Case Digest Compiled f

CASE DIGEST ON TORTS & DAMAGES PROFESSOR: ATTY. JUN DE GRANO

Submitted by: Thursday Class 4:30 to 7:30 P.M.

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List of Cases on Torts

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Assigned to:

PAGE

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Africa vs. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 Alfialda vs. Spouses Hisole, 85 Phil 67 Alitalia vs. IAC, 192 SCRA 9 Amadora vs. CA, 160 SCRA 315 Atlantic Gulf vs. CA, 249 SCRA 397 Batiquin vs. CA, 258 SCRA 334 Bonifacio vs. BLTB, 34 SCRA 618 Bustamante, et al., vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 89880, 6 February 1991 Cangco vs. The Manila Railroad Company, 38 Phil 768 Capuno, et al., vs. Pepsi Cola, et al. G.R. No. L19331, 30 April 1965 China Airlines vs. CA, G.R. NO. 45985, 18 May 1990 City of Manila vs. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January 1968 Corliss, et al., vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 Cruz vs. NLRC, 203 SCRA 286 Cuadra vs. Monfort, G.R. No. L-24101, 30 September 1970 Culion Ice, Fish and Electric Co., Inc. vs. Phil. Motors Corp., 55 Phil 129 Daywalt vs. Recoletos, 39 Phil 587 De Guzman vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 90856, 23 July 1992 Dichoso vs. CA, 192 SCRA 169 EPG Construction vs. CA, 210 SCRA 230 Exconde vs. Capuno, G.R. No. L-10134, 29 June 1957 Fabre vs. CA, 259 SCRA 426 FF Cruz vs. CA, 164 SCRA 733 Filamer Christian College vs. CA, G.R. No. 75112, 17 August 1992 Filinvest vs. CA, 248 SCRA 549 First Malayan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91378, 9June 1992 Fontanilla vs. Mallaman, G.R. No. L-55963, 1 December 1989 Gatchalian vs. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 Gelisan vs. Alday, 154 SCRA 388 Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, G.R. No. 61516, 21

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Dilig Cuyco Lopez Menzon Bolos Equetan Estanislao Lasque

05 07 addendum

09 10 12 13 14

Aure

Addendum

Leon

16

Estanislao

18

Padlan

19

Acosta Villanueva

20 21

Lopez

22

Aure Barrios

23 24

Roxas Gumabay Rodriguez

26 28 30

Lopez Bolos Equetan

31 32 36

Mendoza Salipsip

Addendum

37

Padlan

39

Menzon

40 41 43 44

De Chavez

Rodriguez Pador

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

March 1989 Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil 628 Jarco Marketing vs. CA, G.R. NO. 129792, 21 December 1999 LBC Air Cargo vs. CA, 241 SCRA 619 Lilius, et al. vs. The Manila Railroad Co., 59 Phil 758 Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 Manuel vs. CA, 227 SCRA 29 Mckee, et al. vs. IAC et al., G.R. No. L-68102, 16 July 1992 Merritt vs. Government, G.R. No. 1-11154, 21 March 1916 MHP Garments vs. CA, 236 SCRA 227 Nakpil & Sons vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47851, 3 October 1986 NAPOCOR vs. CA, 161 SCRA 334, GRN L47379 May 16, 1988 NAPOCOR vs. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 103442-45, 21 May 1993 Pantranco vs. Baesa, GRN 79050 November 14, 1989 Pecson vs. CA, 244 SCRA 407 PHIMCO vs City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99 Phoenix Construction, Inc. et al. vs. IAC, et al., 148 SCRA 353 Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809 PLDT vs. CA, 178 SCRA 94 Ponce vs. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 Rakes vs. Atlantice Gulf, 7 Phil 359 RCPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 79578, March 13, 1991 Rubio vs. CA, 141 SCRA 488 Salvosa vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458,5 October 1988 Security Bank vs. CA, 249 SCRA 206 Shookat vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115 Soliman vs. Tuazon, G.R. No. 66207, 18 May 1992 Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16 Phil 8 Umali vs. Bacani, et al., 69 SCRA 263 Velayo vs. Shell, 100 Phil 186

60 Vergara vs. CA, G.R. No. 77679, 30 Sept. 1987 61 Vestil vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 47

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Salipsip

Addendum

Gatioan Dilig

46 48

Abad Agonoy Gatioan

50 51 52

Lasque

54

Mendoza Agonoy

56 57

Pador

59

Dayo

62

Leon

63

Dacanay Tejano Villanueva

64 65 66

Dayo Abad Dacanay Sayo Carlos Cheng Barrios Mori Tejano Sayo

67 69 70 71 72 75 Addendum

77 79 80

Gatioan Cuyco Acosta Rodriguez

81 82 83 84

Cheng Mori

85 86

List of Cases on Damages 62 Air France vs. CA, GRN 76093 March 21, 1989 63 Araos vs. CA, GRN 107057 June 2, 1994 Consolidated Plywood vs. CA, GRN 101706 64 September 23, 1992 Country Bankers vs. CA, G.R. No. 85161 65 September 9, 1991 66 Davila vs. PAL, GRN L-28512 February 28,1973 67 De Leon vs. CA, GRN L-31931 August 31, 1988 Eastern Shipping vs. CA, GRN 97412 July 12, 68 1994 Filinvest Credit vs. IAC, GRN L-65935 69 September 30, 1988 70 Jison vs. CA, GRN L-45349 August 15, 1988 71 Lao vs. CA, G.R. No. 82808 July 11,1991 Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, GRN L72 22415. March 30, 1966 Malaysian Airline vs. CA, GRN L-78015 73 December 11, 1987 Octot vs. Ibanez, GRN L-48643 January 18, 74 1982 PAL vs. CA, G.R. No. 54470. May 8, 1990 (185 75 SCRA 110) PAL vs. CA, GRN 119641 May 17,1996 (257 76 SCRA 33) 77 PAL vs. Miano, GRN 106664 March 8, 1995 78 Patricio vs. Leviste, GRN 51832 April 26, 1989 People vs. Quilaton, GRN 69666 January 23, 79 1992 PNB vs. Utility Assurance, GRN 39215 80 September 1, 1989 Reformina vs. Tomol, GRN L-59096 October 11, 81 1985 Zalamea vs. CA, GRN 104235 November 18, 82 1993 Zamboanga (ZAMCELCO) vs. Buat, GRN 83 100514 March 29,1995

Submitted By: Dilig, Jose Rodolfo Manuel Hugo B.

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Assigned to: Gumabay Hamdain Roxas

88 90 Addendum

Agonoy Legasto Villanueva

91 93 95

Mangotara De Chavez Dacanay Suntay

97 100 101 102

Manlapaz

104

Bolos

105

Barrios

107

Dayo

109

Carlos Hamdain Aure

110 113 114

Legasto

117

Manlapaz

120

Mangotara

121

Suntay

123

Gatioan

126

G.R. No. L-12986

March 31, 1966

THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees. Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, when an unknown bystander threw a matchstick into the nozzle after lighting a cigarette. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Issue: Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees. Held: Reversed. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal observation that the gasoline station being located on a thickly populated area, a person lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and poses as a secondary hazard, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts, descriptive of the location and objective

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circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. Even then, the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high, and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.

Submitted by: Cuyco, Kate Juris Prudence C.

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Margarita Afialda v. Basilio Hisole and Francisco Hisole G.R. No. L-2075

November 29, 1949

Facts: This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support. Defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. Issue: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker. Ruling: NO. The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to

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the caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. The distinction is important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial situation of the appellant.

Submitted by: Menzon, Bradford B.

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Amadora vs. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 315 FACTS: On April 13, 1972, Alfredo Amadora while in the Auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The herein petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action under Article 2180 NCC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of the boys, and the physics teachers together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial the CFI of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.Hence this action for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are liable under Article 2180 NCC. HELD: The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher in charge during the time of the accident. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the Article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the students of apprentice. Neither can it be held liable to answer for the tort committed by any other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending students or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

Submitted by: Bolos, Maria Gracia Patricia S.

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G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995 ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and CORNELIO CASTILLO, respondents. REGALADO, J.: FACTS: Petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area adjacent to the real property of private respondents. Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard, petitioner's personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging to private respondents without their consent. These heavy equipments damaged big portions of private respondents' property which were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that such use of their land was with the former's conformity. Private respondents further alleged that as a result of the dredging operation of petitioner company, the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said property which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production and each averaging an annual net harvest of 75 cavans could no longer be planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and contended that its personnel and equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied any portion of private respondents' landholdings. The alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was due to the flood brought by the heavy rains when typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of Batangas during that year. An action for damages was filed with the trial court which decided the case ordering defendant to pay private respondents. Petitioner company appealed to the Court of Appeals but the said court affirmed the trial court’s judgement with modifications on the amount. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the respondent court misapplied Article 2177 of the New Civil Code. HELD: When the Court of Appeals ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of their said entire landholdings it misapplied Article 2177. What Article 2177 says is that no damages can be twice from the same act or omission. However, the Supreme Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in increasing the amount of damages awarded to private respondents by the court a quo. Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondents who, in the first place, did not interpose an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court. The procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower court. The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner company is liable for the destruction of the property of herein private respondents and consequently entitle the latter to an award of the damages prayed for. WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with regard to the amount of damages awarded to private respondents and the awards of the trial court on this matter are hereby reinstated for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of respondent court is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Submitted by: Equetan, Esteban M.

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BATIQUIN VS COURT OF APPEALS 258 SCRA 334 GR No. 118231 July 5, 1996 Facts: Dr. Batiquin was a resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City, performed a simple caesarian section on Mrs. Flotilde Villegas on the latter’s first child. Days after the operation Mrs. Villegas checked out on the said hospital and paid the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) as Dr. Batiquin’s professional fee thru the latter’s secretary. Soon after leaving the hospital Mrs. Villegas begun to suffer abdominal pains, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin, who prescribed her certain medicines. And in the meantime Mrs. Villegas was given a medical certificate by Dr. Batiquin to report for work. Mrs. Villegas reported for work at the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros Oriental but the pain kept on recurring prompting Mrs. Villegas to consult Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. When Dr. Ma. Salud Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas, she found a piece of rubber material which she described a foreign body. Mrs. Villegas sued Dr. Batiquin for damages. Issue: Wether the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies. Held: Yes The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applies as the entire operation proceedings was under exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin; aside from the caesarian operation Mrs. Villegas underwent no other operation which could have introduced the rubber; and Dr. Batiquin, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.

Submitted by: Estanislao, Rizalino jr

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Bonifacio vs BLT Bus Co., Inc. Facts: Jovito Bonifacio Sr. and his wife, together with their neighbors were on their way to Los Banos, Laguna. The spouses’ Mercedes Benz was driven by Alberto Concepcion, a duly licensed driver. They began to travel at 4am and around 5:20am Concepcion noticed a cargo truck parked on the left portion of the highway without any parking light. Concepcion was running the Benz only at the speed of 30 miles per hour because it was drizzling. He also noticed a bus on the left side of the highway which was going the opposite direction as they were. Since the benz was on the correct lane Concepcion continued the route. Just as he was about to pass the parked truck, the bus swrved to the lane of the benz and collided with the latter. This caused Jovito to be thrown out of the car and die. Others were seriously injured. Issue: who among the drivers is at fault? Is the employer of the guilty driver liable? Held: De Luna, the driver of the BLT bus was at fault. Concepcion was not at fault. De luna’s defense that he did not know that anyone else was using the highway was no excuse to his negligent operation of the vehicle, since he should be especially be watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway; his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence. Concepcion on the other hand, did not have sufficient time to evade the sudden swerve of the bus. He was on his proper lane and the speed of the Benz was not a cause of the mishp. On the second issue, BLTB company contends that they excercised due diligence in selection of employees because their drivers underwent proficiency tests and issued service manuals to employees. However, due diligence in selection will not help if it is proved that there was no diligence of a good father in the supervision of such employees. It was proven that: (a) brake linings were changed more than 30 days prior to the incident when linings last 30 day only, (b) De Luna was at the wheel for more than 11 hours already when the accident happened, (c) De Luna had 31 infractions prior to the mishap but received warnings only, (d) the overhauling of the bus was overdue by 6 months. Therefore, BLTB co. inc. is liable as employer due to its negligence in supervision. Submitted by: Lasque, Mervin N.

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BUSTAMANTE, ET AL., VS. CA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 89880, 6 FEBRUARY 1991. FACTS: Six thirty in the morning, a collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck and a passenger bus. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained. During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar. The passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned jointly by Magtibay and Serrado. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it. CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision, and dismissed the complaint insofar as del Pilar and Montesino are concerned. SC reversed and set aside the judgment of the CA reinstated that of the lower court, with the modification on the indemnity for death of each of the victims which increased to P 50, 000.00 each (lasque, mervin’s digest). ISSUE: Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable in a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles? RULING: The Appellate erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between defendants because the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, it erred in absolving the owner

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and driver of the cargo truck from liability. Furthermore, because as between defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable of the injured person by reason of his discovery of the later’s peril, and it cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury.

Submitted by: Leon, David Martin L.

