Cases on Vawc

CASES ON VAWC DABALOS VS QUAIMBAO GR NO. 193960, JAN. 7, 2013 FACTS:

 Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 9262.  After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009.  Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.  In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. ||

|||

|||

ISSUE: WON ACCUSED CAN BE CHARGED WITH RA 9262. RULING. YES.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. 6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred.

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law. DEL SOCORRO VS VAN WILSEM GR NO. 193707 FACTS:  Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.  Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. 4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and

her son came home to the Philippines.  respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.  Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.  On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter |||

|||

|||

|||

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child. RULING: YES. To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists. |||

|||

we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine

laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36 The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

longer liable to support his former wife. Finally, we do not agree with respondent's argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5 (e) (2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, 53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed. |||

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son altogether. EHaASD

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no

REPUBLIC VS YAHON G.R. No. 201043. June 16, 2014. FACTS:  Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her previous livein partner. |||

 On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows: “xxx |||

To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent's retirement and other benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON.”

execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary. |||

GO-TAN VS SPS TAN [G.R. No. 168852. September 30, 2008.] |||

ISSUE: whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter's lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262 RULING: YES. It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 17 Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. 19 We hold that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from

FACTS: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. GoTan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen Denise. 5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5), and (i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTSIN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004”.

becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

RULING: The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

FACTS:  This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.  The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262  complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.  In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish's face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender's cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." CScaDH

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them

ANG VS CA [G.R. No. 182835. April 20, 2010.]

|||

|||

|||

Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).  After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. |||

|||

ISSUES: Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;

1.The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2.The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3.The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5 (h) of R.A. 9262; RULING: Section 3 (a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. |||

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3 (e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: (e)"Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business

or social context is not a dating relationship.

it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair." 9 |||

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women . . . refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman . . . with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3 (e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3 (f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan's messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three|||

month romantic relation as continuous. (Ang y Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, [April 20, 2010], 632 PHIL 609-624) |||

the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan's low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today's youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare. |||

TUA VS MANGROBANG [G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014. FACTS:

 On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and Jezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the

Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 046405 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from petitioner's abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children's financial support.  On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) )  Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE: A.) The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO ) |||

|||

|||

||

B. WON there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.

SC RULING:

A. In Garcia v. Drilon, 13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held: A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. AEIHaS

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction

by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

B. the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." |||

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court's discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed. ) ||