Case Digests in Statutory Construction Philippine Law Student

1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ROUND 1

2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3 Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14 FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35 FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Astorga v. Villegas Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37 FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee. FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2 HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials.

Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42 FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

5 People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje Case No. 203 G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. National Power Corporation Case No. 8 G.R. No. L-24396 (July 29, 1968) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 7a, 25c, 37, d FACTS: Republic Act No. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121”. In Section 3 of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee, to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses; and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 121” does not embrace, thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d

6 Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. Abalos Case No. 291 G.R. No. L-114783 (December 8, 1994) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 37, d FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII, Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. LATIN MAXIM: 20a, d

7 Ayson and Ignacio v. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. 11 G.R. No. 14019 (July 26, 1919) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v. Commission on Elections Case No. 148 G.R. No. L-28089 (October 25, 1967) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.51 FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas, Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. 13, section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing, with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos,’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality, are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government, after payment of a fee of P50 annually, payable every three months.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917, is invalid. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916, now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title, “An Act amending the Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 3 of the Jones Law, which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill,” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province, which is Cotabato, violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790, prompted by the upcoming elections. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law, and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually

affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. LATIN MAXIM: d

8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Reyes Case No. 169 G.R. No. 43263 (October 31, 1935) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Ferrer Case No. 208 G.R. No. L-32613-14 (December 27, 1972) Chapter I, Page 13, Footnote No.50 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47 with interest. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him, as provided by Act No. 4122. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 4122, entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section, to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A,” is valid. HELD: Act No. 4122 is valid and enforceable. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 37 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. The cases were dismissed, to which the Government appealed. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. HELD: Yes. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d

9 Del Rosario v. Carbonell, et al. Case No. 33 G.R. No. L-32476 (October 20, 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. 230 G.R. No. L-9659 (May 29, 1957) Chapter I, Page 14, Footnote No. 55 FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention, Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention, Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen, and for Other Purposes.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. HELD: No. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969, and both Resolutions No. 2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines,” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1 of both Resolutions. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself, whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9d, 51d FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was “an Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act,” did not include weapons other than firearms, and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” ISSUES: 1. W/N Act No. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. HELD: No. At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1780 on October 12, 1907, the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only, and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution, pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 30a, 36a, 46a, 50

10 People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Leoncio Lim Case No. 210 G.R. No. L-14432 (July 26, 1960) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.83 FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional. HELD: No. The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37–1. Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was invalid. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time, but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. LATIN MAXIM: 37, 38a

11 KMU Labor Center v. Garcia Jr. Case No. 68 G.R. No. 115381 (December 23, 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank Case No. 57 G.R. No. L-34526 (August 9, 1988) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. PBOAP, without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB, availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase. ISSUES: 1. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase. 2. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. HELD: 1. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. 2. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1, 1972- June 30, 1973, as provided in the Act. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1, 1972- June 30, 1972; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1973June 30, 1974; the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995. HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law, the basic law prevails. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. LATIN MAXIM: 9c

12 China Banking Corp. v. CA Case No. 59 G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) Chapter I, Page 19, Footnote No.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Honorable Estenzo Case No. 140 G.R. No. L-14740 (September 26, 1960) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No. 3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3 as So Ching was contending. ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. 2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company, of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3,494.40, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. After 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R.A. No. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. 2. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. HELD: Petition was dismissed. 1. The Commission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of Congress. Furthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. 2. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. LATIN MAXIM: 30, 35, 46a

13 Grego v. Commission on Elections Case No. 120 G.R. No. 125955 (June 19, 1997) Chapter I, Page 23, Footnote No.98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Municipal of Caloocan Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-15807 (April 22, 1963) FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner, who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31, 1981. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT, which has a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Since Respondent was reelected, this does not fall under the scope of the term. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 46c rd FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees,” “meat inspection fees,” “corral fees,” “and internal organ fees,” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 655. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Respondent, in the issuance of Ordinance No. 24, exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a, 37

14 National Housing Authority v. Reyes Case No. 85 G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No. 73 G.R. No. 87047 (October 31, 1990) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25,000 sq/rn, subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00, but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. The petition for Certiorari is granted. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years. After it expired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises, and hence, the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982, then from 1982 to 1985. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired; and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: 1. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. On the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. On the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof, and hence, res judicata does not apply. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 11a, 26,

