Case Digests Labor

CHAVEZ VS. NLRC 448 SCRA 478. January 17, 2005 FACTS The respondent company, Supreme Packaging, Inc. engaged the services of the petitioner, Pedro Chavez, as truck driver. The respondent company furnished the petitioner with a truck. The petitioner expressed to respondent Alvin Lee, respondent company’s plant manager, his desire to avail himself of the benefits that the regular employees were receiving such as overtime pay, nightshift differential pay, and 13th month pay, among others. Although he promised to extend these benefits to the petitioner, respondent Lee failed to actually do so. Petitioner filed a complaint for regularization with the Regional Arbitration Branch. Before the case could be heard, respondent company terminated the services of the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner filed an amended complaint against the respondents for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and non-payment of overtime pay, nightshift differential pay, and 13th month pay, among others. The respondents, for their part, denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and the petitioner. They averred that the petitioner was an independent contractor as evidenced by the contract of service which he and the respondent company entered into. The relationship of the respondent company and the petitioner was allegedly governed by this contract of service. The respondents insisted that the petitioner had the sole control over the means and methods by which his work was accomplished. He paid the wages of his helpers and exercised control over them. As such, the petitioner was not entitled to regularization because he was not an employee of the respondent company. The respondents, likewise, maintained that they did not dismiss the petitioner. Rather, the severance of his contractual relation with the respondent company was due to his violation of the terms and conditions of their contract. ISSUE: whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and the petitioner. RULING: Yes. There was an employer-employee relationship in the case at bar. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. All the four elements are present in this case. Of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship, the “control test” is the most important. Although the respondents denied that they exercised control over the manner and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work, a careful review of the records shows that the latter performed his work as truck driver under the respondents’ supervision and control. Their right of control was manifested by the following attendant

circumstances: 1. The truck driven by the petitioner belonged to respondent company; 2. There was an express instruction from the respondents that the truck shall be used exclusively to deliver respondent company’s goods; 3. Respondents directed the petitioner, after completion of each delivery, to park the truck in either of two specific places only, to wit: at its office in Metro Manila at 2320 Osmeña Street, Makati City or at BEPZ, Mariveles, Bataan; and 4. Respondents determined how, where and when the petitioner would perform his task by issuing to him gate passes and routing slips. These circumstances, to the Court’s mind, prove that the respondents exercised control over the means and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work as truck driver of the respondent company. The contract of service indubitably established the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and the petitioner. It bears stressing that the existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract and providing therein that the employee is an independent contractor when, as in this case, the facts clearly show otherwise. Indeed, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.

Wack Wack Golf and Country club vs NLRC GR No. 149793; April 15, 2005 Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J. FACTS: A fire destroyed a large portion of the main clubhouse of the Wack Wack Golf and Counrty Club (wack Wack)., including its kitchen. In view of the reconstruction of the whole clubhouse complex, Wack Wack had to suspend the operations of the Food and Beverages Department which required the suspension of 54 employees. The Wack Wack Employee’s Union found the suspension arbitrary and constitutive of unionbusting, and went to strike. The parties soon entered into an agreement and formulated a “special separation benefir/remittance privilege” which contained, among other things, the following provision: “4. All qualified employees who may have been separated from the service under the above package shall be considered under a priority basis for employment by concessionaires and/or contractors, and even by the Club upon full resumption of operations, upon the recommendation of the UNION. The Club may even persuade an employee-applicant for availment under the package to remain on his/her job, or be assigned to another position.” Three employees, namely: Martina B. Cagasan, Carmencita F. Dominguez, and Crisanto Baluyot, Sr. availed of the aforementioned privilege.

