Case Digest - Go v. Cordero

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style “ACG Express Liner,”, petitioner, vs MORTIMER F. CORDERO, respondent G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010 Facts: Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25. After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel. Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner. On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s

authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFA’s other on-going vessel construction, this was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute, this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998. On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal. The case before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747). Issue: (1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of contract; and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA. Held: While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification. The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

Villanueva vs CA G.R. No. 107624 Subject: Sales Doctrine: meeting of the minds as to price is essential Facts: This is a petition assailing the decision of the CA dismissing the appeal of the petitioners. CA rendered that there was no contract of sale. – In 1985, Gamaliel Villanueva (tenant) of a unit in the 3-door apartment building owned by defendants-spouses (now private respondents) Jose Dela Cruz and Leonila dela Cruz located at Project 8, Quezon City. – About February of 1986, Dela Cruz offered said parcel of land with the 3-door apartment building for sale and plaintiffs, son and mother, showed interest in the property. – Because said property was in arrears(overdue) in the payment of the realty taxes, dela Cruz approached Irene Villanueva and asked for a certain amount to pay for the taxes so that the property would be cleared of any incumbrance. – Irene Villanueva gave P10,000.00 on two occasions. It was agreed by them that said P10,000.00 would form part of the sale price of P550,000.00. – Dela Cruz went to plaintiff Irene Villanueva bringing with him Mr. Ben Sabio, a tenant of one of the units in the 3-door apartment building and requested Villanueva to allow said Sabio to purchase one-half (1/2) of the property where the unit occupied by him pertained to which the plaintiffs consented, so that they would just purchase the other half portion and would be paying only P265,000.00, they having already — given an amount of P10,000.00 used for paying the realty taxes in arrears. – Accordingly the property was subdivided and two (2) separate titles were secured by defendants Dela Cruz. Mr. Ben Sabio immediately made payments by installments. – March 1987 Dela Cruz executed in favor of their co-defendants, the spouses Guido Pili and Felicitas Pili, a Deed of Assignment of the other one-half portion of the parcel of land wherein plaintiff Gamaliel Villanueva’s apartment unit is situated, purportedly as full payment and satisfaction of an indebtedness obtained from defendants Pili. – the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 356040 was issued in the name of defendants Pili on the same day. – The plaintiffs came to know of such assignment and transfer and issuance of a new certificate of title in favor of defendants Pili. – plaintiff Gamaliel Villanueva complained to the barangay captain of Bahay Turo, Quezon City, on the ground that there was already an agreement between defendants Dela Cruz and themselves that said portion of the parcel of land owned by defendants Dela Cruz would be sold to him. As there was no settlement arrived at, the plaintiffs elevated their complaint to this Court through the instant action. – RTC rendered its decision in favor of Dela Cruz. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON there was a perfected sale between Villanueva and Dela Cruz. HELD: – Petitioners contend that private respondents’ counsel admitted that “P10,000 is partial or advance payment of the property.” Necessarily then, there must have been an agreement as to price, hence, a perfected sale. They cite Article 1482 of the Civil Code which provides that “(w)henever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract.” – Private respondents contradict this claim with the argument that “(w)hat was clearly agreed (upon) between

