Cases on Eminent Domain

CASES ON EMINENT DOMAIN

of the RTC because it is incapable of

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON vs. BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna,

pecuniary estimation. estimation. As discussed: discussed: “xx An expropriation suit does not

involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather,

it

deals

with

the

Res Judicata

exercise by the government of its

Expropriation not capable of pecuniary

authority and right to take property for

estimation

 public use. As such, it is incapable of  pecuniary estimation and should be

Facts:

 filed with the regional trial courts. courts. xx” 

Two lots measuring 144 square meters was to be expropriated by Bargy Masili for the purpose of constructing

a

barangay

hall.

However, the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the purchase price of Php 200,000. The first complaint was filed before the MTC.

Whereas, the second

complaint was filed before the RTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of interest of the petitioner lot owners. The RTC stated that the MTC has no  jurisdiction over t he case. It also ruled in favor of Brgy Masili.

Issue/s: 1.

WON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case of expropriation;

2. WON the State is barred from expropriating

the

property

by

reason of res judicata; and 3. Legality of entry into the premises subject of expropriation.

Ruling: The SC held that the expropriation proceedings is within the jurisdiction

As regards to the second issue, the principle of res judicata does judicata does not apply against the inherent powers of the State. The SC has this to say: say: “xx Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged,  judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. It  provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the  parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.

The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the  former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had  jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a  judgment on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Since the MTC had no  jurisdiction over expropriation  proceedings, the doctrine of res  judicata finds no application

even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.  xx” 

The entry in the premises of the expropriated property was held to be  justified by the SC. It ruled that: “xx The requirements for the issuance of a writ of  possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the  fair market value of the  property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.

 petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her  property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the  power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it. xx” 

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor

to

expropriate

1

hectare

portion of the property owned by Percival Moday. The mayor approved approved the said resolution and submitted the same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The latter denied the resolution

In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter  properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If

stating that there are other properties which may be expropriated. Notwithstanding the denial of the resiolution Panlalawigan,

by

the

the

Sangguniang

Municipality

of

Bunawan filed a complaint for the expropriation Moday. municipality’s

of

the

property

of

The RTC granted the motion

to

take

possession of the parcel of lot. The Court of Appeals, upon petition for certiorari, stated that the public

even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.  xx” 

The entry in the premises of the expropriated property was held to be  justified by the SC. It ruled that: “xx The requirements for the issuance of a writ of  possession in an expropriation case are expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the  fair market value of the  property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.

 petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her  property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the  power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it. xx” 

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor

to

expropriate

1

hectare

portion of the property owned by Percival Moday. The mayor approved approved the said resolution and submitted the same to Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The latter denied the resolution

In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter  properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If

stating that there are other properties which may be expropriated. Notwithstanding the denial of the resiolution Panlalawigan,

by

the

the

Sangguniang

Municipality

of

Bunawan filed a complaint for the expropriation Moday. municipality’s

of

the

property

of

The RTC granted the motion

to

take

possession of the parcel of lot. The Court of Appeals, upon petition for certiorari, stated that the public

purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan

del

Resolution

Sur No.

did

not

43-89

declare invalid,

expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.

Issue: whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved

by

the

Sangguniang

Panlalawigan

Ruling: The SC upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals. It stated that the only ground by which the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may deny a resolution or an ordinance is the lack of authority. Thus:

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although  pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal

resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The  provincial (board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board  passes these limits, it usurps usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or  president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the  power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,  pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to  petition for the condemnation of  petitioners' property. Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides: Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1)

Within thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial  fiscal, who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang  panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper. (2) If the sangguniang  panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang  panlalawigan shall be final. final.  xxx xxx supplied.)

xxx

(Emphasis

Diosdado Lagcao Generosa Labra

vs

Hon

Judge

Facts: The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. Included in the said donation is Lot 1029.

In

1965, petitioners Lagcao purchased Lot 1029 in installment installment basis from the City of Cebu. The same lots, however, reverted back to the province and the sale f Lot 1029 to Lagcao was being annulled by the province.

The appellate court

ordered the issuance of Deed of Sale in favor of Lagcao. Lagcao proceedings

initiated against

demolition the

squatters

occupying Lot 1029. This was enjoined by the MTC granting the motion filed by the Province of Cebu. The

Province

expropriation Lagcao.

of

Cebu

proceedings

filed against

The purpose purpose of which is to

construct in the lots socialized housing.

Issue: WON the private property may be expropriated for the purpose of socialized housing thereon Ruling: The SC granted the petition of Lagcao and declared that the purpose was not public use but is only beneficial to few few a handful few. explained:

We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu “xx

It

complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate  petitioners’ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’  property as required by Section [20] 19 of RA 7160. 7160. We therefore  find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process. It should also be noted that, as early as 1998,  petitioners had already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their  property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the  pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation site  for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners’ lot. It was trickery and bad faith,  pure and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance

was passed clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with  public policy, and (6) must not [21] be unreasonable. unreasonable . Ordinance No. 1843  failed to comply with the  foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:  first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent  provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160; second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was  plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;

third, the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out  for expropriation for the  purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and

Jesus Is Lord Church School Foundation (JILCSF) vs Municipality of Pasig Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved the ordinance submitted

 fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances. Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desired results. Over the years, the government has tried to remedy the worsening squatter problem. Far from solving it, however, government’s kid -glove approach has only resulted in the multiplication and  proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas. A  pro-poor program that is wellstudied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and truly respectful of everyone’s basic rights is what this problem calls  for, not the improvident enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small  private lots in no rational  fashion. xx” 

thereto by the Municipality of Pasig, the purpose of which is to expropriate private lots to be used as public roads. Stated in the complaint was averment that the private owners were informed of the expropriation. A

complaint

was

filed

against

owners Ching Cuancos to expropriate their property pursuant to the Local Govt Code. The complaint included a photocopy of a letter to intent sent to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The Municipality of Pasig caused the annotation of a notice of lis  pendens with the complaint under the name of Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation (JILCSF).

The latter was

alleged to have bought the private lots from the Ching Cuancos. JILCSF averred that there was no valid and definite offer to acquire the property and that the property in dispute was already being used by the public.

Issue:

WON there was a valid and

definite offer

Ruling:

The SC held that there was no definite and valid offer. The letter sent to the Lorenzo Ching Cuanco was merely a letter of intent stating that the property was to be expropriated. An extensive discussion on the matter was as follows: “xx

An

offer

is

a

unilateral

 proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract.

It creates a power of

acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual

obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.  An offer would require, among other

It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. A single bona  fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the  property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons dealing with  property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.  xx ”

things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right which should be  protected in every instance. It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation.

As regards to the second contention of Public Necessity, the SC held: The subject property is expropriated  for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is  for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may not capriciously choose what private  property should be taken.

The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially  fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s  property and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the  petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to  prove its claims.

Petitioner filed an ejectment suit against

occupants

of

the

abovementioned parcels of land on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. During

the

pendency

of

the

ejectment proceedings, the City of Manila

government

Ordinance No.

7813

approved authorizing

Mayor Lim to expropriate the parcels of land which form part of the properties of Filstream then occupied by private respondents. properties

were

to

be

The said sold

and

distributed to qualified tenants of the area

pursuant

to

the

Land

Use

Development Program of the City of Manila. Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the expropriation proceedings on the grounds that there was no valid cause, no public necessity, and that there was no just compensation because the price offered was too low.

Issue:

WON the private property

FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF MANILA

which was adjudged in an ejectment

Facts:

Ruling:

Petitioner, Filstream International

case be the subject of expropriation proceedings for socialized housing

The

SC

held

that

the

City

Inc., is the registered owner of the

Government of Manila has the right to

properties subject of this dispute

expropriate private properties for its

consisting of adjacent parcels of land

public use. Thus:

located in Manila.