Soon after, Wack Wack entered into a Management Contract with Business Staffing and Management, Inc. (BSMI) whereby the latter will provide management services to Wack Wack. Cagasan, Dominguez, and Baluyot, Sr. were among those hired by BMSI. Wack Wack also engaged with several contractors which were assigned in various operating functions of the club. Due to these various management service contracts, BSMI undertook an organizational analysis and manpower evaluation. In the course of the assessment, it was decided that the services of Cagasan, Domingues, and Baluyot, Sr. were no longer needed. They were then dismissed from service. Later, these employees individually filed an illegal dismissal complaint against Wack Wack before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints of Cagasan and Domingues for lack of cause of action. As to Baluyot, Sr., the Arbiter found that his dismissal was illegal. Upon appeal by Cagasan and Dominguez, the NLRC decided in their favor. It held that BMSI is only a labor-only contractor and hence, had nothing to do with the grievance of the complainants. It ordered Wack Wack to reinstate Cagasan and Dominguez. ISSUE: WoN BSMI is a labor-only contractor. HELD: NO. An independent contractor is one who undertakes job contracting, i.e., a person who: (a) carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (b) has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipments, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of the business. There is indubitable evidence showing that BSMI is an independent contractor, engaged in the management of projects, business operations, functions, jobs and other kinds of business ventures, and has sufficient capital and resources to undertake its principal business. It had provided management services to various industrial and commercial business establishments. Its Articles of Incorporation proves its sufficient capitalization. In December 1993, Labor Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma, in the case of In re Petition for Certification Election Among the Regular Rank-and-File Employees Workers of Byron-Jackson (BJ) Services International Incorporated, Federation of Free Workers (FFW)-Byron Jackson Services Employees Chapter, recognized BSMI as an independent contractor. As a legitimate job contractor, there can be no doubt as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the contractor and the workers.

MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC., vs. PENA G.R. No. 158255. July 8, 2004 Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner was contracted by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to manage the water distribution system in the East Zone of Metro Manila. Petitioner undertook to absorb former employees of the MWSS whose names and positions were in the list furnished by the latter, while the employment of those not in the list was terminated. Private respondents, notwithstanding their being contractual collectors of the MWSS, were nevertheless engaged for their services without written contract. Thereafter, on September 1, 1997, they signed a three-month contract to perform collection services for eight branches of petitioner. Before the end of the three-month contract, the 121 collectors were contracted to collect charges for the Association Collectors Group, Inc. (ACGI). Only private respondents herein remained with ACGI. Petitioner continued to transact with ACGI to do its collection needs until February 8, 1999, when petitioner terminated its contract with ACGI. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner, contending that they were petitioners’ employees. On the other hand, petitioner asserts that private respondents were employees of ACGI, an independent contractor. ISSUE: Whether or not ACGI is Labor-only contracting and therefore, respondents are employees of petitioner. HELD: YES. ACGI is Labor-Only contractor. First, ACGI does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials, to qualify as an independent contractor. While it has an authorized capital stock of P1,000,000.00, only P62,500.00 is actually paid-in, which cannot be considered substantial capitalization. Second, the work of the private respondents was directly related to the principal business or operation of the petitioner. The collection of the charges therefore by private respondents for the petitioner can only be categorized as clearly related to, and in the pursuit of the petitioner’s business. Lastly, ACGI did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, petitioner. Prior to private respondents’ alleged employment with ACGI, they were already working for petitioner, subject to its rules and regulations in regard to the manner and method of performing their tasks. This form of control and supervision never changed although they were already under the seeming employ of ACGI. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the

employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since ACGI is only a labor-only contractor, the workers it supplied should be considered as employees of the petitioner. San Miguel Corporation vs. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc G.R. No. 144672. July 10, 2003 Bellosillo, J.: FACTS: 291 workers filed complaints against San Miguel Corporation and Maerc Integrated Services, Inc. for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of service incentive leave pays and other labor standards benefits, and for separation pays from 25 June to 24 October 1991. The complainants alleged that they were hired by SMC through its agent or intermediary Maerc. They were paid on a per piece or pakiao basis except for a few who worked as checkers and were paid on daily wage basis. SMC denied liability for the claims and averred that the complainants were not its employees but of MAERC. When the service contract was terminated, complainants claimed that SMC stopped them from performing their jobs; that this was tantamount to their being illegally dismissed by SMC who was their real employer; and, that MAERC was merely made a tool or a shield by SMC to avoid its liability under the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not MAERC is labor-only Contractor. HELD: YES. MAERC is labor-only contractor, hence, complainants are employees of SMC. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. This distinction between job contractor and labor-only contractor, however, will not discharge SMC from paying the separation benefits of the workers, inasmuch as MAERC was shown to be a labor-only contractor; in which case, petitioner's liability is that of a direct employer and thus solidarily liable with MAERC. Maerc Integrated Services, Inc. is declared to be a labor-only contractor. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. BENAMIRA G.R. No. 145271, July 14, 2005 Austria-Martinez, J.