petitioners and respondents Dela Cruz was that the P10,000.00 primarily intended as payment for realty tax was going to form part of the consideration of the sale if and when the transaction would finally be consummated.” Private respondents insist that there “was no clear agreement as to the true amount of consideration.” – Dela Cruz’ testimony during the cross-examination firmly negated any price agreement with petitioners because he and his wife quoted the price of P575,000.00 and did not agree to reduce it to P550,000.00 as claimed by petitioner. – Villanueva on cross-examination: “After the Deed of Sale relative to the purchase of the property was prepared, Mr. dela Cruz came to me and told me that he talked with one of the tenants and he offered to buy the portion he was occupying if I will agree and I will cause the partition of the property between us.” Villanueva said that he agreed and that the price 550,000 was to be divided into two. (Sabio and Villanueva) *The contract which the appellant is referring to was not presented to the court and the appellant did not use all effort to produce the said contract. – SC: “The price of the leased land not having been fixed, the essential elements which give life to the contract were lacking. It follows that the lessee cannot compel the lessor to sell the leased land to him. The price must be certain, it must be real, not fictitious. A contract of sale is not void for uncertainty when the price, though not directly stated in terms of pesos and centavos, can be made certain by reference to existing invoices identified in the agreement. In this respect, the contract of sale is perfected. The price must be certain, otherwise there is no true consent between the parties. There can be no sale without a price. – In the instant case, however, what is dramatically clear from the evidence is that there was no meeting of mind as to the price, expressly or impliedly, directly or indirectly. – Sale is a consensual contract. He who alleges it must show its existence by competent proof. Here, the very essential element of price has not been proven. – Lastly, petitioners’ claim that they are ready to pay private respondents is immaterial and irrelevant as the latter cannot be forced to accept such payment, there being no perfected contract of sale in the first place.

VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., JOSE RAMIRO A. CARPIO, JR., WESSIE QUISUMBING, and ELIZALDE AMPALAYO, respondents., G.R. No. 116384, 2000 February 7, 2000.

Facts: Respondent Norkis Distributor, Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office and business address at A. S. Fortuna Street, Mandaue City, Cebu, is engaged in the business of selling motorcycles and household appliances, with branches all over the country. One of the branches is in Valencia, Bukidnon where petitioner Viola Cruz was employed as cashier/ bookkeeper. For her loyalty and dedication to the company, petitioner Cruz was given compensating salary adjustment of One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos, effective July 1, 1990. In October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were busy packing up and making inventory of the things to be moved because of a scheduled transfer of the Valencia branch, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the Monsanto General Hospital in Valencia, Bukidnon and was later on transferred to the Capitol College General Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City on October 17, 1990. She was diagnosed to be suffering from “CNS Infection: TB Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal Meningitis.” She was later transferred to the Maria Reyna Hospital, where she was confined from October 25 to December 5, 1990, and treated for “ Cryptococcal Meningitis, Pott’s Disease, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II. Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. Two days after petitioner’s collapse, respondent Norkis was able to recruit a replacement cashier/ bookkeeper in the person of Hernando Juaman. On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify the status of her employment. As an answer, she received a termination latter dated November 2, 1990 citing health reasons as the cause for her dismissal. On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. On May 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo rendered a decision but both parties appealed to the NLRC. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents on ground of illness and so she was entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages. Ruling: Private respondents illegally dismissed the petitioner because they failed to comply with the requirement that an employee to be dismissed should be given two written notices. The first notice is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions by reason of which her dismissal has been decided upon; and the second is to inform the employee of

the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Having failed to do the requirement, respondents have not given the petitioner due process which makes their act illegal and void. For this, petitioner is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages.

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner vs. GEORGE G. BARRIOS AND OLGA THERESA CRUZ-BARRIOS, respondents No. L-60859. December 27, 1982

Facts: The petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent-spouses, both physicians, a cablegram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent-wife for a rotating internship in said hospital. As a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her acceptance and the position was given to someone else. The Trial Court and the Court of appeals found that the petitioner was grossly negligent in having admittedly failed to deliver the cablegram which caused respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earnings for approximately six months, serious anxiety, and sleepless nights, for which the petitioner should be held liable, and which should be corrected for the public good.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is excessive.

Ruling: Yes. A telegraph company is a public service corporation owing duties to the general public ands is liable to any member of the public whom it owes a duty for damages proximately flowing from a violation of that duty. However, the petitioner is a quasi-public corporation also affected with public interest and the award of damages made by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was found by the Supreme Court to be excessive. The decision of the Supreme Court modified that of the lower courts by reducing the award.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents No. L-44748. August 29, 1986

Facts: The complaint against the defendant corporation is based on a telegram sent through its Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela. Plaintiff-respondent Dionela alleged that the defamatory words (“sa iyo walang pakinabang dumating-ka diyan-wala kang padala ditto-kahit bulbul mo”) on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to know of the said defamatory words. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleged that the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The trial court ruled that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous and that they clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. There is sufficient publication of the libelous Tagalog words for they are open to view and inspection by third parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Trial Court’s decision by reducing the award of damages. A motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the petition.

