Civil Law Review (Family Code)

San Beda College of Law

ENGRACE NIÑAL v. NORMA BAYADOG G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000 FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born four children, the petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

ISSUES: 1. Was theas subsequent marriage for lack of a marriage license despite cohabiting husband and wife forvoid at least five years? 2. May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

RULING: 1. YES. At the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any 1

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San Beda College of Law distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. 2. YES. The law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

GRACE J. GARCIA v. REDERICK A. RECIO G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001 FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Is the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy?

RULING: NO. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our

jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not 2

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San Beda College of Law take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007 FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She also filed a petition for letters of administration. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

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San Beda College of Law

ISSUE: Is the decree of divorce obtained in the US by deceased’s second wife, automatically recognized in the Philippines?

RULING: NO. The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and prove.

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO, JR. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985 FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. The parties were subsequently divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982. Alice Reyes Van Dorn has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed suit against petitioner stating that Van Dorn’s business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the parties, and asked that Van Dorn be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Upton be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein private respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case 4

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San Beda College of Law on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property. For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Is the divorce decree obtained by Upton in Nevada valid and binding in the Philippines?

RULING: It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his conjugal own representation over the alleged property. before said Court from asserting his right To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

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San Beda College of Law

PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989 Facts: Petitioner Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Geiling, a German national, got married in Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella was born. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany, which later promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chia as and with yet another man named Jesus Chua”.

ISSUE: Can private respondent Erich Geiling file the criminal case for adultery against petitioner?

Ruling: NO. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G.R. No. 134029, 6 February 2007 FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo) was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting 6

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San Beda College of Law Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismisson the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

ISSUE: Can a Filipino, who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988?

RULING: YES. The Court noted that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The Court cited the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., which involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Moreover, the Court noted that the same doctrine was applied in the case of Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. Also, citing the case of Republic v. Orcebido, the Court maintained that the legislative intent behind Art 26(2) of the Family Code may be traced to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

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San Beda College of Law Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CRASUS L. IYOY G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005 Facts: The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. Petitioner Republic, believing that the Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein.

ISSUE: Whether Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to the case at bar.

Ruling: NO. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines – Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the 8

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San Beda College of Law alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005 FACTS: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

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San Beda College of Law In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

RULING: YES. Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. 10

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San Beda College of Law In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS G. R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000 FACTS: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California. On November 27, 1951, the court issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo filed for probate and allowance of his last will and testament but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzo’s will would encroach her legitime. 11

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San Beda College of Law On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition.

ISSUE: Is the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo, a filipino who obtained foreign citizenship, valid and cognizable under Philippine laws?

RULING: YES. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. “Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. “However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.” But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzo’s Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state. As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of srcin for determination of the intrinsic 12

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San Beda College of Law validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 174689, 19 October 2007 Facts: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely" and his sex from "male" to "female." The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which in turn, rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: May a person's sex be changed on the ground of sex reassignment?

Ruling: NO. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. There is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner's first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and 13

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San Beda College of Law the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner's petition were to be granted.

CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997 FACTS: Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night. From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE: Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity?

RULING: YES. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one 14

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San Beda College of Law of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.” This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

REPUBLIC v. MOLINA G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997 FACTS: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Are irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO. Laid down hereinbelow are specific guidelines in interpreting and applying Art. 36, to wit: (a) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the existence of the marriage and against its nullity. (b) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (1) medically or clinically identified; (2) alleged in the com-plaint; (3) sufficiently proven by experts; and (4) clearly explained in the decision. (c) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration of the marriage,'' although the manifestation need not be perceivable at such time. (d) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable, although the incurability may be relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. 15

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San Beda College of Law Furthermore, the incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. (e) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (f) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Arts. 220-225, same Code, in regard to parents and their children. Such non-compliance must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision. (g) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by our courts. (h) The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General and the fiscal shall submit such certification to the court within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is submitted for resolution. In the case at bar, finding that there was no psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent-husband but more a “difficulty'' if not outright “refusal'' or “neglect'' in the performance of some marital duties, and that the evidence merely showed that the parties could not get along with each other, the Supreme Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner-wife.

