Chandrashekhar - My Friend Turned Foe Turned Friend

My friend turned Foe turned friend : Chandrashekhar

Former Prime Minister Chandrashekhar and I had known each other on a personal basis since 1974. Three years earlier in 1971, he had won my admiration by writing an editorial in a magazine, he was bringing out called Young Indian, in which he praised my book then just published titled Indian Economic Planning -An Alternative Approach. Mrs. Gandhi had denounced the book in Parliament as a "dangerous thesis". My thesis was that socialism would not work in India, and would breed governmental corruption. If we wanted to remove poverty and develop nuclear weapons then we should give up our dependence on the Soviet model of governmental controls and move to market economy. I did not advocate like Rajaji a "free market", but a market economy in which the government will have a role to play as an "umpire" between consumers and producers. But both consumers and producers will be free to act within simple rules. Rajaji had advocated the "survival of the fittest" principle, and saw no role for the government to protect the weak against the strong using unfair means. In my book, I had also advocated that for our exports we should develop relations with Israel and China. Naturally my book brought a torrent of abuse from the communists who denounced me as an "American agent" because they could not answer my arguments. Time has proved me right because today we are moving towards a market economy and have improved our relations with Israel and China. Chandrashekhar in his editorial understood my distinction between free market capitalist economy advocated by Swatantra Party and my concept of market capitalist economy. The former was for "free competition" and the latter for "fair competition". Today I am against opening the doors blindly to multinational corporations because that "free competition" will kill our local industry due multinational’s access to capital which our industry does not have. But "fair competition" will ensure that if multinational have some advantage, the government

provides some support (such as cheap credit) to local industry to make the contest or competition equal. I also believe that if Americans ask us to open the market for their capital, we should demand that they open their country to our labour to freely go there. Why should capital have free entry but not labour? To hide these attractive nationalistic ideas, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress and the Communists not only denounced me as an American agent, but got me removed from my Professor's post at the IIT, Delhi (which post was restored to me in 1991 after 20 years by the Delhi Court). In these circumstances, for Chandrashekhar, then a Congress working committee and a friend of Indira Gandhi, to come out publicly in my support took all by surprise, but won my admiration for his courage. I first met Chandrashekhar in 1974 at the Lucknow coffee house located in the famous Hazratbal area. In those days, politicians used to meet intellectuals in coffee houses. Five star hotels had not come into fashion. Both Chandrashekhar and I had been made candidates for Rajya Sabha by our respective parties. He was surrounded by Congress party workers and me of Jan Sangh. I went up to him and introduced myself to him. Congress party workers snarled at me for my anti -Congress statements. But Chandrashekhar got up from his chair and silenced them. He then introduced me to them as an original thinker to whom Congress should listen to. After that Chandrashekhar met me often in Parliament and the friendship grew. It reached a peak during the Emergency, when he wrote glowingly about my daring escape from Parliament. Chandrashekhar was made President of the newly formed Janata party in 1977, but because I had become a friend of Morarji, a strain developed in our relations. Because I remained steadfast with Morarji, and Chandrashekhar's close circle contained two of the most poisonous minds in Indian politics -- Vajpayee and Ramakrishna Hegde-- the relation between us fluctuated and reached a flash point in 1984 when with Morarji's backing I contested for the post of Janata party President against Chandrashekhar in the party polls. I was Deputy Leader

in Parliament then. It was a literal Mahabharata with every newspaper giving front page coverage. Although I lost the election, I got 25 percent of the vote under very imperfect conditions of polling. Morarji refused to accept the verdict saying it was rigged. But Chandrashekhar's circle knew that if not now, two years later at the next party poll, I would certainly be elected President of the party. The modern Mantharas (Kaikeyi's adviser in Ramayana) began to work on Chandrashekhar. Chandrashekhar suddenly announcing my expulsion from the party for six years, a few weeks before the Lok Sabha polls. Both Chandrashekhar and I were defeated for the same reason --we opposed operation Bluestar in the Amristar Golden temple. In the meantime, Ramakrishna Hegde got re-elected to become the CM of the Karnataka government. Like Moopanar has become a media-favourite today, Hegde became the media darling. This went to his head and soon he began plotting against Chandrashekhar, and to remove him from the President ship of the party. This not only hurt Chandrashekhar because it was he who against the part wishes in 1983, had foisted Hegde as the CM over the claim of Deve Gowda. He also realized that till the time I was in the party, Mr.Hegde used to run to Chandrashekhar for protection, to save him from all the corruption charges that I had been collecting against Hegde (these charges were all proved later by the Justice Kuldip Singh Commission). Therefore, one day in 1986, Mr.Jayant Malhoutra (now Rajya Sabha MP) came to see me. He was a very good friend of Chandrashekhar. He said that he had talked to Chandrashekhar, and he felt that now he (Chandrashekhar) understood why Hegde was so keen to get rid of me from the party. Malhoutra asked me that since Chandrashekhar realizes this, could not I and Chandrashekhar become friends again. At first I protested. "How can I when he has expelled me for six years, and made me suffer?" But after some persuasion, I agreed on the principle that when we meet, it will be "bygones will be bygones" and we will think only of the future. Malhoutra talked Chandrashekhar on the

phone and got his agreement. We met in Chandrashekhar's Bhondsi Ashram in February 1987. When he saw me, he became emotional and embraced me. He and I said nothing for sometime, sipping tea in his cottage. Then we talked of the past memories of JP. And finally, he said "Swamy no one can beat you in intelligence or in gathering information. I need your help, so does the nation. Let us work together again". Friendship was re-established as if nothing had happened these last few years. It was so firmly re-established that it never went sour again despite political differences; for example during my struggle against Ms.Jayalalitha, Chandrashekhar felt that I was making it easy for DMK to return to power. While he was against all the violence let loose against me, he had a deep conviction that DMK should not be facilitated to power. But despite this, our friendship has been unaffected. Once the friendship with Chandrashekhar was re-established, we began working together in a true spirit of friendship. In late 1987, I suggested to him that he had a chance to be PM, but for that he should expand the Janata Party base. I told him that the Charan Singh’s base was intact with his son Ajit Singh, and that he (Ajit) should be invited to merge his Lok Dal into the Janata Party. At that time, the Janata Party had a majority government in Karnataka under Ramakrishna Hegde as CM. With another 12 MPs in Lok Sabha, it can become the largest opposition party. The BJP had just 2 MPs. So I suggested to Chandrashekhar, that he should offer the Janata Party Presidentship to Ajit Singh, and get his party to merge in Janata . At first, Chandrashekhar was shocked by the suggestion, but I convinced him that Hegde had used the resources of the Karnataka government to mount a massive whisper campaign against him. Many newspapers were writing editorials to condemn Chandrashekhar for sticking to the Janata Party President’s post. Newspapers like the Hindu and Indian Express began painting Hegde as some kind of Messiah, a Mr.Clean, just as they have done recently with regard to Moopanar. It was clear that a campaign was on to make Hegde the Janata Party President, and then position