FACTS: Complainant-private respondents Rogelio Benamira and others were security guards stationed at the head office of petitioner Manila Electric Company. They were under People's Security, Inc. (PSI). When the contract between Meralco and PSI terminated, Benamira and seven others filed a complaint for unpaid monetary benefits against PSI and Meralco. While the case was ongoing, Meralco entered into another agreement with respondent company Armed Security & Detective Agency, Inc., (ASDAI), who absorbed Benamira and others. Later on, the Labor Arbiter ruled in the complaint in favor of the former PSI security guards. Less than a month later, the individual respondents filed another complaint for unpaid monetary benefits, this time against ASDAI and Meralco. For a third time, Meralco entered into a security service agreement with Advance Forces Security & Investigation Services, Inc. (AFSISI) which terminated the agreement with ASDAI. To this, Benamira and others impleaded AFSISI in their complaint, but later on, AFSISI was found not liable. In respondent's complaint, they allege, on one hand, that Meralco and ASDAI never paid their overtime pay and premium pays. Benamira was no longer given any work assignment, while the rest, even if absorbed, were not given any either. All of them allege dismissal from service without just cause. On the other, petitioner Meralco denied liability on the ground of lack of employer-employee relationship with individual respondents. The Labor Arbiter held ASDAI and Meralco liable to pay the monetary claims of individual respondents. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the LA's decision. The Court of Appeals vacated the NLRC ruling by declaring Meralco as the direct employer of the respondents after applying the four-fold test. Meralco now insists that ASDAI and AFSISI are not labor-only contractors because they are well-equipped and capitalized and that security guards are not necessary in their nature of business, which is electricity distribution. Hence, the petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not ASDAI is a labor-only contractor. 2. Whether or not Meralco is an indirect employer.

HELD: 1. The Court ruled in the negative. ASDAI is an independent contractor; hence, the respondent's employers. Under the security service agreement, it was ASDAI which hired and discharged the security guards; assigned them to MERALCO; provided uniform, firearms and ammunition, among others; paid them salaries; and, disciplined, supervised, and replaced them. Service-oriented enterprises, such security services business, generally follows the "customer/client is always right" rule and, thus, must

satisfy the interests, conform to the needs, and cater to the reasonable impositions of its clients.

ASDAI is not a labor-only contractor. The independent contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. Given the above distinction and the provisions of the security service agreements entered into by petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, the Court ruled that ASDAI and AFSISI were engaged in job contracting.

2. The Court ruled in the affirmative. When Meralco contracted for security services with ASDAI as the security agency that hired individual respondents to work for Meralco, petitioner became an indirect employer of individual respondents pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code. Hence, it is jointly and severally liable to pay under Arts. 106 and 109. However, the solidary liability of Meralco with that of ASDAI does not preclude the application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement from his codebtor by the one who paid. Zialcita, et al. v. Philippine Air Lines Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977 FACTS: Complainant Zialcita, an international flight stewardess of Philippine Airlines (PAL), was discharged from the service on account of her marriage. PAL invoked its policy stipulating that “flight attendants will be automatically separated from employment in the event they subsequently get married,” which was alleged to be in conformity with Article 132 (d) of the Labor Code which allows the employer to “determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.” ISSUE: Whether or not PAL’s said policy is valid. HELD: No. Article 132 [now 130] enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is

precisely the factor that militates against the policy of PAL. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are yet to be established, the policy of respondent PAL against marriage is patently illegal. OLYMPIA GUALBERTO vs. MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORP. 23 CAR 528 June 28, 1978 FACTS: The company employed plaintiff Olympia Gualberto as a dentist in 1971 while she was still single. She married Roberto, another employee (electrical engineer) of the company, in 1972. The company informed her that she was regarded to have resigned her office, invoking the firm’s policy that stipulated that female employees were regarded to automatically terminate their employment the moment they got married. Olympia filed a claim for compensation. The Court of Appeals not only upheld her claim for damages but also awarded exemplary damages, and held, inter alia: ‘No employer may require female applicants for jobs to enter into pre-employment arrangements that they would be dismissed once they get married and afterwards expect the Courts to sustain such an agreement.’ ISSUE: Whether or not an employer may terminate an employee by reason of marriage. HELD: No. The Court made references to the Civil Code, the Woman and Child Labor Act and the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines. In light of this the Court further stated: ‘The agreement which the appellants want this Court to sustain on appeal is an example of discriminatory chauvinism. Acts which deny equal employment opportunities to women because of their sex are inherently odious and must be struck down. **Pandagdag. The following is cited from another case Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs NLRC (G.R. No. 118978) The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial Corporation considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of discriminatory chauvinism tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court

struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution. Case No. 4 DELFIN G. VILLARAMA vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994 Ponente: PUNO, J. FACTS: Petitioner Delfin Villarama was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its Materials Manager. Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work.This prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call Villarama to a meeting, where Villarama agreed to tender his resignation. Golden Donuts moved swiftly to separate petitioner - it approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay and issued an inter-office memorandum advising all concerned that Villarama was no longer connected with the company. Later on, however Villarama reneged on the agreement. Still, Golden Donuts terminated Villarama prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of Villarama holding that due process was not observed. ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid cause to terminate petitioner. HELD: Yes. Loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors. To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees on the ground of lack of trust and confidence.

Libres vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123737, May 28, 1999 Bellosillo, J. Facts: Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC). He received a Notice of Investigation from Assistant VP Isidro F. Hynson Jr., his immediate superior, requesting him to submit a written explanation relative to the charge of sexual harassment made by Susan D. Capiral, Hynson’s secretary, allegedly committed by Libres. The notice also warned him that failure to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard. Petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory interrogation. Hynson conducted an internal investigation to which both parties ventilated their sides and the report was submitted to the Management Evaluation Committee (MEC). MEC concluded that petitioners’ acts clearly constituted sexual harassment as charged and recommended petitioners suspension for thirty (30) days without pay. Libres filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unjust discrimination against respondent NSC on ground that MEC failed to grant him audience despite his offer to answer clarificatory questions, and that he was denied due process since his request for personal was denied by MEC. Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan however ruled that due process was properly observed and that there was a positive finding of sexual harassment to justify petitioners suspension. Hence the present petition wherein Libres primarily disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No. 7877,in determining whether he actually committed sexual harassment. He asserts that his acts did not fall within the definition and criteria of sexual harassment as laid down in Sec. 3 of the law. ISSUE: WHETHER LIBRES WAS ACCORDED DUE PROCESS RULING: YES, Libres was accorded due process. With respect to the issue of not applying RA 7877, the Court emphasized that said law was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session where he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances. Personal confrontation was not necessary. As held in Homeowners v NLRC (1996), litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Petition is denied. Domingo vs Rayala GR No. 155831; February 18, 2008 Ponente: Nachura, J. FACTS: Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment against NLRC Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala before DOLE Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma. According to Domingo, Rayala was “[h]olding and squeezing Domingos shoulders; running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear; having inappropriate conversations with her; giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges; and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones”. The complaint was then referred to the Office of the President (OP), Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP ordered Sec. Laguesma to create a committee to investigate the allegations in the complaint. Thereafter, Sec. Laguesma issued an administrative order creating a Committee on Decorum and Investigation in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The Committee found Rayala guilty as charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under the administrative order, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months (the correct penalty being 6months and 1 day). Upon receipt of the decision of the Committee, the OP ordered instead the dismissal of Rayala from service. Thus, Rayala appealed. The Court of Appeals likewise found him guilty of sexual harassment and imposed the penalty of dismissal for violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Rayala filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA modified the penalty to suspension from service for a maximum of one year. Hence this petition separately filed by Rayala and Domingo. Rayala insists that acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position. ISSUE: WoN Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment.

