Civ Pro Cases

Balbastro vs CA Facts: Petitioner in this case are third-party defendants on a complaint filed by the private respondent Francisco Fernandez because of the petitioner’s refusal to recognize his authority to collect the rents on the doors leased by the petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the filing of said Third-Party Complaint against them is in violation of the express provisions of Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court. However this was dismissed by the court a quo and affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the defendant Francisco E. Fernandez to file a thirdparty complaint against the third-party defendants. Rule: YES. Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court 1 authorizes a defendant to bring into a lawsuit any person "not a party to the action ... for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of his opponent's claim." From its explicit language it does not compel the defendant to bring the third-parties into the litigation, rather it simply permits the inclusion of anyone who meets the standard set forth in the rule. The secondary or derivative liability of the third-party is central whether the basis is indemnity, subrogation, contribution, express or implied warranty or some other theory. The impleader of new parties under this rule is proper only when a right to relief exists under the applicable substantive law. 2This rule is merely a procedural mechanism, and cannot be utilized unless there is some substantive basis under applicable law. The requirement that for a third-party complaint to be available the third-party defendant must be liable secondarily to the original defendant in the event that the latter is held liable to the plaintiff Absent therefore in the case at bar the nexus between petitioners as third-party defendants and Francisco E. Fernandez, the third-party plaintiff, showing the existence of a secondary or derivative liability of the former in favor of the latter "in respect of his opponent's claim" the third-party action would not be proper.

Banco Filipino savings and mortgage bank vs CA Facts: On Dec. 20, 1993, Santiago (Isabela) Memorial Park (SANTIAGO) filed a complaint for redemption and specific performance against Banco Filipino (BANK). SANTIAGO alleged that the BANK foreclosed the mortgage and became the highest bidder in the sale. The Certicate of Sale was inscribed at the back of the TCT on Jan. 21, 1991. On Aug. 6, 1991, SANTIAGO offered to repurchase the property at P700k which was the start of negotiation between the 2. SANTIAGO was given up to the end of March 1992 to negotiate and make special arrangement for any satisfactory plan of payment for the redemption. On Jan. 23, 1992, the Deputy Liquidator directed SANTIAGO to remit at least P50k to the BANK to manifest its willingness to redeem. On Jan. 20, 1993, SANTIAGO increased its offer to P1M. But the BANK demanded P5.8M. Issue: Whether or not SANTIAGO can redeem the property. Held: NO. SANTIAGO has no cause of action for redemption against petitioner. The right of redemption should be exercised within the specified time limit, which is one year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale. The redemptioner should make an actual tender in good faith of the full amount of the purchase price. In case of disagreement over the redemption price, the redemptioner may preserve his right of redemption through judicial action which in every case must be filed within the one-year period of redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights and “freezing” the expiration of the one-year period. In this case, the period of redemption expired on Jan. 21, 1992. The complaint was filed on Dec. 20, 1992. SANTIAGO should have filed the complaint before Jan. 21, 1992.

Moreover, while the complaint alleges that SANTIAGO made an offer to redeem the subject property within the period of redemption, it is not alleged in the complaint that there was an actual tender of payment of the redemption price as required by the rules. It was alleged that SANTIAGO merely made an offer of P700k as redemption price, which however, as stated in complaint, the redemption money was the total bank claim of P925,448.17 plus lawful interest and other allowable expenses incident to the foreclosure proceedings. Thus, the offer was even very much lower than the price paid by petitioner as the highest bidder in the auction sale. Also, there was no categorical allegation in the complaint that the original period of redemption had been extended. Assuming arguendo that the period for redemption had been extended, i.e., up to end of March 1992, still private respondent failed to exercise its right within said period. Gochan vs. Gochan G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 256 (GATCHALIAN) FACTS: ● Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said amount to respondents. (Receipts were issued and given to the petitioners as proof) ● Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a "promissory note. The former drafted the promissory note in his own handwriting and had the same signed by the petitioners. Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale." ● Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and damages alleging that the petitioners that

offered to buy their shares of stock,in consideration of P200M and multiple properties. Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have received from petitioners plus damages. ● Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses one of which is the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for nonpayment of the correct docket fees; ● Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that respondents paid the necessary filing and docket fees of at least P165K. ● MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: 1. Did the respondent file and pay the necessary docket fees to warrant court’s jurisdiction? 1. What is the real nature of the case? 2. What should be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees? HELD: 1. NO 1. Real action not specific performance 2. Assessed value of the property, or the estimated value The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees. It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by

the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated as one for "specific performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property. Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property. In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint. NOTE: The parties in the Sun Insurance case expressed willingness to pay the correct docket fees Republic vs Kenrick Development corp