him for the 1989 Lok Sabha elections as the Janata Party’s PM candidate. Of course, I was against the idea because I had known that Hegde was an immoral character and a crook. I certainly was not going to allow him to become Prime Minister if it was in my power to stop him. So I convinced Chandrashekhar that he was anyway going to lose his Presidentship due to Hegde's high voltage campaign. I also told him that after the merger of the Lok Dal with Janata, Ajit and I would jointly work to make him Prime Minister with in the next two years. A good quality about Chandrashekhar is that if he is convinced about something, he acts swiftly. He does not hesitate thereafter. He thus quickly moved and called a Janata Working Committee Meeting to bring about the Lok Dal merger with the Janata Party. Hegde was so shocked by the speed of our action that he could not block the move. After all Janata Party was going to expand we argued, getting Lok Dal MLAs in UP, Bihar and Rajasthan to join the party. Ajit Singh thus became President and I was made General Secretary of the Party. Considering that in 1984, I had been expelled from the Janata Party for six years by Chandrashekhar, the same Chandrashekhar now before even three years of the six over, brushed aside all objections, admitted me to the party and made me once again General Secretary of the party. Hegde and his friends in the news-media made much of the "opportunism" of Chandrashekhar. There was however no opportunism because after all both Chandrashekhar and I were out of power in those days. By becoming friends, what, compromise did we make? If political enemies become friends, why anyone should object. I have made a rule in politics: never start a fight; but if someone starts it, never stop the fight till either the opponent gives up or is finished. Chandrashekhar had offered the hand of friendship, so I made up with him. Hegde remained un-reconciled to this merger because he understood what it meant. With Deve Gowda joining us to form a foursome group of Chandrashekhar, Ajit, Gowda and myself, I felt time had come to put Hegde in his place. I looked for an opportunity, which arrived when

Indian Express published a transcript of a telephone conversation between Gowda and Ajit plotting against Hegde. The Janata party was shocked, more by the fact that this conversation was tapped and published, than by the content of Gowda. Ajit plot. The party therefore asked me to investigate and give a report to the Parliamentary board. I knew that Hegde and Indian Express were close to each other, so I was confident that Hegde must be the culprit. But how to establish it? As luck would have it, when I took a flight to Bangalore in July 1988 to investigate this telephone tapping, on the plane sat next to me a top Intelligence Bureau Officer. He introduced himself and said that he was my admirer because his younger brother was my student when I taught him economics at the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi. His younger brother had told him what a good Professor I had been. He said to me: "We IB people are sick of today's politicians because they are corrupt. We see them naked. But I admire you because you are different". I jumped at this God sent opportunity of meeting an IB officer, and asked him about telephone tapping. It was he who gave me the tip that later completely exposed Hegde. The IB officer told me to check with the Telephone Exchange whether any written requisition were made for tapping as required under Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act. He also warned me that in some states like Tamil Nadu, the Inspector General of Intelligence illegally tapped telephones by bribing the linesman or the operator at the exchange. In such cases, he said, there will be no records. I thanked him for his tip, and after my plane landed in Bangalore, I raced to a telephone and called my friend, the Communications Minister Mr.Vir Bahadur Singh in Delhi. I requested him to procure the file, if it existed of requisitions for telephone tapping made by Hegde. A few days later, in Delhi Vir Bahadur Singh confirmed the existence of such a file and that he had a copy. Through my friends in the bureaucracy later, I got a Photostat copy of the entire file. According to this file, Hegde ordered the tapping of 51 telephones belonging to Janata Party MLAs and MPs, and surprisingly even seven of his girlfriends! Telephone tapping is permitted by law against anti-social elements, but Hegde was tapping the phones of his own party colleagues and girlfriends rather than keeping a tab on anti-social

elements. My report to the parliamentary board on telephone tapping finished Hegde. He had to resign from the Chief Ministership, which he did after publicly shedding copious tears. Hegde's resignation would have directly benefited Chandrashekhar in the long run, but for the rise of V.P.Singh who had been expelled by the Congress party. With the Bofors scandal filling the pages of the newspapers, V.P. Singh began to be projected as the next PM. People like Hegde, seeing themselves blocked in the Janata Party began advocating the formation of a new party under V.P.Singh's leadership. I tried to stop this formation, but suffered a setback when Ajit Singh deserted us and joined with V.P.Singh. I could never understand how Ajit Singh could give up the Presidentship of a party to become a General Secretary in V.P.Singh's Janata Dal but Ajit was immature and inexperienced. This betrayal ( betrayal because Ajit Singh had assured Chandrashekhar that he will remain with him and canvass for his Prime Ministership) disheartened Chandrashekhar. Soon he too joined the Janata Dal. Therefore except for Deve Gowda and myself, all others joined V.P.Singh. I became the President of the Janata Party and Deve Gowda agreed to organize the Karnataka unit of the party. Gowda remained with me till 1992, but he too joined the Janata Dal. I thus became the only member of the Janata Party of 1977 who still remains in the party. It was lonely, but I went to seek the advice of Paramacharya Sri Chandrashekhara Saraswati. He told me not to worry, and asked me to rebuild the Janata Party even if it takes years. It is because of Paramacharya's blessings that I have dared to keep the Janata Party alive and rebuild it even if it takes time. After the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the Janata Dal under V.P.Singh came to power in a coalition arrangement. Chandrashekhar was kept out the entire power structure and sidelined. One day I found him sitting alone in the Central Hall of Parliament. I walked up to him and sat by his side. He looked quite sad because he felt that V.P.Singh would divide politics of the country by his advocacy of caste via the Mandal Commission Report. He said that while he fully supported the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, he felt that V.P.Singh

