Civil Law 1 Case Digest in Order

Case in Persons and Family Relations Aranas vs. Mercado, Gr. No. 156407, January 15, 2014 Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma). Emigdio and Teresita were married before 1988 and so, their property regime is governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. During the lifetime of Emigdio, he inherited and acquired real properties from her deceased mother. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty and such deed of assignments were executed days before he died. Thelma then petitioned the RTC in Cebu City for the appointment of Teresita as administrator of Emigdio’s estate. Following an order from the court, Teresita filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased but excluded therefrom the properties mentioned to have been already assigned to Mervir Realty. Thelma moved that the list of inventory be amended to include all the properties of the deceased even if already assigned. The trial court issued an order that mandates Teresita to re-do the inventory made. Teresita appealed to the CA to which the CA ruled in her favour. Issue: Whether the properties that had already been assigned to Mervir Realty should be included in the inventory of the administrator of the estate considering the fact that the same were conjugal properties of the deceased and his surviving spouse. Held: Yes, the properties, even though assigned to Mervir Realty should be included in the inventory for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. ―xxx with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains. For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence. In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were, and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory. Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.‖

G.R. No. 183918

January 15, 2014

FRANCISCO LIM, Petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, now known as the BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.,* Respondent. Facts: Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an irrevocable power of attorney in favour of his brother Franco Lim, authorizing the latter to mortgage his share in the property covered by by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 57176,4 which they co-owned. By virtue of said power, Franco Lim was able to obtain two loans from Banco de Oro and Equitable PCI Bank which was secured by the property mentioned on two different instances. The first loan from Banco De Oro had been fully paid but the payment of the loan from Equitable PCI Bank defaulted. Consequently, EPCIBank foreclosed the mortgaged and was able to obtain a Writ of Possession of the same. Francisco Lim opposed the issuance of said writ and thereby applied for a TRO as well as preliminary injunction from the trial court subject to the posting of a bond. The trial court ruled in favour of Francisco Lim finding that his signature on the mortgage contract was forged. The CA reversed the lower court’s ruling. One of the arguments posted by Francisco Lim in his petition is that, the respondent bank should have been alerted by the fact that the subject mortgage contract was executed without the consent of his wife. Issue: Whether the argument pertaining to the absence of the petitioner’s wife consent on the mortgage contract bears material point for voiding the said contract. Held: The argument is immaterial. The absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case. We are not unaware that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife;51 that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone;52 and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.53 However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption. Worth mentioning, in passing, is the ruling in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals 54 to wit: The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final [decree] of registration. Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows: "Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor.

G.R. No. 184621

December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent. Facts: The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts. On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her in-laws, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court The RTC ruled in favour of respondent, which, on appeal by Petitioner, was upheld by the CA. Issues: 1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and (2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead. Held: 1. Yes. Certiorari lies to challenge the decision of the trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired. xxx

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code: "ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules." In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states: "ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.) In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads: "ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory." By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 2. The Stringent Standard for a Declaration of Presumptive Death has not been fully substantiated. In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following: (1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and (2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry. These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead. Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses. Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."

G.R. No. 170022

January 9, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent. Facts: Cesar married Lolita in 1979. In order to support his family, Casar went to Saudi Arabia in 1954 and while he was away, he learned that his wife is having an illicit relationship with Alvin. Sometime in 1991, it was alleged that Lolita left the conjugal children with their two children and has since then lived with Alvin. Despite such knowledge, Cesar maintained his support to his family. In 1995, Cesar filed suit for a declaration of nullity of marriage between him and Lolita. One of the evidences presented to pursue his case was based on the report of Dr. Flores of the National Center for Mental Health which finds Lolita to be suffering from some interpersonal problems. But the report also states that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness". The RTC ruled in favour of Cesar. On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed RTC’s ruling. Upon a motion for reconsideration however, the CA reversed itself. Issue: Whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. Held: None. In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling. In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness. Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

Tiggangay vs. Judge Wacas, April 1, 2013 Facts: During the May 14, 2007 election, Tiggangay and Dagadag ran for a mayoralty position at Tanudan, Kalinga. Tiggangay lost at a slim margin of 158 votes. Following Dagadag’s proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest and the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas. Judge wacas ruled in favour of Dagadag with a modification that Tiggangay actually lost by 97 votes. On appeal to the COMELEC Second Division, the RTC decision was affirmed. The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration. It was then at this point that Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality. He alleged that he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint which was concurred in by the CA. Issue: 1. How does a person become a relative by affinity or consanguinity according to the provisions of the New Civil Code and Family Code? 2. Whether the invocation of the said affinity or relationship of Dagadag (the winning candidate) to that of Judge Wacas (who rendered the decision on the electoral protest) is true, and if in the affirmative, does it have a material bearing to actually indict the said Judge for impropriety and partiality and even, to prevent him from hearing the electoral protest? Held: 1. Affinity denotes ―the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.‖ It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as ―in-laws,‖ or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like. Affinity may also be defined as ―the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife’s blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa.‖ Indeed, ―there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis.‖ 2. In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.

Beckett vs. Judge Sarmiento, January 30, 2013 Facts: Complainant Becket, an Australian national was married to Eltesa, a Filipina. In 2001, their marriage begot them a child and named him Geoffrey Becket Jr. However, the marriage did not last long as series of events which materialized into suits were filed. Eltesa charged Becket with a violation of RA 7610 and filed an action for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. On his part, Becket filed a criminal case for adultery against Eltesa. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. However, a compromise agreement was entered into which contains among others, that all civil and criminal actions filed will be dropped upon the assumption of parental custody of Beckett over Geoffrey with the grant of visitorial rights to Eltesa. However, during the Christmas season of 2011, Eltesa failed to return Geoffrey to the complainant thereby prompting the latter to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Proceedings ensued at the sala of Judge Sarmiento to which the latter ordered for an investigation to be conducted by an officer of the DSWD. Based on the findings of said officer, the grant of parental custody was granted to Eltesa as it was established that Geoffrey, who during that time is already 9 years old, chose to stay with his mother for the reason that his father often leaves him with other people and that, he was at one time locked in his room without food. Complainant now alleges that Judge Sarmiento acted arbitrarily because a judgment based on a compromise agreement over the exercise of parental custody has already been adjudged since 2006. Issue: Whether parental custody of a child grants the parent chosen by the court a permanent right thereto. Whether, based on the compromise agreement entered into by the parents (Beckett and Eltesa) which was confirmed by the court, constitutes res judicata in a judgment involving custody of a minor child. Held: No. Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr., in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15, 2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his father, is that respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, ―is not permanent and unalterable [and] an always be re-examined and adjusted.‖ And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be regarded as ―permanent and unbending,‖ the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the latter’s best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.

