Case Doctrines_Special Proceedings
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SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE De Leon vs. CA *A probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is the court’s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties. A probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. An order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate is an interlocutory order. Valarao vs. Pascual * The probate court has jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix even after the filing of a notice of appeal from the decision disallowing probate of the holographic will. Multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator. The special administrator has the discretion to take actual custody of the properties of the estate for the purpose of preserving them for regular administration. This is evident from the combination of the words "possession" and "charge" in Sec. 2 of Rule 80. While "possession" means only the fictitious custody of a thing as respondents suggest, “charge" may require actual possession of the properties according to the discretion of the special administrator. The possessory right of a special administrator is indispensable in fulfilling his mandate to preserve the properties of the estate until a regular administrator is designated. Unionbank vs. Santibañez *There can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. This presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. If the assumption of liability was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and the partition is invalid, the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect. Jamero vs. Melicor *Appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory; hence, it is not appealable. The appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and nonappealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City *The revocation of the authority of the special administrator is not a supervening event that would warrant the suspension of the execution of the judgment nullifying the extrajudicial partition. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which develop after the judgment has acquired finality. The revocation Enderes’ appointment as special administratrix was made before the decision of the SC was promulgated. This was evidently not a supervening event. Heirs of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA
Eden C. Brion
*Only the widow and the children, regardless of age, are entitled to provisional support during the pendency of the settlement of estate. Allowances for support should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. During the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. However, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. San Luis vs. San Luis *In the settlement of estate, “residence” means “actual residence,” and not “legal residence or domicile.” The term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." It should be understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. *The legal capacity to be the administrator may arise from the status as the surviving spouse, or as co-owner under Article 147 and 148 of the Civil Code. Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144. Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino Briones * The publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same is a notice to the whole world. The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made. ESCHEATS Alvarico vs. Sola * Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under the Public Land Act. Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under the Public Land Act. A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Caro vs. Sucaldito *An action for reversion can only be instituted by the government. In an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State. Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
Eden C. Brion
A suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a partyin-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance. ADOPTION Cang vs. CA * Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. The act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. Vda. de Jacob vs. CA *The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. Republic vs. Hernandez *A petition for change of name xxx is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. (This doctrine is no longer applicable.) Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name asked for. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. While it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, these two petitions are not related and are different from each other. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly. On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name. Republic vs. CA *Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. In re: The Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia *The adopted child may use the middle name of her biological mother. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. However, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. SSS vs. Aguas
Eden C. Brion
* Only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Landingin vs. Republic *The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Potenciano Ilusorio *The husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan *A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to proceed. Lacson vs. Perez *The writ of habeas corpus is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion." The writ of habeas corpus is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Pulido vs. Abu *Filing of petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus is forum shopping. The ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping. Veluz vs. Villanueva * Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where restraint of liberty exists. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. A court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists.
Eden C. Brion
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo Writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner. The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. While the right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. OCA vs. Perello *Petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence as he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term. Martinez vs. Mendoza *The grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a person, but on his illegal detention. If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then it should be dismissed. Habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. When respondents stated that they have never had custody over the person who is the subject of the writ, the petition must be dismissed, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary. When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings. The law enforcement authorities are duty-bound to investigate it with due diligence and to locate the missing person. When the wrongdoing is attributable to the police agencies and/or their agents, the aggrieved may secure the assistance of the People’s Law Enforcement Board or the Commission on Human Rights. Salientes vs. Abanilla *The writ of habeas corpus does not grant custody but merely directs the person against whom it is issued to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. Private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age. In re Ashraf Kunting *The writ is not allowed if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, an also when the has already been charged before a court. The writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
Eden C. Brion
thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. CHANGE OF NAME AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES Eleosida vs. Local Civil Registrar of QC *The proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversary in nature. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Republic vs. Kho *The publication of the order of hearing cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established; provided, the parties avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. R.A. 9048 has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108. The publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. A petition for correction is an action in rem. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Kilosbayan vs. Ermita *Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108. From the records of the Court obtained when Ong applied for membership in the Bar, he is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order. A change in citizenship status is a substantial change. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Republic vs. Capote *The fact that no one opposed the petition did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The evidence presented sufficiently established that Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to participate therein. The fact that no one opposed the petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang *A person’s name cannot be changed for mere convenience.
Eden C. Brion
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. Petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. Ceruila vs. Delantar *In addition to publication, summons must still be served to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. No party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake. In addition to publication, summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. Republic vs. Bolante * As the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. Hearing was scheduled within the 4-month prohibited period. However, the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error, rescheduled the initial hearing for several times. Publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing. In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. The provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. During the initial hearing, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements. The Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. Silverio vs. Republic *A person may not successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery. A correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. A birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. The sex of a person is determined at birth. Republic of the Philippines vs. Jennifer B. Cagandahan
Eden C. Brion
*Respondent's mature decision to be a male on account of his unordinary congenital condition is a valid ground for the correction of his gender in the birth certificate. We give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state, and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
CHED vs. Dasig *The procedure under Rule 108 was not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates. The procedure under Rule 108 was not applicable to the students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of correcting or canceling entries in the civil registry. Hence, there is no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of attorney's fees and litigation expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either approve or disapprove the students' request to change entries in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates.
Eden C. Brion
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