Cases in Succession and LIST

LIST OF CASES SUCCESSION INTER VIVOS VS. SUCCESSION MORTIS CAUSA 1. ARELLANO VS. PASCUAL 2. DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER 3. MAGLASANG VS. HEIRS OF CABATINGAN 4. AUSTRIA- MAGAT VS. CA 5. BONSATO VS. CA 6. REYES VS. MOSQUEDA CONTRACTUAL SUCCESSION 7. VITUG VS. CA TRANSMISSION/ ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH 8. PASCO VS. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN 9. BALUS VS. BALUS 10. DELA MERCED VS. DELA MERCED 11. OPULENCIA VS. CA 12. CORONEL VS. CA 13. PAULMITAN VS. CA 14. RIOFERO VS. CA 15. EMNACE VS. CA OBJECT OF SUCCESSION 16. LIMJOCO VS. FRAGRANTE 17. ARAYATA VS. JOYA 18.ALVAREZ VS. IAC 19. LIM VS. CA 20. ESTATE OF LLENADO VS. LLENADO 21. DKC HOLDINGS VS. CA 22. SAN AGUSTIN VS. CA 23. AGGABAO VS. RTC 24. RIOFERO VS. CA FORCED SUCCESSION/ LEGITIME 25. MANONGSONG VS. ESTIMO 26. SPS. JOAQUIN VS. CA INTANGIBLE RIGHT TO THE LEGITIME 27. JLT AGRO VS. BALANSANG 28. BLAS VS. SANTOS 29. FERRER VS. SPS. DIAZ NO IMPAIRMENT 30. IMPERIAL VS. CA 31. DOROTHEO VS. CA 32. FRANCISCO VS. FRANCISCO 33. RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ 34. CONCEPCION VS. STA. ANA PRIMARY FORCED HEIRS 35. SPS. TUMBOKON VS. LEGASPI 36. VIZCONDE VS. CA EFFECT OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONS

37. RIVERA VS. RAMIREZ SHARES/ LEGITIME 38. SPS. BOLANOS VS. BERNARTE 39. CONCEPCION VS. CA 40. JOAQUIN VS. REYES 41. BENITEZ- BADUA VS. CA 42. BABRIERA VS. CATOTAL ADOPTIVE CHILDREN 43. RIVERA VS. RAMIREZ 44. IMPERIAL VS. CA 45. SAYSON VS. CA 46. IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA 47. LIM VS. IAC 48. TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL LEGITIMATE PARENTS AND ASCENDANTS 49. NUGUID VS. NUGUID SURVIVING SPOUSE 50. ENRICO VS. HEIRS 51. CATALAN VS. CA 52. QUITA VS. CA ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN 53. ARUEGO JR. VS. CA 54. ESTATE OF JUAN DIZON VS. CA 55. GUY VS. CA 56. CRUZ VS. CRISTOBAL 57.HEIRS OF MARAMAG VS. MARAMAG 58. IMPERIAL VS. CA 59. RIVERA VS. HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA 60. MALOLES VS. CA RESERVA TRONCAL 61. GONZALES VS. LEGARDA 62. AGLIBOT VS. MANALAC 63. SOLIVIO VS. CA 64. NIEVA VS. ALCALA 65. TIOCO VS. CAMACHO 66. SUMAYA VS. IAC 67. GONZALES VS. CFI 68. EDROSO VS. SABLAN 69. SIENES VS. ESPARCIA 70. CHUA VS. CFI TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION 71. RABADILLA VS. CA 72. REYES VS. CA 73. CASTANEDA VS. ALEMANY 74. DACANAY VS. FLORENDO 75.DELA CERNA VS. REBACA