was using it to create caste warfare. Then he sighed deeply, and said that a riot between castes has become inevitable. "I feel useless today" he said in an emotional tone. "But what about trying to become PM to stop this rot?" I asked. "Be serious, he retorted. How can I?" "Well, I have a plan if you agree" I replied. Thus began the Operation Topple of the V.P.Singh Government. The plan for putting Chandrashekhar into the PM's chair was arithmetically simple: Rajiv Gandhi's Congress plus allies such as AIADMK were 220 in number. The deficit thus for a Parliamentary majority was 52. If I could mobilize 52 MPs from the Janata Dal, then it would serve two legal purposes, one of providing a majority and two, of being more than one-third of the Janata Dal to legally split the Party. Chandrashekhar's supporters were only 7 MPs, so there was the problem of securing the remaining 45. Arithmetically simple, but in terms of human chemistry, it was a night mare. I discussed the matter with Rajiv Gandhi for the first time; the Chandrashekhar government formation in March 1990, three months after V.P.Singh came to power. Rajiv was keen for this new formation because he felt that V.P.Singh was not loyal to the nation's interests. I too never liked Mr.V.P.Singh because I found him a hypocrite. He talked about fighting corruption, but his political friends were the most corrupt in the country, such as Ramakrishna Hegde and Arun Nehru. So I was prepared to believe the worst about him. Toppling his government was pleasure for me. But it took me a while to convince Rajiv that Chandrashekhar was "PM material". Rajiv told me that he was uncomfortable with Chandrashekhar because most Congress leaders distrusted him. I told Rajiv that there is no other leader in the Janata Dal on whose name I can mobilize 52 MPs. I told him that I would guarantee that Chandrashekhar gave him due respect.

On that note, Rajiv agreed. We also decided that we would meet everyday at 1 A.M! So every day for six months of plotting to bring down the V.P.Singh government. I met Rajiv Gandhi at 10, Janpath from 1 AM to 3 AM. No one except George, his Secretary and occasionally Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, was seen in the premises in those unearthly hours. Rajiv Gandhi would sit with his computer in which the names of all the MPs, their bio data, names of their friends, their allegiance to leaders, their weaknesses, etc. had been stored. So we drew up a list of 76 MPs who were unhappy with V.P.Singh for some political reason or the other, and could be recruited. Thereafter we would everyday take up a list of 5-7 names and I would meet them during the day and report back to Rajiv and his computer. Again at 1 AM Rajiv and I would meet and discuss the prospects of which MP is likely to join and who might not. Throughout this operation, Chandrashekhar did very little to help. The entire operation was a Rajiv-Swamy managed show. This continuous meeting between me and Rajiv developed a bond between us. Therefore, when the operation was near completion, in end of October of 1990, and as per plan, Chandrashekhar was slated to take oath in the first week of November, I got a call from Rajiv one day at 4 AM after I had gone to sleep. In his typically sweet and shy voice, he said "Swamy, are you free to come now to see me. I will give some excellent coffee and chocolates". When I entered Rajiv's study room at 10, Janpath at 4.30 AM, he said in a soft voice, but fresh as ever: "Swamy, I want you as PM, not Chandrashekhar" shocked by this, I said "Why at this late stage?” My party people are comfortable with you, but they don't like Chandrashekhar". "Will the President (R.Venkataraman) agree to administer me the oath?" I asked, hoping to discourage Rajiv at this change of heart. "I will send R.K.Dhawan to the President with the proposal. He dare not refuse him," he said. "Why?" I asked. Rajiv only smiled but refused to elaborate. "But, Rajiv," I went on ,"the 52

MPs have agreed to come out of Janata Dal to make Chandrashekhar PM, not me". "Yes, but now that they have come out, they cannot go back. You take oath, and they will fall in line". Much as I would have loved to grab that chance to be PM, I knew it would not work. I would earn the wrath of the 52 MPs who may fall in line, but they would despise me for cheating them. My age was 50 years then, and suppose it became a fiasco? I would have to live in disgrace. I was at that time too young to retire from politics but also too old to restart my academic career in the University. For sometime, I kept sipping coffee and eating chocolates. Then I told Rajiv, getting emotional at his trust in me: "Rajiv, I shall never forget his honour, the faith you have in me. But it is gone too far now to change Chandrashekhar." Let him be, and after one year it will be time for the Presidential elections, at which time Chandrashekhar can become President and you may become PM then. I shall work for it." At 6 AM, a sleepy Rajiv relented. It will be difficult to work with Chandrashekhar. We will have to go to the polls, but let us go through with the plan as it is for now." Thus most reluctantly, Rajiv went through with the plan. But he did not turn up for the oath ceremony of the Council of ministers. As usual, Chandrashekhar being the strong headed independent minded person, he took into the Council of Ministers, Mrs.Menaka Gandhi and Sanjay Singh, both disliked by Rajiv Gandhi. So Rajiv boycotted the oath ceremony in protest without any warning. After taking oath as a senior Minister, holding the portfolios of Commerce and Law & Justice. I went to 10, Janpath to call on Rajiv and thank him. He received me warmly, and gave lot of sweets to eat and celebrate. “Why did you not come for the oath ceremony" I asked? "What for?. You said that the Chandrashekhar government was a necessary transition from V.P.Singh's government to the General Elections. I have done my duty as per my agreement with you. There is nothing to

celebrate however" he said. But it was clear that he was already angry with Chandrashekhar. Will the Government last even one week? I wondered. When I next met Chandrashekhar, I urged him to meet Rajiv and clear things up. Chandrashekhar was equally upset. "Do you think that for the PM's post, I will prostrate before Rajiv?" It was a miracle that Chandrashekhar lasted seven months because from day one, Rajiv and Chandrashekhar were at logger heads. I can claim that had I not been in the middle, Chandrashekhar government not only would not have come into being, but when it did, it would not have lasted more than one week. But as Prime Minister, Chandrashekhar was very good and decisive. Our government set many things right. After Chandrasekhar became Prime Minister, it became clear to me that it was only a question of time before Rajiv Gandhi brought the Government down. I was keen that our Government does not go out in disgrace without doing anything during the time it lasts – though it may be only few months. The main plus about Chandrasekhar was his decisiveness. If he became convinced of something, he would not be afraid of annoying anybody to do it. There fore I was hopeful that the PM and I together would achieve something. In our system of Government, the Cabinet is Supreme. This is widely known. But what is not widely known is the existence of a "super Cabinet" called the cabinet committee on political affairs (CCPA), which consists of the PM, Home Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister and any other Minister the PM specially nominates. The intelligence services such as RAW, IB and Military Intelligence have to give clearance for a Minister to become a member of this super Cabinet, because it is the CCPA which reviews intelligence reports and not the full Cabinet.