MARCOS v. MARCOS G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000 FACTS: The spouses first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts and then were married. The wife alleged that after the downfall of President Marcos, her husband left the military service and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The 16

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San Beda College of Law following day, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. The appellee submitted herself to psychologist for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other hand, did not. The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x. The ruling of the trial court was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE: 1. Was the CA correct in reversing the trial court as to its findings of the psychology incapacity of the respondent in the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis that the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. 2. Was the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

RULING: 1. NO. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 2. NO. The alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral 17

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San Beda College of Law pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127358, 31 March 2005 FACTS: A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. Petitioner, with leave of court, amended the petition stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Respondent denied the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio and ordered, among others: 1. Plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos, exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of decision plus attorney’s fees of 100,000. 2. Liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property, particularly plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits from the Far East Bank and Trust Company and shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies, and ceding ! (50%) of the net amount of retirement benefits and outstanding shares, respectively. The damages were awarded on the basis of Article 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner assails the trial’s court decision on the ground that damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. Petitioner also assailed the decision the trial court ordering him to cede ! of his retirement benefits and outstanding shares of stock.

ISSUES: 1. Is the award of damages and attorney’s fees proper in case of declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity? 2. What property relations govern the parties to a void marriage who do not have legal impediment to contract marriage? ULING: R 1. NO. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological

incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By 18

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San Beda College of Law declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. The award for attorney’s fees is likewise not proper. 2. The property relation is CO-OWNERSHIP under Article 147 of the Family Code. Under this regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.” Unlike in conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Thus, the order giving respondent the ! share of retirement benefits and outstanding shares of stock is sustained but on the basis of liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

BOBIS v. BOBIS G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000 FACTS: Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information for bigamy was filed against respondent Isagani. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code. 19

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ISSUE: Is the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?

RULING: NO. Parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

MORIGO v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004 FACTS: Lucio Msrco and Lucia Berrete were married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Sometime in 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada and left Lucio behind. On August 19,1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against Lucio which was granted on January 17, 1992 and took effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago. Lucio then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lucia on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Lucio was, however, charged with bigamy. The trial court discounted his claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. It further held that want of a valid ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. Froilan filed an appeal with the CA. While the same was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision on the civil case declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio. The appellate court, however, affirmed the judgment of conviction ratiocinating that what the RPC seeks to punish is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved. It held that the fact the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case. 20

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San Beda College of Law Both the trial court and CA ruled that the divorce obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity as it was contrary to public policy.

ISSUE: Is Msrco guilty of bigamy?

RULING: NO. First, in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy thus: a. the offender has been legally married; b. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; c. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and d. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Second, the mere private act of singing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Berrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan where it was held that a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just one, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.

OFELIA GOMEZ v. LIPANA G.R. No. L-23214, 30 June 1970 Facts: The defendant-appelant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of the seocond marriage, the first was still subsisting, whcih fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.

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San Beda College of Law On December 17, 1943, the spouse of the second marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubai, Quezon city, for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens Title for the property was issued in the name of “Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez”. Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless, survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. Ofelia Gomez, judicial administrator of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the sid estate. Reliance was placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil code, the Spanish text of which provides: La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser declarado nulo. El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte en los bienes gananciales. The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been declared void, The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties. The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforecited provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.

ISSUES: 1. Can the validity of a marriage be attacked collaterally? 2. Is Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code applicable in this case?

Ruling: 1. YES. There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him after at thethe trial.first, Indeed, second years and he hecontracted has not the shown that marriage his first less wifethan wasseven then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so. 2. YES. The conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after the dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force. Even though the said provision was no longer in force, it is still presumed with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor the conjugal partnership never existed, and hence such spouse has no right to share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership 22

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San Beda College of Law formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its existence. The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

NIÑAL v. BAYADOG G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000 FACTS: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.

ISSUE: Is the cohabitation contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code which exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license refer to one which both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire fiveyear continuous period?

RULING: YES. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence ofday the of marriage. This 5-year period be should be the years immediately before the the marriage and it should a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that 23

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San Beda College of Law their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132955, 27 October 2006 Facts: Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. ilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals dismiss the petition.