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CAPUNO VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES GR. No. L-19331 / April 30,1965 FACTS: The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi. At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its, from which order the present appeal has been taken. The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal is that the action had already prescribed. ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by petitioners based on quasi-delict is barred by prescription. HELD: The action filed is barred by prescription. There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). When they commenced the civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have been premature and in any event would have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other words the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent. But the complaint here was filed only on after the lapse of more than five years.

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An action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) maybe brought" which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict.

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Submitted by: Estanislao, Rizalino jr. China Air Lines, Ltd. vs Court of Appeals GR 45985. May 18, 1990 Facts: Jose Pagsibigan bought a Manila-Taipei-Hong Kong-Manila ticket from Transaire Travel Agency. The latter contacted Philippine Air Lines who was then a ticketing agent of China Airlines. PAL ticketing clerk Roberto Espiritu issued a CAL ticket of the desired flight with a departure time 5:20pm. Pagsibigan arrived at the airport one hour before the mentioned departure time only to be informed that the flight he was supposed to take had already left for Taipei 10:20 in the morning of that day. Pagsibigan filed for damages. Issue:Who may be held liable? Held: Espiritu and Philippine Air Lines are liable, China Air Lines is not. It is important to recognize that the contractual relations of PAL between CAL is one of Agency. However, this action premised on the negligence of the employee and the complainant seeks recovery for the resulting damages from both PAL and Espiritu without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employee under Art. 2180 of the new civil code. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer in the selection or in the supervision of its employees. Such presumption is rebuttable by clear showing of the exercise of care and diligence of a good father of the family by the employer. In the case at bar however, PAL failed to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against it. Its main defense that it is only an agent and may not be held liable to third persons when duly acting is untenable. A case for damages against the agent arising from torts is an admitted exception to the rule invoked by PAL. Therefore, Espiritu is primarily liable under Art. 2176 while PAL is liable under 2180.

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Submitted by: Padlan, Jay Vincent S. City of Manila vs. Teotico 22SCRA267 Facts: On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 pm, Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a “loading and unloading” zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. In addition to the eye injury he suffered, Teotico also had several injuries in his body which necessitated medical treatment. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed with the court a civil case for damages against the City of Manila as provided by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides: “Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. The City of Manila, on the other hand, contended that P. Burgos is a national highway, which meant that it did not belong to the City of Manila and thus could not be held liable. Issue: Whehter or not the City of Manila is liable for the damages caused by the defective road to Teotico Held: Yes, the City of Manila is liable. In Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective road or street belongs to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either “control or supervision” over said street or road. In the case at bar, even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its “control or supervision” by the City of Manila, as provided for by Section 18 of Republic Act 409.

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Submitted by: Acosta, Voltaire S. CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. # L-21291, March 28, 1969 Facts: Preciolita V. Corliss whose husband, the late Ralph W. Corliss, was, at the tender age of twenty-one, the victim of a grim tragedy, when the jeep he was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant-appellee Manila Railroad Company, close to midnight on the evening of Febuary 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga. Ronald J. Ennis, a witness of the plaintiff, substantially declared in his deposition, that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, that it made a brief stop but that it did not stop dead stop. Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down, Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop. He also testified that he could see the train coming from the direction of San Fernando and that he heard a warning but that it was not sufficient enough to avoid the accident. Virgilio de la Paz, another witness of the plaintiff, testified that on the night of February 21, 1957, he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught fire, was pushed forward. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him. Issue: Whether the plaintiff can recover damages from defendant Held: The accident was caused by the negligence of Ralph Corliss. The latter was sufficiently warned in advance that defendant’s train was coming because of the siren and signal of the train, and besides, the victim knew about the setup of the checkpoint, and the existence of the trucks. Under the circumstances, the victim should have stopped completely before the crossing and should have allowed the train to go through its course. Having failed to do this, the victim is considered negligent, and plaintiff was not allowed to recover damages.

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Submitted by: VILLANUEVA, Vincent Irving P. CRUZ vs. NLRC G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991 FACTS: Clarita V. Cruz went abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her future. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18, 1988, after completing her two-year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry grievance. On March 23, 1988, she filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised the principal defense of settlement as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant NLRC dismissed the complaint by the petitioner. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the affidavit of desistance signed by the complainant is a valid waiver of her right to collect for compensation against private respondents. HELD: No. The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.

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Submitted by: Lopez, John MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO MONFORT G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970 Facts: Cuadra,12, and Monfort,13, were classmates in grade six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962, they were assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. While performing the assigned task, Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said that she had found an earthworm, and as a prank to frighten Cuadra threw the headband towards her. At that precise moment, Monfort turned to face her friend, and the headband thus hit her right eye, injuring it. Cuadra treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye began to swell, and the parents thus took her to a doctor where she had to undergo surgery, despite that, she eventually lost sight in that eye, as a result of the said injury. The parents of Ciuadra sued for damages, based on article 2176 and 2180 of the civil code, ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter. ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Issue: Whether or not the parents of Maria Teressa Cuadra may be held liable for the acts of their minor child’s tortuous act? Held: The act of throwing the head band was deemed to be a childish prank, and was in fact not an act contemplated by 2176 of the civil code. Being a childish prank, the court declared that there was no way that any parent could ever anticipate such prank. The said act also did not reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

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Submitted by: Aure, Gary C. CULION ICE, FISH,ETC. vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS Facts: The manager of defendant corporation accepted the job of changing the gasoline engine of plaintiff’s boat. After installing a new fuel tank and a new carburetor, the boat was taken out for trial. During this period, a backfire occurred in the cylinder of the engine. The boat was ultimately destroyed. Plaintiff filed an action to recover the value of the boat from the defendant. Issue: Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Philippine motors and was the accident avoidable? Held:

The burning of the boat resulted from an accident but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It should not have occurred if he observed the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work, which he attempts to do. The defendant was held liable for the value of the vessel.

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Submitted by: Barrios, Noelle Ann E. DAYWALT vs. RECOLETOS, ET AL. G.R. No. L-13505 February 4, 1919 FACTS: In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, a tract of land upon the issuance of a title to the land and a Torrens certificate. A second contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction. In 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old. Later on, the Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of the proceedings, it was found by official survey that the area of the tract was about 1.248 hectares instead of 452 hectares. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area. The defendant, La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation whose representative, Father Isidro Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendancy. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of business including the tract in issue, was accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order with whom she came in contact. As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were pastured upon said land. Litigation prospered due to Endencia’s change of mind and refusal to comply with her agreement with Daywalt despite order of the court for specific performance. ISSUE: Whether or not the inducement made by Father Sanz to Endencia constitutes actionable interference in the contract Whether or not the defendant corporation made itself a co-participant with Endencia in the breach of the contract due to the alleged unlawful intervention. HELD: No. As preliminary to a consideration of the first of these questions, we deem it well it dispose of the contention that the members of the defendants corporation, in advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with

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the contract of sale, were actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial court found that this contention was not sustained, observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy on the part of the defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. It may be added that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor, and the doubt in which the issue was involved to the extent that the decision of the Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was divided the attitude of the defendant corporation, as exhibited in the conduct of its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other members of the order of the Recollect Fathers, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff. Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in possession.

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Submitted by: Roxas, Thomas Joseff Mari M. DE GUZMAN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 90856 July 23, 1992 FACTS: Arturo de Guzman was the general manager of the Manila office of the Affiliated Machineries Agency, Ltd., which was based in Hongkong. On June 30, 1986, he received a telex message from Leo A. Fialla, managing director of AMAL in its main office, advising him of the closure of the company due to financial reverses. This message triggered the series of events that are the subject of this litigation. Immediately upon receipt of the advise, De Guzman notified all the personnel of the Manila office. The employees then sent a letter to AMAL accepting its decision to close, subject to the payment to them of their current salaries, severance pay, and other statutory benefits. De Guzman joined them in these representations. These requests were, however, not heeded. Consequently, the employees, now herein private respondents, lodged a complaint with the NLRC against AMAL, through Leo A. Fialla and Arturo de Guzman, for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages or commissions, separation pay, sick and vacation leave benefits, 13th month pay, and bonus. For his part, the petitioner began selling some of AMAL's assets and applied the proceeds thereof, as well as the remaining assets, to the payment of his claims against the company. He also organized Susarco, Inc., with himself as its president and his wife as one of the incorporators and a member of the board of directors. This company is engaged in the same line of business and has the same clients as that of the dissolved AMAL. NLRC held petitioner jointly and severally liable with AMAL ISSUE: Whether or not de Guzman can be held jointly and severally liable with AMAL. RULING: In the case at bar, the petitioner, while admittedly the highest ranking local representative of AMAL in the Philippines, is nevertheless not a stockholder and much less a member of the board of directors or an officer thereof. He is at most only a managerial employee. Petitioner cannot be held directly responsible for the decision to close the business that resulted in his separation and that of the private respondents. That

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decision came directly and exclusively from AMAL. The petitioner's participation was limited to the enforcement of this decision in line with his duties as general manager of the company. We hold that although the petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with AMAL for the monetary demand of its employees, he is nevertheless directly liable to them for his questionable conduct in attempting to deprive them of their just share in the assets of AMAL. Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This is supplemented by Article 21 of the same Code thus: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Although the question of damages arising from the petitioner's bad faith has not directly sprung from the illegal dismissal, it is clearly intertwined therewith. The predicament of the private respondents caused by their dismissal was aggravated by the petitioner's act in the arrogating to himself all of AMAL's assets to the exclusion of its other creditors, including its employees. The issue of bad faith is incidental to the main action for illegal dismissal and is thus properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. It is stressed that the petitioner's liability to the private respondents is a direct liability in the form of moral and exemplary damages and not a solidary liability with AMAL for the claims of its employees against the company. He is being held liable not because he is the general manager of AMAL but because he took advantage of his position by applying the properties of AMAL to the payment exclusively of his own claims to the detriment of other employees.

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Submitted by: Gumabay, Ma. Nina Katrina M. Dichoso vs. CA GR No. 55613 December 10, 1990 Facts: Spouses Gaspar Prila and Maria Beldad owned a parcel of land at Cagmanaba, Ocampo, Camarines Sur surveyed in the name of Gaspar. Upon the death of Maria in 1925, the eastern half was given to their only daughter, Vivencia, and when Gaspar died, the ½ portion pertaining to him was divided into three: a third was given to Vivencia, another third to Asuncion Pacamara, and the last third to Custodia Parcia. The terms of said settlement were agreed to by the three parties and the deeds were duly registered at the Register of Deeds. This was further confirmed judicially by the CFI of Camarines Sur. In 1955 Vivencia sold her portion to petitioner Dichoso who has been, ever since, in actual possession thereof, exercising various acts of ownership thereof. On the other hand, Asuncion sold to wife of private respondent Teodolfo Ramos her share but the deed mentions the area to be in excess of her share. Hence, said property which Ramos claims to have possessed is now the land in question. Respondent Ramos took possession of the contested Riceland upon its purchase. It yielded an average harvest of 20 sacks of palay per planting whish was twice a year. One-third of the harvest went to Ramos and the remaining twothirds was the tenant’s share. Dichoso, meanwhile, claims that the disputed land was inside his property. Sometime in 1962 Ramos, with a constabulary soldier and two policemen, allegedly seized the produce of the land consisting of 50 cavans of palay from petitioner’s tenant. In retaliation, petitioner brought with him a constabulary soldier and appropriated 6 cavans of the produce. On December 1967, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title over the Riceland before the CFI of Camarines SUr. It rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Issue: WON the CA erred in requiring petitioner to deliver 40 cavans annually to respondent despite its finding that only 1/3 of the produce “went to” Ramos. Ruling: YES. Petitioner alleged that since respondent’s share of the harvest is only 1/3, only the 1/3 of the annual harvest must be awarded to him. Ramos’ contention that his tenant will be deprived of his share if only 1/3 was awarded to him. Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly

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proved, and proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. In view of his dispossession from 1964 and the fact that his tenant has vacated the land the same year, he cannot allege that his tenant is entitled to his 2/3 share.

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Submitted by: Rodriguez, Christian Patrick S.

EPG Construction Company vs. Court of Appeals 210 SCRA 230 Facts: Herein petitioner EPG Construction Company, Inc. and herein private respondent University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a contract for the construction of the UP Law Library for the stipulated price of P7,545,000.00. Upon completion, the building was formally turned over by the petitioner to UP; the latter issued a Certification of Acceptance. Sometime later, UP complained to the petitioner that six air-conditioning units in the building were not cooling properly. The latter agreed to shoulder the expenses for their repair, which was, however, never undertaken. UP was forced to contract with another company which repaired the units for P190,000.00. UP then demanded reimbursement of the said amount plus liquidated damages from the petitioner, which the latter rejected. UP then filed an action against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of UP and ordered the petitioner to pay actual and liquidated damages. Said decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. The petitioner contended that by issuing the Certificate of Acceptance, UP has waived the guarantee provision in their contract and is now estopped from invoking it. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable under the guarantee provision in the contract notwithstanding the Certificate of Acceptance issued by UP? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. All UP certified to, when it issued the Certificate of Acceptance, was that the building constructed by the petitioner was in good condition at the time it was turned over to it. It did not thereby relieve the petitioner of liability for any defect that may arise or be discovered later during the one-year period of the guaranty. The defects complained against were hidden and UP was not expected to recognize them at the time the work was accepted. Moreover, there was an express reservation by UP of its right to hold the petitioner liable for the defects during a period of one year. Decision Affirmed.

