Case Digest in Political Law New

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs CA and MACABULOS Case Digest

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS and DR. MERCEDITA J. MACABULOS G.R. No. 159395, 07 May 2008, FIRST DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.) The use of the word “may” is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. FACTS: Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who was then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports - National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil Service Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by the latter to produce dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices. Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr. Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia LopezDee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist, who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of her claim, she attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said purchase using the cash advance of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance by improperly spending it and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice in conformity with the amount of the cash advance. Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the contents of the first page were entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her counteraffidavit. A new memorandum by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer investigate the complaint since the acts complained of were committed one year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not immediately executory. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not CA„s interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is correct 2. Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the private respondent is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases

HELD: The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention filed by the Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the complaint since it was filed more than one year from the occurrence of the complained act. The Court found this interpretation by the appellate court unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided under the Constitution to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The use of the word ―may‖ is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word ―may,‖ when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word ―may‖ in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission. The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer. Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs PADERANGA Case Digest

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON. SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al. 464 SCRA 481 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The determination of just compensation is a judicial function and the recommendation of the commissioners is given weight and consideration if the same is reasonable and just. FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land located in Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands. The RTC issued an order granting NPC„s motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation. The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However, NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395 which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the market value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes, subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines. The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court„s decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation HELD: In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority report„s valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.

Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term ―expropriation. From the Commissioner„s report it cannot be gainsaid that NPC„s complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.„s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant„s life and limb. The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the commissioners„ recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

MMDA vs VIRON TRANSPORTATION Case Digest

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al. 530 SCRA 341 (2007), EN BANC, (CARPIO MORALES, J.)

et

al.

v.

VIRON

It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating

as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179 was a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional HELD: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President„s power of control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned by E.O. 179; hence, it could

not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents„ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents„ terminals can be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents„ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites.

Engineer Paredes, the general manager of MCWD, filed Certificate of Public Convenience by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), which permitted the company to operate and maintain waterworks supply services. MCWD alleged that the Board of Directors of MCWD did not give consent to the issuance of the franchise applied for. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 47 of Presidential Decree 198 grants exclusive franchise to publicutilities HELD: MWCD„s position that an overly strict construction of the term ―franchise‖ as used in Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this context, were strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly from the legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot issue franchises for operating waterworks systems without the water district„s consent, the NWRB may keep on issuing CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not only would the NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory.

While the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 - the constitution in force when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973. That the legislative authority - in this instance, then President Marcos - intended to delegate its power to issue franchises in the case of water districts is clear from the fact that, pursuant to the procedure outlined in P.D. 198, it no longer plays a direct role in authorizing the formation and maintenance of water districts, it having vested the same to local legislative bodies and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL v. JAC LINER Case Digest

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 452 SCRA 174 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. FACTS: Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individual„s rights.

Raymond V. Palatino, representative of Kabataan Party-list assailed the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 and seeks declaration of its nullity. Palatino contends that this would be considered an encroachment of the legislative power of Congress as it amends the system of continuing voter registration under Section 8 of The Voter„s Registration Act of 1996. It was prayed that Resolution No. 8585 be declared null and void and to extend the registration until January 9, 2010. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8585, adjusting the deadline of voter registration to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15, 2009, is null and void HELD: Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State derives its power from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election. In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by R.A. 8189, Sec. 8 - daily during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor. COMELEC Resolution No. 8585 is declared null and void insofar as it set the deadline of voter registration for the May 10, 2010 elections on October 31, 2009. The COMELEC is directed to proceed with dispatch in reopening the registration of voters and holding the same until January 9, 2010.

EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO v. SANDIGANBAYAN 509 SCRA 190 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The Ombudsman has the power to issue subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum in relation to cases pending before it. FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman requested the Sandiganbayan to issue subpoena duces tecum against the Urban Bank relative to the case against President Joseph Estrada. Ms. Dela Paz, receiver of the Urban Bank, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of manager checks detailed in thesubpoena duces tecum. The Sandiganbayan granted the same. However, Ejercito claims that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may not be enforced because the information found therein, given their ―extremely detailed‖ character and could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials. Ejercito thus contended that, following the ―fruit of the poisonous tree‖ doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed. Moreover, the ―extremely-detailed information obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous investigation of the charges against him, such inquiry into his bank accounts would itself be illegal. ISSUE: Whether or not subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum may be issued to order the production of statement of bank accounts even before a case for plunder is filed in court HELD: The Supreme Court held that plunder is analogous to bribery, and therefore, the exception to R.A. 1405 must also apply to cases of plunder. The court also reiterated the ruling in Marquez v. Desierto that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly

identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, he concludes that the information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts. Thus, his attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. The high Court, however, rejected the arguments of the petitioner Ejercito that the bank accounts which where demanded from certain banks even before the case was filed before the proper court is inadmissible in evidence being fruits of poisonous tree. This is because the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of Ejercito about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001. While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute. Thus, the Court referred to the teaching of Columbia Pictures Inc., v. Court of Appeals, that: It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO vs ROGELIO S. SOLUTA Case Digest

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO v. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA et al. 482 SCRA 660 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) To constitute waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it. FACTS: Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for Finance of petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis), with his personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security guard entered the union office located at the hotel basement. The same is with the permission of union officer Henry Babay. Babay was apprised about the suspected illegal activities. During the search they discovered marijuana flowering tops in the union office. An Information indicting the union officers was then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the accused on the ground that the marijuana tops are inadmissible as evidence. Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union thereafter filed before the RTC a complaint against Silahis, Panlilio and those who cooperated for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC granted such petition. It

ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis and Panlilio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court„s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the constitutional right of Soluta et al. HELD: As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one„s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. In the present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay. The course taken by Silahis and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Silahis and Panlilio„s violation of individual Soluta et al.„s constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. As for Silahis et al.„s contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For Soluta et al., being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure. Neither does Silahis et al.„s claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babay„s account of why Silahis and company went to the union office - to consider Panlilio„s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they were armed with a search warrant. While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.

ROMONAFE CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION Case Digest

ROMONAFE CORPORATION v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, et al. 513 SCRA 424 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled corporation filed a complaint for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Romonafe Corporation (Romonafe) and Vine Development Corporation (Vine). The complaint covered 48, 103.12 square meters of property to Romonafe and 96,963.38 square meters of property belonging to Vine. RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of NPC and the trial court designated commissioners to determine the just compensation for the properties. The trial court ordered the fair market value of the property at 3,500.00 per square meter for Romonafe and Vine. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioned the agreement to pay Romonafe on the basis of the 1997 valuation of its property at 3,500.00 per square meter as ―contrary to decisional law. In lieu thereof, it further decreed by the Court that the fair market value of the fair market value of the land be fixed at 1,500.00 per square meter. Thus, this present petition filed by Romonafe. ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between NPC and Romonafe is valid considering the compensation given to Romonafe by NPC HELD: Just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at bar, just compensation should be determined as of July 12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed before the trial court. The Provincial Appraisal Committee has established the fair market value on the subject parcels of land a value which is not too high on the part of the government and not too low on the part of property owners. The Court notes that the appellate court failed to pass on NPC„s appeal with respect to the property of Vine. And, as NPV and even Romonafe manifest, the appellate court failed to consider the Partial Compromise Agreement between NPC and Vine in its assailed Decision. A remand of the case to the appellate court is thus in order.

