Case Digest -Lates

sday, August 26, 2009 Case digests for Constitutional Law (Midterms) Download here. Labels: case digest, Political Law Review scribbled by swexie @ 9:25 PM

0 Objections

Monday, February 02, 2009 University of San Agustin Employees Union vs Court of Appeals Case Digest This is a case between the University of San Agustin Employees Union-FFW (UNION) and The University of San Agustin (UNIV). Sometime on 2000, the parties agreed on a 5-year CBA, the economic provisions of which are effective for 3 years only. After the lapse of 3 years, the parties negotiated on the economic provisions but did not agree on the terms during the remaining 2 years of the CBA and beyond. Since the parties did not agree on the computation of tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) which shall be the basis for the increase of salaries, they underwent a preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. Still unresolved, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock and thereafter filed a Notice of Strike at the NCMB, which was expectedly opposed by the Univ through a Motion to Strike-out Notice of Strike and Refer the Dispute to Voluntary Arbitration, since the CBA contained a "no-strike, no-lockout" provision, and a grievance machinery for settling disputes, including a voluntary arbitration mechanism should the grievance machinery fail to settle the dispute. The NCMB, however, failed to resolved the Univ's Motion Thereafter, both parties made a joint request for the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On September 18, 2003, he SOLE assumed jurisdication, and with such assumption of jurisdiction, any strike or lockout was strictly enjoined. The day after the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, and on the same day that the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order (AJO) was supposedly served to both parties, the Union staged a strike. Union members refused to receive a copy of the AJO assailing that only the Union President is authorized to receive the same. The Union filed a Petition Declare Illegal Strike and Loss of Employment Status of the striking employees, which Petition was filed at the NLRC. Such Petition was later on consolidated with the case pending before the SOLE, at the request of the Univ. The SOLE rendered a Decision resolving the various economic issues over which the parties had a deadlock in the collective bargaining, and likewise dismissed the Petition to Declare Illegal Strike. The University elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the SOLE. The Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition. It declared the strike as illegal, but affirmed the SOLE's decision regarding the economic issues. Both the Univ and the Union filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.

Basing on the CA's decision, on April 7, 2005, the Univ served the striking employees with their notices for termination and concurrently, the Union filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike, this time on ground of alleged union busting. On April 22, 2005, the parties again took initial steps to negotiate the new CBA but said attempts proved futile. Hence, on April 25, 2005, the Union went on strike. In reaction, the University notified the Union that it was pulling out of the negotiations because of the strike. On August 23, 2005, the CA, acting on the parties' respective motions for reconsideration, promulgated the herein challenged Partially Amended Decision. Finding merit in the respondent University's motion for partial reconsideration, the CA ruled that the SOLE abused its discretion in resolving the economic issues on the ground that said issues were proper subject of the grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Consequently, the CA directed the parties to refer the economic issues of the CBA to voluntary arbitration. The CA, however, stood firm in its finding that the strike conducted by the petitioner Union was illegal and its officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. Thus, the Union and its dismissed officers file this Petition to the Supreme Court, on the following issues: Whether or not the strike was illegal and the Union Officers deemed to have lost their employment status on their failure to return to work immediately upon the service of AJO issued by the SOLE. Whether or not the economic provisions of the CBA should be referred to Voluntary Arbitration. The Supreme Court resolved the foregoing issues as follows: On the first issue, the SC ruled that ART. 263 of the Labor Code provides: ."..Such assumption or certification (of the SOLE) shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." The phrase "immediately return to work" indicates an almost instantaneous or automatic compliance for a striker to return to work once an AJO has been duly served. Therefore, the act of the striking employees is violative of the foregoing provision. On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, and these matters should be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator, as provided in Art. 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. The peculiar facts of the instant case show that the University was deprived of a remedy that would have enjoined the Union strike and was left without any recourse except to invoke the jurisdiction of the SOLE.