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Submitted by: Lopez, John SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957 Facts: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the school’s supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi. Issue: Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act? Held: Although at the time of the accident the father was not present, plaintiff contends that at the time of the accident Dante was a minor who was living with his parents. The court thus found that Delfin Capuno should be held solidarily liable for the tortuous act of his son Dante, for his failure to exercise proper parental authority.

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Submitted by: BOLOS, MARIA GRACIA PATRICIA S. Fabre vs. CA, 259 SCRA 426 G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College in Malate, Manila. Private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area ,it being his first trip to La Union, was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he described as “siete.” The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion. The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late. The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day. On the basis of their finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage to the latter’s fence. On the basis of Escano’s affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners Fabre was dismissed.

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Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila. As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy. The trial court found that no convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a long distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendants which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case. The trial court ordered herein petitioners to pay Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio for they were the only ones who adduced evidence for their claim for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective claims. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners, jointly or solidarily, were negligent and if they are liable for damages and to what extent. HELD: The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.

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Considering the foregoing, the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only 20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio. Pursuant to Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer. Petitioners argue that they are not a common carrier, hence, ordinary diligence or diligence of a good father of a family is only the degree of diligence due of them. As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. The article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

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The liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification as to the award of damages. Petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline Antonio.

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Submitted by: Equetan, Esteban M. F.F. CRUZ and Co., INC. VS Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 731 No. L-52732, August 29, 1988 Facts: Petitioner F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. is an owner of a furniture shop in Caloocan City which was adjacent to the residence of Mable family, herein private respondents. That sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable requested to the herein petitioner that a firewall be constructed between the latter’s shop and their house. Such request fell on deaf ears. Unfortunately, on September 6, 1974, a fire broke out in the petitioner’s shop which eventually spread into private respondents’ house. Both the house and the shop were razed to the ground. As a result, the private respondent filed an action for recovery of damages against the petitioner. After the trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents and ordered the petitioner to pay the damages for the loss of the formers’ house, furnitures and other valuables. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Lower Court. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR is applicable in this case? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. Under the Doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR: “Where the thing which cause the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.” The facts of the case at hand clearly call the application of the abovementioned doctrine. In the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible materials may usually be found thereon. Furthermore, negligence or want of care on the part of the petitioner was not merely presumed; the latter’s failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinance would suffice to support findings of negligence.

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Submitted by: Mendoza, Barleon R. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 75112. October 16, 1990 Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages before the RTC of Roxas City. Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity "in that he personally authorized and allowed Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said vehicle. Allan Masa, was not impleaded as a co-defendant. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and negligent of the acts complained of which caused the injury to plaintiff. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity, because he was not in the vehicle during the alleged incident. Filamer appealed the lower court's judgment to the Court of Appeals. Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. Hence, the appeal. Filamer contented that it cannot be held responsible for the tortuous act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them.

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Issue: Whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha. Held: The Supreme Court held that Funtecha is an employee of Filamer and need not to have an official appointment for driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his negligent act. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the janitorial duties, does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption “juris tantum” that there was a negligence on its part either in the selection of the servant or employee or in the supervision over him.

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Submitted by: Padlan, Jay Vincent S. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 209 SCRA 660 Facts: Crisostomo Vitug fild a Civil Case against defendant First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC), to recover damages as a result of a three-vehicle collision on December 14, 1983, involving his car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in the name of FMLFC and driven by one Crispin Sicat. The evidence shows that while Vitug’s car was at a full stop at the intersection of New York Street and EDSA in Cubao, Quezon City, northward bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck bumped a Ford Granada car behind him with such force that the Ford car thrown on top of Vitug’s car. The cargo truck thereafter hit Vitug’s car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode and setting the car ablaze. FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it was not the owner of the truck, neither was it the employer of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck to Vicente Trinidad on September 24, 1980. Issue: Whether or not First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation is liable for the mishap Held: Yes, FMLFC is liable for damages caused to Vitug. Regardless of who the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the registered owner or operator of record is the one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless of any alleged sale or lease made thereon. In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle to be valid against third persons, it must be recorded in the LTO. For, although valid between the parties, the sale cannot affect third persons who rely on the public registration of the motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In law, FMLFC was the owner and operator of the Isuzu truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by its operation.

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Submitted by: Menzon, Bradford B. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R.No.55963, December 1, 1989

FACTS: A pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency driven by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioners along Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and his companion were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment.Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. The trial court rendered judgment, which directed National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not National Irrigation Administration is liable for the negligent act of Hugo Garcia. HELD: National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driveremployee(Hugo Garcia).In this particular case, the NIA assumes responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA.The negligence referred to here is the negligence of the supervision.

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Submitted by: De Chavez, Faith REYNALDA GATCHALIAN vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 FACTS: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded paying passenger bus own by Arsenio Delim. Said bus is bound to Baung La Union. During the course of the trip, the passengers already noticed a snapping sound which the driver ignored. Somewehre along the highway of Bo. Payocpoc, the vehicle bumped a cement flower po on the side of the road causing the vehicle to go off the road, turn turtle and fall of the ditch. Consequently, several passengers including Gatchalian were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union for medical treatment. On 14 July 1973, while injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign a prepared affidavit of quit claim Notwithstanding this document, Gathalian still filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him by virtue of the signed affidavit. ISSUE: Is Gatchalian still entitled for damages despite execution of affidavit of quit claim? HELD: Yes, Gatchalian is still entitled for damages. The Supreme Court held that since what is involved is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence. Thus, the waiver cannot be used as an escape for liability.

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Delim failed to rebut the statutory presumption of negligence as prescribed in Artibles 1733 and 1755 of the NCC. To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries. The act of the driver of ignoring the snapping sound and continued on driver despite it being noticed by most passengers is a clear proof of utter negligence. This could also mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

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Submitted by: Rodriguez, Christian Patrick S.

Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SCRA 388 Facts: Herein petitioner Bienvenido Gelisan is the registered owner of a freight truck. On Jan. 31, 1962, he entered into a contract with Roberto Espiritu under which the latter hired the same freight truck for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer. Subsequently, herein respondent Benito Alday, a trucking operator who had a contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, entered into an agreement with Espiritu for the hauling of 400 bags of fertilizer with the use of the truck leased by the latter. However, Espiritu failed to deliver the bags of fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega in Mandaluyong. The respondent was then compelled to pay for the value of the 400 bags of fertilizer to Atlas Fertilizer Corp. This prompted him to file a complaint against both Espiritu and the petitioner. The petitioner disowned any liability on the ground that he had no contractual relations with the respondent and that the misappropriation committed by Espiritu was entirely beyond his control and knowledge. After trial, the trial court ruled that only Espiritu is liable to the respondent and not the petitioner. However, the Court of Appeals modified the said decision and held that the petitioner, being the registered owner of the truck, is likewise liable. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, the registered owner of the truck, is likewise liable for damages? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. If the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, such as what happened in this case, the transfer is not binding upon the public and third persons. However, the petitioner has the right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount which he may be required to pay as damages. Petition Denied.

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Submitted by: Pador, Reo Arlan B. FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989 FACTS: The plaintiff, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, for a period of 16 days. She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses. Hence, a cilvil action was filed by plaintiff Frorentina Guilatco for recovery of damages against the City of Dagupan. The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the same person who is also the City Engineer of Dagupan. ISSUE: Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists. RULING: The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. Furthemore, it is expressly provided in the charter of Dagupan that the City Engineer has care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers and is mandated to inspect and regulate the use of the same.

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The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end is more important than the manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects, causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

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Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison JARCO vs. CA G.R. No. 129792 December 21,1999 FACTS: Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH), a six year old child. In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor. As a result, ZHIENETH died fourteen (14) days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. ISSUES: (1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence? and (2) Whether ZHIENETH, a six year old child and CRISELDA can be held liable for contributory negligence? HELD: Petitioners’ omission and failure to act on the previous observation of an employee of the counter’s unsafe structure belies the claim of the petitioners that what had happened is an accident. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. Negligence, on the other hand, is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

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As to the second issue, In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. Further, CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

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Submitted By: Dilig, Jose Rodolfo Manuel Hugo B. G.R. No. 101683 February 23, 1995 LBC AIR CARGO, INC. FERNANDO M. YU and JAIME TANO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourth Division, SHERWIN MONTEROLA y OYON-OYON, represented by PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, and PATROCENIA GRONDIANO y MONTEROLA, respondents. Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November 1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained. A criminal case for "homicide thru reckless imprudence" was filed against Tano. A civil suit was likewise instituted by the heirs of deceased Monterola against Tano, along with Fernando Yu and LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, for the recovery of damages. The trial court dismissed both cases on the ground that the proximate cause of the "accident" was the negligence of deceased Rogelio Monterola. Private respondent appealed the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the court a quo. Issue: Whether or not LBC may invoke the doctrine of Last Clear Chance in order to refute its liability. Held: Affirmed. From every indication, the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a

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left turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle. Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. In the case at bench, the victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact; that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. It is true however, that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. We, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages.

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Submitted by: Abad, Cernick S. Lilius v. Manila Road Company 59 Phil. 758 FACTS: Plaintiff, his wife and his daughter, left Manila in their Studebaker car, driven by plaintiff for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, on a sight seeing trip. At about 7 and 8 meters from the railroad crossing at Dayap, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Lilius saw a truck parked on the left side of the road and noticed that several people have alighted from the truck going to the opposite side. While slowing down his speed at about 12 mile per hour, he sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. This distracted his attention and shortly thereafter, upon hearing two short whistles, his car was hit by a passing train. The car was dragged ten meters away, and the train stopped about 70 meters from the crossing. For injury sustained by Lilius, his wife and child, he filed an action to recover damages from the defendant. ISSUE: Is the defendant liable? HELD: The defendant failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. In fact, the flagman or watchman arrived after the collision, and there was no notice nor sign of the existence of the crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of approaching trains. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but included inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties. Manila Railroad is adjudged liable for its negligence and that of its employees.

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Submitted by: Agonoy, Ciara Lim vs. Ponce de Leon 66 SCRA 299 Facts: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch. A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Consequently, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor launch from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962, Maddela entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent. Issue: Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffsappellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful. Held: Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiff-appellants. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person whose constitutional rights have been impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, Delfin Lim’s claims were amply supported by evidence that he should be awarded damages. However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred

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the ownership and possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure. Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison MANUEL vs. CA G. R. No. 96781 October 1, 1993 FACTS: Private respondents were passengers of an International Harvester Scout Car owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila for Camarines Norte in the morning of December 27, 1971 With respondent Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver of the vehicle. There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was was driven by petitioner Emiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing. All its ten occupants, which included four children, were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physical injuries. The Lower Court and the Court of Appeals finds for the respondent. In their appeal before us, petitioners contend that it was Fernando Abcede, Jr., driver of the Scout car, who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim that Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19-years old at the time of the incident, did not have a driver's license. The awarded damages were likewise contested as excessive and unsubstantiated. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the allegation of lack of driver’s license of the alleged driver of the injured party will exempt petitioners from liability? 2. Whether or not the damages awarded is justified? HELD: The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident, could not simply exempt petitioners' liability because they were the parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane. Nevertheless, the witnesses presented by petitioners who allegedly saw "the younger Abcede pinned behind the driver's wheels," testified on matters that

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transpired after the accident. Discrediting this allegation, the Court of Appeals noted that none of the aforesaid witnesses actually saw the younger Abcede driving the car and that the younger Abcede could have simply been thrown off his seat toward the steering wheel. The damages awarded are proper. Plaintiffs were able to prove their injuries and submitted evidence to show expenses for their treatment, hospitalization and incidental disbursement. The above mentioned damages are considered actual or compensatory (Par. 1 Art. 2197 in relation to Art. 2199, New Civil Code). Evidence was also adduced showing that as a result of the incident and the resultant injuries there had been an impairment on the earning capacity of some of the plaintiffs which are recoverable pursuant to Article 2205 of the New Civil Code. Considering the nature of their, injuries one month each loss of income seem reasonable. Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is also proper. Since the act complained of falls under the aegis of quasi-delict (culpa aquilina), moral damages is likewise available to plaintiffs pursuant to Article 2219 also the New Civil Code".

