Civ Pro Digest
Case Doctrines Civil Procedures Table...
GR No 209535
Case Lee vs Chong
Ruling Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. two concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by prior judgment; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Ernesto Inc vs Compas
elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies. It is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land registration cases is conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It expressly provides: Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system. Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses Under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis pendentia); [c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and [d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription. In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent and available at the time of the filing of their first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss. Similar to the above-cited case, EOI erroneously filed a second motion to dismiss raising improper venue as basis—one which is susceptible of being waived—after the first motion to dismiss was denied. EOI only insisted that the proper venue was the RTC where the original case in which the decree or registration was entered and not with the RTC Las Piñas after its first motion to dismiss alleging the failure to state a cause of action was filed and denied. Consequently, the ground of improper venue was
Heirs of Vda de Abella vs Heir of Abella
Roasters Phil. Inc vs Gaviola
deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by EOI because the issue on venue was not raised in its prior motion to dismiss. First, the direct resort to the court violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. Although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, such concurrence did not give the petitioners unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Jurisprudence and practice dictate that a direct resort to the court of last resort and must remain so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. Secondly, certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted in the instances authorized by the Rules of Court. Under Sec.1, Rule 65, the conditions authorizing the resort to certiorari are that: 1) the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioners disregarded these conditions. They could not deny that they had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There is no exceptional and compelling reason that clearly and specifically set out in the petition to warrant a direct recourse to the court. An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit that the dismissal of the complaint due to failure to prosecute "shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits unless otherwise declared by the Court."
Teofilo B. Adolfo, V. Fe. T. Adolfo
In the herein questioned order of dismissal, there was no mention of any reason why the ruling should not be considered as an adjudication on the merits. The respondent, therefore, had the right to appeal the dismissal of their complaint. They could have timely done so. But, as already discussed, they filed the Notice of Appeal only after the lapse of the reglementary period to do so. Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”While Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said case. While there is nothing irregular with this, the trial court however disregarded the fact that its decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It should have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.One of the issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution
of his case. Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner’s request for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered the pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. After all, CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-2683; an appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower court. On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. Marra
Leonardo Villalon vs Renato Lirio
A petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when there is neither appeal, nor plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal; it is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. Lirio's mere invocation of the words "surreptitiously and fraudulently" does not make the allegation particular without specifying the circumstances of Villalon's commission and employment of fraud, and without delineating why it was fraudulent for him to remove Semicon's properties in the first place. The allegation of fraud would have been averred with particularity had Lirio alleged, for example, that Villalon removed the equipment under the false pretense that they needed repair and refurbishing but the equipment were never returned; or that Villalon removed the merchandise because Semicon needed to sell them in exchange for new supplies but no new supplies were bought. No such allegation was ever made. Thus, the RTC could not have properly ruled on whether there was a need to pierce the veil of corporate entity precisely because the complaint failed to state with particularity how Villalon committed and employed fraud.
St. Mary Crusade v. Hon. Teodoro Riel
Finally, even if we grant that the allegations of fraud were averred with particularity, the RTC's finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action against Villalon was only an error of judgment and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment, which is properly reviewed through an appeal, is not necessarily equivalent to grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions defined by the Rules of Court. These conditions are: 1. the respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 2. there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his jurisdiction, or could have gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Further, the correct recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is
Heirs of Arturo Garcia vs Mun. of Iba, Zambales
impermissible, for an extraordinary remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. No error of judgment by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors. Finally, the filing of the instant special civil action directly in the Supreme Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. There being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court there are different modes of appeal, namely: (a) Ordinary appeal (b) Petition for review in accordance with Rule 42 and (c) Appeal by certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. In this case, the petitioners’ resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong. The proper mode of appeal should have been by an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, albeit the wrong mode, was a substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal.
Dennis Mortel vs Michael Brundige
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. Their bare plea for substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend the rules. We have always looked at appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. Their failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases where a liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court. Nature and Propriety of Summary Judgment Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation: Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment? A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. Requirement for Summary Judgment: (a) that there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) that the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is a settled rule that when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. In the present case, the petitioner tacitly admitted his default in the payment of his obligation. Considering that the petitioner's
Dolores L. Hacbang And Bernardo J. Hacbang Vs. Atty. Basilio H. Alo
Sps. Ricardo and Gena Golez v Meliton Nemena
indebtedness and liability were uncontested, a full blown trial can be totally dispensed with. The submission of further evidence is not necessary since judgment could be rendered judiciously on the basis of the petitioner's admissions. Under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code which was the law applicable at that time says that, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of the death of the decedent. The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership. For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity. However petitioners maintain that because case was archived without any pronouncemenst as to the intrinsic validity of the will, intestate succession should govern. They maintain that the entire inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners' ascendants. Thus, they claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as representatives of the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents. However the Supreme court did not find their argument meritorious. Under the Spanish Civil Code or the present Civil Code it says that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render its entire provisions operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies. The Court ruled that the spouses should pay the back rentals for the period within which they were in possession of the leased property as to rule otherwise would be a clear case of unjust enrichment. Further, the awards for damages were found lacking in factual and legal basis, since these damages were not pleaded in Nemeno’s complaint or proven during trial. In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like, and even if the moral damages were specifically pleaded, Nemeno did not testify on the same. The Court also dismissed the Spouses’ counterclaims. The possession of Nemeno of the PN evidencing his debt to the spouses is prima facie evidence of payment of the same as provided in Section 3(h) of Rule 131 of the ROC. SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. xxxx (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
