CIVIL LAW I (6-8-13)

Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24 [1987]

CHAPTER 5 OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted. Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided. Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise. Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. CHAPTER 6 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Section 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and such documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have general application or which he may authorize so to be published. The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership"; WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven. Tanada v. Tuvera GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446) Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall

have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place,which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause ³unless otherwise provided´. Held: The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to thedate of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event beomitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directlyconferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a citynotwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects onlythe inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in the details´ of the CentralBank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Reasoning: The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upontheir approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by thelegislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. FUENTES VS. ROCA FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios’ signature was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty. Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be given weight, and that the action has already prescribed. On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action must be brought within 10 years. Given that the

transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was well within the prescriptive period. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged; 2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and 3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale. RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document giving consent and another document executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in the document which stated consent was completely different from the sample signature. There was no evidence provided to explain why there was such difference in the handwriting. 2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void contract never prescribes. On the argument that the action has already prescribed based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes spouses since it was them who should have assailed such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so. On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe since it is a void contract. 3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, vs.HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency.

Petitioner issued Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 prescribing guidelines, for tariff purposes, in the applicable to importation of wheat. Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas City. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat, thus, action for declaratory relief is improper RULING: . The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine the validity of the acts of the political departments. Also, Section 1403 of the Tariff and customs law mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer‘s prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat. It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

Kasilag versus Rodriguez Case Digest/ Brief 69 Phil 217

PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the defendantpetitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P, acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states ―Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith,‖ the P‘s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis. HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void. Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.

REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof. ___________________________________________________________________________________

ELEGADO v. COURT OF APPEALS (First Division)Ildefonso O. Elegado, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Warren Taylor Graham,vs. Hon. CA & Commissioner of Internal RevenueCruz, May 12, 1989Topic: Ignorance of the Law (for foreigners)Facts:Warren Taylor Graham died (March 14, 1976) and left certain shares of stock in the PhilippinesHis son Ward Graham filed an estate tax return on September 16, 1976BIR Commissioner assessed estate with estate tax of P96, 509.35-protested on March 7, 1978 (by a foreign law firm on behalf of the estate), denied byCommissioner on July 7, 1978, no further actionJanuary 18, 1977: Will had been admitted to probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon-Elegado appointed as attorney-in-fact of War d Graham for will’s allowance in the Philippines-Will was allowed on December 18, 1978 with petitioner as ancillary administratorElegado filed a 2 nd estate tax return with BIR on June 4, 1980IR Commissioner imposed assessment of P72, 948.87-protested on August 13, 1980Commissioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96, 509.35-petitioner regarded this as implied denial of August 13, 1980 protest-he filed a petition for review with Court of Tax Appeals

on September 15, 1981challenging the first assessment-Commissioner cancelled the protested assessment; letter dated March 31,1982-Court granted motion on April 25, 1984Issues:1. WoN the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause of action2. WoN the shares of stock left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive and not conjugalproperty3. WoN the said stocks should be assessed on the time of the owner’s death or six months thereafter4. WoN the appeal filed with the respondent count should be considered moot and academic5. WoN the first assessment is invalid because the foreign lawyers were not familiar with our taxlaws and procedurea. (The petitioner’s argument is that it is invalid.) Held and Ratio:1. No. Court of TA cannot act on appeal from an assessment already cancelled.2. Immaterial in proceedings.3. Immaterial in proceedings.4. Yes. Second assessment was expressly cancelled by letter dated Mar. 31, 1982. No cause of action for petitioner.5. No. Foreigners are not excused from compliance with our laws and procedure because of ignorance. ____________________________________________________________________________________

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS Article 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect. For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2, Transitional Provisions). Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise

thereto may have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. (Rule 1) Article 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n) Article 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code, even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of laws goes into effect. (n) Article 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same, with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a) Article 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code. If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be applied. If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a) Article 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule 4) Article 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws. (n) Article 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n) Article 2261. The exemption prescribed in article 302 shall also be applicable to any support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes effective. (n) Article 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the provisions of article 320. (n) Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws

and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code. (Rule 12a) Article 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in article 287, shall also be acquired by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n) Article 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's possession before said date. (n) Article 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect: (1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants; (2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage; (3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation; (4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself; (5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments; (6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title; (7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromises. (n) Article 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective: (1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; (2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n) Article 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n) Article 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated by them. (Rule 13a) RPC Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

CABALIT V. COA (2012) [G.R. No. 180236, January 17, 2012] FACTS: As per investigation of the State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma in their JointAffidavit, a scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, in the vehicle registration fees. In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.[11] Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties were required to submit their counter-affidavits. In response, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counteraffidavits, all essentially denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies. After proper hearing the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment, finding petitioners liable for dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than they actually collected. Accordingly, they were given the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the Ombudsman. Hence filed with the CA separate petitions. The CA dismissed the consolidated petition and modified that Olaiver be held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which carries the same penalty as dishonesty. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions. Issues: 1. Whether or not there was a violation of the right of due process. 2. Whether or not the petitioners were administratively liable. Ruling: 1. No. In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend

himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. 2. Yes. Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference. However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to mind one's task. Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. Hence, the CA should have found Olaivar liable for dishonesty. The CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect of duty, is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. Under Section 58, such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. Republic v Granada, GR 187512 Under Article 41 of the Family Code, a married person whose spouse has been absent for four consecutive years can marry again if he/she is able to prove in a summary proceeding filed in court that his/her spouse has been missing for four years and she/he has a well founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. As to what constitutes a ―well founded belief‖ is answered in this case of Yoly. In 1991, Yoly met Rolly at an electronics company in Parañaque where they were both working. The two eventually got married on March 3, 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of a son. But sometime in May 1994, the electronics company closed down, forcing Rolly to go to Taiwan to seek employment there. From that time on, Yoly had not received any communication from her husband notwithstanding efforts to locate and get in touch with him. So after nine years of waiting, Yoly filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to have Rolly declared presumptively dead. In the hearing of the petition, Yoly testified and told the court about Rolly‘s

leaving them, going to Taiwan and never heard from again. Her brother likewise testified that he had inquired from Rolly‘s relatives as to his whereabouts but to no avail. On February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Rolly as presumptively dead. This decision was questioned by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) by filing a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC. The OSG contended that Yoly failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Rolly and thus failed to prove her well founded belief that he was already dead. Was the OSG correct? Yes. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.

Issues 1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented In this case, Yoly did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother testified to having inquired from the latter‘s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate his testimony. If Yoly were diligent in her search for her husband, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. Nevertheless, since the petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the decision of the RTC is immediately final and executory, and hence, not subject to ordinary appeal. The attempt to question it through a mere Notice of Appeal is unavailing. The OSG should have filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. On technical grounds therefore, Yoly won the case. The RTC decision having become final could no longer be reversed or modified (Republic vs. Granada, G.R. 187512, June 13, 2012).