LEE vs COMELEC Case Digest

SALLY A. LEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA 405 SCRA 363 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go behind them and investigate election irregularities

presupposes that the returns “appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face” hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. FACTS: Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were candidates for Mayor of Sorsogon City. During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries were made for the position of congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to fill up election returns. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the questioned election return was clear and regular on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then filed a petition to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lee„s proclamation and the exclusion of the questioned election return. The COMELEC Second Division granted Dioneda„s petition and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lee„s proclamation and excluded the questioned election return HELD: Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is ―restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularities,‖ citing the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections. The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns ―appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face.‖ Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

LECAYCO vs COA Case Digest

MANUEL LECAYCO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 482 SCRA 215 (2006), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) While a person, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated by law, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution. FACTS: Petitioner Manuel Lecayco, Jr. (Lecayco) was the Provincial Treasurer of Oriental Mindoro and at the same time an appointed member of Inspectorate Team of the Provincial

School Board (PSB). The Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office allegedly found deficiencies on the checks issued by the PSB of Oriental Mindoro. The funds are covered by the Special Education„s Fund (SEF). The COA then issued Notices of Disallowance holding Lecayco and other members of Sangguniang Panlalawigan liable for signing the Certificates of Inspection and falsely attesting to its 100% completion. Lecayco appealed to the COA maintaining that he is not liable, since as a member of the Inspectorate Team, his duty is limited to "monitoring the progress of PSB projects". However, the COA denied such appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the COA has the authority to hold Lecayco liable as a member of the Inspectorate Team HELD: In light of this function of the Inspectorate Team, its members may be held liable by the COA for any irregular expenditure of the SEF if their participation in such irregularity can be established. While Lecayno, in his capacity as member of the Inspectorate Team, is not an accountable officer as contemplated in Section 101 of P.D. No. 1445, he may, nonetheless, be held liable by the COA under the broad jurisdiction vested on it by the Constitution ―to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government.‖ In addition, the authority of the COA to hold Lecayno liable is also implied in its duty to ―promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.‖ Since, as earlier noted, payment should not be made to a contractor without the prior inspection of the project by the Inspectorate Team, the members thereof who sign the certificate of inspection participate in the use and application of local government funds (in this case, the Special Education Fund of the Province of Oriental Mindoro). Thus, if there is an irregularity in the performance of this duty, they may be held liable for any loss that is incurred by the government as a consequence thereof. In this case, there was such irregularity when Lecayco and other members of the Team attested to the 100% completion of the projects notwithstanding their undisputed deficiencies.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIM Case Digest

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUZ LIM AND PURITA LIM CABOCHAN 529 SCRA 129 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. FACTS: Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) compulsorily acquired lands owned by Luz Lim and Purita Lim Caochan. The Land Bank computed the value of the property. Lim however rejected Land Bank„s valuation. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform

Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the property. Dissatisfied with the PARAD„s decision, Lim and Cabochan filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court. The RTC adopted the valuation submitted by the appointed commissioner. Both parties moved for reconsideration. The RTC then reconsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation. Landbank, not satisfied, filed a petition for review on certiorari for fixing the valuation of Lim„s property. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in adopting the calculations of the LBP instead of the Administrative Order of DAR HELD: In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, the Court underscored the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94 which provides that in determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.‖ It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

When Jose de Venecia, Jr., assumed position as the new Speaker of the House, he appointed Emmanuel A. Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID on temporary status. On even date, Mayor Belmonte again requested for the detail of Loanzon to his office. Loanzon sought clarification from the Civil Service Commission about the status of her appointment in light of Albano„s appointment to her position. The CSC holds that Loanzon was a rightful holder of the position of Deputy Secretary General up to July 31, 2001 and is entitled to the payment of her salaries and other benefits up to that period only. Accordingly, when Speaker De Venecia appointed Albano as Deputy Secretary General, PRID, on July 25, 2001, Loanzon was still detailed at the Office of Mayor Belmonte. Thus, Albano„s appointment on July 25, 2001 is legally infirm because there was no vacancy yet at that time. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found that the position of Deputy Secretary General, PRID pertains to the non-career service; Loanzon held a primarily confidential position and her tenure was thus coterminous with and subject to the pleasure of the appointing authority, and her termination could be justified only on the ground of loss of confidence. It declared the removal of Loanzon and the appointment of Albano in her place null and void.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service 2. Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void

HELD: 1. Whether or not the CA the position of Deputy Secretary General is a primarily confidential position belonging to non-career service Clearly, the position of Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives belongs to the career service which is, so the Civil Service Law provides, characterized, among other things, by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications and security of tenure. The holder of the position can only enjoy security of tenure if he or she possesses the qualifications and eligibility prescribed for it. In Loanzon„s case, although Loanzon„s appointment was denominated as "permanent," it having been "proposed as permanent," it was in reality temporary for, so her CSC appointment paper clearly stated, she did not enjoy security tenure as she lacked the eligibility requirement for the position. In fine, Loanzon„s appointment was merely temporary, not to exceed twelve months. Since she was appointed on March 8, 1999, it was effective only for one year or up to March 8, 2000. Having continued, however, to hold on to her position up to July 25, 2001 when Albano was appointed by Speaker de Venecia, she did so in a hold-over capacity. 2. Whether or not the termination of Loanzon as Deputy Secretary General is illegal and the appointment of Albano in her place is null and void Even if Albano then did not possess the required eligibility, his appointment was not legally infirm. As correctly pleaded by House of Representatives before the appellate court, when Nazareno approved Mayor Belmonte„s request for Loanzon„s detail until July 31, 2001, Speaker de Venecia had not yet been elected and assumed office as speaker. With Speaker de Venecia„s subsequent election and assumption of office as speaker, Nazareno„s action as secretary-general became subject to supervision and control, hence, it could be revoked anytime. By thus appointing Albano on July 25, 2001, Speaker de Venecia impliedly revoked or modified Nazareno„s action by shortening the period of the approved detail. As for the Speaker„s approval on October 25, 2001 of Mayor Belmonte„s second request for Loanzon„s detail to his office effective August 1, 2001, the same may be taken as mere oversight on the part of the Speaker.

HILADO vs REYES Case Digest

ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES 496 SCRA 282(2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict. FACTS: Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof. However, one of Hilado„s counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the record of the Hilado„s case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely access. ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper RULING: The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-forword testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case. Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."

