is proper despite lack of consent parents or children of the deceased

It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read: Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide: ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party. ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers; xxx Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated: "Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of HadjiYusopUy and his spouse HadjaJulpaUy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale.

2.

Cabale svs CA

GR# 162421/ August 31, 2007

RufinoCabales died and left a 5,714square meter parcel of land. Brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. CayetanoCorrompido with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66. Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her

Whether the sale made by their mother is valid

The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs’ rights to the property when she repurchased the share. In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,we held that a co-owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. But the one who

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi deceased son, Alberto, including his “vale” of P300.00. Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and AnunciacionFeliano. Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. CorrompidoP966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his “vale” of P300.00 In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his father’s hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated, Contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors.

redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due. As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Based on Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code. Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property.

CHAPTER 4- EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHIILDREN (Articles 225-227)

Title Pineda v CA

Facts Issues Ruling  PMSI obtained a group insurance policy for its 1. WON Insular Life YES sailors. 6 of the sailors, during the effectivity of should still be liable 1. The special powers of attorney "do not contain in unequivocal and clear the policy, perished while the ship sank in to the complainants terms authority to Capt. Nuval to obtain, receive, receipt from respondent Morocco. The families of the victims then wanted when they relied on company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seaman-insured. to claimthe benefits of the insurance. Hence, the specialpowers Insular Life knew that a power of attorney in favor of Capt. Nuval for the Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi under the advice of Nuval, the president of PMSI, they executed a special power of attorney authorizing Capt. Nuval to, "follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their benefit the indemnities.  Insular drew against its account 6 checks, four for P200,00.00 each, one for P50,000.00 and another for P40,00.00, payable to the order the families. The checks were given to PMSI. Nuval, the PMSI president, pocketed the amounts in his bank account.  When the families went to insular to get the benefits, their request was denied because Insular claimed that the checks were already given to PMSI.  The families filed a petition with the Insurance Commission. They won and Insular was ordered to pay them 500 a day until the amount was furnished to them. The insurance Commission held that the special powers of attorney executed by complainants do not contain in unequivocal and clear terms authority to Nuval to obtain and receive from respondent company insurance proceeds arising from the death of the seamaninsured; also, that Insular Life did not convincingly refuted the claim of Mrs. Alarcon that neither she nor her husband executed a special power of authority in favor of Capt. Nuval and that it did not observe Sec 180(3), when it released the benefits due to the minor children of Ayo and Lontok, when the said complainants did notpost a bond as required Insular Life appealed to the CA. CA modified the decision of the Insurance Commission, eliminating the award to the minor children. Hence, this petition by the beneficiary families.

of attorney, which Capt. Nuval presented as documents, when they released the checks to the latter. 2. WON Insular Life should be liable to the complainants when they released the check in favor of Ayo and Lontok, even if no bond was posted as required.

collection and receipt of such proceeds was a deviation from its practice with respect to group policies. They gave the proceeds to the policyholder instead of the beneficiaries themselves. Even the Isnular rep admitted that he gave the checks to the policyholder. Insular Life recognized Capt. Nuval as the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners. However, it acted imprudently and negligently in the premises by relying without question on the special power of attorney. Strong vs. Repide- third persons deal with agents at their peril and are bound to inquire as to the extent of the power of the agent with whom they contract. Harry E. Keller Electric Co. vs. Rodriguez- The person dealing with an agent must also act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Obviously, if he knows or has good reason to believe that the agent is exceeding his authority, he cannot claim protection… the party dealing with him may not shut his eyes to the real state of the case, but should either refuse to deal with the agent at all, or should ascertain from the principal the true condition of affairs. Insular delivered the checks to a party not the agent of the beneficiaries. 2. Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. “If the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian.” On group insurance : Group insurance is essentially a single insurance contract that provides coverage for many individuals, particularly for the employees of one employer. There is a master agreement issued to an employer. The employer acts as the collector of the dues and premiums. Disbursement of insurance payments by the employer is also one of his duties. They require an employee to pay a portion of the premium, which the employer deducts from wages while the remainder is paid by the employer. This is known as a contributory plan as compared to a non-contributory plan

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi where the premiums are solely paid by the employer. Although the employer may be the policyholder, the insurance is actually for the benefit of the employee. In a non-contributory plan, the payment by the employer of the entire premium is a part of the total compensation paid for the services of the employee. The primary aim of group insurance is to provide the employer with a means of procuring insurance protection for his employees at a low cost and thereby retain their loyalty and efficiency. Lindain v CA

Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of registered land which their mother (Dolores) as guardian, sold for P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew that the sale was without judicial approval but still proceeded with the transaction. The plaintiffs now contend that the sale is null and void as it was without the court's approval. The Regional trial Court ruled that the sale is indeed null and void, while upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition.