Accenture v Commissioner, GR 190102, 1. For VAT zero-rating of services rendered to non-resident foreign corporation under Section 108(B)((2) of the NIRC, it is not enough that the recipient of services be proven to be a foreign corporation, it must be proven to be a non-resident foreign corporation. Taxpayer filed an application for refund of unutilized input taxes allocated to its zero-rated sale of services to foreign clients. In order to prove that its sales are VAT zero-rated, taxpayer presented as evidence the Official Receipts, Billing Statements, Memo InvoicesReceivable, Memo Invoices-Payable and Bank Statements (OBMMB). Taxpayer argued that these documents show that the zero-rated sales were paid in foreign currency and duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). ISSUE: WON the sale of services to a foreign client is sufficient to prove that sales are zero rated RULING: The Court, however, ruled that for sale of services to be VAT zero-rated under Section 108(B) of the NIRC, the recipient of service must be doing business outside the Philippines. According to the Court, the documents presented by taxpayer merely substantiated the existence of sales, receipt of foreign currency payments and inward remittance of the proceeds of such sales. There is no evidence that the clients were doing business outside the Philippines. Accordingly, the Court denied the claim on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove the fact that the foreign clients to whom the taxpayer rendered services are clients doing business outside the Philippines. (Accenture, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012) Sepearte PDF case in UP vs. Dizon

PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. ARMANDO A. VINUY A, LOUIE M. ORDOVEZ, ARSENIO S. LUMANTA,. JR., ROBELITO S. ANIPAN, VIRGILIO R. ALCANTARA, MARINO M. ERA, SANDY 0. ENJAMBRE and NOEL T. LADEA, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 dated May 9, 2011 and the resolution3dated June 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353. The Antecedents

On March 5, 2008, respondents Armando A. Vinuya, Louie M. Ordovez, Arsenio S. Lumanta, Jr., Robelito S. Anipan, Virgilio R. Alcantara, Marino M. Era, Sandy O. Enjambre and Noel T. Ladea (respondents) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc. (agency), and its President Romeo P. Nacino. The respondents alleged that the agency deployed them between March 29, 2007 and May 12, 2007 to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the agency‘s principal, Modern Metal Solution LLC/MMS Modern Metal Solution LLC (Modern Metal) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The respondents‘ employment contracts,4 which were approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provided for a two-year employment, nine hours a day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay, food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free transportation, free laundry, and free medical and dental services. They each paid a P 15,000.00 processing fee.5 On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave the respondents, except Era, appointment letters6 with terms different from those in the employment contracts which they signed at the agency‘s office in the Philippines. Under the letters of appointment, their employment was increased to three years at 1,000 to 1,200 AED and food allowance of 200 AED. The respondents claimed that they were shocked to find out what their working and living conditions were in Dubai. They were required to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break of only one hour to one and a half hours. When they rendered overtime work, they were most of the time either underpaid or not paid at all. Their housing accommodations were cramped and were shared with 27 other occupants. The lodging house was in Sharjah, which was far from their jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four hours of sleep a day because of the long hours of travel to and from their place of work; there was no potable water and the air was polluted. When the respondents received their first salaries (at the rates provided in their appointment letters and with deductions for placement fees) and because of their difficult living and working conditions, they called up the agency and complained about their predicament. The agency assured them that their concerns would be promptly addressed, but nothing happened. On May 5, 2007, Modern Metal required the respondents to sign new employment contracts,7 except for Era who was made to sign later. The contracts reflected the terms of their appointment letters. Burdened by all the expenses and financial obligations they incurred for their deployment, they were left with no choice but to sign the contracts. They raised the matter with the agency, which again took no action. On August 5, 2007, despondent over their unbearable living and working conditions and by the agency‘s inaction, the respondents expressed to Modern Metal their desire to resign. Out of fear, as they put it, that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and release papers, the respondents, except Era, cited personal/family problems for their resignation.8 Era mentioned the real reason – "because I dont (sic) want the company policy"9 – for his resignation. It took the agency several weeks to repatriate the respondents to the Philippines. They all returned to Manila in September 2007. Except for Ordovez and Enjambre, all the respondents shouldered their own airfare. For its part, the agency countered that the respondents were not illegally dismissed; they voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better paying job. It claimed that the respondents, while still working for Modern Metal, applied with another company which offered them a higher pay.

Unfortunately, their supposed employment failed to materialize and they had to go home because they had already resigned from Modern Metal. The agency further alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed affidavits of quitclaim and release after they resigned. It thus argued that their claim for benefits, under Section 10 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8042, damages and attorney‘s fees is unfounded. The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings On April 30, 2008, Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. Ancheta rendered a Decision10 dismissing the complaint, finding that the respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs. He also found that four of them – Alcantara, Era, Anipan and Lumanta – even executed a compromise agreement (with quitclaim and release) before the POEA. He considered the POEA recourse a case of forum shopping. The respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). They argued that the labor arbiter committed serious errors in (1) admitting in evidence the quitclaims and releases they executed in Dubai, which were mere photocopies of the originals and which failed to explain the circumstances behind their execution; (2) failing to consider that the compromise agreements they signed before the POEA covered only the refund of their airfare and not all their money claims; and (3) ruling that they violated the rule on non-forum shopping. On May 12, 2009, the NLRC granted the appeal.11 It ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed. It anchored its ruling on the new employment contracts they were made to sign in Dubai. It stressed that it is illegal for an employer to require its employees to execute new employment papers, especially those which provide benefits that are inferior to the POEA-approved contracts. The NLRC rejected the quitclaim and release executed by the respondents in Dubai. It believed that the respondents executed the quitclaim documents under duress as they were afraid that they would not be allowed to return to the Philippines if they did not sign the documents. Further, the labor tribunal disagreed with the labor arbiter‘s opinion that the compromise agreement they executed before the POEA had effectively foreclosed the illegal dismissal complaint before the NLRC and that the respondents had been guilty of forum shopping. It pointed out that the POEA case involved predeployment issues; whereas, the complaint before the NLRC is one for illegal dismissal and money claims arising from employment. Consequently, the NLRC ordered the agency, Nacino and Modern Metal to pay, jointly and severally, the respondents, as follows: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 April 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new Decision is hereby issued ordering the respondents PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENTS CO., INC., ROMEO NACINO, and MODERN METAL SOLUTIONS, INC. to jointly and severally, pay the complainants the following:

Employee

Underpaid Salary

Salary for the Placement unexpired fee portion of the contract (1350 x 6

Exemplary Damages

months) Vinuya, ARMANDO

150 x 6 = 900 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Alcantara VIRGILIO