Labels: case digest, labor relations cases

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1 Objections

Wednesday, July 16, 2008 Los Ba�os Rural Bank vs Africa Petitioner Los Ba�os questioned the decision of the Court of Appeals in granting respondent Pacita Africa's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain petitioner from proceeding with the foreclosure and consolidation of the title over the subject property after such property was allegedly sold to Macy Africa by forging Pacita Africa's signature. Los Ba�os argued that they should not be enjoined from foreclosing hte property because the foreclosure sale has long been effected and since it is a consummated act, it can no longer be restrained. The SC held that in the instant case, the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of filing the Amended Complaint, at the poin where the property was already foreclosed. But, the last actual uncontested status that preceeded the conroversy was when the property in dispute was still registered int he name of Macy Africa, petitioner not having consolidated in its name the title thereto. Moreover, the court also held that the requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are present and established by Pacita Africa. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon an applican't showing of two important requisites; namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. The issuance of the wirt of preliminary injuction would no doubt preserve the status quo. Labels: case digest, Provisional Remedies scribbled by swexie @ 11:03 PM

0 Objections

Phil. Sinter vs Cagayan Electric Light and Power Company Whether or not an injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the Energy Regulatory Board? No. After a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule, however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a change int he situation of parties can warrant an injunctive relief. Labels: case digest, Provisional Remedies scribbled by swexie @ 8:42 PM

0 Objections

Saturday, November 17, 2007 Lacson vs Reyes GR No. 86250 February 26, 1990

Atty. Ephraim Serquina did not pay docket fees in his Motion for Attorney�s Fees, contending that such motion was only incidental to the probate of the will of Carmelita Farlin, he being the executor thereof. Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for P68,000.00 attorney�s fees alleging that the sum agreed upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid. The Supreme Court ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees. The payment of docket fees is required before the Motion for Attorney�s Fees could be validly tired. Labels: case digest, Remedial law scribbled by swexie @ 7:34 PM

3 Objections

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum GR Nos 88075-77 December 20, 1989 Tacay vs RTC of Tagum GR Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989 Facts: These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to used the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars the determination of the RTC�s jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining order against the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the determination of the court�s jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property? Decision: Determinative of the court�s jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina) and not the value of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees. (CLICK THE TITLE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE @ LAWPHIL.NET) ANOTHER TACAY VS RTC OF TAGUM DIGEGST AT ARELLANOLAW.NET Labels: case digest, Remedial law

scribbled by swexie @ 7:24 PM

0 Objections

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989 Facts: Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney�s fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49. Issue: Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid? Ruling: Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect. The Court dismissed petitioner�s motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees. Personal Observation: The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees.

(CLICK ON THE TITLE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT OF THE CASE @LAWPHIL.NET) Labels: case digest, Remedial law scribbled by swexie @ 7:14 PM

0 Objections

Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987 Facts: This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only. Issues: When does a court acquire jurisdiction? Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court? Ruling: The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. (CLICK THE TITLE OF THE CASE TO VIEW THE FULL TEXT @LAWPHIL.NET) Labels: case digest, Remedial law scribbled by swexie @ 7:09 PM

0 Objections

Thursday, November 15, 2007 Japan Airlines V. Asuncion (G.R No. 161730, January 28,2005) 449 SCRA 544 Digested by Ms. Karen Mae Gonzales FACTS: This petition for review seeks to reverse and set aside the October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution, which affirmed in toto the June 10, 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 in Civil Case No. 92-3635. On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines� (JAL) Flight 742 bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72 hours. During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted overnight. Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International Service Center (ISC), the agency tasked by Japan�s Immigration Department to handle passengers who were denied shore pass entries, brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. Respondents

were charged US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals. On December 12, 1992, respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport. Issue: Whether or not JAL is liable of breach of contract of carriage. Side Issues: � Whether or not JAL is liable for moral, exemplary damages, � Whether or not the plaintiff is liable for attorney�s fee and cost of suit incurred (JAL counterclaim) Ruling: The court finds that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents� shore pass applications. In the Respondents claim that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain to the immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that JAL did not exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications. JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents� applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita. Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of contract where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, when the party to a contract acts in wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney�s fees are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[17] There being no breach of contract nor proof that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner, there is no basis for the award of any form of damages. Neither should JAL be held liable to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been sufficiently proven that the amount pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for the accommodations provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of JAL. However, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed JAL�s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney�s fees. The action was filed by respondents in utmost good faith and not manifestly frivolous. Respondents honestly believed that JAL breached its contract. A person�s right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.[ WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

October 9, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the award of damages, attorney�s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned. Accordingly, there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney�s fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However, the dismissal for lack of merit of petitioner�s counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney�s fees, is SUSTAINED. No pronouncement as to costs Labels: case digest, Transportation Law scribbled by swexie @ 10:50 PM

1 Objections

Dangwa Transportation Co. vs Court of Appeals GR No. 95582 October 1991 Facts: On March 25, 1985, Pedrito Cudiamat was ran over by a bus operated by Dangwa Transportation Company, and driven by Theodore Lardizabal. Lardizabal, being reckless and negligent, has prematurely stepped on the accelerator of the bus just as when Cudiamat boarded the same. The sudden jerk movement caused Cudiamat to fall from the platform and was ran over by they bus. Moreover, the driver did not immediately brought the victim to the nearest hospital for medical attention. Issue: Whether or not the driver and bus company are liable for the death of P. Cudiamat. Held: They are liable. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by the according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought by the passenger. By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. Labels: case digest, Transportation Law scribbled by swexie @ 10:17 PM

0 Objections

Tuesday, October 16, 2007 Land Titles: Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals; July 5, 1996 Facts:

The case is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Uychocde, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case. The subject property was bought by Sajonas spouses on September 1983 and caused the annotation of their adverse claim on August 1984. The Deed of Sale was executed upon the full payment of the purchase price and the same was registered only on August 1985. Meanwhile, without the petitioners' knowledge, there has been a compromise agreement between the spouses Uychocde and Pilares (Uychocde's judgment creditor), and a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283. Issue: Which should be preferred between the notice of levy on execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985. Decision: The annotation of the adverse claim is equivalent to notice to third persons of the interest of the claimant. The provision of the law (PD 1529) that the adverse claim is only valid for 30 days cannot be upheld. Clearly, the intention of the law is otherwise as may be gleaned on the following discussion: �Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant�s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant. Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was

frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.� Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. Petition was granted. The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is ordered CANCELLED. Labels: case digest scribbled by swexie @ 2:45 AM

0 Objections

Tuesday, October 02, 2007 CASE DIGEST: Congson vs NLRC FACTS: The case was originally filed by herein respondents Bargo et al against Congson, the former being hired as piece-rate workers responsible for the loading/unloading of tuna catch for Southern Fishing Industry owned by the latter. In 1990, the piece-rate workers were replaced with a new set of workers because of their alleged refusal/resistance to the proposed reduction of their piece-rate payment per tuna (the former rate was P1.00 per tuna movement. The reduction was proposed because of the decrease in the volume of tuna catch). They filed for underpayment of wages, contending that their average monthly rate did not exceed P1000, plus non-payment of overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay. The labor arbiter decided in favor of the workers and directed Congson to pay the monetary claims for salary differentials, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and separation pay. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, in toto, thus the instant petition. ISSUES:

1. W/N THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SEPARATION PAY? 2. W/N THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES SHOULD INCLUDE THE VALUE OF TUNA LIVER AND INTESTINES THAT WERE TAKEN BY THE REPONDENT WORKERS AS PART OF THEIR COMPENSATION? HELD: 1. YES. There being a substantive proof that the respondent workers are to be reinstated by their employer, the award for separation pay is appropriate. Separation pay may be given when the employer-employee relationship is to so tainted that reinstatement would not prosper. 2. NO. Article 102 par.1 of the Labor Code states that: Forms of payment. No employer shall pay the wages of an employee by means of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, tickets, chits, or any object other than legal tender, even when expressly requested by the employee. Thus, the computation made by the labor arbiter in arriving at the money claims is correct. Labels: case digest scribbled by swexie @ 12:00 AM

0 Objections

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