CASE DIGEST ON ELECTION LAW

1.

Soller v. COMELEC G.R. NO. 139853

FACTS Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation. Later, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent’s election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case. HELD The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.

2.

AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400)

FACTS On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. ISSUE Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. HELD The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community

from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

3.

TONY L. BENWAREN vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDWIN CRISOLOGO G.R. No. 169393

Facts Petitioner Tony L. Benwaren and private respondent Edwin Crisologo were candidates for the position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Tineg, Abra in the May 2004 elections. During the canvass of the election return of Precinct No. 16A, counsel for petitioner objected to the inclusion of the election return on the ground that the same was allegedly prepared under duress, force or intimidation, or was prepared by persons other than the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) concerned. The MBC deferred the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor because it contended that the contested election return from Precinct No. 16A would affect the result of the election for the position. To speedily settle and put an end to the controversy reconstitution of the MBC with new members, to, among others, determine if the identity and integrity of the said ballot box and the ballots contained therein were not violated; and, proceed to recount the votes of the candidates affected and prepare a new

election return for the said precinct; and then canvass the said return and proclaim the winning candidate/s; or During the examination of the election return, the MBC found that the integrity of the ballot box was violated as it was left unattended and was never delivered to its proper custodian. The ballots were not also placed in properly sealed or placed in enveloped prepared by Comelec. The New MBC proclaimed private respondent Crisologo as the duly elected mayor of Tineg, Abra based on the results of the remaining uncontested election returns. Due to the unfavorable result, Benwaren filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation or to Suspend the Effects Thereof and Petition to Declare Illegal [the] Proceedings of the New Board of Canvassers of Tineg, Abra. In a Resolution dated February 18, 2005, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition for lack of merit, declaring the New MBC was specifically mandated by it to determine whether the identity and integrity of the ballot box for Precinct No. 16A and its ballots were violated. Thus, it held that the matter was left to the sound discretion of the members of the New MBC, which complied with its order. It added that the New MBC is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty absent a strong proof to the contrary by petitioner. Petitioner filed a a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed the ruling of the New MBC that the integrity of the ballot box for Precinct No. 16A, Barangay Lanec, Tineg, Abra, and its contents had been violated.

2. Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it illegally proclaimed private respondent Crisologo based on incomplete canvass of votes. 3. Whether or not COMELEC en banc Resolution dated August 31, 2005 was illegally promulgated since former Commissioners Virgilio O. Garcillano and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. were no longer members of the COMELEC at the time of promulgation. Ruling: 1. No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. The COMELEC First Division specifically mandated the New MBC to determine whether the identity and integrity of the ballot box of Precinct No. 16A and its ballots were violated. After convening for that purpose, the New MBC found that the integrity of the ballot box of Precinct No. 16A and its contents was violated and it issued a Ruling accordingly. The COMELEC upheld the factual finding of the New MBC and declared that the New MBC is presumed to have regularly performed its official duty absent any proof to the contrary by petitioner. The factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field are generally binding and conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave abuse and none has been shown in this case.

2. No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. The COMELEC ruled that based on Section 20 (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, earlier cited, the proclamation of private respondent Crisologo was proper because the contested returns would not adversely affect the results of the election. If the votes in Precinct No. 8A as reflected on the contested return are added to their votes in the uncontested precincts, the result would be 918 as against 924, in favor of private respondent Crisologo who still emerges the winner by a margin of six (6) votes.

3. No, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of Comelec. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Consequently, if at the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, a member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled. However, the Resolution, in this case, remains valid because it is still supported by a majority of the COMELEC en banc.

4. Trinidad vs Commission on Elections and Sunga G.R. No. 135716 September 23, 1999 This is a petition for certiorari questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections disqualifying petitioner as a mayoralty candidate in the May 1995 elections. Likewise, it seeks the review of a subsequent resolution annulling petitioner’s proclamation as elected mayor in the May 1998 elections.

Facts:

Petitioner Trinidad won the May 1995 elections. Private respondent Sunga filed a disqualification case against petitioner and asking the COMELEC to proclaim him as the duly elected mayor. COMELEC promulgated it decision on June 22, 1998, disqualifying Trinidad. Petitioner filed a Motion For Reconsideration claiming that he was deprived of due process. Petitioner was again proclaimed winner in the May 1998 elections. On October 13, 1998 COMELEC denied petitioner’s MR as well as annulling his proclamation as elected mayor. Thus this petition for certiorari. Issues:

1. WON petitioner was deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8, 1995 and May 8, 1998 elections were concerned. 2. WON petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections may be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections. 3. WON private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, may be proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioner’s disqualification. HELD

1. NO. Petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements of forty-eight witnesses. He was also given a chance to explain in his Motion for Reconsideration. He was afforded an opportunity to be heard, through his pleadings, therefore, there is no denial of procedural due process. 2. NO. Petitioner cannot be disqualified from his reelection term of office. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.

