CASE DIGESTS LEGPROF (96-114).docx

LEGAL PROFESSION DIGESTS 96. NAKPIL v VALDES Facts: 

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Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands’ titles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted. What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.

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W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely: o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil; o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm. The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50’s), which was the basis for Imelda’s decision to use his services. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

97. ORDONIO VS EDUARTE FACTS:

Antonia Ulibari filed with RTC for annulment of a document against her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henerido Eduarte. However, Atty. Henerido Eduarte was appointed as RTC judge. The case of Ulibari was then transferred to Atty, Josephine Eduarte, wife of Atty. Henerido Eduarte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Only one of the children, Dominga Ordonio, appealed to CA. While the appeal was pending in the CA, Antonia conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Josephine Eduarte. Antonia also conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Josephine and Atty. Henerido as their attorney‘s fees. All the titles and lands subject to the deeds of absolute sale and deeds of conveyance were in the name of Antonia. Subsequently, Dominga filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Josephine on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother, Antonia, stating that she never conveyed parcel of land to Atty. Josephine as attorney‘s fees and she had no knowledge of the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children. The IBPCBD recommended one-year suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE/S: 1. WON Antonia was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance 2. WON Atty. Josephine violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations therefore, when in truth there were none so received by the seller HELD: 1. Yes. It is clear from Antonia‘s affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney‘s fees. Granting for the sake of argument that Antonio did convey the land as attorney‘s fee, Atty. Josephine should have not caused the execution of the deed since a case was still pending before CA covering the same land. She violated Art 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from acquiring assignment property and rights which may be subject of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The prohibition applies when a lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still subject of a pending case. 2. Yes. Atty. Josephine admitted that Antonia did not actually sell parcels of land to her children and that she utilized the form of deed of sale because it was the most convenient and appropriate document to effect transfer of parcels of land. She violated part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. She violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Overall holding: Suspension of 6 months for having violated Art 1491 of the Civil Code another 6 months for violation of lawyer‘s oath and Rule 10.01. Total of one year suspension.

98. Rubias v. Batiller Facts: Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always

been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. Issue: Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute Held: The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract." 99.

100. DAROY v LEGASPI FACTS:

Complainants charged Atty. Ramon Chavez- Legaspi with malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of P4,000.00 which he had collected for them. They prayed that he be disbarred  FACTUAL EVIDENCE: Complainants hired Atty. Legaspi to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Gonzaga. The complainant-heirs in a joint petition, which Atty. Legaspi signed as counsel agreed that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into 6 equal parts and that the proceeds of the sale of the land would be distributed among them.  Atty. Legaspi wrote to the father of Mrs. Daroy, Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited could be withdrawn. However, Atty. Legaspi had already withdrawn the money (therefore he acted in bad faith). It turned out that Atty. Legaspi was also an heir (although it wasn’t shown how). ISSUE: WoN Atty. Legaspi should be disbarred because he violated the relation between attorney and his client? 

HELD: YES. RATIO: 1. The relation between an atty and his client is higly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. 2. The complainants, however, have to recover the money in an ordinary action, and not in this disbarment proceeding.

101. Businos v. Ricafort FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Businos entrusted Respondent Francisco Ricafort with money for deposit in the bank account of Businos‘ husband. The sum of the money is P32,000. Of this amount, P30,000 was for deposit to the bank account and the P2,000 is the amount Ricafort asked as a bond for civil case no. 5814 when no such bond is required. Instead of depositing the money, Ricafort converted the money to his own personal use and despite several demands, he failed to return the same to Businos. Businos is then constrained to file a criminal case for estafa and a disbarment case against Ricafort. Also, the P2,000 Ricafort asked for was never used for a bond because no bond was required of that case therefore he merely pocketed the said amount. Despite of numerous summons to comment on the complaint, Ricafort failed to comply therefore it indicates his high degree of irresponsibility. ISSUE/S: WON Ricafort violated rule 16.02 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: Yes. By converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent and for collecting P2000 to be used as a bond which is not required, Ricafort is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct therefore the court resolves to disbar him. RATIO: According to Rule 16.02 a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obliged to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for personal purposes without his client‘s consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust.