COJUANGCO vs SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest

IMELDA O. COJUANGCO et al. v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al. 586 SCRA 790 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) While the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which is where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed before the Sandiganbayan a "Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages," of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses which have been invested in the Philippine Long Distance Telecommunication Corporation (PLDT). Ramon and Imelda Cojuangco (Spouses Cojuangco) were subsequently impleaded. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the complaint with respect to the recovery of the PLDT shares. The Republic appealed to the Supreme Court, and the same issued a favorable ruling. The Republic thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, praying for the cancellation of the shares of stock registered in the name of Prime Holdings and the annotation of the change of ownership on PTIC„s Stock and Transfer Book. The Republic further prayed for the issuance of an order for PTIC to account for all cash and stock dividends declared by PLDT in favor of PTIC from 1986 up to the present including compounded interests. The Sandiganbayan granted the same, except its prayer for accounting of dividends. The Republic moved for reconsideration with respect to the denial of accounting of dividends, which the Sandiganbayan granted. The Cojuangcos protested, alleging that the SC„s decision did not include in its dispositive portion the grant of dividends and interests accruing to the shares adjudicated in favor of the Republic. ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is entitled to the dividends and interests accruing to the shares despite its non-inclusion in the dispositive portion of the decision HELD: The Cojuangcos insist on a literal reading of the dispositive portion of the SC„s Decision, excluding the dividends, interests, and earnings accruing to the shares of stock from being accounted for and remitted. The SC, in directing the reconveyance to the Republic of the 111,415 shares of PLDT stock owned by PTIC in the name of Prime Holdings, declared the Republic as the owner of said shares and, necessarily, the dividends and interests accruing thereto. Ownership is a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another. Its traditional elements or attributes include jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that it produces. Contrary to the Cojuangcos„ contention, while the general rule is that the portion of a decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive part of a decision must find support from the decision„s ratio decidendi; and (b)

where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the body of the decision. In the Decision, although the inclusion of the dividends, interests, and earnings of the 111,415 PTIC shares as belonging to the Republic was not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court„s Decision, it is clear from its body that what was being adjudicated in favor of the Republic was the whole block of shares and the fruits thereof, said shares having been found to be part of the Marcoses„ illgotten wealth, and therefore, public money.

GMMSWMC vs JANCOM Case Digest

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE and the METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA 494 SCRA 280 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.) If the contract provides that it shall be effective until and unless it is approved by the President, the same shall first be approved to be valid and enforceable. FACTS: President Fidel Ramos issued Presidential Memorandum Order no. 202 creating an Executive Committee (EC) to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in Rizal and Carmona under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme. Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia was one of the bidders for the Rizal Site which subsequently entered into a partnership with its corespondent Asea Brown Boveri under the firm name Jancom Environmental Corporation (JANCOM). Consequently, EC declared JANCOM as the sole complying bidder of the Rizal Waste Disposal Site hence a Contract for the BOT implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for the Rizal Site was entered between Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee (GMMSWMC) and Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), and JANCOM. The contract was submitted for approval to President Ramos who subsequently endorsed it to then incoming President Joseph E. Estrada. Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo landfill. GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to pursue the contract with JANCOM, citing as reasons therefore the passage of Republic Act 8749, otherwise known as the Clean Air Act of 1999, the non-availability of the San Mateo site, and costly tipping fees. JANCOM filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of MMDA calling for the bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void, and to enjoin them from implementing the Resolution and making another award. The trial court ruled in favor of JANCOM which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court declared the contract valid and perfected, albeit ineffective and unimplementable pending the approval by the President. JANCOM and MMDA later entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement which bore no signature of the parties.

JANCOM then filed before the Pasig City RTC an Omnibus Motion for a writ of execution which upon its issuance, was challenged by GMMSWMC and MMDA. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the RTC Order. ISSUE: Whether or not contract is ineffective and unimplentable until and unless it is approved by the President HELD: The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity. In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Court„s unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected, the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.

ESTRELLA vs COMELEC Case Digest

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 429 SCRA 789 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador„s proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation

HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion„s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.

Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth„s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent„s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories„ (YSS). Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOH„s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig City denying petitioners„ motion to dismiss the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their alleged act of ―illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law‖ is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified Kho„s resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and accordingly modified the penalty to suspension of one year. Luzviminda filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgement, but the same has been denied. Hence, Luzviminda filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed the CSC decision and ordered the reinstatement of Luzviminda. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether there is substantial evidence to hold Maniago guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service HELD: It bears noting that an audit team, Luzviminda herself, following which it confirmed that the amount of loan granted, formed part of the "cash shortage" of the Municipal Treasurer. And that the decision of Kho, was based not only on the Fraud Audit Report, but also on Luzviminda„s Answer to the complaint wherein she did not deny having secured a loan, her only defense being that the loan did not involve public funds, which defense does not deserve consideration in the absence of any iota of proof thereof. The absence of a hearing did not deprive Luzviminda of due process. She was given the opportunity to file, and she did file, an Answer to complaint against her. She was also afforded the opportunity to appeal to the CSC from the September 20, 2000 Resolution of Acting Mayor Kho. Luzviminda having obtained a loan for her personal use out of municipal funds, through the active intercession of the Municipal Treasurer, cannot be countenanced. Although already paid in full, said loan resulted in the diversion of municipal funds for purposes other than what the amount was supposed to be appropriated for in the municipality. Thus, public service was prejudiced.

CORDIA vs MONFORTE Case Digest

ALDO B. CORDIA v. JOEL G. MONFORTE AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 380 SCRA 588 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) When the intention of the voter cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. FACTS: Petitioner Aldo B. Cordia (Cordia) and respondent Joel G. Monforte (Monforte) were the official candidates for Punong Barangay in Legazpi City, Albay in the 2002 Elections. The Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed Cordia as the winner. Monforte filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC) for lack of familiarity with the Rules on Appreciation of ballots. The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of Monforte therefore annulling and setting aside the proclamation of Cordia. On appeal, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of MTCC. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division. Cordia questioned such decision and mentioned the alleged mistake in applying the principle of idem sonans when it counted the vote ―Mantete appearing in the questioned ballot which was written on the space for the position of a kagawad and the ballot with a hole in it caused by a cigarette which Cordia alleged to be a marked ballot. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC made a mistake in the application of the Rules on Appreciation ofBallots HELD: The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The COMELEC, in crediting to respondent the vote for ―Mantete in Exhibit ―A, following the idem sonans rule, the Court finds no grave abuse discretion. Nor does the Court find grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC„s not rejecting Exhibit ―C17 or the ballot with a hole, as a marked ballot, there being no indication that the blot therein was deliberately placed to identify the voter.

