Chapter 3 Statcon Case Digests

People v. Astorga G.R. No. 110097. December 22, 1997 Facts: Around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya. Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused immediately grabbed and held her hand. Accused also placed his hand on her shoulder and covered her mouth. Accused never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead he held and dragged Yvonne until they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. She asked him where they were going and accused answered that they were going home. She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparent’s house is at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. She cried and protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to walk she continued crying. Somewhere near the Luponlupon Bridge they met some group of men. The group was suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken. The group bought Yvonne back home, while the accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven away by her aunt. He left and never talked with the family. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of the law by convicting accused of kidnapping despite the fact that Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty Ruling: Yes. The Court held that there was an error in the judgment of the trial court and that the accused. Accused’s forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no “lockup.”

People v. Puno G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 Facts: Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband, arrived at the bakeshop. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the car. After the car turned right in a corner, it stopped and then a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, and boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her and Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7, 000.00. The two accused told her they wanted P100, 000.00 more. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is located. Beloy asked Socorro to issue a check for P100, 000.00. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Being able to escape by jumping out of the vehicle, Socorro upon reaching Balintawak, reported the matter to CAPCOM. Issue: Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) Ruling: No. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case.

Eugenio v. Drilon G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996 Facts: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment, including interest he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that nondevelopment does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. Issue: Whether or not the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. Ruling: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to give retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.”

Cruz vs. CA GR 108738 17 June 1994 Facts: Andrea Mayor is engaged in the business of granting interest-bearing loans and in rediscounting checks. Roberto Cruz, on the other hand, is engaged in selling ready to wear clothes at the Pasay Commercial Center. Cruz frequently borrows money from Mayor. In 1989, Cruz borrowed P176,000 from mayor, which Mayor delivered. In turn, Cruz issued a Premiere Bank check for the same amount. When the check matured, Mayor presented it to the bank but was dishonored and marked “account closed.” When notified of the dishonor, Cruz promised to pay in cash. No payment was made, and thus the criminal action for violation of BP 22 was instituted. Issue: Whether Cruz is liable for violating BP 22, even upon the claim that the check was issued to serves a mere evidence of indebtedness, and not for circulation or negotiation. Ruling: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment has the same effect of an ordinary check, hence, it falls within the ambit of BP 22. When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the term and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. “In accordance with the pertinent rule of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law has not made any distinction in this regard, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. Furthermore, the history of the enactment of subject statute evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing, without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. This intent may be gathered from the statement of the sponsor of the bill (Cabinet Bill No. 9) which was enacted later into Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, when it was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, that the bill was introduced to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks,. The legislative intent as above said is made all the more clear when it is considered that while the original text of Cabinet Bill No. 9, supra, had contained a proviso excluding from the coverage of the law a check issued as a mere guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted by the Committee on the Revision of Laws in the Batasan deleted the abovementioned qualifying proviso deliberately for the purpose of making the enforcement of the act more effective”

Agacaoli v. Suguitan G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926 Facts: Agcaoli was appointed as justice of the peace of municipality of Laoag on March 25,1916 under Act No. 2041, section 1 which states that “All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behaviour”. However, on March 17,1917 Act No.3107 was adopted and although it provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said Act in section 203 provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in said section ". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years." It was clear that there was nothing in the title of the Act that it indicates a provision applicable for appointment of justices of the peace nor as to the period during which they may serve after appointment. Agcaoli received a letter from the Undersecretary of Justice that he should cease to be a justice of peace by operation of said amendment upon receipt and that if he fails to do so, he would liable for a criminal prosecution. After receipt thereof, Agcaoli entered protests and patiently waited for a resolution and did not receive any reply which prompted him to file a petition for a writ of quo warranto in the Court of First Instance. Issue: Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional, when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve "during good behavior?" Ruling: No. According to subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." It was decided that said provision of the Jones Law was mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which no reference was made in the title. The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title. The SC sustained the decision in the case of Segovia vs. Noel, wherein the Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced against justices of the peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Moreover, when Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as justice of the

peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore be restored to his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

*ITO YUNG TITLE NUNG ACT 3107 An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts; increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his own; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice of the peace court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with three branches; regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of Courts of First Instance, and for other purposes.