15 Hon. Alfredo S. Lim v. Felipe G. Pacquing; Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115044 (January 27, 1995) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union Case No. 169 G.R. No. L-25246 (September 12, 1974) FACTS: Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise, license or permit, to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. Then President Aquino issued an E.O. No. 169 expressly repealing PD. No. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. In 1998, ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai, but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P.D. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. ISSUE: 1. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. 0. No. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 2. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.D. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: R.A. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. And E.O. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 6c, 37, 44, 50 FACTS: Petitioner, an “Iglesia ni Cristo”, was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R.A. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union, which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service. ISSUE: 1. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution, as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest”

and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 40b

16 Tañada v. Tuvera Case No. 287 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. Carpio Case No. 55 G.R. No. 31025 (August 15, 1929) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. HELD: No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted. Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect, and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13, 1928, agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land, the ownership would vest in the Defendants. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount, the Defendants appealed that by that time, August 13, 1928, the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. HELD: No. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties, and on the day from which it should be counted. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. 13 of the Administrative Code, according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. In computing any fixed period of time, with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise provided. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 39a

17 Guzman v. Lichauco Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-17986 (October 21, 1921) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.S. v. Paniaga Case No. 161 G.R. No. 8223 (March 4, 1914) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. 9, 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. 88 of the CCP, as amended by Act No. 2588, in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”, the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. As a result, the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court, setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal. On Feb 28, the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof, and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. By various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally occurred on July 8, 1912, with government as the purchaser. On July 10, 1912, the principal was arrested. On July 13, 1912, the court, on application of the sureties, set aside the order of forfeiting the bond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. HELD: Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday, it shall be excluded.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. The sale here of the property must stand. LATIN MAXIM: 6c HELD: The payment made on August 11, 1921 was one day late. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days. LATIN MAXIM: 25a, 25c

18 PNB v. CA Case No. 238 G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993) Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-25326 (May 29, 1970) and G.R. No. L-25327 (May 29, 1970) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.19 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 9a, 9b FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Agrarian Court dismissed petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else. Moreover, the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation, the section would have expressly said so. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 11a, 12a, 36a, 37, 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c, 30b, 43

19 U.S. v. Navarro Case No. 300 G.R. No. 6160 (March 21, 1911) Chapter II, Page 52, Footnote No.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. Eduvala Case No. 149 G.R. No. L-41106 (September 22, 1977) Chapter II, Page 53, Footnote No.22 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. 2, 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. Evidence showed that the Appellants, except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro, did not own property of the assessed value of P500. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. FACTS: Respondent, Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations, required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Petition denied. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 20a, 24a HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. Both qualifications are under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. 13, 1898, from voting. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. If the property qualification is actual/market value, it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. LATIN MAXIM: 10, 11a, 12a, 28, 36a, 37

20 Regalado v. Yulo Case No. 255 G.R. No. L-42293 (February 13, 1935) Chapter II, Page 55, Footnote No.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B.E. San Diego Inc. v. CA Case No. 26 G.R. No. 80223 (February 5, 1993) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 27 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, Albay. On November 16, 1931, Act No. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved. A few years later, Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code, amended further by Act. No. 3899). Shortly thereafter, Esteban T. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. On December 17, 1934, Villar assumed office. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as further amended by Act No. 3899, the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 3899). LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a FACTS: On March 3, 1986, Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. In her defense, De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517, which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. While it may depart from its source, PD 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as unjust eviction. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 25a

21 Araneta v. Dinglasan Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-2044 (August 26, 1949) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. David Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953) Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33 FACTS: Executive Orders, in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. 671 (Emergency Powers Act), were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. That when Congress convened again on Jan. 1, 1942, said proclamations were also terminated. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 9a FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. HELD: No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”, by the Legislature. Through the separation of powers, such a task must be done by the Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55 FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57 FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid. FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43 HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or

any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979) FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43 FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60 FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

26 Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. 47 G.R. No. L- 30642 (April 30, 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. Salazar Case No. 40 G.R. No. 92163 (June 5, 1990) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. Petitioners, with the exception of Floresca, recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. However, a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation. Thereafter, Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts, the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 40a FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically, the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Therefore, charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. Furthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion, then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 46a, 48

27 Manikad v. Tanodbayan Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. Hermosisimo Case No. 278 G.R. No. L-10662 (December 14, 1956) Chapter II, Page 67, Footnote No.74 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. HELD: No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga, Cebu. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner, Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. HELD: No. Under RA No.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. RA No.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Hence, the decision against him was invalid, even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 3a, 6b, 7a

28 People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang Case No. 211 G.R. No. L-12088 (December 23, 1959) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.87 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Mapa Case No. 213 G.R. No. L-22301 (August 30, 1967) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. Defendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions, invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: Yes. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. HELD: No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 30a, 35, 46c

29 Co v. CA Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993) Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. HELD: No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter, should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 24a, 37, 43

30 Sumulong v. Commission on Elections Case No. 149 G.R. No. 48634 (October 8, 1941) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v. Ramirez Case No. 56 G.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920) Chapter III, Page 79, Footnote No.8 FACTS: On September 15, 1941, Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner, the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Eleven days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. LATIN MAXIM: 36a, 37, d FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No. 2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain, and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” LATIN MAXIM: d

31 Eugenio v. Drilon Case No. 104 G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996) Chapter III, Page 81, Footnote No.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Purisima Case No. 221 G.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978) Chapter III, Page 76, Footnote No.16 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the nonpayment of the amortizations. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect. HELD: No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. “The intent of the statute is the law.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. ISSUE: W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, b2

32 People of the Philippines v. Echaves Case No. 207 G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 (January 28, 1980) Chapter III, Page 77, Footnote No.22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. City of Cebu Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-14526 (March 31, 1965) Chapter III, Page 82, Footnote No.23 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P.D. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.D. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court, thus bringing the case at hand. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring that P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 36b FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. According to Respondent, the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently, both fall within the scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu, through its ordinance, has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence, the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 36b

33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc. Case No. 80 G.R. No. 83736 (January 15, 1992) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. Aquino Case No. 105 G.R. No. 10201 (September 23, 1957) Chapter III, Page 83, Footnote No.28 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid. The Respondent contends, on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. The Supreme Court said that, “Sec. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 36b, 36d FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings, challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code, does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the election”, the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section, taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume office. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9d, 11a, 11e, 36b

34 US. v. Hart Case No. 159 G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. 131 G.R. No. 12767 (November 16, 1918) Chapter III, Page 86, Footnote No.38 FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 11e, 33 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila. Sec. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved, allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court, but Petitioner contends that Sec. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens; and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner, a citizen of the U.S and therefore an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph, or heading, of a section

being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. Petitioner, being a US citizen, thus an alien, is covered by Sec. 636. The will duly probated. LATIN MAXIM: 24a, 25a, 26, 37, 42a, 48

35 People of the Philippines v. Yabut Case No. 231 G.R. No. 85472 (September 27, 1993) Chapter III, Page 87, Footnote No.43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Mendoza Case No.112 G.R. No. L-38076 (November 4, 1933) FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was consequently charged for murder. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. 160. HELD: No. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. 160, and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. According to him, his conviction for murder is not different because it involved homicide. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself, or from the Spanish caption. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the preamble, heading, epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text, which are mere catchwords or reference aids, consulted to remove, not create doubts. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters. They were tried and convicted. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. HELD: No. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question. Judgment was reversed. LATIN MAXIM: 50, d

36 People of the Philippines v. Manaba Case No. 110 G.R. No. L-39037 (October 30, 1933) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U.S. v. Quintanar Case No. 162 G.R. No. 5654 (August 27, 1910) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. After trial, Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter, because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. Subsequently, the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy, but it was denied and he was convicted. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. HELD: No. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law, and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter, and defendant was never in jeopardy. The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling, because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 36a FACTS: Defendants, on the night of March 1, 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium, in violation of Sec. 32 of Act No. 1761, the “Opium Law”. On appeal, Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo.” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1, 1908”. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English, it shall prevail over its translation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

37 Employees’ Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation Case No. 39 G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. Lichauco Case No. 175 G.R. No. 7896 (March 30, 1914) Chapter III, Page 88, Footnote No.49 FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. However, there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is. And likewise, in the duration of Mata’s judgment, there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17,666.60. ISSUE: With these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. However, until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken, the judgment, strictly, is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments, orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure, drawn in part from American and English precedents. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. Even if there was a new judgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 49

38 Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 11 G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda. De Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. 156 G.R. No. L-27489 (April 30, 1970) Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.57 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. ISSUE: 1. W/N there was a valid notice. 2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17 FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12, 1961, which led to his death 16 days later, the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully wedded. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962, to the posthumous daughter of the deceased, Racquel. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. HELD: Yes. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death, are still considered dependents under the Act. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9c, 12a, 37

39 Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al. Case No. 290 G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955) Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. 125 G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In 1943, the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, represented by his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants, with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. HELD: No. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 37, 38b, 48 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases. HELD: Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff Company, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction, prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. Therefore, said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 8, 9c, 11a, 36a, 37

40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Trinidad Case No. 154 G.R. No. 18316 (September 23, 1922) Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.71 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. Martinez Case No. 113 G.R. No. 19864 and 19685 (October 17, 1923) Chapter III, Page 93, Footnote No.93 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, doing business in the City of Manila. Engaging in a stevedoring business, consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant, the Internal Revenue Collector, the sum of P2,422.81, which had been paid under protest. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921, the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242, 281.33. Under the provisions of Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711, the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1462 of Act No. 2711. Therefore, the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 4, 5b, 9c, 11a, 28 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40,000 to Respondent. They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. On the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1,800 to Petitioner, which was cashed. After three months, Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. He now executed a new promissory note, again due within the next three months, and with this note, Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1,800. Again, he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1,800. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25,000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,000. Therefore, Petitioner filed a complaint. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. 2992). Thus, he must give back P11,850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,000. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. HELD: No, since only the interest is forfeited. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law RA 2073, the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unlike the previous law, the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited. As a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is ambiguous, one may consult the

history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9c, 36a, 37

41 US v. De Guzman Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. Luna Case no. 31 G.R. Nos. L-34135-36 (February 24, 1981) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.102 FACTS: Defendant, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. Upon reaching the witness stand, Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice, nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. HELD: Sec. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. However, looking at the legislative history of the statute, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. Finally, discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 22a, b2 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 183 claims, 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna, a clear disregard of their agreement. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records, Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points; Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. Consequently, Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. HELD: Sec. 47 par. 2 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section, a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads; a junction of known rivers or creeks, a known public or private structure; a corner of approved public, private or mineral land survey; a kilometer post of public road; or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Mines, Army Corps of engineers, Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey, or other government agencies.” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 30a, 33, 36b

42 Baga v. PNB Case No. 27 G.R. No. L-9695 (September 10, 1956) Chapter III, Page 95, Footnote No.103 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. CA Case No. 88 G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. ISSUE: W/N Art. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. HELD: No. The Civil Code does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code. RA 390 Sec. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 50, b2 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 17, 24b, 26, 43, b2

43 National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr. Case No. 185 G.R. No. 106724 (February 9, 1994) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v. Ortega Case No. 21 G.R. No. L-34964 (January 31, 1973) FACTS: RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. of the Interior and Local Government,” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). In other words, Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Indeed, the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 11a, 12a, 27, b2 FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money. The trial court declared the said corporation in default. The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. Thus, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. He refused to disclose the sought information, citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. Furthermore, RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking RA 1405. HELD: No. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 11e, 12b, 30b, 35, 38b, 43, b2

44 Mayon Motors v. Acting CIR Case No. 173 G.R. No. 15000 (March 29, 1961) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato Case No. 67 G.R. No. 118910 (November 16, 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. Petitioner requested for reconsideration and, this request having been denied, it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals. After the hearing, said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law, controlling in the interpretation of the law. HELD: No. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan, et al. v. Guingona. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD: No. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B), when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority, but also the phrase “by itself.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes, races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration, association or joint venture” with others or “by itself.” LATIN MAXIM: 34, 36b

45 Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. 77 G.R. No. 9265 (April 29, 1957) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 71 G.R. Nos. 48886-8 (July 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 101, Footnote No.133 FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work, four hours overtime), given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime. ISSUE: 1. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen. 2. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides that “when the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely, shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he “cease to work,” and may rest completely. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 26 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan, Iligan City. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34. HELD: No. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. Sec. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as amended by P.D. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. Sec. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only, it is obvious that the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E.O. 72. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 25d, 30a

46 Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. Case No. 47 G.R. No. L-46908 (May 17, 1980) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.146 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. LATIN MAXIM: 27, 28 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing, carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. Within three months, the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act, and how these statutes are interpreted, the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself, it is the duty of the broker to do so. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. LATIN MAXIM: 6d, 9

47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 176 G. R. No L-15290 (May 31, 1963) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. Gsell Case No. 282 G. R. No 10765 (December 22, 1916) Chapter III, Page 106, Footnote No.149 FACTS: Mariano Zamora, owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila, filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora, bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16, 1944, for P132,000.00 and sold it for P75,000.00 on March 5, 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.C. for P68,959.00 on January 19, 1944 which they sold for P94,000.00 on Feb. 9, 1951. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora, to pay the sum of P235.00, representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora. HELD: No. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. HELD: Yes. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken, being of American origin. LATIN MAXIM: b2

48 Ossorio v. Posadas Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-31088 (December 3, 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp. v. Sta. Cruz Timber Co. and Felix Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-6884 (March 21, 1956) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56,246.72, which the Defendant, according to the complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. HELD: Yes. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property, returning the sum of P56,203.59 to said plaintiff, without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,125 and P1,075, for lack of jurisdiction; holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2,000. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action, on the ground that the amount of two notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in excess of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. HELD: No. The jurisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint, but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a

49 Ang Giok Chio vs. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Case No. 8 G.R. No. 33637 (December 31, 1931) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. Kette and Sellner Case No. 99 G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 1930) FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10,000 was in force. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. HELD: Yes. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under Sec. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states, “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, b2 FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January 30, 1929, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places, to wit, upon the land itself, at the market, and on the municipal building of Pasay. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication, and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, more particularly on the 2nd, 9th, and 15th of February, 1929 and the sale took place on February 19, 1929. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. HELD: Yes. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. 692 of the California Code, the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. LATIN MAXIM: b2