Case Digest

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS IN LEGAL ETHICS SUBMITTED BY: HOPE JARAVATA RELAYSON SUBMITTED TO: ATTY. MARY JUDE CANTORIAS

7/15/2012

HOPE JARAVATA RELAYSON LEGAL ETHICS

CASE DIGEST #1: G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO, vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY. FACTS OF THE CASE: An irate Atty. Almacen, Legal Counsel of the Defendant in a legal Case entitled Antonio H. Calero, Vs. Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, filed a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," in protest against what he asserted as "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." In the said case, Atty. Almacen filed an appeal at the Court of Appeals (CA) after the lower court rendered judgment against his client. The CA denied repeatedly Atty. Almacen’s motions and dismissed the case. He later filed a Petition for certiorari at the Supreme Court (SC) which refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. His further appeals for reconsideration were also denied. At this, Atty. Almacen got disappointed and filed the "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," (with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession). He also caused the publication in the Manila Times an article assailing the SC as “composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” Through the Petition and the publication, Atty. Almacen expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions”. In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, the SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Atty. Almacen replied, but neither showed remorse nor any sign of apology. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. ALMACEN DESERVES TO BE DISCIPLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON THE GROUND OF GROSS MISCONDUCT FOR ASSAILING THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT IN A DISRESPECTFUL MANNER; AND SHOWING NO REMORSE FOR HIS ACTS. HELD: Atty. Almacen deserves to be disciplined. As such, the court suspended him. “A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. “ ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

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CASE DIGEST #2: B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino was convicted of Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide due to a hazing incident which caused the death of a neophyte, Raul Camaligan. Argosino was sentenced of imprisonment but was later discharged on probation in 1993, the same year when he passed the Bar. Based on the order of discharge from probation, Argosino filed a petition to be allowed to take the Lawyer’s oath. The Court then issued a resolution requiring petitioner Argosino to submit evidence so that he may be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. Petitioner submitted certifications and letters issued by prominent people and members of the church. The Court also sought the opinion of the victim’s father. The father, in his statement, forgave the Petitioner and his co-accused but had reservations for he is not in a position to say whether petitioner is morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submitted the matter to the sound discretion of the Court. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE ALLOWED ADMISSION TO THE BAR DESPITE HIS PREVIOUS CONVICTION OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN HOMICIDE. HELD: The Court allowed Argosino to take the Lawyer’s oath and then admitted to the Bar. “We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.”

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CASE DIGEST #3: A.C. No. 716; January 30, 1969 EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant vs. PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent

FACTS OF THE CASE: This case arose from a complaint against respondent Carranza for deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that he was aware of the falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which he introduced as evidence. In the narrative of the Court, it was shown that Respondent did not even bother to read the entirety of the affidavit, which ran counter to his inescapable duty to clear up doubts and inconsistencies. However, it was not proven that Carranza was knowledgeable of any deliberate deception. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT "CONSENTED IN VIOLATION OF HIS OATH, TO THE DOING OF ANY FALSEHOOD IN COURT" DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO READ THOROUGHLY THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION. HELD: The Respondent is guilty, thus, the Court reprimanded and warned him that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not willful and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity.

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CASE DIGEST #4: G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents. FACTS OF THE CASE: This is a case assailing the appointment and qualifications of Mr. Monsod who was nominated by then President Cory Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections which requires “a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.” (1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C) Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. He also practiced his profession in different fields both in the government and private sectors, but not in the common concept of a practicing lawyer who is always seen as a counsel in court hearings. ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MONSOD IS INVOLVED IN ‘PRACTICE OF LAW’ FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS IN DIFFERENT FIELDS OTHER THAN BEING A COUNSEL IN THE COURT ROOM.

HELD: Atty. Monsod is indeed involved in the ‘practice of law’. The Court dismissed the Petition in favor of Respondents. Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term ”Practice of law" particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

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CASE DIGEST #5: A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), Petitioner

FACTS OF THE CASE: Marcial Edillon was omitted from the Roll of Attorneys due to 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP. Under the Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. Edillon assailed that the provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The Court disbarred Edillon. The case at bar is Edillon’s petition to be reinstated.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED HIS REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS DESPITE HIS QUESTIONS ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS ON THE GROUND OF NON-PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP DUES.

HELD: Petitioner deserves to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court restored Marcial A. Edillon’s membership to the bar since he showed that he changed for the better after his disbarment. The Court stated, “a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.” There was emphasis however on the membership in the bar as a privilege burdened with conditions (Included in such conditions is the religious payment of dues). Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

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CASE DIGEST #6: Adm. Case No. 4749; January 20, 2000 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent

FACTS OF THE CASE: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas by herein Complainant. Respondent admitted that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He also committed misrepresentation for using the same IBP Number in his cases and pleadings during the times when he was not able to renew his certificates and licenses to practice as a lawyer. He claimed that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION AND NON-PAYMENT OF BAR MEMBERSHIP.

