Case Digests Long Cases

ESTATE OF MOTA VS. SERRA Case Digest ESTATE OF MOTA VS. SERRA 47 PHIL. 464 FACTS: On February 1, 1919, plaintiffs and defendant entered into a contract of partner ship, for the construction and exploitation of a railroad line from the "San Isidro" and "Palma" centrals to the place known as "Nandong." The original capital stipulated was P150, 000. It was covenanted that the parties should pay this amount in equal parts and the plaintiffs were entrusted with the administration of the partnership. The agreed capital of P150,000, however, did not prove sufficient, as the expenses up to May 15, 1920, had reached the amount of P226,092.92, presented by the administrator and O.K.'d by the defendant. January 29, 1920, the defendant entered into a contract of sale with Venancio Concepcion, Phil. C. Whitaker, and Eusebio R. de Luzuriaga, whereby he sold to the latter the estate and central known as "Palma" with its running business, as well as all the improvements, machineries and buildings, real and personal properties, rights, choices in action and interests, including the sugar plantation of the harvest year of 1920 to 1921, covering all the property of the vendor. This contract was executed before a notary public of Iloilo. Before the delivery to the purchasers of the hacienda thus sold, Eusebio R. de Luzuriaga renounced all his rights under the contract of January 29, 1920, in favor of Messrs. Venancio Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker. This gave rise to the fact that on July 17, 1920, Venancio Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker and the herein defendant executed before Mr. Antonio Sanz, a notary public in and for the City of Manila, another deed of absolute sale of the said "Palma" Estate for the amount of P1,695,961.90, of which the vendor received at the time of executing the deed the amount of P945,861.90, and the balance was payable by installments in the form and manner stipulated in the contract. The purchasers guaranteed the unpaid balance of the purchase price by a first and special mortgage in favor of the vendor upon the hacienda and the central with all the improvements, buildings, machineries, and appurtenances then existing on the said hacienda.

Afterwards, on January 8, 1921, Venancio Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker bought from the plaintiffs the one-half of the railroad line pertaining to the latter, executing therefore the document. The price of this sale was P237,722.15, excluding any amount which the defendant might be owing to the plaintiffs. Of the purchase price, Venancio Concepcion and Phil. C. Whitaker paid the sum of P47,544.43 only. In the Deed, the plaintiffs and Concepcion and Whitaker agreed, among other things, that the partnership "Palma" and "San Isidro," formed by the agreement of February 1, 1919, between Serra, Lazaro Mota, now deceased, and Juan J. Vidaurrazaga for himself and in behalf of his brother, Felix and Dionisio Vidaurrazaga, should be dissolved upon the execution of this contract, and that the said partnership agreement should be totally cancelled and of no force and effect whatever. Since the defendant Salvador Serra failed to pay one-half of the amount expended by the plaintiffs upon the construction of the railroad line, that is, P113,046.46, as well as Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion, the plaintiffs instituted the present action praying: 1) that the deed of February 1, 1919, be declared valid and binding; 2) that after the execution of the said document the defendant improved economically so as to be able to pay the plaintiffs the amount owed, but that he refused to pay either in part or in whole the said amount notwithstanding the several demands made on him for the purpose; and 3) that the defendant be sentenced to pay plaintiffs the aforesaid sum of P113, 046.46, with the stipulated interest at 10 per cent per annum beginning June 4, 1920, until full payment thereof, with the costs of the present action. Defendant set up three special defenses: 1) the novation of the contract by the substitution of the debtor with the conformity of the creditors; 2) the confusion of the rights of the creditor and debtor; and 3) the extinguishment of the contract. The court a quo in its decision held that there was a novation of the contract by the substitution of the debtor, and therefore absolved the defendant from the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. With regard to the prayer that the said contract be declared valid and binding, the court held that there was no way of reviving the