Chandrasekhar's CCPA had Devi Lal, the Deputy PM, Yashwant Sinha, Finance Minister and myself. I was nominated by Chandrasekhar. The PM was the Home Minister and defence Minister as well, so the CCPA consisted of us four. In actual practice, CCPA meant only Chandrasekhar and myself because Devi Lal showed not much interest in its proceedings since CCPA meetings were based on voluminous documents which were in English which language he did not understand. Yashwant Sinha was mostly interested in socialising which his unexpected Ministerial status gave a huge fillip, so he was generally missing or late. Therefore Chandrasekhar, I, along with RAW, IB, and MI Chiefs and senior civil servants usually met to discuss the issues confronting the nation in the CCPA meetings. From the very first meeting, four issues were of concern to us: 1. Mandal agitation and how to cool it down. 2. RSS's Babri Masjid campaign and how to counter it. 3.The alarming network of LTTE in Tamilnadu and other states such as Assam and 4. the economy and how to save it from collapse and bankruptcy. It is to the credit of Chandrasekhar that he handled the Mandal agitation beautifully and cooled it down. Had general elections been held before the Mandal agitation had been brought under control, the elections would have been a violent one. For this alone, Chandrasekhar should be given a Bharat Ratna, because no one else could have saved the situation. He was acceptable to all the sections of the people. On the Babri Masjid issue, Chandrasekhar skilfully used Chandraswami to split the sadhu community in Ayodhya. Chandraswami won over the Mahant (main priest) of the Ayodhya temple itself causing enormous division in the movement. This forced the RSS to call off the karseva scheduled for December 1990. I, as law minister, told the RSS representatives very firmly that we would use the draconian laws, TADA and NSA to arrest even Sadhus if they

touched the Babri Masjid. This frightened the RSS so much that throughout the seven months we were in office, the RSS never raised their voice again on the Babri Masjid issue. In the meantime, we got a commitment from the Muslim organizations, that if it is proved by a commission headed by a supreme court judge that there had been a temple demolished by Babar to build the Babri Masjid over its foundations, they (the Muslims) would help Hindus to remove it, because they then would not regard the structure as a masjid. But before we could implement this compromise, our government fell. Even today, however that is the only solution to the Babri Masjid controversy. The dismissal of the Karunanidhi government was another tough decision. Many people even today do the propaganda that the decision was taken under pressure from Rajiv Gandhi and Ms.Jayalalitha, on whose parliamentary support our government was existing. The truth is however far from it. Although individual Congress leaders like Vazhapadi Ramamurthy were for dismissing the Karunanidhi government, Rajiv Gandhi took the stand that it was for Chandrasekhar to take a view, and whatever was decided by us, he would back us. There was therefore no pressure on us from Congress as a party. As for Ms.Jayalalitha, she made her position known to us that she was for dismissing the government. But by December end, she seemed to have lost hope that we would do anything about it since the Tamilnadu assembly was being convened soon after, and was to go on for two months. She and Sasikala soon left for Hyderabad and were there till nearly the date of dismissal arrived. Therefore, she too put no real pressure on us. The pressure came on us instead from IB reports which were alarming. According these reports, the LTTE had built massive network in Tamilnadu. Warehouses in coastal areas of the state, a highly modern communication system in Tiruchi, a grenade factory in Coimbatore, a military uniform stitching factory in Erode and had financed STD booths and Photostat shops all over. They owned petrol pumps through benamis across the state. The LTTE had also linked up with PWG in Andhra and ULFA in Assam. Besides, the LTTE was liberally using cars

bearing DMK flags so that the police had an excuse not to intercept them while in the travel within the state. When I paid visit to the state as a Minister in the last week of December 1990, police officers met me in my hotel room in Madras to tell me that there were instructions "from above" that the LTTE were Karunanidhi's mapillai (son -in-law) and hence not to be disturbed. I have of course never liked the LTTE because of two reasons: They are Marxists and they are terrorists. Therefore, the IB reports fuelled my determination to do something to save the situation. I had no faith in Karunanidhi controlling the LTTE because basically he is not a courageous person who can face them. Prior to 1987, Karunanidhi was a great supporter of the TELO leader Sabaratnam, who was a hate-figure for Prabhakaran. But when Prabhakaran had Sabaratnam killed, Karunanidhi's opposition to Prabhakaran immediately melts in fright, and soon he began wooing the LTTE. In June 1986, Karunanidhi even offered the LTTE some money from his birthday fund, which the LTTE publicly rejected. But Karunanidhi still continued to cultivate the LTTE and the LTTE used its mappillai status to spread its influence. So we could not expect Karunanidhi to show guts to oppose a Marxist-Terrorist organization. Chandrashekhar and I used to meet everyday when we were in Delhi for dinner at his modest 3, South Avenue Lane. Chandrashekhar used to use the PM's Race Course Residence to meet visitors during the day, but at night we used to sit on the floor in his house allotted to him as a MP, for dinner. He and I discussed practically every issue at these dinner meetings. It was Chandrashekhar who suddenly one night said to me: "Is this Karunanidhi anti-national?" Taken aback, I asked him why he wondered so. Chandrasekar said to me that when Karunanidhi had come to see him recently, he had given him some sensitive details about the LTTE operations, and also given certain confidential directions to him. "Only Karunanidhi and I were in the room, when this conversation transpired, and yet today the intelligence people brought me the transcript of the LTTE intercepted communications from Tamil Nadu to Prabhakaran at Jaffna. In the LTTE transmission, there is a complete description of my