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO and FILIPINA M. ORELLANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

ROSARIO V. ASTUDILLO and FILIPINA M. ORELLANA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 509 SCRA 302 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Written incriminatory statements made not in the course of custodial investigation are admissible in a criminal case filed against the confessant. FACTS: Rosario Astudillo and Filipina Orellana were hired by Western Marketing Corporation (Western), as salespersons, while Roberto Benitez and Flormarie Robel were hired as floor manager and service-in-charge/cashier-reliever, respectively. In the course of preparing the monthly sales report of the branch, the Branch Accountant noticed discrepancies in the monthly sales report. The case of the missing invoices and the shortage of cash sales collection were then reported to Western„s branch manager Lily Chan Ong (Lily). In a subsequent meeting with Lily, Filipina admitted having brought home some appliances while Benitez made a written admission asking for apology. In an inventory of stocks conducted at the branch office of Western, several other appliances were found missing. On the basis of the complaint of Western, Astudillo and Orellana were collectively charged with Qualified Theft, along with Flormarie Robel and Roberto Benitez. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Astudillo and Orellana guilty of Qualified Theft. The Court of Appeals affirmed affirmed the RTC„s decision. Hence, this petitions for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the employees„ extra-judicial admissions taken before an employer in the course of an administrative inquiry are admissible in a criminal case filed against them HELD: It bears noting, however, that when the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioners failed to file any objection thereto including their extra-judicial admissions. At any rate, the Court answers the issue in the affirmative. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation; that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" which, to repeat, are relevant in custodial investigations. The Court of Appeals did not thus err in pronouncing that Astudillo and Orellana were not under custodial investigation to call for the presence of counsel of their own choice, hence, their written incriminatory statements are admissible in evidence. Astudillo and Orellana at all events argue that their written statements were obtained through deceit, promise, trickery and scheme, they claiming that Lily dictated to them their contents. There is nothing on record, however, buttressing Astudillo and Orellana„s claim other than their self-serving assertion. The presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience such that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved thus stands.

CSC vs TAHANLANGIT Case Digest

CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION v. NELI O. TAHANLANGIT 594 SCRA 124 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. FACTS: As a consequence of the reorganization of the Bureau of Patents and Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT), pursuant to R.A. 8293, into what is now known as the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), 137 incumbents therein, including respondent Nelia Tahanlangit, were appointed to new positions in the approved staffing pattern of the IPO. Under the BPTTT plantilla, Tahanlangit occupied the position of Trademark Principal Exmaniner I, a position said to be comparable to the item of Intellectual Property Rights Specialist I (IPRS-I) under the new IPO plantilla to which said Tahanlangit was appointed. Petitioner Civil Service Commission„s (CSC) NCR Office, however, disapproved Tahanlangit„s permanent appointment on the ground that the latter, for lack of the requisite educational qualifications, did not qualify to the above-mentioned position to which she had been appointed. DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II appealed the NCR Office decision before the Civil Service Commission which it, however, affirmed. Insofar as Tahanlangit is concerned, CSC ruled that her appointment as IPRS-I was correctly disapproved by the NCR Office. Tahanlangit thereafter filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Pending resolution, however, she opted to retire optionally under R.A. 8291, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997. The CA thus held that the challenged resolutions had been rendered moot and academic by Tahanlangit„s retirement from the government service pending resolution of her appeal. Further, the CA held that ―the ends of substantial justice will be better served if herein respondent be allowed to retire from the service upholding that her permanent appointment be considered valid and subsisting at the time of her retirement.‖ To this ruling of the CA, CSC moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Tahanlangit„s optional retirement mooted the disapproval of her appointment as IPRS-I HELD: When Tahanlangit retired from the service on August 31, 2003, CSC„s Resolution No. 03-0237 of July 30, 2003 had not attained finality, as it was pending appeal before the appellate court. Section 80 of CSC„s Resolution No. 99-1936, ―The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provide that a decision of the CSC or its Regional Office shall be immediately executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Thus, when Tahanlangit was allowed to avail herself of optional retirement under R.A. 8291, CSC„s assailed resolutions have thus become moot and academic, at least, with respect to the former„s case. Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. In the present case, when Tahanlangit„s appointment was disapproved by the CSC, Tahanlangit would still have been able to retire under the applicable law, R.A. 8291, as the said law only requires that the employee concerned must have rendered at least 15 years of service and must

not have been receiving disability benefits at the time of retirement. Tahanlangit, having retired on August 31, 2003, the position of IPRS I is presumed to have been already filled up and to be now occupied by one bearing the requisite qualifications. Hence, passing on the disapproval of Tahanlangit„s appointment no longer has any practical value. BIENVENIDO A. CERBO, JR., et al. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 516 SCRA 51 (2007), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) COMELEC exercises jurisdiction over petitions for correction of manifest errors only if the same pertains to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. FACTS: Bienvenido A. Cerbo, Jr., Angelo O. Montilla, and Geronimo P. Arzagon were candidates for representative, governor and vice-governor, respectively of Sultan Kudarat in the May 10, 2004 elections. Suharto T. Mangudadatu, Datu Pax S. Mangudadatu and Donato A. Ligo, on the other hand, were petitioners„ respective opponents for the same positions. Cerbo et al. filed Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and/or to Exclude Certificates of Canvass of the Municipalities of Palimbang and Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat before the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC). The PBOC overruled the objection thus, Cerbo et al. filed with the PBOC a notice of appeal, but the appeal was not pursued. Cerbo et al. filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors and Annulment of Proclamation alleging that the proclamation of Suharto T. Mangudadatu et al. was illegal because it was made despite the filing of the notice of appeal. COMELEC dismissed the petition for correction of manifest errors prompting Cerbo et al. to file a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was erroneous to dispose the petition on purely procedural grounds and not to treat it as an original petition for correction of manifest errors. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of manifest errors HELD: A petition for correction of manifest errors filed directly with the COMELEC should thus pertain to errors that could not have been discovered during the canvassing, despite the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner Arzagon, however, together with the other petitioners, initially filed a petition for correction of manifest errors with the PBOC, evidently showing that the errors sought to be corrected were discovered during the canvassing. On his failure to appeal the PBOCs dismissal of his petition for correction of manifest errors, Arzagon claims that the PBOC did not indicate the reasons therefor, hence, he was prevented from appealing the same. Even if, however, the Court may, in the interest of justice, treat the petition for correction of manifest errors filed with the COMELEC as an appeal from the PBOC„s verbal ruling denying petitioners„ similar petition filed with the latter, its dismissal by the COMELEC is in order. Specifically with respect to the Palimbang COC, since its exclusion had earlier been denied by the PBOC, and the denial was not appealed, it had become final. The subsequent filing of a

petition for correction of manifest errors in the Palimbang COC with the PBOC appeared to be just an attempt to substitute the lost appeal, which is impermissible. With respect to Cerbo„s et al. prayer before this Court for correction of manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, the same cannot be considered as an appeal from the verbal denial by the PBOC of a similar petition they earlier filed. For the petition filed with the COMELEC does not include alleged manifest errors in the Lutayan COC, hence, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to rule thereon.