102. Vda de Caina v. Victoriano Facts: Respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr. was the attorney of one of petitioners, Elena Peralta Vda. de Caiña, in an action for ejectment filed before the Justice of the Peace of Caloocan, Rizal, against Ricardo Nabong, which was dismissed and appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the latter court, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3875, and because of the non-appearance of defendant, the latter was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff. This judgment became final and executory for lack of appeal. On June 26, 1957, respondent Dalisay filed a motion in the same ejectment case for annotation of his attorney's lien on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51585 claiming that, notwithstanding the services he had rendered to the widow and her children who were presented by him in said case, they have failed to pay him his attorney's fees which he fixed at P2,020. This motion was set for hearing and thereafter the same was granted in an order entered on July 10, 1957 wherein the court ordered petitioners to surrender their duplicate copy of said certificate in order that the annotation requested may be made. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they were never furnished with a copy of respondent's motion, nor notified of the date of its hearing, for which reason they were not able to appear to contest the same. This motion was opposed by respondent Dalisay who averred that petitioners were furnished with a copy of his motion by registered mail three days before the hearing as shown by the return card attached to his written opposition. And on August 27, 1957, the court denied the motion. Hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON the attorney's lien of respondent Dalisay for services he had rendered in the ejectment case can be ordered annotated on the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51585. Held: An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining alien and the other charging lien. The retaining lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and

papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The charging lien is the right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his client. Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect only from and after, but not before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record and served on the adverse party. It may therefore be seen that the right of a lawyer to insure the payment of his professional fee is either to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client which may have lawfully come into his possession, or to enforce it upon any judgment for the payment of money he may secure in favor of his client. And it has been held that the retaining lien is dependent upon possession and does not attach to anything not in attorney's hands. The lien exists only so long as the attorney's retains possession ends. In the instant case, the lien which respondent attorney tried to enforce for the satisfaction of his professional fee ischarging in the sense that his purpose is to make of record his claim in order that it may be considered in the execution of the judgment that may be rendered in the case, and this he has already done. Thus, he had already caused a statement of his claim to be entered in the record of the ejectment case and that is all what the rule requires of him to do. Certainly, he cannot go any further, such as what he led the trial court to do, that is, to have his lien annotated on the back of the title of petitioners which is beyond the province of the court. The lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution. The respondent judge has therefore exceeded his authority in issuing the order subject of the present petition for certiorari. Petition is granted.

103. Ruby Mae Barnachea vs. Atty. Edwin T. Quicho, A.C. No. 5925,

March 11, 2003 FACTS: Ruby Barnachea engaged the legal services of Atty. Edwin Quiocho to cause the transfer under her name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister. Ruby Barnachea was able to pay respondent for legal fees. However, despite the lapse of almost two months, Atty. Edwin Quiocho failed to secure title over the property in favor of complainant. Ruby Barnachea demanded that Atty. Edwin Quiocho refund to her the legal fees and return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. However, Atty. Edwin Quiocho failed to comply with said demands. Atty. Edwin Quiocho denied that complainant contracted his legal services, although Atty. Edwin Quiocho admitted having received the two checks from complainant, Atty. Edwin Quiocho claimed that said checks were intended to cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation, communication, representation, necessary

services, taxes and fees for the cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the name of complainant and not for legal services. ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Edwin Quiocho violated Rule 16.04 HELD: Yes. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is dutybound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him.

104. Ma. Libertad SJ Cantiller v. Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano FACTS: Complainant lost an ejectment case and was issued to vacate the rented premises. Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case. In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship. Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge. Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the

expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint. At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed. Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987, complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent. ISSUE/S: WON Respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Yes, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. RATIO: When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics. The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact.

105. Santiago et al. v. Atty. Fojas Facts: Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M- 90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union. Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.

