Case Digest

ANGCACO VS. PEOPLE 378 SCRA 297 PETITIONER: JOHN ANGCACO RESPONDENT: POP PONENTE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE VICENTE V. MENDOZA FACTS: In the early morning of September 25, 1980, petitioner and his co-accused, led by Edep, went to the house of Restituto Bergante in Bato,Taytay, Palawan to serve a warrant for the latter’s arrest. When they reached the house, Edep and his men took positions as they had been warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest. Decosto and Angcaco were each armed with armalites, Lota had a carbine, Felizarte a revolver, and Edep a carbine and a revolver. Decosto was on the left side of Edep, around seven to 10 meters from the latter. Angcaco, on the other hand, was on right side of Edep, around four to seven meters from the latter. Edep called Restituto Bergante to come out of the house as he (Edep) had a warrant for his arrest. Restituto’s wife replied that her husband was not in the house, having gone to Puerto Princesa. A commotion then took place inside the house and, shortly after, petitioner saw a man coming down the house. They fired warning shots to stop the man, but petitioner saw another person with a bolo near Edep. He shouted, “Sarge, this is the man who tried to hack you!,” and shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground face up. They later learned that the person killed was Freddie Ganancial. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is justified in killing the victim under the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a lawful duty. HELD: No, the petitioner’s claim that the killing was not done in fulfillment of a lawful duty. For this justifying circumstance to be appreciated, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. As Edep himself explained, the standard procedure in making an arrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers and to show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of the charge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee under custody.[49] But, it was not shown here that the killing

of Ganancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made on RestitutoBergante. Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 29, 2000, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is found guilty of the crime of homicide

MARI VS. CA- May 31, 2000 332 SCRA 475 PETITIONER: QUIRICO MARI RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PONENTE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BERNARDO P. PARDO FACTS: On December 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were missing which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer, Honorio Lumain, complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant. On January 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur a criminal complaint against petitioner for slander by deed. On May 20, 1992, complainant filed an amended criminal complaint, adding that the crime was

aggravated by the fact that the offended party was a woman. After trial, on September 22, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered decision,Finding, therefore, accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge filed against him and crediting in favor of the prosecution one (1) ordinary aggravating circumstance. On December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment a quo convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander by deed with the aggraqvating circumstance of disregard of sex. HELD: yes, the mere fact that the victim is a woman is not per se an aggravating circumstance. 17 There was no finding that the evidence proved that the accused in fact deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect to the offended woman or displayed some specific insult or disrespect to her womanhood. There was no proof of specific fact or circumstance, other than the victim is a woman, showing insult or disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance. 18 Hence, such aggravating circumstance was not proved, and indeed, in the circumstances of this case may not be considered as aggravating.

PEOPLE VS. CALLET 382 SCRA 42 APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES APPELLANT: ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL PON: JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO FACTS: On September 15, 1996 at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched as others played volleyball. While watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by Alfredo’s elbow. He asked Alfredo why he hit him. Alfredo retorted, “Are you angry?” Next, Alfredo grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo warned that he would be his third victim if he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out

a hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards the municipal hall to surrender. The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong. issue: won the accused should be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of acting without intention to commit so grave a wrong. held: no, The lack of “intent” to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE VS. CONCEPCION 386 SCRA 74 APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES APPELLANT: SPO1 RODOLFO CONCEPCION y PERALTA, accusedappellant. PONENTE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING FACTS: between 10:00 and 11:00 in the evening of November 24, 1997, Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got involved in a quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to the barangay hall for questioning. Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of Lorenzo, who was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, however, appellant thrust the barrel of the gun against the abdomen of Lorenzo. Then there was an explosion. Lorenzo was shot in the thigh. At least three more shots were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According to WITNESSES, Sison and Yarte, appellant shot Lorenzo deliberately. Lorenzo died instantly. n his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION claimed that the shooting was only accidental. According to him, he was investigating Lorenzo for the latter’s disorderly behavior at the town plaza when it happened. He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and unruly,

and even verbally challenged him to fight. At this juncture, according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his gun. The gun accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit.On November 10, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder AND SENTENCED THE ACCUSED OF RECLUSSION PERPETUA. ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DEFENSE OF HAVING ACTED UNDER AN ACCIDENT. HELD; Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused.[15] However, once the defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Code. The existence of accident must be proved by the appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this to be properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.[16] Appellant must convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. However, his defense utterly failed to discharge this burden. Thus, we find no reversible error in the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9776, convicting appellant Rodolfo Concepcion of the crime of murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide

PEOPLE VS. DAWATON 389 SCRA 277 PLAINTIFF: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ACCUSED: EDGAR DAWATON

PON: AJ JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO FACTS: Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on September 20, 1998. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon. Domingo Reyes arrived shortly thereafter. The group, all of which are residents of Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora,started drinking. Came 3:00 pm, they decided to transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle Amado after the group has finished four bottles of gin. Upon arriving at the elder Dawaton's house, they proceeded at the balcony and continued theirdrinking spree there. The elder Dawaton was not home at the time of their session. Leonides, due to hisdrunkenness, opted to sleep on thepapag or wooden bench on the balcony area, as the three continueddrinking until they finished another bottle of gin. At around 3:30 pm, Edgar stood up and left for his house. He went back with a stainless knife ranging 2-3 inches in length, and used it to stab the sleeping Leonides near the base of his neck.Awakened by the sudden attack, Leonides was distraught of his companion's deed against him. Edgargave him another stab on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on the arm of Leonides. Leonides tried to escape for his life, but the bigger Edgar grabbed him from the collar of hisshirt and stabbed him multiple times. Leonides still managed to move 20 meters away from the elderDawaton's house, but he dropped in front of the Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar continuouslystabbed him until Leonides expired. After the incident, he fled to the house of his uncle Carlito Baras,where he was arrested by the authorities, who found him when people surrounding the body ofLeonides pointed them to Edgar's whereabouts. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to death.the accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favor.He avers that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSEED-APPELLANT IS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY

ENTITLED

TO

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HELD: no, The guilty pleading of Edgar to the lesser offense is of no merit. Article 13 of the RevisedPenal Code does not present any

attenuating circumstance referring to a scenario wherein theaccused pleads guilty to a lesser offense (in this case, homicide). Furthermore, the accused didnot secure the consent of the prosecution to allow him to plead guilty to a lesser offense (Sec. 2,Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). The prosecution has consistently maintainedits stand that murder, accompanied by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, must beimposed against Edgar. hENCE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding the accused EDGAR DAWATON guilty of MURDER qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED

PEOPLE VS. ROBINOS 382 SCRA 751 APPELLEE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES APPELLANT: MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO PONENTE: JUSTICE ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN FACTS: On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the incident. herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife. Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza IN HER TESTIMONY

STATES THAT THE accused-appellant WAS suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type. The rtc found the accused guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. On the automatic review of the case the accused appellant raised that the court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity." ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF INSANITY. HELD: The RTC is correct in rejecting the defense of insanity. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was committed. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife. Hence, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.

JOSE VS. PEOPLE 448 SCRA 116

PETITIONER: ALVIN JOSE RESPONDENT: POP PONENTE: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. FACTS: The Court of Appeals CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose for violation of R.A. 6425. Accussed-appellant, Jose, alleged that the court erred in not acquitting him who was then thirteen years old. The records show that the accused herein confederated in selling and delivering to other person methamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant should be exempt from criminal liability. HELD: Rene should be exempt from any criminal liability because he did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a coconspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age, in accordance with Section 12 paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, Discernment means the mental capacity of the minor to distinguish what is right and what is wrong. The rule is that, it is for the prosecution to prove that the minor aging nine to fifteen has acted with discernment because the presumption is they do not act with discernment. It is necessary that the minor between nine to fifteen possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act. To be liable, he must discern the rightness and wrongness of the act.

PEOPLE VS. MONTINOLA 360 SCRA 361 APPELLEE: POP APPELLANT: WILLIAM MONTINOLA

PON: CJ HILARIO G. DAVIDE FACTS: the Accused Appellant was charged with robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 47168 and illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 47269. Upon his arraignment on 6 January 1997,3 WILLIAM entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. Joint trial of the two cases was conducted. However, on 19 February 1997, after the prosecution had presented three witnesses, WILLIAM moved to withdraw his previous plea of "not guilty"; and when rearraigned, he pleaded "guilty" to both charges. Nevertheless, trial on the merits continued. On 24 April 1996, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment5 finding WILLIAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges filed against him. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for the robbery with homicide and to the penalty of death for illegal possession of firearm. issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE trial court erred in not crediting in favor of WILLIAM the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty held: NO, the trial court was correct in not crediting in favor of WILLIAM the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, since the change of his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" was made only after the presentation of some evidence for the prosecution.35 To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the accused must have voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.36 The following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution.37 The third requisite is wanting in the present case.