Cases - Legal Ethics (Law)

Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004 Facts: The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing, the respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in the practice of law for 3 months which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit. ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct. RULING: The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby dismissed the case due to lack of merit. Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005 Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files a disbarment case against respondent, Attorney IV said commission on ground for grave misconduct. The respondent was found to have issued 2 orders awarding custody of a child to a complainant in the Commission, ordered a bank to reinstate the bank account of the said complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public documents, and attending court hearings while filling up his DTR at the Commission as present at the same time. The case was referred to the IBP and the investigating commissioner recommended suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6 months. ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts: 1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee; 2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records; 3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and 4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging in private practice. RULING: The court held on the following: 1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to some conditions with indispensable requirement to secure approval from the CHR. In the absence of such approval, the respondent is not allowed in private practice and proved to have falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at the same time without approved leave of absence. 2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR authorized his practice as a notary public. 3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to investigate all forms of human rights violation. They cannot try and decide cases. With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify the suspension of 1 year as sufficient sanction.

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005 Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed account. Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.”

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000 FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate. Issue: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar. Ruling: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar. In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978) Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP ByLaws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment ofmembership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void. Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent. Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includespayment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues B. M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005 Facts: Petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. sought for exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged accountability for the years 1977-2005 stating in his letter dated 22 September 2004 that from July 1962 until 1986, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service then migrated and worked in the USA (United States of America) from December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He cannot be assessed Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues, according to him, for the years he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of their profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law Held: Being an IBP member entails various responsibility which includes the payment of membership fees, dues, etc. regardless whether the member is active or not in his field. Therefore, petitioner’s request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is denied. Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00 FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP membership dues. For years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law profession. Now of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying taxes and membership dues with the IBP. ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen. RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and failure thereof for 6 months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for removal of the member’s name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not. His non-renewal of his PTR is a misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ui v. Bonifacio Petitioner Facts of the case: Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui,husband of Leslie Ui, whom they be got two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail. According, however to respondent, she is avictim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Uinever lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept thesituation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract. Ruling: The practice of law is a privilege.A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character.More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous asa requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct,or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.In the case at bar, Atty. Bonifacio was not proven to have conducted herself in a grossly immoral manner. Thus, the case is dismissed. But she is reprimanded and given a stern warning with regards to the of her marriage contract with an inculcated date. PEDRO G. TOLENTINO vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA,A.C. No. 5151, 11/19/2004. FACTS: Complainants alleged that Respondent, a former judge,abandoned his legal wife and cohabited with a married woman w i t h w h o m h e h a s t w o c h i l d r e n i n w h o s e b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e s . Respondent false indicated that he and his paramour are married.Further, in his certificate of candidacy, Respondent declared his l e g a l w i f e a s h i s s p o u s e w h i l e i n a s u b s e q u e n t c e r t i f i c a t e o f candidacy, he declared his civil status as separated. Respondentcontended that the fact that he was elected as Mayor shows that he has not offended the public’s sense of morality. RULING: Respondent SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY for immorality until he submits satisfactory proof that he has abandoned hisimmoral course of conduct. That Respondent continues to publiclyand openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus,siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character.Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of goodmoral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession.

MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005 Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed account. Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.”

Cojuangco vs Palma A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005 Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his subsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on November 1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for investigation and recommendation. The Assistant Solicitor General heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the presence of respondent’s counsel. On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final actions of his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it was denied. The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he acted under a “firm factual and legal conviction in declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first marriage is void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity. Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage. Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the “firm factual and legal conviction when he declared before the HIC authorities that he was a bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity” cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held: “xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court which holds that purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his frist marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous and criminal.