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY Case Digest

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY 510 SCRA 590 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Upon compliance with the requirements for a valid expropriation, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession. FACTS: Capitol Steel Corporation (Capitol Steel) is a domestic corporation which owns 65 parcels of land located at the province of Misamis Oriental. Phividec Industrial Authority (PHIVIDEC) is a government owned and controlled corporation which is vested the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring rights of way or any property for the establishment or expansion of the PHIVIDEC areas. PHIVIDEC filed an expropriation case for the properties of Capitol Steel because it was identified as the most ideal site for the project of PHIVIDEC. The trial court denied PHIVIDEC„s issuance of a writ of possession, noting that the amount deposited was seemingly inadequate and was simply out of PHIVIDEC„s interpretation of the prevailing zonal valuation and was not mutually agreed upon but it was finally granted by the trial court. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of PHIVIDEC, ordering the RTC to issue a Writ of Possession. Hence, this present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in ordering the RTC to issue a writ of possession in favor of PHIVIDEC HELD: Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials. Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case, in this case PHIVIDEC, is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the

court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974. To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

ARADAIS vs COMELEC Case Digest

HADJA NIDA B. ARADAIS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al. 428 SCRA 277 (2004), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. FACTS: Petitioner Hadja Nida B. Aradais (Aradais) and respondent Abdusali Asmadun (Asmadun) were mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Lugus, Sulu. After canvassing was completed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect by virtue of a Certificate of Canvass (COC). Aradais was also proclaimed as mayor-elect by virtue of a second Certificate of Canvass which is the same as the first COC issued. Asmadun took his oath of office on May 19, 2001 and subsequently assumed office. Aradais on the other hand took his oath of office on June 23, 2001. However, the Regional Election Director of Region IX advised that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should recognize only one proclamation, that of Asmadun, and Aradais„s proclamation was without any legal effect. This prompted Aradais to file before the COMELEC a Petition for the Annulment of Asmadun„s proclamation. The COMELEC then created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into cases of double proclamations wherein it directed Aradais, Asmadun, three members of the BOC, the COMELEC Regional Director, and the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sulu to submit their respective position papers or memoranda and other pertinent documents, as well as affidavits of their witnesses. In its report, the Ad Hoc Committee made recommendations and proclaimed Asmadun as the mayor-elect. Concurring with the findings and recommendations, the COMELEC affirmed the proclamation. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its power and discretion when it delegated its constitutional duty to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases to a mere ad hoc committee HELD: The findings and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee are merely advisory in nature and do not bind the COMELEC, especially in light of petitioner„s failure to present any evidence that the COMELEC merely relied on said findings and recommendations and did not go over the records of the case to make its own assessment. Absent any evidence to the contrary then, the presumption of regular performance of an official duty stands.

It bears emphasis that the COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. In the case at bar, it was well within the COMELEC„s discretion to avail of the means it deemed effective, such as requiring the parties to present their side through position papers and memoranda and conducting a clarificatory hearing wherein the members of the BOC were required to shed light on the two proclamations made. Besides, it is a settled rule that the COMELEC„s judgment cannot be overturned by this Court unless it is clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Since the assailed resolution is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be considered whimsical, capricious or arbitrary warranting the Court„s power of review.

ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Case Digest

YOLANDA O. ALFONSO v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, 520 SCRA 64 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The essence of due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side. FACTS: Petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso (Alfonso), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found administratively liable for allegedly ―acquiescing‖ to the change of the date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Alfonso was investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) upon the request of Phil-Ville Development Corporation (Phil-Ville) who purchased some parts of the land. Phil-Ville„s lettercomplaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement which finds that Alfonso acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith recommending the filing of administrative cases against her and her conspirators. On the other hand, LRA finds her guilty of Grave Misconduct and recommended her dismissal. The Office of the President subsequently dismissed Alfonso. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Alfonso. Hence, this petition contending that her right to due process was violated. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding decision of the Office of the President because Alfonso„s right to due process was violated Held: In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings. Foremost of these requisites is the right to a hearing, including the right to present one„s case and submit evidence in support thereof. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one„s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

As aptly observed by the CA, Alfonso was given every opportunity to explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during the administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently show that in compliance with the ―show-cause‖ letter of the LRA Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence. Likewise, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct. In the case at bar, Alfonso stood charged not for changing the date of registration of OCT No. 994 but rather, she was indicted for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting ―certifications‖ on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she had no hand in the alteration are unavailing. ―Serious misconduct, as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee, is improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act or dereliction of duty, which is willful and intentional neglect and not mere error in judgment. It must be grave and aggravated in character and not merely trivial or unimportant.. In addition, it must be directly related and/or connected to the performance of official duties. Without question, all of these requisites are present in this case. Alfonso is thus administratively liable for serious misconduct.

DRILON vs DE VENECIA Case Digest

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, et al. v. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, et al 594 SCRA 743 (2009), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Issues involving the deprivation of a seat in the Commission on Appointments should be lodged before the respective Houses of Congress and not with the Supreme Court. FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments (CA). In the second week of August 2007, Franklin Drilon et al. went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the Liberal Party in the CA. However, no report or recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department, drawing Representative Tañada to request a report or recommendation on the matter within three days. Hence spawned the filing by Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., alleging that the liberal party with at least twenty (20) members who signed herein, is constitutionally entitled to one (1) seat in the CA. Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal of PDP-Laban wrote a letter claiming that ―the Senate contingent in the CA violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation‖. The Senator avers that political parties PMP and KAMPI were given more seats than they were entitled to in the CA and the political party PRP and other Independents cannot be represented in the CA.

The CA, speaking through its Ex-Officio Chairman Manny Villar, advised Senator Madrigal that CA ―has neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member who is elected by either House, and that any complaints about the election of a member or members should be addressed to the body that elected them.‖ Villar further explained that instructions have been given to ―transmit the original copies of Senator Madrigal„s letters to the Senate Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the Order of Business of the Session of the Senate. Madrigal, not satisfied with the CA„s action, filed a petition with the Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction against Senator Villar as Senate President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the CA. The Court consolidated the petitions filed by Drilon et al. and Madrigal et al. ISSUES: Whether or not the petition before the Supreme Court is proper HELD: The first petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDPLaban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi. Senator Madrigal„s primary recourse rests with the respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar„s invocation of said doctrine is thus well-taken.

BUENAVENTURA y RECTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

HERMINIO BUENAVENTURA y RECTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 529 SCRA 500 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) An objection to the validity of arrest is deemed waived when the accused voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. FACTS: Accused-Appellant Herminio Buenaventura was arrested and subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (R.A. 6425), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for sale and possession of marijuana. He was arrested during a buy bust operation conducted in April of 2002 by the Drug Enforcement Unit of Malate. The RTC found Herminio Buenaventura guilty of both charges, it holding that as between the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses and the bare and negative testimony of Buenaventura, the former indubitably deserves greater weight and credence. Buenaventura appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the same affirmed the RTC„s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Buenaventura alleges that the warrantless arrest made by the Drug Enforcement Unit of Malate was invalid. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is invalid HELD: In the said case, it was also established, based on the testimonies given by witnesses that the buy bust operation performed was lawful. As correctly observed by the appellate court, Herminio failed to move for the quashal of the informations filed against him. He instead submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. With the assistance of counsel, he entered a not guilty plea, and presented evidence in his defense. He thus clearly waived his objection to the validity of his arrest.

SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Case Digest

SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, YOLANDA P. LIONGSON 484 SCRA 452 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is not violative of the constitutional requirement if the same can be inferred from the discussion of the decision. FACTS: Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz and City Administrator Emma C. Luna were held administratively liable for violation of the Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, and the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act in manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in connection with the issuance of a permit to fence a lot. Resolving in the affirmative, the Deputy Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1) Month Salary. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in denying the petition for certiorari HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of the Ombudsman, upon which its decision of May 8, 1999 was based, and which were cited by the appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the evidence on record. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in finding that the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. As for Bedruz and Luna's complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law on which its decision was based, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that ―[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without

expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,‖ the same fails. A trial court„s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, ―is not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court‖ as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision. From the Ombudsman's decision, it can be gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19 of R.A. No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4, paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No. 6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES), requiring public officials and employees to ―perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill,‖ ―act with justness and sincerity‖ and ―not [to] discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.

