Case Digest

CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v. DELIMA [46 Phil. 738 (1922)]

Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but Napoleon answered with a stroke of his lance. The  policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didn’t hit Napoleon. The criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his weapon; the policeman shot him dead. Delima was tried and convicted for homicide; he appealed. Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the killing was done in performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and his disobedience with a weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action ac tion was justified by the circumstances. Case digest on PEOPLE V. HERMOGENES FLORA G.R. NO. 125909

The 2 accused (Hermogenes and Edwin) were convicted for the murder of Emerita and Ireneo and the attempted murder of Flor. The 2 were found to have conspired to kill kill Ireneo. However, during the commission of the crime, Emerita was also also killed and Flor  hit by a bullet. HELD: Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo and no one else. Hence, both can be convicted for the murder of Ireneo. Ireneo. However, only Hermogenes who fired at Emerita and Flor can be convicted for the murder of Emerita Emerita and Flor respectively. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile  phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao

People vs Francisco Abarca G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different  parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot woun ds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of  said spouses. Issue:

W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of co mplex crime of murder with double frustrated murder? Held:

The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under  exceptional circumstances is not murder. We canno t therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has  been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for  hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold A rnold Amparado's loss of  earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

People vs Francisco Abarca G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987 Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different  parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot woun ds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of  said spouses. Issue:

W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of co mplex crime of murder with double frustrated murder? Held:

The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under  exceptional circumstances is not murder. We canno t therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has  been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for  hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold A rnold Amparado's loss of  earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

People of the Philippines vs. Gonzales, Jr.

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Inocencio Gonzales, Jr., accused-appellant. G.R. No. 139542 June 21, 2001 Gonzaga-Reyes, J. FACTS: On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accusedappellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales’. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez’s daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant appe llant tried to free his hand and with Trisha’s substantial body weight  pushing against him the appellant lost his balance b alance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber  Andres, Noel’s wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were wounded. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of Kevin Valdez. Hence, an automatic review or this case.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was  present in the commission of the crime. 2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of  intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances. RULINGS: 1. It has been consistently co nsistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing o r  crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated he ated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victim’s provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused a ccused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behav ior  of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been b een

 preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the  part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder. 2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded  by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant’s  pretense of voluntary surrender. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of   provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of   Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant’s vehicle. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of  attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant’s use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably  placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.

CASE DIGEST ON INTOD V. CA [215 SCRA 52 (1992)]

Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room. However, she was in another city then thus they hit no one. Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder? Held: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime—an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or  carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: (1)

The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;

(2)

There is no intention to perform the physical act;

(3)

There is a performance of the intended physical act; and

(4)

The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to ac tor or beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,  paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

Case Digest on People v. Acuram G.R. No. 117954(April 27, 2000)

The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his commanding officer was told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave camp, where he surrendered. HELD: Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender  The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either becau se he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant’s commanding officer  who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. case digests, case digests of supreme court decisions, case digests Philippines, mobile  phone deals, laptop computers, gadgets, free legal opinion, online jobs, best law firms in Mindanao

Vda. da Bataclan v. Medina

Facts:

The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch.  As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the  bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved. Issue:

 What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers? Held:

  We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of  transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry  Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus  was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the  bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by  plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any  efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result  would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by  setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate

predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably  result therefrom. In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its  back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of  the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC G.R. No. L-15130

May 31, 1960

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLIMACO DEMIAR, defendant-appellant.

Teofilo Mendoza, Jr. for appellant. Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee. BARRERA, J .:

Appeal1 from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu(in Crim. Case No. V4961), convicting appellant Climaco Demiar of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal , as maximum, to pay indemnity in the sum of P4,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased Pilar Edaño, and to pay the costs. It appears that appellant Climaco Demiar and his wife lived in the same house with his mother Pilar Edaño in the sitio of Lacaron, barrio Tambongon, San Remigio, Cebu. At about noontime on Friday, August 5, 1955, appellant who was a gambler, accompanied  by his wife, went to the market place at barrio Tambongon, Cebu. At about 1:30 p.m., after spouses left, Pacita Catanda, 12-year old daughter of Trifona Demiar, Pilar Edaño's daughter, went to the house of her grandmother (Pilar Edaño), as she used to do, with a  brother and a sister. Appellant returned shortly before sunset and, finding that his mother, Pilar Edaño, had not prepared any food, reprimanded her. The latter explained that she was notable to cook their food, because she had been very busy grinding corn. Appellant thereupon became angry and began to choke his mother, making her and Pacita Catanda scream. The screams and shouts attracted the attention of Trifona Demiar who has living in a house nearby, about 30 yards away. Trifona immediately went to the h ouse of her  mother, whereupon she saw her brother, appellant herein, choking their mother Pilar  Edaño, near the stove in the kitchen. Trifona Demiar then and there told appellant to release their mother. Appellant did as he was told and went upstairs. Like Trifona, Meliton Magdadaro, barrio lieutenant of Tambongon, whose house was only about 15 yards from that Pilar Edaño, was also attracted by the shouts for help and the commotion in the house of the latter. He immediately went to said house, and inquired what the commotion was all about. Pilar Edaño, who was then sitting near a stove, speaking in a guttural voice which could hardly be understood, told Magdadaro that she had been choked by her son, herein appellant, who did not pity her.

