Case digests on liberty of abode and travel

1 Villavicencio v. Lukban Villavicencio v. Lukban The mayor of the City of Manila ordered the closure of prostitution houses found in his municipality and had the prostituted women deported to Davao. Facts: 1.

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Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the City of Manila, “ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.” From October 16 to 25, 1918, 170 women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. During said period, the city authorities, with some arrangements with the Bureau of Labor, planned to send the women to Davao as laborers. On the midnight of October 25, the police and Lukban went to the houses and hustled the 170 prostituted women into patrol wagons and placed them aboard the steams Corregidor and Negros. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation and had no knowledge that they were being sent to Mindanao. Moreover, the women were not asked whether they wanted to leave Manila and live in Davao. The vessels reached Davao on October 29. The women were received by the provincial governor, Francisco Sales and by haciendero Feliciano Yñigo.

Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro Acting through Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro directed the Manguines to permanently settle in the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan. Rubi, one of the Manguines subject to said measure, and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and were liable to be punished in accordance with Section 2759 of Administrative Code. Facts: 1.

2. Ruling: 1.

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Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. But one can search in vain for any law, order or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands – and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens – to change domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the US, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express.

Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc

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The provincial governor of Mindoro, Juan Morente, Jr., chose the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan as the place most convenient for the Manguianes (Mangyanes) to live and permanently settle. It is 800 hectares of public land. The action of the provincial governor is anchored on Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Said provision states that provincial governor of any province where nonChristian inhabitants may be found is authorized to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. The site is to be selected by the provincial governor, to be approved by the provincial board and by the Department Head. The governor’s choice was approved by the provincial board on February 1, 1917, through Resolution No. 25, and further by the Secretary of Interior 20 days later. Pursuant to this, the provincial governor issued executive order no. 2 on December 4, which directed all the Mangyans in the towns of Naujan and Pola, Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi’s place in Calapan to permanently settle on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake not later than December 31, 1917. The executive order likewise stated that those Mangyans who refused to comply were to be imprisoned for not more than 60 days upon conviction, in accordance with Section 2759, Administrative Code. Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao. They have questioned Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The Manguianes are very low in nature. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people and numbered approximately 15,000. They have shown no desire for community life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government.

Ruling: 1.

Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to

2 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon

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exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator. Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by a lawful calling, among others. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one’s employment, right to labor, and the right of locomotion. In general, liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men. To hold Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 would leave people weak and defenseless. However, considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that the due process of law has not been followed. To go back to the definition of due process of law and equal protection of law, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of law. Said section is constitutional. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Thus, habeas corpus cannot issue.

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Kant Kwong v. PCGG Petitioners were prevented to leave the country due to hold-orders issued against them by the PCGG. According to PCGG, the petitioners, who are foreign nationals, are representatives of the Hong Kong-Chinese investors of two domestic garment corporations, whose 67% of shareholdings were owned by the Marcoses. Facts: 1.

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3. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon DOLE had issued Department Order No. 1 which enumerated guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. Petitioner contended that, among other reasons, violated the right to travel.

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The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988 which provided for the guidelines governing the temporary suspension of deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers. According to petitioner, a firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas employment, the said measure discriminated males or females, did not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and violated the right to travel. 2.

Ruling: 1.

The police power of the State constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties.

Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc

Petitioners are foreign nationals who are representatives of the Hong Kong-Chinese investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation (domestic garment corporations). The said firms were ordered segregated by the PCGG with the belief that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to control 67% of the firms’ shareholdings. For the aforementioned belief, the PCGG issued hold-orders against petitioners on February 12, 1987. Petitioners prayed that the said hold-orders be lifted. However, said motion was not calendared for hearing and was later denied the Motion to Lift in an Order. On September 24, 1987, Yim Kang Shing, one of the petitioners, wishing to undergo medical treatment, was allowed to leave.

Ruling:

Facts: 1.

The consequence of the deployment ban on the right to travel does not impair the right. Said right is subject to the requirements of “public safety as may be provided by law.” The right to travel is not absolute. As a matter of fact, Department Order No. 1 afforded protection of labor.

Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, created the PCGG and principally tasked the said commission to recover all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family relative, subordinates and close associates, whether in the Philippines or abroad. The PCGG, in its rules and regulations pursuant to Section 3(h) of same EO, may issue writs of sequestration and freeze and/or hold orders in order for the commission to accomplish its task of recovering ill-gotten wealth. According to the same Rules and Regulations of PCGG, a holdorder is an order to temporarily prevent a person from leaving the country where his departure will prejudice, hamper or otherwise obstruct the task of the Commission in the enforcement of EO 1 and 2, because such person is known or suspected to be involved in the properties or transactions covered by said EOs. Petitioners’ right to travel has been impaired. For one, the validity of the holdorders issued against petitioners had already expired pursuant to the Rules and Regulations of the PCGG. A “hold-order,” as defined in PCGG’s Rules and Regulations, is valid only for a maximum period of 6 months, unless for good reasons extended by the Commission en banc. The PCGG has not extended the

3 Marcos v. Manglapus

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lifespan of the hold-orders in question nor has it advanced good reasons for doing so. Second, the grounds for the issuance of the hold-orders have become stale. There were changes made and accomplishments achieved to that effect.

Marcos v. Manglapus The Marcoses wanted to return to the Philippines three years after they had fled to Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino, however, barred their return due to interests of safety and tranquillity and order of the State and society.

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The Marcoses, who fled to Hawaii in 1986, wanted to be return to the country. Thirteen days after the SC dismissed the petition, then-President Marcos died on September 28, 1989. In a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on October 2, 1989, the petitioners contended that “to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;” “the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country;” and “there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.”

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Ruling: 2. 1.

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Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 20(4) of the Revised Securities Act, but was able to post bail for his provisional liberty. More than 2 years after the filing of the information (January 26, 1988), respondent People of the Philippines filed an urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a holddeparture order against petitioner who travelled abroad several times without necessary Court approval, The RTC issued an order directing the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport or deny his application, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent petitioner from leaving the country.

Ruling:

Facts: 1.

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The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court’s decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his/her oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

Silverio v. CA Petitioner was charged for violating Section 20(4) of the Revised Securities Act but was able to post bail. More than 2 years later, petitioner’s passport was cancelled and prevented him from reapplying after RTC’s order to DFA.

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Salonga v. Hermoso Salonga’s certificate of eligibility to travel was not issued by the Travel Processing Center. However, said ban on international travel was lifted by President Marcos.

Facts: Facts:

Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under provision which reads that “*t+he liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired” (Article III, Section 1(4)). The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel which reads “*t*he liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health” (Article IV, Section 5). The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into 2 distinct sentences and treats them differently under “*t+he liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law” (Section 6). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of “national security, public safety or public health” and “as may be provided by law,” a limitive phrase which does not appear in the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party. Said provision should by no means should be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

4 Manotoc v. CA 1. 2.

Salonga was not issued a certificate of eligibility to travel by the Travel Processing Center. On August 21, 1977, President Marcos lifted the ban on international travel during his keynote address in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through law Day.

Ruling: 1.

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The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In case of doubt of the Officer-in-charge of the Travel Processing Center the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any responsible for any delay.

Manotoc v. CA Petitioner was charged for estafa by six clients of his Manotor Securities, Inc. Wanting to go to the US, petitioner applied for a motion for permission to leave the country. But, it was denied. Facts: 1.

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Ricardo Manotoc Jr. appointed a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc. but also for Trans-Insular Management, Inc., after petitioner came home from the US following the “run” on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria’s flight from this jurisdiction. He filed this petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Pending disposition, SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect. When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner (President) and Raul Leveriza (vice-President) for estafa. Petitioner, wanting to go to the US, filed a motion for permission to leave the country. It was denied. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the SEC which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Ruling: 1.

A court has power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond for he needs to appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed

Case Digests: Liberty of Abode and Travel • Mark Justin Mooc

upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.