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Submitted by: Lasque, Mervin N. MCKEE, ET AL. VS. IAC ET AL., G.R. NO. L-68102, 16 JULY 1992 FACTS: Between 9 & 10 o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City & San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of 1 1/2 year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge (lasque, mervin’s digest). ISSUE: Whether or not the herein truck driver can be held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance. RULING: The court ruled that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. The court had the occasion to apply the doctrine of the last clear chance which expound that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious

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consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages. The court herein also imposed liability on the private respondents as employers of the truck driver under Article 2180 of the Civil Code are directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

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Submitted by: Mendoza, Barleon R. E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS [G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916.] Facts: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura. Upon crossing Taft Avenue and was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south turned unexpectedly and struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff was taken to the General Hospital on the very same day as he was so severely injured. The trial court ordered the Government of the Philippine Islands to pay damages. The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur. Issue: Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands may be held liable for the act done by the chauffeur. Held: The Government of the Philippine Islands is not liable. The substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees can be found in paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code, which reads: "The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable." The state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the

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organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents. Submitted by: Ciara Agonoy MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 236 SCRA 227 Facts: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to “undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.” Sometime in October 25, 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents Agnes Villacruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, and employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary. On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 AM, petitioner de Guzman, Captain Peñafiel, and 2 other constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon city went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without any warrant, they seize the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondent’s stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by captain Peñafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. On December 6, 1983, after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the complaint against all private respondents. Late on, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. Upon return of the said items, some of them were of inferior quality. Private respondents then filed a civil suit against the petitioners for sums of money and damages. In its Decision, the trial court ruled for the private respondents. The Decision was appealed to the respondent court. The latter affirmed the decision with modifications.

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Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ is correct in finding that the manner with which the confiscation of the items from private respondents was tortious.

Held: Yes. Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our people from unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bar, the seizure was made without any warrant. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigate the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted with active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the bot and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.

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Submitted by: PADOR, REO ARLAN B. JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-47863 October 3, 1986 FACTS: The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association decided to construct an office building on its lot located at Intramuros, Manila. The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. and the plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building was completed in June, 1966. In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and the front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt forward dangerously. The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored up by United Construction, Inc. A pre-trial was conducted on March 7, 1969, during which among others, the parties agreed to refer the technical issues involved in the case to a Commissioner. Mr. Andres O. Hizon, who was ultimately appointed by the trial court. The Commissioner eventually submitted his report on September 25, 1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the PBA building was caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake whose magnitude was estimated at 7.3 they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared by the third-party defendants' architects, deviations from said plans and specifications by the defendant contractors and failure of the latter to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction of the building and of the contractors, architects and even the owners to exercise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of subject building. United Construction Co., Inc. and the Nakpils claimed that it was an act of God that caused the failure of the building which should exempt them from responsibility and not the defective construction, poor workmanship, deviations from plans and specifications and other imperfections in the case of United Construction Co., Inc. or the deficiencies in the design, plans and specifications prepared by petitioners in the case of the Nakpils.

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ISSUE: Whether or not an act of God-an unusually strong earthquake-which caused the failure of the building, exempts from liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence. RULING: The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. On the other hand, the general rule is that no person shall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable (Article 1174, New Civil Code). An act of God has been defined as an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented. There is no dispute that the earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of God. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: The cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor;

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The event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; The event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and The debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants petitioners was established beyond dispute both in the lower court and in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Defendant United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications. and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision; while the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. As correctly assessed by both courts, the defects in the construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968. For this reason the defendant and third-party defendants cannot claim exemption from liability.

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Submitted By: Dayo, Jesus Frederick D.L. National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (161 SCRA 335) Facts: on November 4,1967, typhoon 'Welming' hit Central Luzon, passing through NAPOCOR’s (NPC) Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at lpo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the dam, since the water level had reached the danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the corporation caused the opening of the spillway gates. Due to the manner with which the spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the gates, and hit the installations and construction works of ECI at the lpo site with terrific impact, as a result of which the latter's stockpile of materials and supplies, camp facilities and permanent structures and accessories either washed away, lost or destroyed. NPC asserts that the destruction and loss of the ECI's equipment and facilities were due to force majeure. It argues that the rapid rise of the water level in the reservoir of its Angat Dam due to heavy rains brought about by the typhoon was an extraordinary occurrence that could not have been foreseen. Issue: Whether or not the NPC can be held liable for the destruction of ECI’s structures and equipments. Held: The NPC is Liable. Based on the findings of fact, petitioner NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon "Welming" when it knew very well that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage. Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any

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previous negligence or misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been occasioned. Submitted by: Leon, David Martin L. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS May 21,1993 161 SCRA 384 FACTS: When typhoon “Welming” hit Luzon in 1967 heavy rains fell and, to prevent an overflow of water at the Angat Hydro Electric Project and Dam at Ipo, Bulacan, NPC opened the spillway gates. An extraordinarily large volume of water rushed out of the gatesand hit the installations and construction works of ECI at Ipo site with terrific impact as a result pf which the latter’s stock pile of materials and supplies, camp facilities, and permanent structures including its accessories were either washed way, lost or destroyed. An action for damages was filed. NPC raised force majeure as a defense. ISSUE: Whether or not NPC should be held liable for damages as a result of its negligence act. HELD: NPC is liable. The negligent manner with which the spillway gates were opened caused the extraordinarily large volume of water to rush out of the gates. If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God there occurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay, or contravention of the tenor of the obligation which resulted in loss or damages, the obligor cannot escape liability. To be exempt from such, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct which occasioned the loss. Thus, under Art.1174, NCC, for breach of an obligation due to an act of God, the following must concur: 1. the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the obligor; 2. the event must either be unforeseeable or unavoidable; 3. the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and

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4. the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

Submitted by: Dacanay, Jan Jacob Pantranco v Baesa 179 SCRA 399 Facts: The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim, Marceline and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela The jeepney, while going towards MAlalam River, collided with a speeding Pantranco bus while the latter was negotiating a turn, which had encroached on the jeepney’s lane. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged. The driver of the bus went in hiding after. Pantranco contended that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the driver David Ico. Furthermore, Pantranco raised the defense that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. The lower court rendered a decision against Pantranco, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals. Thus, Pantranco filed a case in the Supreme Court, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. Issue Whether or not the doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable Held: The Court found no merit in the claim of Pantranco that the negligence of the driver of the jeepney was the proximate cause of the collision. Neither did the Court find merit in the claim of Pantranco that the jeepney driver could have avoided the collision. It stated that even if the jeepney driver saw from a distance the approaching bus, he could not have had seen the impending danger, since it was safe to assume that the bus would go back to its lane. Moreover, the bus in

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this case was speeding, so much so that it might have been too late for the jeepney driver to do anything by the time he realized that the bus was not going back to its lane. Hence, the jeepney driver had no chance to avoid the bus.

Submitted by: Tejano, Francis John L. Pecson vs. Court of Appeals 244 SCRA 407 Facts: Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street. Quezon City on which he built a four (4) door two- storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the lot was sold to the Spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid. Pedro Pecson filed a complaint on the validity of the auction sale before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City but RTC dismissed the complaint, however, private respondent would like to include the building and praying that a writ of possession must be issued. RTC ruled that petitioner is a builder in good faith and that a public auction of the building was not included as appealed tax payer. Private respondent appealed to Court of Appeals and CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto and ordered Nuguid to pay the construction cost. Petitioner move for MR but it was not acted upon, Hence, it ordered the sheriff to place movant Juan Nuguid in possession of the subject property. Petitioner Pecson aggrieved by the decision of the CA hence, he filed a petition to Supreme Court that he be restored in possession. Issue: Whether or not the issue here is that the petitioner is a good faith? Held: It was ruled that the petitioner be reinstated to possession until after the respondent has indemnified the petitioner to the cost of the land and building to its market value, in order that respondent shall not unjustly enrich at the expense of the petitioner.

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Submitted by: VILLANUEVA, Vincent Irving P. PHILIPPINE MATCH CO., LTD vs. CITY OF CEBU G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978 FACTS: Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City which was approved by the mayor as well as by the Provincial Board provides that, for purposes of the tax, "all deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not stored are sold" in that city, "shall be considered as sales" in the city and shall be taxable. Petitioner assails the legality of the tax which the city treasurer collected on out-of- town deliveries of matches, which it paid under protest and filed a claim for damages predicated on articles 19, 20, 21, 27 and 2229 of the Civil Code. It argued that the city treasurer refused and neglected without just cause to perform his duty and to act with justice and good faith. The company faults the city treasurer for not following the opinion of the city fiscals, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax because such transactions were effected outside of the city's territorial limits. In reply, it is argued for defendant city treasurer that in enforcing the tax ordinance in question he was simply complying with his duty as collector of taxes ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for damages filed by the petitioner will prosper. HELD: No. Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said that the city treasurer acted willfully or was grossly negligent in not refunding to the plaintiff the taxes which it paid under protest on out-of-town sales of matches.

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The city treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance with his bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The fact that his action was not completely sustained by the courts would not him liable for we have upheld his act of taxing sales of matches booked and paid for in the city. Submitted by: Dayo, Jesus Frederick D.L. Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Internediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 353) Facts: Leonardo Dionisio was on his way from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car not far from his home when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 21/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which the driver had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and the driver, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. Issue: Whether or Not Phoenix and the dump truck driver may be held liable for the injuries sustained by Dionisio.

Held:

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Phoenix construction and its driver is liable. There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. As to the second, the testimony of the patrolman present immediately after the accident was given credence by the court, hence leading to the conclusion that the volkswagon was “moving fast.” As to the third issue, the court believes that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio. Finally, as to the fourth issue, the court finds there simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. Nonetheless, the supreme court agrees with the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Phoenix also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. It is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

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Submitted by: Abad, Cernick S. Picart v. Smith 37 Phil. 813 FACTS: Plaintiff Picart was riding a pony in a bridge. He saw an approaching automobile and he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing in the right, the wrong side of the bridge. The driver of the automobile sounded his horn but Picart made no move to go to the right side. The driver guided his car to the right without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car. Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered contusions, he sued Smith for the value of his animal, medical expenses and damage to his apparel. ISSUE: Who is at fault? HELD: Plaintiff Picart was originally at fault but defendant Smith has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm by merely swerving his automobile. Smith failed to do this and he should therefore be chargeable for the consequences of his acts, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote factor in the case.

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Submitted by: Dacanay, Jan Jacob PLDT v. CA 178 SCRA 94 Facts: The jeep which spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, thereby sustaining injuries. The trench was an excavation was allegedly undertaken for the installation of conduit systems of PLDT. Antonio Esteban also alleges that he failed to notice the mound of earth and the trench since there were no adequate warning signs and it was dark at that time. Having sustained injuries, they filed a claim for damages against PLDT. PLDT for its part, denies liability contending that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Antonio Esteban. Furthermore, PLDT contends that if an entity should be held responsible, it should be L.R. Barte and Co., an independent contractor who undertook the construction of the trench and the installation of the conduit system. As such, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations. Issue: Whether or not the accident was imputable to the negligence of PLDT or to that of Antonio Esteban. Held:

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The accident was imputable to the negligence of Antonio Esteban. First, Antonio Esteban knew of the excavations, as he regularly passes by the route. Secondly, the Court sustained the findings of the trial court that the jeep could not have had been running for only 25 km/hour since, if it was doing so, it could have stopped before it reached the mound, or at least before it went airborne. Also, if Antonio Esteban could not have seen the mound which was fairly big and visible, he also could not have seen the warning devices, given the fact that he had his dim lights on. SUBMITTED BY: SAYO, RICHARD EMMANUEL L. PONCE VS. LEGASPI 208 SCRA 377 FACTS: Spouses Ponce, petitioner’s herein, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L’NOR Corporation. Spouses filed a disbarment case against Atty. Legaspi, herein defendant, on the ground that Atty. Legaspi in his dual capacity as legal counsel of L’NOR and YRASPORT (corporation which was incorporated by some of the officers of L’NOR to compete with the latter with aid and assistance of Atty. Legaspi who happens to be the retaining counsel of L’NOR), facilitated, assisted and aided in the fraudulent manipulations, anomalous management and prejudicial operations by certain officers of L’NOR which caused great damage and prejudice to L’NOR. The disbarment proceeding was dismissed. Thus, Atty. Legaspi filed a complaint for damages against the spouses Ponce on the ground of malicious prosecution. ISSUE: Whether or not filing of disbarment case makes out a case of malicious prosecution HELD: Yes RATIO: Generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause. The foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. An action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is anchored on the provisions of Articles 21, 2217 and 2219 of the New Civil Code.

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Malice is essential to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution and not merely to the recovery of exemplary damages. Malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify action. The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution had been carried on without probable cause. Submitted by: Carlos, Mary Maizie C. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. No. 1719, January 23, 1907 FACTS: The plaintiff, one of the laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company’s yard in Manila. Plaintiff claims that only one car was used in this work. The defendant, however, has proved that they were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails projected beyond the cars both in front and behind. The rails lay upon two crosspieces secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. The defendant, on the other hand, contends that some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water’s edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff broke his leg which was afterwards amputated at about the knee. The trial court found that the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon was the cause of the sagging of the track and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of the accident. A fellow-worker of the plaintiff testified that a day before the accident, he called the attention of the foreman and asked the latter to have it repaired. It has not been proved that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or had any proper system of inspection. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the trial court based its judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal action is the proper remedy for injuries through negligence.

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Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff which caused his injury. Whether or not the plaintiff may recover damages if he is guilty of contributory negligence.

HELD: NO. The Civil Code provides that obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Since nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen, his obligation therefore is one “not punished by law” and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. Under the Penal Code, the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in the process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing out of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code cannot affect this action. YES. The plaintiff is charged with carelessness in two particulars: a) that having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and b) that he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it. As to the first point, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber underneath the sleeper. While the method of construction may have been known to the men who had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at his job less than two days. Although the plaintiff perceived the sagging of the track, his lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not so gross as to constitute negligence which would bar him to recover from the defendant.