confidential conversation with Karunanidhi. How would they know unless Karunanidhi told them?" Soon we held a CCPA meeting in which M.K.Narayan, the IB director was present. In that meeting, we got full details of the LTTE machinations. I was surprised how the LTTE had spread its net wide to include even G.K.Moopanar's close confident, P.V.Rajendran who is a TMC MP today. LTTE cadres had made friends in the media, bureaucracy and even amongst retired Supreme Court judges and foreign Secretaries, who went on foreign trips to do the LTTE propaganda. Today, that network in still intact despite Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. The way some affidavits have been filed before the Jain Commission and the way cross-examinations have taken place, has convinced some in the SIT of CBI that the proceedings of the Jain Commission have benefited the LTTE in delaying or contesting the Rajiv Gandhi murder trial. The Jain Commission Proceedings is helping the LTTE immensely by the wild accusations being made in that forum. It is then we decided that the DMK government should be dismissed and the LTTE network destroyed, and in the CCPA adopted a decision to that effect. Many persons felt at that stage that this would create sympathy for DMK, that it may spur a separatist movement, or that like MGR's dismissal in 1980, the DMK may sweep back to power in the midterm polls. But to the credit of Mr.Chandrashekhar, he did not waver, even after then Governor Surjit Singh Barnala took a partisan stand. Barnala had agreed with the seriousness of the intelligence reports, but he told us clearly that he was appointed by the V.P.Singh's National front government, so he would remain loyal to them. We got over his objections since Article 356 of the Constitution does not require the Governor's report. Barnala however promised us that he would not go back to Tamil Nadu and campaign against our decision. He however broke his word and criticised our decision. Here too Chandrashekhar did not hesitate. He got Barnala replaced by Bhisma Narain Singh.

But to our surprise, President Mr.R.Venkataraman developed cold feet. When the CCPA recommendation went to him for his signature, he hesitated . Chandrashekhar asked me to go and talk to the President, which I did. Venkataraman, despite his contrary media-cultivated image, was the most undeserving person to become the President of India. His political career was based on strategic betrayal of whoever came to trust him or repose faith in him e.g., Rajiv Gandhi. At that moment when the national security was at state, Mr.Venkataraman's concern was what would DMK volunteers do to his four houses in Kotturpuram in Chennai, and not the safety of the Tamil people. But really, he had no alternative but to sign because it was a cabinet decision based on extensive documentation. But to satisfy Mr.Venkataraman, we asked the CRPF to keep an eye on his houses. People at various levels had of course warned us that DMK volunteers would get violent, and one civil servant said "rivers of blood would flow". Chandrashekhar asked me about this possibility. I told him that every Collector knows and every police station has a list of rowdies of the area. As soon as we take over, I said to the PM, ask the police or CRPF to ensure that they make pre-emptive arrests of these rowdies. Party volunteers never riot, only hired rowdies: Some of them can be party men, but in the eyes of the law, they are still rowdies. On January 31st, 1991 that is exactly what happened. There was absolute peace in Tamil Nadu after the dismissal of the DMK government. The LTTE hardware network was smashed in the following two months, but the LTTE personnel just melted into the Tamil populace. But we had saved Tamil Nadu even if later we could not save Rajiv Gandhi from his assassination. While we were planning our moves in Tamil Nadu, Chandrashekhar one day called me up in the secret RAX phone to say that unless we got $ 2 billion from abroad within a week, the economy may collapse. He said I must use my influence in the USA to arrange it. Then he put an impossible rider: if the money comes from IMF, we cannot accept any conditions. When we first met as a government in November 1991, Chandrasekhar told the cabinet that there was a great economic crisis particularly in petroleum and foreign exchange looming.

After some discussion, it was decided by the PM that I should, for controlling the crisis, explore some informal steps to obtain crude oil on barter i.e., in exchange of sugar, or engineering goods, and also get $ 2 billion (Rs.6000 crores) IMF loans (and without conditions). That is, the PM wanted me to act as Finance Minister as well! Chandrasekhar had denied me the Finance Ministership when the Cabinet was formed because, he told me my free market philosophy would "embarrass" his "socialist" image. But the real reason was (in my opinion) I, as Finance Minister, would go after the Swiss bank accounts of politicians, and as a consequence, many political leaders would go to jail. (There is Rs.3,20,000 crores deposited illegally by Indians in Swiss banks). Therefore when the Cabinet was being formed, there was near hysteria at the prospect of my becoming Finance Minister. Chandrasekhar was bombarded by these frightened friends, saying "please bring the devil as Finance Minister, but not Swamy". This "fear" later was amply justified on May 3, 1991 when I insisted as Law Minister that the CBI be allowed to raid the residences and offices of the 'hawala kings', the Jain brothers, despite vociferous opposition from Finance Minister (now BJP) Mr.Yashwant Sinha and Minister of State Kamal Morarka. The PM sided with me after a heated discussion. But for the raid on that date, hawala probe would never have come about. When the Cabinet meeting was over, Chandrasekhar asked me to come with him to the airport (he was going to Varanasi). In the car, sitting next to him I taunted him: "you denied me the Finance Minister, and now you want me to do the work of the Finance Minister as well?" "Arre Baba!" he exclaimed in Hindi, the economy is on verge of collapse and you can only think of your grievance". "'Why should I do this task?" I persisted. After all, Commerce and Law, was my portfolio, and therefore why should I have to work for another Minister? "Listen" said Chandrasekhar "No one else in the Cabinet has your contacts abroad, in USA, Israel, China etc., so use it for the nation's sake". We sat quietly till the car reached the Special VVIP airport, and out to the tarmac where the