People v. Echaves G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 Facts: Fiscal Ello, petitioner filed with the lower court separate information against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen pieces of information that sometime in 1974 in the province of Bohol, the accused with stealth and strategy, entered, occupied and cultivated a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr., did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended. Before arraignment, respondent Judge Echaves issued an omnibus order dismissing the five other pieces of information out of the 16 raffled, on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court and invoked Republic Act No. 5440. Issue: Is P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts applicable to agricultural lands? Ruling: No. The protest in this case involves squatting in a pasture land in a rural area. It was stated in the preamble of the said decree that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. Furthermore, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

*ITO YUNG PD 772 Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides: SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)

People vs Degamo G.R. No. 121211 April 30, 2003 Facts: Roy Degamo succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Ellen Virtudazo against her will. As a result of the rape, Ellen became temporarily insane until the pendency of the case. Dr. Go attested the insanity of the victim. Hence, Degamo was charged and found guilty with the crime of rape qualified by the circumstance of insanity. Degamo argues that Ellen had not become insane by reason of rape because she gave intelligent answers on the witness stand. Issue: Whether or not the Degamo’s crime of rape should be qualified by temporary insanity. Ruling: There is no doubt that the highest penalty shall be imposed if the victim if the victim becomes permanently insane, there is no ruling yet whether temporary insanity still falls within the purview of provision. It is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in construing a law to determine the legislative intention from its language. An examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether permanent or temporary, is not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying circumstance for as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.

Abaquin Security vs Hon. Diego Atienza G.R. No. 72971 October 15, 1990 Facts: Petitioner, Abaquin Security (Abaquin), employed Antonio Jose as a security guard. Due to his failing health and to withdraw his cash deposits with Abaquin, Jose voluntarily resigned. Relying on the absence of any management policy or any collective bargaining agreement, Abaquin paid Jose only his cash deposits. Jose filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against Abaquin for separation pay and retirement benefits. The Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the retirement benefits under Rule 1, Book IV of the rules and regulations implementing the labor code is subject to tha existence of a collective bargaining agreement or management policy and Jose cannot claim benefits which are not granted by the Labor Code, otherwise the Ministry of Labor would be guilty of Legislative usurpation. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the arbiter. The NLRC construed Section 14 (a) of Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code in relation to the second paragraph of Article 288 as entitling a retiring employee to termination pay of one-half (½) month for every year of service in the absence of any agreement or employer policy on retirement pay. It ruled that said Section 14 (a) was intended "to give full effect and application to Article 288 of the Labor Code which covers all retiring employees, regardless of the existence of any agreement, company policy or otherwise.” Issue: Whether or not Jose should be given retirement benefits under the implementing rules Ruling: While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional interpretation. The interpretation given in the case by the NLRC to Section 14 (a) of the implementing rule is in harmony with Article 288.

US vs Hart G.R. No. L-8327 March 28, 1913 Facts: Hart was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. Issue: Whether or not Hart should be charged with vagrancy Ruling: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. In as much as defendant had, “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted

People of the Philippines vs. Purisima G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978 Facts: 26 petitions for review filed are consolidated in a decision involving a basic question of law. Information were filed charging the respective accused with “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree Number 9. An order quashing or dismissing the information, on a common ground that the information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree number 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. Issue: Whether or not, PD no.9 (3) shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the act prescribed is essentially an offense (malum prohibitum) penalized for reasons of public policy. Ruling: The petitions for review were denied. PD no.9 (3) provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime. In statutory offenses, the intention of the accused is immaterial. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure. The two elements of the offense covered by this PD no.9 (3) must be alleged in the information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charge.

Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Insular Collector of Customs G.R. No. L-2776 December 6, 1927 Facts: The Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency at all times, acted as a representative of the Ma-ao Sugar Central Company. The plaintiff shipped 5,124,416 gross kilograms of centrifugal sugar consigned to the United States that the said sugar was laden through a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, leased to it by the Government of Philippine Islands. Insular Collector of Customs assessed and collected wharfage dues on sugar at 2 pesos per thousand gross kilograms with a total amount of 10,248.84 pesos. The plaintiff paid, under protest, the said amount but overruled by the Insular Collector of Customs. Issue: Whether or not, the Government of Philippine Islands can legally collect the duty of 1 dollar per gross ton of 1,000 kilograms as a charged for wharfage. Ruling: August 5, 1909, the Congress of the United States passed what is known as the "Philippine Tariff Act of 1909," entitled "An Act to raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," section 14 of which, under the head of "Wharfage," states that there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods, wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement, the product of the Philippine Islands, exported through ports of entry of the Philippine Islands, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos, as a charge for wharfage, whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel: Provided, that articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported, exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the United States, or of that of that of the Philippine Islands, shall be exempted from the charges prescribed in this section. The Government of Philippine Islands can legally collect the duty of 1 dollar per gross ton of 1,000 kilograms as a charged for wharfage.