“xx the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its  jurisdiction. The right to expropriate  private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, to wit:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain –  A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or  purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon  payment of just compensation,  pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, that the  power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the  property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the  property to be expropriated: Provided,  finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.” (Italics supplied) More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate  private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing  program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409) as follows:

“General powers –   The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take,  purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal  property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for  public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred.”   (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Italics supplied).

 x x x

xxx

xxx

“Sec. 100.  The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of this section, the city may raise necessary  funds by appropriations of general  funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation  proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the President x x  x”. (Italics supplied). In fact, the City of Manila’s right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a  final and executory judgment over the  property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, [32] 1993. Relying on the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the Court declared that:

“The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL Facts: The City of Manila filed a petition for expropriation or private properties

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the  property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter  for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987]).

for the purpose of constructing public improvement. Included in the private properties to be expropriated is the parcel of lot covered by the Chinese Cemetery. The Chinese Community refused the

offer

on

the

ground

that

Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nol 103125, May 17, 1993; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure  Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).

expropriation is not necessary, there

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing  Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of  Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including a  particular, urban land reform  and housing.” xx”

The SC ruled in the negative. Thus,

will be more expenses to be incurred and

that

parcels

of

lots

to

be

expropriated were already devoted for public use.

Issue:  WON the parcel of lot forming part of Chinese Cemetery and owned by

the

Chinese

Community

be

expropriated

Ruling: it stated: “xx Where a cemetery is open to

 public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other  public uses under a general authority.  And this immunity extends to the unimproved

and

unoccupied

parts

which are held in good faith for future use… It is alleged, and not denied, that

the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery,

would make the cemetery in question  public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public  property. xx ”  The Supreme Court also added “xx

But,

whether

or

not

the

cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a  public street, especially during the

that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property,  perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?

lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such

purposes

until

it

is

fully

established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.  xx”  On the issue on whether the eminent domain may be exercised by a municipality, the Supreme Court ruled in the wise: “xx It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The right to take private  property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as the legislature has given it general authority to take private property for  public use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the  property upon that question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711,

The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be justified in inquiring into that question and in  finally denying the petition if no public  purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a  public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The

ascertainment of the necessity must  precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.) The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

 particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.) By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.) xx” 

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LUIS L. DICTADO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte, EDUARDO R. MORENO, LT. COL. RUFINO CHAVEZ, CAPT. ALFREDO BORJA, CONRAD C. LEVISTE and VINES REALTY CORPORATION Facts: Conrad Leviste filed a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage against Philippines Smelter Co. Judgment was made in favor of Leviste. Two parcels of lot were levied upon and were sold at public auction. The lots were sold to Vines Realty Co. Owner Vines Realty Co. filed a petition

for

the

removal

of

the

improvements on the lot. Included in such improvements are the power

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not  judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a

lines owned by petitioner CANORECO.

Issue: WON the installed power lines and posts constitute expropriation of property

that

would

required

CANORECO to pay just compensation

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the simple right-of-way easement do not require the owner to be compensated. However, due to the nature of the power lines, the private owner is constricted in its use of the lot. The Supreme Court stated: “xx Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent domain.

The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the  power of eminent domain. Such conclusion  finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private  property condemned for public use. The Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus held that: "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires. The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land  for an indefinite period deprives private

respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.  Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation. No matter how commendable petitioner’s purpose is, it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-ofway easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities’ power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator. Consequently, we rule that a court’s writ of demolition cannot prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain. xx” 

ESTATE OF JIMENEZ, petitioner, EXPORT ZONE, respondent.

SALUD vs. PHILIPPINE PROCESSING

Facts: In 1981, Private respondent PEZA filed a complaint before the RTC to expropriate three parcels of lot owned by Salud Jimenez.

Ten years thereafter, the trial court decide in favor of PEZA. However, the petitioner

filed

a

motion

The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Salud Jimenez.

for

reconsideration on the ground that the

Issue:

properties will only be transferred to

may be returned to the estate of Salud

Philippine Vinyl, Co.

Jimenez

WON the disputed property

PEZA and the petitioner executed a compromise agreement.

One of the

provisions therein is that the disputed

Ruling: The SC held that the property

property of Salud Jimenez will be

cannot

be

remanded

back

swapped with one of the lots owned

petitioner Salud Jimenez despite the

by PEZA. Thus:

nonpayment of just compensation for 11 years. the SC has this to say:

“Estate of Salud Jimenez

shall transfer lot 1406-B

“xx In the case at bar, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner insists that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should apply. Said articles  provide that:

with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms  part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the  plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged

 Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the  provisions of Article 1330 of this Code.

with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered

by

Certificate

of

Transfer Title

No.

14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud  Jimenez. However, PEZA failed to transfer the parcel of lot to petitioner because the same was not registered under the name of PEZA but under Progressive Realty, Inc. The

trial

court

annulled

the

compromise agreement and ordered PEZA to return the property.

However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already commenced.  Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which they might have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or more but not to all of the questions settled shall not

to

itself be a cause for annulment or rescission of the compromise, unless said documents have been concealed by one of the parties. But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one thing to which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly discovered documents.(n)”   Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is [40] voidable. The applicability of the above-quoted legal provisions will not change the outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash  payment, was rescinded. This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public  purpose. In Sumulong v. [41] Guerrero  ,  this Court has ruled that, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this  jurisdiction, the statutory and

 judicial trend has summarized as follows:

been

this Court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for  public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever  project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the  purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play… It is accurate to state then that at  present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4 (2nd Ed. 1977) The term “public use” has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.

In Manosca v. Court of  Appeals, this Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is  just as broad as “public [42] welfare.”  Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980

issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree No. 66, which provides that:

banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said  public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA’s original charter, which provides that:

Section 23. Eminent Domain. –    For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any property for the establishment of export  processing zones, or of low-cost housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs, wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal  facilities, structures and approaches thereto, the  Authority shall have the right and power to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation  proceedings. Should the authority elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name of the Authority and it may  proceed in the manner provided  for by law. (italics supplied)

Sec. 7. ECOZONE to be a Decentralized Agro-Industrial, Industrial, Commercial/Trading, Tourist, Investment and Financial Community. Within the  framework of the Constitution, the interest of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, ECOZONE shall be developed, as much as possible, into a decentralized, self-reliant and self-sustaining industrial, commercial/trading, agroindustrial, tourist, banking,  financial and investment center with minimum government intervention. Each ECOZONE shall be provided with transportation, telecommunications and other  facilities needed to generate linkage with industries and employment opportunities for its own habitants and those of nearby towns and cities.

 Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated “for the construction … of terminal  facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” The authority is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what  public use the expropriated  property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent leased a  portion of the lot to commercial

The ECOZONE shall administer itself on economic, financial, industrial, tourism development and such other matters within the exclusive competence of the national government. (italics supplied)  Among the powers of PEZA enumerated by the same law are:

Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of PEZA Board. ---- The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board shall have the following  function and powers: (a) Set the general policies on the establishment and operations of the ECOZONE, Industrial estate, exports  processing zones, free trade zones, and the like;  x

x

x

(c) Regulate and undertake the establishment, operation and maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the ECOZONE, such as heat, light and  power, water supply, telecommunications, transport, toll roads and bridges, port services, etc. and to fix just, reasonable and competitive rates, fares, charges and fees [43] thereof . In Manila Railroad Co. v. [44] Mitchel   ,  this Court has ruled that in the exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term “necessary”, in this connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the  private landowners to part with

their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other  facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion  program. The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the original charter of respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to said purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area. According to the comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment of an export  processing zone but it was also bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land “for the construction … of terminal  facilities, structures and approaches thereto.” Republic  Act No. 7916 simply  particularized the broad language employed by Presidential Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation of an industrial estate, an export  processing zone, free trade zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of

making banking and transportation facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. In such a manner, PEZA’s goal of being a major force in the economic development of the country would be realized. Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that: …(T)he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property  for a particular improvement for  public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity  for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory  provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially  political and not judicial in their [45] character . Inasmuch as both Presidential Decree No. 66 and Republic Act No. 7916, bestow respondent

with authority to develop terminal facilities and banking centers, this Court will not question t he respondent’s lease of certain portions of the expropriated lot to banks, as well as the construction of terminal  facilities. Petitioner contends that respondent is bound by the representations of its Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot was to be devoted  for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say that PEZA can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for  public use. Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are for public purpose. Lastly, petitioner appeals to the sense of justice and equity to this Court in restoring the said lot to its possession. From the time of the filing of the expropriation case in 1981 up to the present, respondent has not yet remunerated the petitioner although respondent has already received earnings from the rental  payments by lessees of the subject property. We have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time  from its taking. Without prompt  payment, compensation cannot

be considered “just” inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary [46] to cope with his loss. Payment of just compensation should  follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the delay to constitute a violation of due  process must be unreasonable and inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of  justice. We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to  petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the trial court in 1993. However,  from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent. As we have ruled

in Cosculluela [47]  Appeals:

vs.