IAF Boeing reserved for the PM was parked. As he climbed the stair case to alight the plane, I told him when he returned, I would have a proposal on how to tackle the financial crisis. "To hell with the Finance Ministership" I said to myself. "CCPA membership is more prestigious". The foreign exchange crisis had been caused by the large number of short term loans (3 -5 years repayment) taken from Europe by the Rajiv Gandhi government (1985-89) mostly to pay for defence equipment purchases abroad. These loans became due for repayment during V.P.Singh's tenure as PM (who as finance Minister sanctioned it) but he slept over it. So when we came to power it coincided with non-payment, plotting to declare India as a defaulter or bankrupt. It was a Mexican type situation. We needed $ 2 billion to tide over this, and save our reputation. We could, like Mexico, straight away have applied to the IMF for a "crisis loan", but then the IMF would have strapped us, like Mexico, with humiliating conditions. When I spoke to Rajiv Gandhi about this crisis, after returning from the airport, he said flatly that the Congress party would not support any Mexican type conditionality. So our government was in a fix: "No conditions, No loan from IMF; no loan, no economy!" But I knew of one possible escape route. The IMF is dominated by the Americans, who control 87 percent of the voting power in the Executive Board of the IMF. Despite popular impressions to the contrary, Americans are very simple people if you have a deal with them on a give and take basis. If you want something from an American, offer him something in return which he needs. Then he will respond fully. Americans in the past were irritated with us because we took their aid, and yet voted against them in the UN. Americans are straight forward, contractual minded people, whereas we are highly moralistic people who do not like to reveal our mind. Americans are much like me in character: blunt and open in thought, but a typical Indian is more like Narasimha Rao: soft in words, but covert in action. So when Chandrasekhar returned to Delhi, I received him at the airport, and told him of Rajiv Gandhi's refusal to support an IMF conditions-prone loan. I then told him: "There is one way out. Ask the Americans to help. They will help, if you offer them something in return". "What can be possibly given them that they do not have already?" asked Chandrasekhar. I had no answer. I just kept quiet. Chandrasekhar

said "We are running out of time. Think of something". Soon after sometime, the opportunity came. The US Ambassador came to my Commerce Ministry office to tell me that the US was planning to support a UN declaration of war on Iraq, and US will conduct the operations. He said that the Indian government should support the war effort of the US. With IMF on my mind, I asked the Ambassador: "What will India get by doing so?" The Ambassador was taken back. He said it was a moral imperative for the world, since Kuwait had been crushed by Iraq's invasion. I laughed at the US ambassador. I told him "Listen Excellency, ten years in the US as a student and as a professor has made me more American than you. You keep your moral imperative, but give me a deal". I explained our problem to him. He was very sympathetic. As I expected, he immediately responded. Thereafter President Bush and Chandrasekhar were in touch with each other. The $ 2 billion arrived without any conditions! We, of course allowed the US to refuel their planes flying in from Philiphines to Saudi Arabia. Nowhere will it be recorded as a "deal", but the truth is this. In the history of the IMF, such a large loan has never been given without conditions. Ours was the exception. Of course once the loans came, the close associates of Chandrasekhar like Sinha and Morarka, who were jealous of his growing trust in me naturally wanted to claim credit or thought that it could have been done by them. In May-June 1991, when again the same crisis came, they saw to it that I was not allowed to interfere. They soon found out what "credibility" and "credentials" meant. Every government ignored our Finance Minister, and in the end, the President Mr.Venkataraman and the Finance Minister (now BJP) Mr.Yashwant Sinha together in one of the biggest undiscovered scandals of our history, mortgaged with European banks, our gold reserves without informing the Commerce Ministry. I publicly protested, and even threatened to register a criminal case for bypassing the Commerce Ministry. But by then, elections were at hand and therefore I could not do anything. Someday I will reopen this. But the resolution of the crisis in January 1991 generated tremendous confidence in

Chandrasekhar's mind about my abilities. Soon for practically every problem, he was on the phone consulting me. In this atmosphere of confidence, I began pressing Chandrasekhar to abandon his traditional socialist bias. I urged him to consider economic reform and liberalization. His economic adviser was Dr.Manmohan Singh (later Finance Minister). I had known Manmohan Singh since the days we were Professors of Economics. In those days, he was a leftist and against my ideas. But the collapse of the Soviet Union made him come over to my views. So he gave me full support. Montek Ahluwalia, now Finance Secretary, was my Commerce Secretary. I had known him since he was an economics student at Oxford. His wife was a student of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) situated next to Harvard. With the help of Ahluwalia and Manmohan Singh, I prepared a series of documents on economic liberalization. At that stage, Dr.Manmohan Singh asked me: "Do you think that any government will implement this?" Little did he realize that the next government of Narasimha Rao will have Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister and the government will take all the credit for our government's economic liberalization programme. The Congress party government did a complete ideological somersault, and in broad daylight stole my economic liberalization blue print. Chandrasekhar government was not long enough in office to implement this economic package, but the nation has benefited by the Congress somersault and theft. The granting by the Chandrasekhar government permission for US military planes to refuel in Indian airports during the Gulf War suddenly transformed Prime minister Chandrasekhar's image in the eyes of the Americans as a "good friend". This was the first time an Indian government had helped the US. Naturally the prestigious newspaper like Washington Post, New York Times began praising our government for its "decisiveness". During this period, I had also in the GATT talks, bargained with the Americans for a formulation on agricultural subsidies that pleased them; at the same time they helped us to protect our interests in textile

exports. This was another great help to the US vis-à-vis Europe. So the American press began portraying Chandrasekhar and myself as "able leaders", who can be trusted to be good friends. This publicity internationally, pleased Chandrasekhar a great deal, but I warned him that he would now have to be extra humble with Rajiv Gandhi, because the Nehru family was always very sensitive to foreign publicity. They do not like to be upstaged internationally. I told Chandrasekhar that some Congress leaders would now go to and tell Rajiv how if he continued in office as PM, he would swallow up Congress Party, and that Rajiv would become an orphan. At the same time, I told him (Chandrasekhar) that some flatterers would come and tell him how popular he had become and that if he got rid of Rajiv's "crutches" and stood alone now, he would, like Indira Gandhi in 1971, sweep the Lok Sabha polls. So these sycophants would urge him to go for elections immediately. I also told Chandrasekhar that he should control his two rootless Ministers whom I had nick-named as the "disco" group businessman, Mr.Kamal Morarka and ex-bureaucrat turned Finance minister, Mr.Yashant Sinha. These two were talking loosely, I said, to their girl friends in Delhi's Taj Hotel discotheques about Rajiv Gandhi, boasting how they could control him by enforcement Directorate and Bofors Investigations. These girl friends, mostly unmarried journalists or Rajya Sabha MPS, would in turn boast it to people like P.Chidambaram (another disco fan), whose only job those days was to carry tales to Rajiv Gandhi. Such tales would irritate Rajiv Gandhi no end, and made him think of Chandrasekhar as an ungrateful person. "Let us not forget" I said Chandrasekhar, "that it is 220 MPs of Rajiv Gandhi that is underwriting the government. We need at least a year in government before people fully accept us in our own right. Therefore today we cannot do without Rajiv Gandhi's help. But Chandrasekhar's personality was not cut out for this role of humble partner. He could not bear to hear some of his close associates taunt or tease him that he is "crawling" before Rajiv Gandhi for the post. He told me one even in Feb, 1991: "Now that the Mandal fire is under control and the Babri Masjid issue has been contained, why not go for elections?" Obviously,