Facts: Kenrick Development Corp built a perimeter wall which encroached upon some parcels of land occupied by Air transportation office (ATO) based on TCTs derived from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO verified the TCTs with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was found that there were no record of TCT no. 17508 and its ascendant title. Land was also covered by Villamor Air Base. -so OSG, on behalf of LRA, filed a COMPLAINT FOR REVOCATION, ANNULMENT AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE in behalf of RP vs. Kenrick and Alfonso Concepcion -Alfonso Concepcion cannot be found so alias summon by publication done -Kenrick allegedly filed an answer signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr as their counsel (but later on, during a Senate hearing, it was found that somebody else signed for Atty. Garlitos but he did not authorize such signing) -case punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, MTDs, Motion to declare defendant in default, et al. -Pending hearing, Senate conducted hearing in aid of legislation on the issuances of fake titles and focused on how Kenrick was able to obtain title to lands wherein it built perimeter fence. Here is where atty. Garlitos denied that he signed the answer before the RTC -with that admission before the senate, OSG filed Urgent motion to declare Kenrick in default. answer no signature of counsel so mere scrap of paper -RTC: granted, declared defendant in default, allowed RP to present evidence ex parte -MR: Denied, so petition for certiorari -CA: reversed RTC

Statements of Atty. Garlitos in the Senate hearing unreliable, not subject to cross examination Acts of Atty Garlitos after the filing of the answer: although he did not sign it, he prepared the draft of the answer and even if it was signed by another person, he did not contest it and even represented Kenrick in another case - these acts supposedly cured whatever defect the answer had ISSUE: WON CA erred ? YES. Kenrick is really in default, for their answer was not signed therefore the said pleading is deemed as a mere scrap of paper and thus they are not considered to have submitted any answer at all. On the alleged blanket authority given by Atty. Garlitos for anyone to sign the draft answer he prepared -acts of Kenrick was deemed to have adopted the statements of Atty. Garlitos (that the answer submitted was not signed by him therefore, they have submitted a defective answer) - adoptive admission -SIGNED PLEADING: signed by the counsel or the party himself; counsel's signature cannot be delegated and means that he certifies that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters. On liberal interpretation of rules (rules are mere technicalities….) Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19 The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals 20 is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules. As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible misconduct. Argallon vs CA FACTS: Petitioner, Jocson filed a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against Private respondents, Marcelo Steel Corp (MSC) and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) represented by their president, Jose Marcelo.  The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.  Since no appeal from the decision of the CA was made by the defendants, said decision became final and executory.  Jocson thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was granted by the court.  A Writ of Execution was issued, and the properties of MSC were levied in full satisfaction of the judgment.  Execution sale was scheduled; meanwhile Midas Corporation filed a third-party claim alleging that some of the levied