Issue: Whether or not award of moral damages based on documentary evidence without supporting oral testimonies is proper.

Ruling: Yes. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR or “the thing speaks for itself,” by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent. G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

Facts: Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled fro the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, his grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega. In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law, the plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiff’s name also appeared in the invitation for the 35th Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws. The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988. during the program of which he went up the stage, his mother and brother placed his Hood, his Tassel turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination. Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and exemplary damages for the abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Ruling: The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid but not entitled to moral damages. The court does not believe that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because he could not graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated that it behooved on respondent to

verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. Respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Tuesday, December 25, 2012 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs REYES Case Digest NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA” 2005 Feb 28 G.R. No. 154259 FACTS: In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager. During the party and when respondent was lined-up at the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman approached him and escorted him out of her party. Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstances painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity. She asked him to leave the party after he finished eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter screamed and made a big scene. Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party. Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its decision. Thus, this instant petition for review. ISSUES: Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her. RULING: The Court found more credible the lower court’s findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the story was unsupported, failing to present any witness to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employees. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Article 21 states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act cannot amount to abusive conduct. The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury) was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger.

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest/ Brief G.R. No. L-14628 Procedural Facts: Case filed in Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered decision in favor of P (soledad). Lower Court’s decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by increasing compensatory damages and moral damages. Substantive Facts: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant married one Romanita Perez. ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry? HELD: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses as well as attorney’s fees. REASONING: Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code. - See more at: http://studentsofsocrates.blogspot.com/2010/04/hermosisima-vs-court-of-appealscase.html#sthash.07r2sgEn.dpuf

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993 Facts: Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipina filed on Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Lingayen for a complaint for damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh (an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments in Guilig, Dagupan City and is an exchnage student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges), for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of thar year; the petitioner visited to private respondent’s hometown in Banaga, Bugallion, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometimes in August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in his apartment. Because of the petitioner’s promise to marry the private respondent, the latter surrendered her virginity. A week before the filing of the complaint, the petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change; he matreated and threatened to kill her. He said that he does not want to marry her because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. The private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages, reimbursements for actual expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs. On the other hand, the petitioner also filed a counter claim, of course, denying and reversing the allegations against him by the private respodent. On October 16, 1989, the Regional Trial Court applied the Article 21 of the Civil Code favoring the private respondent. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding the decision of the trial court. On February 18, 1991, the CA affirmed in toto the trial courts ruling. Thus, unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed instant petition on March 26, 1991. Issue: Whether or nor damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that, in the existing rule under our Civil Law, a breach of promise to marry itself is not an actionable wrong. The Supreme Court found out the true character and motive of the petitioner, that is, he used deception and took advantage of the situation of the private respondent (a high school graduate and financially unstable) by proposing to support and marry her, just so he can satisfy his lust. Thus, he clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and defied the traditional respect was not going to marry her after all, she left him. Therefore, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision the instant petition hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendantDecember 26, 1964

Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23, 1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to marry? Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents. G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000 Facts: The spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the respondents, were residing in an apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor Nicolas was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after contributing capital with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned. Rodrigo Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the deceased husband of Florence, went to Nestor’s apartment and accused him of committing adulterous relationship with Florence. Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence even ceased to do business with the spouses. The spouses started to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husband’s fidelity. Nestor forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. The latter ignored that triggered the spouses to file civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He reasoned out that he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family. Issue: Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, spouses Nicolas Ruling: The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that supports such award of damages has been rejected. Article 26 of the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human personality, which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Thus, the petitioner is liable to the spouses for P50, 000 as moral damages, P25, 000 for exemplary damages, P10, 000 for attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit.