G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent. Facts: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio. She stated that in consideration of $2,000.00, Fringer will help her process her application for American citizenship. The RTC ruled that their marriage is one entered into in jest and therefore void. On appeal by the OSG, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Issue: Whether a marriage contracted into by two individuals for the sole purpose of acquiring Amercian citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent. Held: The marriage is valid. Under said Article 2 (of the Family Code), for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26 Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013 NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent. Facts: On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF). Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child. The testimonial evidence of the owner of the apartment where petitioner allegedly housed respondent when she was pregnant was one of the basis for respondent’s claim for support. The RTC ruled in favour of respondent to which the CA affirmed on appeal. Issue: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence (the testimonial evidence of the owner of apartment, the Baptismal Certificate, the Birth Certificate which however does not contain the necessary signature of petitioner) sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner. Held: Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth (Exhibit ―A-1‖) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father. As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit ―B‖) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity. The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits ―E‖ and ―F‖ showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account (Exhibit ―C‖) from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity. As to the handwritten notes (Exhibits ―D‖ to ―D-13‖) of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code

which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

G.R. No. 204169

September 11, 2013

YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS. Facts: Petitioner Iwasawa was married to private respondent Felisa Gangan on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. Thereafter, the couple migrated to Japan. In July 2009, petitioner learned from respondent herself that the latter has been married to Raymond Arambulo in 1994 and that, it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 35 (4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. The trial court ruled that the public documents presented by petitioner, i.e. Marriage Certificate between him and respondent; Marriage Certificate between respondent and Raymond Arambulo; Death Certificate of Raymond Arambulo; and Certification from the NSO stating that respondent indeed contracted two marriages while the first one was still subsisting, were not competent proofs to establish the nullity of the second marriage as the NSO Officer did not physically appear before the court to make her testimony. A motion for reconsideration was denied through an Order.

Issue: whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight. Held: There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.

Gr. No. 161921, July 17, 2013 Joyce Ardiente, Petitioner vs. Spouses Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., Respondents Facts: Petitioner Ardiente and Spouses Pastorfide entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the latter undertakes to pay the amount of Php 70,000.00 as consideration of a unit held by the former at Emily Homes Balulang, Cagayan De Oro City. It was also stipulated in the MOA that electric and water bills will now be transferred on the account of Pastorfide. However, the conflict aroused when petitioner, without informing respondents, requested that the water line of the latter be cut off by Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD). COWD on its part, without due notice, acceded to petitioner’s request. When Ma. Theresa learned of such transaction, she paid the water bills at the instant and requested that their water line be reconnected. However, despite such payment, Manager Gonzales failed to fulfil his obligation. Complaint for damages were filed before the RTC by respondents against Ardiente and COWD. The trial court ruled in favour of the spouses Pastorfide. On appeal, the CA affirmed said ruling. Issue: Whether, despite the stipulation in the MOA between Petitioner Ardiente and Respondent Spouses Pastorfide that the latter will undertake to have the water account to their names and despite failure to do so, Ardiente may still be held liable for abuse of rights under Article 19 of the New Civil Code. Held: Yes. Ardiente may still be held liable. It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith. The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

G.R. No. 196049

June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS. Facts: On January 23, 2004, Petitioner Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Marinay in the Philippines. However, the marriage did not go well with them because of petitioner’s parents. Fujiki could not therefore bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. Eventually, the two lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese national, Maekara and in the same year, they got married in Quezon City. Marinay went with Maekara to Japan. However, Marinay suffered physical abuse in the hands of Maekara and so she left him and started to contact Fujiki again. Marinay and Fujiki were able to establish their relationship again and through Fujiki’s help, Marinay was able to obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared her marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC of Quezon City fo the recognition of the said foreign judgment obtained in Japan. The RTC dismissed the petition based on the ground that according to AM No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of absolute Nullity of Void Marriages) because according to said court, the petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. In this case, Fujiki was not considered to be the husband being referred to in the law thus, he has no legal personality. Issue: Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. Held: Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage. Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting

marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. Facts: Benjamin Bangayan was married to Azucena Alegre in 1973 to which they begot three children. In 1979, Benjamin had illicit relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan. In 1981, Azucena went to the United States. On December of 1982, Benjamin and Sally contracted marriage despite knowledge of the latter that the former still has a valid and subsisting marriage. Since Sally’s father was opposed to the relationship so in order to appease him, she brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City to sign a purported marriage contract. In this marriage, they begot two children and acquired real properties which mostly contain the words ―married to Sally‖. The relationship between Sally and Benjamin soon ended in 1994 when the former went to Canada together with their children. Sally therein filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin on the other hand, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. The trial court ruled that indeed, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is void and nonexistent. It further held that absent any showing that the real properties acquired during the cohabitation were acquired through their joint efforts, then the same is considered to belong to Benjamin. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling except with regard to proper identification of some of the properties alleged to belong to Benjamin alone. Issues: 1. Whether a marriage that is declared void ab initio by a trial court is inconsistent with the ruling declaring it as non-existent as well? 2. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is bigamous within the ambit of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code considering the fact that it was declared void ab initio due to an irregularity in one of the formal requisites of marriage, i.e. a valid marriage license. 3. Considering the circumstances of the case, what provision governs the property relations of Sally and Benjamin? 4. Whether the Transfer Certificate of Titles containing the words ―married to‖ is indicative of co-ownership between sally and Benjamin. Held: 1. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

2. the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. 3. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 4. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove coownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

Gr. No. 202370, September 23, 2013 Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr., Petitioner, vs. Eden Villena Aguila, Respondent Facts: Juan Sevilla Salas Jr., was married to Eden Villena Aguila on September 7, 1985. On June 7, 1986, Aguila gave birth to their daughter. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling and communication between them stopped. On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of the Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they have no properties whatsoever. The RTC rendered a decision declaring the nullity of marriage of Salas and Aguila which further provides for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any. It was only on September 10, 2007 that Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion regarding two registered properties she discovered in the name of ―Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina S. Salas.‖ Nine days later, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry of Appearance requesting for an Entry of Judgment of the RTC decision where no conjugal property was involved. Later on, the RTC rendered an Order mandating for the partition of properties which was earlier discovered by Aguila. Salas opposed thereto but his motion for reconsideration as well as appeal to the CA was futile. He maintains the fact that the RTC decision wherein Aguila stated that they have no conjugal properties was a judicial admission on her part. Rubina Salas on her part, filed a motion to intervene stating that the discovered properties were hers to which the CA did not adhere to. Issues: Whether the properties later on discovered by Aguila in the name of Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina S. Salas, belongs to the common-law marriage of Juan and Rubina or to that of the conjugal property of Juan and Aguila. What is the property regime or governing rule that is appropriate to consider in the case at bar? Held: The discovered properties belong to the conjugal property of Juan and Aguila. In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favour of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share

shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules on coownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

