Case Doctrines

CASE

DOCTRINE

1

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil 644 [machinery]

2

Standard Oil Co. v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil 681[contract]

1) Inscription in the chattel mortgage registry does not change the status of real property to chattel. When real property is sold to two or more buyers, the first to have it registered in the real property registry is the owner; where there is no entry, the first to take possession in good faith is the owner. 1) The register of deeds has no authority to determine the nature of a property, whether it be real or personal. They must only accept the proper fee and record the document in the book of records of chattel mortgages as their duty is purely of ministerial character. 2) Parties in a contract may treat as personal property that which by nature is real property.

3

Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390 [real as personal]

4

Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil 709 [mortgage]

5

Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil 512 [growing fruits]

[As an exception to the general rule that ungathered products are immovable property, for] the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, “ungathered products” have the nature of personal property.

6

Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800 [machinery]

1. Machineries are movable by nature. It will only become immovable when it is the owner who placed the machineries, receptables, instruments or implements, unless the person is duly authorized by the owner. 2.) Machineries not placed by the owner of an immovable are considered movable or personal properties

7

Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Co., 10 SCRA 68 [steel towers]

Steel towers are not real property. They do not fall under par 1 because they are not buildings not constructions adhered to the soil. They do not fall article 3 because as per description given by the lower court they are removable without having to break the material or causing deterioration to the object which they are attached to. Neither do they fall under par 5 for they are not machineries, receptacles, instruments, or implements, and even if they were they are not intended for industry or works on the land.

8

Manila Electric Co. v. CBAA Batangas, 114 SCRA 273 [oil storage tanks]

9

MERALCO Securities Industrial Corp. v. CBAA, BAA Laguna, 114 SCRA [pipeline]

Oil storage tanks are considered as personal property since they are not attached to the soil. However, for the purposes of taxation, personal property may be considered as real property. In this case, oil storage tanks are subject to realty taxes because they are classified as improvements. The pipeline system is an immovable property. It is a construction adhering to the soil. It is attached to the land in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling the steel pipes which were welded to form the pipeline.

10

U.S. v. Carlos, 21 Phil 553 [electricity]

Electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by electricians as a fluid, but its manifestation and effects, like those of gas, may be seen and felt. The true test of what can be stolen is not whether the subject is corporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner. Like gas, electricity is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by another. *(Paras, used electricity as an example of a deemed personal property under Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code)

11

PLDT v. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 14 [telephone service]

The Court ruled that international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services by PLDT are not personal properties that can be the subject of theft.

12

Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 [State property]

Municipal lands are owned by the State and are only held by the municipalities as a usufructuary right.

13

Republic v. Tri-Plus [reclassification]

91

1.) The classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the prerogative of the Executive Department. 2.) Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.

14

Manila International Airport Authority v. Pasay, 583 SCRA 234 [port]

1.) Term “ports x x x constructed by the State” in Art. 420 includes airports and seaports. 2.) Airport land and buildings are devoted to public use and are properties of public dominion. Hence, exempt from Real Property Tax under Sec 234 of LGC.

Corp.,

503

SCRA

Building is separate and distinct from land, thus a building is by itself immovable, and can be mortgaged apart from land. Such mortgage will still be a Real Estate Mortgage for building will still be considered immovable.

15

Chavez v. PEA-AMARI, 384 SCRA 152, 415 SCRA 403 [submerged lands]

16

Republic v. Parañaque, 677 SCRA 246 [reclaimed land]

17

Santos v. Moreno, 21 SCRA 1141 [canals]

18

Hilario v. City of Manila, 19 SCRA [river bed, river bank]

Under Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code, canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for private use must be of private ownership. 1.) The three elements of a river are it's bed, running waters and banks. In general, rivers are of public ownership so it follows that all its elements are also fall under the scope of public ownership.

19

Dacanay Jr. v. Asistio, 208 SCRA 404 [outside the commerce of man]

Property which are outside the commerce of man cannot be a subject of any lease of licenses. Public streets are outside the commerce of man. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract.

20

Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil 505 [prescription]

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for public uses. Such shores and lands are not susceptible of prescription, as they do not pertain to the commerce of men.

21

Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, 495 SCRA 591 [foreclosure]

The Airport Lands and Buildings of the MIAA cannot be the subject of foreclosure, encumbrance, or auction sale. It is part of public dominion ("ports" under Art. 420). Moreover, it is outside the commerce of men. UNLESS the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the ALBsfrom public use, the same remains as properties of public dominion andare INALIENABLE.

22

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [contract]

Under Art. 422 of the NCC, property of public domain when declared as no longer intended for public use becomes part of the patrimonal property of the state - which can be the subject of a contract

23

Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [embassy property]

1) A property will continue to be a public dominion until there is a formal declaration of the government to withdraw it from being such. 2) Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

24

Zamboanga Del Norte v. Zamboanga City, 22 SCRA 1334 [special law]

The classification of municipal property devoted for governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification.