3. NO. As earlier decided by the Supreme Court, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. That would be disenfranchising the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice.

5.

Tolentino and Mojica vs Commission on Elections, Recto and Honasan G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the

ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as VicePresident of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica’s standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that

COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01005 and 01-006. Issue: WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645. HELD: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void. (2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for. Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator

Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”

6.

Taule vs Santos

August 12, 1991 G. R. No. 90336 This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void. Facts: An election for the officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Council (FABC) was held on June 18, 1989 despite the absence of other members of the said council. Including Petitioner was elected as the president. Respondent Verceles sent a letter of protest to respondent Santos, seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Petitioner denied the allegations of respondent Verceles and denouncing respondent for intervening in the said election which is a purely non-partisan affair. And requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. Respondent Santos issued a resolution on August 4, 1989 nullifying the election and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent Santos in his resolution on September 5, 1989. Thus this petition before the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. WON the respondent Santos has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the officers of the FABC.

2. WON the respondent Verceles has the legal personality to file an election protest.

Held: 1. No. The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code. It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC have the appellate jurisdiction over it.

2. Yes. The Governor has the personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the vicegovernor, elective members of the said sanggunian, etc. He acted as the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan. As presiding officer, he has an interest in the election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If said member assumes his place under questionable circumstances, the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their validity or legality. Therefore, respondent governor is a proper party to question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC. The election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and void for not complying with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09. DLG Circular No. 89-09 provides that “the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum.” It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Therefore, there was a clear violation of the said mandatory provision.

* Pending resolution, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto Antonio, despite him being absent on said election. The Secretary of Local Government has no authority to appoint anyone who does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.

7.

Sinica vs Mula and Commission on Elections

In this case, assailed was the COMELEC Resolution on Oct. 6, 1998 in SPA No. 98-292, declaring the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. by petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca as invalid. Facts: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinica was a substitute candidate for the mayoral post of the Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinica, Jr., was disqualified for being convicted of bigamy. He was proclaimed winner after the canvassing. (Matugas Wing was a faction in the LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD party, as well as the Barbers Wing. Each faction has separate candidates for the mayoral post in the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.) Respondent Mula (who got Sinica, Jr. disqualified) filed a disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said substitution was invalid because: a) Sinica was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a substitute; and

b) it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. However, when respondent Mula filed a Motion for Reconsideration, COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate. Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member. Therefore, this case before the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinica was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca, an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov. Matugas with his written acceptance of the party’s nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

8.

Romualdez-Marcos vs Commission on Elections G.R. No.119976/September 18, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution Held: Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in

the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice

9.

Gador vs Commission on Elections G.R. No. L-52365 January 22, 1980

This petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was filed on January 21, 1980 at 4:47pm asking the Supreme Court to immediately order the respondent COMELEC to include the name his name in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of Ozamiz. Facts: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC.

However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid. Held: NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that “The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980.” It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

10.

Quinto vs Commission on Elections December 1, 2009

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. Facts: In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 – the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides that “Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of

his certificate of candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts those elected officials saying that “Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.” Sec.13(par. 3) of Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 9369 provides: “x x x any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office x x x.” Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, reads: “x x x Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” Petitioners were appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue: WON COMELEC resolution is constitutional.

Held: No. Sec. 4(a) of the COMELEC Resolution is null and void for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. Sec. 13(par. 3) of R.A. 9369 & Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code were also declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881 & RA 8436 relating to the automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs was repealed by R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act). “There was, thus, created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while elective officials were not.”

Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied with in order that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law. (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. According to the Supreme Court, the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law.

11. Salcedo II vs Commission on Elections Aug. 16, 1999 This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998. Facts:

Salcedo married Celiz, marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Salcedo married private respondent Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar. Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of candidacy. However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was “Salcedo.” Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo. In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname “Salcedo” in all her personal, commercial and public transactions. Comelec’s Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the surname “Salcedo” constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. However, the Comelec en banc resolution, overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent’s certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation. Issue:

Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname “Salcedo” in her certificate of candidacy. A false representation under section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of “Ermelita Cacao Salcedo” or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name. The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private respondent’s certificate of candidacy.