Gr. No. 183896, January 30, 2013 Syed Azhar Abbas, Petitioner, vs. Gloria Goo Abbas, Respondent Facts: It has been established from the case that Petitioner Abbas filed before the RTC of Pasay for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Respondent Abbas. A purported Marriage Contract between Syed and Gloria stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. In order to support his claim that there was no valid marriage license obtained, Syed secured a Certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to which the latter attested that the said marriage license was issued to a certain Arlindo Getaldo and Myra Mabilangan. Several witnesses testified that there had been indeed a marriage ceremony held in the respondent’s house who among others were the mother of respondent, the solemnizing officer, and Atty. Sanchez (principal sponsor and who was relied upon by the respondent to secure the marriage license). The RTC rendered a decision declaring the marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The CA reversed the trial court holding that based on the facts where several people testified that a wedding ceremony actually took place and the signing of the contracting parties of the marriage contract are proofs that a there was marriage between petitioner and respondent. Issue: Whether a valid marriage license exist thereby proving the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent. Held: Negative. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, ―The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).‖ Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.

Gr. No. 182760, April 10, 2013 Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Robert P. Narceda, Respondent Facts: Respondent Narceda was married to Marina on July 22, 1987 who was at the time of the wedding was only 17 years and 4 months old. Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and thereafter, there was never any communication between them. Narceda looked for her but to no avail. He was later informed that Marina was already living with a Singaporean husband. In his desire to remarry, respondent filed with the RTC on May 16, 2002 a Petition for a Judicial Declaration of the Presumptive Death and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted the said petition to which the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the OSG’s petition and reasoned that the decision of the trial court in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is governed by Title XI of the Family Code particularly Article 247 which provides that the said decision is immediately final and executory. Issue: Whether a decision granting a petition for judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or absence is immediately final and executor and the availment of the wrong remedy of appeal by the OSG resulted in the lapse of the period to question the said decision. Held: We agree with the CA. The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code, because the judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Article 247, are immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. In support of its stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino), in which this Court held: In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are ―immediately final and executory.‖ It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, ―the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.‖ Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are ―immediately final and executory,‖ the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead" may no longer be entertained by this Court.

G.R. No. 171557

February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent Facts: Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 in Zamboanga del Norte. Their marriage begot them two children. After leaving for the Army, Rodolfo alleged that Natividad left the conjugal home and lived with two different men at two different times. He further avers that despite efforts to work the marriage out, the same proved to be futile. Thus he filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage before the RTC alleging that Natividad is phsychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations. Trial ensued and based on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Zalsos finding that both of Natividad and Rodoldo were psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations and further stating that such was already exhibited even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, the RTC declared the marriage void. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision upon appeal by petitioner. Issue: Whether the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad were void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Held: Negative. "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, whose salient points are footnoted hereunder. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos. Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that therein respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. In the same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;

that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature." The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1âwphi1 Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.

G.R. No. 171904

August 7, 2013

BOBBY TAN, PETITIONER, vs. GRACE ANDRADE, PROCESO ANDRADE, JR., CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE, ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, GLORY ANDRADE, MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE,RESPONDENTS. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 172017 GRACE ANDRADE, CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE, ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA, MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE, PETITIONERS, vs. BOBBY TAN, RESPONDENT Facts: Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20 situated in Cebu City (subject properties) which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu (Simon). When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00. The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name. Fourteen years later, Rosario’s children (petitioners in Gr. No. 172017) filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC. In their complaint, one of the arguments they maintain is that, since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name. The RTC ruled that the subject transaction was an equitable mortgage, that the subject properties were exclusive properties of Rosario, and that the action has already prescribed. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling except that it reversed its finding as to the nature of the properties. The CA held that the properties were conjugal. Issue: Whether the nature of the subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario thereby allowing her to dispose of the same without any inhibitions or whether they pertain to the conjugal properties of Rosario and her deceased husband thereby entitling the children to retain their ownership therewith. Held: The subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario. In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the

subject deed of sale was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario. Rationale: Article 160 of the Civil Code xxx states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

Succession Case Digest Tiggangay vs. Judge Wacas, April 1, 2013 Facts: During the May 14, 2007 election, Tiggangay and Dagadag ran for a mayoralty position at Tanudan, Kalinga. Tiggangay lost at a slim margin of 158 votes. Following Dagadag’s proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest and the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas. Judge wacas ruled in favour of Dagadag with a modification that Tiggangay actually lost by 97 votes. On appeal to the COMELEC Second Division, the RTC decision was affirmed. The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration. It was then at this point that Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality. He alleged that he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint which was concurred in by the CA. Issue: 3. How does a person become a relative by affinity or consanguinity according to the provisions of the New Civil Code and Family Code? 4. Whether the invocation of the said affinity or relationship of Dagadag (the winning candidate) to that of Judge Wacas (who rendered the decision on the electoral protest) is true, and if in the affirmative, does it have a material bearing to actually indict the said Judge for impropriety and partiality and even, to prevent him from hearing the electoral protest? Held: 3. Affinity denotes ―the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.‖ It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as ―in-laws,‖ or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like. Affinity may also be defined as ―the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife’s blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa.‖ Indeed, ―there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis.‖ 4. In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.