ISSUE: Should the marriage be annulled based on vitiated consent, fraud, and lack of cohabitation?

Ruling: NO. To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster defense, if not bring about his acquittal the criminal case forhis bigamy which wasaltogether then already pending against him. in Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very 24

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San Beda College of Law outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall. As to the issue of vitiated consent -

he cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. Based on the records, he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. As to whether there is fraud

in this case which he also invoked as a basis for annulment of his marriage, he argued that he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x. As to the lack of cohabitation -

appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.

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SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995 FACTS: Leouel and Julia got married on 1986 and lived with the latter's parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things. On 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code". Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: "(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated." The complaint was eventually dismissed for lack of merit. SSUE: IShould the failure on the part of Julia to communicate with her husband for

several years be considered a psychological incapacity thereby warranting the nullity of marriage?

RULING: NO. In accordance with the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family 26

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San Beda College of Law Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS & MOLINA 268 SCRA 198, 13 February 1997 FACTS: On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was later affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Are irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitutive of psychological incapacity?

RULING: YES. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by experts; and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 27

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San Beda College of Law (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

LUCITA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 126010, 8 December 1999 FACTS: Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981. They had three (3) children. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life.

ISSUE: Should the marriage be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO. Other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.

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San Beda College of Law Furthermore, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.

DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004 Facts: Petitioner David B. Dedel and Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel were married and the union produced four children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological incapacity”?

Ruling: NO. "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and 29

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San Beda College of Law persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

LAM v. CHUA G.R. No. 131286, 18 March 2004 FACTS: The case commenced on March 11, 1994 upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they incapacitated begot one toson, John Chua marital Lam; Jose was psychologically comply with Paul the essential obligations of marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

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San Beda College of Law The trial court then set the case for hearing. The lone witness was Adriana herself. She testified that her marriage with Jose was arranged by her parents in the traditional Chinese way; that her married life was abnormal because Jose very seldom came home, never worked for a living and instead kept asking for money from her to buy his sports cars; that she was also the one spending for all the expenses of their only child, John Paul.[3] After her testimony, counsel for Adriana formally offered the documentary evidence. On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open[4] on the ground that she was able to secure additional new evidence which were significant, material and indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court granted the motion to re-open the case and held a hearing for the reception of additional evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25, 1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago, and another Marriage Contract dated May 6, 1982 between Jose and one Evan Lock,[5] showing that Jose had been married twice before he married Adriana in 1984. On August 4, 1994, the Pasay RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Adriana Chua and Jose Lam.

ISSUE: Did the trial court correctly ruled on the declaration of nullity of marriage between the parties?

RULING: NO. A judgment of a court upon a subject within its general jurisdiction, but which is not brought before it by any statement or claim of the parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it is a serious error for the trial court to have rendered judgment on issues not presented in the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so. The amendment of the petition to reflect the new issues and claims against Jose was, therefore, indispensable so as to authorize the court to act on the issue of whether the marriage of Jose and Adriana was bigamous and the determination of the amount that should have been awarded for the support of John Paul. When the trial court rendered judgment beyond the allegations contained in the copy of the petition served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and deprived petitioner Lam of due process. Insofar as the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Adriana and Jose for being bigamous is concerned, the decision rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared as invalid for having been issued beyond its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana in his motion for reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay 31

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San Beda College of Law RTC to receive evidence and render judgment on his previous marriages with other woman which were not alleged in the petition filed by Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.[20]

OSCAR P. MALLION v. EDITHA ALCANTARA G.R. No. 141528, 31 October 2006 FACTS: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code alleging psychological incapacity. The petition was denied. Subsequently, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that the marriage was null and void because it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits.

ISSUE: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?

RULING: YES. Petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Moreover, in the first petition, the petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO G.R. NO. 158896, 27 October 2004 FACTS: After twenty-four (24) years of married life together, Manuel filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, 32

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San Beda College of Law chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage. The trial court denied Manuel’s petition. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: 1. Did the CA properly apply the ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA? 2. Is Juanita Psychologically incapacitated?