Pacita Catanda, Trifona Demiar, and Meliton Magdadaro, noticed that the face of Pilar  Edaño, who had always been in good health and doing a lot of household chores  previously, became bluish. After choking by appellant, Pilar Edaño could no longer swallow any food, nor drink  water, due to her swollen neck. Her physical condition deteriorated, until she died 3 days after the incident. It appears, likewise that after Pilar Edaño was choked by appellant prevented her from doing so, threatening her with death, if she ever called a doctor. After Pilar Edaño's death, a daughter of hers, named Santas Demiar, arrived from Tabuelan, Cebu, and learned of the cause of her mother's death. On August 10, 1955, accompanied by Trifona Demiar, Meliton Magdadaro, and Ciano Bacare, Santas Demiar  reported the incident to the chief of police of San Remigio, Cebu. Acting upon the report, said chief of the police cited appellant to appear before him. During the investigation conducted by the chief of police, appellant denied having choked his mother Pilar Edaño. He claimed that he only held her shoulder, and she fell to the floor; that on that occasion, he tried to tell his mother to keep quiet, as he was then quarrelling with his wife. Appellant's wife, however, when questioned by the chief of police in the presence of  appellant, admitted that her husband (appellant) choked his mother. Likewise, during the investigation, when the chief of police and the Justice of the Peace of San Remigio asked questions, appellant cried and asked for forgiveness from his sister and begged them to discontinue the case against him. While he was under detention in the municipal building at San Remigio, after the corresponding complaint for parricide was filed against him by the chief of police on August 11, 1955, he sent a letter (Exhs. A and A-3-A) to his  brother-in-law, Lope Mayol, husband of Santas Demiar, asking him, among other things, for forgiveness and pity, and requesting his sister to withdraw the complaint against him. On the witness stand, appellant denied that he choked his mother, Pilar Edaño, the deceased, and stated that she died of ill-health and high-blood pressure. His version, corroborated by his brother, Bernardino Demiar, and sisters, Priscila Demiar and Dominga Demiar, is as follows: That he is the youngest son of the deceased Pilar Edaño, who, during her lifetime, lived with him at Lacaron, barrio Tambongon, San Remigio, Cebu; that his deceased mother  was sickly, and suffered from high blood pressure; that she went to Masbate, sometime in May, 1955, to visit her sons and daughters residing there; that while his deceased mother  was in Masbate in the house of her daughter Dominga Demiar, she fainted 5 times due to high blood pressure; that she was sickly when she returned to appellant's place at Lacaron, Tambongon, San Remigio, Cebu; that sometime in the afternoon of August 5, 1955, she had an attack of her high blood pressure, lost consciousness, and remained Demiar, Trifona Demiar, Meliton Magdadaro, and some neighbors came and tried to revive her; that she regained consciousness in the morning of August 8, 1955, and remained conscious for about half an hour; that after bequeathing her rings, earrings, necklaces, and other pieces of jewelry to appellant, she again lost consciousness and

never regained it; that the accusation against him is false, malicious, and fabricated by his sister Santas Demiar and her husband Lope Mayol, who bore a grudge against him,  because he opposed the mortgage of a land belonging to their mother; that after appellant was detained, Santas Demiar and her husband mortgaged the land to Juanito Pepito for  P250.00; and that later, the spouses had the house of appellant demolished and appropriated the materials thereof. Appellant's claim that his mother's death was due to natural sickness and that she died of  high blood pressure cannot be sustained in the face of the direct and positive testimonies of Pacita Catanda, the 12-years old grandchild of the deceased Pilar Edaño and niece of  appellant and Trifona Demiar, appellant's sister, which are corroborated by those of  Meliton Magdadaro, appellant's cousin, and Telesforo Pestaño, chief of police of San Remigio, who investigated appellant. An examination of the testimony of Pacita Catanda, who actually saw the choking of her grandmother, the deceased Pilar Edaño, by appellant, disclosed that said witness, although a child of tender age at the time she took  the witness stand, was intelligent enough to convey what she perceived on the date in question. We are in entire accord with the following observations of the trial court on the  point. The Court finds no reason to doubt the credibility of Pacita Catanda. She has b een examined with reference to her ability to understand the nature of an oath and the Court has observed that she is possessed of sufficient intelligence and discernment to justify it in accepting to the questions propoun ded to her were  prompt, straightforward, responsible to interrogatories, and devoid of evasion or  any semblance of shuffling. Pacita Catanda is a niece of the accused and there is nothing in the record to show that she has been induced or in any manner  impelled by any ulterior motive to testify falsely against the accused. The Court, therefore, believes that her testimony is admissible in evidence against the accused. Needless to say, an intelligent child is as a rule the best witness in the world. (People vs. Bustos, 45 Phil., 9; People vs. Alembra, 55 Phil., 578.) But apart from Pacita Catanda's testimony, there is the testimony of Trifona Demiar, appellant's sister, who also saw appellant choke their mother. The defense, however, contends that the trial court in relying upon the allegedly unreliable testimony of Pacita Catanda, and the supposedly improbable testimony of  Trifona Demiar. Appellant points to an apparent contradiction in Pacita Catanda's testimony, who, on cross-examination, stated that she did not see appellant in her  grandmother's house, while on direct examination she said that she saw appellant choke her grandmother in the latter's house. Suffice it to say, that the trial court, which observed and sized up said witness, gave credence to her testimony, not only because it is rational,  but also because it is intelligible as well. In respect of appellant's contention that his sister  Trifona Demiar could not have heard the screams and shouts as her mother at a distance of 60 yards, suffice it also to state that said witness heard, not only her mother's screams,  but also the shouts of her daughter Pacita Catanda. Besides, it is a matter of common