his sycophants had succeeded in putting him on the offensive. The seed had been planted. I did not answer him then since he would start arguing with me, and become bitter about Rajiv Gandhi. Besides, I had to leave that night for Beijing, the capital of China, to sign the first ever Trade Pact with that country. There were many documents for me to read before catching the flight, so I told Chandrasekhar that I would answer that question after returning from China. I needed time to think, I told him and excused myself. While I was in China, I learnt from telephone calls from friends in Delhi, that the disco group was playing havoc in my absence. Not being in grass root politics, they were carried away by the foreign newspapers in praise of Chandrasekhar, little realizing the ground realities. We had 54 MPs, Rajiv had 220; we had no party structure, while Rajiv had a massive party organisation for which he had plenty of finance. The four months in office had created a good impression about him in people's mind, but it needed consolidation. Popularity is fleeting, and by itself cannot make win elections. Popularity, like Imran Khan found out much later, does not substitute for party organization. When I returned from China ten days later, I was expecting a celebration for getting the first ever Trade Pact signed with that country, enabling us to export among other things, telephone exchanges and steel production processes. Instead I found the atmosphere so vitiated by suspicion, that the fall of the government was being discussed. Soured by the nasty propaganda of the disco group and influenced by the Mantharas in his party, Rajiv had decided to bring Chandrasekhar down. First, he made an issue of why we did not support Saddam Hussein in the Iraq war. Later he dropped the issue, because our Gulf policy had been made with his prior consultation and approval .Furthermore, Rajiv Gandhi had relied on Mr.Gorbachev of the Soviet Union to join him in an international campaign in favour of Saddam Hussien. But Gorbachev supported our stand, disappointing Rajiv. So he had to drop this issue as a nonstarter. Next, he picked on the Haryana CID surveillance issue. Two constables had been posted by the Chauthala government to spy on who goes in and out of 10, Janpath, Rajiv said. Obviously, this was an excuse for fighting with Chandrasekhar. But one thing led to another,

and soon enough there were angry words exchanged. Rajiv wanted Chandrasekhar to make amends. The character of Chandrasekhar came out clearly in this conflict. He was not a person to bend for a post to the point of humiliation, so he refused to make amends. This was his strong point as well as weak point. As a leader of the government with absolute majority, Chandrasekhar's unbending character would have made him a hero of people. But as a leader of coalition, it made him a zero. Chandrasekhar was Janata Party President for 11 years (1977-88), but he presided over his gradual liquidation. In the end, he quit and joined the Janata Dal led by V.P.Singh. Why? Janata Party was founded as a coalition party, a merger of five parties. Chandrasekhar had no patience for the compromises necessary for a coalition. Had Janata Party been built like other parties, brick by brick, and over 50 years, Chandrasekhar as its leader would have flourished. Strong leaders cannot lead coalitions unless they know how either to blackmail the partners into submission like Jyoti Basu does, or be a sweet gentleman. But Chandrasekhar was a gentleman strong leader. That as Chanakya would have said is a self defeating combination. For a coalition, a leader should be either a gentleman or strong, but not both. After the Haryana constable issue, the government fell. Elections came. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated. Chandrasekhar felt truly sorry. So as a gentleman, he proposed in the cabinet that Rajiv Gandhi should be given Bharat Ratna for his sacrifice. This did not mollify Rajiv Gandhi' supporters. They demanded that the Government allot a Rajghat area for Rajiv Gandhi's memorial. Chandrasekhar immediately agreed, and proposed that in the vast area for Indira Gandhi's memorial called Shakti Sthal an enclosure be carved out to create a place for Rajiv Gandhi. This infuriated Rajiv's followers. Even Sonia Gandhi was upset. They wanted Rajiv Gandhi's memorial on its own merit, not as Indira Gandhi's son. One day in late May 1991, a few days after the assassination, I got a call from Chandrasekhar at 6 AM in the morning. He asked me to come right away. When I saw him at his residence, he told me about the problems he was having with the Rajiv Gandhi memorial site. He told me that the Government had offered to prepare a site out of the Shakthi Sthal, but Sonia Gandhi

had refused, because she had wanted Rajiv Gandhi's memorial to have an independent identity. I told Chandrasekhar that Sonia was right. After all, Rajiv had been PM for five years in his own right. But the problem Chandrasekhar told me was that Sonia was asking for a part of Lal Bahadur Shastri's memorial area which was then a temporary CRPF camp. Not all of Shastri's Memorial had been developed despite so many years. He said, "If you cannot carve out a memorial for Rajiv from Shakti Sthal, I am not going to agree to carve it out from poor Lal Bahadur Shahtri's area" "So what's the problem that I should come here so early in the morning?" I asked Chandrasekhar, sensing that something else was on his mind. "IB tells me that Sonia is going to go to public today, or ask for Doordarshan time, to condemn our government for 'dishonouring' Rajiv memory. That should be prevented because so many world leaders are arriving for the cremation and no site is ready" Chandrasekhar said. "Why don't you talk to her directly?" I asked despite knowing the answer. Sonia was already bitter with Chandrasekhar for forcing Rajiv to go to the polls, and so she was unlikely to come on the phone to talk to him. "She is unavailable, every time I telephone her house" he said. "What can I do now?" I asked. "Amitabh Bachhan told me last night that if you talked to her, she might agree. She would talk to no one else. Since she is so upset and in mourning" Chandrasekhar told me. "She will agree to what, Chandrasekharji? What do I offer, and why should not we close down the CRPF camp and shift it elsewhere? If it can be even temporarily partitioned for the CRPF, it can be permanently set aside for Rajiv Gandhi" I retorted. "Except Lal Bahadur's memorial you have the authority to take out any government land anywhere in India to offer it to Sonia for the memorial. But don't try to force me on Lal Bahadur's site. I too have sentiments. I will not agree”, Chandrasekhar added belligerently, obviously hurt by the way the Rajiv loyalists were behaving. I agreed to talk to Sonia, because I had no choice. If nothing else for Rajiv's sake. Otherwise there would have been an International Scandal.

