case digests on special proceedings

MARINDUQUE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 161219 October 6, 2008 Facts: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners for the construction of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project. Petitioners opposed contending that the expropriation would render the remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for whatever purpose. The trial court, in its decision, determined NAPOCOR’s authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated. And on its supplemental decision, ruled that petitioners are entitled to consequential damages because NAPOCOR’s expropriation impaired the value of the remaining area and deprived petitioners of the ordinary use of their property. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for being moot and academic because a Notice of Appeal was also filed by the latter on the trial court’s supplemental decision. The corresponding writ of execution was ordered thereon. Hence, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. NAPOCOR argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it denied NAPOCOR’s notice of appeal of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision on the sole ground that it was not filed and served personally. Petitioner, on the other hand, moved for its dismissal because NAPOCOR failed to file a record on appeal. Issue: WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in special proceedings. Held: No. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules of Court so require. The reason for multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial court. In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the complaint for expropriation, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal.

ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES vs LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and ANTONIO J. HENSON G.R. No. 159130 August 22, 2008 Facts: Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the RTC of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby’s petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted with “unconscionable bad faith” in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix. An Interim Special Administrator of the estate was appointed, however, Ferro, declined the appointment. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate. The court ordered the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to immediately conduct an audit of the administration, and suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate. A Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus was filed by the respondents to CA. The petition assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment. Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari, the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones’ commission. They subsequently filed their record on appeal. The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on the ground of forum shopping. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in assailing the commission of executor. Held: No. From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator’s commission is no less a claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for “Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.” Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate “is appealable as in ordinary cases.” Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special Administrator’s commission – effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the estate – is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA vs PETRONIO L. BENEMERITO G.R. No. 146963 March 15, 2004 Facts: Petronio L. Benemerito, filed a verified petition before the RTC of Nueva Ecija asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito. The entries sought to be corrected included change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L. Benemerito and the date of marriage of Joven Lee’s parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio L. Benemerito appearing therein. Joven Lee Benemerito was born when Petronilo and Edna had been living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. The respondent testified that his name was erroneously recorded in the birth certificate of his son as Peter Laurente Benemerito instead of his correct name Petronio Laurente Benemerito, and that the date of his marriage with Edna V. Sicat appearing in the birth certificate of Joven Lee as 01 September 1989 instead of 25 January 1998. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals contending that the petition should not have been granted since substantial changes, such as the date of marriage of parents, name of the father, or filiation of the child and whether legitimate or illegitimate, could only be threshed out in adversarial proceedings. Issue: WON change of fathers name and date of marriage is considered substantial changes which could only be threshed out in adversarial proceedings. Held: Yes. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certificate of birth, to 25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the status of the child, Joven Lee, born on 01 June 1990 at a time when he and his wife were not as yet legally married, from being the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being instead the legitimated child of Petronio L. Benemerito. These changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito, which can possibly affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both respondent and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary. Hence, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court should apply, which provides that interested parties may avail themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding to correct substantial errors and to establish the true facts in the civil registry. A case does not amount to an adversarial proceeding simply because an opportunity to contest the petition is afforded by the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs PRYCE GASES, INC., INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, and NEDERLANDSE FINANCIERINGS-MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSLANDEN N.V. G.R. No. 188365 June 29, 2011 Facts: The International Finance Corporation and the Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with the RTC of Makati due to the failure of Pryce Gases, Inc. to service its debts as well as the refusal of PGI’s parent company, the Pryce Corporation, to provide financial support to PGI. IFC and FMO proposed a financial restructuring that called for the conversion of dollar-denominated loans to peso and the splitting of the whole debt instrument into two categories. The court gave due course to the petition and appointed Mr. Gener Mendoza as Rehabilitation Receiver and directed him to submit his evaluation, study and recommendation on the proposed rehabilitation of PGI. The rehabilitation plan was approved, however, Bangko Sentral filed a Notice of Appeal. PGI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that BFB failed to perfect the appeal because of failure to file the record on appeal within the required period. The case was then dismissed. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON filing of a notice of appeal without the required record on appeal would suffice. Held: Yes. Section 5 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides that the review of any order or decision of the court or an appeal therefrom shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court. Under A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, a petition for corporate rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding. Thus, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19(b) of the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 for special proceedings shall apply, that is, the period of appeal shall be 30 days since a record of appeal is required. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. In this case, BFB did not perfect the appeal when it failed to file the record on appeal. The filing of the notice of appeal was not sufficient because at the time of its filing, the Rules required the filing of the record on appeal and not merely a notice of appeal. The issuance by the Court of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC providing that all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, to be filed within 15 days from notice of the decision or final order of the Regional Trial Court, did not change the fact that BFB’s appeal was not perfected. Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. The party who seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. While the Court, in certain cases, applies the policy of liberal construction, it may be invoked only in situations where there is some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but not where its application subverts the essence of the proceeding or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009 Facts: The RTC of Pasig issued an order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner LiwaywayVinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Later on, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration to the Order granting letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity. Subsequently, Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the RTC and filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato. The Motion for reconsideration of Republic and Imelda was both denied. Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. The Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA which was denied later on. Hence, a motion for reconsideration was filed to SC. Issue: WON petition for certiorari was proper. Held: No. Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, which was then in effect provides that, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorarias the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as provided in the pertinent portions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the "issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case."

REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES vs NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA, G.R. No. 186053November 15, 2010 Facts: Nisaida was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina. Her father later died and so her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother’s second husband, “Hakamada.” Later on, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name “NisaidaSumeraNishina”. Hence, she filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. After hearing the petition, RTC granted respondent’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos “to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada issued in 1993 and to change particularly the surname of respondent from Nishina to Watanabe.A copy of the Order was received on by the OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Issue: WON filing of a record on appeal is necessary in this case. Held: No. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. It contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

CARLOS T. GO, SR. vs LUIS T. RAMOS G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009 Facts: Luis T. Ramos filed a complaint-affidavit for deportation before the Bureau of Immigration against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Respondent presented the birth certificate of Jimmy issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis averred that, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. He alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Later on, a Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by Jimmy. Meanwhile, Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. Hence, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.In an Order, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court. Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus is proper. Held: No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.