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With regard to the second, while the plaintiff and his witnesses testified that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testified that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof, the preponderance is in favor of the defendant’s contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause. YES. In determining which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident, a distinction must be made between the accident and the injury – between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, contributing to his own proper hurt. In the case at bar, the cause of the accident was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving to the occasion for damages. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. On the other hand, had the crosspiece been out of place through the act or omission of the plaintiff, that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. However, where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, as in the case at bar, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

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Submitted by: CHENG, ROY E. RADIO COMMUNICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 79528, March 13, 1991 FACTS: Minerva and Flores Timan sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins, Mr. and Mrs. Hilario Midoranda, through Radio Communication of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), to convey their deepest sympathy for the death of the mother-in-law of Hilario, to wit: Mr. & Mrs. Hilario Medoranda Trinidad, Calbayog May God give you courage and strength to bear your loss. Our deepest sympathy to you and members of the family. Miner and Flory The condolence telegram was correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However, the condolence message as communicated and delivered to the addresses was typewritten on a “HAPPY BIRTHDAY” card and placed inside a “CHRISTMASGRAM” envelope. Believing that the transmittal of the aforesaid telegram in that manner was done intentionally and with gross breach of contract resulting in ridicule, contempt, and humiliation of private respondents and the addresses, including their friends and relatives , the spouses Timan demanded an explanation The Timans were not convinced of the explanations of RCPI. Hence, their complaint for damages against RCPI. The trial court decided in favor of the Timans, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of thye lower court in toto.

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RCPI argued that it still correctly transmitted the text of the telegram and was received by the addressee on time despite the fact that there as error in the social form and envelope used. RCPI asserted that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or damage to the Timans.

ISSUE: Is RCPI guilty of negligence? Is RCPI guilty of bad faith, fraud and malice? RULING: Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company can choose to send his message in the ordinary form or a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of the message is typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form with the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and delivered in an envelope matching the pupose of the occasion and the words and intent of the message. The sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for the ordinary form. Hence, when RCPI typed the message of condolence in a birthday and delivered the same in a colorful Christmas envelope, it committed a breach of contract as well as gross negligence. Its excuse that it had run out of social condolence cards and envelope is flimsy and unacceptable. It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message in ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost of the sender. But by transmitting it unfittingly, through other special forms, clearly, albeit outwardly, portraying the opposite feelings of joy and happiness and thanksgiving, RCPI only exacerbated the sorrowful situation of the addressees and the senders. This botchery exposed not only RCPI’s gross negligence but also its callousness and disregard for the sentiments of its clientele, which is tantamount to wanton misconduct, for which it must be held liable for damages It is not surprising that when the Timan’s telegraphic message reached their cousin, it became the joke of the Midorandas’ friends, relative, and associates who thought that the unpardonable mix-up was a mockery of the death of the mother-in-law of the sender’s cousin. Thus, it was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment and distress to Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his confinement for 3 days at the hospital.

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Under the circumstances, defendant’s plea of good faith predicated on the exhaustion of social condolence forms cannot be accepted, gross negligence or carelessness can be attributed to defendant in not supplying its various stations with such sufficient and adequate social condolence forms when it held out to the public the availability of such social condolence forms and accepted for a fee the transmission of message on said forms. Knowing that there is no such forms as testified to by its material control manager, and entering into a contract for the transmission of message in such forms, defendant committed acts of bad faith, fraud, and malice. Submitted by: Mori, Paul Krian Akira Salvosa vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 70458, October 5, 1988 Facts: Jimmy Abon was a duly appointed armorer of the ROTC Unit of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF). He received his appointment as an armorer from the AFP. Not being an employee of BCF, he received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto Ungos, Commandant of the said ROTC unit. Abon was also a commerce student of BCF. On March 3, 1977, around 8:00pm, Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a student of University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of BCF. As a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of Homicide by the Military Commission. Subsequently, the heirs of Casto sued for damages, impleading Jimmy Abon, Roberto Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), LIbertad Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF), and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision sentencing only defendants Jimmy Abon, Benjamin Salvosa, and Baguio Colleges Foundation jointly and severally to pay private respondents (heirs of Castro). The rest of the defendants were absolved. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modifications the decision of the Trial court reducing the amount of some of the awards given by the Trial Court. Hence, this petition. Issue: Can the petitioners be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as a consequence of the tortuous act of Abon?

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Ruling: NO. the petitioners cannot be held under Article 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with Jimmy Abon for the damages resulting from the latter’s acts. The Court held that under the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of the teacher, the latter stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student. Likewise, the phrase used in Article 2180 so long as the [students] remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. The Court held that Jimmy Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in school” or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro.

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Submitted by: Tejano, Francis John L Security Bank vs. Court of Appeals 249 SCRA 206 Facts: Private respondent Ysmael Ferrer entered into a contract of building construction with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC) in Febrary 1980. It was stipulated therein that Ferrer would finish the said construction in Davao City within 200 working days for the price of P1,760,000.00. Ferrer made demands for reimbursement of the said expenses but was repeatedly denied by petitioner who reiterated the stipulated cost it the agreement. A complaint for breach of contract was filed by Ferrer. The trail court ruled in favor of Ferrer. The trail court ruled in favor of Ferrer, prompting SBTC to appeal. Issue: Whether or not SBTC may be held liable for the payment of additional expenses incurred by Ferrer? Held: It cannot be denied that SBTC derived benefits when private respondent completed the construction even at an increase amount. To allow SBTC to acquire the constructed cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust payment for the bank to the prejudice of private respondent, Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. So, therefore SBTC is liable for the additional expenses incurred by private respondent Ysmael Ferrer.

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SUBMITTED BY: SAYO, RICHARD EMMANUEL L. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS 219 SCRA 115 FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC on the ground of breach of promise to marry against petitioner. Private respondent alleged that petitioner courted and proposed to marry her. Because of such promise, petitioner made private respondent surrender her virginity to him and to live with him. They agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. Petitioner already secured the approval of private respondent’s parents to the marriage. The parents of private respondent, by reason of petitioner’s promise to marry their daughter, made some preparations for the wedding including giving of invitations to friends and relatives. However, before the wedding and during their cohabitation, petitioner’s attitude towards private respondent started to change. He maltreated and threatened her. Petitioner, despite his promise, did not marry private respondent because according to him he was already married to other woman. RTC ruled in favor of private respondent which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the New Civil Code HELD: Yes RATIO: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the

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proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison SOLIMAN vs. TUAZON G. R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992 FACTS: On 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of said school taking his morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused plaintiffs death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely healed." Issue: Whether or not the RCC may be held liable for the action of the security guard who is an employee of the security agency? Held:

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Supreme Court held that as a general rule a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it. The duty to observe due diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its security guard is the agency. While it is true that the school was not the employer of the guard its liability is not only based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court must have read the case of PSBA vs. CA in dismissing its judgment, for it should have allowed the petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contactu or ex lege on the part of respondent school. Submitted by: Cuyco, Kate Juris Prudence C. David Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company Facts: David Taylor, 15 years of age and son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics went together with a friend to the power plant of Manila Electric to meet an employee of the said company. When the employee did not show up, the boys decided to roam around the vicinity out of curiosity. They bought home a cylinder ( a capt size of a pistol cartridge), which are indended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite and have in themselves a considerable explosive. They opened it and decided to light it with matches. The device exploded and injured the two boys and a girl who accompanied them. Taylor said the company for damages. Issue: Whether the company should be held liable? Ruling: No, the company cannot be held liable because it was the plaintiff’s own acts which caused the injury. It was held that the boy well knew of the danger that comes with lighting the device, considering he was more mature and intelligent than the average boy of his age; and the fact that he had previous work experiences, yet he still recklessly and knowingly produced the explosion. On this note, the Supreme Court held that “the just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault and that he cannot demand reparation therefore from another.

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Submitted by: Acosta, Votlaire S. Umali vs. Bacani 69 SCRA 263 Facts: A strong typhoon hit Alcala, Pangasinan on May 14, 1972 as a result, banana plants near Alcala Electric Plant fell on the electric wire which caused it to be cut. One end of the wire was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell on the ground under the fallen banana plants. Knowing this, the Captain of the Barangay told an employee of the electric plant about it and asked him to fix it. The latter said he will look for a lineman to fix it. Unfortunately, Manuel Saynes, a boy leaving nearby got in contact with the live cut wire which led to his death. Fidel Saynes, father of Manuel Saynes, filed an action for damages against Teodoro Umali, owner and manager of the electric plant. Umali’s contention is that the death of Manuel Saynes is due to a fortuitous event (referring to the strong storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric wire). Issue: Whether the owner of the electric plant is liable for damages? Held: Umali was held liable for damages. The employees of Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage caused by the storm to the electric lines which is dangerous to life and property, but they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines. They could have done this pending inspection of the wires. Likewise, they did not take the necessary precaution to eliminate the source of danger to the electric line, knowing that tall banana plants

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were standing on elevated ground and which were higher than the electric post. The Court also took note of the negligence of Cipriano Baldomero. He being an employee of the electric plant and aware of the live cut wire, he did not take the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the place.

Submitted by: Rodriguez, Christian Patrick S.

Velayo vs. Shell Company of the Philippine Islands 100 Phil. 186 Facts: Herein defendant Shell Company of the Philippine Islands is the official supplier of gasoline of Commercial Airlines, Inc. (CALI). The latter has an existing debt of P170,162.58 to the former. In 1948, the management of CALI called a meeting of all its major creditors and announced that it was in a state of insolvency and will stop its operations. The said creditors all agreed to proceed with a pro-rata division of the assets of CALI. The defendant then assigned its credit to the Shell Oil Company in the United States. The latter then filed an action in a California court for the collection of the credit and for a writ of attachment, which was granted, of a C-54 plane belonging to CALI. As a result of the defendant’s action, CALI filed in the Philippines a petition for voluntary insolvency. During the proceedings of the case, the creditors of CALI unanimously elected herein plaintiff Alfredo Velayo as assignee. The latter then filed an action for recovery of damages against the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the defendant acted in bad faith and is therefore liable for damages? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative. The defendant clearly acted in bad faith when it schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54 plane of its debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its sister company in the United States. It took advantage of its knowledge that insolvency proceedings would most probably be instituted by CALI if its creditors fail to come up with an

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understanding as to the manner of distribution of the assets. According to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, “Any person who willfully causes loss and injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute or law, should be compensated by damages. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages in an amount double the value of the attached aircraft.

Submitted by: CHENG, ROY E. VERGARA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77679, September 30, 1987 FACTS: The defendant and his friend were traveling by car to Manila from Baguio. From the opposite direction, the following were travelling: a tricycle, a passenger bus and a private jeep in that order. The bus tried to overtake the tricycle but in doing so, it swerved into the lane of the defendant. This prompted the defendant veer his car to the shoulder of the highway to avoid a head-on collision. Defendant, however, lost control of his car causing it to collide with a private jeep. No charges were filed against the owner of the passenger bus. Defendant as then charged of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and multiple physical injuries. Defendant claimed that he is not guilty of criminal negligence because he lost control of his car when the bus swerved into his lane. ISSUE: Is the contention of defendant tenable? RULING: The owner of the car cannot be faulted because he lost control of his car when in order to avoid a head-on collision with a passenger bus which suddenly swerved into his lane, he veered his car to the shoulder of the highway and collided with a private jeep. The real culprit is the passenger bus but there were no charges that were filed. The court held that although the defendant was not criminally negligent, and therefore cannot be held liable for a crime, there is enough evidence to prove that defendant should have exercised a little more caution and discretion in reacting to the treat of a head-on collision.

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For this reason, he was adjudged civilly liable for the hospital expenses and unearned salaries of the victims.

Submitted by: Mori, Akira Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 179 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 74431, November 6, 1989 Facts: 3-year old girl Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, father of Purita Vestil. Theness was rushed to the hospital where she was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. The following day, Theness died. The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of Andoy, the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge insisting that the dog was owned by the late Vicente Miranda, that the dog was tame, and that no one witnessed that the dog bit Theness. After trial, the CFI of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the respondent court arrived at a different conclusion ruling that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child died as a result of the dog bites and not from causes independent thereof a submitted by the appellees. The respondent court ordered the Vestils to pay for damages and for the death of Theness. Issue: Are the Vestils liable for damages as possessor of an animal causing damage to another under Article 2183 of the Civil Code?