knowledge that barrios are free from the noises that obtain in large and busy communities, so much so that a light noise is easily heard at far distances. The testimony of Meliton Magdadaro corroborates those of Pacita Catanda and Trifona Demiar, and leaves no room for doubt that appellant did, in fact, choke the deceased Pilar  Edaño. This witness stated that his attention was attracted by the shouts and screams coming from Pilar Edaño's house. He went there to investigate, and was told by Pilar  Edaño that she was choked by her son, appellant herein, who did not pity her. Added to this, is the behavior or appellant who, during the investigation and in the presence of the chief of police and the justice of the peace, cried and asked for forgiveness from his sister. Too, while under detention, appellant wrote a letter (Exhs. A and A-3-A)to his  brother-in-law, Lope Mayol, seeking forgiveness from his sister and asking them to testify that their mother (the deceased Pilar Edaño) died a natural death. Appellant's  behavior, is evidently incompatible with his protestations of innocence. As correctly observed by the trial court: If it is true the accused did not choke his mother, there was certainly no necessity for him to induce his sister Santas Demiar to just declare that their mother died of  illness. This letter, in effect, bolsters the testimony of the witness for the  prosecution that the accused, in truth and in fact, choked his mother on the afternoon in question. Appellant's claim that the charge against him is false, malicious, and concocted by his sister Santas and her husband Lope Mayol, who allegedly bore a grudge against him,  because of his opposition to his proposal to mortgage the land of their mother Pilar  Edaño, does not deserve any serious consideration. It appears that the land in question was sold by the deceased to the spouses Lope Mayol and Santas Demiar on September 4, 1954 (Exh. B), and appellant himself was one of the witness to the sale. The money realized from the sale was used to defray the marriage expenses of appellant and his wife. Granting for the sake of argument, that Lope Mayol and his wife were actuated by ulterior motives, there is no showing that the other witnesses, like Pacita Catanda, appellant's niece; Trifona Demiar, appellant's sister; Meliton Magdadaro appellant's cousin; and Telesforo Pestaño, chief of police, had any motive to falsely impute so grave a crime as parricide to appellant. On this point, the trial court said: The witness of the prosecution, Pacita Catanda, Trifona Demiar Meliton Magdadaro, and the Chief of Police Telesforo Pestaño, appear to be disinterested witnesses in this case. No evidence whatsoever has been presented to show any reason or motive why these witnesses should have testified falsely against the accused. In the absence of such evidence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed, and that their testimony is worthy of faith and credit. (People vs. Macalindong, 76, Phil., 719; 43 Off. Gaz., 490.) Between the positive testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and the mere denials of the accused, greater weight must necessarily be given to that of the former. (People vs. Barbano, 76 Phil., 702, 43 Off. Gaz., 478.)

It is also contended for appellant that the trial court erred in admitting appellant's letter to his brother-in-law Lope Mayol (Exh. A) and that there is nothing in the letter which would show that appellant admitted his guilt. Appellant argues that, instead of  considering said letter as evidence indicative of his guilt, the trial court should have considered it in his favor, because he disclaimed therein asked forgiveness from his sisters and begged them to testify that their mother died of natural illness and not of  strangulation, we fail to see why said statements could not be taken as an admission of  appellant's guilt. As to the argument that said letter should have been considered in appellant's favor, it may stated that self-serving statements made extra-judicially cannot  be admitted as evidence in favor of the person making them, although the incriminating statement is evidence against him. (People vs. Piring, 63 Phil., 564.) It is finally contended that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of   parricide, in the absence of evidence that the cause of the deceased's death was the result of strangulation; that no expert witness was presented to testify on the cause of her death; and that possibly the deceased had died of another cause and not due to the act of  appellant. It is argued that the trial court should have given credence to the defense version that the deceased was a sick woman, suffering from high blood pressure, which may have cause her death. But, as already stated, there is direct and positive, fullycorroborated testimony, that before the choking incident, the deceased Pilar Edaño was enjoying normal health, and did the daily household chores such as fetching water, grinding corn, cooking food, and splitting firewood; that after appellant choked her, she  became seriously ill; that from the time she was strangled, she could not swallow food or  drink water; and that she died 3 days later, without recovering from the effects of the strangulation. From these facts, it is to conclude, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the deceased's death was the direct and natural consequence of the injuries inflicted on her by appellant. (People vs. Reyes, 61 Phil., 341.) Considering that appellant h ad choked the deceased, thereby inflicting injuries upon her, he is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act, the death of said deceased, which resulted as consequences of such injuries. Well-settled is the rule that a person is responsible for the direct, natural, and logical consequences of his criminal or unlawful acts. (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil., 524; People vs. Martin, 98 Phil., 18 and other cases.) The crime committed by appellant is parricide (Art. 246, Revised Penal Code),the deceased victim of the criminal act being his legitimate mother, which crime is  punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. As correctly held by the trial court, appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong (Art. 13 [3], id.). We do not agree, however, that the mitigating circumstance of  obfuscation, or a circumstance of analogous nature should be considered in his favor. As  pointed out by the Solicitor General, the failure of appellant's deceased mother to prepare food for him while he was away gambling, leaving her at home to do the household chores for him, gave him no justification to lose his temper and strangle her to death. The  penalty imposed by the trial court is, therefore, modified to that of reclusion perpetua, which we hereby impose on appellant.