Case Digest in Property January 15, 2014 SPOUSES BERNADETTE and RODULFO VILBAR, Petitioners, vs. ANGELITO L. OPINION, Respondent. Facts: Spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty executed a Contract to Sell over Lot 20 in Airmen’s Village, Las Pinas City on July 10, 1979 while a Deed of Absolute Sale was also executed between the two parties, together with another co-purchaser, over Lot 21. These lands were covered by TCTs but were never registered in the name of the spouses even after full payment of the loan contracted by the spouses with the Development Bank of the Philippines and the further cancellation of the real estate mortgage over Lot 20 which stood to secure the loan obtained by the spouses from the said bank. Angelito Opinion on the other hand, maintains that he became the owner of the subject lots through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale when the Gorospes failed in their obligation to pay the loan contracted by them with the former on January 12, 1995. The TCTs that were acquired by Opinion through said extrajudicial foreclosure sale were later on cancelled and new ones issued in his name. Opinion avers that he never questioned the title of the Gorospes and the continued settlement of Spouses Vilbar was tolerated because of his knowledge that the same is just for tenancy. The trial court ruled in favor of Opinion and the CA concurred therewith. Thus, this petition. Issue: Who between the parties has a better right over the subject lots? Held: The Court ruled in favor of Opinion. xxx the Court recognizes "[t]he settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the [properties] involved [were] duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land." This Court also treats Opinion as a buyer in good faith. Admittedly, Opinion stated that prior to the execution of the mortgage, he only went to Lots 20 and 21 once and saw that the properties had occupants. He likewise admitted that he never talked to the spouses Vilbar and Guingon to determine the nature of their possession of the properties, but merely relied on the representation of Gorospe, Sr. that the occupants were mere tenants. He never bothered to request for any kind of proof, documentary or otherwise, to confirm this claim. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the CA that Opinion is not required to go beyond the Torrens title, viz: Contrary to the [Spouses Vilbar’s] claim, [Opinion] was never remiss in his duty of ensuring that the Gorospes had clean title over the property. [Opinion] had even conducted an investigation. He had, in this regard, no reason not to believe in the assurance of the Gorospes, more so that the claimed right of [Spouses Vilbar] was never annotated on the certificate of title covering lot 20, because it is settled that a party dealing with a registered land does not have to inquire beyond the Certificate of Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or protecting his interest, for all that he has to look into and rely on are the entries in the Certificate of Title.87 Inarguably, Opinion acted in good faith in dealing with the registered owners of the properties. He relied on the titles presented to him, which were confirmed by the Registry of Deeds to be authentic, issued in accordance with the law, and without any liens or encumbrances

G.R. No. 190106

January 15, 2014

MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, Petitioner, vs. FILOMENO GARCIA, substituted by his heirs, namely, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, LIZA GARCIA-GONZALEZ, THERESA GARCIA-TIANGSON, MARIVIC H. GARCIA, MARLENE GARCIA-MOMIN, GERARDO H. GARCIA, GIDEON H. GARCIA and GENEROSO H. GARCIA, and ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, Respondents Facts: Sometime in 1990, Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. FGCI alleged that there was failure on Villasi’s part to pay the accomplishment billings so the former filed a suit for collection of sum of money against the latter. Villasi, on her part, maintains that it was FGCI that failed to complete the construction of the said building. The trial court ruled in favour of FGCI. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s ruling and even found that Villasi paid an excess amount to FGCI. After the judgment became final and executory, Villasi moved for the execution of the judgment in her favour. The sheriff, in order to satisfy the judgment levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). The Spouses Garcia then filed a terceria in order to assert their rights as third party claimants. Issue: When there is a clear showing that the land in question is owned by the third party claimants (Spouses Garcia) while the building thereon is owned by the FGCI, does ownership vests only upon one of them? Held: No. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, 32 such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal. In Carbonilla v. Abiera, we denied the claim of petitioner that, as the owner of the land, he is likewise the owner of the building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to buttress his position: To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.34 xxx The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are

factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

G.R. No. 193517

January 15, 2014

THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S. MAXIMO, ALBERTO A. SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A. SARILI, Petitioners, vs. PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS MOJICA,Respondent Facts: Respondent Lagrosa claims that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by a TCT and that, he has been reliosiously paying the real estate taxes therefor since its acquisition on November 29, 1974. He further alleged that he is a resident of California and that during his vacation in the Philippiens, he discovered that a new certificate of title of the subject property was issued in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo by virtue of a falsified Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 16, 1978 purportedly executed by him and his wife. Spouses Sarili, on the other hand maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value, having purchased the subject property from Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed and presented a Special Power of Attorney to sell/dispose of the same, and in such capacity, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 20, 1992 notwithstanding the fact that there has been an irregularity in the acknowledgement made before the Notary Public. Issue: Whether Spouses Sarili, in building a house on the subject property of the case, having knowledge of the fact of the irregularity in their Deed of Sale, may be considered as builders in good faith within the contemplation of the New Civil Code? Held: The Spouses are not builders in good faith. The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built 59 on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code which respectively read as follows: ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower. ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land. xxxx ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) xxxx To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that

there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. 60 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 61 As for Sps. Sarili, they knew – or at the very least, should have known – from the very beginning that they were dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject property considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any further investigation on Ramos’s capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to proceed with its purchase and even built a house thereon. Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject property in bad faith under legal contemplation. The case is therefore remanded to the court a quo for the proper application of the above-cited Civil Code provisions.

G.R. No. 175874

December 11, 2013

HEIRS OF CIPRIANO TRAZONA, Namely: FRANCISCA T. MATBAGON, NATIVIDAD T. ABADIANO, CARLITO C. TRAZONA; and Heirs of EDELBERTO C. TRAZONA represented by his daughter DOMICINA T. ARANAS, ELADIA T. ALICAMEN (Now Deceased) Substituted by DOMINGO ALICAMEN, LUPECIO ALICAMEN, REBECCA ALICAMENBALBUTIN, ELSEI ALICAMEN, GLENN ALICAMEN, LENNEI ALICAMEN-GEONZON, DANILO ALICAMEN, JOVELYN ALICAMEN-VILLETA, JIMBIE ALICAMEN and HERMOGENES C. TRAZONA (Now Deceased) Substituted by LILYBETH TRAZONAMANGILA, GEMMA TRAZONA, ELIZALDE TRAZONA, BOBBY TRAZONA, and PALABIANA B. TRAZONA, Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DIONISIO CANADA, Namely: ROSITA C. GERSALINA, CONCEPTION C. GEONZON, DANIEL CANADA, GORGONIO CANADA, LEOPOLDO CANADA, SUSANA C. DUNGOG, LUZVIMINDA C. TABUADA, AND CEFERINA CANADA; PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR of Cebu and MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR of Minglanilla, Cebu, Respondents. Facts: Cipriano Trazona is the owner of a property located in Minglanilla, Cebu, known as Lot 5053-H is covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764 and has an area of 9,515 square meters. He acquired said property from the government since 1940. Since then, he has taken possession of the land, cultivated it, and paid taxes thereon. When Dionisio Canada bought an adjacent land in 1949 from one Pilar Diaz, it was found that the former encroached on a small portion of Lot 5053. A confrontation before the barangay happened in 1952 wherein Dionisio offered to buy the portion encroached upon to which Cipriano refused. In 1956, Cipriano gave his permission to Dionisio for the latter to build a house thereon to which it still stands. No ejectment case was instituted during Cipriano’s lifetime against Dionisio and his family. The controversy arose in 1997 when the heirs of Cipriano found out that there has been a cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00764 and another one issued in the name of Dionisio in 1996. On 28 July 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint20 against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959, recovery of possession and ownership, damages, and payment of attorney’s fees. The RTC ruled in favour of the heirs of Cipriano stating that the signature of Cipriano in the Deed of Sale had been forged. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court. Issue: Whether Dionisio, knowing fully well of the temporary arrangement between him and Cipriano in occupying the portion of the subject property, acted as a builder in good faith and if in the affirmative, what expenses is he entitled of? Held: Dionisio is a builder in bad faith thus, he is only entitled to necessary expenses. The actual possession of Lot No. 5053-H by petitioners has been properly ruled on by the RTC. Much has been made by the CA of the fact that respondents' house was standing on the property. However, petitioners have explained that the house was erected only after Cipriano permitted it. Dionisio was then well aware that this temporary arrangement may be terminated at any time. Respondents cannot now refuse to vacate the property or eventually demand reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses under Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, because the provisions apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. 52 Persons who occupy land by virtue of tolerance of the owners are not possessors in good faith. 53 Thus, the directive of the RTC for respondents to demolish their residential house on Lot No. 5053-H was also proper.