Court

of

In the present case, the irrigation  project was completed and has been in operation since 1976. The project is benefiting the  farmers specifically and the community in general. Obviously, the  petitioner’s land cannot be returned to him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be  paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation  proceedings, seize a person’s  property, allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance. Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to  petitioner, we cannot, however, grant the petitioner’s prayer for the return of the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory. Petitioner cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda. De [48] Villaroy a to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot where this Court ruled that “under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid

While

 property is the obvious remedy.” However, the said statement was not the ruling in that case. As in other cases where there was no prompt payment by the government, this Court declared in Sorsogon that “the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delay be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any  patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this decision.” However, this Court also stressed and declared in that case that “In cases where land is taken for public use,  public interest, however, must be considered.”  xx”

the

performance

case

for

was

specific

pending.

The

Republic of the Philippines filed a case for expropriation and deposited an amount

of

representing

Php the

12,970,350

10%

of

the

approximate fair market value of the property. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention

alleging

that

the

Ramas agreed to sell the disputed property to him. In 1991, the petition for specific performance was granted by the RTC. In 1995, the RTC declared that Guerrero was the rightful owner of the property in dispute and that just compensation should be paid to him. Issue: owner

WON Guerrero is the rightful of

the

expropriated

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, MARIA DEL CARMEN ROXAS DE ELIZALDE, CONCEPCION CABARRUS VDA. DE SANTOS

property

and

in

to

effect,

The SC held that Guerrero has the rightful title. It was explained thus:

Guerrero the subject parcel of land

Expropriation proceedings was filed

described

However,

it

therein.

created

an

by

obligation on the part of the

Milagros and Inocentes dela Rama in

De la Ramas to convey the

1983.

land, subject to the fulfillment

the

properties

owned

In 1988, a contract to sell was

just

Ruling:

to sell did not convey to

Facts:

be

compensation whould be paid to him

“xx It is true that the contract

MILAGROS AND INOCENTES DE LA RAMA

against

de

of the suspensive conditions

executed by Milagros and Inocentes

therein

stated.

The

dela Rama in favor of Alfredo Guerrero

declaration of this contract’s

wherein the former received a partial

validity, which paved the way

payment of Php 2,200,000.

Gerrero

 for the subsequent execution

filed an action for specific per formance

of the Deed of Absolute Sale

to enforce the contract to sell.

on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial

Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay

City,

effectively

SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

conveyed ownership of said  parcel of lot xx” 

Facts: In order for NAPOCOR to construct

As regards to the amount to be paid

230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission

by Guerrero to the de Ramas, the SC

lines, the power lines will have to pass

stated that the RTC has already ruled

though several parcels of lots owned

on the matter and the purchase price

by private respondents. A commission

with legal interest was fixed by said

was created to determine the amount

court at Php 1,383,000. Thus:

of just compensation to be awarded to the private owners.

“xx Petitioners can no longer question a judgment which has already become final and executory. The order of the Regional Trial Court on the  payment of legal interest was issued on September 18, 1991 in the case for specific  performance against the De la Ramas (Civil Case No. 6974P). Hence, they are already barred from questioning it now in this proceeding.

Finally, we take note of the  fact that the De la Ramas have withdrawn and appropriated for themselves the amount paid by Guerrero. This amount represented the  purchase price of the entire 4,075 square meters of land, including the expropriated  portion, which was the subject of their agreement. The payment, therefore, to them of the value of the expropriated portion would unjustly enrich them. xx” 

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.

However, the private respondents contested

the

findings

of

the

commission that the award was only Php 10.00. The contention was that the amunt should be the market value of the parcel of lot which is Php 50.00 pr square meter. Issue: WON the amount to be awarded to the private owners should be the full market value considering the nature of the installation of power lines

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the  just

compensation

should

be

equivalent to the amount of loss which the owner shall suffer by reason of such expropriation.

Thus the High

Court has promptly observed:

". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their  proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than

three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the hightension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the  fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property." The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for  private property condemned for public use (See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597,1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, * thus held that: Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and  possession of, the expropriated  property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned  property, without loss of title and  possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV MexicoLimay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the

land for an indefinite period deprives  private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the  property expropriated is entitled to a  just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is  possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said  property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation (Province of Tayabas vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467 [1938]; Assoc. of Small Land Owners of the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777,14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). The price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just compensation (National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, [1984]). The above price refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market value thereof.  According to private respondents, the market value of their lot is P50.00 per square meter because the said lot is adjacent to the National and super highways of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and Olongapo City. Private respondents recognize the inherent power of eminent domain being exercised by NPC when it finally consented to the expropriation of the said portion of their land, subject however to payment of just compensation. No matter how laudable NPC's purpose is, for which expropriation was sought, it is just and equitable that they be compensated

the fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity (EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]; Mun. of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503 (1979]).

absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit. xx” Another issue raised in this case is whether the State may expropriate the

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION

same property once all the legally requirements were meant. As the SC discussed:

Facts: Sangguniang Bayan of Paranaque

“xx The scope of eminent domain is

passed a resolution to expropriate two

 plenary and, like police power, can

parcels of lots with a total of 10,000

“reach every form of property which

square meters belonging to VM Realty

the State might need for public use.

Co. A complaint for expropriation was

“All separate interests of individuals in

filed against the private owner and the

 property are held of the government

trial court gave tit due course.

under this tacit agreement or implied

The

private

corporation

in

its

reservation. Notwithstanding

answer argued that the expropriation

grant

proceedings was not valid because

domain, the highest and most exact

there was no ordinance authorizing

idea of property, remains in the

such proceedings.

government, or in the aggregate body

mere resolution

was not tantamount to an ordinance.

to

individuals,

the

the eminent

of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to

Issue:  WON the resolution of the

resume the possession of the property

SAngguniang Bayan of Paranaque is a

whenever the public interest requires

substantial compliance of the staturoy

it.

requirement

agent cannot be forever barred from

of

R.A.

7160

on

expropriation proceedings.

Thus, the State or its authorized

exercising said right by reason alone of  previous

Ruling: The SC held that there was no cause

non-compliance with

any

legal requirement. While

the

principle

of res

of action. Thus, it was stated:

 judicata does not denigrate the right of

“xx The fact that there is no cause of

the State to exercise eminent domain,

action is evident from the face of the

it does apply to specific issues decided

Complaint for expropriation which was

in a previous case. For example, a final

based on a mere resolution. The

 judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no

 prior offer precludes another suit

In 1938, Republic of the Philippines

raising the same issue; it cannot,

expropriated

however, bar the State or its agent

Gervasia Denzon and Eulalia Denzon.

 from thereafter complying with this

A deposit amounting to Php 9,500 was

requirement, as prescribed by law, and

made with PNB pursuant to the order

subsequently exercising its power of

of

eminent

same

possession of the lot thereafter but the

By the same token, our

 just compensation held by the same

ruling that petitioner cannot exercise

court amounting to Php 4.062 was

its delegated power of eminent domain

never made to the Denzons.

domain

 property.

over

the

through a mere resolution will not bar it

from

 proceedings,

reinstituting once

requirement matter, all others

the

and,

said for

are

the

two

CFI.

lots

owned

by

The Republic took

Jose Galeos, heir of the Denzons

similar

filed a claims for rentals on the lots

legal

from National Airports Commission.

that

The claim was rejected.

properly

In 1961, there being no payment of

complied with. Parenthetically and by

 just

 parity of reasoning, the same is also

government,

true of the principle of “law of the

Valdehueza

case.”   In Republic vs De Knecht, the

complaint for recovery in possession of

Court ruled that the power of the State

the properties.

or its agent to exercise eminent

their favor, stating that they retain

domain is not diminished by the mere

ownership

 fact that a prior final judgment over

However, they were ordered to sell

the property to be expropriated has

the same to the Republic.

become the law of the case as to the

compensation

from

the

successors-in-interests, and

Panerio,

filed

a

The CFI decided in

over

the

properties.

In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio

 parties. The State or its authorized

executed

agent may still subsequently exercise

disputed properties in favor of Vicente

its right to expropriate the same

Lim.

 property, once all legal requirements

In

a

1992,

mortgage

there

over

still

being

the

no

are complied with. To rule otherwise

payment of just compensation, Lim

will not only improperly diminish the

filed a complaint for quieting of title

 power of eminent domain, but also

over the properties.

clearly defeat social justice. xx” Issue:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS vs. VICENTE G. LIM Facts:

whether the Republic has

retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its

failure

to

pay

predecessors-in-interest

respondent’s

the

just

compensation therefor pursuant to the  judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940 Ruling:

The SC held that the two parcels of lots are still owned by the Valdehueza and Panerio. The rights of Vicente Lim as a mortgagee is still protected. Thus, it is held:

“xx Here, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a “reasonable market value.” It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation we recognized the owner’s absolute right over his  property pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus: “It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the  property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the  property being expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rightspertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.

It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: “ It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government .”  For respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the  performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it is inseparable from the  property. It adheres to the  property regardless of who its owner may subsequently [25] be. Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides: “Art. 2127. The mortgage the natural extends to accessions, to the improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation

becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity owing to the granted or  proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for with the  public use , declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person. In summation, while the  prevail ing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government  failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings , the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.”   To be sure, the  five-year period limitation will encourage the government to  pay just compensation  punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes  property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined  just compensation as not only the correct determination of the

amount to be paid to the  property owner but also the  payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without  prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”  xx” 

It was also held that Vicente Lim did not act in bad faith. “xx 932 by its failure to pay just

compensation. The issue of bad  faith

would

relevance

have

assumed

the

Republic

if

actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if respondent’s

title

was

registered first, it would be the Republic’s

title

ownership

or

that

upheld. But

right

shall

now,

of

be

assuming

that respondent was in bad  faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot 932?  We believe not. This

is because in the first place, the Republic has no title to speak of. xx” 

CASES ON EMINENT DOMAIN

•

CAMARINES

NORTE

ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Conrad Regional

L.

Trial

Leviste

filed

Court

a

with

the

complaint for

collection

of

a

sum

of

money

and

After the petition filed before the

foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine

Court of Appeals was dismissed, the

Smelter Corporation (PSC). The trial court

petitioner re-constructed its power lines

rendered decision in favor of Leviste for

along

failure of PSC to file an answer to the

authority of the District Engineer of the

complaint.

DPWH due to public need. Vines Realty

When the decision was final and executory, the trial court issued a writ of execution and the respondent sheriff levied upon two parcels of land which were sold at a public auction in favor of Vines Realty Corporation (Vines Realty).

the

provincial

road

upon

the

however sent a letter prohibiting the said construction

without

its

permission.

Petitioner replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way of the provincial road. Hence, this petition.

After the writ of possession was granted to Vines Realty, it filed an amended motion for an order of demolition and

Issue/s:

removal of improvements on the subject

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled

land, included were the power lines and

to retain possession of the power

electric posts belonging to the petitioner.

lines located in the land sold at public auction as a result of extra-

Petitioner opposed the motion on the

 judicial foreclosure of mortgage.

ground that petitioner was not the party to the case and therefore not bound by the  judgment of the trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way agreements over said property. The trial court, however, directed to shut off the power lines energizing several business establishments in the area. Vines

Ruling: The Court finds that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in hastily ordering the removal of the electric posts. The trial court failed to appreciate the nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities.

Realty cut down petitioner’s electric posts

professedly using a chainsaw.

Among the powers granted to electric cooperatives

by

virtue

Decree No. 269 are:

of

Presidential

“Section 16 Powers-

Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent

(j) To construct, maintain and

operate

electric

transmission

and

distribution

lines

along,

upon, under and across  publicly owned lands and  public

thoroughfares,

including,

without

limitation,

all

roads,

highways, streets, alleys, bridges

and

causeways;

Provided, that such shall not

prevent

or

unduly

impair the primary public uses to which such lands and

thoroughfares

are

otherwise devoted; “(k) To exercise the power

of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by

other

corporations

constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems.” 

domain. The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property

condemned for public use. The

Supreme Court, in Republic vs. PLDT thus held that: "Normally, of course, the  power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and

possession

of,

the

expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned

property,

without loss of title and  possession. It unquestionable  property

may,

is that

real

through

expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-ofway."

However,

a

simple

right-of-way

easement transmits no rights, except the easement.

Vines

Realty

retains

gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.

full

ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.

Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-ofway easement and not ownership over the land. Public utilities’ power of eminent domain may be exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator.

The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private

Consequently,

the Supreme Court

ruled that a court’s writ of demolition

cannot prevail over the easement of a right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain.

respondents of its ordinary use. For these Private respondents are ordered to

reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money

restore or restitute petitioner’s electric

posts

and

power

restoration compensation

or

otherwise

indemnify petitioner for the cost of the

equivalent of the property. Just

lines

has

been

understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss, which the owner of the res expropriated has to suffer by reason

thereof. Finally,

private

respondents are permanently enjoined or prohibited from disturbing or interfering with the operation and maintenance of the business of petitioner.

of the expropriation. The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the

Government

are

the

criteria

for

determining just compensation. No matter how commendable petitioner’s purpose is,

•

PHILIPPINE

PRESS

INSTITUTE

v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts:

it is just and equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc.

the taking of its property, which is the

(PPI), a non-stock, non-profit organization

measure of the indemnity, not whatever

of newspaper and magazine publishers, is assailing

the

constitutional

validity

of

Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent

property for public use without

COMELEC and its corresponding COMELEC

 just compensation.

directive dated 22 March 1995, through a

2. Whether or not Section 2 of

petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Resolution

No.

2772

asks

COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is a valid exercise of the police power

the

of the State.

allocation of  free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one

Ruling:

newspaper of general circulation in every Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is

 province or city for use as "Comelec Space."

clearly susceptible of the reading that PPI asks the Court to declare COMELEC

Resolution

No.

petitioner PPI has given it.

2772 That Resolution No. 2772 does not,

unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just

in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters

with

some

criminal

or

other

sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention was

compensation.

simply to solicit or request voluntary The Solicitor General argued that the

questioned

implementing

Resolution

letter

directives

and

its

do

not

provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance. Moreover, even if they are viewed as mandatory, the same would be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State.

Issue/s:

donations of print space from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce

a

coercive

effect

upon

the

company so addressed. That the agency

1. Whether or not Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 can be classified as “taking” of private

may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only

aggravates

difficulties

inhearing

the in

constitutional the

present

situation. The enactment or addition of

private property for public use need to be

such sanctions by the legislative authority

examined here:

itself

would

be

open

to

serious

one is the necessity for the

constitutional objection.

taking; another is the legal

To compel print

media

authority

to

effect

the

taking.

companies to donate " COMELEC -space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of

The element of necessity

Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half

for the taking has not been

page), amounts to "taking" of private personal

property

for

public

use

shown

or

such

compulsory

"donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as COMELEC may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is

respondent

COMELEC.

purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of

by

It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell  print space at their normal rates to COMELEC for election

purposes.

Indeed,

the

unwillingness or reluctance of COMELEC to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.

not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of

Similarly,

it

has

not

been

private property. The monetary value of the

suggested, let alone demonstrated, that

compulsory "donation," measured by the

COMELEC has been granted the power of

advertising rates ordinarily charged by

eminent domain either by the Constitution

newspaper publishers whether in cities or in

or

non-urban areas, may be very substantial

reasonable relationship between that

indeed.

power

by

the

and

administration The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised

legislative

the of

authority.

enforcement election

laws

A

and by

COMELEC must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.

under the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. The

That the taking is designed to

threshold requisites for a lawful taking of

subserve "public use" is not contested by

petitioner PPI. We note only that, under

as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to

Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free

publishers to donate free print space, as

"COMELEC

Section

space"

sought

by

the

1

of

Resolution

No.

2772-A

respondent Commission would be used not

attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all

only for informing the public about the

to

identities, qualifications and programs of

publishers from voluntarily giving free print

government of candidates for elective o ffice

space

but also for "dissemination of vital election

contemplated in Resolution No. 2772.

information"

(including,

prevent

to

newspaper

COMELEC

for

and

the

magazine

purposes

presumably, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772

circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by COMELEC). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies (including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be

does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for COMELEC purposes. Section 2 does not

constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

brought to the attention of the general public.

As

earlier

noted,

the

Solicitor

General also contended that Section 2 of The taking of private property for

public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "COMELEC space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by

Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling

PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for COMELEC purposes, or

to

"donate"

"COMELEC space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too

casually

to

require

prolonged

consideration on our part.

respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner

publishers

Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of COMELEC) to show that the police power — essentially a power of legislation —  has been

constitutionally

delegated

to

respondent Commission. Secondly, while

COMELEC. As such, Section 2 suffers from a

private property may indeed be validly

fatal constitutional vice and must be set

taken in the legitimate exercise of the

aside and nullified.

police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.

• 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

BROADCAST

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports,

ATTORNEYS

AND OF

THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMELEC Facts:

without a showing of existence of a national emergency

public

In the present case, the Court

without

considers the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. No.

regard to the individual business condition

881 against claims that the requirement

of particular newspapers or magazines

that radio and television time be given free

located in differing parts of the country, to

takes property without due process of law;

take private property of newspaper or

that it violates the eminent domain clause

magazine publishers. No attempt was made

of the Constitution which provides for the

to demonstrate that a real and palpable or

payment of just compensation; that it

urgent necessity for the taking of print

denies

space confronted the COMELEC and that

protection of the laws; and that, in any

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself

event, it violates the terms of the franchise

the

of petitioner GMA Network, Inc.

necessity,

only

or

other

imperious

indiscriminately

reasonable

and

and

calibrated

broadcast

media

the

equal

response to such necessity available to the COMELEC. Section 2 does not constitute a

Petitioner Telecommunications and

valid exercise of the police power of the

Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

State.

is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in

are

suing

as

citizens,

taxpayers,

and

its present form and as interpreted by

registered voters. The other petitioner,

COMELEC in its 22 March 1995 letter

GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and

directives, purports to require print media

television broadcasting stations throughout

enterprises to "donate" free print space to

the Philippines under a franchise granted by

candidates within the area

Congress.

of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this

Petitioner claims that it suffered

purpose, the franchise of all

losses running to several million pesos in

radio

providing COMELEC Time in connection

broadcasting

television

with the 1992 presidential election and the

stations

and are

hereby amended so as to

1995 senatorial election and that it stands

provide radio or television

to suffer even more should it be required to

time, free of charge, during

do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation

the period of the campaign.

that it will suffer losses again because it is

(Sec. 46, 1978 EC)

required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of §92.

Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air time to the candidates and requires the

. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is not "a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. B.P . Blg. 881,

(Omnibus

commission

shall

procure radio and television to

be

known

as

"Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially

air

time

for

allocation

to

the

candidates. It will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, §92 states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of

Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property

Sec. 92. Comelec time. —

time

and

charge.

Election Code)

The

COMELEC instead to procure print space

among

the

without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of

media of communication or information during the period of election.

The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption

Issue/s:

that air time is "finished product" which, it

1. Whether or not §92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 violates the eminent domain clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just

is said, become the property of the company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their production. But air time is not owned by broadcast companies.

compensation.

As held in Red Lion Broadcasting

Ruling:

Co. v . F .C .C ., 19 which upheld the right of a Radio and television broadcasting

party personally attacked to reply, "licenses

companies, which are given franchises, do

to broadcast do not confer ownership of

not own the airwaves and frequencies

designated

frequencies,

through which they transmit broadcast

temporary

privilege

signals and images. They are merely given

Consequently,

the temporary privilege of using them.

broadcasting, but the license has no

Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the

constitutional right to be the one who holds

exercise of the privilege may reasonably be

the license or to monopolize a radio

burdened with the performance by the

frequency to the exclusion of his fellow

grantee of some form of public service.

citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment

"a

which

of

but

only

using

license

prevents

the

them." permits

the

In the granting of the privilege to

Government from requiring a licensee to

operate broadcast stations and thereafter

share his frequency with others and to

supervising radio and television stations,

conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with

the state spends considerable public funds

obligations to present those views and

in

such

voices which are representative of his

It would be strange if it cannot

community and which would otherwise, by

even require the licensees to render public

necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As

service by giving free air time.

radio and television broadcast stations do

licensing

stations.

18

and

supervising

not own the airwaves, no private property

is taken by the requirement that they

account COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A,

provide air time to the COMELEC.

§2 of which states:

The

basic

flaw

in

petitioner's

Sec. 2. Grant of "Comelec

argument is that it assumes that the

Time." — 

Every

provision for COMELEC Time constitutes the

broadcasting and television

use and operation of the stations of the

station

GMA Network, Inc., This is not so. Under

franchise shall grant the

§92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not

Commission, upon payment

take over the operation of radio and

of just compensation, at

television stations but only the allocation of

least thirty (30) minutes of

air time to the candidates for the purpose

prime time daily, to be

of ensuring, among other things, equal

known as "Comelec Time",

opportunity, time, and the right to reply as

effective February 10, 1998

mandated by the Constitution. 23

for

operating

imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise

to

render

"adequate

public

service time" implements §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable

under

candidates

President, For the fact is that the duty

radio

for

Vice-President

and Senators, and effective March

27,

1998,

for

candidates for local elective offices, until May 9, 1998. (Emphasis added).

the government to communicate with the people on matters of public interest.

This is because the amendment providing

In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege. Thus far, we have confined the discussion to the provision of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 for free air time without taking into

for

the

compensation"

is

payment invalid,

of being

"just in

contravention of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 that radio and television time given during the period of the campaign shall be "free of charge."

Indeed,

Resolution

No.

2983

originally provided that the time allocated shall be "free of charge," just as §92 requires such time to be given "free of charge." The amendment appears to be a

reaction to petitioner's claim in this case that

the

original

the

allocation

of

limited

was

resources, relevant conditions may validly

allegedly

be imposed on the grantees or licensees.

authorized the taking of property without

The reason for this is that, as already noted,

 just compensation. Hence, the amendment

the government spends public funds for the

cannot be invoked by the parties.

allocation and regulation of the broadcast

unconstitutional

provision

In

because

it

industry, which it does not do in the case of Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. They contend that newspapers and magazines

the print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

are not similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute v . COMELEC , the

From another point of view, this

Court upheld their right to the payment of

Court has also held that because of the

 just compensation for the print space they

unique and pervasive influence of the

may provide under §90.

broadcast media, "[n]ecessarily . . . the freedom

The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same treatment under the

free

speech

guarantee

of

of

television

and

radio

broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media."

the

Constitution as the print media. There are

Petitioners' assertion therefore that

important differences in the characteristics

§92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal

of the two media, however, which justify

protection of the law has no basis. In

their differential treatment for free speech

addition, their plea that §92 (free air time)

purposes.

physical

and §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid

limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the

political ads) should be invalidated would

government must, of necessity, allocate

pave the way for a return to the old regime

broadcast frequencies to those wishing to

where

use them. There is no similar justification

monopolize

for government allocation and regulation of

disadvantage

the print media.

resources. That is what Congress tried to

Because

of

the

moneyed

candidates

media of

advertising

candidates

could to

the

with

less

reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A.

No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the

election is maintained. For while broadcast

 judgment of Congress, especially in light of

media are not mere common carriers but

the recent failure of interested parties to

entities with free speech rights, they are

have the law repealed or at least modified.

also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving their qualifications and programs

of

government.

More

than

merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, §7 of

the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, §6 states that "the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to

• REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PLDT

Facts:

own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is] subject to the duty of the

This case arose from a complaint

State to promote distributive justice and to

filed on May 17, 1972 by the Republic

intervene when the common good so

Telephone Company [RETELCO] (now PLDT),

demands."

seeking to enjoin the respondents Director or Acting Director of the Bureau of

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an

Telecommunications

(now

DOTC);

its

Regional Superintendent; the Exchange Manager and Chief Operator of the Bureau

of Telecommunications at Malolos, Bulacan,

Republic Telephone Company, Inc.,

and the agents and representatives acting

or RETELCO, is a domestic corporation

in

and

engaged in the business of installing,

maintaining their local telephone system in

operating and maintaining nationwide local

Malolos,

soliciting

telephone services. On December 1959, it

subscribers in that municipality and its

had acquired a municipal franchise from the

environs,

such

Municipal Council of Malolos, Bulacan per

the

Resolution No. 190, Series of 1959 to install,

of

maintain and operate a local telephone

subscribers by respondents constituted an

system within the municipality of Malolos

unfair and ruinous competition to the

for a period of thirty-five years x x x. The

detriment of petitioner [RETELCO] who is a

municipal franchise was approved by the

grantee of both municipal and legislative

Provincial Board of Bulacan thus certificate

franchises for the purpose.

of public convenience and necessity was

their

operations telephone

behalf,

from

Bulacan

and

alleging inter and

operating

from

alia that

maintenance

system

and

of

solicitation

secured from the Public Service Commission Order was issued on June 30, 1972, restraining respondents [BUTELCO] from operating

and

maintaining

the

local

telephone system in Malolos and from soliciting customers.

of

the

approved x x x. RETELCO accepted the commission

certificate

and

filed

the

required deposit with the Treasurer of the Philippines x x x. RETELCO obtained a

The Republic of the Philippines, on behalf

which the President of the Philippines

Bureau

of

Telecommunications, begged leave of court to intervene in the proceedings on the ground that the suit affected state property and accordingly the state has a legal interest involved. There being no essential dispute between the parties over the fact that the suit indeed involved property of the state, the Answer in Intervention was admitted and the case proceeded to trial.

legislative franchise under Republic Act No. 3662 of the then Congress of the Philippines for

the

construction,

operation

and

maintenance of a nationwide telephone service with exchanges in various areas including the municipality of Malolos. It was approved by the President of the Philippines for a period of fifty years x x x and the correspondent certificate of public convenience and necessity was granted under Public Service Commission case No. 67-4023 x x x.

Way RETELCO

back

in

learned

February, through

1969 public

of telephone subscribers to the difference in rates individually charged by them x x x.

announcements of government projects to be

launched

that

the

Bureau

of

Telecommunications would establish and operate telephone system in Malolos to serve government offices and the private [sector] as well thus exposing x x x appellee’s *RETELCO’s+ telephone business

operation

to

the

risk

competition. Immediately,

of

The lower court, finding after trial that BUTELCO and intervenors-appellants were duplicating the functions of RETELCO in contravention of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, rendered a judgment making

the

preliminary

injunction

PERMANENT.

undue

they

filed

Respondent

appellate

court

protests, and sought for administrative

sustained the court a quo’s finding that

remedies

the

Section 79 of Executive Order No. 94, Series

Telecommunications Board, the President

of 1947 prohibited any other entity, besides

of the Philippines, the Secretary of the

the present operator, from maintaining and

Department

selling

and

reliefs

of

from

Public

Works

and

telephone

services

in

Malolos,

Communication, the then Speaker Jose B.

Bulacan, unless there was first executed a

Laurel, Jr. of the House of Representatives,

mutually

and the Philippine National Bank which was

agreement between such other entity and

financing the project x x x but all were to no

the

avail. In

of

utilization

the

latter’s

existing

its

facilities. Respondent

court

found

May,

1969,

Telecommunications

the

Bureau

commenced

acceptable

present

operator of

arrangement

as

regards

or

the

operation of the telephone exchange in

respondent RETELCO to be the present

Malolos and, incidentally, number of the

operator of telephone services in Malolos,

telephone subscribers of RETELCO dropped.

Bulacan, and BUTELCO having failed to first

The Bureau of Telecommunications was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission on matters of fixing the rates of fees to be charged to telephone

subscribers,

thus

RETELCO

attributed the sharp decline in the number

make arrangements with the former before establishing its own telephone system, respondent appellate court upheld the propriety of the permanent injunction issued by the court a quo.

In rendering judgment in favor of respondent RETELCO, the appellate court

PLDT in the operation of a telephone system.

rejected BUTELCO’s main argument that Section 79 of Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, has been repealed by Presidential Decree

No.

1

promulgated

by

then

President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers, by virtue of which decree the Integrated Reorganization Plan was

made

part

of

the

law

of

the

land. Under such plan, in turn, BUTELCO’s functions had been expanded to include the operation government augmenting

of

telephone offices

for

systems

for

purposes

of

inadequate

private

communications services. However, this was rebuffed by the appellate court.

In fact, we have made it a matter of  judicial notice that all legislative franchises for the operation of a telephone system contain the following provision: “It is expressly provided

that

in

the

Philippine

event

the

Government

should desire to maintain and operate for itself the system

and

enterprise

herein

authorized,

the

grantee shall surrender his franchise and will turn over to the Government said system and all serviceable

Issue/s:

equipment therein, at cost,

1. Whether or not RETELCO have the exclusive right to operate and

less

reasonable

depreciation”.

maintain a telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan.

BUTELCO’s initiative to operate and

maintain a telephone system in Malolos,

Ruling:

Bulacan,

was

undertaken

pursuant

to

Section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, There is no clear showing by

Series of 1947.

RETELCO, however, that its franchises are of an exclusive character. At any rate, it may very well be pointed out as we ll that neither did the franchise of PLDT at the time of the controversy confer exclusive rights upon

While we affirmed that “*t+he Bureau

of Telecommunications, under section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone communications throughout the

Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in

Now in the subsequent case of Director

cities, towns, and provinces under such

of the Bureau of Telecommunications v.

terms and conditions or arrangement with

 Aligaen, we emphasized the relevance of

present owners or operators as may be

the latter portion of Section 79 (b) of

agreed upon to the satisfaction of all

Executive Order No. 94 as providing a

concerned,” we also at the same time

caveat to any initiative on the part of the

clarified that “nothing in these provisions

government to operate and maintain a

limits

non-commercial

telephone system in an area where there is

activities or prevents it from serving the

an existing franchise holder. In the said

general public.”

case of Aligaen, we foregrounded the need

the

Bureau

to

for BUTELCO to first enter into negotiation

“x x x It may be that in its

or arrangement with the operator or owner

original prospectuses the

of the existing telephone system. We had

Bureau officials had stated

stated, thus:

that the service would be limited

to

government

“x

x The

Bureau of

offices; but such limitations

Telecommunications

could

future

take steps to improve the

expansion of the system, as

telephone service in any

authorized by the terms of

locality in the Philippines,

the Executive Order, nor

but in so doing it must first

could the officials of the

enter into negotiation or

Bureau

arrangement

not

block

bind

the

may

with

the

Government not to engage

operator or owner of the

in

existing telephone system.

services

that

are

x x x When a private person

authorized by law.”

In other words, BUTELCO cannot be said to be prohibited under the aforecited legal

x

provision

from

operating

and

maintaining its own telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan.

or

entity

legislative operate

is

granted

franchise a

a to

telephone

system, or any public utility for

that

government correlative

matter

the

has

the

obligation

to

afford the grantee of the

satisfaction

of

franchise all the chances or

concerned”

*emphasis

opportunity

supplied].

to

operate

profitably, as long as public convenience

is

The right of the prior operator under

properly

the aforecited provision is to be unfailingly

served rather than promote a

competition

with

all

and seriously considered in case it chooses

the

to propose arrangements or such terms and

grantee. x x x”

conditions

whereby

BUTELCO

is

to

This is not to say, however, that the lack of

coordinate its efforts to set up and operate

prior

existing

a telephone system with the existing

telephone system operator renders illegal

operator. BUTELCO, in that case, would be

the operation by BUTELCO of a telephone

obligated to exercise good faith and exert

system. After all, the very provision in

optimal cooperative efforts so that it may

question phrases the prior negotiation

save government some money and prevent

requirement

mandatory

competition by “utilizing existing facilities in

terms. Section 79 (b) of Executive Order

cities, towns and provinces x x x [of] the

No. 94, Series of 1947 provides:

present owners or operators,” as mandated

negotiation

in

with

less

the

than

“(b) To x x x negotiate for,

operate and maintain wiretelephone

or

radio

by Section 79 (b) of Executive Order No. 94. In the case at bench, BUTELCO admittedly

did

not

fulfill

this

telecommunications service

obligation. Such failure, however, is not

throughout the Philippines

violative of any mandatory provision of

by utilizing such existing

law. There was no violation of Section 79

facilities in cities, towns,

(b) of Executive Order No. 94 but only an

provinces as

may

irregularity in the procedure by which

and

BUTELCO undertook the operation of a

and

telephone system in Malolos, Bulacan.

and

be found under

feasible

such

terms

conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may

be agreed

upon

to

the

It cannot be denied that, even if prior negotiations were undertaken by BUTELCO with RETELCO, and they both could not agree on mutually acceptable

terms and conditions, nothing in Section 79

dissatisfaction. After

(b) of Executive Order No. 94 prohibits

neither PLDT nor any other

BUTELCO from proceeding with the setting

public

up and operation of a telephone system in

constitutional right to a

Malolos, Bulacan, despite the presence of a

monopoly position in view

prior

of

operator

in

the

person

of

utility

the

all,

has

a

Constitutional

RETELCO. Thus, any injunction prohibiting

proscription

BUTELCO from operating its telephone

franchise

system finds no sufficiently legal and just

authorization

basis under Section 79 (b) of Executive

exclusive in character or

Order No. 94.

shall last longer than fifty

Order

No.

94

an

of

the

shall

Constitution; Section

franchise holders, smacks of a promotion of monopolization

certificate

or be

Article XIV, Section 5, 1973

ultra-

protectionist policy in favor of telephone

the

no

(50) years (ibid ., Section 11;

To read from Section 79 (b) of Executive

that

Article 8,

XIV, 1935

Constitution).”

country’s

telephone industry which, undeniably, has contributed to the slackened pace of national development.

•

REPUBLIC

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES

v.

CASTELLVI

As we have pointed out in the case

Facts:

of PLDT v. National Telecommunications The Republic of the Philippines,

[16]

Commission

:

(hereinafter referred to as the Republic) “Free competition in the

industry may also provide the answer to a muchdesired improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved technology, fast and handly mobil service, and

reduced

user

filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent

domain

against

defendant-

appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi,  judicial administratrix of the estate of the late

Alfonso

de

Castellvi

(hereinafter

referred to as Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,

Pampanga

and

against

defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo

Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Toledo-

be expropriated were residential lands, they

Gozun) over two parcels of land.

recommended unanimously that the lowest

In

its

complaint,

the

Republic

alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10 which the

price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the lands of Castellvi and

Toledo-Gozun;

July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among other things, that the land under her administration (occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease), being a residential land, had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, had

additional

P5,000.00 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages

The Commissioners' report was

In her "motion to dismiss" filed on

it

an

be awarded.

court granted.

so

that

a

total

market

value

of

P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

objected to by all the parties in the case — by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should be fixed at P0.20 per square meter. The trial court finds:

particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated demands, illegally

“That

occupying her property since July 1, 1956,

recommendation

thereby preventing her from using and

commissioners

disposing of it, thus causing her damages by

(P10.00) pesos per square

way of unrealized profits.

meter for the three lots of

The Commissioners submitted their report and recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to

the

unanimous

of of

the ten

the defendants subject of this action is fair and just. The plaintiff will pay 6%

interest per annum on the

2. Whether the “taking” of

total value of the lands of

the properties commenced

defendant

Toledo-Gozun

with the filing of this

since

the

action.

(sic)

deposited

as

amount

provisional

3. Whether

the

plaintiff-

value from August 10, 1959

appellant shall pay 6%

until full payment is made

interest on the adjudged

to said defendant or deposit

value

therefor is made in court.

property starting from July

of

the

Castellvi

1956. In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per

Ruling:

annum will also be paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the

1. A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a  private property.

instant action had not yet been commenced to July 10,

This circumstance is present in the

1959 when the provisional

instant case, when by virtue of the

value thereof was actually

lease

deposited in court, on the

through the AFP, took possession of

total value of

the property of Castellvi.

the said

agreement

the

Republic,

(Castellvi) land as herein adjudged.xxx”

Second, the entrance into private  property must be for more than a

Issue/s:

momentary period.

1. Whether the price of P10

"Momentary" means, "lasting but a

per square meter of the

moment;

subject lands is a just

duration"

compensation.

The aforecited lease contract was for

of

but

a

moment's

a period of one year, renewable

the intention was, but what is

from year to year. The entry on the

expressed in the language used. (City

property,

of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53

under

temporary,

the

and

transitory.

The

fact

Republic,

through

lease,

is

considered that the

the AFP,

constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,

undertook to

return

Phil. 515, 525)

the

 premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud — the question being not what

Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their

contemporaneous

and

subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in

1947

was

permanently

really

Castellvi's

to

occupy property,

why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why

was

the

lease

agreement

renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a  jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice —  of such intention on the part of

the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not,

bind the landowner, nor bind the

In the instant case, the entry of the

land itself. The expropriation must

Republic into the property and its

be actually commenced in court

utilization of the same for public use

(Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil.

did not oust Castellvi and deprive

461, 484).

her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.

owner,

Castellvi and

recognized

remained

was

as

as

continuously

owner

by

the

Republic, as shown by the renewal of

This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as

the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract

the

Republic

undertook to return the property to Castellvi

lessee.

whereby

when

the

lease

was

terminated. Neither was Castellvi Fourth,

the

property

must

be

deprived

of

all

the

beneficial

devoted to a public use or otherwise

enjoyment of the property, because

informally

the Republic was bound to pay, and

appropriated

or

had

injuriously affected.

been

paying,

Castellvi

the

agreed monthly rentals until the It

may

be

conceded

that

the

circumstance of the property being

time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.

It

is

clear,

therefore,

that

the

"taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to

Fifth, the utilization of the property

have taken place in 1947 when the Republic

 for public use must be in such a way

commenced to occupy the property as

as to oust the owner and deprive

lessee thereof. We find merit in the

him of all beneficial enjoyment of

contention of Castellvi that two essential

the property.

elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1)

that the entrance and occupation by the

in the instant case, ceases

condemnor must be for a permanent, or

upon the day fixed, without

indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting

need of a demand (Article

the property to public use the owner was

1669, Civil Code). Neither

ousted from the property and deprived of

can it be said that the right

its beneficial use, were not present when

of eminent domain may be

the Republic entered and occupied the

exercised by simply leasing

Castellvi property in 1947.

the

premises

expropriated Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy." “We

accept

the

Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can

give

rise

to

a

 permanent right to occupy, since

by

express

legal

 provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land

be

(Rule

67,

Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic would enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or why the Republic should

enter

into

a

simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and

cannot

to

could

expropriate

Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect.

To

sustain

the

contention of the Republic

scheme, which would have

is to sanction a practice

the effect of depriving the

whereby in order to secure

owner of the property of its

a low price for a land which

true and fair market value

the government intends to

at

expropriate

expropriation

(or

would

the

time

when

the

proceedings

eventually expropriate) it

were actually instituted in

would first negotiate with

court. The Republic's claim

the owner of the land to

that it had the "right and

lease the land (for say ten

 privilege"

or

then

 property at the value that it

expropriate the same when

had at the time when it first

the

to

occupied the property as

terminate, then claim that

lessee nowhere appears in

the "taking" of the property

the lease contract. What

 for the purposes of the

was agreed expressly in

expropriation be reckoned

 paragraph No. 5 of the

as of the date when the

lease agreement was that,

Government

to

should the lessor require

occupy the property under

the lessee to return the

the lease, and then assert

 premises

that

the

condition as at the time the

 property being expropriated

same was first occupied by

be reckoned as of the start

the AFP, the lessee would

of the lease, in spite of the

have

 fact that the value of the

 privilege" (or option) of

 property, for many good

 paying the lessor what it

reasons,

would fairly cost to put the

twenty

years)

lease

the

is

about

started

value

had

of

in

the

to

buy

in

the

the

"right

in

the

the

same

and

meantime increased during

 premises

the period of the lease. This

condition as it was at the

would be sanctioning what

commencement

obviously is a deceptive

lease, in lieu of the lessee's

of

same

the

 performance

the

be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the

undertaking to put the land

Republic first occupied the same pursuant

in said condition. The "fair

to the contract of lease, and that the just

value"

of

compensation to be paid for the Castellvi

occupancy, mentioned in

property should not be determined on the

the lease agreement, does

basis of the value of the property as of that

not refer to the value of the

year. The lower court did not commit an

 property if bought by the

error when it held that the "taking" of the

lessee, but refers to the cost

property under expropriation commenced

of restoring the property in

with the filing of the complaint in this case.

at

of

the

time

the same condition as of Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the

the time when the lessee took

possession

of

Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is

the

to be determined as of the date of the filing

 property. Such fair value cannot

refer

to

of the complaint. This Court has ruled that

the

when the taking of the property sought to

 purchase price, for purchase

be

was never intended by the  parties

to

the

commencement

lease

the

the

expropriation

domain, the just compensation should be

that "However general the

determined as of the date of the filing of

terms of a contract may be, not

of

with

the filing of the complaint for eminent

interpretation of contracts

shall

coincides

proceedings, or takes place subsequent to

contract. It is a rule in the

they

expropriated

the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine

be

National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1

understood to comprehend

SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is

things that are distinct and

undisputed that the Republic was placed in

cases that are different

possession of the Castellvi property, by

 from those upon which the

authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.

 parties intended to agree"

The "taking" of the Castellvi property for

(Art. 1372, Civil Code).” 

the purposes of determining the just We

hold,

therefore,

that

the

"taking" of the Castellvi property should not

compensation to be paid must, therefore,

be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the

in the present case, as of August 10, 1959

complaint for eminent domain was filed.

when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were residential lands and

2. In determining the value of land appropriated

for

public

purposes, the same consideration are to be regarded as in a sale of  property between private parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is

were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions. Indeed, the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for which they would bring the most in the market at the time the same were taken from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the present case relates to the question of what is the just compensation that should be paid to the appellees.

at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is

The Court arrived at the conclusion

plainly adapted, that is to say, What

that the price of P10.00 per square meter,

is it worth from its availability for

as recommended by the commissioners and

valuable uses?

adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our considered view that the price of

In

expropriation

proceedings,

therefore, the owner of the land has the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. The owner may thus show every advantage that his

property

possesses,

present

and

prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may be satisfactorily determined. The owner may also show that the property is suitable for division into village or town lots. We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the lands that are the subject of expropriation

P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to t he owners

thereof.

In

arriving

at

this

conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration

the

resolution

of

the

Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to

this expropriations proceedings, and in

1959 when it deposited in court the

fixing the price of the lands that are being

provisional value of the land.

expropriated the Court arrived at a happy medium

between

the

price

as

recommended by the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value

of

the

Philippine

peso

has

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows: (a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public use;

considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30Considering

that

the

lands

of

(b) the fair market value of the lands of the

Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining

appellees is fixed at P5.00 per square

each other, and are of the same nature, the

meter;

Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all these lands.

(c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the

sum

of

P3,796,495.00

as

just

3. If Castellvi had agreed to receive

compensation for her one parcel of land

the rentals from June 30, 1956 to

that has an area of 759,299 square meters,

August 10, 1959, she should be

minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she

considered as having allowed her

withdrew out of the amount that was

land to be leased to the Republic

deposited in court as the provisional value

until August 10, 1959, and she

of the land, with interest at the rate of 6%

could not at the same time be

per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day

entitled to the payment of interest

full payment is made or deposited in court;

during the same period  on the amount awarded her as the just

(d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-

compensation of her land. The

Gozun the sum of P2,695,225.00 as the just

Republic, therefore, should pay

compensation for her two parcels of land

Castellvi interest at the rate of 6%

that have a total area of 539,045 square

per annum on the value of her land,

meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that

minus the provisional value that

she withdrew out of the amount that was

was deposited, only from July 10,

deposited in court as the provisional value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%,

per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and (f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of Court.

1. • REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COURT OF APPEALS

without admitting, that they are the same lands, the court no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action since

Facts:

the issue of possession over said lots was Both Republic and respondents

already decided by the Court of First

Alfredo V. de Ocampo and Oscar Anglo

Instance of Negros Occidental. The subject

claim ownership over the same lots i.e.,

two lots were registered in the name of the

Nos. 817 and 2509 of the Sagay-Escalante

then applicant Ocampo.

Cadastre, Negros Occidental, subject matter of this litigation. The basis of the Republic’s

The Republic contend that actual

claim is that the said lots were bequeathed

fraud had been perpetrated by Respondent

to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of

de Ocampo in securing the lower court’s

Public

decision ordering the registration of the lots

Schools)

by

the

late

Esteban

Jalandoni through his will.

in his name, as well as the issuance of the decree

Respondent de Ocampo, on the other hand, predicates his claim on an application for registration of the same lots. He averred that the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation from Luis Mosquera.

of

registration

and

the

corresponding certificate of title, on the grounds which, briefly restated. advert to respondent

de

Ocampo's

alleged

misrepresentations that the two parcels of land applied for by him in the land registration case were "different from the

Respondent Anglo intervened in the

two parcels of land of the same lot

case having allegedly bought the same lots

numbers, technical descriptions and areas

from de Ocampo

belonging to the Government, knowing

De Ocampo averred in his answer

such allegations to be false, the truth of the

that the properties alleged to have been

matter being that said parcels of land are

donated by Esteban Jalandoni to the the

the

then Bureau of Education were different

Government"; that there was previous

from the properties involved in this case.

registration of the same parcels of land,

The lots applied for by de Ocampo and

Lots Nos. 817 and 2509, under the Torrens

which the Republic sought to recover were

System in favor of Meerkamp and Company

unregistered lands, and that granting,

which later sold the same to Jalandoni who,

same

property

owned

by

the

in turn, gave the lots to the Bureau of

A consideration in depth of the

Education as a legacy and that the Court of

unique and peculiar facts attendant to this

First Instance no longer had jurisdiction to

case and the procedural and substantive

decree again the registration of Lots Nos.

implications of the dismissal of the appeal

817 and 2509, in favor of respondent de

now

Ocampo, in view of the earlier registration

reconsidered; and a due and proper regard

of the same lands in favor of Meerkamp

to the merits of the case rather than a

and Company.

fascile reliance on procedural rules, compel

sought

to

be

reviewed

and

this Court to reverse and set aside the The trial court concluded that the evidence adduced by the petitioner in this

dismissal

of

Republic's

appeal

by

respondent Court of Appeals.

incident does not establish actual and constructive fraud which is the only kind of

1. 

The

documentary

exhibits

fraud that is considered a legal ground to

adduced by Republic in the hearing of the

review, reopen or set aside the decree

Amended Petition below signed by the

which has already been issued in the name

Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental,

of Alfredo V. de Ocampo.

stating that there was registered a sale executed by Meerkamp and Company in

The Republic appealed but was dismissed.

favor of Esteban Jalandoni and as a result the name of the Company was cancelled and the title was issued to Jalandoni; that

Issue/s:

the title was later cancelled by virtue of the

1. Whether the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of Republic's appeal

will of Jalandoni leaving the parcel of land to the then Bureau of Education.

from the decision of the trial court denying its Amended Petition, is not proper and should be set aside as contended by Republic, or correct and should be maintained, as argued by respondents.

The trial court also made the express finding that the alleged deed of donation by Luis Mosquera in favor of respondent de Ocampo does not appear in his notarial book which is on file in the Bureau of Record Management, Manila.

Ruling:

The Provincial Assessor of Negros

misrepresentations

and

machinations,

Occidental likewise issued a certification

which, buttressed by strong evidence, can

stating that Lots Nos. 817 and 2509 were

nullify the second registration and/or set

never declared in the name of Mosquera.

aside OCT No. 576 issued to respondent de

His later certification states that the said

Ocampo —  taken in relation with the

lots were assessed in the name of the

procedural and substantive implications

Bureau of Education, and that the technical

which could and would arise if the appeal

descriptions in the Bureau of Lands records

were dismissed, namely, the risk that the

show that the same lots were in the name

holdings may be transacted to third parties

of Meerkamp and Company.

and the fact that Republic's action to recover tile holdings would give rise to

Authorities are in agreement that a land

registration

court

is

without

 jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void.

multiplicity of suits —  compel Us to conclude that the only recourse —  in the interest of just and expeditious proceedings considering that these have been pending for close to twenty (20) years now —  is to suspend Our rules and/or to except this case from their operation. For when the

2. There is a serious charge, which is also crucial to the issue between the parties, that respondent de Ocampo used fraudulent

misrepresentations

and

machinations in securing his title. If the charge is true, there is the element of wilfull intent to deprive Republic of just rights which

constitutes

the

essential

characteristics of actual — as distinguished from legal — fraud.

3. 

The

operation of the Rules of will lead to an injustice we have, in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent it. While the above exceptions are predicated on different grounds, they nevertheless support the view that the rigid adherence to the rules on perfection of appeals may and should be relaxed where compelling reasons so warrant. The grounds

foregoing

overriding

considerations then —  the alleged lack of  jurisdiction and the alleged fraudulent

invoked in this case —  not only lack of  jurisdiction but gross injustice itself — more than justify the exception —  considering