RULES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF WILLS 76. REYES VS. CA GOVERNING LAW 77. PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS 78. ALSUA- BETTS VS. CA 79. LLORENTE VS. CA 80. VDA DE PEREZ VS. TOLETES 81.SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY 82. AZNAR VS. GARCIA 83. BELLIS VS. BELLIS 84. PCIB VS. ESCOLIN TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 85. ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE 86. BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO 87. ABQUILAN VS. ABQUILAN 88. BUGNO VS. UBAG 89. TORRES VS. LOPEZ 90. SANCHO VS. ABELLA 91. BETTS VS. CA 92. RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ 93. HEIRS OF MONTINOLA VS. CA FORMS OF WILL 94. ABANGAN VS. ABANGAN 95. ACOP VS. PIRASO 96. GONZALES VS. LAUREL 97. SUROZ VS. HONRADO 98. NOBLE VS. ABAJA NOTARIAL WILLS 99. MACAPINLAC VS. ALIMURUNG 100. GUISON VS. CONCEPCION 101. LEANO VS. LEANO 102. GARCIA VS. LA CUESTA 103. YAP TUA VS. YAP CA 104. DE GALA VS. GONZALES 105. CANEDA VS. CA 106. PERRY VS. ELIO 107. JABONETA VS. GUSTILO 108. NEYRA VS. NEYRA 109. AVERA VS. GARCIA 110. ICASIANO VS. ICASIANO 111. FERNANDEZ VS. VERGEL 112. LOPEZ VS. LIBORO 113. LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ 114. AZUELA VS. CA 115. TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA 116. NOBLE VS. ABAJA 117. CANEDA VS. CA

118. TABOADA VS. ROSAL 119. MARAVILLA VS. MARAVILLA 120. VDA DE RAMOS VS. CA 121. ALDABA VS. ROQUE 122. FERNANDEZ VS. VERGEL 123. GUERRERO VS. BIHIS 124. ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE 125. CRUZ VS. VILLASOR 126. GARCIA VS. VASQUEZ 127. ALVARADO VS. GAVIOLA WITNESSES TO WILL 128. CRUZ VS. VILLASOR 129. GONZALES VS. CA 130. MOLO VS. TANCHUCO HOLOGRAPHIC WILL 131. LABRADOR VS. CA 132. DE JESUS VS. DE JESUS 133. IN RE ESTATE OF CALDERON 134. KALAW VS. RELOVA 135. AJERO VS. CA 136. CODOY VS. CALUGAY 137. RIVERA VS. IAC 138. GAN VS. YAP 139. RODELAS VS. ARANZA REVOCATION OF WILLS 140. MOLO VS. MOLO 141. SAMSON VS. NAVAL 142. GAGO VS. MAMUYAC 143. UNSON VS. ABELLA 144. YAP TUA VS. YAP CA KUAN 145. KALAW VS. RELOVA 146. GAGO VS. MAMUYAC 147. TRILLANA VS. CRISOSTOMO ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS 148. LASAM VS. UMENGAN 149. PASCUAL VS. CA 150. REYES VS. CA 151. BALUYOT VS. PANO 152. CUENCO VS. CA 153. VENTURA VS. VENTURA 154. GUEVARA VS. GUEVARA 155.

IN RE PILAPIL

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE: EXTRINSIC VALIDITY 156.

DOROTHEO VS. CA

157.

NUFABLE VS. NUFABLE

158.

GALLANOSA VS. ARCANGEL

159.

PALACIOS VS. PALACIOS

160.

SANCHEZ VS. CA

161.

RIVERA VS. IAC

162.

TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL

163.

GAN VS. YAP

164.

RODELAS VS. ARANSA

165.

CODOY VS. CALUGAY

166.

RODRIGUEZ VS. BORJA

167.

VDA DE. PRISCILLA VS. NARCISO

168.

CUYUGAN VS. BARON

169.

COSO VS. DEZA

INSTITUTION OF HEIRS 170.

BELEN VS. BPI

171.

NABLE JOSE VS. USON

172.

AUSTRIA VS. REYES

173.

BARRIOS VS. ENRIQUEZ

174.

GABRIEL VS. MATEO

175.

DIZON VS. DIZON

PRETERITION 176.

SEANGIO VS. REYES

177.

JLT AGRO VS. BALANSANG

178.

ACAIN VS. IAC

179.

NERI VS. AKUTIN

180.

NUGUID VS. NUGUID

181.

MANINAN VS. CA

182.

AZNAR VS. DUNCAN

183.

SOLANO VS. CA

FIDEICOMMISSARY 184.

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND

TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO 185.

ORENDAIN VS. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE

186.

PEREZ VS. GARCHITORENA

187.

CRISOLOGO VS. SINGSON

188.

ARANAS VS. ARANAS

189.

RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ

190.

RABADILLA VS. CA

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION 191.

VDA DE VILLANUEVA VS. JUICO

192.

MICIANO VS. BRIMO

193.

SANTOS VS. BUENAVENTURA

194.

MORENTE VS. DELA SANTA

COLLATION AS COMPUTATION 195.

ARELLANO VS. PASCUAL

196.

UNION BANK VS. SANTIBANEZ

197.

NAZARENO VS. CA

198.

IMPERIAL VS. CA

199.

ZARAGOZA VS. CA

200.

VISCONDE VS. CA

DISINHERITANCE 201.

SEANGIO VS. REYES

202.

LAHOM VS. SIBULO

203.

BARITUA VS. CA

204.

PECSON VS. MEDIAVILLO

205.

MANINANG VS. CA

LEGACIES AND DEVISES 206.

ROBLES VS. SANTIAGO

207.

DEBUQUE VS. CLIMACO

208.

VERA VS. NAVARRO

INEFFECTUAL LEGACIES 209.

FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA

RULES ON INTERPRETATION 210.

BELEN VS. BPI

LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

211.

BAGUNU VS. PIEDAD

212.

PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL

213.

LEONARDO VS. CA

214.

SAYSON VS. CA

215.

TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL

216.

LANDAYAN VS. BACANI

217.

VDA DE CRISOLOGO VS. CA

218.

BICOMONG VS. ALMANZA

219.

SALAO VS. SALAO

220.

ABELLANO- BACAYO VS. FERRARIS- BORROMEO

ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION 221.

GONZALES VS. CA

222.

MANUEL VS. FERRER

223.

RAMIREZ VS. BAUTISTA

224.

SANTILLON VS. MIRANDA

225.

PISUENA VS. HEIRS OF UNATING

226.

ARCENAS VS. CINCO

227.

IN RE: CHANLIONGCO

228.

CRISOLOGO VS. CA

229.

PORTEO VS. PABELLON

230.

BARANDA VS. BARANDA

231.

ARMAS VS. CALISTERIO

232.

ABELLANO- BACAYO VS. FERRARIS- BORROMEO

233.

TIOCO VS. CAMACHO

234.

ROSALES VS. ROSALES

CAPACITY TO SUCCEED 235.

HALILI VS. CA

236.

RESURRECTION VS. JAVIER

237.

NEPOMUCENO VS. CA

ACCEPTANCE AND REPUDIATION 238.

GUY VS. CA

239.

REPUBLIC VS. DE GUZMAN

240.

SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY

COLLATION/ PARIFICATION 241.

VIZCONDE VS. CA

242.

ADAN VS. CASILI

243.

CARANDANG VS. CAPUNO

244.

MATEO VS. LAGUA

EXTRA- JUDICIAL PARTITION 245.

JLT AGRO VS. BALANSANG

246.

ZARAGOZA VS. CA

247.

CHAVEZ VS. IAC

248.

HEIRS OF TEVES VS. CA

JUDICIAL PARTITION 249.

HEIRS OF VELASQUEZ VS. CA

WHEN PARTITION PROHIBITED 250.

FIGURACION VS. VDA DE FIGURACION

SALE BY CO-HEIR OF UNDIVIDED INTEREST 251.

DE JESUS VS. MANGLAPUZ

252.

VERDAD VS. CA

253.

GARCIA VS. CALALIMAN

EFFECTS OF PARTITION 254.

MAESTRADO VS. CA

255.

KILARIO VS. CA

256.

ALEJANDRINO VS. CA

257.

QUIZON VS. CASTILLO

258.

HERNANDEZ VS. ANDAL

259.

DIZON VS. DIZON

260.

FAVOR VS. CFI

NULLITY AND RESCISSION OF PARTITION 261.

FELICIANO VS. CANOZA

262.

BALUS VS. BALUS

263.

NON VS. CA

Case No. 1 G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010 AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO, Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents. FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, and alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner. The probate court found the Deed of Donation as valid and went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which reads: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property donated by decedent to Amelia is subject to collation? HELD: Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced. The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate.There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER GR NO. 187056 SEPTEMBER 20, 2010

Case No. 2

FACTS: Spouses G executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" the terms of which are as follows: It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse. It is our will that J and E will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by them. It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated. It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS. ISSUE: Whether the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective upon death), as in fact designated, or actually a donation inter vivos (effective during the lifetime of the Donors)? HELD: IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS. That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,

what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; 2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and 3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime. Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Case No. 3

MAGLASANG vs. CABATINGAN June 5, 2002

FACTS: Conchita Cabatingan executed deed of donation over a house and lot in favor of his brother. Also, she executed 4 other deeds of donation in favor of the petitioners. The deeds provided that it shall take effect upon the donor’s death. Conchita died. Respondents filed an action to annul the 4 deeds on the ground that it is void for failure to comply with the formalities of a will.

ISSUE: WON the deed is a donation mortis causa. HELD: Yes, it is. The nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Conchita’s death. Donations mortis causa must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments. Though the deeds were acknowledge before a notary public, they were not executed in the manner provided for under Article 805-806 of the Civil Code, thus it is void. Case No. 4 MAGAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS 337 SCRA 298 FACTS: Private respondent Santiago A. Guerrero was President and Chairman of "Guerrero Transport Services", a single proprietorship. Sometime in 1972, Guerrero Transport Services won a bid for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs within the Subic Naval Base, in Olongapo. As highest bidder, Guerrero was to "provide radio-controlled taxi service within the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, utilizing as demand requires . . . 160 operational taxis consisting of four wheel, four-door, four passenger, radio controlled, meter controlled, sedans, not more than one year . . . " On September 22, 1972, with the advent of martial law, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1. On September 25, 1972, pursuant to the aforequoted Letter of Instruction, the Radio Control Office issued Administrative Circular No. 4: Subject: Suspending the acceptance and processing of applications for radio station construction permits and for permits to own and/or possess radio transmitters or transceivers. On September 25, 1972, Guerrero and Victorino D. Magat, as General Manager of Spectrum Electronic Laboratories, a single proprietorship, executed a letter-contract for the purchase of transceivers at a quoted price of US$77,620.59, FOB Yokohoma. Victorino was to deliver the transceivers within 60 to 90 days after receiving notice from Guerrero of the assigned radio frequency, "taking note of Government Regulations.” The

contract was signed and Victorino contacted his Japanese supplier, Koide & Co., Ltd. and placed an order for the transceivers. On September 29, 1972, Navy Exchange Officer, A. G. Mason confirmed that Guerrero won the bid for the commercial transportation contract. On October 4, 1972, middle man and broker Isidro Q. Aligada of Reliance Group Engineers, Inc. , wrote Victorino, informing him that a radio frequency was not yet assigned to Guerrero and that government regulations might complicate the importation of the transceivers. However, in the same letter, Victorino was advised to advise his supplier "to proceed (with) production pending frequency information." Victorino was also assured of Guerrero's financial capability to comply with the contract. On October 6, 1972, Guerrero informed Aligada of the frequency number assigned by Subic Naval Base authorities. Aligada was instructed to "proceed with the order thru Spectrum Electronics Laboratories." On October 7, 1972, Aligada informed Magat of the assigned frequency number. Aligada also advised Victorino to "proceed with the order upon receipt of letter of credit." On January 10, 1973, Guerrero applied for a letter of credit with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. This application was not pursued. On March 27, 1973, Victorino, represented by his lawyer, Atty. Sinesio S. Vergara, informed Guererro that the order with the Japanese supplier has not been canceled. Should the contract be canceled, the Japanese firm would forfeit 30% of the deposit and charge a cancellation fee in an amount not yet known, Guerrero to bear the loss. Further, should the contract be canceled, Victorino would demand an additional amount equivalent to 10% of the contract price. Unable to get a letter of credit from the Central Bank due to the refusal of the Philippine government to issue a permit to import the transceivers, Guerrero commenced operation of the taxicabs within Subic Naval Base, using radio units borrowed from the U.S. government. Victorino thus canceled his order with his Japanese supplier. On May 22, 1973, Victorino filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract against Guerrero. On June 7, 1973, Guerrero moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. On June 16, 1973, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. On July 11, 1973, Victorino filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court assailing the dismissal of the complaint. On April 20, 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the complaint sufficiently averred a cause of action. The Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. On November 27, 1984, the trial court ordered that the case be archived for failure of Victorino to prosecute. On March 11, 1985, petitioners, Olivia, Dulce, Ma. Magnolia, Ronald and Dennis Magat, moved to reinstate the case and to substitute Victorino in its prosecution. Apparently, Victorino died on February 18, 1985. On April 29, 1985, the trial court granted the motion. On July 12, 1991, the trial court decided in favor of the heirs of Victorino and ordered Guerrero to pay temperate, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On

August 21, 1991, Guerrero appealed to the Court of Appeals. However it was dismissed. On October 26, 1995, the heirs of Victorino filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration. On March 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the transceivers were contraband items prohibited by the LOI and Administrative Circular to import; hence, the contract is void. 2. Whether or not the contract was breached. RULING: Anent the 1st issue, NO. The contract was not void ab initio. Nowhere in the LOI and Administrative Circular is there an express ban on the importation of transceivers. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render “radios and transceivers” illegally per se. The Administrative Circular merely ordered the Radio Control Office to suspend the acceptance and processing… of application… for permits to possess, own, transfer, purchase and sell radio transmitters and transceivers… therefore; possession and importation of the radio transmitters and transceivers was legal provided one had the necessary license for it. The LOI and Administrative Circular did not render the transceivers outside the commerce of man. They were valid objects of the contract. Anent the 2nd issue, NO. The contract was not breached. Affirming the validity of the contract, the law provides that when the service (required by the contract) has become so manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released there from in whole or in parts. Here, Guerrero’s inability to secure a letter of credit and to comply with his obligation was a direct consequence of the denial of the permit to import. For this, he cannot be faulted. Even if the Court assumes that there was a breach of contract, damages cannot be awarded. Damnum absque injuria comes into the fore.

Case No. 5 Heirs of Juan and Felipe Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-6600, July 30, 1954, 95 Phil 481) FACTS: On the first day of December, 1949, Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the

requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. The lower court ruled that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. In the Court of Appeals, majority of the justices declared that the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causa and were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two justices, however, dissented, claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations inter vivos. HELD: Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept. ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions. Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633); (2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R. L-4326, November 18, 1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828). Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990 RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator, petitioners, vs. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents. Facts: Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed a special proceeding for the administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. ISSUE: Was the donation valid? RULING:

The title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donationwhether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.

CASE NO. 7 VITUG vs. CA 183 SCRA 755 FACTS: Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug, executed a survivorship agreement with the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor. ISSUES: WON the survivorship agreement is a will. WON it is valid. RULING: Because the account was a joint account and they made a will while they were married, so naturally the cash would be their absolute community or conjugal property. The cash is owned in-common by them. When the spouses opened savings account, they merely put what rightly belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other. Since the wife predeceased her husband, the

latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the amount under the savings account. Case No. 8 G.R. No. 165554 : July 26, 2010LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO vs. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-PRINCIPE FACTS: The present petition began with a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages filed onDecember 13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman, represented by Cresencia deGuzman-Principe, against petitioners Lauro Pasco and Lazaro Pasco. The case was filed before theMunicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case No. MM-3191.In their Complaint, herein respondents alleged that on February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan inthe amount of ₱140,000.00 from Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners’ loan, Lauro executed a chattel mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death, her heirs sought tocollect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands, petitioners refused to either paythe balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the respondents. Thus, respondents wereconstrained to file the collection case to compel the petitioners to pay the principal amount of ₱140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of 5% monthly interest from February 7, 1995, 25% attorney’s fees, exemplary damages and expenses of litigation. ISSUES: WON the Special Power of Attorney did not validly authorize Cresencia to enter into theCompromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs. RULING: No. it is undisputed that Cresencia’s co -heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney, dated April6, 1999, designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. Consequently, Cresencia entered into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco from Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.

Case No. 9 CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS G.R.No. 168970 January 15, 2010 Peralta, J.: Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific onethird portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their coownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Issue: Whether or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject

property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank. Held:

The

court

is

not

persuaded.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

CASE NO. 10 DELA MERCED vs. DELA MERCED February 25, 1999 FACTS: Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue and left (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs.

On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, executed an extrajudicial settlement, adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of (1/3) pro-indiviso. Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial and prayed that he be included to share in the (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. ISSUE: WON Joselito as an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from Evarista’s estate. HELD: No. Article 992 of the NCC is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the NCC, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. Case No. 11 OPULENCIA VS CA FACTS:

   



Respondents filed a complaint for Specific Performance against Petitioner on the basis of a Contract to Sell of a lot in Sta. Rosa Laguna wherein a downpayment of P300,000 was received by the Petitioner. Petitioner admits these but claims that the subject property formed part of the estate of her father in respect of which a petition for probate was filed in the RTC. This was allegedly known by the Respondents. Petitioner claims that the same should be approved by the probate court and upon realization of the nullity of the contract, she wanted to have the contract rescinded and was willing to give back the downpayment. Trial Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which allows the sale of properties subject of a probate proceeding provided that it is beneficial to the estate and complies with the requirements of the law. It further stated that where the administratrix realizes the nullity of the transaction entered into, she is not estopped from interposing the contracts nullity. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s decision. Hence, the appeal. ISSUE: Whether a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceeding valid and binding without the approval of the probate court? HELD: YES Contract to Sell Valid





Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. The Supreme Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. Administration of the Estate not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell





The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." 19 Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Estoppel

Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences.

Case No. 12 CORONEL V. CA (October 07, 1996) FACTS: Coronel et al. consummated the sale of his property located in Quezon City to respondent Alcaraz. Since the title of the property was still in the name of the deceased father of the Coronels, they agreed to transfer its title to their name upon payment of the down payment of 50K. and thereafter an absolute deed of sale will be executed. Alcaraz’s mother paid the down payment in behalf of her daughter and as such, Coronel made the transfer of title to their name. Notwithstanding this fact, Coronel sold the property to petitioner Mabanag and rescinded its prior contract with Alcaraz. ISSUE:

WON the rescission of the first contract between Coronel and Alcaraz is valid. HELD: The case is a contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition in which consummation is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father, to their names. Thus, the contract of sale became obligatory. With regard to double sale, the rule that the first in time, stronger in right should apply. The contention of the petitioner that she was a buyer in good faith because the notice of lis pendens in the title was annotated after she bought the property is of no merit. In case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. The ruling should be in favor of Alcaraz because Mabanag registered the property two months after the notice of lis pendens was annotated in the title and hence, she cannot be a buyer in good faith.

CASE NO. 13 PAULMITAN V. CA- CO-OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is transferred to the buyer. FACTS: The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners. Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.

The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mother’s lot (2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property HELD: (1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property. When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that “each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.” Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a coowner. (2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes. Case No. 14 and 24 RIOFERIO vs. CA January 13, 2004 FACTS: Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.

Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate. Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-ininterest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator. HELD: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.

Case No. 15 EMNACE vs. CA November 23, 2001 FACTS: Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986,

they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them. Petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. Tabanao's filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. ISSUE: WON the heirs of Vicente Tabanao Lacks the capacity to sue the petitioner. HELD: No.

The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or

administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. Case No. 16 Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397 FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the

deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission. Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed”. Case No. 17 BASILIA ARAYATA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928 VILLA-REAL, J.: FACTS Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite. On June 4, 1906, Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under said Act No. 1120, which were designated as lots Nos. 1031, 1058, 1086, 1153, 2352 and 547. As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire under the law was limited, lots Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and noted in the proper registry book. On April 24 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya consideration of the sum of P2,000 said conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry book. On

May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot No. 547 to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450, conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lot No. 1058 to Florentino Joya, lot No. 1086 to Pablo Joya, lot No. 1031 to Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, lot No. 1153 to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, lot No. 2352 to Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and lot No. 547 to Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153 and 1031, were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya. On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud. ISSUES (1)Has the plaintiff-appellant, as the surviving spouse, exclusive right to all the lots in question? (2) In case she has, is she entitled to the possession and products thereof? HELD (1) YES. [H]older[s] of a certificate of sale of friar lands, who has not fully paid the purchase price may transfer and convey his rights, but that the transferee or grantee is not subrogated to all the transferor's right until the transfer has been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the registry book in the Bureau of Public Lands. In other words, in order that a transfer of the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. If, as it was held in the case of Jocson vs. Soriano, the right conferred by Act No. 1120 on the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands in similar to that conferred on the holder of a "homestead," and if the latter has no right to dispose of said certificate by will to the prejudice of his surviving spouse and for his children (29 C. J., 930, par. 342), then by analogy, the holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands cannot dispose of his rights to said lands by will to the prejudice of his widow and children. (2) YES. The defendants, who are in possession of the said lands, cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code relative to possession in good faith, inasmuch as the principle on which the right of a holder in good faith is based is the belief that his possession is with just title under claim of ownership.

While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property given them in the will and may taken possession of their respective portions upon the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the property of estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession thereof. (Pimentel vs. Palanca; Fernandez vs. Tria). Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance of the fact that until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is made, said property belongs to the lather's estate and it together with its products, is subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if any. Only after judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil., 895.) In conclusion, the defendants are not entitled to the possession of the lands in question or their products, and they are bound to return them to the herein plaintiffappellant, after deducting the necessary expenses for cultivation and preservation. (Art 453, Civil Code.)

Case No. 18 ALVAREZ vs. IAC May 7, 1990 FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B.

Aniceto Yanes

was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib. It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. After Fuentebella's death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the

Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the lots. ISSUE: WON the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process. RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. "Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and duties. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. . . ."Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.

Case No. 33 RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ 111 SCRA 82

FACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens. ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct. HELD:

No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Case No. 71 RABADILLA vs. CA June 29, 2000 FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. ISSUE: WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD: Under Article 776 of the NCC, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

CASE NO. 115 TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA January 31, 2005 FACTS: Abada executed his will in 1932. Abada died in 1940. It was asserted that the will of Abada does not indicate that it was written in a language or dialect known to the testator and that the will was not acknowledged before a notary public, citing Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: What law shall govern the validity of the will? HELD: The law that governs the validity of the will of Abada is the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889 and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure (which governed the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code), the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is

not necessary in the execution of any will.

Abada’s will does not require

acknowledgement before a notary public. Under Article 795, the validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made.

Case No. 127 ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA September 14, 1993

FACTS: The testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the 8-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the 3 instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter 4 followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Said will was admitted to probate. Later on, a codicil was executed, and by that time, the testator was already suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. ISSUE:

Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will? HELD: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness. However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In this case, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place.

CASE NO. 166 RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA 17 SCRA 41 FACTS: In this case, there were 2 proceedings.

First was an intestate proceeding

instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was instituted ahead of the other. ISSUE: Which proceeding should be preferred? RULING: As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The

wishes of the testator must be given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a sound mind. If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate.

Case No. 178 ACAIN vs. IAC October 27, 1987 FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited. ISSUE: Was there preterition? HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Insofar

as

the

widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.

However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of

respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.

CASE NO. 191 VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO 4 SCRA 550 FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto. Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will. ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina. HELD: The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the

properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition.

Case no. 192. MICIANO vs. BRIMO 50 PHIL 867 FACTS: A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance ISSUE: Will there be forfeiture?

HELD: Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a will should not be given effect. A person’s will is merely an instrument which is

PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws. The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his national law. He cannot provide otherwise. The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that provision is not legal.

Case No. 205 MANINANG vs. CA June 19, 1982 FACTS: Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. ISSUE: Was Bernardo preterited? HELD: In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited,

and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.

Case No. 263 NON vs. CA February 15, 2000 FACTS: Petitioners contended that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. ISSUE: Was preterition present that would warrant annulment? HELD:

When Virginia died intestate, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Petitioners are vague on how and in what manner fraud, forgery and undue influence occurred. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT issued. The relief instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.