G.R. No. 194538

November 27, 2013

MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons him, Petitioner, vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.

claiming

rights

and

interests

under

Facts: Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. The property has a total land area of 156 hectares and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007) 15807. The lot that petitioner presently occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles above-mentioned. On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D. 293), which invalidated the titles of respondent and declared them open for disposition to the members of the Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI). On the basis of said Decree, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, a member of the MHAI, occupied Lot No. 32 and subsequently built houses there. On the other hand, respondent was constrained to allow the members of MHAI to also occupy the rest of Pangarap Village. On 29 January 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National Treasurer (Tuason), which declared P.D. 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. By virtue of an affidavit executed by Pelagio Juan in favour of petitioner (but only after 7 years from the time the Tuazon ruling was promulgated), petitioner built structures on the subject lot and actually occupied the same. The respondent, after an unheeded demand, was constrained to file a case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner. The MTC ruled in favour of the respondents and ordered the petitioner to vacate the property. On appeal, the RTC reversed MTC’s ruling. The CA, on further appeal, reversed the ruling of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC. Issue: Whether Petitioner Millarosa is a builder in good faith . Held: Negative. Petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in good faith. Petitioner also argues that he is a builder in good faith for want of knowledge of any infirmity in the promulgation of P.D. 293. Being a builder in good faith, he believes that he is entitled to the reimbursement of his useful expenses and that he has a right to retain possession of the premises, pending reimbursement of the value of his improvements to be proven during trial, in accordance with Article 545 of the Civil Code. Upon perusal of the records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of that ruling. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, its existence should be on one hand, x x x matter of mandatory judicial notice; on the other, ignorantia. legis non excusat. He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 171937

November 25, 2013

CERILA J. CALANASAN, represented by TEODORA J. CALANASAN as Attorney-inFact, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VIRGILIO DOLORITO and EVELYN C. DOLORITO, Respondents. Facts: Petitioner Calanasan took care of her orphan niece Respondent Evelyn Dolorita since the latter was a child. In 1982, when Evelyn was already married to Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been mortgaged for Php 15,000.00 subject to the following conditions: that Evelyn must redeem the land and that the petitioner was entitled to possess and anjoy the property as long as she lived. Evelyn accepted the donation and its terms in the same deed. Evelyn was able to fulfil the two conditions set forth in the deed. On August 15, 2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J. Calanasan, complained with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be revoked; in their answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of ingratitude. The petitioner died while the case was pending with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores J. Calanasan, substituted for her. After the petitioner had rested her case, the respondents filed a demurrer to evidence. According to them, the petitioner failed to prove that it was Evelyn who committed acts of ingratitude against the petitioner; thus, Article 765 of the New Civil Code found no application in the case. The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents herein. On appeal, the CA affirmed the TC’s decision but with modification. The CA found that the donation was inter vivos and onerous thus should be governed by the rules on ordinary contracts and Article 765 finds no application in the case. Issue: 1. What rule properly governs the above-mentioned donation? 2. If in the affirmative, since the redemption price paid by the respondent exceeded that which is required by law, does the petitioner have the right to cancel the donation made on the excess portion? Held: 1. The CA is correct in its findings that the rule on ordinary contracts governs the present case. A pure/simple donation is the truest form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory type has for its purpose the rewarding of the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a consideration for future services; it also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, whose value is inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous donation imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation; this is made for a valuable consideration whose cost is equal to or more than the thing donated.12 In De Luna v. Judge Abrigo,13 we recognized the distinct, albeit old, characterization of onerous donations when we declared: Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa L9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495."14 In the same case, we emphasized the retention of the

treatment of onerous types of donation, thus: "The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides: Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."15 We agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property forP15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect to the onerous portion of the donation. 2. No, the petitioner does not have the right to have the donation pertaining to the gratuitous portion cancelled. Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517

September 18, 2013

HILARIA BAGAYAS, Petitioner, vs. ROGELIO BAGAYAS, FELICIDAD BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS, MICHAEL BAGAYAS, and MARIEL BAGAYAS, Respondents Facts: Petitioner Hilaria Bagayas is found to be the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia. This fact was established by the RTC of Tarlac when petitioner instituted an action for partition and annulment of sale of a purportedly falsified deed of sale (which resulted to the issuance of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658) executed by the said parents in favour of their biological children, Rogelio and Orlando. The falsification pertains to the forgery of Eligia’s signature as it was alleged that it is impossible for her to sign the deed as she was already dead the time it was executed. The RTC ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a mere surplusage, as the subject lands belonged exclusively to Maximino who could alienate the same without the consent of his wife. It was further held that even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not ask for partition of the subject lands as she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale. Also, the action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando. A motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC through a resolution. Petitioner did not appeal the Resolution and so, it became final. The petitioner then instituted twin petitions before the same RTC for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include her name and those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of one-third of the lands covered therein. The petitions were dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Issue: Whether the declaration by the trial court that petitioner is indeed the adopted child of the deceased adoptive parents resulted to her right or interest to the subject lands thereby entitling her as co-owner to ask for partition in a petition for annulment of the falsified deed of sale. Held: xxx While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because the present controversy involves not the amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, the prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues. Relief under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or hat there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such ruling. Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529.