The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M- 90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union. Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The trial court, per Judge Teresita DizonCapulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a non extendible period of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 25834. Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte. The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail. ISSUE/S: WON the respondent committed a culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complaints an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. HELD: Yes. He is liable for inexcusable negligence. RATIO: The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: (A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's

106. Stemmerik v. Mas FACTS: Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips in thePhilippines, he met Atty. Mas. Since he was marveled at the beauty of

thecountry, he wanted to buy a real property and consulted Atty. Mas. The lattertold Stemmerik that he could legally acquire a real property in the Phils. andeven suggested a 86K hectare land in Subic, Zambales. Atty. Mas, as the atty.-in-fact of Stemmerik bought the property from a certain Bonifacio de Mesa. Thecontract to sell provided that De Mesa sold the property to Ailyn Gonzales for3.8M. Then, in another notarized deed made by Atty. Mas, it was stated that Gonzales received the funds from Stemmerik. In preparing all these documents,Atty. Mas received 400K fee from Stemmerik. The latter also gave Atty. Mas, the3.8M purchase price to which the latter issued a receipt.S u d d e n l y , At t y. M a s b e c o m e s c a rc e a n d n o l o n g e r a n s w e r t h e c a l l s o f Stemmerik. When Stemmerik visited the Phils, he engaged the service of theFernandez Law Office and found out the subject property is inalienable, beinglocated in the former U.S. military reservation. Also, he was apprised that alienscannot own real properties in the Phils.Meanwhile, Atty. Mas had already abandoned his office and his whereabouts isunknown. Stemmerik filed an action for disbarment against Atty. Mas before theCommission on Bar Discipline but Atty. Mas never appeared. ISSUE: WON Atty. Mas should be disbarred? HELD: YES. Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promotere s p e c t f o r t h e l a w a n d u p h o l d t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e b a r. A s m e n a n d w o m e n entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to protect libertyand not as an instrument of oppression or deception.Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession andhas been found wanting. Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is alsoguilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thecode of ethics of the legal profession. By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant andthat de Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase forand in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violatedthe Anti-Dummy Law.All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do nofalsehood. 21 That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is asacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. 22 Lawyers are servants of the law 23 and the law is their master. They should notsimply obey the laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto byserving as exemplars worthy of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of theCode of Professional Responsibility:

107.

108. Victoria Legarda vs CA, New Cathay House LEGARDA v CA Facts:

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New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda. For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and downpayment of rentals then filed for specific performance. Legarda’s counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension to file an answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that period. Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything. The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt. Cathay’s manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not redeem the property within the 1 year period. Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did not lose faith in her counsel. Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka dean!) So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted and the sale of the QC property to be set aside. The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel. Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision.

Issue: 

W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel

Held:   

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Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser) As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of abandoned her case. Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision.

109. Natividad Uy vs. Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin FACTS: Natividad was the defendant in an ejectment case filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court to defend her rights, Natividad engaged the services of Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin who timely filed an Answer to the complaint for ejectment. Required to file a Position Paper, respondent, however, failed to file one for and on behalf of

Natividad. Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MTC against Natividad. Natividad, through Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin, elevated the case to the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal. In an Orderdated May 25, 2004, the RTC dismissed the appeal solely because of the failure of Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin to file a memorandum on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for having been filed out of time. Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel, Natividad initiated the disbarment case against respondent, before the IBP. Natividad averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin, but the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate. She also claimed that respondent‘s failure to file the required position paper and memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross negligence, which caused grave injury to Natividad.Lastly, Natividad alleged that not only did Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin fail to file the required pleadings, he also was remiss in informing her of the status of the case. For his part, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin admitted that Natividad obtained his legal services, but no legal fee was ever paid to him. Respondent explained that he could not submit an intelligible position paper, because the contract between Natividad and her lessor had long expired. He added that he failed to file the position paper and memorandum on appeal, because Natividad told him that she would work out the transfer of ownership to her of the land subject matter of the ejectment case. In effect, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin said that he did not submit the required pleadings, because he knew that the law favored the plaintiff as against Natividad in the ejectment case. ISSUE/S: WON the lawyer violated canon 18 section 3. HELD: YES, he violated it. RATIO: Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client about the developments in her case fall below the standard exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their client‘s cause. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance, and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his client‘s counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the client‘s interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary therefor; and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. It must be recalled that the MTC required the parties to submit their respective position papers. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court order. In addition Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failed to file the memorandum on appeal this time with the RTC where complainant‘s appeal was then pending. The case was dismissed on that ground alone. Respondent‘s failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Resposibility