Modified as above indicated, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the defendant appellant Climaco Demiar. So ordered.  Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

People v Piamonte (Daniel) Share | [*1] People v Piamonte (Daniel) 2010 NY Slip Op 50746(U) [27 Misc 3d 134(A)] Decided on April 21, 2010 Appellate Term, Second Department Published by New York  State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. Decided on April 21, 2010 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  APPELLATE TERM: 9th and 10th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS PRESENT: : LaCAVA, J.P., TANENBAUM and IANNACCI, JJ 2008-716 W CR. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, against Daniel Piamonte, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Cortlandt, Westchester  County (Daniel F. McCarthy, J.), rendered March 13, 2008. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal contempt in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed. We have reviewed the record and agree with defendant's counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted (see Anders v California, 386 US 738 [1967]; People v Paige, 54 AD2d 631 [1976]). LaCava, J.P., Tanenbaum and Iannacci, JJ., concur. Decision Date: April 21, 2010

[G.R. No. 130499. October 5, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAMFILO QUIMSON @ “NOEL QUIMSON,” accused-appellant. DECISIO N

 PER CURIAM : Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, 5 Judicial Region, Branch 11, Ligao, Albay, in Criminal Case No. 3388 for  Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads; th

“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, PAMFILO QUIMSON, a.k.a. NOEL QUIMSON, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER  defined and penalized under Article 248, as amended, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating circumstance, of evident premeditation without any mitigating circumstance, and hereby imposes upon said accused the penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the legal heirs of the victims sums of money as follows: “HEIRS OF ROMEO MATIAS, SR. P

50,000.00

-

Actual Damages

P

150,000.00

-

Moral Damages

P

30,000.00

-

Burial

“HEIRS OF CRISALDO GUIMBA P

50,000.00

-

Actual Damages

P

150,000.00

-

Moral Damages

P

30,000.00

-

Burial

“HEIRS OF RAUL RENDOR  P

50,000.00

-

Actual Damages

P

150,000.00

-

Moral Damages

P

30,000.00

-

Burial

“HEIRS OF GLENDA VILLAREAL P

50,000.00

-

Actual Damages

P

150,000.00

-

Moral Damages

P

30,000.00

-

Burial

“With costs. “SO ORDERED.” The antecedents are as follows: In the evening of August 17, 1995 Romeo Matias, Sr., Crisaldo Guimba, Raul Rendor, Glenda Villareal and Antonio Flores - who were all then on board a blue Toyota Tamaraw FX traveling along Colon St. in Barangay Bagumbayan, Ligao, Albay - were waylaid and fired upon by gunmen.Antonio Flores, the driver of the Tamaraw FX, and Raul Rendor, who was seated beside him, managed to get out of the vehicle. Wounded, the two proceeded to the house of Romeo Matias, Sr., where they met the latter’s wife, Isidra Matias. Rendor and Flores confided to Isidra that they were ambushed by Pamfilo Quimson with some unidentified companions. Raul Rendor was noticeably weak and  pale, and he was constantly clutching his stomach, while Antonio Flares was trembling. Thereafter, Isidra told their family driver to bring Rendor and Flores to the hospital. Wilfredo Matias, who earlier accompanied another victim, met Rendor and Flores at the Albay Provincial Hospital where the two were subsequently brought. The re, Rendor told Wilfredo Matias that Pamfilo Quimson was one of their assailants. The following day, Raul Rendor was operated on in order to repair the perforated wounds in his right diaphragm and the lacerated wounds in his lungs. Surgical packs were temporarily placed inside his body to prevent further bleeding at the back of his liver. In the morning of August 21, 1995, Raul Rendor underwent a second operation to remove the said surgical packs. Later that day, Raul Rendor died of respiratory failure. SPO1 Penafiel, SPO3 Bea and P03 Borromeo were the first policemen to respond to the ambush-slaying of Matias’ group at the corner of Colon and Mabini Streets. The three  policemen found the blue Tamaraw FX resting on the shoulder of the road. They took  Glenda Villareal and Romeo Matias, Sr. to the Pio Duran Memorial Hospital. Minutes later, SPO3 Iglesia arrived at the crime scene and secured it. He saw the Tamaraw FX slanting on the right shoulder of the road and facing the direction of the house of Romeo Matias, Sr., some 100 meters ahead. He found the body of Crisaldo Guimba, which had been lifted out of the Tamaraw FX by onlookers, lying on the road some three (3) meters from the rear of the ambushed vehicle. He made a sketch and caused the vehicle to be photographed. He also recovered 39 empty bullet shells from the crime scene. Based on the physical evidence at hand, Major Arroyo of the PNP Crime Laboratory concluded that the ambush vehicle was fired upon from the right side and at the back. Thereafter, the investigation of the shooting incident was transferred to the Task Force Katarungan under Senior Superintendent D. Saminiano.On August 19, 1995, the Task  Force went to the Albay Provincial Hospital to interview Raul Rendor. His wife Vivian