G.R. No. 181359

August 5, 2013

SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners, vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.

Facts: An unnotarized Deed of Sale was executed by Alberto Garcia in favour of Juanito Muertegui over a parcel of unregistered land located in Biliran, Leyte del Norte in 1981. Juanito;s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. And brother Domingo Jr. Took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on said lot. However, in the year 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr., through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and a new Certificate of Title was thereafter issued in the name of Atty. Sabitsana. The heirs of Domingo Sr., when the latter passed away, applied for registration of the lot under the Public Land Act. The same was opposed by Atty. Sabitsana. Issue: 1. Whether the action to quiet title is lodged with first level courts considering the fact that the assessed value of the land is only Php 1,230.00. 2. What law applies to the case at bar? Is it Article 1544 of the New civil Code or Act 3344? 3. Pursuant to the proper law applicable to the case at bar, who, then is the rightful owner of the subject lot? Held: 1.xxx an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules. 2.What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.

3.Respondent has a better right to the lot. The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet. The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code, is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability. And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.

Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.

G.R. No. 200858

August 7, 2013

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, vs. CORAZON B. BAELLO, WILHELMINA BAELLO-SOTTO, AND ERNESTO B. BAELLO, JR., RESPONDENTS. Facts: In 1951, Pedro Baello and Nicanora Baello inherited from their mother a land situated in Sitio Talisay, Municipality of Caloocan. In a decision, the RTC established that indeed, Pedro and Nicanora were the lawful owners of the land and an order for partition (2/3 and 1/3 respectively was rendered by the court. Pursuant to said order, the Director of the Bureau of Lands issued the respective Original Certificate of Title. Soon, Pedro and Nicanora died and the former was survived by 32 heirs. In 1974, during the Martial Law regime of President Marcos, a Presidential Decree was issued which aims to transform lands into industrial/commercial and residential purposes. One of the lands overtaken by the National Housing Authority (NHA) pertains to the lands that the Baellos have title to. After the EDSA People Power, the heirs (respondents herein) moved that the lands in which they have title to be partitioned to them. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the heirs of the Baellos. The courts even ordered that damages be awarded to the heirs because of the forcible and unlawful taking of their lands. Issue: Whether the NHA acted in bad faith when it forcibly ousted the Baello and Rodriguez families from their lands pursuant to a Presidential Decree by former President Marcos. If in the affirmative, what is the consequence of it (NHA) being a builder in bad faith?

Held: In light of our foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that the petitioner acted in gross bad faith when it took possession of the property in 1976, introduced improvements thereon and disposed of said property despite knowledge that the ownership thereof pertained to the respondents. In determining whether a builder acted in good faith, the rule stated in Article 526 of the New Civil Code shall apply. ART. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing. In this case, no less than the trial court in Civil Case No. C-169 declared that the petitioner not only acted in bad faith, but also violated the Constitution: And the Court cannot disregard the fact that despite persistent urging by the defendants for a negotiated settlement of the properties taken by plaintiff before the present action was filed, plaintiff failed to give even the remaining UNAWARDED lots for the benefit of herein defendants who are still the registered owners. Instead, plaintiff opted to expropriate them after having taken possession of said properties for almost fourteen (14) years. xxx

Again, it was already established that the NHA acted in bad faith.The NHA also raised the same issue in G.R. No. 143230. Having established that the NHA acted in bad faith, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the award of damages and attorney’s fees to respondents.

The issue of reimbursement was also raised in G.R. No. 143230 where the NHA alleged that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that it was a builder in bad faith and therefore, not entitled to reimbursement of the improvement it introduced on the property. Article 449 of the Civil Code applies in this case. It states: Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right of indemnity. Thus, under Article 449 of the Civil Code, the NHA is not entitled to be reimbursed of the expenses incurred in the development of respondents’ property.

G.R. No. 170677

October 24, 2012

VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. UNIWIDE SALES, INC. and DOLORES BAELLO TEJADA, Respondents. Facts: This case involves a certain property allegedly owned by two different owners. The established facts go to say that Petitioner VSD Realty & Development Corporation is a holder of a title of a land which it previously purchased from one Felisa Bonifacio which on the other hand had gotten her title by virtue of an order authorizing the segregation of the same in Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. C-3288. Respondent Dolores Baello Tejada, on the other hand, avers that the subject land was bequeathed to her through a will by her adoptive mother. When her will was duly approved by the probate, she then moved to register the title in her name to which a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued. She then contracted a lease agreement with Uniwide wherein the latter constructed a building thereon in the amount of Php 200,000,000.00. The trial court ruled in favour of VSD Realty on the basis of the testimonial evidences it had presented in court during the proceedings when it instituted a suit against the respondents herein for the annulment of title held by the latter as well as reconveyance of the subject property. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and instead held that the burden of proving whether an opponent’s title to the property rests on the evidence of the plaintiff to which VSD Realty failed to substantiate. Issues: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that substantial evidence had not been presented by herein petitioner in order to establish the fact that it is indeed the rightful and lawful owner of the subject property. 2. Whether Uniwide, being a lessee of the subject land, would be entitled to reimbursement of the improvements established therein if it is proved that the lessor (Baello) does not actually have a rightful title to the property. Held: On the first issue, the court of Appeals indeed erred in reversing the trial court’s ruling:

The Court holds that petitioner was able to establish through documentary and testimonial evidence that the technical description of its Torrens title covers the property that is being occupied by respondent Uniwide by virtue of a lease contract with respondent Baello. A comparison of the technical description of the land covered by the title of petitioner and the technical description of the land covered by the title of Baello shows that they are not the same. TCT No. 285312 registered in the name of petitioner reads: IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan Psd-706, LRC x x x situated in Balintawak, Caloocan, Rizal. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the SE., along line 2-3 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of the subd. plan and on the SW., NW., along line 3-4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6, Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 69 deg. 07’E., 1,306.21m. from BLLM No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46’W., 25.16 m. to point 2; S 65 deg. 116.78 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 12’W., 23.85 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 57’E. 127.39 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR

SQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,834.80) more or less. All pts. referred to are indicated on plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. old points bearings true; date of original survey, Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922.33 On the other hand, TCT No. (35788) 12754, registered in the name of respondent Dolores Baello, states: IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, Philippines, bounded and described as follows: Un terreno (Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original Psu-2345 de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal. Linda por el NE, con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por el SE, con el lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision; por el SO, con el Lote No. 7; y por el NO, con propiedad de Ramos Dane (Lote No. 1). x x x midiendo una extension superficial de DOS MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CUATRO METROS CUADRADOS CON OCHENTA DECIMETROS (2,834.80) mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original, 8 al 27 de Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911, y de la subdivision 29 de Diciembre de 1924. (Full technical description appears on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10300/T-42).34 From the foregoing, the title of petitioner covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706, while the title of respondent Baello covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot No. 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706. It should be pointed out that the verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A based on its technical description showed that Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A is the lot being occupied by Uniwide.35 Baello claims that her Lot No. 3-A is the same as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. However, the claim cannot be given credence because of the disparity of the lot description, and the technical description of the land covered by Baello’s title shows that it is not the same as the technical description of the land covered by petitioner’s title. Moreover, the technical description of the land covered by Baello’s title, or the boundaries stated therein, are not the same as those indicated in the survey plans36 which she adduced in evidence. Since Baello’s title covers a different property, she cannot claim a superior right over the subject property on the ground that she registered her title ahead of petitioner. As petitioner has proven that its title covers the property in dispute, it is entitled to recover the possession thereof, the basis of which shall be discussed subsequently. The recovery of possession of the subject property by petitioner is not dependent on first proving the allegation that Baello’s title is spurious and the annulment of Baello’s title, since Baello’s title does not cover the subject property and petitioner has proven its title over the subject property and the identity of the property. On the second issue, Uniwide, being a lessor, is not entitled to reimbursement.

The Court holds that petitioner was able to establish through documentary and testimonial evidence that the technical description of its Torrens title covers the property that is being occupied by respondent Uniwide by virtue of a lease contract with respondent Baello. A comparison of the technical description of the land covered by the title of petitioner and the technical description of the land covered by the title of Baello shows that they are not the same. TCT No. 285312 registered in the name of petitioner reads: IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd. plan Psd-706, LRC x x x situated in Balintawak, Caloocan, Rizal. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D, on the SE., along line 2-3 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, both of the subd. plan and on the SW., NW., along line 3-4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6, Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being N. 69 deg. 07’E.,

1,306.21m. from BLLM No. 1, Caloocan thence; S. 01 deg. 46’W., 25.16 m. to point 2; S 65 deg. 116.78 m. to point 3; N. 23 deg. 12’W., 23.85 m. to point 4; N. 65 deg. 57’E. 127.39 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR SQUARE METERS AND EIGHTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,834.80) more or less. All pts. referred to are indicated on plan and are marked on the ground by P.S. old points bearings true; date of original survey, Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922.33 On the other hand, TCT No. (35788) 12754, registered in the name of respondent Dolores Baello, states: IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that certain land situated in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, Philippines, bounded and described as follows: Un terreno (Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original Psu-2345 de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia de Rizal. Linda por el NE, con el Lote No. 3-D del plano de subdivision; por el SE, con el lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision; por el SO, con el Lote No. 7; y por el NO, con propiedad de Ramos Dane (Lote No. 1). x x x midiendo una extension superficial de DOS MIL OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CUATRO METROS CUADRADOS CON OCHENTA DECIMETROS (2,834.80) mas o menos. x x x la fecha de la medicion original, 8 al 27 de Septiembre, 4 al 21 de Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911, y de la subdivision 29 de Diciembre de 1924. (Full technical description appears on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10300/T-42).34 From the foregoing, the title of petitioner covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706, while the title of respondent Baello covers a parcel of land referred to as Lot No. 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-706. It should be pointed out that the verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A based on its technical description showed that Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A is the lot being occupied by Uniwide.35 Baello claims that her Lot No. 3-A is the same as Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A. However, the claim cannot be given credence because of the disparity of the lot description, and the technical description of the land covered by Baello’s title shows that it is not the same as the technical description of the land covered by petitioner’s title. Moreover, the technical description of the land covered by Baello’s title, or the boundaries stated therein, are not the same as those indicated in the survey plans36 which she adduced in evidence. Since Baello’s title covers a different property, she cannot claim a superior right over the subject property on the ground that she registered her title ahead of petitioner. As petitioner has proven that its title covers the property in dispute, it is entitled to recover the possession thereof, the basis of which shall be discussed subsequently. The recovery of possession of the subject property by petitioner is not dependent on first proving the allegation that Baello’s title is spurious and the annulment of Baello’s title, since Baello’s title does not cover the subject property and petitioner has proven its title over the subject property and the identity of the property.

G.R. No. 192383

December 4, 2013

ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. LUCILA C. DELA CRUZ, Respondent. Facts: Petitioner Isabelo Dela Cruz and his sisters/respondents Lucila and Cornelia were co-owners of a 240-square meter land in Las Pinas which they bought on an installment basis from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid for the down payment and religiously paid for the monthly amortizations. Upon Lucila’s plea to help out a financially distressed cousin (Corazon), the siblings agreed to make use of the lot as collateral and security for a loan from the Philippine Veterans Bank. In order to make this possible, Lucia paid the P8,000 outstanding balance to Gatchalian Realty and had the deed of title registered in her name. The title was then mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. However, Corazon was not able to pay for the loan and the mortgaged lot was then foreclosed by the bank. The foreclosed lot was however redeemed by Lucila. In 2002, Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing all her share, interest and participation to her brother Isabelo and her niece Emelinda. Isabelo then filed an action for partition seeking the segregation of his portion of said lot and the corresponding title in his name. This action was, however, contested by Lucila claiming that the waiver she executed ceding ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a condition that their family problems would be resolved. She claims that this condition did not happen and that she had every right to revoke the waiver. This was made evident by the revocation she made through an affidavit dated September 24, 2004. The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and this was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule that Lucila’s cession of half of the property to Isabelo through waiver did not have the effect of making him part owner of the property with a right to demand partition. Held: In partition, the court must first determine the existence of co-ownership. The action will not lie if the plaintiff has no proprietary interest in the subject property. Indeed, the rules require him to set forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title to the property. It would be premature to order partition until the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. xxx contrary to the position that the CA and the RTC had taken, Lucila’s waiver was absolute and contained no precondition. The pertinent portion of the affidavit of waiver reads: That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my share, interest and participation in so far as it refer to the one half portion (120 SQ. M.) of the above-parcel of land, with and in favor of my brother ISABELO C. DELA CRUZ, of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at Las Pinas City, and the other half portion (120 SQ. M.) in favor of my niece, EMELINDA C. DELA CRUZ, also of legal age, single, Filipino and residing at Sto. Rosario Hagonoy, Bulacan; x x x x18 Evidently, Lucila would not have used the terms "to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive…" if her intent was to set a precondition to her waiver covering the property, half to Isabelo and half to Emelinda. If that were her intention, she could have stated, "subject to the condition that everything is put in proper order, I hereby waive..." or something to that effect. When she instead said, "That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive my share, interest and participation" in the two halves of the subject property in favor of Isabelo and Emelinda, Lucila merely disclosed what motivated her in ceding the property to them. She wanted to put everything in proper order, thus she was driven to make the waiver in their favor. Lucila did not say, "to put everything in proper order, I promise to waive my right" to the property,

which is a future undertaking, one that is demandable only when everything is put in proper order. But she instead said, "to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive" etc. The phrase "hereby waive" means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his coowner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its partition.

