case digest

MILA CABOVERDE TANTANO AND ROSELLER CABOVERDE, PETITIONERS, VS. DOMINALDA ESPINA-CABOVERDE, EVE CABOVERDE-YU, FE CABOVERDELABRADOR AND JOSEPHINE E. CABOVERDE, RESPONDENTS. JULY 29, 2013 GR NO. 203585 The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted CASE: REMEDIAL LAW (RECEIVERSHIP) FACTS: Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano (Mila) and Roseller Caboverde (Roseller) are children of respondent Dominalda Espina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other respondents in this case, namely: Eve Caboverde-Yu (Eve), Fe Caboverde-Labrador (Fe), and Josephine E. Caboverde (Josephine). Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna, are the registered owners and in possession of certain parcels of land, having purchased them from their parents, Maximo and Dominalda Caboverde. The present controversy started when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court where they prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring certain parcels of land from their parents Maximo and Dominalda in favor of petitioners Mila and Roseller and their other siblings, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand. During the pendency of the civil case, Maximo died. Eve and Fe filed an Amended Complaint with Maximo substituted by his eight (8) children and his wife Dominalda. Fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, Dominalda filed with the Regional Trial Court a Verified Urgent Petition/Application to place the controverted parcels of land under receivership. Mainly, she claimed that while she had a legal interest in the controverted properties and their produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin. She alleged that she immediately needs her legal share in the income of these properties for her daily sustenance and medical expenses. Also, she insisted that unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties is in grave danger of being totally dissipated, lost and entirely spent solely by Mila and some of her selected kin.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated by the rules; and (2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Resolution of the RTC and ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the rules. HELD: SC IMPORTANT DISCUSSIONS ISSUE #1 First, Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured. Second, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of them. Third, placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. ISSUE #2 Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an

applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court.

RYAN VIRAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. NOVEMBER 11, 2013 G.R. No. 205180 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the trial court, when sustained by the appellate court, are binding in the absence of any indication that both courts misapprehended any fact that could change the disposition of the controversy. CASE: CRIMINAL LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/REMEDIAL LAW FACTS: An Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the Regional Trial Court. The accused admitted that he was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant ZenaidaVedua (Vedua) and was never allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to 9:00 in the morning. The prosecution presented evidence that private complainant Vedua maintains 75 dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite City. To assist her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who would report for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Private complainant left for Batangas and when she returned, noticed several belongings were missing. She discovered that the main doors of her house were destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo, which was located near the bedroom. The plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts later found to belong to accused. Several witnesses saw the accused inside the house during the incident. After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial court rendered a Decision, holding that the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an actual breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain entry into the house. Similarly, Viray cannot be properly charged with qualified theft since he was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a daily basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant. In this light, the trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was the one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to Vedua. The Regional Trial Court found petitioner Viray guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery. During the appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification that the accused-appellant is convicted for the crime of qualified theft.

ISSUE: 1.

Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the ground of grave abuse of confidence reposed upon the accused by the private complainant.

2.

Whether or not accused is guilty of the crime of robbery based on the generic aggravating circumstance of breaking of door.

HELD: ISSUE #1: The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself, without more, create the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner committed qualified theft because he "enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets" is without legal basis. The offended party’s very own admission that the accused was never allowed to enter the house where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence of the high degree of confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by "forcing open the doors of the same house." ISSUE #2 The taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. The same breaking of the door neither constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Private complainant did not repose on Viray "confidence" that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information.