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents. G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001 Facts: Amonoy, the petitioner, was the counsel of Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos. Such estate involves six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. The Project of Partition was approved on 12 January 1965 and two of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. With regard to the attorney’s fees, Amonoy charged P27, 600.00. To secure the payment of such, on 20 January 1965, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them. Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda passed away on 24 February 1969 and on 2 July 1969, respectively. Among the heirs of Alfonso was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez. On 21 January 1970, Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, since his attorney’s fees secured by the two lots were not paid. The heirs opposed. However, on 28 September 1972 judgement, it was rendered in favour of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay the P27,600.00by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as a value of the harvests, and P9,654.00 as another round of attorney’s fees within 90 days. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public auction. On 25 July 1985, the CFI issued a Writ of Possession and a pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985. The land, where the house of Gutierrez spouses was situated, was part of the said parcel of land to be possessed by Amonoy. On 27 September 1985 a petition was filed by the petitioners (including Angela Gutierrez) before the Supreme Court. A Decision rendered setting aside the Writ of Possession and the Temporary Restraining Order was made permanent, and ordering that the six (6) parcels of land are returned to petitioners. However, the said dwelling had already been destroyed. Thus, a Complaint for damages for such was filed before the RTC; but it was dismissed. On appeal the CA set aside the lower court’s decision, rather ordered petitioner Amonoy to pay P250, 000 as actual damages. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable to the respondents for damages Ruling: The petition has no merit. The Latin phrase damnum absque injuria – that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury finds no application to this case. Though petitioner, under the Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC, commenced the demolition, there was a continuation the same after the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house, was issued by the Supreme Court. Thus, costs against petitioner.

TEODORO GUARING, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997

Facts: This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila. Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring’s car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring’s Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite direction. The Regional Trial Court awarded the heirs with moral and exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision upon review. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners’ action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter’s acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Issue: Does judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr?

Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for a decision in accordance with law. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001

Facts: On or about the 25th day of September 1982, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeepdriven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. The petitioner then proceeded to the Supreme Court and held that he would be subject to double jeopardy if he trial on his civil libility would ensue.

Issues: a. Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless imprudence? b. Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It should be noted that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CAG.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Scrutiny of the lower court’s decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge.

FLORENCIO BONITE, plaintiff vs Zosa, defendant G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988

Facts: At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City, he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 9328. Petitioners through their counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the accused. After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case, acquitting the accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2806. In an order dated 25 February 1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages. THe petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the said order.

Issue: Is an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action?

Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the rulings of the lower courts. It allowed the reinstatement of the case for retrial. When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case notwithstanding. Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and independent actions

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999 Facts: Eduardo M Cojuangco, a known busenessman-sportsman, won a total of P1,020,700.00 on various horse-racing. He then sent a letter demanding to the defendants the collection of the prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance heeding to then President Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 2 freezing all properties of former Presidet Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies, in which Cojuangco is a friend of the former President Marcos. Finally, February 7, 1991, the PCGG advised defendants that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr. As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Mendoza, petitioner’s counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Issue: a) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; b) Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief; c) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents; d) Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law Ruling: The appellate court committed no error in dismissing the appeal since the representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act as principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations. With regards the alleged failure of Mr. Carrascoso to file an appeal brief, his filing is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal. What is important is that respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. As to the third issue, respondent court could not reverse and set aside the RTC decision in its entirety and dismiss the original complaint without trampling upon the rights that the accused accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. The controlling article regarding the fourth issue is Article 32 of the Civil Code which states that: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The deprivationof property without due process of law. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even of the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued seaquestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law. Mr. Carrascoso is thereby ordered to pay petitioner nominal damages.