150 X 4 = 600 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Era, MARINO

350 x 4 = 1400 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Ladea, NOEL

150 x 5 = 750 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Ordovez, LOUIE

250 X 3 = 750 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Anipan, ROBELITO

150 x 4 = 600 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Enjambre, SANDY

150 x 4 = 600 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

Lumanta, ARSENIO

250 x 5 = 1250 AED

USD 400

8100 AED

P 20,000.00

TOTAL:

6,850 AED

US$3,200

64,800 AED

P 400,000.00

or their peso equivalent at the time of actual payment plus attorney‗s fees equivalent to 10% of the judgment award.12 The agency moved for reconsideration, contending that the appeal was never perfected and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the labor arbiter‘s decision.The respondents, on the other hand, moved for partial reconsideration, maintaining that their salaries should have covered the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, pursuant to the Court‘s ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.13 The NLRC denied the agency‘s motion for reconsideration, but granted the respondents‘ motion.14 It sustained the respondents‘ argument that the award needed to be adjusted, particularly in relation to the payment of their salaries, consistent with the Court‘s ruling in Serrano. The ruling declared unconstitutional the clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less," in Section 10, paragraph 5, of R.A. 8042, limiting the entitlement of illegally dismissed

overseas Filipino workers to their salaries for the unexpired term of their contract or three months, whichever is less. Accordingly, it modified its earlier decision and adjusted the respondents‘ salary entitlement based on the following matrix:

Unexpired portion of contract

Duration of Contract

Departure date

Date dismissed

Vinuya, ARMANDO

2 years

29 March 2007

8 August 2007

19 months and 21 days

Alcantara, VIRGILIO

2 years

3 April 2007

8 August 2007

20 months and 5 days

Era, MARINO

2 years

12 May 2007

8 August 2007

21 months and 4 days

Ladea, NOEL

2 years

29 March 2007

8 August 2007

19 months and 21 days

Ordovez, LOUIE

2 years

3 April 2007

26 July 2007

21 months and 23 days

Anipan, ROBELITO

2 years

3 April 2007

8 August 2007

20 months and 5 days

Enjambre, SANDY

2 years

29 March 2007

26 July 2007

20 months and 3 days

Lumanta, ARSENIO

2 years

29 March 2007

8 August 2007

19 months and 21 days15

Employee

Again, the agency moved for reconsideration, reiterating its earlier arguments and, additionally, questioning the application of the Serrano ruling in the case because it was not yet final and executory. The NLRC denied the motion, prompting the agency to seek recourse from the CA through a petition for certiorari. The CA Decision The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.16 It upheld the NLRC ruling that the respondents were illegally dismissed. It found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC‘s rejection of the respondents‘ resignation letters, and the accompanying quitclaim and release affidavits, as proof of their voluntary termination of employment. The CA stressed that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation. Moreover, it found nothing in the records to substantiate the agency‘s contention that the respondents‘ resignation was of their own accord; on the contrary, it considered the resignation letters "dubious for having been lopsidedly-worded to ensure that the petitioners (employers) are free from any liability."17 The appellate court likewise refused to give credit to the compromise agreements that the respondents executed before the POEA. It agreed with the NLRC‘s conclusion that the agreements pertain to the respondents‘ charge of recruitment violations against the agency distinct from their illegal dismissal complaint, thus negating forum shopping by the respondents. Lastly, the CA found nothing legally wrong in the NLRC correcting itself (upon being reminded by the respondents), by adjusting the respondents‘ salary award on the basis of the unexpired portion of their contracts, as enunciated in the Serrano case. The agency moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration of the CA decision.18 The Petition The agency is now before the Court seeking a reversal of the CA dispositions, contending that the CA erred in: 1. affirming the NLRC‘s finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed; 2. holding that the compromise agreements before the POEA pertain only to the respondents‘ charge of recruitment violations against the agency; and 3. affirming the NLRC‘s award to the respondents of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, pursuant to the Serrano ruling. The agency insists that it is not liable for illegal dismissal, actual or constructive. It submits that as correctly found by the labor arbiter, the respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs, and even executed affidavits of quitclaim and release; the respondents stated family concerns for their resignation. The agency posits that the letters were duly proven as they were written unconditionally by the respondents. It, therefore, assails the conclusion that the respondents resigned under duress or that the resignation letters were dubious. The agency raises the same argument with respect to the compromise agreements, with quitclaim and release, it entered into with Vinuya, Era, Ladea, Enjambre, Ordovez, Alcantara, Anipan and

Lumanta before the POEA, although it submitted evidence only for six of them. Anipan, Lumanta, Vinuya and Ladea signing one document;19Era20 and Alcantara21 signing a document each. It points out that the agreement was prepared with the assistance of POEA Conciliator Judy Santillan, and was duly and freely signed by the respondents; moreover, the agreement is not conditional as it pertains to all issues involved in the dispute between the parties. On the third issue, the agency posits that the Serrano ruling has no application in the present case for three reasons. First, the respondents were not illegally dismissed and, therefore, were not entitled to their money claims. Second, the respondents filed the complaint in 2007, while the Serrano ruling came out on March 24, 2009. The ruling cannot be given retroactive application. Third, R.A. 10022, which was enacted on March 8, 2010 and which amended R.A. 8042, restored the subject clause in Section 10 of R.A. 8042, declared unconstitutional by the Court. The Respondents‘ Position In their Comment (to the Petition) dated September 28, 2011,22 the respondents ask the Court to deny the petition for lack of merit. They dispute the agency‘s insistence that they resigned voluntarily. They stand firm on their submission that because of their unbearable living and working conditions in Dubai, they were left with no choice but to resign. Also, the agency never refuted their detailed narration of the reasons for giving up their employment. The respondents maintain that the quitclaim and release affidavits,23 which the agency presented, betray its desperate attempt to escape its liability to them. They point out that, as found by the NLRC, the affidavits are ready-made documents; for instance, in Lumanta‘s24 and Era‘s25 affidavits, they mentioned a certain G & A International Manpower as the agency which recruited them — a fact totally inapplicable to all the respondents. They contend that they had no choice but to sign the documents; otherwise, their release papers and remaining salaries would not be given to them, a submission which the agency never refuted. On the agency‘s second line of defense, the compromise agreement (with quitclaim and release) between the respondents and the agency before the POEA, the respondents argue that the agreements pertain only to their charge of recruitment violations against the agency. They add that based on the agreements, read and considered entirely, the agency was discharged only with respect to the recruitment and pre-deployment issues such as excessive placement fees, nonissuance of receipts and placement misrepresentation, but not with respect to post-deployment issues such as illegal dismissal, breach of contract, underpayment of salaries and underpayment and nonpayment of overtime pay. The respondents stress that the agency failed to controvert their contention that the agreements came about only to settle their claim for refund of their airfare which they paid for when they were repatriated. Lastly, the respondents maintain that since they were illegally dismissed, the CA was correct in upholding the NLRC‘s award of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, as enunciated in Serrano. They point out that the Serrano ruling is curative and remedial in nature and, as such, should be given retroactive application as the Court declared in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship‘s Management.26 Further, the respondents take exception to the agency‘s contention that the Serrano ruling cannot, in any event, be applied in the present case in view of the enactment of R.A. 10022 on March 8, 2010, amending Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment restored the subject clause in paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 which was struck down as unconstitutional in Serrano. The respondents maintain that the agency cannot raise the issue for the first time before this Court when it could have raised it before the CA with its petition for certiorari which it filed on June 8,