properties were previously mortgaged to it.  Thus the execution sale was postponed, and Jocson posted a P36M indemnity bond so the levied properties will not be released to Midas Corp.  The execution sale proceeded in full satisfaction of judgment, and a certificate of sale was issued to petitioner Rodolfo Tuising, who was the highest bidder.  MSC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to annul the execution sale and to issue an order directing the Sheriffs not to deliver the properties sold at the auction to Tiusing alleged that its obligation was merely joint with MCFC and that the total price of the properties sold on execution was unconscionably inadequate. The Trial Court granted MSC’s motion and annulled the execution sale and cancelled the Certificate of Sale.  Jocson moved for reconsideration arguing that the obligation was solidary and therefore may be enforced in full against either of the defendants.  MSC filed a Manifestation and Motion on Satisfaction of Judgment, depositing P4,260,198.11 in Manager’s Check with the TC.  TC denied Jocson’s Motion and granted MSC’s Manifestation and Motion.  Jocson filed a Notice of Appeal but later withdrew it and instead filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which however denied the petition, ruling that since the TC’s decision was silent as to the nature of the obligation, the same is therefore joint; the MR was also denied, hence this petition.  The petition filed before the SC however was not signed by Jocson’s counsel but only by Tuising’s counsel.  Also, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for nonforum shopping (CNFS).  Four months from filing the petition, Tuising filed a Special Power of Attorney allegedly signed by Jocson authorizing him (Tuising) to file the petition and to verify and certify the same.  Meanwhile Jocson filed with the TC a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution to implement the decision against MCFC. ISSUE: WON the petition is defective. HELD: Yes.

RATIO: 1. Under Sec 3 of Rule 7, every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him; otherwise it produces no legal effect. a. There is nothing in the record of the case that shows Tusing’s counsel was authorized by Jocon’s counsel to sign on his behalf. b. Tusing’s counsel had no authority to sign for Jocson or his counsel. 2. A pleading which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading, and therefore without effect. a. A petition for review on certiorari requires verification (Section 1 Rule 45). b. Tuising did not explain why the SPA was belatedly filed. 3. Lack of or a defective CNFS is generally not curable by its subsequent correction or submission, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special circumstances. a. Here there is no compelling reason to relax the rules. b. The CNFS is based on the rule that in the interest of orderly judicial procedure, litigants should not pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. c. The CNFS requires personal knowledge, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing by his copetitioners of any action similar to the current petition. d. The flaw is fatal because it was Jocson, the principal party in the original case, who did not sign. e. Further, Jocson filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ, signifying that he did not anymore intend to appeal the decision of the CA. Vicar vs FEB leasing

FACTS: Petitioner obtained loans from herein respondent for the purchase of construction equipment. The same was sold to the respondent with lease-back agreement. However, due its course, petitioner defaulted in payment. Hence, respondent filed an action for sum of money, damages and replevin for the leased equipment against herein respondent. Petitioner filed for motion to dismiss but was denied by the RTC which was ground on forum-shopping. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the subject equipment. , however, instantly dismissed by the CA in its herein assailed Resolution dated October 23, 2002, because the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Petitioner Carmelita V. Lim without any showing that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-corporation. On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached Secretary’s Certificate, denied on the ground of the same was belatedly filed and did not cure the defect of said petition. Hence the appeal. ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition. RULE: YES. , the Court deems it proper and justifiable to grant the present Petition. Clearly, petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC Circular 28-9191 to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. In fact, a "Verification/Certification," stating the information required under the Circular, was attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA. Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lim’s authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretary’s Certificate attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicar’s board of directors had unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president and general manager,

Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and "to execute and sign x x x the verification and certification against forum shopping." The Certificate was submitted to the CA on the day right after it had denied the Petition. Such swiftness of action indicates that the Resolution -- authorizing Petitioner Lim to file the Petition and execute the Verification and the Certification against forum shopping on behalf of Petitioner Vicar -- did exist at the time the Petition was filed. Such fact also lends credence to the assertion of petitioners that it was only due to inadvertence and oversight that they failed to attach the Secretary’s Certificate to their Petition for Certiorari. In closing, the Court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.23 Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice.

Maranaw Hotels v CA Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against herein petitioner before the labor arbiter. The Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint went to NLRC, the latter reversed the former’s decision. Hence, petitioner appealed before the CA but was dismissed on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals. on the ground of non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping taking into account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel Director of petitioner corporation without attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of petitioner corporation per board resolution or special power of attorney executed by

the latter. petitioner invokes substantial justice as justification for a reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals.13 Petitioner likewise contends that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum shopping attached constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement. Hence the appeal. Issue: WON CA erred in dismissing the petition. Rule: NO. Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement. Substantial compliance applies only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to its presence in the pleading wherein it is required. Petitioner’s contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural and juridical persons.

HUIBONHOA V CONCEPCION Facts: