Case in Political

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al v . HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HISCAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk thePhilippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with thet erm s of t he Un i te d N ati ons Co nv enti on o n t he L a w o f t he S ea (U NCL O S I I I ), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortenedone baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippinea r c h i p e l a g o a n d c l a s s i f i e d a d j a c e n t t e r r i t o r i e s s u c h a s t h e K a l a y a a n I s l a n d Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as ―regimes of islands‖ whose islandsgenerate their own applicable maritime zones.Petitioners, in their capacities as ―citizens, taxpayers or legislators‖ assailthe constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending thatthe law unconstitutionally ―converts‖ internal waters into archipelagic waters,t hus subjec ti ng th es e w a ters to th e r i gh t o f i n noc en t an d sea l a nes pa ssage und er U NCL OS I I I , i nc l u di ng ov er fl i gh t . Pe ti ti o ner s hav e c o nte nd ed th at th ese passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal watersinto archipelagic waters HELD: Petition DISMISSED. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippine’s national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding thec ou n try ’s mar i ti m e z one s , t he l a w al s o al l ow s an i nter na ti o nal l y rec og ni ze ddel i mi ta ti o n o f t he b r e adt h of the P hi l i ppi ne’ s m ari ti me zo nes a nd c on ti ne nt al shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters intoarchipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to thew a t e r s e n c l o s e d b y t h e a r c h i p e l a g i c b a s e l i n e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e i r d e p t h o r distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exerciseof s ov erei gn t y ov er w a ters a nd ai r s p ac e , b e d an d s ubs oi l a nd the re so urc es therein LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO (G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986) FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines." ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government. Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines (G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008) Facts: On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as ―associative,‖ characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring ―amendments to the existing legal framework‖ shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. Issues and Ruling: 1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. 2. YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

3. W/N there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). 4. YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda: a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society; b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment; c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP). 5. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. 6. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional. NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. 7. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege. NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. Carpio-Morales, J. The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.

The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external selfdetermination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: P ri v ate r esp ond en t, D an di n g Coj uan gc o, fi l ed a c a se t o c ompel th e PC G G t o al l ow him to inspect corporate books of SMC and UCPB. ISSUE: Is this a suit against the state requiring the PCGG to allow Mr. Cojuangco to inspectthe books of corporations in which he has shares of being a stockholder. HELD: T h i s i s n o t a s u i t a g a i ns t t h e s ta t e . T h i s i s o nl y a n e x e r c i s e o f h i s r i g h t a s a stockholder. The stocks or his shares of s t i c k s w h i c h h a v e b e e n s e q u e s t e r e d h a v e n o t a ut o ma ti c al l y b ec o me s t oc ks o f the g ov ern me nt. T he tes t o f s ui t agai nst t he st at e: I f i t r e q u i r e s a n a f f i r m a t i v e act on the part of the state to disburse public funds or loss o f g ov er n m en t p r o p er ty . I n thi s p eti ti on , thes e are no t a t ten dan t . Besi des, i n th e c orpo rat e books, the stocks are still in the name of Cojuangco.

Tanada v. Angara Facts On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the ―Filipino first‖ policy. Issue Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional Ruling The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a ―self-reliant and independent national economy‖ does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither ―economic seclusion‖ nor ―mendicancy in the international community.‖ The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it ―a part of the law of the land‖. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar (Consti1) In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of Manggahan Floodway in Pasig  The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct thereon 145 housing units  By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa, Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units  Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit" 

Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract, by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and forthcoming  Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63 

Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)  In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303  In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the DPWH  In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject money claims  Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees. 

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Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997

Issue: 1. Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary Canlas should be upheld 2. Whether or not the State is immune from suit Holding: 1. Yes. 2. No. Ratio: 1. While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in the instant petition  The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality  "in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld, applying the principle of quantum meruit  Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims 2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside. 

Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000 Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber.The drivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products. Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suitagainst the State Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activitieswithin the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suitagainst the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003] PONENTE: J. YNARES-SANTIAGO FACTS: On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the purpose of the public use of Socialized housing.  On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to NHA’s power to expropriate their properties. Thus an order of execution has been granted and the court already appointed commissioners to determine the amount for just compensation  On April 17, 2000, the Commissioners submitted their report wherein they recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter wherein a partial judgment has been rendered.  After the report on the just compensation has completed, both parties filed an MR on the amount for the just compensation stating that it has no adequate basis and support. Both MR was denied by the court.  While the judgment has been rendered in the RTC and an entry of judgment and the motion for execution has been issued, NHA filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same. 

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Wherefore, the Petitioner NHA filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED AND COERCED BY THE COURTS TO EXERCISE OR CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;

2) WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE 3) WHETHER OR NOT JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND IF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT; HELD: The petition was denied and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed. ·

RATIO: On the first issue, the court held that, yes the state can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the expropriation proceedings before the court has rendered the case final and executory. In the early case of City of Manila v. Ruymann and Metropolitan Water District v. De Los Angeles, an expropriation proceeding was explained.

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Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

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The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.” The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal there from. On the second issue, the court held that a socialized housing is always for the public used and that the public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court has fixed. On the third issue, the court ruled that in this case the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA, although it is ―public in character‖, it is only public in character since it is government-owned, having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

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CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA, petitioners,v. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB), respondents.

G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003 FACTS : In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees assailed thelegality of the abolition. The CF I in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Governmentappealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partialpayment of her back-wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago.The City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle;properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and directedthe sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago asback-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check butthe City Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocancorresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the CityTreasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liablefor any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. ISSUE : Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago¶s claim. HELD : Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subjectto his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third personor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited inthe PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not besubject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Eventhough the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is atliberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgmentsrecovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final andmake provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-definedexception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a case, themonetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocanalready approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiago¶s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell

squarely within the exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds. Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 Facts: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by the National ParksDevelopment Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution, petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages andinjunction against petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against the State, which could not prosper without the State’s consent Held: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaintsfiled against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority. Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs. DUMDUM, JR.G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010, Peralta,J:p FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy,Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that acontract was entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out

certain developmentalundertakings in the municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chao’s claim for payment. Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interestand damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstthe Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing thesheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality.The Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which theaction had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing outthat there was no written contract or document that would evince the supposedagreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued, invoking, among others,immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that as a municipal corporation,it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution andgarnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that, the Municipality’s claim of immunityfrom suit is negated by the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporationswith the power to sue and be sued. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipalityof Hagonoy is valid. HELD: No. The universal rule is that where the State gives its consent to be sued byprivate parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Since government funds andproperties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects Republic of Indonesia vs. James Vizon G.R. No. 54705, June 26, 2003 FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated

the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can be sued. RULING: The Supreme Court on the matter ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it. The Court stated that the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment is still part sovereign function of the State. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. � ` u a �� �� public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its

employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004A mere license is always revocable FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional and Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.In evaluating a due process claim; the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that ―a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.‖ In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:―Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.‖xxx In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that ―the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.‖ Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields,...

BFAR VS COA FACTS: Petitioner Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union,Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City issued Resolution No. 01, series of 1999 requesting theBFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It justified its request on the high cost of living, i.e., "the increase in prices of petroleumproducts which catapulted the cost of food commodities, has greatly affected theeconomic conditions and living standard of the government employees of BFAR RegionVII and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, i.e. , food,shelter, clothing and education." -

It also relied on the Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS), The ESIAS "includes the granting of incentives that will help employees overcomepresent economic difficulties, boost their morale, and further commitment anddedication to public service The Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Cebu Citydisallowed the grant of Food Basket Allowance under Notice of Disallowance. BFAR Regional Office No. VII, moved for reconsideration and prayed for the lifting of thedisallowance. It argued that the grant of Food Basket Allowance would enhance thewelfare and productivity of the employees. Further, it contended that the approval by the Honorable Drilon, Undersecretary forFisheries and Livestock, of the said benefit was the law itself which vested the specificauthority for its release. The Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO) Regional Office No.VII, Cebu City denied the motion. BFAR appealed to the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO)National, Quezon City. The appeal was denied. Hence, this appeal.Petitioner cites the following grounds for its appeal:1. The disallowance in question is unconstitutional as it contravenes the fundamentalprinciple of the State enshrined under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987Constitution, which provide as follows: SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensurethe prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from povertythrough policies that provide adequate social services, promote fullemployment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of nationaldevelopment.2. The Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock is an extension of the Secretary of Agriculture who is an alter-ego of the President. His approval was tantamount to theauthority from the Office of the President, as contemplated in DBM Budget Circular No.16, dated November 28, 1998.3. The grant of the Food Basket Allowance is in conformity with Sec. 12 of the SalaryStandardization Law.HELD: We deny the petition. RATIO: First, we rule on the issue of constitutionality. BFAR invokes the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on social justice to warrant thegrant of the Food Basket Allowance. Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of the Constitution arenot selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. -

They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect, legislativeenactment is required. As we held inKilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato , the principles and state policiesenumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not selfexecutingprovisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They donot embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation." Second, petitioner contends that the approval of the Department of Agriculture (DA)Undersecretary for Fisheries and Livestock of the Food Basket Allowance is the lawwhich authorizes its release. It is crystal clear that the DA Undersecretary has no authority to grant any allowance tothe employees of BFAR. In the instant case, no Administrative Order has been issued by the Office of thePresident to exempt BFAR from the express prohibition against the grant of any food,rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentive/allowance to its employees. In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance is definitely not in the nature of anallowance to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. It is a form of financial assistance to all officials and employees of BFAR. Petitioner invokes the rule of statutory construction that "what is not included isexcluded." Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius . Petitioner claims that the Food Basket Allowance is distinct and separate from the specific allowances/additionalcompensation listed in the circular. Again, we reject petitioner’s contention. The Food Basket Allowance falls under the 14thcategory, that of incentiveallowance/fee/pay. Petitioner itself justified the Food Basket Allowance as an incentiveto the employees to encourage them to be more productive and efficient. We are not convinced that the Food Basket Allowance falls under the incentive awardsystem contemplated above. In the instant case, the Food Basket Allowance was granted to all BFAR employees,without distinction. It was not granted due to any extraordinary contribution orexceptional accomplishment by an employee. The Food Basket Allowance was primarily an economic monetary assistance to theemployees. HELD: The petition is DENIED

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.‖ As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one

who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) vs Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) FACTS: PCA was created by PD 232 as independent public corporationto promotetherapidintegrateddevelopment and growth of thecoconutand other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure thatcoconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growththrough a regulatory scheme set up by law. PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-becoconut plant operators. On 24 March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 whichno longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protectiveregulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition amongoperators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-basedcommodities. The APCD then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke BR No. 018-93. ISSUE: Whether or not PCA ran inconflictagainst the very nature of its creation. HELD: Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez- fai re as aneconomicprinciple. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it

nonethelessreserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of ―protective regulations‖ for the benefit of thegeneral public. This is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reservesthe power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interestso requires Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a corespondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional; Held: YES under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Facts: Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in ―Balikatan 021.‖ They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the ―Balikatan‖ is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. Issue: Whether ―Balikatan 02-1‖ activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement? Ruling: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in ―activities,‖ the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must ―abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .’activities‖ arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,‖ a ―mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,‖ falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as ―Supernumerary Project Worker‖, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ―ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.‖ The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

PRC vs. De Guzman Facts: The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twentyone scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its part, the NBI found that ―the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.‖ Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers OPOSA VS. FACTORAN G.R. No. 1010183, July 30, 1993 FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of thenatural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." This instant petition was filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and tocease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the natural resourceproperty and violates their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution) and the protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

2. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. HELD: 1. The Court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 2. The Court does not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in thefundamental law (Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution). While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not underthe Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. EO 192 and Admin Code of 1987 define the powers and functions of DENR, under whose authority and office the complaint falls. The petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right. The petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of their own as well as the future generations’ behalf can only be based on the concept of intergenerational esponsibility insofar as the said right is concerned. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES: 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and minority leader

exercising the position of Senate

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: FIRST ISSUE The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President(read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review). The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue. SECOND ISSUE There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution,the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shallautomatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of

electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. THIRD ISSUE Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader. FOURTH ISSUE Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizingRespondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority ROMEO P. GEROCHI vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007Ponente: NACHURA, J. :FACTS P e ti ti one rs R ome o P . Ge r oc hi , K a tul o ng Ng Ba yan (K B ), a n d Env i r o nme nt al i s t C on s um ers N et w ork , I nc . (E CN )(p e ti ti o ners ), c om e be for e t hi s Co ur t in t hi s or i gi nal ac ti o n pr ayi ng tha t S ect i on 3 4 of Rep ub lic Act ( RA ) 9136,o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e E l e c t r i c P o w e r I n d u s t r y R e f o r m A c t o f 2 0 0 1 (EPIRA) , i m p o s i n g t h e Universal Charge , and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)

Which seeks to implement the said imposition , be declared unconstitutional .P e t i ti one rs al s o pra y th at the U ni v er s al Char ge i mp ose d up on the c ons um ers be refunded a nd tha t a pr el i mi n ar y injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing,charging, and collecting the said charge.Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent NationalP o w e r C o r p o r a t i o n - S t r a t e g i c P o w e r U t i l i t i e s G r o u p ( N P C SPUG) filed with respondent Energy RegulatoryCommission (ERC) a peti t i o n f o r t h e availment f r o m t h e U n i v e r s a l C h a r g e o f i t s s ha re f o r Mi s s io na r y Electrification . O n M ay 7 , 20 02 , N PC fi l ed a no t he r pe ti ti o n wi th ERC , pra yi ng tha t t he pro p o s ed s hare fro m t he U n i v e r s a l C h a r g e f o r t h e E n v i r o n m e n t a l c h a r g e b e a p p r o v e d f o r w it hd r a w a l f r o m t h e S p e c i a l Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for therehabilitation and management of watershed areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order provisionallyapp rov ing t h e computed amount as the share of the NPCS P U G f r o m t h e U n i v e r s a l C h a r g e f o r M i s s i o n a r y Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collectthe same from its endusers on a monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsiderationasking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003, ERC authorized the NPC to draw upto P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P.Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from themonth of July 2003. Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought t o i m p l e m e n t t h e s a m e a r e unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of saidpow e r t o a n y ex e cut iv e o r a d min i st ra t iv e a g en cy li k e t h e E RC i s unc on s t it ut i ona l, giv ing t h e s a me unlimited authority . The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined,fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.2 ) T h e E R C i s a l s o e m p o w e r e d t o a p p r o v e a n d determine where the funds collected should be used.3)The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory a n d a m o u n t s to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented. Respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents Departmentof Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends: 1)

Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is leviedfor a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. 2) It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power . On this premise, PSALM submits thatt her e i s no und ue del e gat i o n o f l egi sl a ti v e p ow er t o t he ERC si nc e the l a t ter m er el y exe rc ise s a l i mi ted authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. 3) Universal Charge does not possess the essential characteristics of a tax , that its imposition would redoundt o the be nefi t o f t he el ec tri c p owe r i nd us try an d n o t t o t he p ubl i c , an d t ha t i t s r a te i s u ni fo rm l y l ev i ed on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. 4) Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process. PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification andEnvironmental Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERCCa s e N os . 2 00 2 - 19 4 a nd 2 00 2 - 1 65 .O the rwi se , P E CO c oul d be hel d l i ab l e u nde r Sec . 4 6 [24]o f the E PI R A, w hi c h imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR. ISSUE 1)Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax 2)Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax o n t h e p a r t o f t h e E R C . HELD 1 st ISSUEThe conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge ismade . If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. Ine xac ti ng th e as sai l ed Uni v ersal C harge t hro ugh Sec . 3 4 o f t he E PI R A, t he S ta te 's p ol i c e p o wer , par ti c ul arl y i tsreg ul a to ry di me nsi on , i s i nv o ke d . S uc h c an be de duc ed fr om Sec . 34 w hi c h en umer ate s t he p urp oses f or whi c h t he Universal Charge is imposed. From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Chargeis not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted. 2 nd ISSUE There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizanceof and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrineof separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegatanon del eg ar i p o tes t

(w h a t has b een del eg ate d c an no t be d el ega ted ). T hi s i s bas ed on the e t hi c al pri nc i pl e t ha t s uc hdelegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.I n the fac e of the i nc r easi n g c o mp l ex i t y o f m od er n l i f e , d el ega ti o n o f l egi sl a ti v e po wer to v ar i ous s p e c i al i z ed administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions intoday's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptlyto the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked toexecute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statuteand effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that theregulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test andthe sufficient standard test. Under the first test , the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such thatw he n i t re ac hes the del eg ate , the onl y thi n g he wi l l h av e to do i s t o en fo r c e i t . T he second test mandates adequateguidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegationfrom running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, iscomplete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. 1 st test - Al th ou gh S ec . 34 o f the E PI R A me rel y pr ov i des t ha t wi thi n o ne (1 ) y ea r fro m the e ffec ti v i ty th er eo f , a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, andtherefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain bythe legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does notenjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and passesthe first test for valid delegation of legislative power. 2 nd test - Pr ov i si ons of the E PI R A s uc h a s , amo ng o ther s , t o en sur e t he to tal el e c tri fi c a ti on o f the c ou ntr y a nd t heq ual i t y , r el i a bi li ty , s ec uri ty a nd a ff or dabi l i t y of the s up p l y of el ec tri c po we r [59]and watershed rehabilitation and management[60] m eet th e requi r e me nts f or v al i d del ega ti on , as t he y p r ov i de t he l i mi t ati ons on th e E RCs p owe r t o formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to theERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of theU n i v e r s a l C h a r g e o n a l l e n d users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation withoutr ep r es ent a t io n. H enc e, s uch co nt e nt i on i s dee med w aiv ed o r aba ndo ned . Mo r eov e r, t he d et er m i na t ion of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same

.Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, therem ust b e a c l ear and uneq ui v oc al br eac h of the Co ns ti tuti o n an d n ot o ne th at i s d oub t ful , spec ul a ti v e, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find noclear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit ABAKADA GURO vs. PURISIMA FACTS: Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause. HELD: Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –

taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006 CASE This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial Court which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. FACTS entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions. y relief were filed by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal. RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void. ISSUE Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasilegislative power. YES. SC RULING promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites: (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable. statutory bases. er must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO. with the third requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect." Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.