contract which the parties themselves in interest had spontaneously and voluntarily extinguished. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not there was a novation of the contract by the substitution of the debtor with the consent of the creditor, as required by Article 1205 of the Civil Code; and 2. Whether or not there was a merger of rights of debtor and creditor under Article 1192 of the Civil Code. RULING: 1. NO, there was no novation of the contract. It should be noted that in order to give novation its legal effect, the law requires that the creditor should consent to the substitution of a new debtor. This consent must be given expressly for the reason that, since novation extinguishes the personality of the first debtor who is to be substituted by new one, it implies on the part of the creditor a waiver of the right that he had before the novation which waiver must be express under the principle that renuntiatio non praesumitur, recognized by the law in declaring that a waiver of right may not be performed unless the will to waive is indisputably shown by him who holds the right. The fact that Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion were willing to assume the defendant's obligation to the plaintiffs is of no avail, if the latter have not expressly consented to the substitution of the first debtor. As has been said, in all contracts of novation consisting in the change of the debtor, the consent of the creditor is indispensable, pursuant to Article 1205 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Novation which consists in the substitution of a new debtor in the place of the original one may be made without the knowledge of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. 2. NO, there was no merger of Rights. Another defense urged by the defendant is the merger of the rights of debtor and creditor, whereby under Article 1192 of the Civil Code, the obligation, the fulfillment of which is demanded in the complaint, became extinguished. It is maintained in appellee's brief that the debt of the defendant was transferred to Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion by the document. These in turn acquired the credit of the plaintiffs by virtue of the debt; thus, the rights of the debtor and creditor were merged in one person. The argument would at first seem to be incontrovertible, but if we bear

in mind that the rights and titles which the plaintiffs sold to Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion refer only to one-half of the railroad line in question, it will be seen that the credit which they had against the defendant for the amount of one-half of the cost of construction of the said line was not included in the sale. That the plaintiffs sold their rights and titles over one-half of the line. The purchasers, Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion, to secure the payment of the price, executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs on the same rights and titles that they had bought and also upon what they had purchased from Mr. Salvador Serra. In other words, Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion mortgaged unto the plaintiffs what they had bought from the plaintiffs and also what they had bought from Salvador Serra. If Messrs. Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion had purchased something from Mr. Salvador Serra, the herein defendant, regarding the railroad line, it was undoubtedly the one-half thereof pertaining to Mr. Salvador Serra. This clearly shows that the rights and titles transferred by the plaintiffs to Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion were only those they had over the other half of the railroad line. Therefore, as already stated, since there was no novation of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant, as regards the obligation of the latter to pay the former one-half of the cost of the construction of the said railroad line, and since the plaintiffs did not include in the sale, the credit that they had against the defendant, the allegation that the obligation of the defendant became extinguished by the merger of the rights of creditor and debtor by the purchase of Messrs. Phil. C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion is wholly untenable. *************************************** Antonio C. Goquilay vs. Washington Z. Sycip, ET AL. FACTS: Tan Sin An and Goquiolay entered into a general commercial partnership under the partnership name "Tan Sin An and Antonio Goquiolay" for the purpose of dealing in real estate. The agreement lodged upon Tan Sin An the sole management of the partnership affairs. The lifetime of the partnership was fixed at ten years and the Articles of Co-partnership stipulated that in the event of death of any of the

partners before the expiration of the term, the partnership will not be dissolved but will be continued by the heirs or assigns of the deceased partner. But the partnership could be dissolved upon mutual agreement in writing of the partners. Goquiolay executed a GPA in favor of Tan Sin An. The plaintiff partnership purchased 3 parcels of land which was mortgaged to "La Urbana" as payment of P25,000. Another 46 parcels of land were purchased by Tan Sin An in his individual capacity which he assumed payment of a mortgage debt for P35K. A downpayment and the amortization were advanced by Yutivo and Co. The two obligations were consolidated in an instrument executed by the partnership and Tan Sin An, whereby the entire 49 lots were mortgaged in favor of "Banco Hipotecario"?Tan Sin An died leaving his widow, Kong Chai Pin and four minor children. The widow subsequently became the administratrix of the estate. Repeated demands were made by Banco Hipotecario on the partnership and on Tan Sin An. ?Defendant Sing Yee, upon request of defendant Yutivo Sons , paid the remaining balance of the mortgage debt, the mortgage was cancelled Yutivo Sons and Sing Yee filed their claim in the intestate proceedings of Tan Sin An for advances, interest and taxes paid in amortizing and discharging their obligations to "La Urbana" and "Banco Hipotecario" Kong Chai Pin filed a petition with the probate court for authority to sell all the 49 parcels of land. She then sold it to Sycip and Lee in consideration of P37K and of the vendees assuming payment of the claims filed by Yutivo Sons and Sing Yee. Later, Sycip and Lee executed in favor of Insular Development a deed of transfer covering the 49 parcels of land.?When Goquiolay learned about the sale to Sycip and Lee, he filed a petition in the intestate proceedings to set aside the order of the probate court approving the sale in so far as his interest over the parcels of land sold was concerned. Probate court annulled the sale executed by the administratrix w/ respect to the 60% interest of Goquiolay over the properties Administratrix appealed.?The decision of probate court was set

