Chua v Cfi of Negros Occidental

CHUA V CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL FACTS: DECEDENT - Consolacion de la Torre, DIED INTESTATE First Marriage Jose Frias Chua ========= Patricia Militar (D)

Ignacio

Lorenzo (D) Dominador Remedios

Manuel (D)

Reservees Second Marriage Jose Frias Chua ========= Consolacion De la Torre Origin Reservor

Juanito Frias Chua Reservista Ignacio, Dominador and Remedios filed a complaint praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias (child from second marriage) but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal. CFI Negros RULING: The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner. The court held that there was no reserve troncal because there was no gratuitous transfer. The transfer to Consolacion and Juanito was found to be for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from the testate proceedings of Jose Frias Chua (to pay the Standare Oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20). ISSUE: 1. WON the property of Jose which passed to his son Juanito and upon the latter’s death, passed to the mother Consolacion, became the reservable property of the sons of Jose from his first marriage upon the death of Consolacion 2. WON the transfer was gratuitous 3. WON the claim of the reserves had prescribed HELD: 1. YES, property subject to reserve troncal In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister

by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein. 2. YES, transfer was gratuitous "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. It does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. 3. It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua who died on February 27, 1952 has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so. PARTITION OF PROPERTY: Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion.

CANO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS FACTS: 

Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 in the name of Maria Cano (reservista) subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero.

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When the reservista died, Eustaquia Guerrero through counsel filed a motion and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of him.

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This was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano insisting that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared.

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They further argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the following facts:(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or sister;(2) Said descendant dies without issue;(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said property came.

ISSUE: 1. WON the above-mentioned elements need to be proven first before Guerrero be granted the ownership of Lot 1799? 2. WON intestacy proceeding is still necessary before reservatorio (Guerrero) can acquire the property? RULING: NO. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were expressly recognized. It appears from their agreed stipulations of facts that: Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero. And that Eustaquia Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero, the latter being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other private oppositors. This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are barred thereby from contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the title from the reservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned. 2. NO. The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life interest in the reservable property. It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.

LUNSOD V ORTEGA FACTS: Upon the death of Mariano Ortega, he left three children, named Sinforoso, Francisca and Estanislao Ortega; (2) that Estanislao Ortega was married on May 8, 1895, to Rufina Medel and died on September 26, 1902, leaving a daughter born of said marriage, named Anacleta Ortega, who also died on June 17, 1903, at the age of six years, she and Estanislao Ortega having been survived by said Rufina Medel, who died on April 10, 1916.chanrob RUFINA MEDEL sold to Francisco Lunsod, for the sum of P2,000 and with the right to repurchase for two years, three parcel of land planted with coconut trees. Francisco Lunsod filed in the justice of the peace court of San Pablo a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega ALLEGING THAT he was deprived of the possession thereof by Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga, who have been collecting the fruits, thereby injuring him in the sum of P150. The justice of the peace court ruled in favor of the plaintiff Lunsod, sentencing Sinforoso Ortega to restore the possession of the property. The case was dismissed as to the defendant Cariaga An appeal was made The property while the case is pending was under the administration of Cipriano Medel (brother of Rufina Medel). During inventory: defendants Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega asked that said parcels be excluded from the inventory of the property of the deceased RUFINA on the ground that said parcels were their exclusive property and were then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same from their first cousin, Anacleta Ortega (daughter of Rufina and Estanislao Ortega). Cipriano Medel contends that her sister Rufina Medel is the legal owner of the being the sole heir of her daughter Anacleta Ortega. Hence, the contracts entered into by Rufina and Lunsod was valid. CONSOLIDATED CASES: Three cases were actually filed by the parties here, In case No. 219, which is the land registration case; other two civil cases, Nos. 2286 and 2322 involving the land in question. These were tried jointly by common consent of the parties. TRIAL COURT’S DECISION: Ruled in favour of the defendants (Sinforoso Ortega and Francisca Ortega). Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON RUFINA IS THE LEGAL OWNER OF THE PARCELS OF LAND WHICH WOULD RENDER THE SALE TO LUNSOD AS VALID RULING: YES, only during her lifetime but still subject to a condition. According to article 811 of the Civil Code an ascendant who inherits from a descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister is

obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law in favor of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came. In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter Anacleta Ortega, who died at the age of six years, the three parcels of land in question situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina in the municipality of San Pablo Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by said Anacleta Ortega gratuitously, that is to say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her father Estanislao Ortega, and said three parcels having come from Mariano Ortega, father of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco Ortega, who are therefore relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta Ortega, daughter of Estanislao Ortega, then according to the provisions of said article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable property in favor of said Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in interest with respect to the property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

" What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?" The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively - use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. HOWEVER, subject to a condition that if there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words: "During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs. "The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the articles of the Code referring to use and usufruct. library "But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 to 976 of the same Code. It is, therefore, indisputable, in view of the preceding discussion made in the decision of this court just cited, that the person obliged to reserve, that is, Rufina Medel, heir of her daughter Anacleta Ortega, was not only a usufructuary but also the owner in fee simple of the three parcels of land in question, notwithstanding the fact that they have the character of reservable property in favor of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega. But it is also indisputable that Rufina Medel acquired these parcels subject to a resolutory condition, that is to say, her ownership of said property was subject to said condition, to wit, that there should or should not exist at the time of her death relatives of Anacleta Ortega from whom she inherited said property, included within the third degree and belonging to the line from which said property came, therefore she could not have effected said sale without saving the rights of the persons entitled to have the property reserved to them, by securing to the latter the value thereof.

SINCE said Rufina Medel did not comply with what the law requires when she did not mentioned in said document the fact that said property was reservable, said alienation is void and can have no effect as against the persons entitled to have such property reserved, who are Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the addition that Sinforoso Ortega is absolved from the complaint filed against him by Francisco Lunsod. NIEVA V ALCALA FACTS: Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, two parcels of land. Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land abovementioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein. Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father. On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. The LOWER COURT held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the property here in question because an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. 2. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code RULING: 1. Yes. Plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father ;that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. 2.

No. Article 811 of the Civil Code reads as follows: Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of

law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came. The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. There can be no question whatever but that, under said Article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. But in said Article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. The eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of Article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. Manresa, one of the eminent commentators, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, says: Persons in whose favor thereservation is established — This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came. It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what the article intends to prevent. It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it is a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article.

TIOCO DE PAPA V CAMACHO Facts: This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise": 1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles. 2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. TongoCamacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.

3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs) 4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal proindiviso shares. 5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'Cl', were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal proindiviso shares. 6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one half (1/2) proindiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal. 7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad DizonTongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko. 8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho. 9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho now owns onehalf (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad DizonTongko. 10. xxx 11. xxx 12.xxx On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay TongkoCamacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to onehalf of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions Issue: Whether, as contended by the plaintiffsappellees and ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code or, as asserted by the defendantappellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession. Ruling: The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). xxx xxx xxx The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the

relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915) Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffsappellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendantappellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffsappellees would have been excluded by the defendantappellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendantthereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario. Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant appellant Dalisay Tongko Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffsappellees.

PADURA V BALDOVINO FACTS:

The case is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Laguna in Special Proceedings 451, declaring all the reservees WITHOUT DISTINCTION as “co-owners, pro indiviso in equal shares of the parcels of land” subject matter of the suit ISSUE: WON all claiming reservees may be declared as co-owners of the subject property without distinction HELD: NO The reservatarios who are nephews of the full blood are declared entitled to a share TWICE AS LARGE as that of the nephews of the half-blood.