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon City Branch ET AL, respondents No. L-76353. May 2, 1988 Facts: Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City, while respondents are: Philippine Scholl of Business Administration Quezon City Branch, a non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino, Vice-president for admission and registration of PSBA; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-charge; and Ramon Agapay, director of the Office of Student Affairs and Romeo Rafer, chief security of PSBA. As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the school year 19861987. On Oct. 28, 1986, the president of the student council filed a complaint against PSBA. Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on Nov. 10, 1986, by the PSBA Faculty Union representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as intervenors on the ground of similarity of issues and cause with that of the petitioners. Thereafter, an investigating committee was established. The committee submits the following recommendation: that Renato Palma, Bernadette Ang, Rogelio Taganas are to be exonerated of all charges; that Sophia Alcuaz be honorable dismissed; that Florante Bagsic and Atenogenes Bondoc, both faculty-intervenors, be reprimanded with a warning; that Severinon Cortes, also a faculty-intervenor, be granted non-renewal of his semester appointment and that Asser Tamayo and Rene Encarnacion, also faculty-intervenors, be terminated. Respondents adopted the afrestated recommendations and prayed that the case be dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from enrollment and for intervenors-faculty whose services have been terminated?

Ruling: It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Par 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the manual that the “written contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester”. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBAQC no longer has any existing contract either with the student or with thee intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. This court moreover stressed that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court. Furthermore, the court found out that petitioners were academically deficient while the intervening teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the school committed various acts of misconduct. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation has always been recognized by this court.

Premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed. ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the 5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990 Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges Inc., in Daet were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their re-admission to the school, but the trail court dismissed the petition using the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA as the basis. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari. The case was assigned to the 3 rd division of the court, which then transferred it to the Court en banc on Aug. 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. Respondent school justified their action of non-readmission due to the fact that the petitioners incurred academic deficiency. Petitioners used the following as defense: that 3 of them were graduating; that their academic deficiencies do not warrant re-admission; that their breach of discipline was not serious; that the improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly; that there was no due investigation; that respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-years-in itself punishment enough.

Issue: Whether or not the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA be binding in this case?

Ruling: The court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the manual of Regulations for Private Schools. On the other hand, the manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities were the student mass actions conducted in Feb. 1988 and which led and/or participated by the petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basis tenets of fair play. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission and who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of the respondent school. Wherefore, the petition is granted. The orders of respondent judge are herby annulled. Respondent Mabini College is ordered to re-admit and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners.

CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., respondents G.R No. 150256. March 25, 2004 Facts: About 2am on April 14, 1987, respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District Headquarters where Emelita Despuig, and employee of the National Institute at Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. In the presence of Morales, Despuig executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding the reported offenses. She stated that the first incident was on March 14, 1987 where she was abducted and raped by the petitioner at Flamingo Hotel. The second incident was an attempted rape on the night of April 14, 1987. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Despuig. After the interview, Morales tried to contact Arafiled at the NIAS office to verify Despuig’s story but failed, the office having already closed. That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales’ report appeared as headline on People’s Journal Tonight reading: “GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED GIRL by Romy Morales”. On April 13, 1988, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal Jr., as president of the Philippine Journalists Inc., aspersions were cat on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the news item, having been sourced out of the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a personal interview is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional freedom of the press. RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. The CA however found that petitioner was not able to prove by that respondents were motivated to cause harm or injury.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages? Ruling: Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first 7 paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained by Despuig. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Despuig had reported at the police headquarters. In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