Whether or not a sale by a guardian of a minor’s property requires judicial approval.

YES. Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Arts. 228-233) Title Bondagyjy v Bondagjy



Facts Respondent Fouzy Ali Bondagjy filed with the Shari’a District Court an action to obtain custody of his two minor children.



the Shari’a Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:



“WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered:



Awarding the custody of the minors Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouaje

Issues

Ruling

Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her

The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her children. We find that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim law or the Family Code. In Pilipinas Shell Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (April 20, 2001, G.R. No. 114923), we said that in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is

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Artadi Bondagjy in favor of their natural father, petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; and for this purpose ordering the respondent Sabrina Artadi Bodagjy or any person having the care of said minors in her stead or behalf, to turn over, relinguish and surrender the custody of said minors to their natural father, the petitioner in this case Fouzi Ali Bondagjy; 

fitness to be the custodian of her children?

Ordering the petitioner Fouzi Ali Bondagjy to ensure that the said minors are provided with reasonable support according to his means and in keeping with the standard of his family, and, a suitable home conducive to their physical,

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not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of her children. The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner according to the school’s certification.

mental and moral development; and, with his knowledge and under reasonable circumstances allow the respondent and natural mother of the said minors Mrs. Sabrina Artadi Bondagjy to visit her minor children Abdulaziz Artadi Bondagjy and Amouje Artadi Bondagjy

Silva. Ca Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC) Grande v Antonio

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Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons

Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.

The petition is partially granted CIVIL LAW Filation Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

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were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. RTC- ruled in favor of Antonio The CAmodified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children. The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father. In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtis enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

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Remo v. Sec of Foreign Affairs

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consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name, she could use her maiden name in her passport application only if she had not used her married name in her previous application. The Secretary explained that under

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Petition denied. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists. No conflict between Civil Code and RA 8239 Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Yasin case not in point Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman, Remo’s marriage remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s marriage. Special law prevails over general law Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance

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Dela Cruz v Gracia

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When her motion for reconsideration was denied, Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)] Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge

must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Implied repeals are disfavored Remo’s theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This, Remo failed to establish. State is mandated to protect integrity of passport Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is valid.

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

Yes! Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument. The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of

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paternity

to

the

child.”

filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.

TITLE XIV. ABSENCE (Article 381-396, NCC Valdez v Republic

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Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years had passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in

Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid. Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code. Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states: Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-founded belief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve. In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the

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presumption of Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.

1.

Republic v Uy

Fujiki v Marinay Rep. v CosetengMagpayo

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Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo claimed that his parents were never married and filed a petition in QC to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng (using the maiden name of his mother) Respondent submitted proof o Mother has no record of marriage from NSO o Records which show that he has been using the surname of Coseteng since childhood (academic records) Trial Court granted petition and ordered Civil Registrar to: o Delete the entry “date and place of marriage”(of parents) in respondent’s live birth certificate o Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng

WON respondents change of name was affected through an appropriate adversary proceeding

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Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of the recognized grounds in rule 103(respondent denies his legitimacy by affecting his legal status in relation to his parents) Since respondents desired change affects his legitimacy, rule 108 should apply Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected (Makati, not QC) and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated Decision of Trial Court was nullified

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Delete entry of Coseting from “Middle name” o Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for “Father” Republic filed a motion against the order of the court stating that: o The change of name of respondent also calls for a change of civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. o Court exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered deletion of name of the father A person can effect a change of name under rule 103 using valid grounds: o when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce o when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation o when the change will avoid confusion o when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, o

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o

o

Republic v Marcadera

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and was unaware of alien parentage a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest

Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-inFact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048. Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and

Whether or not the court of appeals erred on a question of law in granting the change in respondent’s name under rule 103.

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.

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Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, , for the hearing of said petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions.

