Case Digest

Case Digest

G.R. No. L-12444

February 28, 1963

STATES MARINE CORPORATION and ROYAL LINE, INC., vs. CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC., FACTS: The Union (CEBU SEAMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC.) alleged that the officers and men working on board the petitioners' vessels have not been paid their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened or coerced them to accept a reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners; that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were not required to pay their meals and that because Captain Carlos Asensi had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the petitioners dismissed said captain who now claims for reinstatement and the payment of back wages from December 25, 1952, at the rate of P540.00, monthly. The petitioners' shipping companies, answering, averred that there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or vacation leave to employees or workers of private firms, and that in enacting Rep. Act No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law), the Congress had in mind that the amount of P.40 per meal, furnished the employees should be deducted from the daily wages. A decision was rendered on February 21, 1957 in favor of the respondent union. The motion for reconsideration thereof, having been denied, the companies filed the present writ of certiorari, to resolve legal question involved. ISSUES: 1) WON there is a conflict between Section 3, par. F and SEC. 19 of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602). 2) WON the CIR erred in declaring that the deduction for costs of meals from the wages or salaries after August 4, 1951, is illegal and same should be reimbursed to the employee concerned, in spite of said section 3, par. (f) of Act No. 602. RESOLUTION: 1) Section 3, par. f, of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602), provides as follows — (f) Until and unless investigations by the Secretary of Labor on his initiative or on petition of any interested party result in a different determination of the fair and reasonable value, the furnishing of meals shall be valued at not more than thirty centavos per meal for agricultural employees and not more than forty centavos for any other employees covered by this Act, and the furnishing of housing shall be valued at not more than twenty centavos daily for agricultural workers and not more than forty centavos daily for other employees covered by this Act. Petitioners maintain, in view of the above provisions, that in fixing the minimum wage of employees, Congress took into account the meals furnished by employers and that in fixing the rate of forty centavos per meal, the lawmakers had in mind that the latter amount should be deducted from the daily wage, otherwise, no rate for meals should have been provided. However, section 19, same law, states — SEC. 19. Relations to other labor laws and practices.— Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions nor justify an employer in violating any other labor law applicable to his employees, in reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment. It is evident that Section 3(f) constitutes the general rule, while section 19 is the exception. In other words, if there are no supplements given, within the meaning and contemplation of section 19, but merely facilities, section 3(f) governs. There is no conflict; the two provisions could, as they should be harmonized. And even if there is such a conflict, the respondent CIR should resolve the same in favor of the safety and decent living laborers (Art. 1702, new Civil Code).. 2) The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage, is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The criterion is not so much with the kind of the benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but its purpose. Considering, therefore, as definitely found by the respondent court that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to August 4, 1951, while they were on the high seas "not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew personnel during the voyage", the deductions therein made for the meals given after August 4, 1951, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels affected should continue giving the same benefit.

[G.R. No. 118506. April 18, 1997] NORMA MABEZA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER NG/HOTEL SUPREME Labor Standards – Abandonment of Work – Loss of Confidence FACTS: Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the DOLE at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees to execute an affidavit attesting to Hotel Supreme’s compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions of law. Mabeza signed the affidavit but she refused to certify it with the prosecutor’s office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed to take her shift. She then asked for a leave but was not granted yet she’s not being allowed to work. In May 1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza as he alleged that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to amend his reply in the labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of confidence by reason of the theft allegedly committed by Mabeza. The labor arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. 2) Whether or not loss of confidence as ground for dismissal applies in the case at bar. 3) Whether or not there was underpayment of wages and benefits on the basis of exhibit an undated summary of computation prepared by allegedly by respondent's external accountant. HELD: No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was unfortunately affirmed by the NLRC. Abandonment Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her employment status. She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear indication that she has no intention to abandon her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not fly so he amended his reply to indicate that it is actually “loss of confidence” that led to Mabeza’s dismissal. Loss of Confidence It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to workers whose positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each day and who has to account for each and every towel or bed sheet utilized by the hotel’s guests at the end of her shift would not fall under any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply. Further, the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor complaint against him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of Mabeza’s dismissal. Underpayment Granting that meals and lodging were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without the employer complying first with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee. Finally, facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These requirements were not met in the instant case. More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel. G.R. No. L-58870 December 18, 1987 CEBU INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (CIT), petitioner, vs. HON. BLAS OPLE FACTS: A case was filed against CIT by, Panfilo Canete, et al., teachers of CIT, for non-payment of: a) cost of living allowances (COLA) under Pres. Dec. Nos. 525, 1123, 1614, 1678 and 1713, b) thirteenth (13th) month pay differentials and c) service incentive leave. CIT maintained that it had paid the allowances mandated by various decrees but the same had been integrated in the teacher's hourly rate. It alleged that the payment of COLA by way of salary increases is in line with Pres. Dec. No. 451. It also claimed in its position paper that it had paid thirteenth month pay to its employees and that it was exempt from the payment of service incentive leave to its teachers who were employed on contract basis. Minister of