2010;27 otherwise, their right to due process will be violated. The agency, on the other hand, would later claim that it is not barred by estoppel with respect to its reliance on R.A. 10022 as it raised it before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353.28 They further argue that RA 10022 cannot be applied in their case, as the law is an amendatory statute which is, as a rule, prospective in application, unless the contrary is provided.29 To put the issue to rest, the respondents ask the Court to also declare unconstitutional Section 7 of R.A. 10022. Finally, the respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising only questions of fact, rather than of law. The Court’s Ruling The procedural question We deem it proper to examine the facts of the case on account of the divergence in the factual conclusions of the labor arbiter on the one hand, and, of the NLRC and the CA, on the other.30 The arbiter found no illegal dismissal in the respondents‘ loss of employment in Dubai because they voluntarily resigned; whereas, the NLRC and the CA adjudged them to have been illegally dismissed because they were virtually forced to resign. The merits of the case We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible error and neither did it commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC’s illegal dismissal ruling. The agency and its principal, Modern Metal, committed flagrant violations of the law on overseas employment, as well as basic norms of decency and fair play in an employment relationship, pushing the respondents to look for a better employment and, ultimately, to resign from their jobs. First. The agency and Modern Metal are guilty of contract substitution. The respondents entered into a POEA-approved two-year employment contract,31 with Modern Metal providing among others, as earlier discussed, for a monthly salary of 1350 AED. On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal issued to them appointment letters32 whereby the respondents were hired for a longer three-year period and a reduced salary, from 1,100 AED to 1,200 AED, among other provisions. Then, on May 5, 2007, they were required to sign new employment contracts33 reflecting the same terms contained in their appointment letters, except that this time, they were hired as "ordinary laborer," no longer aluminum fabricator/installer. The respondents complained with the agency about the contract substitution, but the agency refused or failed to act on the matter. The fact that the respondents‘ contracts were altered or substituted at the workplace had never been denied by the agency. On the contrary, it admitted that the contract substitution did happen when it argued, "as to their claim for underpayment of salary, their original contract mentioned 1350 AED monthly salary, which includes allowance while in their Appointment Letters, they were supposed to receive 1,300 AED. While there was a difference of 50 AED monthly, the same could no longer be claimed by virtue of their Affidavits of Quitclaims and Desistance."34 1âwphi1

Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal committed a prohibited practice and engaged in illegal recruitment under the law. Article 34 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:

xxxx (i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor. Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042,35 defined "illegal recruitment" to include the following act: (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment. Second. The agency and Modern Metal committed breach of contract. Aggravating the contract substitution imposed upon them by their employer, the respondents were made to suffer substandard (shocking, as they put it) working and living arrangements. Both the original contracts the respondents signed in the Philippines and the appointment letters issued to them by Modern Metal in Dubai provided for free housing and transportation to and from the jobsite. The original contract mentioned free and suitable housing.36 Although no description of the housing was made in the letters of appointment except: "Accommodation: Provided by the company," it is but reasonable to think that the housing or accommodation would be "suitable." As earlier pointed out, the respondents were made to work from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a meal break of one to one and a half hours, and their overtime work was mostly not paid or underpaid. Their living quarters were cramped as they shared them with 27 other workers. The lodging house was in Sharjah, far from the jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four hours of sleep every workday because of the long hours of travel to and from their place of work, not to mention that there was no potable water in the lodging house which was located in an area where the air was polluted. The respondents complained with the agency about the hardships that they were suffering, but the agency failed to act on their reports. Significantly, the agency failed to refute their claim, anchored on the ordeal that they went through while in Modern Metal‘s employ. Third. With their original contracts substituted and their oppressive working and living conditions unmitigated or unresolved, the respondents‘ decision to resign is not surprising. They were compelled by the dismal state of their employment to give up their jobs; effectively, they were constructively dismissed. A constructive dismissal or discharge is "a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."37 Without doubt, the respondents‘ continued employment with Modern Metal had become unreasonable. A reasonable mind would not approve of a substituted contract that pays a diminished salary — from 1350 AED a month in the original contract to 1,000 AED to 1,200 AED in the appointment letters, a difference of 150 AED to 250 AED (not just 50 AED as the agency claimed) or an extended employment (from 2 to 3 years) at such inferior terms, or a "free and suitable" housing which is hours away from the job site, cramped and crowded, without potable water and exposed to air pollution. We thus cannot accept the agency‘s insistence that the respondents voluntarily resigned since they personally prepared their resignation letters38 in their own handwriting, citing family problems as their common ground for resigning. As the CA did, we find the resignation letters "dubious,"39 not only for having been lopsidedly worded to ensure that the employer is rendered free from any liability, but