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Ruling: YES. The Vestils are liable for damages under Article 2183 of the Civil Code. The Court held that the evidence of the child’s hydrophobia (based on the medical report and testimony under oath of Dr. Tautjo) is sufficient to convince it that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The Court further held that the petitioners’ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forgot that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

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Submitted by: Gumabay, Ma. Nina Katrina M. Air France vs. CA G.R. No. 76093 March 21, 1989 Facts: Sometime in October 1977, respondent Narciso Morales thru his representative purchased an airline ticket from Aspac Management Corporation, petitioner's General Sales Agent in Makati. The itinerary covered by the ticket included several cities, with certain segments thereof restricted by markings of "non endorsable' and 'valid on AF (meaning Air France) only’. While in New York, Morales obtained 3 medical certificates attesting to an ear infection which necessitated medical treatment. From New York, he flew to Paris, Stockholm and then Copenhagen where he made representations with petitioner's office to shorten his trip by deleting some of the cities in the itinerary. Morales was informed that, as a matter of procedure, confirmation of petitioner's office in Manila (as ticketing office) must be secured before shortening of the route. Air France in Amsterdam telexed AF Manila requesting for rerouting of the passenger to Amsterdam, Hamburg, Geneva, Rome, Hong Kong, Manila. As there was no immediate response to the telex, respondent proceeded to Hamburg where he was informed of AF Manila's negative reply. After reiterating his need to flying home on a shorter route due to his ear infection, and presentation of supporting medical certificates, again, the airline office made the necessary request to Manila on 23 November 1977 for a Hamburg, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Paris, Hong Kong and Manila route. Still, the request was denied. Despite respondent’s protest and offer to pay any fare difference, petitioner did not relent in its position. Respondent, therefore, had to buy an entirely new set of tickets, for the homeward route. Upon arrival in Manila, respondent sent a letter-complaint to Air France dated 20 December 1977 thru Aspac Management Corporation. Morales was advised to surrender the unused flight coupons for a refund of its value, but he kept the same and, instead, filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages.

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The CFI found Air France in evident bad faith for violation of the contract of carriage, aggravated by the threatening attitude of its employees in Hamburg. Considering the social and economic standing of respondent, who is chairman of the board of directors of a multi-million corporation and a member of several civic and business organizations, an award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition to the actual damages incurred, was deemed proper under the circumstances. On appeal, the CA modified the award of damages, ordering defendant to pay to said plaintiff: (1) 1,914 German Marks in its equivalent in Philippine peso at prevailing rate of exchange as actual damages, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid; (2) P 500,000.00, as moral damages; (3) P 150,000.00, as exemplary damages; and (4) 5% of the amount of actual, moral and exemplary damages which are recoverable, as attorney's fees. Issue: WON there was a breach of contract of carriage on the part of the petitioner, as to justify the award to private respondent of actual, moral and exemplary damages. Ruling: NO. Private respondent wanted a rerouting to Hamburg, Geneva, Rome, Hong Kong and Manilas which shortened the original itinerary on the ticket issued by AF Manila through ASPAC. Considering the original restrictions on the ticket, it was not unreasonable for Air France to deny the request. Besides, a recurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating urgent return to Manila. Assuming arguendo a worsening pain or discomfort, private respondent appears to have still proceeded to 4 other cities covering a period of at least 6 days and leaving open his date of departure from Hong Kong to Manila. And even if he claimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in Manila, no medical certificate was presented. He failed to even remember his date of arrival in Manila. With a claim for a large amount of damages, the Court finds it unusual for respondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital information to substantiate his plea. It is also essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily prove during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. Air France employees in Hamburg informed private respondent that his tickets were partly stamped "non-endorsable" and "valid on Air France only." Mere refusal to accede to the passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in the absence of bad faith. Respondent has failed to show wanton, malevolent or reckless misconduct imputable to petitioner in its refusal to re-route. Air France Manila acted upon the advise of ASPAC in denying private respondent's request. There was no evident bad faith when it followed the advise

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not to authorize rerouting. At worst, the situation can be considered a case of inadvertence on the part of ASPAC in not explaining the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Of importance, however, is the fact that private respondent is a lawyer, and the restriction box clearly indicated the nonendorsable character of the ticket.

Submitted by: HAMDAIN ,TASNEM A. ARAOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS 232 SCRA 771 FACTS: The petitioners are lessees of a ten-door apartment building which they have been occupying for some 25 years. The building was originally owned by one Vivien B. Bernardino with whom the petitioners had a written contract of lease which expired on January 31, 1988. Nevertheless, after this period, the petitioners peacefully occupied their respective units and the lessor continued to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract. On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to private respondent Jovan Land, Inc. Bernardino and the private respondent made a simultaneous demand to petitioners and other lessees who were occupying to vacate the units. When the demands went unheeded, ten separate cases for unlawful detainer were filed against the petitioners and other lessees by the private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioners were entitled to recover damages RULING: The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the

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damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. The petition is hereby partly GRANTED.

Submitted by: Agonoy , Ciara Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 85161 Facts: Respondent Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation (OVEC), as lessor, and the petitioner Enrique F. Sy, as lessee, entered into a lease agreement over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters and the land on which they are situated in Cabanatuan City, including their air-conditioning systems, projectors and accessories needed for showing the films or motion pictures. The term of lease was for 6 years commencing from June 13, 1977 and ending June 12, 1983. After more than 2 years of operation of the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters, the lessor OVEC made demands for the repossession of the said leased properties in view of the Sy’s arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement taxes. On August 8, 1979, OVEC and Sy had a conference and by reason of Sy’s request for reconsideration of OVEC’s demand for repossession of the 3 theaters, the former was allowed to continue operating the leased premises upon his conformity to certain conditions imposed by the latter in a supplemental agreement dated August 13, 1979. In pursuance of their latter agreement, Sy’s arrears in rental was reduced as of December 31, 1979. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the 3 theaters to the City Gov’t of Cabanatuan City had accumulated. Hence, letters of demand dated January 7, 1980 and February 3, 1980 were sent to Sy demanding payment of the arrears and amusement tax delinquency. The latter demand was with warning that OVEC will re-enter and repossess the Avenue, Broadway and Capital Theaters on February 11, 1980 in pursuance of the pertinent provisions of their lease contract of June 11, 1977 and their supplemental letter-agreement. Notwithstanding the said demands and warnings Sy failed to pay the above-mentioned amounts in full. Consequently, OVEC padlocked the gates of the three theaters under lease and took possession thereof in the morning of February 11, 1980 by posting its men around the

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premises of the movie houses and preventing the lessee’s employees from entering the same. Sy, through counsel, filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement, damages and injunction late in the afternoon of the same day. Sy prayed for the issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction to enjoin OVEC and all persons employed by it from entering and taking possession of the Three theaters, conditioned upon Sy’s filing of a P500,000.00 bond supplied by Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBISCO). The trial court ruled that Sy is not entitled to the reformation of the lease agreement and that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction. From this decision of the trial court, Sy and CBISCO appealed it to the respondent court. The latter found no ambiguity in the provisions of the lease agreement. It held that the provisions are fair and reasonable and therefore, should be respected and enforced as the law between the parties. Issue: Whether or not the awarding of damages to the respondents constitutes unjust enrichment at the expense of the petitioners. Held: No. the forfeiture clause stipulated in the lease agreement does not unjustly enrich the respondent OVEC at the expense of Sy and CBISCO. A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee’s violation of any of the terms and conditions of the agreement is a penal clause that may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. As a general rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interest in case of noncompliance. This is specifically provided for in Article 1226 (1), New Civil Code. However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the principal obligation. They are first, when there is a stipulation to the contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay the agreed penally; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud. It is evident that in all said cases, the

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purpose of the penalty is to punish the obligor. Therefore, the obligee can recover from the obligor not only the penalty but also the damages resulting from the non-fulfillment or defective performance of the principal obligation. In view of the foregoing, the respondent court correctly sustained the trial court in holding that the bond shall and may answer only for damages which OVEC may suffer as a result of the injunction. The arrears in rental, the unmeritted amounts of the amusement tax delinquency and attorney’s fees which were all charged against Sy were correctly considered by the respondent court as Damages which the OVEC sustained not as a result of the injunction. Submitted by: Legasto, Vanessa G.

Davila vs. Philippine Airlines 49 SCRA 497 Facts: On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, the plane identified as PI-C133 took of from the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board, including Pedro T. Davila Jr.. It did not reach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after take-off. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila Jr., had no definite news of what had happened to their son, until they received, on December 19, 1960, a letter of condolence from the defendant’s president Andres Soriano, informing them that their son died in the crash. It was said that the route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration was Iloilo- Romblon-Manila, the latter stage, denominated as airway “Amber I, “ being a straight lane from Romblon to Manila. The prescribed elevation of the fight was 6,000 ft. However, it did not intercept airway ‘ Amber I, “over Romblon as it was supposed to do although Romblon was a compulsory checking point. The fact was that the plane had deviated from the prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. The reading of the altimeter of the plane when its wreckage was found was 6,800 ft. In lieu of these findings, the Court of first Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment against the defendant ordering the latter to pay the plaintiff various sums of money as follows: The amount of P6,000 for the death of Pedro t. Davila Jr., the rate of p12,000 per annum for five 5 years in the amount of P60,000 for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, P10,000 for moral damages, P10,000 for exemplary damages, P5,000 for actual damages, and P10,000 for Attorney’s fees.

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Both parties appealed from the judgment herefrom, the plaintiffs seeking for an increase in said amounts, while the defendant asks for a complete exoneration from, or at least mitigation of liability. Issue: 1. Whether or not the defendant is liable for breach of contract of carriage 2. Whether or not the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiffs by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo are deemed proper. Held: 1.The provisions of the Civil code on this substantive question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them, by reason of the nature of their business and public policy. Article 1755 establishes the standard of care required of common carrier, which is, “ to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. “ Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by creating the presumption that common carriers are at fault or negligent in case of death or injuries to passengers. Lastly, Article 1757 states that “ the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers…cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements of tickets, or otherwise. “ It is undisputed that the pilot of the defendant plane did not follow the prescribed route for his flight to which a reasonable conclusion could be made that his failure to do so was intentional and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila, and that a clear violation of air-traffic rules therefore amounts to a breach of contract of carriage for failure to observe extraordinary diligence required of it. 2. Pursuant to the current jurisprudence, the indemnity for Pedro T. Davila’s death fixed by the trial court should be increased from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00. As to the damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, the latter having a gross income of P15,000.00 a year but with P7,800.00 as his net yearly income must be multiplied by his life expectancy which is fixed to 25 years founded on the basis of his medical history showing that he suffered from certain ailments during his lifetime, thereby amounting to a total of P195,000.00 which should be the amount to be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect. The amount of actual damages was however sustained as well as that with respect to the moral damages for the long period of uncertainty and suffering

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underwent by the plaintiffs from November 23, when the plane crashed to December 19, when the death of their son was confirmed. The court, on the other hand eliminated the award for exemplary damages since that the defendant has not been found to have acted fraudulently or in a wanton, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner which would have warrant the award of exemplary damages under Article 2232 of the Civil Code in contracts and quasicontracts. Lastly, the award of Attorney’s fees made by the trial court in the P10,000.00 was sustained since that the same has not been found to be groundless.

Submitted by: VILLANUEVA, Vincent Irving P. DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-31931 August 31, 1988 FACTS: The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo were the former registered owners of the fishpond situated at Bulcacan. This fishpond was the subject of a deed of mortgage executed by the spouses Briones in favor of Hermogenes Tantoco involving the consideration of P20,000.00 which amount was later assigned by the mortgagee to his father herein defendant and third party plaintiff Dr. Cornelio S. Tantoco. Apart from this mortgage, the spouses Briones likewise executed a deed of second mortgage for P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco. Both mortgages were duly registered and duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 28296of the Briones. While these two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses sold the fishpond, which is the subject matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff spouses De Leon in the amount of P120,000.00. Of the said amount, the Briones spouses actually received only the amount of P31,000.00, as the amount of P89,000.00 was withheld by the plaintiff De Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage indebtedness of the Briones to the Tantocos. After the sale plaintiffs De Leon satisfied the mortgage loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly executed a deed of discharge of mortgage, but the mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in the amount of P68,824 was not satisfied. On February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the defendant Cornelio Tantocos. Petitioners a complaint with the CFI of Bulacan against private respondent Tantoco, for discharge of mortgage.

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The Lower Court dismissed the complaint filed by De Leon and ordered him to pay the private respondent attorney’s fees as well as moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner appealed the said decision to the CA. The latter affirmed the decision of the Lower Court, hence the present petition. Petitioner questions the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents, inter alia. ISSUE: Whether or not the award for damages is proper. HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that the filing of the case against respondent being unfounded and maliciously prosecuted satisfactorily proves the existence of the factual basis for moral damages and the causal relation to petitioners' acts.

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Submitted by: Mangotara, Aisha M. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS 234 SCRA 79 FACTS: This is an action against defendants shipping company, arrastre operator and broker-forwarder for damages sustained by a shipment while in defendants' custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages. On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines under Bill of Lading No. YMA-8. The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine Insurance Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38. Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff. On January 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per "Request for Bad Order Survey.") On January 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse. The latter

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excepted to one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake (per "Bad Order Waybill" No. 10649). Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants. Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to pay the same. As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants (per "Form of Subrogation", "Release" and Philbanking check).