BAROT vs COMELEC Case Digest

FELIX BAROT v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF TANJAN CITY, et al. 404 SCRA 352 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) The COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. FACTS: Petitioner Felix Barot and private respondent Rolando Tabaloc were candidates for councilor of Tanjay City, Negros Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed the winning candidates for mayor, vice-mayor, and ten councilors including Barot who was proclaimed the 10th. Then, BOC Chair Nochefranca requested the COMELEC En Banc for authority to correct the erroneous entries in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates, and to proclaim Tabaloc in place of Barot. The COMELEC En Banc granted the request and annulled the proclamation of Barot. Hence, this petition. Barot contends that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition for the same has been filed beyond the reglementary period. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction acquired jurisdiction over the petition HELD: As to the claim that the petition was not filed within the reglementary period, it should be noted that the 5-day period to file a petition for correction may be done after proclamation as provided under paragraph (b), Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules. The petition may also be made before proclamation as provided in Section 34 of Resolution No. 3848 which furnishes instructions for the Municipal, City, District and Provincial Boards of Canvassers in connection with the May 14, 2001 national and local elections.

At all events, Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules provides that in the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all the matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission. The COMELEC thus has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice such that even if the petition was filed 12 days after the proclamation, the COMELEC may, in the interest of justice, disregard the reglementary periods provided by the rules and resolve the matter filed before it.

BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION vs LERMA Case Digest

BAGONG WEST KABULUSAN 1 NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC v. JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA 452 SCRA 26 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) In the absence of bad faith, malice and corrupt practices on the part of the judge, he cannot be made administratively liable thereof. FACTS: CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST) filed before the Muntinlupa Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) thirty eight (38) complaints for ejectment against thirty nine (39) individual-defendants who were occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay Cupang Muntinlupa City. The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of CST and ordered the defendants to vacate the lots and surrender possession thereof to CST Enterprises but they refused to vacate the lots, hence MeTC directed to demolish their respective structures within 5 days from notice thereof. Petitoner Bagong West Kabulusan Neighborhood Association (Association), claiming to represent the underprivileged and homeless residents of the lot, filed a complaint against MeTC sheriff Armando Camacho for ―Injunction with Very Urgent Petition for Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the Status Quo. IThe Association„s complaint for injuction was raffled to Judge Alberto Lerma who denied their prayer for TRO and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. They thereafter filed charges for gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, gross neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law with manifest bias and partiality against Judge Lerma. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lerma can be administratively held liable HELD: The charge that Judge Alberto Lerma exhibited gross ignorance with manifest bias and partiality remains unsubstantiated. Granting arguendo that Judge Lerma may have erred in not taking a more suitable course of action, given the circumstances surrounding the case, not to mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with the judicial processes, lapse on his part can be seen as a mere error of judgement, of which he may not be held administratively liable in the absence of a showing of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.

DON vs LACSA Case Digest

AZUCENA B. DON, et al v. RAMON H. LACSA AS ERSTWHILE PUNONG BARANGAY OF BACOLOD, JUBAN, SORSOGON 529 SCRA 327 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The phrase “final and executory” in the Local Government Code simply mean that administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of decisions. FACTS: Ramon H. Lacsa, then Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon was charged with grave threats, oppression, grave misconduct, and abuse of authority by Azucena B. Don, et al. A Special Investigating Committee (SIC) was created by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) to investigate. A resolution was passed by the SB for the preventive suspension of Lacsa. The mayor, acting on such resolution, imposed a two-month preventive suspension. The SIC subsequently submitted its report finding the allegations to be true. On the basis of such report, the SB issued another resolution providing therein the removal of Lacsa from office. The mayor thereafter appointed Florencio H. Lacsa to replace Ramon H. Lacsa. Consequently, Lacsa filed before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon a Petition for Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Don, et al, along with the Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor Ma. Theresa Guab-Frugata. ISSUE: Whether or not Lacsa has the right to appeal despite the ―final and executory‖ phrase provided for by the Local Government Code HELD: An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and executory. Lacsa shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event that the appeal results in exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and other such emoluments during the pendency of the appeal. Obviously, the said Code does not preclude the taking of an appeal. On the contrary, it specifically allows a party to appeal to the Office of the President. The [phrase] ―final and executory x x x in Sections 67 and 68, respectively, of the Local Government Code, are not, as erroneously ruled by the trial court, indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from the decision of the Sanggunian concerned. These phrases simply mean that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be.

DBP vs TESTON Case Digest

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO TESTON 545 SCRA 422 (2008), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales J.) Due process requires that a party be given opportunity to be heard and present evidence.

FACTS: By virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale, Romeo Teston purchased, on installment basis, two (2) parcels of land situated in Masbate, Teston from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Teston defaulted in the payment of his amortizations. Consequently, DBP rescinded their contract of conditional sale. DBP thereafter transferred the two (2) parcels of land to the government. It was subsequently found out that Teston had also voluntarily offered the two parcels of land for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under the Voluntary Offer to Sell. Teston filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a Petition against DBP alleging that under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Republic Act No. 6657, DBP„s right to rescind the sale was extinguished by operation of law. The DARAB Regional Adjudicator dismissed Teston„s petition on the ground that Teston has never been the owner of the land, hence could not have validly offered the property under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the Regional Adjudicators decision. The Court of Appeals modified the Trial Court„s decision by ordering DBP to return to Teston the P1,000,000 downpayment paid by Teston without requiring the latter to present evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in modifying DARAB„s decision ordering DBP to return to Teston the P1,000,000 downpayment allegedly paid by Teston HELD: It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secudum allegata et probata. Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant. To require DBP to return the alleged P1,000,000 without first giving it an opportunity to present evidence would violate the Constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,or property without due process of law. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense GABRIEL S. CASAL et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 509 SCRA 138 (2006), EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.) Failure of an officer to observe the issuances of the President and the directives of the Commission in Audit amounts to gross negligence. FACTS: The National Museum granted an incentive award to its officials and employees pursuant to Provision No. 8 of its Employees Suggestions and Incentive Awards System (ESIAS) approved by the Civil Service Commission.