Hersie Mary Vi
Virgilio C. Briones vs CA and Cash Asia Credit Corporation
the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.33 instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue,viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the same
rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. 35 Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue.To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
Norma vs.Sps. and Tiotuico
Javate Renato Lerma
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones’s complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located. that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment. Moreover, there is no dispute that petitioner remained in possession of the subject property prior to the issuance of the questioned writ of possession. It is, thus, clear that respondents' resort, as a subsequent or third party purchaser, to the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is proper. Finally, it bears to point out at this stage that the Court agrees with the CA that petitioner's certiorari petition filed with the CA questioning the implementation of the subject writ of possession is a mere ploy to simply delay such implementation considering that the writ was issued almost ten ( 10) years ago. Petitioner was already given her day in court when she was earlier given the opportunity to file a suit to question the legality of the issuance of the writ, which case eventually reached this Court and was decided against petitioner. The instant petition is DENIED. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of
Corp vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue
the parties in order to protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court set the guidelines for when the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified, namely: (a) when the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; or (b) when the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) when a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Granting of JPV's application already amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner from considering and passing upon the applications of other parties like Grahar to operate their own PETC in Iloilo City based on JPV's still controversial capability to serve all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City. Under the circumstances, the challenged orders of the RTC were undeniably tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other tribunal or officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding then pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the procedure is not according to the course of the common law. It is available when the following indispensable elements concur, to wit: 1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and 3. That there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess a/jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. A final order is appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court declaring that "an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable." In light of the foregoing rule, respondents' remedy from the RTC orders, which dismissed with prejudice the injunction case, was therefore an ordinary appeal. To perfect the same, respondents should have filed a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. However, instead of doing so, respondents erroneously filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, or way beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect an ordinary appeal. Given the improper remedy taken, the order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has become final and immutable, therefore, can no longer be altered or modified. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that had already attained finality, even if the
purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law. The exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. The ejectment case before the MTCC upholds respondents' right of possession over the subject property on the strength of the title in their names. As such, they were justified in committing acts of possession over the property, to the exclusion of Abadilla, Jr., notwithstanding the dismissal of the injunction case on technicality. Santiag o
194702 /19659 2 203993
Ricardo vs GMA
paz international environment universlity
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement requires the intervention of MTRCB before GMA Films can reject a film and require its replacement. Specifically, Paragraph 4 requires that MTRCB, after reviewing a film listed in the Agreement, disapprove or X-rate it for telecasting. GMA Films does not allege, and we find no proof on record indicating, that MTRCB reviewed Winasak na Pangarap and X-rated it. GMA Network rejected Winasak na Pangarap because the network considered the film "bomba." In doing so, GMA Network went beyond its assigned role under the Agreement of screening films to test their broadcast quality and assumed the function of MTRCB to evaluate the films for the propriety of their content. This runs counter to the clear terms of Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement. Petitioner Outside of the Terms of the Agreement The Agreement, as its full title denotes ("TV Rights Agreement"), is a licensing contract, the essence of which is the transfer by the licensor (petitioner) to the licensee (GMA Films), for a fee, of the exclusive right to telecast the films listed in the Agreement. Stipulations for payment of "commission" to the licensor is incongruous to the nature of such contracts unless the licensor merely acted as agent of the film owners. Nowhere in the Agreement, however, did the parties stipulate that petitioner signed the contract in such capacity. On the contrary, the Agreement repeatedly refers to petitioner as "licensor" and GMA Films as "licensee." Nor did the parties stipulate that the fees paid by GMA Films for the films listed in the Agreement will be turned over by petitioner to the film owners. Instead, the Agreement merely provided that the total fees will be paid in three installments. We find it unnecessary to pass upon the question whether an implied trust arose between the parties, as held by the CA.1âwphi1 Such conclusion was grounded on the erroneous assumption that GMA Films holds an interest in the disposition of the licensing fees it paid to petitioner.
whether or not Capt. Clarke should have been impleaded as an indispensable party was correctly resolved by the CA which held that the former was merely an agent of respondent. While Capt. Clarke’s name andsignature appeared on the MOA, his participation was, nonetheless, limited to being a representative of respondent. As a mere representative, Capt.Clarke acquired no rights whatsoever, nor did he incur any liabilities, arising from the contract between petitioner and respondent. Therefore, he was not an indispensable party to the case at bar.. The CA had correctly pointed out that, from the very language itself of the MOA entered into by petitioner whereby he obligated himself to allow the use of the hangar space “for company aircraft/helicopter,” petitioner cannot deny that he contracted with respondent.Petitioner further acknowledged this fact in his final letter dated July 23, 2002, where he reiterated and strongly demanded the former to immediately vacate the hangar space his “company is occupying/utilizing Section 2161 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides that one who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation, as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is bound by his obligation under the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law. As aptly raised by respondent in its Comment to the instant petition, it is futile to insist that petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments in respondent’s name and not with Capt. Clarke’s, whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter’s personal capacity, only because it was upon the instruction of an employee. Indeed, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that all private transactions have been fair and regular. Hence, it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing with respect to his business
Romero Domingo Singson
GSIS vs Velasco
with respondent. Petitioner’s pleadings, however, abound with clear indications of a business relationship gone sour. In his third letter dated July 19, 2002, petitioner lamented the fact that Capt. Clarke’s alleged promise to buy an. The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be resolved in respondent's favor. True, no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived While the procedure taken is allowed -under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,32 the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession - the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof- pursuant to the principle that "the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof."33 Such provisional determination of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners' favor. The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the SC, the CA, the Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides: Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction: (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied) Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of prohibition issued by the RTC sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.