and his attending physician, Dr. Barrosa gave their consent to the interview. The investigation was brief because the witness was in pain and had difficulty in breathing. The sworn statement of the late Raul Rendor pointed to accused Pamfilo Quimson as one of the gunmen. Based on the evidence presented, the court a quo found the injuries and cause of death of  the victims to be as follows: “ROMEO MATIAS, SR.: He died on the spot. There were sixteen (16) gunshot wounds of varying sizes, some characterized by contusion collars and tattooing. Gunshot Wound  No. 2 involved an avulsion of the scalp and evisceration of the tissues of the brain. Each of the wounds was fatal. The cause of death is ‘hemorrhagic shock due to skull fracture, secondary to multiple fatal gunshot wounds with brain tissue evisceration’ (Exhibit ‘C’). “CRISALDO GUIMBA: He died also on the spot. He sustained fourteen (14) gunshot wounds, mostly at the back. The most fatal is wound No. 1 which involved skull fracture and avulsion of the scalp. The cause of death is also ‘hemorrhagic shock due to skull fracture secondary to fatal gunshot wounds’ (Exhibit ‘E’). “RAUL RENDOR: He sustained gunshot wounds involving vital organs of the body and died on August 21, 1995, at Albay Provincial Hospital. The cause of death is ‘respiratory failure, secondary to gunshot wounds’ (Exhibit ‘J’). “GLENDA VILLAREAL: No medical evidence was presented. However, witnesses testified that they saw her wounded and had to be brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital where she died on August 18, 1995. “ANTONIO FLORES: He did not testify in the case. There is no medical evidence to  prove his injuries.” On October 2, 1995, accused-appellant Pamfilo Quimson was charged with Multiple Murder and Frustrated Murder under the following information: “The undersigned, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Albay, hereby accuses PAMFILO QUIMSON alias NOEL QUIMSON, of the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER with FRUSTRATED MURDER, committed as follows: ‘That on or about 8:45 in the evening of August 17, 1995 at Barangay Bagumbayan, Ligao, Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, together with two male persons, who are still unidentified, conspiring, confederating and helping each other for a common purpose, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and with the u se of firearms (M-16, M-14 and 9MM  pistol), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire at a blue colored Tamaraw FX, causing the death of the following passengers - ROMEO MATIAS, SR., GRISALDO GUIMBA, RAUL RENDOR and GLENDA VILLAREAL y BORBE; seriously wounding ANTONIO “REY” FLORES which would have produce d the crime

of MURDER, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the immediate medical assistance given to Flores, to the damage and prejudice of the victims and their heirs.’ “ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.” Upon arraignment on November 14, 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. In disowning liability for the offense charged; accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi. At around 8 o’ clock in the evening of August 17, 1995, accused-appellant claimed that he was in Macalaya, Castilla, Sorsogon, with two of his fellow soldiers in the house of a barangay kagawad. According to accused-appellant, they were then drinking in the said house located just outside their camp from 5:00 in the afternoon to 10:00 in the evening. Thereafter, accused-appellant and his two companions returned to their quarters inside the military camp. After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of  the crime charged and was sentenced accordingly. With the court a quo’s imposition of  the death penalty, the case is now before us on automatic review. Accused-appellant raises the following errors: “ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS: 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE STATEMENT OF RAUL RENDOR AS A DYING DECLARATION AND BASING ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UPON IT. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE EXISTED EVIDENCE OF RES GESTAE, AND BASING ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UPON IT. 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF INADMISSIBLE, INCREDIBLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE AND IGNORING THE MORE CREDIBLE AND PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.” The appeal is not meritorious. We have long since held that in order for a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1) the declaration was made by the deceased under consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstance of the declarant’s death; and (4) it is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry.

The only question raised by accused-appellant against the admissibility of the written ante mortem statement of Raul Rendor is whether or not the latter made his declaration under the consciousness of his impending death. Accused-appellant invites our attention to that portion of the said statement wherein Rendor promised to give a supplemental   statement after he had recovered, and to the fact that the same was made almost twelve (12) hours after Rendor’s first operation. He also points to the testimony of Dr. Barrosa, Rendor’s physician, admitting that Rendor was quite fine. At first glance, it would seem that appellant’s argument may have some basis. A thorough study of Dr. Barrosa’s testimony, however, would prove the contrary. “x x x “CONDITION OF PATIENT: - conscious, coherent, ambulatory - Blood Pressure: 100/80 - Cardiac Rate: 120/min. “BRIEF HISTORY: - Nature of Incident: Ambushed - Time of Incident: 8:30 P.M. - Place of Incident: Centro, Ligao, Albay “Physical Examination revealed the following findings: - there was a round wound below the right scapular area - another round wound through and through at the back of his leg - Abdomen was flat - with abdominal tenderness at the right upper quadrant - other quadrant soft, no guarding “IMPRESSION: - intra-thoracic injury - intra- abdominal injury”

“x x x “A- Operative Findings of the first operation of Raul Rendor: - the patient was placed under general anesthesia - Close tube thoracotomy (right) F32 rectal tube revealing a pint of fresh blood and evacuating around - midline incision carried from skin down to peritoneum - upon opening the abdominal wall, 2.0 liters of blood consisting of clotted and nonclotted was found or evacuated - recovery of slug inside abdominal cavity - around 750 cc of clotted blood was evacuated “a) 2.5”cm. lacerated wound was seen at the anterior surface of right lobe of  liver  “b) stellate-shaped laceration around 7.0 cm. in greatest diameter noted surrounded by necrotic liver tissues postero lateral surface of the (right) lobe of  liver  - a 2.0 cm. perforation of the right diaphragm was also seen - repair of diaphragmatic laceration was done using chronic I straumatic needle - repairing liver laceration using parenchyma suture of metal patching was done - bleeding persisted - application of 7 square packs surrounding the liver was done - close “Q - Will you explain in layman’s language the findings you have read? “A - This 2.5 laceration of the right lobe of liver. Our liver consists of 2 parts, right and left part. There was a wound there of about 2.5 cm. The character of the wound the edges were rugged on the anterior surface of the liver, and another one, also a round wound at the back portion of the liver which is larger than the one on the lungs. The third wound, 2.0 cm. perforation on the right diaphragm. The diaphragm is the one separating our  abdominal cavity from the chest cavity. The operation done in the diaphragm was repairing. The liver was sutured, and metal patching was done by application of square