also for the odd coincidence that all the respondents had, at the same time, been confronted with urgent family problems so that they had to give up their employment and go home. The truth, as the respondents maintain, is that they cited family problems as reason out of fear that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and their release papers. Only Era was bold enough to say the real reason for his resignation — to protest company policy. We likewise find the affidavits40of quitclaim and release which the respondents executed suspect. Obviously, the affidavits were prepared as a follow through of the respondents‘ supposed voluntary resignation. Unlike the resignation letters, the respondents had no hand in the preparation of the affidavits. They must have been prepared by a representative of Modern Metal as they appear to come from a standard form and were apparently introduced for only one purpose — to lend credence to the resignation letters. In Modern Metal‘s haste, however, to secure the respondents‘ affidavits, they did not check on the model they used. Thus, Lumanta‘s affidavit41mentioned a G & A International Manpower as his recruiting agency, an entity totally unknown to the respondents; the same thing is true for Era‘s affidavit.42 This confusion is an indication of the employer‘s hurried attempt to avoid liability to the respondents. The respondents‘ position is well-founded. The NLRC itself had the same impression, which we find in order and hereunder quote: The acts of respondents of requiring the signing of new contracts upon reaching the place of work and requiring employees to sign quitclaims before they are paid and repatriated to the Philippines are all too familiar stories of despicable labor practices which our employees are subjected to abroad. While it is true that quitclaims are generally given weight, however, given the facts of the case, We are of the opinion that the complainants-appellants executed the same under duress and fear that they will not be allowed to return to the Philippines.43 Fourth. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release)44 between the respondents and the agency before the POEA did not foreclose their employer-employee relationship claims before the NLRC. The respondents, except Ordovez and Enjambre, aver in this respect that they all paid for their own airfare when they returned home45 and that the compromise agreements settled only their claim for refund of their airfare, but not their other claims.46 Again, this submission has not been refuted or denied by the agency. On the surface, the compromise agreements appear to confirm the agency‘s position, yet a closer examination of the documents would reveal their true nature. Copy of the compromise agreement is a standard POEA document, prepared in advance and readily made available to parties who are involved in disputes before the agency, such as what the respondents filed with the POEA ahead (filed in 2007) of the illegal dismissal complaint before the NLRC (filed on March 5, 2008). Under the heading "Post-Deployment," the agency agreed to pay Era47 and Alcantara48 P 12,000.00 each, purportedly in satisfaction of the respondents‘ claims arising from overseas employment, consisting of unpaid salaries, salary differentials and other benefits, including money claims with the NLRC. The last document was signed by (1) Anipan, (2) Lumanta, (3) Ladea, (4) Vinuya, (5) Jonathan Nangolinola, and (6) Zosimo Gatchalian (the last four signing on the left hand side of the document; the last two were not among those who filed the illegal dismissal complaint).49 The agency agreed to pay them a total of P 72,000.00. Although there was no breakdown of the entitlement for each of the six, but guided by the compromise agreement signed by Era and Alcantara, we believe that the agency paid them P 12,000.00 each, just like Era and Alcantara.

The uniform insubstantial amount for each of the signatories to the agreement lends credence to their contention that the settlement pertained only to their claim for refund of the airfare which they shouldered when they returned to the Philippines. The compromise agreement, apparently, was intended by the agency as a settlement with the respondents and others with similar claims, which explains the inclusion of the two (Nangolinola and Gatchalian) who were not involved in the case with the NLRC. Under the circumstances, we cannot see how the compromise agreements can be considered to have fully settled the respondents‘ claims before the NLRC — illegal dismissal and monetary benefits arising from employment. We thus find no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the rejection by the NLRC and the CA of said agreements. Fifth. The agency‘s objection to the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case is of no moment. Its argument that the ruling cannot be given retroactive effect, because it is curative and remedial, is untenable. It points out, in this respect, that the respondents filed the complaint in 2007, while the Serrano ruling was handed down in March 2009. The issue, as the respondents correctly argue, has been resolved in Yap v. Thenamaris Ship‘s Management,50 where the Court sustained the retroactive application of the Serrano ruling which declared unconstitutional the subject clause in Section 10, paragraph 5 of R.A. 8042, limiting to three months the payment of salaries to illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers. Undaunted, the agency posits that in any event, the Serrano ruling has been nullified by R.A. No. 10022, entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, As Amended, Further Improving the Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and For Other Purposes."51 It argues that R.A. 10022, which lapsed into law (without the Signature of the President) on March 8, 2010, restored the subject clause in the 5th paragraph, Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment, contained in Section 7 of R.A. 10022, reads as follows: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker‘s salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement "of" his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.52 (emphasis ours) This argument fails to persuade us. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.53 By its very nature, the amendment introduced by R.A. 10022 — restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 declared unconstitutional — cannot be given retroactive effect, not only because there is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because retroactive application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling entitlement to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective application, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used.54 We thus see no reason to nullity the application of the Serrano ruling in the present case. Whether or not R.A. 1 0022 is constitutional is not for us to rule upon in the present case as this is an issue that is not squarely before us. In other words, this is an issue that awaits its proper day in court; in the meanwhile, we make no pronouncement on it. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 9, 2011 and the Resolution dated June 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353 are AFFIRMED. Let this Decision be brought to the attention of the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration as a

black mark in the deployment record of petitioner Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc., and as a record that should be considered in any similar future violations. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. ________________________________________________________________________________

Nerwin v PNOC, G.R. No. 167057 Republic Act No. 8975[1] expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Government’s direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project. Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law. Antecedents The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22, 2004,[2] viz: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (“NEA”) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the country’s Rural Electrification Project. The said contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEA’s projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit their financial bids. Following a thorough review of the bidders’ qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent [Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award

inspection of private respondent’s *Nerwin’s+ manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEA’s requirements. In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEA’s Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent *Nerwin+ of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the following: a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder; b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc. approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as based on the pre-award inspection conducted. However, on December 19, 2000, NEA’s Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80 “given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of October 2001 fast approaching”. In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder. On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private respondent [Nerwin]. Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied, the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding, NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000. In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (“O-ILAW project”).

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles. Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint.[3] On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents’ reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No. 03106921.[4] On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,[5] as follows: WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court: 1.

DENYING the motion to consolidate;

2.

DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;

3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as counsel for the defendants; 4.

DECLARING defendants in default;

5.

GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case by this Court. This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of P200,000.00. Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order. SO ORDERED.

Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint.

On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents’ motions for reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit answer.[6] Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents’ counsel from representing them.[7] On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,[8] to wit: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondent’s complaint for issuance of temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005.[9] Issues Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues: I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government projects. II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy. III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages. Ruling The petition fails. In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows: It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judge’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.

Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners’ sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003. Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus: Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: xxx (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof; xxx This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge. Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Allarde “As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio and Big Bertha Construction: The term ‘infrastructure projects’ means ‘construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.” Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent Judge’s blatant disregard of a “simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects.” Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e., when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should not have given due course to private respondent’s complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners.[10] The CA’s decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and, secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide: Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts: (a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government project; (b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof; (c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project; (d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project. This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought. If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.

Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect. The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government. It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the amount of P40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v. Hidalgo,[11] where this Court stated: The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its abovestated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975 against a government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately disregarded this Court’s various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgosand National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project. Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Laviña faulted a judge for grave misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus: xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability. In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them. Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent. The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply properly. IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension.[12] Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwin’s other submissions superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be avoided. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.[13] It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it is established that: (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or (b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.[14]

The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,[15] the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz: As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute aprima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity

for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[16] Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in Saulog v. Court of Appeals,[17] it is enough that: xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a “sampling” intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court. Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.[18] In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts.[19] Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law.[20] When that is done, the exercise of sound discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse.[21] Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,[22] for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,[23] or to decide controverted facts.[24] It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,[25] further injury,[26] and irreparable harm[27] or injustice[28] until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful decision.[29] Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.[30] It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.[31] WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit. The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance. SO ORDERED.

____________________________________________________________________________________ Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (1814a)

D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001

FACTS: On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable. Held: The decision of the CA is affirmed. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. SAME!

