Case Digests Consti law
Case Digests Consti law...
JACOT VS DAL G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008
Facts: Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989. Jacot sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act no. 9255 or the “Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act”. He filed a request for the administration of his Path of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, Ca. The Los Angeles PCG issued an Order of Approval of Jacot’s request and on the same day, he took his Oath and Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing Jacot as a citizen of the Philippines. On March 27, 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin and on May 2, 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship. On May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. Jacot filed a Motion for Reconsideration but COMELEC en banc dismissed his Motion. Hence, he sought remedy from the Supreme Court through a petition for Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Jacot is disqualified from running as a candidate in the local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US Citizenship
Ruling: Petition DENIED. His oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By taking the oath, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
BENGSON vs HRET G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001
Facts: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino as a US citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Then on June 5, 1990, he was naturalized citizen, in connection with his service in the US Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran against petitioner Bengson III for the office of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected for said office. Bengson III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET, claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House since he was not a natural-born citizen. HRET dismissed the petition. Issue:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a naturalborn Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Ruling: Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person, who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the same Constitution, naturalborn citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity .As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided. As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The rule applies to Cruz’s case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon his repatriation.
CO vs HRET G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. Petitioners questioned the citizenship of respondent Ong since Ong’s father was only a naturalized Filipino citizen and questioned Ong’s residence qualification since Ong does not own any property in Samar. The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Ong is a citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Samar
Ruling: On April 28, 1955, Jose Ong Chuan, respondent’s father, an immigrant from China was declared a Filipino citizen by the CFI of Samar while respondent’s mother, Agripina Lao, is a natural-born Filipino. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
PASI Vs TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO G.R. No. 142362
May 3, 2006
Facts: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161ºEand 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28, 1996. PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the name of [Michael de Guzman] and sabotage the business of PASI." Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose identity was unknown to PASI. Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC, and the "Unknown Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153º East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action, for injunction(1), sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude should be enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to PASI, (2)for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the award to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority and for (3)damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged "crusade" to malign the name of plaintiff [D]e Guzman and sabotage the business of [PASI] Lichauco filed a Motion to admit with attached Motion to Dismiss on 27 February 1998. She rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the Office of the President.
Issue: Whether or not the suit is against the state.
Ruling: The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties. As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of
action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case. A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action, anchored as it is on alleged acts that are tortious in character or otherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions against them in her letter to the Land Bank President. The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial to be determined on the basis of the evidence. However, if proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
MACARIOLA vs ASUNCION A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
Facts: On June 8, 1963, Respondent Jjudge Elias B. Asuncion rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 3010 for lack of appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Bernardita Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. On July 31, 1964 the fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, wherein Judge Asuncion was the president. on August 9, 1968, petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola filed an instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking four causes of action,  that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him;  that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte;  that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practicing attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar; and  that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge.
Issue: Whether or not the action of Judge Asuncion violated the above stated provisions. Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities. SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965. The Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless.
DOH vs PHIL PHARMAWARE G.R. No. 169304
Facts: On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products but was later amended by A.O. No. 10, Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic “Penicillin G Benzathine.” Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that the processing of and release of the result of respondent’s request were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its filing. Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the pre-qualifications, and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract). Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondent’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS. Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City praying that the trial court “nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract”.
Issue: Whether or not doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
Ruling: As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State. While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract which act was done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.