HELD: Respondent is Guilty as charged. The Court SUSPENDED Atty. Llamas from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

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CASE DIGEST #7: G.R. No. L-2610; June 16, 1951 CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners, vs. ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents FACTS OF THE CASE: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan placing one Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to petitioners, and of the decision rendered by the same court ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to satisfy the payment of an obligation. This is rooted on the failure of petitioners to pay the mortgage with Rivera regarding the properties in question. Upon petitioners’ failure, Rivera sold the properties to private respondent, Lopez, who filed a motion to gain possession of said property. Respondent Judge ordered the turn-over of the property to Lopez, but the Petitioners refused to deliver. As the petitioners did not heed the order, they were summoned by the court to explain why they should no be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply with the writ of possession, to which they answered contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an action and as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale conducted by the sheriff was illegal because petitioners were not properly served with summons as defendants in the foreclosure suit. The explanation given by petitioners having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and threatened to punish the petitioners as for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS OF THE DELIVERY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT. HELD: The Respondent Judge did not commit an error of judgment. The Court Dismissed the Petition and upheld the order of Respondent Judge. The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortegavs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340). According to Section 257 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court) it is the duty of the competent court to issue a writ so that the purchaser may be placed in the possession of the property which he purchased at the public auction sale and become his by virtue of the final decree confirming the sale. (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201).

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CASE DIGEST #8: A.C. No. 3405; June 29, 1998 JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, Respondent FACTS OF THE CASE: Complainant Julieta Narag filed this case for the Disbarment of her Husband, Respondent Atty. Narag on the grounds of gross immoral conduct. Mr. Narag apparently left his family in order to live with his paramour, whom he bore two illegitimate children. Mr. Narag defended himself by assailing the jealous character of his wife, who aimed at disbarring him by falsely accusing him of leaving their family for another woman. In his answer, Mr. Narag filed a petition for Annulment of their Marriage to bolster his defense. However during the hearings of the case at bar, the evidence and the testimonies of witnesses including relatives of his paramour and his children with Mrs. Narag, it was proven that he is guilty of the charges against him. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE DISBARRED ON THE GROUNDS OF GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT. HELD: Respondent is guilty of immoral conduct. The Court ordered the disbarment of Respondent and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting," a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."

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CASE DIGEST #9: A. M. No. 139; March 28, 1983 RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent. FACTS OF THE CASE: In this case, Mr. Abad has been charged by Atty. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., for practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar. As Mr. Abad told the Court, he was not able to take the oath and sign the roll of attorneys on the scheduled date because of a case, in which he was counsel. He prioritized the case over the oath taking, and presumed that because he paid the fees and the subsequent membership dues, he was already admitted to the Bar.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT MR. ABAD COMMITTED CONTEMPT WHEN HE PURSUED THE PRACTICE OF LAW DESPITE HIS FAILURE TO TAKE THE OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

HELD: The Respondent was held in contempt of court and fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment. Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

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CASE DIGEST #10: G.R. No. L-27072; July 31, 1968 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners, vs. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and MAC-ARTHUR INTERNATIONAL MINERALS CO., respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Honorable Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Gaudencio Cloribel, from continuing with the hearing of Civil Case involving herein Petitioners, and from enforcing a restraining order issued therein, as well as to annul an order of respondent Judge in the same case. It appears in the narrative of the case that respondent Judge ruled in favor of Respondent Company (MacArthur), which lost in a bid for the exploration and development of mineral deposits in a portion of the Surigao Mineral Reservation. The Petitioner did not award the contract to private respondent, which became the latter’s basis for filing an action against the former for the issuance of a restraining order against the continuation of the bidding process. Respondent Judge thereby granted the private respondent’s request on the ground that there was a perfected contract when the Petitioners accepted their proposals as an answer the the Invitation to Bid. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.

HELD: It was held by the Court that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its restraining order. The Private respondent (MacArthur) had no cause of action against petitioners herein because contrary to the conclusions made in the pleadings of Mac Arthur, it has not adhered faithfully to the terms and conditions of the Invitation to Bid, which was a mere invitation, and not a contract. As the Invitation explicitly declared that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected", the bid of the Mac Arthur had been submitted without the requisite bond which led to its disqualification. Since there is no contract (which is Mac Arthur’s basis) to speak about, there is no cause of action on its part, and that the Judge cannot issue a restraining order on such ground.

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