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages

after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

AUJERO VS. PHILCOMSAT HYPTE R. AUJERO, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. Facts: It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter’s Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after 34 years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved, effective September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of P274,805.00. On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of P9,439,327.91. Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat’s favor. The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits, which is equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is provided under the Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees. Issue: Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat. Held: While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.[29]Considering the petitioner’s

claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver. While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law. Villareal v. People Facts:

The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20] While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused. As far as the law is concerned, our lawmakers learned a lot from the hazing-death of Aqula Legis neophyte Lenny Villa in 1991. The Anti-Hazing Law was enacted 4 years thereafter, in 1995, and criminalized certain activities done during hazing. [1] (Hazing, of course, is still perfectly legal.) The Anti-Hazing Law is necessary as shown by the February 2012 Supreme Court decision on the consolidated cases related to Lenny Villa’s death. The case reminds us of how weak the applicable laws were in 1991. Of the 35 accused and charged for Lenny’s death, only 5 Aquilans: Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson, have been found “guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code”. Not only that, the 5 were only ordered to serve a maximum term of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional.[2] As for the other accused: Efren de Leon and Artemio Villareal are already dead; RULING: In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term “personal penalties” refers to the

service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term “pecuniary penalties” (las pecuniarias )refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e.,civil liability ex delicto).However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action. Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

FF Cruz v HR Industries Contracts; rescission of contract. The rescission referred to in Article 1191 of the Civil Code, more appropriately referred to as resolution, is on the breach of faith by the defendant, which is violative of the reciprocity between the parties. The right to rescind, however, may be waived, expressly or impliedly. While the right to rescind reciprocal obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be expressly provided in the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same. Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC had agreed to continue the performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. In view of the provision of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC is deemed to have effectively waived its right to effect extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI. Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the Subcontract Agreement, was not justified in implementing a work stoppage. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp.; G.R. No. 187521. March 14, 2012

Reciprocal Obligations – Rescission March 14, 2012F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP. FACTS: FFCCI entered into a contract with DPWH for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct. FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HRCC for the supply of materials,labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project.Pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay within 30 days from receipt thereof. The parties agreedthat the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completedworks as approved by FFCCI. Eventually, FFCCI did not pay the amount stated in the secondand third progress billing, even though HRCC submitted its progress billins claiming that it hadalready paid HRCC for the completed works for the period stated therein. HRCC demanded payment but still was not paid so HRCC halted the construction of the subcontracted project. ISSUE: Whether FFCCI’s non-compliance with their contract make HRCC rescission valid RULING NO, HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract agreementThe determination of the validity of HRCC’s work stoppage depends on a determination of thefollowing: first, whether HRCC has the right to extrajudicially rescind the SubcontractAgreement; and second, whether FFCCI is already barred from

disputing the work stoppage of HRCC. HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement.The right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations. Article 1191 of theCivil Code pertinently reads:Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocalones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.Theinjured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosenfulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.Contrary to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the CA, we find that HRCC had no rightto rescind the Subcontract Agreement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waivedsuch right in its Subcontract Agreement, Hence, in spite of the existence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the course of the Subcontract Agreement, HRCC hadagreed to continue the performance of its obligations pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. Inview of the provision of the Subcontract Agreement quoted above, HRCC is deemed to haveeffectively waived its right to effect extrajudicial rescission of its contract with FFCCI Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the Subcontract Agreement, was not justified inimplementing a work stoppage _______________________________________________________________________________

Article 18 Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked. FC Art. 254. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Thornton vs. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598August 16, 2004, J. Corona Facts: Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married in Manila. A yearlater, respondent gave birth to a baby girl. However, after three years, respondent grew restless andbored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in anightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. Whenever petitioner was out of the country,respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefreeways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera withoutnotifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta.Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City butthis was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner thenwent to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did notfind them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification3thatrespondent was no longer residing there.Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showingcalls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitionerthen filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writof habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave familycourts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and

Batas Pambansa 129 (The JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980):Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was re-stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides: Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:xxx xxx xxxb. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation tothe latter. Issue: WON there is an implied repeal of RA 7902 (expanding the juris of ca) by RA 8369 (family court) Held: Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more thanone sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in thelanguage of a statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity,injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result ingrave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" underthe Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate mustprevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA8369.Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored: The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof mustsurface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute mustbe so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known theexisting laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts mustbe resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonizeand give effect to all laws on the subject." The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further,it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible sinceRA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeascorpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read inharmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.Petition granted

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

DECISION BRION, J.: I.

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the

ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]? 2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? 3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.] 1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections. In this case, the ARMM elections, although called ―regional‖ elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a ―local‖ election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the

President certifies to the necessity of the bill‘s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President‘s certification of necessity in the following manner: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President‘s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.] 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the

rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. The above considerations leave only Congress‘ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are: First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President‘s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be ―elective and representative of the constituent political units.‖ This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. [T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

PECSA VS. PECSA FACTS: Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vesselbound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March

1975. They did not live together as petitioner wasstill a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after themarriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own housein Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they couldstay together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year oldRyan, and 9-year old Richie.It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of "psychological incapacity" toperform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He wascruel, violent and a habitual drinker. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in thepresence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode. Two months later, petitioner decided toforgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out asexpected. Indeed, matters became worse. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed againstrespondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to elevendays of imprisonment.Petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Petitioner sued respondent before theRegional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought thecustody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court anddeclared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have thedecision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, promulgated on 13 February 1997, shouldhave no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines thereinoutlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of theSantos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal Issue:

Whether or not psychological incapacity is present in this case

RULING: The phrase "psychological incapacity" borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, untilthe relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention.At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant adeclaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychologicalincapacity.The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family6that the Statecherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totallyterminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quitegiven up, neither should we. Petition is denied. De castro vs JBC FACTS: The movants present their arguments on the main issue at several levels. Some argue thatthe disputed constitutional provisions – Article VII, Section 15 and Article VIII, Section 4(1) –are clear and

speak for themselves on what the Constitution covers in banningappointments during the election period.23 One even posits that there is no conflict becauseboth provisions can be given effect without one detracting against the full effectiveness of the other,24 although the effect is to deny the sitting President the option to appoint in favorof a deferment for the incoming President’s action. Still others, repeating their originalarguments, appeal to the principles of interpretation and latin maxims to prove their point.Issues:Whether or not Section 15, Article VII of the Phil Consti. does not lead to an interpretationthat exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointmentsRULING: The court denies the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters beingthereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, andaccordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela ruling,It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolvingthat because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbentPresident, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successorof the retiring Chief JusticeHad the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. Theycould not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easilyand surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equallyapplicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that theprohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within twomonths before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or ActingPresident’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended pointin order to suit the purposes of any quarter Ty v Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 188302 THE PETITION The petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to apply G.R. No. 137533 under the principle of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment and stare decisis, and ignoring the November 26, 2007 minute resolution in G.R. No. 177865[64] and the April 7, 2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608[65] that reiterated the Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No. 137533. THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT The respondent submits that the petitioner is estopped from amending the issues since she never raised the pendency of the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 in her CA petition, which was based only on the Court’s rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. No. 177865. THE ISSUE The core issues boil down to whether the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 137533 applies as stare decisis to the present case OUR RULING