ISSUES: (a) whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre operator and the customs broker; (b) whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the decision appealed from is rendered; and (c) whether the applicable rate of interest, referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%). RULING: The question of charging both the carrier and the arrastre operator with the obligation of properly delivering the goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the Court. In Fireman's Fund Insurance vs. Metro Port Services (182 SCRA 455),the court have explained, in holding the carrier and the arrastre operator liable in solidum, thus: The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5 [1967]. The relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the consignee. The court do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the customs broker are themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-versa, nor that attendant facts in a given

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case may not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought solely by Eastern Shipping Lines, which, being the carrier and not having been able to rebut the presumption of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case. A factual finding of both the court a quo and the appellate court, we take note, is that "there is sufficient evidence that the shipment sustained damage while in the successive possession of appellants" (the herein petitioner among them). Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of whether there are others solidarily liable with it. The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance. I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts or quasi-delicts 18 is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. 19 The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. 20 II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. 21 Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. 22 In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 23 of the Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court 24 at the rate of 6% per annum. 25 No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. 26 Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the

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computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed from the decision, dated 03 February 1988, of the court a quo. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment thereof. Submitted by: De Chavez, Faith FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUÑGA JR. G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988 FACTS: Nestor Sunga purchased a passenger Mazda minibus from Motor Center, Inc. He executed a promissory not in lieu of the amount of the vehicle. A chattel mortgage was likewise executed in favor Motor Center. The Chattel Mortgage and assignment was assigned to Filinvest Credit Corp (FCC). On 21 October 1978, Sunga claims that the minibus was seized by 2 employees without any receipt. The taking was because of alleged delinquency in payments. It was later found out that there was a mistake on the part of FCC and the vehicle was returned to him. Sunga filed a claim for moral damages in the trial court. Trial Court awarded damages amounting to P 30,000. FCC appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed decision and increased amount of damages to P50,000. FCC filed a Petition for Certiorari saying that there was grave abuse of discretion in the ascertainment of the amount of damages. ISSUE: Is the amount of moral damages awarded valid? HELD:

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Yes, the award is valid however it is exorbitant. The Supreme Court held that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses. Although, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, the SC set the criterion that "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. The SC reiterated the caveat to lower courts to guard against the award of exorbitant damages that are way out of proportion circumstances of a case. Submitted by: Dacanay, Jan Jacob Jison v. CA 164 SCRA 399 Facts: In a contract to sell, Robert O. Phillips and Sons (ROPSI) agreed to sell a lot in Antipolo for P55,000.00 to the spouses Jison, with the interest of 8% payable on installment basis. The contract also provided that a house be built on the lot. When the spouses Jison failed to build a house, a penalty of P5 per sq/m. the Jison spouses failed to pay the monthly installments for January, February, and March 1966 on their due dates, but ROPSI accepted their subsequent payments. Afterwards, the Jison spouses failed to pay again, this time for their October, November, and December 1966 and January 1967. ROPSI reminded the spouses to settle their accounts and of the automatic rescission clause of their contract to sell. The Jison spouses eventually paid. However, the Jison spouses again failed to pay their February, March, and April 1967 payments. When the Spouses Jison tried to tender payments, ROPSI refused, prompting the Jison spouses to file an action for specific performance. Issue: Whether or not the automatic rescission clause as well as the forfeiture clause was valid Held:

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The Court ruled that the automatic rescission clause was valid, citing the fact that while the Jison spouses had substantial compliance, there was also a substantial breach on their part, as evidenced by their failure to tender their monthly installment payments. Furthermore, the forfeiture of the amounts already paid was valid. In this case, the Court ruled the forfeiture of the amounts paid is to be treated as liquidated damages. However, the Court found that the forfeiture of the accumulated fines due to the non-construction of a house as stipulated in the contract was iniquitous, and thus lowered the amount which was to be forfeited. The Code provides that liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable [Art. 2227.]

Submitted by: Suntay, Angel DENNIS L. LAO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE FLORENTINO FLOR, Regional Trial Court, Branch 89 of Morong, Rizal, BENJAMIN L. ESPIRITU, MANUEL QUERUBIN and CHAN TONG, respondents. G.R. No. 82808 July 11, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner Dennis Lao was an employee of the New St. Joseph Lumber & Hardware Supply, owned by the private respondent, Chan Tong. In January 1981, St. Joseph Lumber filed a collection suit against a customer, the private respondent, Benjamin Espiritu, for unpaid purchases of construction materials from St. Joseph Lumber. Upon advice St. Joseph’s lawyer a criminal case for estafa was filed against Espiritu. Lao being the employee who transacted business with Espiritu, he was directed by his employer, Chan Tong, to sign the affidavit or complaint prepared by the lawyer, Attorney Manuel Querubin. The Fiscal finding probable cause filed an information for estafa which was dismissed, the court believed that the liability of Espiritu was only civil and not criminal.

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On April 12, 1984, Espiritu filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against the petitioner and St. Joseph Lumber, praying that the defendants be ordered to pay him P500,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as actual damages, and P100,000 as attorney's fees. Lao in his answer alleged he acted only as agent or employee of St. Joseph Lumber when he executed the affidavit which his employer submitted to the investigating fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation of his employer's estafa charge against Espiritu. After petitioner was declared in default, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. On January 22, 1985, a decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of Espiritu ordering the defendants Lao and St. Joseph Lumber to pay jointly and severally to Espiritu the sums of P100,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision and motion for new trial was denied by the trial court. Appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied, thus the filing of a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to partially annul the appellate court's decision and to enjoin the execution of said decision against him. ISSUE: Whether or not Lao together with his employer is liable for damages for malicious prosecution? Whether the damages awarded to the defaulting debtor may be satisfied by execution against the employee's property since his employer's business has already folded up? HELD: Lao had a valid defense to the action for malicious prosecution (Civil Case No. 84-M) because it was his employer, St. Joseph Lumber, not himself, that was the complainant in the estafa case against Espiritu. It was Chan Tong, the owner of the St. Joseph Lumber, who, upon advice of his counsel, filed the criminal complaint against Espiritu. Lao was only a witness in the case. He had no personal interest in the prosecution of Espiritu for he was not the party defrauded by Espiritu. He executed the affidavit which was used as basis of the criminal charge against Espiritu because he was the salesman who sold the construction materials to Espiritu. He was only an agent of St. Joseph Lumber, hence, not personally liable to the party with whom he contracted (Art. 1897, Civil Code; Philippine Products Co. vs. Primateria Societe Anonyme, 122 Phil. 698). To maintain an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, three elements must be present: First, the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally

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terminated with an acquittal; second, that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and third, the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice (Ferrer vs. Vergara, 52 O.G. 291). Lao was not motivated by malice in making the affidavit upon which the fiscal based the filing of the information against Espiritu. He executed it as an employee, a salesman of the St. Joseph Lumber from whom Espiritu made his purchases of construction materials and who, therefore, had personal knowledge of the transaction. Although the prosecution of Espiritu for estafa did not prosper, the unsuccessful prosecution may not be labelled as malicious. "Sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights without later having to stand trial for instituting prosecutions in good faith" (Buenaventura vs. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239). In view of the foregoing circumstances, the judgment against Lao was a nullity and should be set aside. Its execution against the petitioner cannot be allowed to proceed. Submitted by: Manlapaz, Katherine Grace R. FERNANDO LOPEZ, ET AL., vs. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS FACTS: Reservations for first class accommodations and tickets of PAN-AM from Tokyo to San Francisco were made for then Senator Fernando Lopez, his wife Maria J. Lopez, his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., and his daughter, Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., As scheduled plaintiffs left Manila, arriving in Tokyo. As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez followed up regarding their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. Through mistake, PAN-AM’s agents cancelled the reservations. Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would be made before the time, the supervisor decided to withhold from the plaintiffs the fact that their reservations had been cancelled. The first class seats therein were all booked up that PAN-AM could not accommodate them in that trip as first class passengers. PAN-AM's Tokyo office firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class therein. Due to pressing engagements awaiting in the United States, business conference and a medical check-up plaintiffs were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers and did so under protest. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a suit for damages for breach of contracts in bad faith, actual, moral and exemplary damages and a claim for attorney’s fees. ISSUE:

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Whether defendant acted in bad faith in the breach of its contract with plaintiffs. RULING: Plaintiffs were mislead into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its a foresaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to plaintiffs as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. Submitted by: BOLOS, MARIA GRACIA PATRICIA S. G.R. No. 78015 December 11, 1987 MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM BERNAD, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RENATO ARELLANO, respondent. FACTS: The petitioner recruited the private respondent, Renato Arellano from Philippine Airlines for his training and experience and contracted his services as pilot for two years. When the plane he was driving landed at Bintulo Airport, all the tires burst, causing alarm among the passengers but, fortunately, no injuries. An investigation was conducted pending which he was preventively suspended. He was offered and accepted an extension of his contract for another year, subject to the expressed condition that he would submit to the jurisdiction of Malaysian courts in all matters relating to the contract. Ultimately, however, he was found negligent by the investigating board and dismissed by the petitioner. The private respondent sought relief from the Malaysian courts but to no avail. He then brought suit in the regional trial court of Manila where the petitioner moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The order of the trial court denying its motion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and later by this Court. The case then proceeded to trial on the merits. After hearing, it was held that the private respondent was not guilty of negligence and that the accident was due not to his violation of the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) manual of instructions but to a defect in the rigging of the brake control valve and the failure of the ground crew to properly maintain the aircraft. The court also

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found that the petitioner had acted in bad faith in inveigling the private respondent into signing the renewal of the contract submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts and that his dismissal was prompted by a letter-complaint signed by Filipino and Indonesian pilots, including himself, protesting their discrimination in pay and benefits by MAS. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court erred in awarding the private respondent damages. HELD: We affirm the factual findings of the respondent court and the lower court, there being no sufficient showing that the said courts committed reversible error in reaching such conclusions. As we are not a trier of facts, we generally rely upon, and are bound by, the conclusions on this matter of the lower courts, which are better equipped and have better opportunity to assess the evidence firsthand, including the testimony of the witnesses. We have repeatedly held that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on substantial evidence. We cannot agree, however, with the award of damages, which seems to have gotten out of hand. The inordinate amount granted to the private respondent cans for the moderating hand of the Court, that justice may be tempered with reason instead of being tainted with what appears here to be a ruthless vindictiveness. The petition is denied and the challenged decision is affirmed.

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Submitted by: BARRIOS, NOELLE ANN E. DIOSDADO OCTOT vs. JOSE R. YBAÑEZ G.R.No. L-48643 January 18, 1982 FACTS: Petitioner Diosdado Octot was employed as Security Guard since 1970 and at the time of his separation from the service was receiving a salary of P4,632 per annum plus P50.00 per month as cost of living allowance. In 1975, petitioner was summarily dismissed “for being notoriously undesirable” pursuant to P.D. No. 6 and LOI Nos. 14 and 14-A, having been convicted by the Court of First Instance of the crime of libel, but his appeal therefrom was pending in the Court of Appeals. Believing that his dismissal was illegal, petitioner continued reporting for work the whole month of October 1975 but respondent Regional Director refused to order the release of his salary for the period and instead ordered that his name be deleted from the office payroll When petitioner was acquitted by the Court of Appeals, and made a request for his reinstatement, respondents readily took him back and recommended to the authorities concerned his reinstatement. Petitioner's papers were likewise favorably acted upon by the Presidential Executive Assistant but in returning the papers to the Secretary of Health, attention was invited to the provision of LOI No. 647, dated December 27, 1977.

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After his reinstatement was authorized by the Office of the President, respondents promptly communicated with him, directing him to report to the Regional Office and accomplish the necessary papers for his reinstatement, but he delayed doing so ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to his claim for backwages from the date of his dismissal in 1975 up to the date of reinstatement and damages.

HELD: In the absence of Proof that respondent Regional Director acted in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner is not entitled to backwages and consequently cannot claim for damages. The record manifests that respondents officials were not motivated by ill will or personal malice in dismissing petitioner but only by their desire to comply with the mandates of Presidential Decree No. 6. The Court likewise denies petitioner's claim for moral damages, because if there was any delay in his reinstatement, it was attributed to his own fault and negligence. It is clear that since the separation of petitioner from the government service had not been shown to be in bad faith, an award for damages under the circumstances would not be just and proper. Neither is it among the cases mentioned in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral damages may be recovered. Thus, our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be awarded, as follows: First: They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. 6 Second:

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The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Third: The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, 8 and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Submitted By: Dayo, Jesus Frederick D.L. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (185 SCRA 110) Facts: On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines (hereafter PAL) took off from the Manduriao Airport in Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the plane's complement. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff. Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla who was a passenger on the star crossed flight. He was 29 years old, single. His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir. As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint against PAL, demanding payment of P600,000 as actual and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and P60,000 as attorney's fees. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mrs. Padilla and ordered PAL to pay the sum of P477,000.00 as award for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor A. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy Natividad Padilla, and thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477,000 as indemnity for loss of earnings.