 packs at the back portion of the liver. These square packs measure 4 x 8 cm., and this consists of about 7 packs, and they were placed at the back of the liver. The purpose of  this is to prevent the bleeding of the liver.” The medical findings quoted above show just how serious Rendor’s condition was. With two vital organs damaged, his arduous discomfort and agonizing pain are quite real. More so since the effect of anesthesia had obviously worn off after almost 12 hours from the first operation. We also take note of Dr. Barrosa’s impression of Rendor who was  perceptibly fatigued and in anguish during the taking of the latter’s statement. In fact, Rendor could not even bring himself to sign his declaration. After only six questions, the interview had to be stopped. He only had enough strength left to place his thumbmark. Indeed, Rendor was in such a precarious state that the idea of dying could not have escaped him. In the early case of U.S. vs. Virrey, this court had occasion to illustrate some of the means by which to determine the declarant’s state of mind at the time he gives his ante mortem statement. “This may be shown by the words or statements of the declarant himself, or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted. It may also be shown by his conduct at the time and the communications, if any, made to him by his medical adviser  or others, if acquiesced in by him. The fact that a clergyman has administered to him the last rites of the church also tends to show that he was under the sense of approaching death. (citations omitted) “When death supervenes speedily after such a declaration is made, the inference that the declarant realized his condition may be obvious; but it should be remembered that it is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the testimony admissible. The admissibility of the declaration, as is thus apparent, depends on the state of declarant’s mind at the time of making the declaration; and the mere fact that death does not immediately follow will not render the declaration inadmissible, provided death does ensue as a result of the injuries which are the subject of  the declaration.” The isolated pronouncements of Dr. Barrosa as pointed out by accused-appellant are not  persuasive. These were but the result of the mismatch between the good doctor and the cunning defense counsel. When the doctor was provided the chance to explain and clarify his answers however, Rendor’s true condition was affirmed. “x x x “Q - And the surgery was done at 1:20 P.M. of August 18? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - Or in the afternoon of the following day?

“A - Yes, sir. “Q - And it was done that time because you did not find anything urgent with respect to the patient? “A - In general, his blood volume is very low and his complaint of on and off pain of the upper portion of his abdomen, that’s why initially, I was already contemplating of … “Q - And the purpose of the operation was to evacuate the blood stocked up or  accumulated on his thorax and abdominal cavity? “A - The primary reason is that operation called “exploratory laparotomy”, wherein in entirety, the midline portion of the abdomen was being opened from the upper portion of  the area going down. “Q - And that operation shows that there was no danger? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - And because of that finding, the surgeons applied packs to stop the bleeding? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - And they succeeded doing so? “A - Yes, sir. “COURT: “Q - The examining counsel wanted to know from you doctor, why several hours had elapsed before the actual operation could be performed on the patient. “A - Before we operate on the patient, I still build up the patient. “Q - What do you mean by building up? “A - To correct his blood volume; to give him antibiotics to be absorbed; to monitor any other existing injury, if any. “Q - In other words, the building up of the patient is necessary before an operation could  be performed? “A - In this particular case, yes, Your Honor. “COURT: Go ahead.

“ATTY. REANTASO: “Q - But in extra-ordinary cases, that preparatory procedure may be dispensed with and you can go directly to surgery? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - And since it was not a critical urgent case, you have to build him up to more or less make the operation successful? “A - Yes, sir, and to lessen anesthesia risk, and at the same time to make his body a little  bit stronger for his operation and blood transfusion. “COURT: “Q - Was there anything alarming from the con dition of the patient before operation could be performed? “A - In this particular case, his pain was only localized on the right upper portion. “Q - In other words doctor, the condition of the patient as you so examined him was such, that the operation could be delayed if there was a necessity? “A - To be delayed and the benefit of building him up and to prepare him to survive the surgery .” (emphasis supplied) “x x x “ATTY. REANTASO: “Q - After you realized that the operation was of success and the remedies you applied were effective, you were optimistic about the chan ces of the patient after you administered all these things? “ATTY. BRIGUERA: After when? Which day thereafter? “COURT: Immediately after. “WITNESS: “A - I am qualifying my answer basing on two organs, the liver and the lungs. The  pressure problem was solved but the lungs was perforated. It no longer functions, the right lung. It was bleeding. So, his breathing was already complicated, then, ano ther  complication is infection.  And later on the lungs collapsed. His right lung no longer  functions inspite of the tube placed, the lung tube placed, the injury to the lungs becomes worth watching.