RULING: 1. NO. Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. The CA perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. 2. NO. we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.

NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR. v. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007 FACTS: Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly complained that he didn't have time for her; and that she constantly quarreled with him even before marriage when he could not give her the things she wanted. He added that she was not supportive of his medical career. Even marriage counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that when they quarreled, she refused to have sex with him and even told him to look for other women. He filed the petition for nullification of their marriage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made pregnant by a man whom respondent hired to follow him. The trial court held that petitioner and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. Respondent appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and declared that the marriage still subsists. 33

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ISSUE: Is the marriage void on the ground of the parties' psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In the present case, the spouses' frequent squabbles and respondent's refusal to sleep with petitioner and be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. Petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments even before their marriage and respondent's scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity, and immaturity does not constitute psychological incapacity.

LEONILO ANTONIO v. IVONNE REYES G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila. Out of their union, a child was born, who sadly died five (5) months later. Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family; (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred; (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither; (4) She claimed to be a singer or a freelance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold 34

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San Beda College of Law and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million ; and (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner presented Dr. Acebede a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.

ISSUE: Will the acts of Ivonne, which constitute persistence in lying and making up stories, be considered as a psychological incapacity as a ground of declaration of nullity of marriage?

RULING: YES. Following the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court explained that the evidence to establish psychological incapacity must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto. Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. However, It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage." At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding onthe civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. While the Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed 35

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San Beda College of Law by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Nevertheless, the Court applied the guidelines as provided in the Molina case so as to determine whether or not Ivonne is psychologically incapacitated: First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in 36

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San Beda College of Law particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable. Thus, the Court declared that the marriage between Antonio and Reyes is void.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004 Facts: Petitioner sought to annul her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national. Petitioner alleged that her husband left her and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. Petitioner asserted that such abandonment constitutes psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Is Toshio psychologically incapacitated?

Ruling: NO. The Court finds that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological 37

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San Beda College of Law illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do. It must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, the Court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. The Court cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

ROLANDO LANDICHO v. HON. LORENZO RELOVA G.R. No. L-22579, 23 February 1968 ACTS: F Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."

On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided by respondent Judge Relova where Fe Lourdes Pasia seeks to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and 38

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San Beda College of Law intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Is the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner and a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage by the petitioner constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him?

RULING: NO. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

DONATO v. LUNA G.R. No. 53642, 15 April 1988 FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato. Before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent Paz Abaya filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. He also contended that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent.

ISSUE: Does the annulment case constitute a prejudicial question which would warrant the suspension of the criminal action for bigamy?

RULING: NO. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in raised a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" arethe automatically in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown 39

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San Beda College of Law that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar. Petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage. Also, it was petitioner's second wife, private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DIY G.R. No. L-53703, 19 August 1986 FACTS: In an action filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia’s previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence (1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and (2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else. Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES: 1. Is the second marriage contracted by a spouse (in this case, the wife) during the existence of her first marriage considered as valid on the ground that her first marriage was vitiated by force? 2. Is the second marriage contracted by a spouse during the existence of her first marriage be considered as valid on the ground that her first husband had a prior existing marriage at the time of their marriage, and thus the said first marriage is void?

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RULING: 1. NO.The fact that the first marriage of the wife was vitiated by force committed against both parties will not render the said marriage void but merely voidable, and therefore valid until annulled. Without having been annulled, the first marriage is still valid and any subsequent marriage of said spouse is VOID. 2. NO. The fact that the wife’s first husband had an existing prior marriage at the time of their marriage will not render the subsequent marriage contracted by the said wife valid, for then such first marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her second marriage. Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993 FACTS: Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo and petitioner Roberto Domingo were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and subsisting, which became known only to private respondent in 1983 when dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Since 1983 up to present, petitioner had been unemployed and completely dependent upon private respondent for support and subsistence. Sometime in June 1989, private respondent discovered that petitioner was cohabiting with another woman; and discovered further that petitioner had been disposing some of private respondent’s property without her knowledge and consent. Petitioner failed and refused to return the possession and administration of said property to her brother/attorney-in-fact. On May 29, 1991, private respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property against petitioner.