In fine, this court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by preponderance of evidence. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL) INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001 Facts: IFFI is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Argos and Pineda (respondents) are the general manager and commercial director respectively of the Fragrance Division of IFFI. In 1992, the office of Managing Director was created to head the corporation’s operations in the Philippines. Costa was appointed as the Managing Director. Argos and Pineda as general managers have to report directly to Costa. Because of serious differences between the Managing Director and the General Manager, the latter agreed to terminate their services. They signed a “Release Waiver and Quit Claim” on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which described respondents as ‘persona non grata’ and urged employees not to have further dealings with them. The respondents filed a libel case in Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila. On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages at Regional Trial Court of Pasig against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. On October 1995, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss for the respondents failure to reserve right to institute a separate civil case. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and was granted the same court. IFFI on the other hand filed a motion to reconsider the said order but was denied by the court. The case was elevated by the IFFI to the Court of Appeals reiterating the same ground for dismissal. However, the Ca dismissed the case. Issue: Whether the private respondents can sue IFFI for civil case for damages in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Ruling: It was held by the court, based on the case of Joaquin vs. Aniceto, Article 33 of the New Civil Code contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not apply against the employer to enforce its subsidiary liability, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before conviction of its employee is premature.

Having established that respondents did not based their civil action on IFFI’s primary liability under Article 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa is premature. The court granted the petition and the decisions of the RTC and Ca were reversed and set aside.

MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPREALS, FELARDO PAJE and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents. No. L-34529. January 27, 1983 Facts: On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao Pampanga, a bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to petitioner Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in RTC Pampanga. On January 23, 1957 an action for damages was filed in the RTC of Rizal by the petitioner against Victory and Paje, alleging that the mishap due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving. While the civil case was in progress in Rizal, RTC Pampanga rendered its decision and convicted the respondent. However, in their appeal to the Ca they were acquitted. As conducted by the CA, criminal negligence is wanting in the case, and that Paje was not even guilty of Civil Negligence because it was a case of mere accident. Respondent Paje in the Civil Case in Rizal moved for dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the CA for his acquittal. However, the Rizal RTC dismissed the motion and thereafter continued the trial. The RTC Rizal dismissed the complaint against Victory and Paje based on the decision of the CA. The petitioner appealed to the CA invoking Article 33 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Sec. 3. The CA held that private respondent cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was pure accident.

Issue: Whether the civil case filed separately be dismissed.

Ruling: It was held by the court that Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by the petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages maybe instituted in connection therewith. Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from which the civil might arise did not exist.” Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. No. L-45404. August 7, 1987 Facts: Agustina Tagaca, laundry woman for petitioner Atty. Jesus Ruiz filed an administrative charge against respondent Encarnacion Ucol. In the answer of the respondent to the charge filed against her, she alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucol’s because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucols’ husband against Ruiz. She also alleged to have made remarkds that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charge. The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused. Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded. Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribe and that the case of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.

Issue: Whether the civil case was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.

Ruling: It was held that the trial court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz against Ucol because her guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. And in the review of the findings by the court, the disputed answer of Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. The court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz.

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO, respondents No. 48006. July 8, 1942

Facts: On May 3, 1936, about half past one in the morning on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision coreccional but the court granted the petition that the right to bring civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the criminal case. On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto Barredo: (1) the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and (2) Barredo’s primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take and they preferred the second. On March 7, 1939, Severino Garcia and Timoteo Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action to the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the employer of Pedro Fontanilla. This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action based on cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana against Fausto Barredo for the death of Faustino Garcia.

Ruling: Yes. The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo because of the separate individuality of cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for the better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. The court also found out that defendant-petitioner is Fontanilla’s employer. There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It is shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding – violations which appeared in the Records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed wherein the plaintiffs should be awarded for damages by defendant-petitioner P1, 000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner’s wife answered by alleging that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor’s office in Makati, who found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them on September 16, 1997. On March 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the warrant of Arrest in the criminal case issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Such motion and the motion for reconsideration were denied.

Issue: Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?

Ruling:

No. The Court averred that petitioner’s contention is untenable. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case because the facts in the latter case are not based on the former for the guilt of the petitioner-accused to be determined.

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL., respondents No. L-15315. August 26, 1960

Facts: Abundio Merced was married to Eufriciana Tan and without such marriage having been legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force and intimidation by the relatives Elizabeth force him into marriage and filed for annulment. He also raised the issue of prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the prosecution for bigamy.

Ruling: The civil action must be decided first before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed (before the new Family Code took effect).