25

Nazareno v. CA, 326 SCRA 338 [right of actual possessor]

A writ of possession on a building cannot be granted where judgment was rendered only as to the ownership of the land in question and not on the building placed on it.

26

Factoran v. CA, Judge Dayaw, 320 SCRA 393 [replevin] Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, 651 SCRA 414 [wrongful entry]

Replevin is not automatic upon the applicant’s filing of a bond and affidavit. If property in custodia legis cannot be subject of replevin Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

Fernandez v. Co, 625 SCRA 370 [physical possession]

Continuous physical possession passes on from predecessors-in-interest; The law protects possession de facto; Affidavit recognizing possession is binding

27

28

1.) Submerged and foreshore lands reclaimed by the gov't even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion. 2.) There must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. Reclaimed lands are reserved lands for public use. They are properties of public dominion. The ownership of such lands remain with the State unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential proclamation from public use

29

Rico v. Rufon, 525 SCRA 477 [in personam]

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. The former, being directed only against the plaintiffs and not against the whole world, requires actual notice of the scheduled hearing. The latter, on the other hand, being directed against the whole world, requires constructive notice.

30

Barrameda v. Gontang, 19 SCRA 387 [trespassing]

In provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner of the land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a person who has no right to enter from time to time, cut wood, or carry other products. The intermittent nature of such acts, and the probability of repetition in the future, makes the legal remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of the equitable remedy.

31

German Management Services v. CA, 177 SCRA 495 [better right of possession]

32

Pang-oden v. Leonen, 510 SCRA 93 [action to recover]

…the party who [files an action for recovery of real property] must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same

33

Aranda v. Republic, 656 SCRA 140 [claim of ownership]

Requisites of Claiming Ownership under PD 1529: 1.) Alienable and Disposable Property, 2.) Open, continuous, adverse, and public possession, in the concept of an owner, 3.) Bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier

34

Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393 [titles,tax declarations] Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu, 167 SCRA 615 [just compensation]

It was ruled that tax declaration is not a conclusive evidence of ownership against an original certificate of title.

36

PNB v. Marañon, 700 SCRA 297 [ rent]

Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession

37

Gaboya v. Cui, 38 SCRA 85 [same person]

Recourse to the rules of accession are totally unnecessary and inappropriate where the ownership of land and of the materials used to build theren are concentrated one one and the same person.

38

Pacific Farms v.Esguerra, 30 SCRA 684 [unpaid materials]

39

PNB v. De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557 [honest belief]

40

Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407 [2 or more parties]

On the premise that Pacific Farms is the owner, it has the obligation to pay CLC for the materials bought by Insular Farms Inc. However, since Pacific Farm was ruled to be an owner in bad faith, the SC granted it 30 days to exercise option of redeeming the six buildings upon payment to CLC of the sum due. One is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part of the builder. Nevertheless, the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership.

41

Depra v. Dumlao, 136 SCRA 415 [removal]

Owner of the land in good faith on which improvement was built by another in good faith is entitled to removal of improvement only after landowner has opted to sell the land and the builder refused to pay for the same

42

Vda. De Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 589 [accretion]

Requisites of an alienable alluvion: (1) the increase in soil must be gradual and imperceptible; (2) the increase must be caused by the current of the waters; and (3) the alluvion must be adjacent to the river banks or rivers or sea coasts.

43

City Mayor v. Ebio, 621 SCRA 555 [increase in area]

The owner of the land adjoining the banks of rivers also owns the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters (Art 457). Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. Moreover, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through prescription (acquisitive prescription).

35

P.D. 76 could only be used for determining just compensation in expropriation proceedings. In this case, P.D. 76 does not apply because the government did not exercise its power of eminent domain but instead opted to enter into a negotiable sale with the land owners. As such, just compensation should be based on the agreement of the parties and not on P.D. 76. Assuming arguendo, but not conceding, that the government did indeed exercise its power of eminent domain, P.D. 76 would still not apply considering that the SC declared it unconstitutional in a separate case.

44

Viajar v. CA, 168 SCRA 405 [reduced area]

1.) Presumption: change in the course of river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion 2.) Any accretions which the banks of the rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon. (Art. 457 NCC) 3.) Registration does not protect riparian owner

45

Baes v. CA, 224 SCRA 562 [change in course of river]

If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means.

46

Aguirre v. Pheng, 18 SCRA 18 [unjust enrichment]

As a general rule, the absolute owner of the property is entitled to all accessions thereto. However, where there is absence of bad faith or there is good faith on the one who made the improvements or accessions, the absolute owner should reimburse the value of the improvements made by the one in good faith.