“Q - In other words, the lung was worth watching? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - Doctor, is there a technical, medical meaning when you say that an operation has  been successful? “A - Success. is categorized into two levels, the intra-operative level wherein the operation was performed and was finished. “Q - With the patient surviving? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - That is intra-operative level? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - What is the other one? “A - The post-operative level wherein complications set in. It is the stage of monitoring the patient’s complication. In this stage, complication is to be watched on. “Q - Which of the two you say or is characterized as successful operation? “A - The post-operative operation. “Q - In other words, just exactly what do you mean when you say it was successful, the  post-operative operation? “A - In this particular case, the surgery was only successful in intra-operative because the  bleeding was stopped; the tube was placed and the surgical procedure warranted for him or already been given him; the operation was finished, the patient was still alive. In  postoperative, complication sits in. It is in this level when surgery on the liver was successful but later on the patient died. “Q - How long after operation can complication sit-in? “A - In the multi-organ involvement, especially when the lungs are involved, sometimes it will take several hours if given proper care and medication. “Q - Or a maximum of how many hours when complication sit-in? “A - After 6 hours. “Q - Now, the injury to the lung is only seen on the right lung but the left lung is intact?

“A - Yes, sir, but on x-ray, it showed contusion, meaning, ‘nalanog.’ So, there w as a minimal bleeding on the left lung. “Q - But you will agree with me doctor when I say that a person, could survive with only one lung? “A - Yes, sir. “Q - Because there was a case when one lung is removed but the patient was still alive. “A - But the chances are very small  because sole lung do not function dependently when compared to our kidneys. In anatomy of kidneys, our kidney is located in a very convenient portion of the body, but our lungs, specially the left lung, is very prone to stress because it is very near the heart. “Q - But it can maintain life alone? “A - Maybe, but in a very short time only.”(emphasis supplied) “x x x “Q - The difficulty of breathing which you described as gasping for breath could be traced from the malfunctioning of the lungs? “A - Yes, Your Honor. “Q - Has the liver injury anything to do in the difficulty of breathing? “A - The liver injury may just add because of the pain in the diaphragm because the diaphragm was also violated. This guarding was on his breathing because he does not want to use his other breathing muscle because the pain would come or may sits in. “Q - In what way may a malfunctioning lung bring about difficulty in breathing? “A - If the lungs collapsed. “Q - By that answer doctor, you would like to say that a person can still be alive even if  he has a collapsed lung? “A - In this particular case, a close tube is designed to maintain the intra-thoracic pressure of the lung which is to be connected into a bottle close tube to aspirate or to maintain or  to give aid to the lung and to make it function as if it was a closed chest. “Q - And that tube that you installed is to help only the right lung that was injured? “A - Yes, Your Honor.

“Q - Because the left lung as you said was not injured, therefore, it would sustain life unlike kidneys where you can survive? “A - I don’t think so, sir. “Q - You need two lungs to sustain life unlike kidneys where you can still survive with only one kidney? “A - Yes, Your Honor.” (emphasis supplied) “x x x “Q - And this administration of oxygen to the patient was done up to the time the patient have undergone surgery is routinary? “A - No, sir, if it does warrant oxygen. “COURT: “Q - Why was a there a necessity for oxygen? “A - Because his right lung is already very weak, so, supplemental oxygen is needed to enter his lungs to support the blood circulation. The purpose of that supplemental oxygen is to give the blood real oxygen. “Q - Was the patient under oxygen support at the time his statement was taken? “A - Yes, Your Honor. “Q - Why was there a necessity to give him oxygen? “A - He was gasping already for air and there was already impending septic vasogenic shock.” “x x x “Q - And again, considering the lapse of time from the first operation to the second operation which is three days, that gave more optimism to the chances of the patient? “A - In surgical protocol, in liver injuries where pack is applied, the maximum period to remove the pack is 72 hours, depending on the clinical evaluation. If there are signs of   progressive bleeding, the pack could be maintained up to the maximum period of 72 hours, but it could also be removed in less than 72 hours.

“Q - And after the second operation when the pack was already removed, there was no more bleeding noted? “A - No more. There was no active bleeding noted but there was still intra-abdominal evacuation of blood amounting to 200 cc. “Q - 200 cc. is a big amount of blood evacuated? “A - It was a small amount of blood only to normal individuals. But to a person with extensive blood evacuation, there was already a need for a blood transfusion because of the massive bleeding. The liver also had blood evacuation, that’s why there was a  blood transfusion which consists of chemical fluid, not pure blood. It is labelled as sero sanguinuous fluid.” (emphasis supplied) The gravity of Rendor’s wounds on his right lung and liver could never be downplayed  by defense’ crafty cross examination. In the early case of U.S. vs. Mallari , this Court emphasized that “(T)he credibility of statements made by a person severely wounded rests not only on the serious situation resulting from his wound but also on his physical and mental condition, which, given the depressed state of his mind, has induced the profound conviction that his life is actually slipping away, and that he is in positive and imminent danger of dying sooner or later from the wound; nor can the force of such declaration be affected by the circumstances that he died later, hours or days after it was inflicted, for when the patient did finally die his death was due to the wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration until the hour of his death.” As regards Rendor’s statement that he is to give a supplemental statement in case he recovers, we find the same to be insufficient to render his declaration inadmissible. Rendor’s assent was with regard to his willingness to give a subsequent statement rather  than on the investigator’s vain hope for the declarant’s recovery.  Now, even without the questioned written declarations of Rendor, his spontaneous disclosure of their assailants to Mrs. Matias, in whose house they took refuge immediately after the ambush, is likewise admissible as an ante mortem statement. With the pain and discomfort from his injured lung and liver, with his heart rate increasing due to the loss of blood from his internal wounds, and with no medical assistance still in sight, Rendor’s state of mind was unmistakably on his possible dissolution. And even granting for the sake of argument that such a statement is not admissible as a dying declaration, the same may still be admitted as part of res gestae since it was made immediately after the startling occurrence. Rendor’s declaration before Mrs. Matias is genuinely an emanation of the incident for he had then no opportunity to concoct or  contrive an untrue version of the attack.