ISSUES: 1. Is a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage? 2. Is the petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage filed only for purposes of remarriage? 3. Is there a need for filing an action for separation of property separate from the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

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RULING: 1. YES. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage. As a matter of policy, the nullification of a marriage for the purposes of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky ground. 2. NO. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground of defense. Article 40 of the Family Code, (The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.) as finally formulated, included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not obtained only for purposes of remarriage.The position of the word “solely” in Article 40 of the Family Code shows that it is meant to qualify “final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. One can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of marriage for purposes other that remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latter’s presumptive legitimes. 3. NO. Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc. There is no need for filing a separate civil action for such purposes. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

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BELTRAN v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 137567, 20 June 2000 FACTS: After 24 years of marriage between the petitioner and his wife Charmaine E. Felix, the petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36. In her Answer, the petitioner's wife alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Will the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity pose a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage?

RULING: NO. The import of Article 40 of the Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. So that in a case for concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. 43

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MERCADO v. TAN GR No. 137110, 1 August, 2000 FACTS: Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.

ISSUE: Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage, which is in inception void, necessary before entering into a subsequent marriage?

RULING: YES. Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows: “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.” Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Committee has observed: “[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).” 44

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San Beda College of Law It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993 Facts: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco married Janet Monica Parker, a British national she met while his ship was on a port call in England. They were married in Catholic rites in Antique but shortly after giving birth to their first child, Parker left Antique. In the present petition, respondent avers that he took efforts to look for her himself. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica. On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.

ISSUE: Was there a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead?

Ruling: NO. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. United States v. Biasbas, is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that: While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. .

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San Beda College of Law In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

ARMAS v. CALISTERIO G.R. No. 136467, 6 April 2000 FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death. Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without the estate of of the the estate deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her afterbond, all theofobligations would have been settled.

ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositorappellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse?

RULING: YES. Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur : (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial 46

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San Beda College of Law declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

MANUEL v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 165842, 29 November 2005 Facts: Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. He contracted a second marriage now with Tina Gandalera on April 22. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was “single.” However, starting 1999, Eduardo started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return and he even stopped giving financial support. Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. In a response to a complaint for bigamy, Eduardo testified that he declared he was “single” in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

ISSUE: Is Eduardo Manuel criminally liable for bigamy?

DOCTRINE: YES. In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he had a well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family 47

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San Beda College of Law Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden and having failed to do so, he is liable for bigamy.

LUCIO MORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004 Facts: Lucio Msrco and Lucia Barrette were boardmates for a period of four (4) years (1974-1978). After school year 1977-1978, Msrco and Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Msrco was surprised to receive a card from Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Barrete returned to the Philippines but left for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. Lucia subsequently came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Msrco to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married married on August 30, 1990 at Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Barrette reported back to her work in Canada leaving Morgio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court. Msrco subsequently married Maria Jecacha Lumbago. Msrco then filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. Seeking, among others, the declaration of nullity of Msrco’s marriage with Barratte, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. Appellant was thereafter charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City with the RTC of Bohol. Msrco moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of His his motion marriage with Barratte a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. was granted, butposed subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, herein Msrco pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. Meanwhile, while the bigamy case was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. On appeal, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first

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San Beda College of Law marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

ISSUE: Is a judicial declaration of nullity required to contract a second marriage in a case where there was no marriage ceremony that was conducted during the first marriage?

Ruling: NO. As a rule, a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies if the earlier union is characterized by statutes “void.” However, in the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Msrco and Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constiture an ostensibly vaild marriage for which Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequient marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Msrco is not guilty of bigamy.

TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004 FACTS: Petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed in Lapu-Lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas in Cebu City. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro was indeed her husband. Thereafter, Ancajas filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. The RTC find the accused guilty of bigamy.

ISSUES: 1. Was there sufficient evidence to prove the first marriage?

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San Beda College of Law 2. Is petitioner liable of bigamy despite the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage?

