CAse Digests (Article 1-73 of FC) -Jammy's Part

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Article 1- Definition of Marriage Marriage is a special contract of a permanent union between a man and woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. Marriage is the foundation of the family and an inviolable institution whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation except that marriage settlements may fix property relations within the limits provided by the Family Code of the Philippines. Case: Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P. Arquero Nature: Administrative Case Facts: On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brooke’s Point, Palawan for immorality. Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC Brooke’s Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot, Brooke’s Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girl’s Baptismal Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by the petitioner was just a mere harassment and a product of complainnat’s hatred and jealousy. By respondent’s own admission however, he had an illicit relationship with the petitioner’s wife for 8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that the petitioner and his wife had a “kasunduan” in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan indicated that they would sever their marriage ties and allow themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go to court to institute any action against the other. Issue: Whether or not the “Kasunduan” is enough ground to sever the marriage tie. Ruling: SC ruled that respondent’s justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an institution of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the parties. Respondent is suspended for 6 months.

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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

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Article 3- Formal Requisites of Marriage/ Authority of Solemnizing Officer Case: Zenaida Beso vs Judge Juan Daguman, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-TaranganPagsanjan Nature: Administrative Complaint Facts: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr., for solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Registrar. The respondent acting as a solemnizing officer solemnized the wedding of the pertitioner and his fiancée in Calbayog City. The judge having jurisdiction only in Sta. Margarita, Samar. After the wedding the husband abandoned the petitioner, Smelling something fishy the petitioner went to the local civil registrar to search for the marriage documents but to no avail her marriage was no registered. Petitioner went to the judge to search for the marriage documents but said judge did not possess the documents, it was in fact within the possession of the husband and he left no copy to the judge. Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid? Whether or not the judge was authorized to solemnize the marriage in this case? Whether or not the judge is duty bound to process the papers for registering the marriage? Ruling: With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that Art. 7. Marriage my be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that: Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the counselgeneral, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or were both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in 2

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remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiancé Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married." Considering that respondents Judge's jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observance extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.

Case: Aranes vs. Judge Salavador M. Occiano Nature: Administrative Complaint Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.

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Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. The judge executed the solemnization of the marriage out of compassion, according to the judge that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded. Thereafter he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid? Ruling: The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. The court also said that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Case: Juvy Cosca, Edmundo Peralta, Ramon Sambo and Apollo Villamora vs. Hon. Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, MTC Tinambac, Camarines Sur 4

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Nature: Administrative Complaint Respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. Facts: Petitioners alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriages were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that one of the marriages was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present. Issue: W/N the said marriages are valid for lacking the essential requisite of a valid marriage license? Ruling: With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already. In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might 5

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have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.The judge is warned and liable of penalty.

Case: Ireneo Geronimo vs. CA and Antonio Esman Nature: Petition for Review on CA Decision (Affirming the decision of RTC declaring the marriage of Graciana and Antonio is valid) Facts: Petitioner contends that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo (his sister) and oppositor Antonio A. Esman was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract and that the marriage contract itself does now show the number of the marriage license issued. Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but to Pasig in October 1959. On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions; that a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents would show that except for the phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract issued by the Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named the oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on the Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or municipalities thru proper requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding years. Issue: Whether or not the marriage was valid? Ruling: It may be conceded that the evidences presented of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of the marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at best, such non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other hand, the marriage license number does appear in the certified archives copy of the marriage contract. The non-indication of the license number in the certified copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law which 6

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requires that the marriage license number would be indicated in the marriage contract itself. In Conclusion there was a valid marriage license issued, error in the recording of the serial number of the license does not tantamount to an invalid marriage.

Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Angelina M. Castro (SECRET MARRIAGE) Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC  valid, CA not valid) Facts:The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As ground therefore, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage. On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. Trial court denied the petition but on appeal CA declared the marriage void for lacking the essential requisite of a valid marriage license. Issue: W/N a valid marriage license was issued? Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas? Ruling: The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former. Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot 7

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be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas. It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer. In fine, SC hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.The petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court

Case: Filipina Sy vs. CA, RTC of San Fernando Pampanga and Fernando Sy Nature: Petition for Review on Decision of CA (affirmed RTC in denying for the declaration of nullity of the marriage) Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that one afternoon, she went to the dental clinic at Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without 8

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justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter. RTC and CA denied the declaration for nullity of the marriage of Filipina and Fernando based on latter’s allegedly psychological incapacity. However, upon this petition, Filipina Yap-Sy contended that the lower courts overlooked the dates of their marriage ceremony and the issuance of a marriage license. Issue: W/N marriage was valid due to absence of marriage license? Ruling: Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination. Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the 9

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marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.

Case: Jaime Sevilla vs. Carmelita Cardenas Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari (RTC: invalid; CA reversed and declared it valid) Facts: There are two facts given by both the plaintiff and the respondent: -

There was a Civil Marriage contracted in the City Hall of Manila Thereafter a Religious Ceremony was Conducted in Quezon City Plaintiff averred that he was forced to enter into marriage with the respondent Respondent averred that the plaintiff and took her away from her parents and arranged a wedding for them Plaintiff alleges that he did not procure a marriage license Due to irreconcilable differences, plaintiff and respondent were separated, thereupon plaintiff obtained a divorce decree and subsequently married in the US It was attested by different witnesses that it was the plaintiff’s family that arranged the marriage. RTC declared the marriage void for lack of a marriage license, because they found out that there was no existing license on record CA reversed the decision due to the fact that it was not substantially proven that there was no marriage license issued. There were erratic problems with regard to the records because records were not found due to the absence of the handling officer.

Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question? Held: SC agrees with the ruling of CA the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. It can also mean, as SC believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, SC cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein. 10

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Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage." This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petition is Denied. Judgment of CA is affirmed by SC.

Marriage in Articulo Mortis (Article 27, 31, 32) Case: Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria and Felipe Apelan Felix Nature: Review of a decision of CA involving the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix. Facts:

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Fact appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis, Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945. After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies. On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint. Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal questionwhich they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage. Issue: W/N the marriage was celebrated in Articulo Mortis? Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity? Ruling: Yes. There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife." The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613) this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit. In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them. 12

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In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually occurred In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its environs.

Cohabitation for Five Years (Article 34) Case: Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioners should have filed the action to declare their father’s marriage to respondent before his death applying by analogy of Article 47 of the FC (which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate fro annulment of marriage) Issue: Whether or not the second marriage was void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license? Ruling: There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other. 13

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period? Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage Ceremony (Article 6) Case: Lucio Morigo y Cacho vs People of the Philippines Nature: Petition for review on certiorari (RTC convicted Lucio of Bigamy guilty beyond reasonable doubt) Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). Lucia worked in Singapore and Canada and maintained communication with Lucio. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. 14

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. Issue: Whether or not there was a marriage ceremony validating the marriage of Lucio and Lucia? Held: The SC found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Case: Rodolfo Navarro vs. Judge Hernando Domagtoy Nature: Administrative Complaint Facts: The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Issue: Whether or not the judge has jurisdiction in the case at bar to solemnize marriage? Ruling: Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. 16

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. Respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Marriage Certificate: Contents Thereof (Article 6, 22) Case: Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudisio Balogbog vs. CA, Ramonito Balogbog and Generoso Balogbog Nature: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them. Facts: Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. After which there were witnesses presented that corroborated the story of Ramonito and Generoso that Gavino and Catalina were indeed married. Most of the witnesses said that they were present during the marriage ceremony. Catalina testified that there was a marriage certificate but it was burned during the war. Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo, then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day.

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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a marriage certificate would rebut the presumption of marriage?

Held: Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence. The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. Case: In Re: Intestate Estates of Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,his nephews and nieces,his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

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Facts: Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman. The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessarily means that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. Issue: W/N there was a valid marriage? Held: First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners. Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage. Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. Case: Antonietta Garcia VDA De Chua vs. CA, Hon. Japal Guiani and Florita Vallejo, as administrator of the Estate of the late Roberto L. Chua 19

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Facts: During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

This is a case regarding the distribution of the property of the late Roberto Chua and the resolution of the designation of the Adminitratrix of his Estate Sometime from 1970 up to late 1981 petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely, Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978. It was found that the deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and without legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the above named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children with herein petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they said is the marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business residence of the decedent. Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother. Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968 through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of the alleged two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent showing that his residence is Cotabato City. 20

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

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Issue: Whether or not petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased? Held: It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no personality to file the subject motion to dismiss. The petitioner has no standing to be the administrator of the properties of her children with the deceased. PETITION is denied. Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent. 21 Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. The trial court correctly ruled in its 21 August 1992 Order that:

Marriage by Proxies/ Common- Law Marriages Case: Tomas Eugenio Sr. v.s. Judge Velez Nature: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case Facts:  On 28 August, 1988, unaware of the death of Vitaliana Vargas , the VARGASES, her full blood brothers and sisters (the private respondents) filed on September 27, 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by Eugenio in his residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.  Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.  The respondent court in an order dated September 28 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied.  Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder. 21

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

 Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.  Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents were granted leave to amend their petition.  Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her.  Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988. Issue: Whether the petitioner has the right for the legal custody of the dead body of his common-law wife (Vitaliana)? Ruling: No. Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21

When referring to a "spouse" it contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. Because, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. Ratio: Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified: (b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses. Case: Imelda Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Somerah

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Nature: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash (Petitioner being charged of adultery) Facts:  On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.  After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.  Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.  On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.  The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.  The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.  On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named JamesChua sometime in 1983".  The case was filed in court but a Motion to Quash was filed but which was denied.  Hence, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court contending that the complainant cannot be qualified as an offended party since he has already obtained a final divorce under his national law prior to the filing of the case. Issue: Whether the adultery case against the petitioner can prosper even after she and her former foreign husband had divorce in Germany? Ruling: No. In case of adultery or concubinage, the complainant must be the offended spouse and by this is meant that the complainant is still married to the accused. Since they are already divorced, he has no more capacity to file such action because said divorce and its effects are recognized in the Philippines insofar as he is concerned. Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was not the offended spouse at the time of the suit. Case: Paula T. Llorente vs. CA and Alicia Llorente Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of CA 23

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Facts: • • • • • •

• • •

Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was enlisted to the US Army and became an American citizen His wife was left in the Philippines but when he came back, he found out that Paula is living in with the brother of Lorenzo He went back to the USA and filed a petition for divorce which was granted When he came back to the Philippines, he married Alicia with whom he had children He executed a will bequeathing all his properties to his wife Alicia and their children When his will was submitted to probate, Paula filed a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour contending that is the surviving spouse; that various properties were acquired during their marriage and that his will encroached on her legitime and ½ shares in the conjugal property The petition was given due course The RTC declared one of the children of Lorenzo as only an illegitimate child entitling her to 1/3 of the estate and 1/3 of the free portion. The CA modified the decision declaring Alicia as a co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased husband may have acquired during their converture

Issue: Is Alicia entitled to inherit? Why? Ruling: Yes, because it is clear from his will that he intended to bequeath his properties to his second wife and children. His wishes cannot be frustrated since he was a foreigner, not covered by the Philippine Laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. As to who inherits from him is governed by foreign law, his national law. Is the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo valid? Why? Yes, owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15, NCC which covers only Philippine nationals. Such policy covers foreign divorces which are valid in the Philippines even though obtained abroad, provide they are valid according to their national law. And since the man was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the former wife lost her right to inherit.

Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Cipriano Orbecido III Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari regarding the declaration of the capacity of Orbecido III to remarry by RTC 24

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Facts: • • • • • •

Cipriano married Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 In 1986 Myros left for the US, a few years later, Cipriano discovered that Lady Myros had been naturalized as an American citizen It was in the year 2000 that Cipriano learned from his son that Lady obtained a divorce decree and then remarried Cipriano thus filed a petition for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code The RTC granted the petition Hence the present recourse where the Solicitor General argues that the subject provision only applies in the case of a valid mixed marriage- between a Filipino citizen and an alien

Issue: Does par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code apply in the case of Cipriano? Ruling: The twin requisites for the application of Par 2 of Art. 26 of the FC are both present in the case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. The intent of paragraph 2, Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision includes cases involving parties who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The respondent must prove to the said divorce as a fact and in accordance with the foreign law, where Lady is naturalized.

Case: Weigel vs. Sempio-Dy GUYS SORRY HINDI KO MAHANAP SA NET YUNG CASE NA TO. SO I PASTED ONLY SOME CITATIONS FROM OTHER CASES RELATED. Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted 25

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,i[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: “x x x There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; ” Case: Mercado vs. Tan Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals Facts:  Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991  

As entered in their marriage contract the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva

 Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.  Bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted in the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in information dated January 22, 1993.  On November 13, 1992, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva  Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio.  Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information had been filed. Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of bigamy because of entering into a subsequent marriage without a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage? Ruling: Yes. Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 26

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him. Ratio: The Elements of Bigamy are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity Conflicting Decisions of SC: People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon: The ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when the accused married for the third time In subsequent cases: the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided: “Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent court." The Court held in those two cases that the said provision “plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.”

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Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

Case: SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent Nature: Petition for Certiorari in the Decision made by CA Facts:  The deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages, o 1st: June 20, 1969  with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño( 2 Kids: Sahlee and Sandee Cariño) o 2nd: November 10, 1992 with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982)  In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.  He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.  Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.  Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”  On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)  Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.  Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. 

To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.

 On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee 28

Article 1-73 of the Family Code of the Philippine June 23, 2009

Remulla, Jammy Kate S. Case Digests

 On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether the second spouse of the deceased will be entitled of death benefits even though there is no declaration of the nullity of the deceased’s first marriage? Ruling: No. (Death Benefits are not considered common to the deceased and to his second wife) Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, “... Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...” In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regim The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. Ratio: The Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. 29

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Case: Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque Sanchez, MRC, Infanta, Pangasinan Nature: Administrative Complaint against Judge Sanchez for Gross Ignorance of Law Facts:  Herminia Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on May 21, 1966 in Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage.  On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."  Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in

question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of the deceased husband is valid? Whether the Judge can be charged of Gross Ignorance of Law? Ruling: No. The subsequent marriage of the late David Manzano with Luzviminda Payao is null and void, because, even though the two cohabited for seven years, still both of them had legal impediments to be married again because of their previous valid marriages. Not all of the requirements of Article 34 (Provision on Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation) are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in the affidavits of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge himself, expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Yes. Judge Sanchez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void Note: Article 34 of the Family Code: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage Case: Tsoi Chi Ming vs. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi Nature: Petition to Review CA Decision Facts: On May 22, 1988, Tsoi Chi Ming and Gina Lao married in Manila Cathedral. After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. As newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room.

They slept together in the same room and on the same bed in 10 Months. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science. The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage. The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined and the doctor said that the petitioner is not impotent. The doctor asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had

only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. Issue: Whether there is a psychological incapacity to declare the marriage void? Ruling: Yes. Petitioner admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Case: Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or

whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents. On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the USA to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s objections. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. So, when he came back to the Philippines, he filed an action for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground of “psychological incapacity”. Julia through counsel filed an answer and denied the claim. The case was dismissed by the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. Before the SC, he asserted that there is no love and affection from her because of her failure to communicate with him for three years. Hence, she is suffering from psychological incapacity. Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological incapacity? Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to

have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

Case: Republic vs. CA and Roridel Olaviano Molina Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts:  This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila  Son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986  Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged  In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City  A few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.  On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.  In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."

Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological incapacity? Ruling: No. There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to the SC to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability Guidelines on Psychological Incapacity 1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a. Medically or clinically identified b. Alleged in the complaint c. Sufficiently proven by experts d. Clearly explained in the decision 3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage 4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable 5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage 6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by: Articles 68-71, 220,221 and 225 of FC 7. Interpretations of National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, must be given great respect by the courts 8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as a counsel of the State Case: Brenda Marcos vs. Wilson Marcos Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts: Brenda and Wilson were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig ; and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born.

Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions. Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them.The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation while the appellant on the other hand, did not. RTC the marriage is void

CA reversed the decision of RTC  not psychological incapacity because there is a need for an examination Issue: Whether the personal medical or psychological examination respondent is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity?

of

Whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated? Ruling: No. It is not a requirement and the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. (Also look for Molina Doctrine) No, it is not enough. Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Petition is denied. Case: David B. Dedel vs. CA and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel aka Jane Ibrahim Republic of the Philippines, oppositor-respondent Facts: David and Sharon married on September 28, 1966. They had four children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national. Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon

abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Lower court declared their marriage void. Republic  appealed to set aside the judgment of the lower court The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term “psychological incapacity?” Ruling: No. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.Petition is Denied.

Case: Republic of the Philippines vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano Nature: Petition for Review on the Decision of CA (Affirming the decision of RTC declaring the marriage null and void) Facts: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony. Issue: Whether their marriage can be declared void due to psychological incapacity? Ruling: No. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

Case: Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne Reyes Facts: Leonilo and Ivonne got married barely a year after their meeting. They begot three children. Leonilo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity claiming that Ivonne lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: 1. She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.

2. She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 3. She misrepresented herself as psychiatrist to her obstetrician, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when neither was true. 4. She claimed to be a singer voice talent affiliated in Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but he discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion has taken place. 5. She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 6. She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 7. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. In opposing the petition, respondent obligations by attending to all the needs no truth to the allegation that she personalities. She presented her version,

claimed that she performed her marital of her husband. She asserted that there was fabricated stories, told lies and invented thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband. (2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. (5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband�s whereabouts. (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner’s wife? Ruling: Yes. The SC find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented

witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals. Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the

Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.

Action for Legal Separation Cooling-Off Period (Art. 58) Case: Araneta vs Conception and Araneta Luis Ma. Araneta, petitioner Hon. Hermogenes Concepcion and Emma Benitez Araneta, respondents Facts: •

Action of the petitioner against his wife for legal separation in the ground of adultery • the defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their children, a monthly support of P5,000 and the return of her passport, and to pay for the attorney’s fees • plaintiff denied the petition and alleging that the defendant abandoned the children, that the conjugal properties are only worth P80,000 and not one million pesos, that her passport was not taken and contested her right for attorney’s fees • He also contended that defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she abandonded them and committed adultery • Plaintiff claims that there were no conjugal assets and she is not entitled for support because of infidelity and that she was able to support herself • Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition by granting custody of the children to defendant and monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. • Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed against the judge to require the parties to submit evidences before deciding the omnibus petition. Writ of preliminary injunction granted against the order Issue: w/n the grant of custody, alimony and support was valid Held:

•

Writ prayed for was issued and respondent judge is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendent lite. Court’s order fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Rationale: • Article 103 (article 58 FC) “action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition • It is conceded that the period of 6months is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. • Period does not have the effect of overriding the other provisions of the Code such as determination of the custody of the children, the grant of alimony and support pendent lite. Case: Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta Jr. Lucy Somosa-Ramos, petitioner Clementer Ramos, respondent Facts: • • • •

Petitioner filed a case for legal separation, concubinage on the respondent’s part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return of her claimed paraphernal and exclusive property August 4, 1971 respondent judge granted a motion to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. Petition for certiorari was filed

Issue: w/n Article 103 would preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit Held: • • •

Article 103 of the civil code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the 6 months period At any rate from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971 more than six months has already elapsed There can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

Based upon the Stipulation of Facts or Confession of Judgment (Art. 60)

Case: De Ocampo vs. Florenciano JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent Facts: • • • • • • • • • • •

They were married and had children which is said to be living with the plaintiff Sometime March 1951, plaintiff dicovered that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas when defendant had finished studying, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. June 1955 plantiff surprised his wife by having an illicit affair with Nelson Orzame Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action Plaintiff filed a case of legal separation on the ground of adultery Defendant while interrogated by the fiscal admitted having sexual relationship with Orzame During prosecution, the defendant kept silent and did not attend any hearing Court ordered the fiscal if there was collusion and the result was none The Court of First Instance of dismissed the case and Court of Appeals confirmed that there was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription

Issue: w/n there was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to adultery and prescription Held: • •

No confession of judgment, condonation, collusion and prescription. SC reversed the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano.

Rationale: •

•

Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relationship. It was the wife who "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return

Notes: •

Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to

•

the plaintiff's demand. Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement. . . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.

Effects of Filing Petition for Legal Separation (Art. 61 and 62) Case: SABALONES vs CA Samson Sabalones, petitioner Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, respondent Facts: • • • • •

• • • •

Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a assigned as a diplomat was assigned in different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15years After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and medical treatments Respondents opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Curameng Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife Decision of lower court was appealed and granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the administration of their properties Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right will be violated

Issue: w/n article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal properties Held: Petition DENIED •

Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets

•

Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole conjugal assets • Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction: o Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate o There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and children Notes: •

•

•

Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit Twin requirements of valid injunction: o Existence of a right o Actual or threatened violation Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator

Case: ESPIRITU vs. CA Facts: • • • • • • • • • •

Petitioner Reynaldo and Respondent Teresita Masunding met in 1976 in Iligan city where the P is employed bu the NSC and R employed as a nurse 1979 R wife left for the US to work as a nurse and obtained her immigrant status 1984 P husband was sent by the NSC to the US and there began their relationship to live as common law husband and wife they had 2 children & 1990 when their relationship started to deteriorate & separated R left P & children, P bought the children to the Philippines w/ his sister & went back to the States because his assignment was not yet complete 1992 R returned to the Phils. & filed a petition of writ if habeas corpus against the P to gain custody over the children TC dismissed the petition & suspended the parental authority of the R to the children & declared P having parental authority over them TC granted custody to the P father CA reversed the decision & gave custody to the mother SC reversed the CA decision & upheld the decision of TC

Issue: w/n respondent court (CA) erred in reversing the decision in granting custody to the respondent Held: CA erred in granting the custody to the respondent mother •

Whether child is under or over seven yrs of age the paramount criterion must always be the child’s interests

• •

Discretion to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration Consideration involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained that the time that either parent is given custody ever the child

LERMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS Teodoro Lerma, petitioner Conception Diaz, respondents Facts: • • • • • • • • •

Petitioner and respondents are husband and wife married on May 19, 1951 August 22,1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against respondent Respondent filed in lower court a complaint against the petitioner for legal separation/ separation of properties, custody of their children and support with urgent petition lite for her and their youngest son Complaint for legal separation on 2grounds (1)concubinage, (2) attempt against her life The application for petition for pendente lite was granted as to effect orders (1) respondent entitled to support pendent elite from the date of the filing of the complaint, (2) monthly support reduced from P2250 to P1820 Petition for certiorari & prohibition with preliminary injunction to was filed to annul the orders granted by Judge Luciano CA: granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court for his defense against the petition for pendente lite Respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had never asked that he be allowed to present evidences in the lower court CA set aside its 1st decision and dismissed the petition instead

Issue: w/n petitioner should be allowed to present evidence in the lower court when the defense of action has been moot and academic Held: resolution of respondent CA and order issued to the respondent is set aside •

petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who him/herself guilty of an act w/c constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support

Duty to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support (Art. 68) ARROYO vs ARROYO Facts: • • • • • •

Spouses were united in bonds of wedlock by their marriage in 1910 Not until 1920 when the wife went away from the common home with the intention of living separately with her husband After efforts made by the husband for his wife to comeback to them, it initiated him to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him Defendant wife admitted that she had left her husband without his consent Wife prayed for affirmative relief consisting of (1) decree of separation, (2) liquidation of conjugal partnership, (3) allowance for counsel fees and separate maintenance Lower court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant

Issue: w/n plaintiff husband can compel his wife to return to the conjugal home? Held: •

• • •

it is not within the province of the court to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the other, although husband is without a doubt entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself w/o sufficient cause and that is she is admonished that it is her duty to return act of living together is a mere voluntary act of the spouses if one of the spouses leaves the conjugal home, the other spouse cannot go to court and seek for an order to compel such spouse to return a writ of habeas corpus will not even issue to compel a spouse to live together with the other

Case: ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER Facts: • • • • • • •

Potenciano Ilusorio a lawyer and a rich business man is married to Erlinda Kalaw and had 6 children Upon his arrival from the US the stayed in Antipolo with Erlinda for 5 months Their children alleged that their mother overdosed him as a result of his deteriorating health Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the properties due to his health problems and advanced age After attending a meeting in Baguio city he did not return to their house in Antipolo but instead lived in Makati Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and visitation rights CA granted the petition for humanitarian reasons

•

SC reversed the CA’s decision

Issue: w/n the CA erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus Held: • • • • •

Writ of habeas corpus should not be issued No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife Evidence show that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Ilusorio that would justify the issuance of the writ Even though he is in medication- does not render him mentally incapacitated Ilusorio was in sound and alert mind and can still make his own choices

Case: AYALA INVESTMENT vs. CA AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents. Facts: • • • • • • •

• •

Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). To security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC PBM failed to pay the loan AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching Court found PBM and Ching jointly and severally liable upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8M bond private respondents filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied because the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void

Issue: w/n respondent court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of private respondents is not liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband Held : NOT liable • • • • •

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate even though members of the said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and petitioner’s right of recourse against Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of

Case: CARLOS vs. ABERLARDO HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent. Facts: • • • • •

October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt and the amount was in full payment of the property when petitioner inquired about the status of the loan due, respondent spouses pleaded that in they are not yet in the position to settle the obligation respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation

• • • •

petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his wife SC reversed decision of CA

Issue: w/n CA erred in dismissing the case due to lack of evidence to prove that respondent spouses are liable Held: petition GRANTED, respondent spouse are jointly and severally liable in the payment plus damages a. General rule is that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25k was used to purchase the property and used as family home o Spouses didn’t deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. o acknowledgment of the loan made by respondent wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family b. R husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan for he is not a stockholder nor an employee of the company o

c. the amount of money loaned came from the personal account of the plaintiff Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Case: WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA, VS. FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision affirmed RTC  annulled the sale

Facts: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975.  During their marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.  Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. (verbally)  Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon.  Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor.  Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.  On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.  On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. ISSUES: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid? Ruling: It is Conjugal Property  As proof of the lot's conjugal nature, Elisera presented a transfer certificate of title, a real property tax declaration, and a Memorandum of Agreement dated November 19, 1979 which she and her husband had executed for the administration of their conjugal properties. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a co-owner of the subject lot. Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void ab initio. “held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide: ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,the husband cannot alienate or

encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent... Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.

Case: JADER vs. CAMAISA THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents. Facts: • • • • • •

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Through an advertisement, petitioner was interested in 2 properties in Makati and Taytay respectively, so she negotiated to purchase it from a real estate broker authorized by the respondent spouses After inspection of the properties and some documents, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker The agreement made was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto and petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife's conformity and consent to the sale A contract to sell has been executed petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" for the full amount of the consideration Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses Norma filed a Motion for summary judgment TC rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent CA affirmed judgment of TC

Issue: whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written consent.

Held: No • • • •

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of spouse the conjugal partnership administration of the conjugal properties, the other may assume sole property powers ofshall belong to both spouses case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall administration. These powersjointly. do not In include the powers of disposition or encumbrance subject recourse the court wife for a proper remedy, which must whichprevail, must have the to authority of to the court or by thethe written consent of the other spouse. In be availed of within five years from the of the contract implementing such the absence of such authority or consent the date disposition or encumbrance shall be void. decision. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.