Case Digests.pdf

Ernesto Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute G.R. No. 106483, May 22 1995 Facts: Petitioner was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, that it enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. However, the NLRC set aside such, and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this petition. Issue/s: a) Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute, which arose from an employer-employee relationship. Held: a) No, IRRI did not waived its immunity. IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 which provides that it shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. Its immunity is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity. Petition dismissed. The Holy See vs. Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, et al. G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994 Facts: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). Respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the land and damages against the petitioner, as represented by the Papal Nuncio and other defendants. Petitioner answered, saying that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. Respondent contended that the petitioner shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question. Issue: a) Whether the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit from its act of entering into a contractual relations centering on the sale of lot to a private person. Held:

a) Yes, Holy See is immune from suit in the case at hand. As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the country has adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. The Holy See is immune from suit. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. Calalang Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality. Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all people. It is neither communism, despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands Digested MERITT vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 34 Phil 311 FACTS:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, when an ambulance of

the General Hospital struck the plaintiff in an intersection. By reason of the resulting collusion, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain had suffered material injury.

Upon recovery the doctor noticed that the plaintiff’s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The damages that the plaintiff got from the collision disabled him to do this work as a contractor and forced him to give up contracts he recently had.

As the negligence which cause the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. The Philippine Legislature made an Act (Act No. 2457) that authorizes the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

RULING: No, the Government is not legally-liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. It being quiet clear that Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not previously recognized.That according to paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the May 18, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law – Government Agency, Proprietary Functions) FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver. HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees. Fontanilla v. Maliaman G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045 February 27, 1991 Facts: The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. Issue: whether NIA is performing governmental functions and is thus exempt form suit for damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its special agent Held: No. The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The functions of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society. The NIA was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.” Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE 18 SCRA 1120 FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the CustomsArrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of theshipment.Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amountof P18,493.37 plus other damages.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law,defendants cannot be sued.Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants can invoke state immunity. HELD: Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the Department of Finance, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end.