RULING: 1. YES. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. 2. YES. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001 FACTS: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee 50

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San Beda College of Law admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUES: 1. Is the first marriage valid? 2. Is the nullity of the previous marriage validates the second marriage?

RULING: 1. NO. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. However, Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all. 2. NO. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). 51

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TY v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127406, 27 November 2000 FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979. Private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent alleged that ‘no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.

ISSUE: Is a decree of nullity of the first marriage required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?

RULING: NO. Where the second marriage of a person was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986), during which time the prevailing rule was found in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977), People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957), there was no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, the Court conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

SARAO v. GUEVARA 40 O.G. 263, 31 May 1940 F ISCLAIMER : : I was not able to find the full text for this case. Rest assured, due diligence was (DACTS exercised in searching for available digests online). Sarao and Guevarra got married on June 3, 1936. When Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge with Guevarra, she refused. When nighttime came, she 52

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San Beda College of Law eventually gave in. Guevarra complained that her private part was in pain and even noticed some matter oozing therefrom which had a foul smell. Upon advice of a physician and with consent of Sarao, Guevarra had her uterus and ovaries removed. After the operation, Sarao claimed to have lost any desire to have intercourse with his wife after her operation and filed a case for annulment on the ground of impotency.

ISSUE:

Can Sarao’s claim prosper?

RULING: NO. Marriage may be annulled if the party was, at the time of celebration of the marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state and that such incapacity remains incurable. Sarao wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into the married state into incapacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. It must not be confused with sterility. Impotency must exist at the time of the marriage and must also be permanent and incurable. Temporary and occasional incapacity for copulation is not a ground. Guevarra is not impotent – the removal of organs rendered her sterile, but it did not render her unfit for sexual intercourse. It was due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance that made him give up the idea of having sexual intercourse with her again even after she had been rid of her disease. Added ruling: With respect to Sarao’s contention of fraud that Guevrra did not inform him of her illness, such contention was not given merit because fraud was not alleged in the complaint and was not proved at the trial.

GODOFREDO BUCCAT v. LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941 Facts: Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in November 26. On February 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was nine (9) months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

ISSUE: Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the ground that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling: NO. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of 53

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San Beda College of Law pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Note: The case is written in Spanish. FERNANDO AQUINO v. CONCHITA DELIZO G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that Conchita Delizo at the date of her marriage to petitioner Fernando Aquino concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another man, and about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff. The trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found the petitioner’s claim unbelievable that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her.

ISSUE: Can a woman, who is four months pregnant, be considered as to have committed fraud, when she concealed such pregnancy from her husband?

RULING: YES. In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19), plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen 54

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San Beda College of Law more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months.

EMILIO R. TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS and TUASON G.R. No. 116607, 10 April 1996 Facts: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains. On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990. On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.

Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.

ISSUE: Whether the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

Ruling: NO. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of 55

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San Beda College of Law nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, 30 July 2004 FACTS: A verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr. Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the period file an she filed instead a Motionoftofirst Dismiss, set 30-day for hearing ontoApril 20,answer, 2001 However, acting which upon she the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19, 2001, or one day before. 56

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San Beda College of Law In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions and manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the respondent judge. One was denied while the rest were ignored. As previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30, 2001 without resolving the other motions and manifestations.

ISSUE:

Is the respondent judge justified in disregarding the motions and deciding the case ex-parte?

RULING: NO. It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court, even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage. In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation. Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule. While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had filed a Certification dated May 04, 2001 with the respondent judge's court, stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had. Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the case. Cervantes v. Fajardo - RAMPAS

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REPUBLIC v. IYOY G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005 FACTS: Crasus Iyoy was married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave birth to five children. Fely Iyoy eventually left for the States to provide for their family in 1984 and in less than a year sent Crasus documents to sign with regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus eventually found out that Fely married Stephen Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived of a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of Fely’s subsequent marriage. The CA in deciding the case sided with Fley.

ISSUE: Is a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino in the US valid and recognized in the Philippines?

RULING: NO. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995 Facts: Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife in the USA. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by 58

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San Beda College of Law Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

ISSUE: Is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be granted?

Ruling: NO.The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under “compelling reasons'' is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final. The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125041, 30 June 2006 Facts: Petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was subsequently annulled. Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica and Rina were then admitted to different universities in USA however they are 59

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San Beda College of Law financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education. Petitioner likewise averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latter’s father, Francisco, for general support but it was left unheeded.

ISSUE: Was the grandfather, in case of the inability of the father and the mother, liable to support pendete lite?

Ruling: YES. Under the Rules of Court, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court – By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication with their grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and Rina. Indeed, respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins are the children of Federico. Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial court’s grant of support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is who should be made liable for said award. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica andparents. Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their Anent respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina as stated in Art 204 of the Family Code, however in this case, this court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the 60

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San Beda College of Law amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment. (NOTE: The issue of the case is mainly on support pendete lite.

With regard to the issue on annulment of marriage, it was just stated in the facts that the spouses were once married (at the age of 19 (male)and 21) (female) but without CONSENT under art. 85 of the New Civil Code. The latter was the ground for the annulment. Not mentioned in the case but here is Art 85 of NCC:

A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; XXX)

ANAYA v. PALAROAN G.R. No. L-27930, 26 November 1970 FACTS: Defendant Fernando Palaroan (Fernando) filed and action for annulment of the marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora Anaya’s (Aurora) counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando had divulged to Aurora that prior to their marriage he had premarital relationship with a close relative of his. Aurora claimed that “the nondivulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of Fernando definitely wrecked their marriage.” Consequently, Aurora argued that the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted fraud, in obtaining her consent within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code. Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

ISSUE: Is the non-disclosure of the husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of the marriage?

RULING: NO. Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as to" chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of pre-marital lewdness or feel having been 61

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San Beda College of Law thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. Article 86 of the Civil Code provides: Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article: 1. Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties; 2. Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more; 3. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune, or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of m arriage.

FRANCISCO v. TAYAO G.R. No. L-26435, 4 March 1927 FACTS: Juanaria Francisco, plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, defendant, contracted marriage in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then moved to Zamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding, Lope Tayao, together with his co-accused Bernardina Medrano, was sentenced to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prision correccional, and to pay the costs. On these facts Francisco sought to have the bonds of matrimony between her and Lope Tayao dissolved. The trial judge denied the action, stating that the plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law.

ISSUE: Under Act No. 2710, the Philippine Divorce Law, may the wife of a husband held guilty of adultery by another action be granted divorce?

RULING: NO. The causes for divorce are prescribed by statute. The Divorce Law is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the of the husband . . . ." 8Note well the adverb "only"shall and the "or."part Later on comes section providing that "A divorce not conjunctive be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"—that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final 62

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San Beda College of Law sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Facts Peculiar to the Case: (1) This case was decided under Act No. 2710, or the Philippine Divorce Law of 1917, now long repealed; and (2) Act No. 2710 as affirmed by this case then required final judgment in a criminal action of adultery or concubinage before divorce - then possible by law - is allowed. The rule was modified as discussed in Gaudionco v. Penaranda .

GANDIONCO v. PENARANDA G.R. No. 79284, 27 November 1987 FACTS: Private respondent Teresita Gadionco (Teresita), the legal wife of petitioner Froilan Gadionco (Froilan), with the RTC presided by Judge Penaranda, a complaint against Froilan for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a complaint against Froilan for concubinage. Froilan contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto, such as, application for support, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. Froilan cites Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .

ISSUE: Should a civil action for legal separation be suspended upon the filing a criminal action for concubinage to await conviction or acquittal?

RULING: NO. First, the Sec 3, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure refers to “civil actions to enforce civil liability arising from the offense”. As earlier noted, an action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. In other words, a civil action for legal separation based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is no one to “enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to 63

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San Beda College of Law the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. Second, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof of preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILIAM ONG v. LUCITA G. ONG G.R. No. 153206, 23 October 2006 Facts: Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like “putang ina mo”, “gago”, “tanga”, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her. William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community.

ISSUE: Is there a valid ground for the issuance of a decree of legal separation?