12. Dumpit-Michelena vs Boado

Nov. 17, 2005 This is a petition assailing COMELEC resolution disqualifying Dumpit in the May 2004 election. Facts: Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Boado sought Dumpit-Michelena’s disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her COC on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that DumpitMichelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24, 2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated a caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed by Dumpit-Michelena. Issues: WON Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991. Held: Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency requirement. The concept of residence in determining a candidate’s qualification is already a settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.

13. Bañaga, Jr. vs Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 134696 July 31, 2000 This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the en banc resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections promulgated on June 29, 1998, in a COMELEC special action case, SPA No. 98-383. Facts: Petitioner Banaga, Jr. and respondent Bernabe, Jr. were both candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Parañaque in the May 1998 election. In said election, the city board of canvassers proclaimed respondent Bernabe, Jr., as the winner for having garnered 71,977 votes over petitioner Banaga, Jr.’s 68,970 votes. Dissatisfied with the result, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 1998, a Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections, alleging that said election was replete with election offenses, such as vote buying and flying voters. He also alleged that numerous Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated. In fact, there were people arrested who admitted the said election offenses. Therefore, the incidents were sufficient to declare a failure of elections because it cannot be considered as the true will of the people. Petitioner Banaga, Jr. is praying that he should be adjudged as the duly elected Vice-Mayor in the City of Parañaque, during the May 1998 local elections. Respondent COMELEC dismissed petitioner’s suit and held that the election offenses relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result in a failure to elect and therefore, cannot be viewed as an election protest. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction for dismissing his petition motu propio without any basis whatsoever and without giving him the benefit of a hearing. Issues: WON petition to declare a failure of elections and/or for annulment of election is considered as an election protest. WON respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions. Held: No. Mr. Banaga, Jr.’s petition docketed as SPA-98-383 before the COMELEC was a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. An election protest is an ordinary governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions. Petitioner also did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest such as failing to pay filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest. No. Respondent COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections for being groundless. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are present. Respondent COMELEC only based its decision on the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code with regard to declaring a failure of election. There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election

results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The instances being not present in the petition of Mr. Banaga, Jr. The respondent COMELEC have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.

14. Mercado vs Manzano Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as ViceMayor. Held:

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

15. RAYMUNDO ADORMEO VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002 Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, reelected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms. Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. “If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed”—this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of Congress.

16. RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005 Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The second-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained

the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president. Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case? Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of President but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.

17. ADIONG v. COMELEC G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof. Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides: Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — It is unlawful:… (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards… Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party.

The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.) Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

18. TEODULO M. COQUILLA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MR. NEIL ALVAREZ, RESPONDENTS. G.R. 151914, JULY 31, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. In 1965, he joined the US Navy and was naturalized as a US Citizen. On October 15, 1998, petitioner came back to the Philippines and took a residence certificate. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the special committee on naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and on November 10, 2000, he took oath as citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Oras, Eastern Samar, in addition, on February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident thereof for 2 years. On March 5, 2001, Mr. Alvarez filed for the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation by stating thereat that the latter has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years, when in truth and in fact he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The Comelec was unable to render judgment on the case before the election. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and proclaimed mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. On July 19, 2001, the Comelec (2nd Div) ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Comelec en banc affirmed the order, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001. RULING: The Supreme Court held that the term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation”, but rather to “Domicile” or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin by becoming a US

citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines. Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a US citizen. Wherefore, the petition is without merit and DISMISSED.

19. Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC 140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986 FACTS: Eleven petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.” The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections? HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the

election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

20. Salva v. Makalintal GR No. 132603 18 September 2000 FACTS: Salva, et al, officials and residents of Barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, and the COMELEC for annulment of OrdinanceNo. 5 and Resolution No. 345, enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 Ordinance No. 5 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 5, overriding the veto exercised by the Governor of Batangas. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, on the other hand, provided for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on 28 February 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao. The trial court denied the motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to it, any petition or action questioning an act, resolution, or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the SC. ISSUES: W/N the trial court had jurisdiction to enjoin the COMELEC from IUmplementing Resolution No. 2987. HELD:

YES. Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may well be taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts

The powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the COMELEC may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasijudicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character