HELD: YES. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment. The CA correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Case No. 7 REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS CASTANEDA G.R. NOS. 169295-96, NOVEMBER 20, 2006 PUNO, J.: Facts: Erlinda started working as a company cook for Remington, a corporation engaged in a trading business. Erlinda worked six days a week as early as 6 am and would end at 5:30 pm , or even later after most of the employees had left the company premises. She continuously worked at Remington until she was prevented from reporting work when Remington transferred to a new site. Erlinda believed she was illegally dismissed. For this, she filed a complaint against Remington. Remington denied that Erlinda was dismissed illegally. Remington argued that Erlinda was a domestic helper not a regular employer. The labor dismissed the complaint and ruled that respondent a domestic helper under the personal service of Tan. Issue: W/N Erlinda is the petitioner’s domestic helper Held: No. The Court upheld the ruling of the NLRC that respondent was a regular employee of

the petitioner since the former worked at the company’s premises and catered not only to the personal comfort and enjoyment of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of employees of the latter. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. xxx In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employee’s lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within the company premises, and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.

CASE NO. 8 CHUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 125837, OCTOBER 6, 2004 TINGA, J.: FACTS: Private respondents filed with the SSS for SSS coverage and contributions against petitioner Chua, the owner of Prime Mover Construction Development. They claim that they were all regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business. Private respondents further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SS for compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social Security Act. They also claim that they were assigned by petitioner in his various construction projects. ISSUE: W/N private respondents are regular employees of the petitioner thus, entitled to SSS benefits HELD: Yes. The Social Security Act was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the laborers throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. It provides for compulsory coverage of all employees not over sixty years of age and their employers. xxx Wellsettled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship xxx There is no dispute that private respondents were employees of petitioner. xxx There rule is in accord with the Court’s ruling in Luzon Stevedoring Corp.vs. SSS to the effect that all employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS, except those classes of employees contemplated in Section 8 (j) of the Social Security Act.

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. Social Security System G.R. No. L-20088; January 22, 1966 Bengzon, J.P., J. FACTS: Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (Lusteveco), a domestic corporation with principal office in Manila, is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towering in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod under the trade name of Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. It carried in its payrolls temporary employees. The Consolidated Union of the Philippines, Trade Union of Central Philippines, Union de Marinos de Iloilo, Vistranco Employees Association and Lustevo requested the Social Security Commission for the exemption of the aforementioned temporary employees from compulsory coverage of the Social Security Act (R.A. 1161) on the ground that they "work only intermittently and are not in a position to maintain membership in the Social Security System long enough to be fully entitled to the law's sickness, disability, death and retirement benefits". However, the Social Security Commission denied the request. ISSUE: Whether or not said temporary and casual employees come within the compulsory coverage of the Social Security Act. HELD: Yes. It is not entirely correct to say that the employees in question cannot possibly be entitled to social security benefits by reason of their temporary employment. From the moment an employee is reported for membership, he is entitled to death and disability benefits pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 1161, as amended. The number of monthly contributions mentioned in said section is not a prerequisite to the enjoyment of death or disability benefits but is merely a basis in determining the amount of benefit to be paid. In the case of sickness and retirement benefits, an employee member may enjoy said benefits provided he accumulates to his credit twelve and one-hundred twenty months contributions, respectively. It is not an impossibility for the employees in question to reach the minimum number of monthly contributions simply because their employment is temporary and intermittent. For nowhere in the law is it required that the monthly contributions be in the same amount, consecutive or derived from the same employer. The coverage in the Social Security System of the employees in question, temporary though their employment may be, is in line with the declared policy of Congress to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the laborers throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. Adherence to such policy would strongly militate in favor of the coverage of such temporary employees for, more than their brothers who are regularly and permanently employed, they are exposed to the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death. More often than not, they are hapless and defenseless victims of these hazards. Social justice demands that "they who have less in life should be given more in law".

#10 Sta. Rita vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119891; August 21,1995 Ponente: Feliciano, J. Facts: Petitioner St. rita, the President/General Manager of B. Sta. Rita Co., Inc, was charged in the RTC with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161,otherwise known as the Social Security Law.It was alleged that Sta. Rita refused to remit the Social Security System contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employees Compensation for its covered employees.Sta. Rita moved to dismiss the case to which the RTC granted.It ruled that the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the DOLE and SSS extending the coverage of Social Security, Medical Care and Employment Compensation laws to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels was null and void as it was entered into by the Administrator of the SSS without the sanction of the Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, in contravention of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended. The People filed in the CA for the reinstatement of the criminal case and the respondent court granted the petition.On the other hand,petitioner Sta. Rita contends that the Filipino seafarers recruited by B. Sta. Rita Co. and deployed on board foreign vessels outside the Philippines are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 1161 under Section 8 (j) (5) thereof. Issues: 1.WON the Memorandum of Agreement between DOLE and SSS is valid. 2. WON the seafarers are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No.1161 under Section 8 (j)(5) Held: 1. YES.Respondent appellate court correctly upheld the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the DOLE and the SSS.The Memorandum of Agreement is not a rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the latter's quasi-legislative authority Under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which reads as follows:”To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.”The Memorandum is not subject to the approval of the President.What the Memorandum of Agreement did was to record the understanding between the SSS on the one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter would include among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment

required in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. 2. NO.Section 8 (j) (5) simply defines the term "employment" and does not in any way relate to the scope of coverage of the Social Security System.That coverage is, upon the other hand, set out in Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of SSS coverage in the following terms:”Fillpinos recruited in the Philippines by foreign employers for employment abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary basis.”Moreover, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers. 11. HINOGUIN vs ECC and GSIS G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989 FACTS: This is a Petition for Review against the Decision of the ECC which affirmed the GSIS in denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin. Sgt. Hinoguin started military service in 1974 until at the time of his death on August 7, 1985. On August 1, he and 2 members, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog, of his Detachment in Nueva Ecija sought permission to go on an overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya to settle an important matter. They arrived at Nueva Viscaya on the same day, had lunch at Alibuyog's home, and proceeded to consume alcohol from 4pm to 7pm. Until then, they left to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle cab to their place of destination, Hinoguin was sitting with Clavo inside the Cab while Alibuyog sat at the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Alibuyog dismounted, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, and not noticing the safety lever was on semi automatic. He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot and hitting Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant was rushed to a hospital for treatment and later on transferred to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City where he died on August 7. In March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits, claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a solder at the time of his death. It stated that under the law, death resulting form injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. In the case beforehand, Sgt. Hinoguin was merely on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion. ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin is compensable HELD: Yes.

Article 167(k) of the Labor Code defines a compensable injury as any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. The Amended Implementing Rules elaborated on the provision stating to include those injuries sustained elsewhere when the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. As a soldier on active duty status, a work place cannot be referred to as if he were a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. Aritao, Nueva. Viscaya was not where he was stationed, and it appears to us that they have secured lawful permission to be at a place cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officers. The three were in an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. Further, they were not on vacation leave and were required or authorized to carry firearms. In regard to whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it is to be noted that a soldier is on active duty status on 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, the work-connected character of the injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass and therefore did not effectively cease performing "official functions." Indeed, it appears that a soldier should be presumed on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily. 12. NITURA vs ECC and GSIS G.R. No. 89217 September 4, 1991 FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorary against the Decision of ECC which affirmed the GSIS in denying the claim of death benefits on account of the death of her son, Pfc. Regino Nitura. Pfc. Nitura started his military service on October 5 1978 until at the time of his death on March 3 1986. In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Brgy. San Jose, Dipolog City to check on several personnel of the Command who were then attending a dance party. On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge. His head hit the stony portion of the ground and he died due to hemorrhage due to the severe concussion of the brain due to accidental fall. Petitioner Juanita Nitura filed to claim for death benefits but was denied on the ground that the resulting death must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Such has not been satisfied in this case. Further, ECC reasoned out that the deceased was not at his place of work nor was he performing his official function as member of the Philippine Army when the incident occurred. Additionally, he acted with notorious negligence, for although he was already intoxicated, he still proceeded to attend the dance party at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would be dangers to cross the hanging bridge in the dark.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Pfc. Nitura is compensable HELD: Yes. While his Battalion Commander attested to the fact that the deceased was instructed to check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, he failed to state in his affidavit the reason why the deceased was given such instruction. Such is fatal as it cannot be determined if the instruction was indeed official and had something to do with his duties as a soldier. In light of the facts and in resolving this issue, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code. To justify compensability, the concept of a work place cannot be literally applied to a soldier in active duty status as if he were a clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed. Although he was in another place at the time of his death than where he should be stationed, he was carrying out a directive from his superior which necessitates the passing of a hanging bridge connecting the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case, a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. With regard to the contention that the deceased acted with notorious negligence for intoxicated at the time, it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness to show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unnafected. Thus, intoxication does not necessarily incapacitate the employee from following his occupation. It must be shown that intoxication was the proximate cause of death.

BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION Facts: Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate for 11 years. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home. Her abdominal pain persisted even after delivery. When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was

discharged from the hospital, she died three days thereafter. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter also denied the claim affirming the denial of the claim by GSIS. Issue: Whether or not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is work-related and therefore compensable. Held: The court ruled that the death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable

LAZO V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION Facts: Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines. His shift is usually from 2:00 PM to 10:00 PM. On June 18, 1986, the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. Lazo rendered overtime duty up to 5:00AM the following day. With the permission from his superior, Lazo left early in order to take home his sack of rice. On his way home, the jeepney that he was riding on turned turtle due to theslipperyroad. Lazo sustained injuries and for which he seeks compensation. The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Lazo was not at his place of work when the incident occurred. This denial of claim was affirmed by ECC. Issue: Whether or not the injuries sustained by Lazo due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as “arising out of or in the course of employment” and thus compensable. Held: The court ruled that employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. It can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to

leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer’s premises. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the Labor Code. The policy then is to extend the applicability of the Labor Code to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

16. ZAIDA G. RARO vs. ECC G.R. No. L-58445; April 27, 1989 GUTIERREZ, JR., J FACTS: The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision. Petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so. ISSUE: Whether or not brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws HELD: NO. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation or cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof. The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered.

[PS: hindi nakarecover si raro kasi walang proof na nipresent kasi nagrely lang siya sa presumption of compensation if no proof is given.]

17. CARMEN SANTOS vs. ECC G.R. No. 89222; April 7, 1993. Nocon, J. FACTS: Francisco Santos was employed as welder at the Philippine Navy and its Naval Shipyard in 1955. He spent the last 32 years of his life in the government service, the first year as a welder helper and the last two years as shipyard assistant. In 1986, Francisco was admitted at the Naval Station Hospital in Cavite City, on complaint that he was having epigastric pain and been vomiting blood 2 days prior. His case was diagnosed as bleeding Peptic Ulcer disease (PUD), cholelithiasis and diabetes mellitus. In 1987, he died, the cause of which was liver cirrhosis. Carmen A. Santos filed a claim for the death benefit of her husband, Francisco. . However the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denied the claim on the ground that upon proofs and evidence submitted, Francisco's ailment cannot be considered an occupational disease. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the Commission affirmed the denial of the GSIS on petitioner's claim relying on the fact that the diagnosis on Francisco's illness did not specify the type of cirrhosis which caused his death. Nevertheless, the Commission took cognizant of the fact that the deceased employee did not have a previous history of alcoholism, hepatitis or a previous history of biliary condition which could give a clue to the nature of cirrhosis he had. ISSUE: Whether or not liver cirrhosis is compensable HELD: YES. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Cirrhosis of the liver is not listed as an occupational disease. As a welder, Francisco was exposed to heat, gas fumes and chemical substances coming from the burning electrodes caused by welding. Generally, the metal burned is iron. These vaporized metals are inhaled by the welder in the process and significantly in this case, Francisco had to do welding jobs within enclosed compartments. Research shows that ingestion or inhalation of small amounts of iron over a number of years may lead to siderosis. Acute poisoning brings about circulatory collapse which may occur rapidly or be delayed to 48 hours with liver failure. These are industrial hazards to which Francisco was exposed. And in the long course of time, 32 years at

that, his continuous exposure to burned electrodes and chemicals emitted therefrom would likely cause poisoning and malfunction of the liver.

18. NEMERIA V EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GSIS GR No. L-57889; October 28, 1987 Paras, J. Facts: Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November 1948, first in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu and later transferred to municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From September 8-25, 1978, Nemaria was confined at the Southern Islands’ Hospital, Cebu City, for on and off severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of the cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These ailments did not respond to medications and she died on October 16, 1978 at the age of 58. The service record of the decedent shows that she rendered government service for about thirty years. Alleging that the cause of his wife’s death was due to her employment, filed with GSIS a claim for death benefits under PD 626 but GSIS denied the claim, which was affirmed by ECC. Issue: W/N Rosario Nemaria’s death is compensable under PD 626? Held: Yes. The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several kilometres away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less 29 years. The possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein. Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the GSIS. The conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the decedent’s ailments developed during her employment while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto. The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by employment where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions thereof. The Court has ruled that the cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may be deemed work-connected. Moreover, in Abana v Quisumbing, the Court held that under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in thr growth development or acceleration of the claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree. Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where the cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, not duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand impossibility.

19. MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. & SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD. V NLRC GR No. 94167; January 21, 1991 Gancayco, J. Facts: Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard the vessel on July 13, 1987. On January 16, 1988 at about 3pm, while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from the shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged thise eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his head and notice blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1968. Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the POEA for the payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages. Issue: Is the employer exempted from liability in a case of an employee who ran amuck or who in a state of intoxication provoked a fight as a result of which he was killed? Held: Yes. The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits. When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or wilful act on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision. By the same token, when as in this case the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck, or committed an unlawful aggression against another, inflicting injury on the latter, so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman, the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and wilful act on his own life directly attributable to him. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. Thereafter, he returned to the messhall picked up and broke a cap and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. Thus sprovoked, the oiler fought back. The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable.

Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino G.R. No. L-43674 June 30, 1987 Facts: On December 22, 1971, the vessel M/S Rajah owned by petitioner sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes. Rolando G. Lim, a licensed second mate, was on board of the vessel. His parents sued petitioner on the ground that Rolando's death was due to the negligence of petitioner. In defense, petitioner argued that the parents had received Php 4,160 from petitioner and had signed release papers discharging petitioner from any liability arising from the death of their son, and that they had already been compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the compensation remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code. Held: In the Floresca case, the Court held that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under that WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the selection has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. Respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA. Therefore, if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option.

Vicente vs. Employee's Compensation Commission G.R. No. 85024 January 23, 1991 Facts: Domingo Vicente was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. At the age of forty-five and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional retirement, giving as reason his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. He also filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for income benefits claim for payment, under PD No. 626, as amended. The petitioner's application was granted but only for permanent partial disability compensation or for a period of nineteen months. The petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him, but was subsequently denied. The respondent Commission also argued that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from permanent total disability.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner suffers from permanent total disability? Held: Yes. Under the Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, "total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do." Permanent partial disability, on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with this former work. Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service.

LOTT VS. GSIS GR NO. 86994; June 30,1993 ROMERO, J FACTS: Petitioner, a lawyer, retired at age of 65 as Special Assistant in the Development Bank of the Philippines on September 27, 1980. He started serving the government in 1939 as a clerk in the Bureau of Health and had a short stint as a military officer from 1941 to 1947, after which, he started working as a stenographer at the DBP. Sometime in 1969, when he was branch manager of the DBP in Puerto Princesa, he began complaining of headache and chest pain. He consulted physicians at the DBP but he was referred to the St. Luke's Hospital where he was disposed as suffering from hypertensive cardiovascular disease. One year after his retirement in 1980, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Attached to his claim was a certification from his attending physician at the United Doctors Medical Center, Dr. Antonio F. Guytingco, stating that petitioner was suffering from "arteriosclerotic hypertensive cardiovascular disease" and "left ventricular hypertrophy by voltage criteria" and that his degree of disability was "permanent total." GSIS considered him to have only partial permanent disability , and awarded him medical benefits from September 1980 to March 1982 or for 19 months. ISSUE: Whether petitioner's disease is a permanent total disability HELD: Total disability does not require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that she cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom . . . . It is not the injury which is compensated but the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.

While we do not question the competence of GSIS physicians in determining the extent of an employee's disability, yet we cannot close our eyes to the fact that these physicians place more reliance on reports rather that on personal examination of an employee. It must be conceded that the findings of the medical staff of the GSIS should be given due weight. Moreover, the ECC's contention that petitioner suppressed evidence by his failure to present certifications of other physicians who attended to him during his hospitalization at the Philippine General Hospital cannot adversely affect petitioner's rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the same manner, the strain and tension caused by managing a branch of a bank may have aggravated petitioner's ailment, such that aggravation persisted even after he had retired from the service. His longevity inspite of a debilitating ailment should not stand in the way of his availment of the benefits provided for by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Being a social legislation, said law should be liberally construed to attain its objective of amelioration of workmens' plight to prevent them from becoming objects of charity.