Ruling: YES. As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children. Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, of legal separation should not granted, following 56, par. (4)aofdecree the Family Code which provides that be legal separation shallArt. be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without 64

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San Beda College of Law justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

REPUBLIC v. IYOY G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005 FACTS:

Respondent Crasus Iyoy married Fely Ada Rosal on December 16, 1961. As a result of their union, they had five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America, leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. and she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. Fely returned to the Philippines several times including one when she attended the wedding of her eldest child, Crasus, Jr., where she had invitations made in which she was named as “Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus.” At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Do abandonment and sexual fidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

RULING: NO. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. It should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so 65

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San Beda College of Law permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. In the instant case, at most, the wife’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situation where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.

BUGAYONG v. GINEZ 100 Phil 616, 28 December 1956 Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. On crossexamination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which she claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. This prompted him to ask for advice from the legal department of the Navy. Plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". Benjamin Bugayong filed in against the Court First Instance of who Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation his of wife, Leonila Ginez, timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a 66

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San Beda College of Law reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor, counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same. The motion to dismiss is based on the alleged condonation by the husband.

ISSUE: Should the complaint for Legal Separation be dismissed on the ground that there is condonation?

Ruling: YES. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. In this case, there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code. The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73). If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation? Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d). Additional Info from the case: Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's 67

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San Beda College of Law Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Courtand link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission defendant had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.

LAPUZ SY v. EUFEMIO G.R. No. L-30977, 31 January 1972 FACTS: Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio, thereafter, to dismiss the abated "petition foraction legal for separation" mainly on the ground thatmoved the death of Carmen the legal separation. Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

ISSUE: 1. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? 2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

RULING: 1. YES. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines (now governed by the Family Code) recognizes this by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 68

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San Beda College of Law 108 (now Article 66 of FC) by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. 2. YES. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved because these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

CERVANTES v. FAJARDO G.R. No 79955 January 27, 1989 ,

Facts: This case is a petition for writ of Habeat Corpus over the minor Angelie Cervantes, daughter of common-law spouse Conrado Fernando and Gina Carreon. It appears that Angelie was offered for adoption to petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes (sister of Gina Carreon) and Nelson Cervantes. Petitioners took custody of the child when the latter was two weeks old. Gina Carreon executed an affidavit of consent to the said adoption and the court later approved the petition for adoption. Years later, the biological parents of Angelie demanded from the adoptive parents the payment of P 150,000 otherwise they would get back their child. Petitioners refused and as a result, Gina took the child from the petitioner’s residence and would only return the child upon the payment of the said amount. According to Gina, the consent of adoption was not fully explained to her. However, this is in contrast with her utterances during the interview with the social worker who conducted the case study of the said adotion.

ISSUE: Considering the circumstances surrounding the life of the natural parents as compared to that of the adoptive parents, the latter being in a better position, are the adoptive parents entitled to the custody of the child?

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Ruling: YES. In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon previously gave birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. On the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and the consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and to exercise parental authority and responsibility over her.

ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. They both went abroad to work and there maintained a common law relationship. They finally got married while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines. They had two (2) children, Rosalind and Reginald. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, copetitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of 70

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San Beda College of Law being arrested. Meanwhile, she decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children.

ISSUE: Should the custody of the children be given to Teresita?

RULING: NO. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. Both Rosalind and Reginald are over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother.

GOITIA v. CAMPOS RUEDA G.R. No. 11263, 2 November 1916 Facts: This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. The defendant Jose Campos Rueda, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff Eloisa Goitia de la Camara, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. The plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. The 71

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San Beda College of Law defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body. As the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. Articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows: ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article. 1. The consorts. ART. 149. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.

ISSUE: Can the defendant be compelled to support the plaintiff outside of the conjugal dwelling only if it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant?

Ruling: NO. Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them. The provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. It is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for 72

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San Beda College of Law separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

ARROYO v. VASQUEZ G.R. No. L-17014, 11 August 1921 FACTS: Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.

ISSUE: Can one of the spouses be compelled by a court order to cohabit with the other spouse?

RULING: Upon examination of the authorities the Court is convinced that it is not within its province to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invalid, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution 73

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San Beda College of Law of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. The Court is therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

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