A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Wherefore The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

The RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary

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Title Corpus v Sto. Tomas Baldos v Ca

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The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.

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The appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC order.

Facts

Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on October 30, 1948. However, his birth was not registered in the office of the local

Issues

Ruling

Whether or not the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid.

In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is petitioner’s son. Petitioner’s reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he did not live up to her expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for her and the oppositor. Bad blood runs in the veins of the parties. But while oppositor may have done an act that caused

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Republic v Cagandahan

civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on February 11 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth. On March 8, 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a complaint for cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son. Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

Silverio v Republic Republic v Kho Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family

plaintiff to regret that she gave him life, such acts however, are not justifications of what she prays from this Court. An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a reason to strip a person of one’s filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance though. The documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties’ relationship.

WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

Whether or not Kho‘s request for

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of

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applied for the correction of various details in their birth certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; (2) delete “John” from his name; and (3) delete the word “married” opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.

Republic v Bolante

The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which allows first name and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer approved of the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground that the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.  Respondent filed a petition for change of name before the RTC. She alleged that her registered name (birth certificate) is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which she did not use; but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records.  The RTC upon finding that the

change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial proceeding

Carlito‘s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the “married” status of Carlito‘s parents in his and his siblings‘ respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments. For the change involving the nationality of Carlito‘s mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito‘s and his siblings‘ parents were “married” alters their filiation from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,” with significant implications on their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as “An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order,” has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.

whether or not respondent's bare testimony, unsupported by any other evidence, is sufficient to prove that the change of her name is not resorted for illegal purposes.

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes

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petition is sufficient in form and substance ordered respondent to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on Feb. 20, 2001. At the scheduled Feb. 20 initial hearing the RTC ordered the respondent to file a written formal offer of evidence. The Clerk of Court acting on court’s express directive for a resetting issued another notice for a hearing and a second resetting was made after notice was given scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. On the Sept. 25 hearing, respondent presented several documents without any objection on the part of petitioner, represented by the OSG. She also took the witness to state the purpose of her petition which was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She testified that she wanted to secure a passport issued with her correct name and to avoid any complication on her records upon her retirement. The RTC granted the petition and the appellate court affirmed the same, hence; the current case. Petitioner argued that the jurisdictional facts were not complied with as prescribed by Rule 103 Section 3 in which

embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.13 The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts." In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight. Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi “xxx the date set for hearing shall not be within 30 days prior to an election nor within 4 months after the last publication of the notice.” Petitioner argued that the notices were published on these dates: Nov. 23, 30 and December 7 and the hearing was set on Feb. 20 which is within the prohibited period of 4 months. Petitioner also argued that the reasons given by respondent is not sufficient to grant the request for change of name. CHAPTER 4. OTHER MATTERS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS (Art. 253) Republic v Granada Republic v. Tango o In 1987, Ferventino Tango, Whether Tango has By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding respondent, and Maria Jose established a basis shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal Villarba were married in civil to form a well- can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of rites. Tango and Villarba had founded belief that presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without only spent a night together and his absent spouse saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of had been intimate once when is already dead Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Villarba told Ferventino that she Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the and her family will soon be Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted leaving for the USA. Villarba freedom of choice of court forum. assured Tango that the former will file a petition so that the From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition latter can live with her in the for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is USA and in the event that the because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely petition is denied, Villarba errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. promised to return to the Philippines to live with Tango. In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed Thereafter, Villarba and her a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC family flew to Seattle, USA. equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records Tango and Villarba kept in of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction touch for a year before Villarba to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately stopped responding to Tango’s final and executory. Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal letters. Tango had inquired from and treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it Villarba’s uncle of Villarba’s Natalie Joyce Estacio – Ciara Christia Infantado – Stephen Jacobo – Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 – 2015) Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi whereabouts but it turned out that even the latter’s relatives had no idea. Tango solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas, but to no avail. Finally, Tango sought the aid of his parents in Los Angeles and his aunt in Seattle, but again, to no avail. o

Republic v Bermudez-Lorino

were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable. Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become final. Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.

This prompted Tango to file a petition before the RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Villarba under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC issued an Order declaring Villarba presumptively dead. On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, the CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her children. From the time she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives. In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial

In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.

Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code were duly established.

Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these rules, to wit: Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expedition’s manner with out regards technical rules. The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.

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