Labor and Employment issued the assailed Order and held that the basic hourly rate designated in the Teachers' Program is regarded as the basic hourly rate of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should not be taken from the 60% incremental proceeds of the approved increase in tuition fee. In a nutshell, the present controversy was precipitated by the claims of some school personnel for allowances and other benefits and the refusal of the private schools concerned to pay said allowances and benefits on the ground that said items should be deemed included in the salary increases they had paid out of the 60% portion of the proceeds from tuition fee increases provided for in section 3 (a) of Pres. Decree No. 451. Petitioner assails the aforesaid Order in this Special Civil Action of certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on December 7, 1981 against the enforcement of the questioned Order of the Minister of Labor and Employment. ISSUE: Whether or not allowances and other fringe benefits of employees may be charged against the 60% portion of the incremental proceeds provided for in sec. 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451. RESOLUTION: This Court has consistently held, beginning with the University of the East case, that if the schools have no resources other than those derived from tuition fee increases, allowances and benefits should be charged against the proceeds of tuition fee increases which the law allows for return on investments under section 3(a) of Pres. Dec. No. 451, therefore, not against the 60% portion allocated for increases in salaries and wages. In University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of Pangasinan, supra: ... The sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary. The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law, an increase intended also to help the teachers and other workers tide themselves and their families over these difficult economic times.

While coming to the aid of the private school system by simplifying the procedure for increasing tuition fees, the Decree imposes as a condition for the approval of any such increase in fees, the allocation of 60% of the incremental proceeds thereof, to increases in salaries or wages of school personnel. This condition makes for a quid pro quo of the approval of any tuition fee hike by a school, thereby assuring the school personnel concerned, of a share in its proceeds. The condition having been imposed to attain one of the main objectives of the Decree, which is to help the school personnel cope with the increasing costs of living, the same cannot be interpreted in a sense that would diminish the benefit granted said personnel.

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INCORPORATED, respondents. Facts: Labor union, Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit Association, submitted to the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. (respondent herein) several demands, among which was an increase of P0.50 in daily wage. The matter was referred by the mining company to the Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration and settlement. On July 14, 1951, the Court rendered a decision fixing the minimum wage at P2.65 a day with the rice ration, or P3.20 without rice ration; denying the deduction from such minimum wage, of the value of housing facilities furnished by the company to the laborers, as well as the efficiency bonus given to them by the company; and ordered that the award be made effective retroactively from the date of the demand, September 4, 1950, as agreed by the parties. From this decision, the mining company appealed to SC. Atok-Big Wedge Mining Company for authority to stop operations and lay off employees and laborers, for the reason that due to the heavy losses, increased taxes, high cost of materials, negligible quantity of ore deposits, and the enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law, the continued operation of the company would lead to its immediate bankruptcy and collapse (Rec. pp. 100-109). To avert the closure of the company and the consequent lay-off of hundreds of laborers and employees, the Court, instead of hearing the petition on the merits, convened the parties for voluntary conciliation and mediation.