The Resident Auditor of the Commission on Audit at the National Museum subsequently inquired from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on whether it granted authority to the National Museum to use its savings from its appropriation for personal services to pay the subject incentive award. The DBM, through a letter, informed the Resident Auditor that it had not received any request for such authorization from the National Museum. The Resident Auditor thus disallowed the incentive award through Notice of Disallowance for being violative of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268 and Section 2 of A.O. No. 29 and also for lack of the requisite authorization from the DBM. Gabriel Casal appealed the disallowance to the COA. The appeal was denied by COA. Casal. in his capacity as Executive Director of the National Museum, filed the instant petition which prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. ISSUES: Whether or not COA is at fault in ordering the officials and employees of the National Museum to refund the subject award or bonuses even the absence of any bad faith or malice on the part of the museum„s workforce HELD: In a letter dated December 21, 1992 addressed to petitioner Casal, then CSC Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, replying to Casal„s request for approval of the Museum„s ESIAS, stated: ―xxx This Commission, after a careful evaluation of the said ESIAS, hereby approves the same, provided that the grant of productivity incentive award under Section 9(e) (sic) thereof be made subject to the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the President in coordination with the CSC and the DBM on the matter, as embodied under Section 7 of the Administrative Order No. 268 dated February 21, 1992. xxx The immediately quoted proviso, it bears emphasis, was annotated on the National Museum„s ESIAS itself, just below the name and signature of Chairman Sto. Tomas signifying the CSC„s approval of said document. When Casal and the approving officers authorized the subject award then, they disregarded a prohibition that was not only declared by the President through A.O. 268, but also brought to their attention by the CSC by a letter specifically addressed to Casal. The imprimatur given by the approving officers on such award certainly tended to give it a color of legality from the perspective of these employees. Being in good faith, they cannot, following Blaquera, be compelled to refund the benefits already granted to them.

CSC vs DBM Case Digest

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) “Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not DBM„s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional HELD: DBM„s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as ―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a ―no report, no release‖ policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.

BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Case Digest

HENRY EDQUIBAN BARRERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 438 SCRA 221 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. FACTS: Henry Barrera, the Mayor of the Municipality of Candelaria, Zambales was indicted before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. An administrative case was also filed against Barrera before the Office of the Ombudsman which recommended that he be faulted for abuse of authority and be penalized with suspension from office without pay for six (6) months. Barrera filed a motion but it was denied. He thus filed a petition for review of the Ombudsman decision before Court of Appeals which denied the same. The Sandiganbayan ordered Barrerra„s preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. ISSUE : Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in placing Henry Equiban Barrera under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days HELD: Henry Barrera admits in his memorandum filed before the Supreme Court that upon his receipt of the resolution directing his preventive suspension, he started serving the same. The issue has thus been rendered moot and academic. Besides, the Sandiganbayan, by Decision dismissed Criminal Cases on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were not established beyond reasonable doubt. At this juncture then, a determination of whether the preventive suspension under Section 13 of Rule 3019 is mandatory and automatic would not have any practical effect on the existing controversy. En passant, if the administrative case filed against Barrera has been terminated also in his favor, he may invoke Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. It is Barrera„s contention that Section 13, R.A. 3019 should not be taken in isolation but should be viewed in light of the rationale behind the suspension, the purpose being to prevent the officer or employee from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. And, so Barrera maintains, since the prosecution failed to prove, if not substantially allege that he is abusing the prerogatives of the office, intimidating possible witnesses and/or tampering with documentary evidence during the pendency of the cases against him, the suspension order should not have been issued. It has been long settled, however, and it bears reiteration that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the accused public official "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical, leaving no room for interpretation. There are no ifs and buts about it. The court has neither the discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan so teaches.

BALBASTRO vs COA Case Digest

CORAZON C. BALBASTRO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI 556 SCRA 729 (2008), EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J.)

A defendant who deliberately failed to attend the preliminary conference deprives himself of the right to question alleged irregularities in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. FACTS: The Commission on Audit conducted an investigation relative to the letter-complaint filed by the officers of the Iloilo City National High School (ICNHS) Teachers and Employees Association against petitioner Corazon Balbastro. COA discovered irregularities which Balbastro and Lydia Ocate, the Disbursing Officer of ICNHS, has probably committed. Based on said report, Ombudsman recommended upgrading of pending inquiry against Balbastro into criminal and administrative case. During the first preliminary conference, only Ocate and her counsel were present. On the second preliminary conference, Balbastro again failed to show up despite notice. The Ombudsman was thereafter prompted the Ombudsman to consider Balbastro's and her counsel's two consecutive absences as a waiver of her right to ask for a formal hearing and to present evidence on her behalf. Thereafter, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding Balbastro guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. Balbastro filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Balbastro was denied due process and proceedings before the Ombudsman were attended by serious irregularities HELD: Balbastro„s only objection, as it turns out in her Reply, is that she was not able to respond to the charges specifically enough. Balbastro has no one to blame but herself, she having had ample time to do the same. Besides, if she really wanted to be more particularly informed of the charges against her, she should have attended the two preliminary conferences set by the Ombudsman, one of the purposes of which being to allow the parties to consider, inter alia, whether they "desire a formal investigation to determine the nature of the charge, stipulation of facts, a definition of the issues." Balbastro goes on to claim the presence of the following irregularities in the proceedings before the Ombudsman: only one hearing was held, on December 19, 2001, where only Ocate testified; the case is bereft of any record containing the testimonies of complainant and its witnesses; the Ombudsman decided the case without even requiring the complainant and its witnesses to affirm and confirm their affidavits, if any were submitted, and testify on the unsworn and unsigned COA report which was furnished petitioner; and the members of the ICNHS Teachers and Employees Association who authored the letter-complaint were not presented during the formal investigation of the administrative case. Balbastro deprived herself of standing to raise these issues, however, for failing to show up for two consecutive times at the preliminary conference which thus constrained the Ombudsman to deem her to have waived her right "to ask for a formal hearing and present evidence" and led it to consider the case "for resolution based on the evidence on record as far as she is concerned.

MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. v. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND Case Digest

MERCURY GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. v. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND 541 SCRA 211 (2007), SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio Morales, J.) The law of the case doctrine cannot be adhered to when the same will result in an unjust decision. FACTS: P.D. No. 1752, the ―Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980‖ created the PagIBIG Fund System. Under P.D. No. 1752, coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund is mandatory for all employees covered by the SSS and the GSIS and their employers. The law provides, however, for a waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund. Upon the effectivity of the law in 1980 up to 1995, Mercury Drug and its subsidiaries were, on their application, annually granted waiver from coverage of the Fund because their Retirement or Provident Plan was superior to it. In 1995, the Board of Trustees of Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), issued Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, an employer with a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund is entitled to execution/waiver from Fund coverage. In 1996, HDMF had once again amended the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended, this time limiting waiver from Fund coverage only to ―distressed employers‖. Mercury then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare null and void the 1996 amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 1752, as amended. By Order, RTC dismissed Mercury„s petition for certiorari on the ground that it failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and that HDMU„s questioned amendment of the implementing rules was made in the exercise of its legislative/administrative, not judicial, function. The Court of Appeals affirmed HDMF„s denial of Mercury„s request applying the law of the case doctrine. ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver of Fund coverage of Mercury should be granted HELD: In affirming HDMF„s denial of Mercury„s request for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996, the appellate court harped on the law of the case doctrine. Thus it held that Mercury„s application anew for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage is anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case which declared as null and void Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the RRI of R.A. No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. It is in this view that Mercury contends that HDMF should have considered its application for waiver/exemption from the coverage of the Fund. On the other hand, HDMF invoked the doctrine of the law of the case pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 132416 in denying Mercury„s application for waiver/exemption from the Fund coverage. The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132416. The present case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case - G.R. No. 132416. This is an entirely new one which was commenced by Mercury„s filing