We grant the petition. The case at bar presents the same issue that the Court already resolved on April 7, 2009 in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, wherein we applied the Court’s November 22, 2002 decision in G.R. No. 137533, one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against the respondent arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance case subject of the present petition, that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. We quoted therein the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 137533, thus: The Bank alleges that the sale and twenty-year lease of the disputed property were part of a larger implied trust "warehousing agreement." Concomitant with this Court's factual finding that the 20-year contract governs the relations between the parties, we find the Bank's allegation of circumstances surrounding its execution worthy of credence; the Bank and Tala entered into contracts of sale and lease back of the disputed property and created an implied trust "warehousing agreement" for the reconveyance of the property. In the eyes of the law, however, this implied trust is inexistent and void for being contrary to law.[66] An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this Court has held that "where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud."[67] x x x [T]he bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached x x x . Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price". This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while we find the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, we cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the 'clean hands' doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.[68] (italics supplied.) The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no affirmative relief should be given to one against the other. The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further collect rent from the Bank. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical relation such as a trust to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law.Neither the Bank nor Tala came to court with clean hands; neither will obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands.[69](emphases ours; citation omitted)

G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, is binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine ofstare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established."[70] Under the doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.[71] The doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from res judicata, which is based upon the judgment.[72] The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same [issue].[73] (italics supplied) It bears stressing that the basic facts of the present case and those of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 are the same. Clearly, in light of G.R. No. 137533 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, which the Court follows as precedents, the present action for reconveyance cannot prosper. It is the Court's duty to apply the previous rulings in G.R. No. 137533 and in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608 to the present case. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner.[74] WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107104 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2506-MN before Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. _____________________________________________________________________ RPC Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

PEOPLE VS. RITTER Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by Appellantwho inserted a foreign into her vagina causingher death. Criminal case and civil case was filedagainst the defendant.Issue: WON def liable on both cases.Held: No. Only with regard to the civil case.Crim case requires evidence beyond reasonabledoubt. While civil cases require onlypreponderance of evidence.Source: Criminal offenses. Acts or omissionpunished by the law.**Institution of Civil Case while pending criminalcase, is reservation to the right to file theformer necessary or can file anytime within thependency of the criminal case

EODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents. DECISION REYES, J.: Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. The Case At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Resolution2dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a) reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioner‘s appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union. The Undisputed Facts The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenshipbefore the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner‘s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner‘s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. Ruling of the RTC In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the petitioner‘s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the RTC‘s decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner): 1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union; 2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and 3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant. SO ORDERED.9 Ruling of the COMELEC The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its Order10dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution11 dated September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en bancconcurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appealfiled by the private respondents. The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as follows: 1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit; 2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and 3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010. SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied) Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc. The Petitioner’s Arguments The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her. She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225. She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and 2010 elections. Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution pending appeal of the RTC‘s judgment. The Issues Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner‘s eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement. The Court’s Ruling I. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration.

The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz: Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit: Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en banc‘s prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it. We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioner‘s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement. Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc‘s exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place. The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the petitioner‘s appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioner‘s argument would be virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en banc‘s adjudicatory powers. More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.14 II. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. We cannot subscribe to petitioner‘s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only to the court of origin.

There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC‘s authority to order discretionary execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15 Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. III. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioner’s eligibility to hold public office. The fact that the petitioner‘s qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit: (1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that: Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz: Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours) Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.17 The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.

IV. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus: Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: "I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion." Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one‘s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz: Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours) Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court‘s duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one such instance. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible meanings.20 The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines, thus: The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn

renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship; xxxx The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours) Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship. We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey.26 Even a resort to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz: INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos. Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative. Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether they can indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship. Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized public officer.

Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn renunciation of their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular provision. In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its elections. Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill. Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they will also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country. Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the residency and registration requirements as provided for in the Constitution. Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship. Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision because Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of public officers. In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma requirement. On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who became foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore qualified to run for the presidency, the vicepresidency or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship. As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended by not considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered as repatriated citizens.

In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the latter‘s comments on the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert back to the status of being naturalborn citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino citizenship. Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship. On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill. Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens. Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens. In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born citizens. In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of one‘s original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens. On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-born citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the matter.27 The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier‘s statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in the records. The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier‘s statement ought to be understood within the context of the issue then being discussed, that is – whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress. It was Representative Javier‘s position that they should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that

natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement. Petitioner‘s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-acquisition of one‘s status as a naturalborn Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation. It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers‘ primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides: Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that one‘s statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false.28 Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer‘s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis ours) Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the

official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law.30 The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same. 1âwphi 1

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship. This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.32 The petitioner‘s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.34 The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35 In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether

they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office. Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. ________________________________________________________________________ Consti Article 12 Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being. The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain RULES OF COURT RULE 129 Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a) Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (n) Martinez v.Van Buskirk 18 Phil. 79 Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.

MASTER AND SERVANT; DRIVERS OF HORSES; CUSTOM AND USAGE; NEGLIGENCE.—A coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for aconsiderable time, during which the animals had shown no disposition to becomeunruly, left his team as usual and was assisting in unloading the wagon when thehorses bolted and running into the plaintiffs' carriage caused personal injuries to theplaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It was further shown that, to leave teams underlike

circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the custom of drivers inthe city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers. Held: That acts, theperformance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have beengenerally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into acustom, can not be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under thecircumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team whileassisting in unloading his wagon ________________________________________________________________________________ RULE 22 COMPUTATION OF TIME Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Sec. 2. Effect of interruption. Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof. The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.

RAC Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise. Commissioner vs. Primetown (PDF) Petition for review; computation of period for filing petition for review. Petitioner assailed, among others, the resolution issued by the Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for review for being filed out of time. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner filed a petition for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday. However, petitioner prayed in his petition for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. Petitioner’s filing with the Court of Appeals a petition for extension of time to file petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition (reckoning the extension from May 21, 2007 [Monday] and not from May 19, 2007 [Saturday]) is in violation A.M. No. 00-2-14SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted). Alfredo Jaca Montajes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183449, March 12, 2012.