47

Heirs of E. Diaz v. Virata, 498 SCRA 141 [invalid instrument]

The validity of Antero’s titles were upheld by the court and were not found to be tainted with defect. The collateral attack made by Enrique Diaz on Virata’s title over the disputed properties cannot be allowed. The attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. If the petitioners believed that that respondent’s title were spurious, they should have filed appropriate proceedings therefor. Antero’s certificates of title were issued as early as 1959. Well-established is the principle that the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. This rule refers to the date of the certificate of title. Absent any muniment of title issued prior to 1959 in favor of Enrique, et al. which could prove their ownership over the contested lots, the Court declares their claim over the properties as void.

48

Foster-Gallego v. Galang, 435 SCRA 275 [sole issue]

In an action for quieting of title, the sole issue is “whether or not there is a cloud on a title to real property because of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which on its face appears valid. Thus, issues on fraud or denial of due process which Foster-Gallego implores upon the court cannot be resolved in an action for quieting of title.

49

Mananguil v. Moico, 686 SCRA 123 [requisites]

The requisites for quieting of title to prosper: 1) Plaintiff/complainant has legal or equitable title to or interest in the subject real property, 2) The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to cast cloud on his title must be shown to. Proof of heirship alone is not suffice to prove equitable title or interest. Note: Legal title: denotes registered ownership and Equitable title: Beneficial ownership.

50

Pingol v. CA, 226 SCRA 118 [personality]

Since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that, actually, the action for conveyance is one to quiet title A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title. Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Rationale: Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. An owner of real property in possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a continuing menace to his title.

51

Solid State Multi-Products Corp. v CA, 196 SCRA 630 [Torrens Title]

1.) Acquisition of a friar land must be with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and not in compliance with the procedure mandated by is irregular and void. 2.) Even assuming that a purchaser was in good faith, the law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights.

52

Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp. v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327 [res and jurisdiction]

The remedy for Quieting of Title may be of declaratory relief if the plaintiff is able to establish ownership over the subject property

53

Baricuatro v. CA, 325 SCRA 137 [equity]

Ownership of an immovable property shall belong to the purchaser in good faith who registers it first in the registry of property.

54

Republic v. Mangotara, 624 SCRA 360 [declaratory relief]

In declaratory relief, the subject matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order, or ordinance. In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to be quieted.

55

Padre v. CA, 214 SCRA 446 [accion publiciana]

An action for quieting of title can be converted into a case of accion publiciana so that complete relief may be afforded to the parties. This arises when it is necessary to provisionally determine the ownership over the disputed area.

56

Rumarate v. Hernandez, 487 SCRA 317 [noninterference]

Action for quieting of title does not prescribe. Requisites for quieting of title:(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action;(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy

57

Cruz v. CA, 456 SCRA 165 [aliquot share]

Co-ownership is terminated upon judicial or extra-judicial partition of the properties owned in common. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

58

Diversified Credit Corp. v. Rosado, 26 SCRA 470 [specific portion]

Civil Code provides that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until the partition thereof.

59

Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil 320 [occupancy]

The sale is valid only with respect to his 1/22 share. The lone seller can be sued, not because he is a co-owner, but because he had acted as if her were the exclusive owner

60

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, [marriage]

The words “married to” are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner and does not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no ownership under Art.148.

61

Navarro v. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1 [recovery]

62

Sering v. Plazo, 166 SCRA 85 [attorney-in-fact]

63

Aguilar v. CA, 227 SCRA 472 [action to compel sale]

64

Arambulo v. Nolasco, 720 SCRA 95 [alienation]

Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefor alienate, assign, or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Jurisprudence (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals) also supported this by ruling that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale.

65

Bailon-Casilao v. CA, 160 SCRA 138 [sale]

A sale by one of the co-owners of the entire property is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property

66

Del Banco v. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [judicial decree]

A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court… adjudicate to himself in fee simple (sic) a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners. Also, when SC uses the word 'partition', it may be in its metaphysical or ideal sense (interests or shares), not in its physical sense (demarcating determinate parts).

700 SCRA 702

Any one of the co-owners may file an action for recovery (of either movable or immovable property); Note - All property acquired during the marriage is presumed conjugal, and conjugal property follows the rules on partnership; Partners are deemed coowners. Under Art. 487, any one of the co-owners may file an ejectment suit without the necessity of including the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs. The provision covers all kinds of actions for recovery such as forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, accion reivindicatoria, quieting of title, and replevin. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. However, when the thing is indivisible, adn the co-owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and proceeds accordingly distributed.