aside for failure to include the indispensable parties. New pleadings were filed The second amended complaint prays for the annulment of the sale in favor of Sycip and Lee and their subsequent conveyance to Insular Development. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court hence this appeal.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS: The plaintiffs in their complaint challenged the authority of Kong Chai Pin to sell the partnership properties on the ground that she had no authority to sell because even granting that she became a partner upon the death of Tan Sin An the power of attorney granted in favor of the latter expired after his death.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS: The defendant's defended the validity of the sale on the theory that she succeeded to all the rights and prerogatives of Tan Sin An as managing partner.

DECISIONS OF -LOWER COURT: The trial court sustained the validity of the sale on the ground that under the provisions of the articles of partnership allowing the heirs of the deceased partner to represent him in the partnership after his death Kong Chai Pin became a managing partner, this being the capacity held by Tan Sin An when he died. CA:

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a widow or substitute become also a general partner or only a limited partner. Whether or not the lower court err in holding that the widow succeeded her husband Tan Sin An in the sole management of the partnership upon Tan's death

Whether or not the consent of the other partners was necessary to perfect the sale of the partnership properties to Sycip and Lee?

HELD: Kong Chai Pin became a mere general partner. By seeking authority to manage partnership property, Tan Sin An's widow showed that she desired to be considered a general partner. By authorizing the widow to manage partnership property (which a limited partner could not be authorized to do), Goqulay recognized her as such partner, and is now in estoppel to deny her position as a general partner, with authority to administer and alienate partnership property. The articles did not provide that the heirs of the deceased would be merely limited partners; on the contrary, they expressly stipulated that in case of death of either partner, "the co partnership will have to be continued" with the heirs or assignees. It certainly could not be continued if it were to be converted from a general partnership into a limited partnership since the difference between the two kinds of associations is fundamental, and specially because the conversion into a limited association would leave the heirs of the deceased partner without a share in the management. Hence, the contractual stipulation actually contemplated that the heirs would become general partners rather than limited ones.

Separate Opinion: Justice Angelo Bautista The court affirmed the decision but on different grounds, among which are: (1) there is no sufficient factual basis to conclude that Kong Chai Pin executed acts of management to give her the character of general manager of the partnership, or to serve as basis for estoppel that may benefit the purchasers of the partnership properties; (2) the alleged acts of management, even if proven, could not give Kong Chai Pin the character of general manager for the same is contrary to law and well- known authorities; (3) even if Kong Chai Pin acted as general manager she has no authority to sell the partnership properties as to make it legal and valid; and (4) Kong Chai Pin had no necessity to sell the properties to pay the obligation of the partnership and if she did so it was merely to favor the purchasers who were close relatives to the prejudice of Goquiolay. The sale of the partnership properties by Kong Chai Pin cannot be upheld on the ground of estoppel, first, because the alleged acts of management have not been clearly proven. Moreover, mere acceptance of the inheritance

does not make the heir of a general partner a general partner himself. He emphasized that heir must declare that he is entering the partnership as a general partner unless the deceased partner has made it an express condition in his will that the heir accepts the condition of entering the partnership as a prerequisite of inheritance, in which case acceptance of the inheritance is enough. But here Tan Sin An died intestate. Kong Chai Pin cannot be deemed to have declared her intention to become a general partner by exercising acts of management because as a general rule the heirs of a deceased partner succeed as limited partners only by operation of law, it is obvious that the heir, upon entering the partnership, must make a declaration of his character, otherwise he should be deemed as having succeeded as limited partner by the mere acceptance of the inheritance. And here Kong Chai Pin did not make such declaration. Being then a limited partner upon the death of Tan Sin An by operation of law, the peremptory prohibition contained in Article 148 of the Code of Commerce became binding upon her and as a result she could not change her status by violating its provisions not only under the general principle that prohibited acts cannot produce any legal effect, but also because under the provisions of Article 147 of the same Code she was precluded from acquiring more rights than those pertaining to her as a limited partner. The alleged acts of management, therefore, did not give Kong Chai Pin the character of general manager to authorize her to bind the partnership. Kong Chain Pin could not sell the partnership properties without authority from the other partners. the relationship between a managing partner and the partnership is substantially the same as that of the agent and his principal, the extent of the power of Kong Chai Pin must, therefore, be determined under the general principles governing agency. And, on this point, the law says that an agency created in general terms includes only acts of administration, but with regard to the power to compromise, sell mortgage, and other acts of strict ownership, an express power of attorney is required. Here Kong Chai Pin did not have such power when she told the properties of the partnership. Since Kong Chai Pin sold the partnership properties not in line with the business of the partnership but to pay its obligation without first obtaining the consent of the other partners the sale is invalid being in excess of her authority.

Upon the strength of the foregoing considerations, the court grant the motion for reconsideration. ******************************************************* Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill G.R. No. L-27343. February 28, 1979

than P2,000.00 and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the case

Facts:

Held:

Petitioners filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against Respondents a complaint praying for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Sheriff from proceeding with the sales at public auction, and to declare null and void the Chattel Mortgage executed by defendants in favor of defendant Saldajeno, being in fraud of creditors of the defendant partnership. Defendants Leon Garibay, Margarita G. Saldejeno, and Timoteo Tubungbanua had entered into a Contract of Partnership under the firm name "Isabela Sawmill”. Civil Case No. 4797 was filed by the spouses Cecilio Saldajeno and Margarita G. Saldajeno against the Isabela Sawmill, Leon Garibay, and Timoteo Tubungbanua. The same defendants executed a document entitled "Assignment of Rights with Chattel Mortgage". Thereafter, the defendants Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua did not divide the assets and properties of the "Isabela Sawmill" between them, despite the withdrawal of defendant Saldajeno, they continued the business of said partnership under the same firm name "Isabela Sawmill". Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental executed a Certificate of Sale in favor of the defendant Margarita G. Saldajeno, as a result of the sale conducted for the enforcement of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 5223 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. Thereafter, defendants appealed to the CA. CA certified the records of this case to the Supreme Court "considering that the resolution of this appeal involves purely questions or question of law. It is contended by the appellants that the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5343 because the plaintiffs Oppen, Esteban, Inc., Agustin R. Tonsay, Jose L. Espinos and the Bacolod Southern Lumber Yard sought to collect sums of moeny, the biggest amount of which was less

Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental did no err in exercising jurisidction over Civil Case No. 5343 Appellants’ contention is devoid of merit because all the plaintiffs also asked for the nullity of the assignment of right with chattel mortgage entered into by and between Margarita G. Saldajeno and her former partners Leon Garibay and Timoteo Tubungbanua. This cause of action is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Where the basic issue is something more than the right to recover a sum of money and where the money claim is purely incidental to or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is as a case where the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation and is cognizable exclusively by the Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in so far as the authority thereof depends upon the nature of litigation, is defined in the amended Judiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any case the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. An action for the annulment of a judgment and an order of a court of justice belongs to the category. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely

incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.

above-stated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.

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Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.

Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA 425

FACTS:

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime." According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate wife and children.

Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latter’s share.

HELD:

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, “the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract”. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay. An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised not to interfere with each other’s affairs

since they are incompatible and not in the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the exparte proceedings against petitioners and the decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.