110. Spouses Garcia vs. Atty. Rolando S. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005 FACTS: Complainants Spouses Garcia engaged the services of respondent Atty. Bala to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB). Instead, Atty. Bala erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review. Because of Atty. Bala‘s error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala. The Court required Atty. Bala to comment on the Complaint. He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard. In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found Atty. Bala guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution which adopted with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating commissioner. It recommended that Atty. Bala should be reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court. ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Bala should be disciplined. HELD: Yes. He should be disciplined. Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is suspended from the practice of law for six months. RATIO: Rule 18.03 provides that ―a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.‖ Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed. Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore negligent. Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money paid by complainants.

112.

113. Felisa Joven-De Jesus vs. PNB, et. al., G.R. No. L-19299 November 28, 1964 FACTS: The case at bar presents a procedural question on the dismissal of in appeal as perfected out of time. On September 15, 1956, Feliza Joven De Jesus filed a civil case against Philippine National Bank (PNB), Del Carmen Branch at the CFI of Pampanga. The Court rendered a decision ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P3,274.98 with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% a year from the date of the filing of the complaint. until the principal shall have been fully paid, plus the other sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees of the said plaintiff. On March 16, 1961 defendant PNB filed its notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file record on appeal. On March 17, 1961, it filed its record on appeal and appeal bond. However, its appeal was dismissed on that day by the court on plaintiff Joven De Jesus‘ motion as filed out of time because the registry return card showed receipt by PNB of its copy of the decision on February 13, 1961. PNB filed a "motion for reconsideration and relief from, and/or to set aside the order of March 17, 1961." It alleged that movant's failure to appeal on time was due to "accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence," as supported by affidavits annexed to the motion. The Court denied the motion on May 18, 1961. Defendant bank has appealed from the orders of March 17, 1961 and May 18, 1961. The record will show that copy of the decision sent to appellant's counsel in its legal department was received on February 13, 1961. In its motion filed, it stated that the registered mail containing said copy was received from the post office on February 13, 1961 by Eugenio Magpoc. Although the latter is postal mail and delivery clerk of appellant's cashier department, his affidavit states that "as such, one of my duties is to get and receive from the Post Office all registered mail matters addressed to the Philippine National Bank, its personnel and different departments" PNB admitted having filed its notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond beyond the 30-day period, but contended in its motion of March 22, 1961, that the delay was due to "accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence." In support of such contention, it is alleged that on February 13, 1961 the registered letter was given by the bank's postal mail clerk Eugenio Magpoc to Feliciano Jimenez, Jr., registered mail clerk of appellant's cashier department. Due to volume of work, Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. delivered it to the receiving clerk of appellant's legal department only on February 15, 1961 and failed to inform the latter that it was received two days before. Thereupon, it was stamped by said receiving clerk as received on February 15, 1961. On the basis of this date, appellant's counsel computed the period to appeal. ISSUE/S: WON the counsel of the appellant neglected the period for appeal in the case at bar. HELD: Yes, appellant‘s counsel carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt stamped on the letter. He violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility: ―A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.‖ RATIO: According to Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: ―A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.‖ The lower court did not find excusable the negligence in the circumstances of the case. Appellant's counsel carelessly took for granted that the date of receipt stamped on the letter by the legal department's receiving clerk was the date of receipt from the post office. It was known or at least should have been known to him that letters addressed to appellant's legal department were taken from the post office by Eugenio Magpoc and sorted out by Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. Thus, from appellant's system of handling and receiving correspondence for its legal and all other departments, it was clear that the date of receipt by the receiving clerks of its several departments could not be relied upon as the very same date of receipt from the post office. Counsel for appellant could have easily found out the latter date had he inquired from Eugenio Magpoc or Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. and in the circumstances, we find no excuse for his having failed to do so. The Court cited, Bello vs. Fernando, ―Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court requires that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the record on appeal be all filed in court, and served on the adverse party, within thirty days from notice of judgment. ...; and compliance with this period for appeal is considered absolutely indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business, so that if said period is not complied with, the judgment becomes final and executory. 114.