When I went home, I called Amitabh Bachhan. Bachhan was very friendly with me because as Law Minister I had ordered withdrawal of a FERA case against his brother Ajitabh, a case filed by V.P.Singh's government. V.P.Singh had hatred for the Bachhans, so he had directed a FERA case to be filed, even though in law it had no basis. But in these politically motivated cases like Lakhubhai cheating and St.Kitts cases. The idea is to get one's target or enemy, arrested for interrogation purposes (remand), and then after sometime release the person on bail. The newspaper would do rest of the job, making out that remand is actually conviction or punishment. One's enemy then becomes guilty without a trial. The person may be acquitted after some years, but who is to remember that, or who is to compensate for the lost years? Take the ISRO so-called spy case. How many people have needlessly suffered? As Law Minister, whenever anyone made a petition to me charging that such frivolous case had been filed, I usually went into the case myself. Ajitabh Bachhan's FERA case was one such. Chandrasekhar had forwarded Ajitabh's petition made to him, and had asked me to deal with it. The case was silly, because the charge was that Ajitabh had purchased a house in Switzerland with foreign exchange without RBI permission. So a FERA case was foisted on him. Ram Jethmalani had taken up this issue to please V.P.Singh so that he could come into V.P.Singh's inner circle. But Jethmalani never does his home work. He tried to get his point by shouting all kinds of legal rubbish. The ordinary citizens get frightened by it since they do not know law. In Ajitabh's case, he was already a NRI with Indian passport, so he was entitled in law to buy a house abroad, in foreign exchange. How he got the NRI status was another matter, but CBI did not question that. I was shocked by the silly nature of the case, which was untenable and waste of public funds in prosecution. For nearly a year, Ajitabh had been harassed by such a baseless FERA case. I therefore called the law Secretary and asked him to instruct the CBI and Enforcement Directorate to withdraw the case. The Law Secretary told me: "Sir, you will get a bad name for this. Please consider". "Am I wrong legally?" I asked the Law Secretary. "No Sir. But this is a

political matter which newspapers will play up. It will spoil your good name" he said. "Politics is my area, not yours. Call a press conference and I will announce my decision to the world" I told him. "Why Sir?" asked an alarmed Law Secretary. Because if I don't, the Indian Express will get a leak from the CBI, and then it will be big news. If I call a press conference, and explain the basis, people will understand" I replied. That is exactly what happened. Ajitabh case was withdrawn and even though the Indian Express condemned it in an editorial, no one else agreed. Rajiv, Sonia and Amitabh were naturally pleased. Amitabh had then asked to see me. I told him he could see me in Attorney General G.Ramasamy's house. At GR's house, Amitabh told me that he would never forget my help. "Rajiv's opinion that I had the courage of my conviction is amply proved", he said. So when I telephoned Amitabh on that morning, after meeting Chandrasekhar he warmly responded. He gave a special telephone number at which a mourning Sonia would be available. He said she was expecting my call. But he warned me that she was going to insist on the CRPF Shastri site. I called Sonia and fixed a time to see her that afternoon. With the PM's authority, I called up the Urban Development Minister Daulat Ram Saran and asked him to send the secretary of the ministry with the entire blueprint of the Rajghat area for my study. After studying map for empty spaces available, I selected one site, next to Shakthi Sthal, but not on it. It was a dumping ground for coal ash of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) and was fenced by a wall from the Sakthi Sthal. It was filthy but it could be easily cleaned up. While I drove to 10, Janpath to meet Sonia, I had only one question in my mind: how to protect Chandrasekhar's sentiment or shall I say obduracy, on the CRPF site and at the same time make Sonia agree to a new site, in this highly emotional climate. It was a very delicate mission for me, with international consequences. But I had a trump card for success, which I did not tell Chandrasekhar about. When I was taken to Sonia's room, there was besides her, Amitabh,

Rahul and Priyanka. Sonia asked me to be seated. I spread the map on the table and said:" Soniaji, you know how much I respected Rajiv. This site I have selected, please accept. We will use the government funds to clean it up and make it the best". At this, Priyanka flared up and said in a demanding tone: "Are you, or are you not going to give the CRPF camp site for my father's memorial. Otherwise we don’t want anything from Government". At this tone of voice, I was upset. I was a senior Cabinet minister and Priyanka was a college girl. She had no right to talk to me like that. I had come to see her mother, not her. Congressmen can be backbone less wonders, but not Subramanian Swamy even if he has to go into the wilderness for it. In a raised voice, I thundered "No! We will not give that site. I will pass such an order on the CRPF site that no future government can dare to overrule it". There was an eerie silence for nearly a minute. Amitabh was feeling very uncomfortable. No one spoke. Then Sonia said in a very soft voice: "why? Why not that site? With that question, I got a chance to play my trump card. I said, "Soniaji, the only reason is that I want to respect Rajiv's sentiment. When in 1987 Charan Singh died and was to be cremated ,his son Ajit and I had asked Rajiv (as PM) for the same CRPF site for Chaudhary Saheb. He had declined. Rajiv had explained to me then that already Shastri's memorial is much neglected, and if this site, temporarily with the CRPF is given away , there will be much misunderstanding and adverse publicity. He recorded this in the files of the Government. So to respect Rajiv's view, we cannot give the site of your choice. But I have told the PM that this alternate site I have selected should be offered for Rajiv Gandhi memorial and immediately developed. After a few moments, Sonia agreed. I took it as recognition by her that I would not deliberately try to give a bad site for Rajiv's memorial. Because I had so much regard for Rajiv which she knew was mutually felt by Rajiv. I would she understood, select the best available site. Priyanka was still angry, but Sonia restrained her from speaking anymore. "We will accept because it has come form you" she said. The crisis was over. A site has been selected. When I

informed the PM, he promptly announced it over Doordharsan, to set all the rumours afloat, at rest. Had I not intervened, God only knows what would have happened. But for Rajiv's sake, who I consider was the most patriotic and dynamic leader produced to date by the Nehru family, and perhaps also the most underrated, it was God's grace that we found a way out.