67

Pangan v. CA, 166 SCRA 375 [repudiation]

š Gen Rule: As long as co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition is imprescriptible and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor or any of the co-owners š Exception: For prescription to arise, there must be a clear showing of repudiation [or adverse possession] and other co-owners to be advised of the exclusive claim to the property in question š Requisites of Adverse Possession: (1) Trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust (beneficiary of the estate held in trust), (2) Such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust, (3) Evidence should be clear and convincing

68

Rizal v. Naredo, 668 SCRA 114 [technical description]

When different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet TECHNICALLY DESCRIBED, the ownership ceases.

69

Sunset View Condominium v. Campos, 104 SCRA 84 [stockholder]

70

Limson v. Wack Wack Condominium, 14 Feb 2011 [common area]

(1) the buyer of a unit in a condominium acquires ownership over the unit only after he has paid in full its purchase price. (2) the ownership of a condominium unit is the "separate interest" of the owner which makes him automatically a shareholder in the condominium The electrical main panel is considered as part of the common area and is therefore Wack Wack Condominium's responsibility to maintain. Utilities are considered part of the common area even if found within the unit itself.

71

Twin Towers v. CA 27 Feb 2003 [non-payment of dues]

Condominium Act, petitioner’s By-Laws and Master Deed expressly empower petitioner to promulgate House Rule 26.3 (denies use of facilities upon defaulting on obligation to pay association dues.) Only condominium facilities; does not extend to other matters such as: restriction on water/electricity use, access to unit, etc.

72

Far East Bank & Trust Co. v. Marquez, 465 Phil 276 (2004) [HLURB]

Under PD 957, the mortgage of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit is void, if executed by a property developer without the prior written approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). That an encumbrance has been constituted over an entire property, of which the subject lot or unit is merely a part, does not affect the invalidity of the lien over the specific portion at issue.

73

PNB v. Parayno and Puerto Azul, 30 Jan 2013 [PD 957]

The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to the intent of P.D. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB.

74

Lovina et al, v. Moreno, 9 SCRA 557 [water code]

75

Bulao v. CA, 218 SCRA 321 [water ditches]

Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works. It merely empowers the secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession to the intent of P.D. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of

76

Atok Big Wedge Mining Co. v. IAC, Tuktukan Saingan, 261 SCRA 538 [mining]

The process of recording mining claims could not have been intended to be classify lands into mineral lands. The recording is only done to reserve to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the land subject of the claim. The power to classify lands into mineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who records a mining claim. Remember, PB 1902 mandates mining claimants to comply with annual work requirements. (Please check ppt for complete discussion of history of mining laws)

77 78

Pendot v. CA, 172 SCRA 20 [squatters] Del Rosa v. Carlos, 414 SCRA 226 [forcible entry]

projects sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB. 1.) Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession. 2.) Forcible entry involves only questions of physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership of the property.

79

Duran v. IAC, 128 SCRA 489 [innocent third persons]

Mortgagees, in this case, relied on the validity of the title believing that it had no infirmity. Therefore, mortgagees are purchaser in good faith and as such they gain title over the property after its foreclosure. As a rule, a possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing possessed.

80

Maneclang v. Baun, 208 SCRA 179 [filing of case]

81

Buayan Cattle v. Quintillan, 128 SCRA 270 [

82

Acebedo v. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 186 [heirs]

83

Llobrera v. Fernandez, 488 SCRA 509 [tolerance]

A person occupying another person's property by mere tolerance or possession, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the property upon demand.

84

Perez v. Mendoza, 65 SCRA 480 [prior possession]

85

Masallo v. Cesar, 39 Phil 134 [wrongful seizure]

(1) Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Art. 433). (2) In case of conflicting claims of possession, the present possessor is to be preferred (Art. 538). A plaintiff in an action for ejectment cannot succeed if it is show that the defendant has prior lawful possession

86

Aznar v. Yapdiangco, [irrevindicability]

13

SCRA

486

Since good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof, it was incumbent upon the administrator to establish such proof. However, Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that: Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The filing of a case alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good faith. Therefore, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan became a possessor in bad faith because from that moment, it became aware that it possesses the thing improperly and wrongfully. Usurpation is not a valid method of acquiring possession. By virtue of Art. 536 , De Las Marias should have sought the aid of the court if he believed that he has a right to deprive Buayan Cattle of its property, not take it by force which he has done in this case. Heirs acquire possession upon the death of the decedent. In accordance with NCC 533 and NCC 493, heirs are allowed to dispose of their ideal share in a property under administration. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption. The sale by the heirs was valid as they have valid possession and was able to get the approval of the court for the sale.

General Rule of Irrevindicability (Art 559) – Possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. No further proof is necessary. HOWEVER, Art. 559 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicability, to wit: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. If third person acquires property in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Hence, if the owner has lost the thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or robber.