In support of his second assigned error, accused-appellant attacks the probative value of  the late Raul Rendor’s declarations. He argues that the result of the police investigation  belies Rendor’s statement mentioning an M-14 rifle as one of those used in the ambush. Then he claims that Rendor and Pamfilo Quimson did not know each other, hence, could not have possibly identified the latter. He also claims that Rendor’s seat in the ill-fated vehicle prevented him from seeing their assailants, plus the fact that the natural response of Rendor would have been to seek cover. We are not convinced. The lack of precision with which Rendor identified one of the firearms used is of no moment for we cannot expect him to have full knowledge on the matter. Similarly, We do not accept accused-appellant’s argument that Rendor would not have seen their assailants because he was seated at the back of the driver. No evidence, testimonial or otherwise was ever advanced to establish this. On the other hand, there is evidence to the effect that Rendor was seated beside the driver. Be that as it may, the fact that Rendor was seated elsewhere will not prevent him from seeing their attackers. Contrary to what accused-appellant argues, jurisprudence recognizes that victims of  criminal violence have a penchant for seeing the looks, faces and features of their  assailants. Aside from seeking cover from the volley of gunshots, it is equally natural for  Rendor to strive to see the appearance of their attackers and observe the manner the crime was committed. Accused-appellant’s contention that Rendor doesn’t know the former is likewise not enough to discredit the questioned declarations. Generally, people in rural communities know each other either by face, by name or both.While Rendor is originally from Oas and accused-appellant is from Ligao, the former’s wife testified that they stayed for about three (3) years in Ligao sometime after they got married. Also according to her, their  house is near that of the Quimson’s. She also testified that they occasionally pass by the Quimson’s in going to the market and would even see accused-appellant. While Rendor  and accused-appellant may not have been friends, it is unlikely that their paths had not crossed during those three (3) years that the Rendor spouses stayed in Ligao. Besides, the degree of closeness or familiarity with the accused-appellant on the part of the witness, although helpful, is by no means an indispensable requirement for the purpose of  identifying the former. On the other hand, accused-appellant’s claim that he made himself scarce in Ligao is both unbelievable and unsubstantiated to deserve consideration. It is quite incredible that accused would only spend a maximum of two (2) hours during his visit to his family in Ligao, if indeed his visits were infrequent. He could not even remember the very few times that he went to Ligao. He also failed to substantiate his claim, that he stayed in Tigaon, Camarines Sur after graduating from high school, by presenting his aunt in whose house he allegedly stayed. As regards his third assigned error, we find the same to be full of holes. The evidence he offered is inadequate to support his defense of alibi. In order for us to consider such a defense, accused-appellant must convincingly prove that it was impossible for him to be

at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Where there is the least chance for  him to be present at the crime scene, alibi will not hold water. On its own, accused-appellant’s alibi is already defective. While he claims that, upon returning to camp in the afternoon of August 16, 1995 he never left, he did admit subsequently of having a drinking session some 30 meters outside their camp the following night. The same night that Romeo Matias, Sr. and his group were ambushed. Add to this the camp’s slack policy on monitoring the whereabouts of its soldiersand accused-appellant’s alibi becomes unreliable for it shows that he can easily leave camp unobserved. The corroborative evidence on the alleged drinking session that fateful night is equally unreliable because when such evidence is offered by his friends and relatives, the same is held with extreme suspicion considering the facility by which it may be fabricated or concocted. More so when these witnesses themselves prove to be unreliable. Finally, accused-appellant also claims that their camp from Ligao, Albay takes a good five (5) hours of travel. He tempers It down however, when he added that the five (5) hour travel time includes waiting time. Subsequently though, he also admitted that when he was arrested by the police, it took them three (3) hours more or less, to reach Ligao, Albay. Hence, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the proximate time of its commission. All these considered, we affirm the findings of the trial court and hold accused-appellant Pamfilo Quimson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) co unts of Murder. As to the award of damages, the trial, court failed to award civil indemnity or  compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime the heirs of, the deceased are entitled to be indemnified without need of any proof thereof. Hence, an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the heirs of the four victims is hereby awarded. As regards the trial court’s award of actual damages, the same will have, to be denied with regard to the heirs of the late CRISALDO GUIMEA, RAUL RENDOR, and GLENDA VILLAREAL since the prosecution failed to offer any evidence to support the allegations of the witnesses claiming actual damages. The separate award of P30,000.00 representing burial expenses for the above-mentioned heirs is necessarily deleted for the same reason. Moreover, the same should have already been included as part of actual  damages in case the latter is permitted. On the other hand, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of the late Romeo Matias, Sr. in the amount of P50,000.00 will have to be increased to P110,000.00considering that the same was properly supported by receipts. As regards the award of moral damages, the same is denied with regard to the heirs of the late GLENDA VILLAREAL because the prosecution failed to present evidence, testimonial or otherwise, to show that the heirs of the deceased are entitled thereto.The award of moral damages to the heirs of the late ROMEO MATIAS, SR., CRISALDO GUIMBA and RAUL RENDOR while justified, must be reduced to P50,000.00 in keeping with present jurisprudence.