of an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against HDMF. Even assuming arguendo that the present proceeding may be considered a subsequent proceeding of G.R. No. 132416, the doctrine of the law of the case just the same does not apply because the said case was not resolved on the merits. The Order of this Court denying Mercury„s petition for review in G.R. No. 132416 found no reversible error in the Order of the RTC dismissing Mercury„s case primarily on a procedural ground - failure to exhaust administrative remedies. At all events, the doctrine ―is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision.‖ To sustain HDMF„s refusal to grant a waiver of Fund coverage to Mercury on the basis of amendments to implementing rules which had priorly been declared null and void by this Court would certainly be unjust.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC vs Aquino Case Digest ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE, respondents. FACTS: On June 8, 1972 the properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the same was sold to Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer. (a) that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high school and college students are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. The only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties are exclusively for education purposes? HELD: Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation The phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” was further clarified by this Court, thus““Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is „not limited to property actually indispensable‟ therefor, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of hospitals, „a school for training nurses, a nurses‟ home, property use to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents‟ (84 CJS 6621), such as „athletic fields‟ including „a firm used for the inmates of the institution.‟ ” The exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose the lease of the first floor to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education; Case at bar.—It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main or primary pur-pose—educational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purposes of education. Trial Court correct in imposing the tax not because the second floor is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes but because the first floor is being used for commercial purposes.—Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Case Digest LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FACTS: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor‟s gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee‟s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to a religious organization is subject to donor‟s tax? HELD: Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes.—Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution.—A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.

PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA Case Digest PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA FACTS: This suit was commenced by two lawyers; a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their own behalf and in behalf of other professionals practicing in the City of Manila who may desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of Manila together with the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected under the ordinance but paid under protest. The ordinance in question imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax "by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." The ordinance was enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above referred to. Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, plaintiff s, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the ordinance, paid the same under protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose already stated. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3398 impose double taxation? HELD: The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which they respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select or exact taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has authorized the City of Manila to impose the said tax, it has withheld that authority from other chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. We do not think it is for the courts to judge what particular cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those imposed by the National Government. That matter is peculiarly within the domain of the political departments and the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.

Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works Case Digest WENCESLAU PASCUAL, AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS FACTS: On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, an item of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals"; that, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May 29, 1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act No. 920, and the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon"; that inasmuch as the projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was "illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and not private streets of a private subdivision'"; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondent Zulueta executed, on December 12, 1953, while he was a member

of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of donation—copy of which is annexed to the petition—of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, as such, said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation." ISSUE: Whether or not the statute is unconstitutional and void? HELD: "It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money." (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-400; Italics supplied.) The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language: "In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals." Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states: "Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be used only for a public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. * ** "The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. * * * ." (81 C.J.S. p. 1147; italics supplied.) The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, later on,

became Republic Act No. 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.4 The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

Sumulong and Vidanes-Balaoing vs Guerrero and NHA Case Digest LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners, vs. HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents. G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987 FACTS: On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings. Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation." Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied ISSUES: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration. 2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause, specifically:   

The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size and no matter how small the area to be expropriated; "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose; The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court;

 

The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors; The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of expropriation.

HELD: The exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution, to wit: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV, Sec. 9); No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1). Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public character." The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources. (p. 231) Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]

Amigable vs Cuenca Case Digest VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972 FACTS: Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title. No annotation in favor of the government of any

right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925." * On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case? HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.

People vs Fajardo Case Digest

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. 104 Phil 443 G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958 FACTS: It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3) Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son inlaw, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question. ISSUE: Whether or not ordinance no. 7, series of 1950 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the

comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.

CITY OF MANILA vs Chinese Community of Manila Case Digest THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees. FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged: That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court. The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a necessity to expropriate the particular land for public use? Whether or not said expropriation is in accordance with the principles of eminent domain? HELD: The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.

Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in making the statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department of the government and that department decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section 158 above quoted, the court said: But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene. The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into. By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.) And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead. Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.) Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)

The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority of the Spanish Governor-General.

Quezon City vs Ericta Case Digest CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 FACTS: This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void. Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution: RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not

repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance. An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised in the City.' The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

YNOT vs IAC Case Digest RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A which provides that “the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos”. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the

constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not executive order no. 626-A is unconstitutional due misapplication of police power, violation of due process, and undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the light of the tests mentioned, we hold with the Toribio Case that there is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no

such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. This measure deprives the individual due process as granted by the Constitution. The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

DECS vs San Diego and Dizon-Capulong Case Digest DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners, vs.ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents. G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 FACTS: The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds. The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the abovecited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. ISSUE: Whether or not MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 is unconstitutional and violative of the constitution rights to academic freedom and quality education, due process and equal protection? HELD: In reversing the decision of the RTC Judge and affirming the constitutionality of the MECS Order No. 12, the court cited that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.” The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among equals.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ Case Digest FLORENTINA A. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ G.R. NO. L-63419 146 SCRA 323 DECEMBER 18, 1986 FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the bouncing check law is unconstitutional? HELD: BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to the public interests. Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; and (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment

of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable (least limitable) of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day. By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nit. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. As aptly stated: “The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category

with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was intended as a shield and not a sword.” In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it. We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws which means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is far fetched.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs SECREATARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM Case Digest ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECREATARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R. NO. L-78742 JULY 14, 1989 FACTS: This is a consolidation of cases which involve constitutional questions as to the validity of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil." The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. ISSUE: Whether or not Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 is unconstitutional and violates individual rights to equal protection clause and due process. HELD: The court in upholding the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 discussed the issues. The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to

elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal. This brings us now to the power of eminent domain. Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused. A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Lutz vs Araneta Case Digest WALTER LUTZ VS. ANTONIO ARANETA G.R. NO. L-7859 DECEMBER 22, 1955 FACTS: This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. Promulgated in 1940, the due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section 3 levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration, on lease or otherwise a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 19481949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to this Court (Judiciary Act, section 17).

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 or Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional and for public purpose. HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6, will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain. Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in section 6 of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". From the point of view we have taken it appears of no moment that the funds raised under the Sugar Stabilization Act, now in question, should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; that the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of "all or none." As ruled in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson vs. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 84 L. Ed. 744, "if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied;" and that "the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach".

Ichong vs Hernandez Case Digest

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident,s corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: The Court cited the following reason in upholding the constitutionality and validity of R.A. No. 1180 which does not violate the equal protection of laws and due process. We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or

emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State. The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. DUE PROCESS The due process of law clause is not violated because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere. The guaranty of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable?; Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 10801081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

PASEI vs Drilon Case Digest PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON G.R. NO. L-81958 JUNE 30, 1988 FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid under the Constitution? HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not been contemplated. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC Case Digest SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-44640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 FACTS: On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments. (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of

people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law. (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication. (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law. (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative. (6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose. ISSUES: 1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. 2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. HELD: Issue 1 – Whether R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to cover the people’s initiative to propose amendments? R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM. Curiously, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Issue 2 – Validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC Case Digest SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976 FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which is quoted in the footnote below. On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.

The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution. On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution? 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? HELD: Issue 1 – Justiciability of the courts We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. Issue 2 – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?

As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997] Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and

mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation‟s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.