G.R. No. 189316

June 1, 2013

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES BERNARD and CRESENCIA MARANON, Respondents. Facts: The facts disclose that Spouses Rodolfo and Emilie Montealegre and Philippine National bank (PNB) entered into a loan agreement whereby as security for such, a mortgage was executed over a 152-square meter parcel of land located at Cuadra-Smith Streets, Downtown, Bacolod (subject lot) allegedly owned by said Spouses as evidenced by a TCT No. T-156512. When the spouses failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the subject lot and during the foreclosure sale, emerged as the winning bidder therein. However, before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent Spouses Bernard and Cresencia Maranon filed before the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Spouses Montealegre, PNB, the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental. The complaint alleges that spouses Maranon are the rightful owners of the subject lot and that, through a falsified Deed of Sale, spouses Montealegre were able to have the former’s TCT cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the latter. After trial, the trial court ruled that indeed, ownership of the subject lot belongs to spouses Maranon. The court further ordered that the lien of PNB over the subject lot, being a mortgagee in good faith should be respected. However, the foreclosure proceedings had over the subject lot was declared null and void because the spouses Montealegre were not the rightful owners and mortgagers in the first place. The controversy arose when spouses Maranon petitioned the trial court that the rentals paid by one Paterio Tolete (Tolete), who is one of the tenants who had built a structure on the subject lot, be transferred to their account from that of the PNB. The RTC ruled in their favour to which, on appeal by PNB, was affirmed by the CA except for the finding that PNB was a mortgagee in good faith. Issue: Considering the fact that Spouses Maranon’s ownership of the subject lot had long been decided by the trial court in 2006, who between the said spouses and PNB is entitled to rentals (an accession to the principal) paid by one of the tenants in the property? Held: The spouses Maranon are the ones entitled to the rentals. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. The rightful recipient of the disputed rent in this case should thus be the owner of the subject lot at the time the rent accrued. It is beyond question that Spouses Marañon never lost ownership over the subject lot. This is the precise consequence of the final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 7213 rendered by the RTC on June 3, 2006 whereby the title to the subject lot was reconveyed to them and the cloud thereon consisting of Emilie’s fraudulently obtained title was removed. Ideally, the present dispute can be simply resolved on the basis of such pronouncement. However, the application of related legal principles ought to be clarified in order to settle the intervening right of PNB as a mortgagee in good faith. The protection afforded to PNB as a mortgagee in good faith refers to the right to have its mortgage lien carried over and annotated on the new certificate of title issued to Spouses Marañon as so adjudged by the RTC. Thereafter, to enforce such lien thru foreclosure proceedings in case of non-payment of the secured debt, as PNB did so pursue. The principle, however, is not the singular rule that governs real estate mortgages and foreclosures attended by fraudulent transfers to the mortgagor. Rent, as an accessory follow the principal. In fact, when the principal property is mortgaged, the mortgage shall include all natural or civil fruits and improvements found thereon when the secured obligation becomes due as provided in Article 2127 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor, or it passes into the hands of a third person. Consequently, in case of non-payment of the secured debt, foreclosure proceedings shall cover not only the hypothecated property but all its accessions and accessories as well. xxx absent an adverse claimant or any evidence to the contrary, all accessories and accessions accruing or attached to the mortgaged property are included in the mortgage contract and may thus also be foreclosed together with the principal property in case of non-payment of the debt secured. Corollary, any evidence sufficiently overthrowing the presumption that the mortgagor owns the mortgaged property precludes the application of Article 2127. Otherwise stated, the provision is irrelevant and inapplicable to mortgages and their resultant foreclosures if the mortgagor is later on found or declared to be not the true owner of the property, as in the instant case.1âwphi1 It is beyond question that PNB’s mortgagors, Spouses Montealegre, are not the true owners of the subject lot much less of the building which produced the disputed rent. The foreclosure proceedings on August 16, 1991 caused by PNB could not have, thus, included the building found on the subject lot and the rent it yields. PNB’s lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains to the subject lot alone because the rule that improvements shall follow the principal in a mortgage under Article 2127 of the Civil Code does not apply under the premises. Accordingly, since the building was not foreclosed, it remains a property of Spouses Marañon; it is not affected by non-redemption and is excluded from any consolidation of title made by PNB over the subject lot. Thus, PNB’s claim for the rent paid by Tolete has no basis. It must be remembered that there is technically no juridical tie created by a valid mortgage contract that binds PNB to the subject lot because its mortgagor was not the true owner. But by virtue of the mortgagee in good faith principle, the law allows PNB to enforce its lien. We cannot, however, extend such principle so as to create a juridical tie between PNB and the improvements attached to the subject lot despite clear and undeniable evidence showing that no such juridical tie exists.

Gr. No. 171555, April 17, 2013 Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises, Petitioners, vs. Wilfredo Rivera, substituted by Ma. Lydia S. Rivera, Frida Leah S. Rivera and Wilfredo S. Rivera, Jr. Facts: During the lifetime of respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, they acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by TCT nos. T-22290 and T-30557. When Loreto died, he was survived by Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza. Eleven years after, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of their one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all properties in favour of Evangeline and Brigida Liza while Wilfredo waived his rights to the same with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. A decade after, Wilfredo filed with th MTCC of Lipa a complaint for forcible entry against petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. The MTCC ruled against Wilfredo which was affirmed by the RTC upon appeal. However, on motion, RTC reversed itself finding that indeed, it is Wilfredo who has the right to possess the subject properties. The CA affirmed with modifications and one of such is that, it held that it was impossible for Evangeline to actually physically reside in the subject property as evidenced by her residence address while it has not been controverted that Wilfredo has been occupying the land for many years. Issue: Who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior physical possession of the property? Held: Wilfredo is the one who has been in prior physical possession of the property notwithstanding the fact that the nature of his possession is that of a usufructuary. xxx possession in ejectment cases ―means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.‖ In a forcible entry case, ―prior physical possession is the primary consideration[.]‖ ―A party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.‖ ―[T]he party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror.‖ xxx In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and that the petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.