RPC Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

RAYRAY V. CHAE KYUNG LEE (1966) [ G. R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966 ] LAZARO B. RAYRAY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CHAE KYUNG LEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. FACTS: Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan, Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a night club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him. Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules

of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer. ISSUE: WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. RULING: Yes. In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res. The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,[2] and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.[3] The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.[4] Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.[5] This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.[6] Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.[7] plaintiff herein is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and - under plaintiff's theory -still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein. FC Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Private recruitment agencies; solidary liability. Republic Act No. 8042 provides for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals in any and all money claims against them. Such provision is automatically incorporated by law in the contract for overseas employment and is a condition precedent for its approval. This is to afford the OFWs immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Moreover, such obligation is not coterminous with the agreement between the local agent and its foreign principal so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Thus, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile. ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010

Tuna vs. PHI Kingford

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,[1] petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, prays that the Resolution[2] dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award[3] against respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,[4] on the ground that petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue.[5]

The Antecedents

On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the “licensor”), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the “Yamaoka Patent”),[6] and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel

Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the “sponsors”/“licensees”)[7] entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[8] pertinent provisions of which read:

1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those patents, and collecting royalties.

The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with Licensor.

xxx

4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. (“TPI”), a corporation established in the State of California, in order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.

5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit funds that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated to spend in connection with the implementation of this Agreement.

6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the purpose of being elected as member of the board of directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors according to their respective equity shares. [9] xxx

The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement[10] dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement[11] dated 14 July 2003.

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.[12] Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against respondent.[13] Pertinent portions of the award read:

13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10). (A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20% of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]

(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;][14] and

(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx

xxx[15]

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.

At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss.[16] After the court denied the motion for lack of merit,[17] respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion.[18] Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding “*t+he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the motion.”[19] Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.[20]

Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.

Issue

The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue.

Our Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed the petition. Thus:

Herein plaintiff TPI’s “Petition, etc.” acknowledges that it “is a foreign corporation established in the State of California” and “was given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent” and “was assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties” in the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it does not have a license to do business in the Philippines.

There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has been doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by the concerned government agency of the Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from “five (5) Philippine tuna processors*,+ namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc.” This being the real situation, TPI cannot be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines.” A priori, the “Petition, etc.” extant of the plaintiff TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to sue in the Philippines.[21]

The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),[22] the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),[23]as none of these specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the following:

In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act

of 2004], New York Convention, or Model Law. It is for this reason that TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the Philippines’ international obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in the relevant laws.[24]

Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York Convention and the Model Law on the other?

In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law, viz-a-viz other special laws. Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,[25] this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code and applied the New Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:

Koruga’s invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that: “The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail – generalia specialibus non derogant.” (Emphasis supplied)[26]

Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,[27] this Court held:

Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail—generalia specialibus non derogant.[28]

Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted “to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes.”[29] It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.[30]

Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law.

In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by specifically providing:

SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. - The New York Convention shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.

xxx

SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.

It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:

Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. International commercial arbitration shall be governed by the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”) adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx.”

Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the affirmative.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:

Article V

1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:

(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution,[31] which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that “*a+ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.” The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5.[32] Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where “the place of arbitration is in the Philippines,”[33] it is specifically required that a petition “to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement”[34] available to the parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for “judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction”[35] after arbitration has already commenced should state “*t+he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued.”[36]

Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this

case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider is the wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,[37] to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts.[38]

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.

Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,[39] petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model Law prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement.[40] Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.

II

The remaining unmeritorious.

arguments

of

respondent

Kingford

are

likewise

First. There is no need to consider respondent’s contention that petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be considered “doing business” in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.

Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 November 2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule 45.[41]

Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the case,[42] we opt to relax the rules following the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,[43] to wit:

[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not triers of facts.[44] A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we,

because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright.[45]

Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised should be seriously considered.[46] Surely, there is a need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy of the State embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx

Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a quo where its recognition and enforcement is being sought.

Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review on certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court.[47] We, however, find petitioner’s reply in order. Thus:

26. Admittedly, reference to “Branch 67” in petitioner TPI’s “Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45” is a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by respondent

Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.

27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPI’s motion was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.[48]

All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Amos vs. bellis (PDF) TAYAG vs. Benguet FACTS:  



March 27, 1960: Idonah Slade Perkins died in New York City August 12, 1960: Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings appointing ancillary administrator Lazaro A. Marquez later on substituted by Renato D. Tayag On January 27, 1964: CFI ordered domiciliary administrator County Trust Company of New York to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines 33,002 shares

of stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors  When County Trust Company of New York refused the court ordered Benguet Consolidated, Inc. to declare the stocks lost and required it to issue new certificates in lieu thereof  Appeal was taken by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleging the failure to comply with its bylaws setting forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed so it cannot issue new stock certs. ISSUE: W/N Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court order because of its by-laws

HELD: NO. CFI Affirmed  Fear of contigent liability - obedience to a lawful order = valid defense  Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts  Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.  corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...."It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. Cannot ignore the source of its very existence Kazuhiro Hasegawa vs. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177

FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering & construction supervision of the BongabonBaler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract. Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD. Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens. HELD: NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the

most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper basis for

a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008) [ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]

FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as ―Special Sales Representative Agreement,‖ the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and theres, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed. As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the lawsof the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most ―convenient‖ or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner‘s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court‘s desistance.

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.

On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur. On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse,[1] hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083[2] or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner‘s motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof. In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases. The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in places where there are no shari’a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari’a court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.

Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[3] Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.[4] Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.[5] There should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.[6] In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court‘s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.[7] Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff‘s causes of action.[8] Petitioner argues that the shari’a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083,[9] which provides -

Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply. (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable

in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested with original andexclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated. SO ORDERED.

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS v . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES andSAMSON R. PACASUM, SR. . G.R. No. 193902. June 1, 2011NACHURA, J .:Procedural History: These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. MariettaD. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order 2 of the Regional TrialCourt (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed bypetitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075 Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites.Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge PerfectoLaguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari‟a Circuit District

Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18,1992, as follows Statement of Facts: This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife,herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as theCode of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.When this case was called for hearing both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus(Mohamad) de Guzman interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which they have freelyentered into on December 18, 1983. This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the hereinparties is fully convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly convertedto the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibilityof reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. The allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a bigamousmarriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus deGuzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] haslong been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was enteredinto by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance with PD 1083, their marriage isdissolved and consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover,the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman underthe Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does notmodify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by them under PD 1083 Issues: Whether or not a divorce decree under Muslim law gives the spouses the right to remarry. Answers: Yes. Since the parties are both converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslimwedding, then they are covered by the Muslim code or Muslim law. The spouses who had adivorce under such law is entitled to remarry other person. Reasoning: If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim lawis complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized inaccordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merelyceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code willapply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law,that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage issolemnized in accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occurs when theCivil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the maleparty is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effectsof irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial bond,entitling one to remarry.It stands to reason therefore that Z amoranos‟ divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed byan Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari‟a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy Holding: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in CriminalCase No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED