Cases on Revocation of Prc License

G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1 On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6 During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9 On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:

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I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11 After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12 Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14 Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16 To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours). This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. 2

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.21 This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

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Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27 In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

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DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3] On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4] On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6] Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.[7] On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single.[8] After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case. The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.[10] Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.[11] Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. [12] When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,[13] petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14] The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts. On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15] The 5

Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.[16] Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.[17] Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.[18] Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues: I PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. II PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE. III PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.[19] The petition has no merit. While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.[20] A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. [21] The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22] The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. [23] Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People vs. Aragon[25] cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[26] In Landicho vs. Relova,[27] we held that:

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Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.[28] It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.[29] Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case: The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board. Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.[31] We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. [32] In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [33] In view of the trial court’s finding that aprima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34] The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of aprima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.[35] The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.[36]Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties. Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had 7

not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit. We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. [37] In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38] this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39] Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states: Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case. This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.[40] The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.[41] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004]

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners, vs. ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R. RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, 8

JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L. SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H. CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision, dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the judgment[2] dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 9366530. The trial court allowed the respondents to take their physician’s oath and to register as duly licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution[3] promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. [1]

The facts of this case are as follows: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OBGyne. The Board also observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine.[4] The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination. Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination. On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne, of the FatimaCollege examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores ofFatima College examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause “strong enough to eliminate the normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, etc.”[5] For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”[6] On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity) filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 9366530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors. 9

Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC. On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC. The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows: WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside. SO ORDERED.[7] Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court. Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel. On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses. On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her nonappearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing. Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4, 1994. The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the Orders of the trial court datedNovember 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows: WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTCManila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’ counsel to cross-examine the respondents’ witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents. IT IS SO ORDERED.[8] The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties. A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the proceedings. In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994. Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 10

On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994. On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision. On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],[9] to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals. No costs. SO ORDERED.[10] As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitledProfessional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch. On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal[11] in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817. On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with accordingly. SO ORDERED.[12] While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. RaquenoRabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them. On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal. 11

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[13] In sustaining the trial court’s decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993. They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,[14] they should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC. Hence, this petition raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES. II WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.[15] To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus? The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this Court’s Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no showing “that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment” in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and executory. Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 20[16] of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.[17] Section 3 of Rule 65[18] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is entitled. We shall discuss the issues successively. 1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382. For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.[19] Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the act, [20] and the performance of the duty has been refused.[21]Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959? 12

As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records: It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for physicians conducted and administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same examinations.[22] The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to practice the medical profession[23] pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959? The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section.[24] The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959. A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners “shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22[25] of the Medical Act of 1959. However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved. Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and “disapprove applications for examination or registration,” pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 1[26] thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as required by Section 9[27] of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled: WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[’] examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS them from taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD. SO ORDERED.[28] Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized. The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are present in their case. Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution No. 26,[29] dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for “immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations.” It likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College. Section 8[30] of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.” Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered “to physicians who qualified in the examinations.” The operative word here is 13

“satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.”[31] Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents “satisfactorily passed” the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents. 2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.[32] There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. [33] It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government.[34] It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right[35] of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. [36] But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. [37] Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by the Philippine Medical Act.[38] In another case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants into medical schools through admission tests.[39] It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.[40] Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.[41] In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. 3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition for mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 9366530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that: Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical consequence.[42] There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.[43] It should be recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners 14

filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.[44] The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case advance their cause any. Section 26[45] of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available.[46] However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised.[47] On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530. As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them. As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names from the suit. Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

RENE VENTENILLA PUSE, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 183678 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

- versus -

LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE,

Promulgated: 15

Respondent. March 15, 2010 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed by petitioner Rene V. Puse assailing the Decision[1] dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 100421. Petitioner is a registered Professional Teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban,Camarines Norte, while respondent is a Barangay Rural Health Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of Jose Panganiban,Camarines Norte. It appears that on 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos Santos-Puse at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte before the Hon. Judge Oscar T. Osorio.[2] He had two (2) children with her, and had a church wedding before respondent found out that petitioner was already married. Respondent discovered that petitioner had already gotten married to Cristina Pablo Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27 December 1986. Respondent likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his first wife.[3] Thus, on 2 August 2005, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband against whom she had filed a criminal case for “Bigamy” and “Abandonment.” She alleged that her husband has not been giving her and their children support.[4] In a letter dated 16 August 2005, petitioner was directed by the PRC of Lucena City to answer the complaint for immorality and dishonorable conduct filed by respondent.[5] Per directive, petitioner submitted his Compliance[6] dated 31 August 2005denying the charges against him. He adopted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Jocelyn Puse Decena andDominador I. Blanco, which were submitted in Criminal Case Nos. 7228 and 7229 before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, CamarinesNorte. He argued that if respondent’s allegations were true, she herself would be equally guilty of immorality and dishonorable conduct, as she was fully aware that petitioner was already married when she married him. He added he has not abandoned respondent or their children and continually gives support for their children. In her Reply to Answer/Compliance[7] dated 6 September 2005, respondent said she married petitioner in good faith, unaware that he was already married to Cristina N. Pablo. When she learned of petitioner’s deception regarding his marital status, she filed a case for Bigamy before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, which found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial. She found petitioner’s explanation “Na ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking unang asawa at ang paniwala ko ay siya aypatay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala ng saysay” to be lame and insufficient to justify his contracting a subsequent bigamous marriage. She claimed that petitioner should have instituted in court a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of his first wife before contracting a subsequent marriage. In the absence of such declaration, her marriage to petitioner is bigamous and void ab initio. She added that the affidavits of his sister and close friend should not be given weight. In his Rejoinder[8] dated 11 October 2005, petitioner reiterated the arguments in his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was not verified and for failure of the respondent to attach a valid certification against forum-shopping. After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings filed, the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a prima facie case for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct against petitioner, and directed respondent to pay docket and legal research fees.[9] The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016. On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found petitioner administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional Teacher. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: 16

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Board finds Rene Ventenilla Puse guilty as charged and accordingly revokes his license as a Professional Teacher. He is ordered to surrender his Certificate of Registration and his Professional Identification Card to the Professional Regulation Commission within ten (10) days from the time this decision becomes final and executory and to desist from the practice of the teaching profession under the pain of criminal prosecution. SO ORDERED.[10] The Board ruled that contrary to petitioner’s contentions, it had jurisdiction over petitioner and could validly order the revocation of his license, as petitioner was a professional teacher. Under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994, the Board has the power and authority to regulate the practice of teaching in the Philippines. The charge of Immorality and/or Dishonorable Conduct is also one (1) of the grounds for the revocation or suspension of a license of a professional teacher. For entering into a second marriage without first seeking a judicial declaration of the presumptive death of his first wife and thereafter cohabiting with his second wife and having children with her, petitioner is liable for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct. The Board added that whether respondent had knowledge of the first marriage or not is irrelevant and further found petitioner’s claim that his cohabitation with respondent was under duress, force or intimidation untenable. Citing Section 3,[11] Article III and Section 3,[12] Article XI of the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, and theOath of Professionals,[13] the Board also explained that petitioner’s official life cannot be detached from his personal life, contrary to his contention that the acts complained of were purely private. His immorality and dishonorable conduct demonstrate his unfitness to continue practicing his profession as he is no longer the embodiment of a role model for young elementary school pupils, the Board ruled. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied by the Board per Resolution dated 9 July 2007.[14] Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100421, before the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolutions dated 16 February 2007 and 9 July 2007 of the Board. On 28 March 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal. [15] The appellate court held that the applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers because petitioner was occupying the position of Teacher I at the S. Aguirre Elementary School. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to investigate the complaint was the Board of Professional Teachers. Thus, it was the Board of Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over the administrative case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) as contended by petitioner. As to the finding of immorality and/or dishonorable conduct, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Board in finding as untenable petitioner’s excuse that he believed his first wife to be dead and that his first marriage was no longer subsisting. It said that petitioner should have applied for a judicial order declaring his first wife presumptively dead before marrying respondent. It further found without merit petitioner’s defense that the complaint is of a private nature, explaining that his actions relate to the very nature of his career: to teach, mold and guide the youth to moral righteousness. As to petitioner’s defense of pari delicto, the appellate court upheld the Board’s finding that respondent was in good faith when she married petitioner. The Board also afforded petitioner due process.

[16]

On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the present recourse. Petitioner argues that: I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN VALIDATING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF PRCMANILA DESPITE THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME AND ITS PATENT NULLITY FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED OUTSIDE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS;

II.

THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC)-MANILA AND LUCENA 17

CITY, GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT ASSUMED PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT IN CONTRAVENTION WITH EXISTING RULES AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER; III.

THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PRCMANILA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF IMMORALITY AND DISHONORABLE CONDUCT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKING HIS TEACHER’S LICENSE AS A PENALTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUSTAINING THE COMPLAINT, WHICH IN EFFECT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[17]

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows: (1) Did the Board of Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by respondent against petitioner? (2) Was petitioner denied administrative due process? (3) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold petitioner liable? On the first issue, petitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint was either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Since the charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC. We do not agree. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.[18] When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[19] The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional TeachersPRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Section 23 reads: SEC. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. – The Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration, for any of the following causes: (a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct; (c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or insane; (d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of the teaching profession; (e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration, professional license or special/temporary permit; (f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs; (g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and other policies of the Board and the Commission, and the code of ethical and professional standards for professional teachers; and 18

(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and the like or the continuing education program prescribed by the Board and the Commission. x x x[20] Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC. However, if the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then under Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers , the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. Section 9 of the Magna Carta provides: SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education. A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee which is under the DepEd. As to the CSC, under P.D. No. 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. These sections state: SEC. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.–The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: xxxx (j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal; xxxx SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.–(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline all government employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[21] Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC. However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.[22] Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers, before which respondent filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.

19

Petitioner’s reliance on the cases of Emin v. De Leon[23] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte[24] to support his claim that it was the DepEd Investigating Committee created pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 which had jurisdiction to try him because he is a public school teacher, is without merit as these cases are not in point. In Emin, the issue was which between theDepEd Investigating Committee (under Rep. Act No. 4670) and the CSC (under P.D. No. 807) had jurisdiction to try the administrative case, while in Estandarte, the issue was which between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DepEd Investigating Committee had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed in said case. In contrast, the instant case involves the Board of Professional Teachers which, under Rep. Act No. 7836, had jurisdiction over administrative cases against professional teachers and has the power to suspend and revoke a licensed teacher’s certificate of registration after due proceedings. As to the issue of due process, was petitioner denied administrative due process? Petitioner questions the authority of the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, arguing that venue was improperly laid as he and respondent are residents of Parang, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte; they were married in Daet, Camarines Norte where the alleged immoral and dishonorable conduct was committed; his professional teacher’s license was issued in the Central Office of the PRC in Manila and renewed in the PRC Regional Office in Legaspi City,Albay; and he is a Teacher I of S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. Moreover, petitioner also faults the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City for acting on respondent’s unverified letter in violation of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which provides: Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. – No complaint against a civil servant shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath. He also asserts that respondent purposely filed the complaint before the Board of Professional Teachers in Lucena Citybecause the investigating officer was her colleague and belonged to the same religious denomination as her. This, according to petitioner, showed the partiality of the board. The Board of Professional Teachers also allegedly denied him due process because he was allegedly informed of the retraction of the testimony/affidavit of his witness (Dominador Blanco) only upon receipt of the Board’s decision. Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[25] The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.[26] Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [27] The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process. As regards his claim that the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City was partial because the investigating officer knew respondent personally, the same was not substantiated. Even assuming arguendo that the investigating officer knew respondent, convincing proof was still required to establish partiality or bias. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.[28] For failure of petitioner to adduce such evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails.[29] That he was allegedly informed of Dominador Blanco’s retraction upon receipt of the Board’s resolution is also of no moment. Even if it were true that petitioner was only informed of the retraction when he received a copy of

20

the Board’s resolution, there was still no denial of due process because he still had the opportunity to question the same in his Motion for Reconsideration. This, he did not do. But was there substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty of immoral and dishonorable conduct? On this issue, we likewise find against petitioner. Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the erroneous belief that his first wife was already deceased. He insists that such act of entering into the second marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts that he committed the act even before he became a teacher. He said that for thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and loving father to his children with respondent. He was even an inspiration to many as he built a second home thinking that he had lost his first. He wanted to make things right when he learned of the whereabouts of his first family and longed to make up for his lost years with them. He maintains that he never violated the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers but embraced it like a good citizen when he opted to stop his illicit marriage to go back to his first family. He adds that respondent knew fully well he was married and had children when they contracted marriage. Thus, she was also at fault. Lastly, he claims there was no substantial proof to show that his bigamous marriage contracted before he became a teacher has brought damage to the teaching profession. However, the issues of whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and whether respondent knew that petitioner was already married have been ruled upon by both the Board of Professional Teachers and the Court of Appeals. The Board and the appellate court found untenable petitioner’s belief that his first wife was already dead and that his former marriage was no longer subsisting. For failing to get a court order declaring his first wife presumptively dead, his marriage to respondent was clearlyunlawful and immoral. It is not the Court’s function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues - an exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the parties may raise only questions of law in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not atrier of facts. As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered in the tribunals below.[30] This is particularly true where the Board and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. While there are recognized exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion,[31] no such circumstances exist in this case. Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the Board as affirmed by the appellate court. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner’s claim that he believed his first wife Cristina Puse to be already dead was belied by the latter’s declaration. In the affidavit submitted before the CSC in A.C. No. CSC RO5 D-06-012 entitled Cristina Puse v. Ligaya de los Santos, Cristina Puse, petitioner’s first wife, declared that “Sometime in 1993, complainant decided to work in Hongkong x x x. Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent financial support to her children and husband. From time to time, complainant would visit her family in the Philippines at least once a year every year.” From this statement, petitioner cannot claim that he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that she regularly sent her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a year. Petitioner’s contention that there was no substantial evidence to show his guilt because respondent did not even formally offer her exhibits also does not persuade. As we have already said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally offer her exhibits the way she would in the courts of justice does not prevent the Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals from admitting said exhibits and considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5 of PRC Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known as the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, “technical errors in the admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties shall not vitiate the proceedings.” Here, we do not find any evidence that respondent’s failure to formally offer her exhibits substantially prejudiced petitioner. Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that because he contracted the bigamous marriage before he even became a teacher, he is not required to observe the ethical standards set forth in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers.[32]

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In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required to strictly adhere to, observe and practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and values laid down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he was not yet a teacher when he contracted his second marriage. His good moral character is a continuing requirement which he must possess if he wants to continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed to abide by the tenets of morality. Petitioner kept his first marriage secret to his second wife. Unfortunately for him, his second wife discovered his true marital status which led to the filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him. In Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, a case involving a teacher dismissed from work on account of immorality, we declared: On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. American jurisprudence has defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate, x x x Thus, in petitioner’s case, the gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at the same time a teacher. xxxx As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their formative years and stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority under our laws. Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A teacher, both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach. Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on the students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and honesty. From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour amounts to immorality, justifying his termination from employment.[33] The Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers contains, among others, the following: PREAMBLE Teachers are duly licensed professionals who possess dignity and reputation with high moral values as well as technical and professional competence. In the practice of their noble profession, they strictly adhere to, observe, and practice this set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values. xxxx ARTICLE II THE TEACHER AND THE STATE Section 1. The schools are the nurseries of the citizens of the state. Each teacher is a trustee of the cultural and educational heritage of the nation and is under obligation to transmit to learners such heritage as well as to elevate national morality, x x x. xxxx Section 3. In the interest of the State of the Filipino people as much as of his own, every teacher shall be physically, mentally and morally fit. xxxx ARTICLE III THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY 22

xxxx Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which purpose he shall behave with honor and dignity at all timesand refrain from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other excesses, much less illicit relations. xxxx ARTICLE XI THE TEACHER AS A PERSON Section 1. A teacher shall live with dignity in all places at all times. xxxx Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could serve as model worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others. [Emphasis supplied.] The foregoing provisions show that a teacher must conform to the standards of the Code. Any deviation from the prescribed standards, principles and values renders a teacher unfit to continue practicing his profession. Thus, it is required that a teacher must at all times be moral, honorable and dignified. The discovery of petitioner’s bigamous marriage has definitely caused damage to the teaching profession. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? The fact that he is now allegedly walking away from his second marriage in order to be with his first family to make up for lost time does not wipe away the immoral conduct he performed when he contracted his second marriage. If we are to condone immoral acts simply because the offender says he is turning his back on his immoral activities, such would be a convenient excuse for moral transgressors and which would only abet the commission of similar immoral acts. His assertion that he fulfilled his responsibilities as a father and a husband to his second family will, even if true, not cleanse his moral transgression. In a case involving a lawyer who raised this same defense, we held: Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in view of respondent’s additional reason why he should be exonerated – that he loves all his children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It has always been the duties of parents – e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. And most important of all, he is obliged to remain faithful to her until death.[34] Petitioner’s claim that he is a good provider to his second family is belied by the complaint of respondent wherein it was alleged that he failed financially to support his second family. Moreover, he is already delinquent as to his duties to his second wife. How can he live with her, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render help and support, and to remain faithful to her until death when he has another family to whom he is returning to? All told, petitioner’s act of entering into said second marriage constitutes grossly immoral conduct. No doubt, such actuation demonstrates a lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the teaching profession. When he contracted his second marriage despite the subsistence of the first, he made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. We now go to the penalty imposed on petitioner. The penalty imposed on petitioner was the revocation of his license which penalty was upheld by the Court of Appeals. He claims that such penalty was harsh and inappropriate. He cites Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which states that disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one 23

(1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that the charge was supposedly his first offense and taking into account his years of committed service, the commensurate penalty, according to petitioner, is only the suspension of his professional license. He refers to the case of Vitug v.Rongcal,[35] where this Court considered remorse and the brevity of the illicit relationship as mitigating circumstances taken in favor of the respondent lawyer. It must be remembered, however, that petitioner was charged before the Board of Professional Teachers under Rep. Act No. 7836 and not under Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board has the power to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration[36] of any teacher for any causes mentioned in said section, one (1) of which is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The Board has the discretion, taking into account the circumstances obtaining, to impose the penalty of suspension or revocation. In the imposition of the penalty, the Board is not guided by Section 22 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides for suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Petitioner, therefore, cannot insist that Section 22 be applied to him in the imposition of his penalty, because the Board’s basis is Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836 which does not consider whether the offense was committed the first or second time. As to the supposed mitigating circumstances of remorse and brevity of the illicit relationship, these cannot be appreciated in petitioner’s favor, as these circumstances are not present in the instant case. We do not find any expression of remorse in petitioner. What we note, instead, is obduracy on his part. Despite the clear evidence (first wife’s statement that she regularly sends financial support to her children and husband [referring to petitioner] and that she visits them in the Philippines at least once a year) showing that petitioner knew that his first wife was still alive, he remains unyielding on his stand that he thought that his wife was already deceased. We also cannot consider the illicit and immoral relationship to be brief because it lasted for more than twelve (12) years until respondent learned about petitioner’s deception. Under the circumstances, we find the penalty imposed by the Board proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 100421 is AFFIRMED.

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