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Held: The trial court was correct in computing the award based on the life expectancy of Nicanor Padilla. The laws provide: Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death; Submitted by: Carlos, Mary Maizie C. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. JOSEFINO MIRANDA and LUISA MIRANDA G.R. No. 119641 May 17, 1996 FACTS: Private respondent spouses went to the United States of America. For their trip back to the country, they obtained confirmed bookings from PAL for a flight from San Francisco to Manila via Honolulu on June 21, 1988; then from Manila to Cebu on June 24, 1988; and finally from Cebu to Surigao also on June 24, 1988. On June 21, 1988, private respondents boarded the flight in San Francisco with five pieces of baggage. After a stopover at Honolulu, and upon arrival in Manila on June 23, 1988, they were told by the PAL personnel that all their baggage were off-loaded at Honolulu due to weight limitations. As a result, private respondents missed their connecting flight from Manila to Cebu City, since they had to wait for their baggage which arrived the following day, June 24, 1988, after their connecting flight had left. They also missed their other connecting flight from Cebu City to Surigao City. On June 25, 1988, they departed for Cebu City and therefrom for Surigao City. On the way to Surigao City, their flight had to return to Mactan Airport due

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to some mechanical problem. The passengers were then booked for the afternoon flight to Surigao City. However, said flight was also canceled. Since there were no more flights for Surigao City that day, private respondents asked to be billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel. But they were told by PAL employees that they could not be accommodated at said hotel because it was fully booked. However, when Dr. Miranda called the hotel, he was informed that he and his wife could be accommodated there. By the time private respondents were ready to go to the hotel, the shuttle bus had already left. PAL offered them P150.00. Dr. Miranda asked for P150.00 more as they could not be accommodated in just one taxi, also for tipping money for hotel boys. PAL refused the said request. Thus, Dr. Miranda decided that he would not avail of the amenities offered by PAL. When private respondents tried to retrieve their baggage, they were told this time that the same were loaded on another earlier flight to Surigao City. Private respondents were finally able to leave to Surigao City only on June 26, 1988. Thereafter, they instituted an action for damages which, after trial as well as on appeal, was decided in their favor. ISSUE: Whether or not PAL acted in bad faith warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees to the private respondents. HELD: YES. A contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty and any discourteous conduct on the part of a carrier's employee toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages and, more so, where there is bad faith. In the present case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that there was breach of contract committed in bad faith by petitioner airline. The private respondents had a confirmed booking on a PAL flight from San Francisco to Manila. Therefore they were entitled to an assured passage not only for themselves but for their baggage as well. It was shown that the private respondents’ baggage were properly loaded and stowed in the plane when it left San Francisco for Honolulu. The off-loading by PAL of their baggage to give way to other passengers or cargo was an arbitrary and oppressive act which clearly amounted to a breach of contract committed in bad faith and with malice. The situation was aggravated by the poor treatment of the Mirandas by the PAL employees during the stopover at Mactan Airport in Cebu; the denial of

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petitioner's personnel to the Miranda spouses' request to be billeted at the Cebu Plaza Hotel by saying that it was fully booked, which was disproven by the fact that Dr. Miranda was able to arrange for accommodations thereat; and, the PAL employees' negligent act of sending off the baggage of private respondents to Surigao City, while they were still in Cebu, without any explanation for this gross oversight. Moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. What amounts to bad faith which would entitle a carrier’s passenger to an award of moral damages is inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. What the law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit. Such unprofessional and proscribed conduct is attributable to petitioner airline in the case at bar. In a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the defendant had acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Attorney's fees in the concept of damages may be awarded where there is a finding of bad faith. The evidence on record adequately sustains that the awards assessed against petitioner on the said items of damages are justified and reasonable. It is PAL's duty to provide assistance to private respondents and any other passenger similarly inconvenienced due to delay in the completion of the transport and the receipt of their baggage. Therefore, its unilateral and voluntary act of providing cash assistance is deemed part of its obligation as an air carrier. Likewise, arrangements for and verification of requested hotel accommodations for private respondents could and should have been done by PAL employees themselves.

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Submitted by: HAMDAIN,TASNEM A. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES VS. MIANO 242 SCRA 235 FACTS: Private respondent took petitioner’s flight PR 722, Mabuhay Class bound for Frankfurt, Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight LH 1452 to Vienna, Austria. At the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), he checked-in one brown suitcase weighing twenty (20) kilograms but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, suits, sweaters, shirts, pants, shoes and other accessories. Upon private respondetn’s arrival at Vienna via Lufthansa, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the Lufthansa authorities. After eleven (11) days, his suitcase was delivered to him in his hotel in Piestany, Czecholovakia. He claimed that because of the delay in the delivery of his suitcase, he was forced to borrow money to buy some clothes, to pay for the transportation of his baggage from Vienna to Piestany, and lost his Nikkon camera. Private respondent instituted an action for damages. ISSUE:

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Whether or not private respondent is entitle to recover damages for breach of contract of carriage RULING: In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The court neither sustains the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasicontract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner. The award of attorney’s fee must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. The fact that private respondent was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect and enforce his claim did not justify the award of attorney’s fee. Petitioner is willing to pay the just claim of $200.00 as result of the delay in the transportation of the luggage in accord with the Warsaw Convention. Needless to say, the award of attorney’s fee must be deleted where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated. Submitted by: AURE, GARY C. G.R. No. L-51832 April 26, 1989 RAFAEL PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, JUDGE, CFI CAPIZ, BRANCH II and BIENVENIDO BACALOCOS, respondents. FACTS: On 16 May 1976 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, while a benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos who is the President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building. As a result of the incident, a criminal complaint for Slander by Deed was flied by petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Pilar, Capiz, docketed as

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Criminal Case No. 2228, but the same was dismissed. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed by petitioner with the court. The court ruled in favor of herein petitioner, as complainant, holding private respondent liable to the former for moral damages as a result of the physical suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by private respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public. Petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment, alleging that the decision had become final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt thereof by private respondent, without any motion for reconsideration or appeal having been filed. However, said motion was denied by the court a quo on the ground that there was a pending motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent. Petitioner further argues that respondent's admission that he slapped herein petitioner in public causing him physical suffering and social humiliation, entitles the latter to moral damages. Actual and compensatory damages need not be proven before an award of moral damages can be granted, so petitioner contends. Petitioner filed the petition at bar contending that no copy of the Motion for consideration was served upon petitioner and no proof of service as well as notice of hearing were attached to said motion when filed with the court. Thus, the motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages to petitioner is without basis for lack of proof of bad faith on the part of private respondent. HELD: In the case at bar, a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served upon petitioner although service was effected through ordinary mail and not by registered mail as required by the rules. But, petitioner was duly given the full opportunity to be heard and to argue his case when the court a quo required him to file a reply or opposition to the motion for reconsideration and subsequently set the motion for oral argument. Meritorious. There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and

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similar injury. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Private respondent's contention that there was no bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter. The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not adversely affect petitioner's right to recover moral damages. In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private respondent by way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be, although such award cannot be recovered as a matter of right. Wherefore, the petition is granted and the order appealed from is reversed.

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Submitted by: Legasto, Vanessa People vs. Quilaton 205 SCRA 279 Facts: Appellant, Gumercindo Quilaton, was a laborer in the Bureau of Forest Development assigned at the PROFEM Nursery in San Agustin, San Simon Pampanga Until June 3,1983 when his services was terminated. While still a laborer, and occasionally after his termination, appellant would spend the night in one of the rooms of the PROFEM office. In the evening of August 16, 1983, Rolando Manahan, then officer-in-charge of the PROFEM, called the appellant’s attention and told the latter to see him at his office to which the appellant did not accede. Rolando Manahan came out of his office and proceeded to admonish appellant to discontinue his practice of sleeping inside the office and of bringing there women brought from the town. A heated exchange of words then ensued between the two. Appellant left the office after his bag of clothes, which has been left inside the office, had been given to him by Lamberto Abugan, an employee of PROFEM, upon his request and upon Rolando Manahan’s instructions. Rolando Manahan followed the appellant in order to ascertain that the latter had

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in fact left the premises. Lamberto Abugan had also went out to look after the two and saw them at the provincial road where Rolando Manahan kicked appellant’s shoes which were lying on the road, and that a heated altercation between the two continued. Thereafter, appellant pulled a fan knife from his right hip and told Rolando Manahan that he’s going to kill him. Lamberto Abugan left to proceed to the police headquarters in order to seek help, and when he, in the company of Pfc. Yambao, returned to the provincial road, they saw Rolando Manahan already dead. Thereafter, appellant was arrested. He admitted that he indeed killed Rolando Manahan but interposed self-defense as a justifying circumstance. The contention of self-defense was, however, rejected by the trial court since that it has only been based on the appellant’s own testimony and without corroborative evidence to support the same. The trial court convicted the appellant for the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court further sentences him to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Rolando Manahan, P26,445.00 for actual damages incurred for burial and other expenses of the deceased, and, P250,000.00 for moral damages, with costs against the appellant. Issues: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Gurmecindo Quilaton for the crime of murder. 2. Whether or not the trial court arrived at a sound determination with regard to the award of damages. Held: 1. The appellant should be convicted of homicide only. The findings of the trial court that the stabbing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery could not be sustained. Treachery cannot be presumed and must be proven positively and that there must be evidence as to the mode of attack used by the offender. This is so because treachery exists only “ when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.” Lamberto Ambugan did not witness the actual stabbing by appellant of Rolando Manahan as he ran away in order to seek help, therefore, his testimony in this respect affords no sufficient basis for reasonably inferring that treachery attended the commission of the crime.

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2. Actual damages awarded in favor of the heirs of Rolando Manahan in the amount of P26,445.00 representing interment and related expenses incurred, was sustained since that the same has been supported by various receipts submitted by the brother of Rolando Manahan and that the same has not been controverted in any way by the appellant. The amount of P100,000.00 as indemnity for death must, however, be reduced to P50,000.00 in conformity with the prevailing jurisprudence on this matter. Aside from this ordinary indemnity for death, appellant is obliged, in accordance with Article 2206 of the Civil Code: 1. to compensate the heirs of Rolando Manahan for the latter’s loss of earning capacity; 2. to give support in the form of expenses for education to the sisters of Rolando Manahan who had been dependent on him therefore; and 3. to pay the heirs of Rolando Manahan moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by them. In the instant case, the trial court lumped these monetary obligations into what it called “moral damages,” which therefore needs some analysis. As to the loss of earning capacity, life expectancy and net compensable earnings should be taken into account. Considering that Rolando Manahan was 26 years of age at the time of death, he was expected to live for another 46 years as determined from the generally accepted formula in computing for life expectancy, based on the 1980 CSO table. However, a man does not normally continue working to earn money up to the final month or year of his life; hence, 46 years could be reasonably reduced to 39 years. Besides, Rolando Manahan is a government employee who is expected to retire at the age of 65. If there are 261 working days in a year and that Rolando Manahan is receiving P23.00 a day, his gross earnings would be approximately P234,000.00, wherein a reasonable amount representing his necessary expenses had he been living, which in this case is P120,000.00, should be deducted, thereby fixes the amount to P114,000.00 for his net or compensable earnings lost. Finally, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, considers it appropriate to award the amount of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, having the same based also on the testimony of Ruben, brother of Rolando Manahan, that their mother suffered a mild stroke upon learning of Rolando Manahan’s slaying, which resulted in the mother’s semi-paralysis.

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Submitted by: Manlapaz, Katherine Grace R. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. UTILITY ASSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC. FACTS: The Kangyo Bank Ltd., Tokyo, Japan, issued Letter of Credit in favor of the Pedro Bartolome Enterprises of Manila to cover an export shipment of logs to Japan. The beneficiary of the Letter of Credit assigned its rights to Lanuza Lumber. Lanuza Lumber obtained a loan of P 25,000.00 from PNB secured by a PN of the proceeds of the Letter of Credit. The PNB in addition required Lanuza Lumber to submit a surety bond executed by defendant Utassco. The promissory note executed by Lanuza Lumber became due and payable. Neither Lanuza Lumber nor Utassco paid the loan despite repeated demands by PNB for payment. Accordingly, PNB filed in the then CFI of Manila an action to recover the amount of the promissory note with interest as provided thereon plus attorney's fees. Utassco admitted that it had executed the surety bond and contended that its obligation under the Surety Bond was to secure the performance of all the terms and conditions of the US$ 28,150.00 Letter of Credit issued by Kangyo Bank Ltd. and had not guaranteed the performance of Lanuza

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Lumber's obligation under its P 25,000.00 loan from PNB. CFI and CA ruled in favor of PNB and moreso, awarded interest and attorney’s fees. ISSUE: Whether or not interest and attorney’s fees should have been granted despite the clause limiting the liability of Utassco. RULING: Creditors suing on a suretyship bond may recover from the surety as part of their damages, interest at the legal rate even if the surety would thereby become liable to pay more than the total amount stipulated in the bond. The theory is that interest is allowed only by way of damages for delay upon the part of the sureties in making payment after they should have done.

Submitted by: Mangotara, Aisha M. REFORMINA VS TOMOL 139 SCRA 261 FACTS: REFORMINAS (herein petitioners) filed this Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Hon. respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr. issued in Civil Case No. R-11279, an action for Recovery of Damages for injury to Person and Loss of Property. The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads as follows: In light (sic) of the foregoing, the considered view here that by legal interest is meant six (6%) percent as provided for by Article 2209 of the Civil Code. Let a writ of execution be issued.

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Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the questioned Resolution having been denied, they now come before the Supreme Court through the instant petition praying for the setting aside of the said Resolution and for a declaration that the judgment in their favor should bear legal interest at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 416 dated July 29, 1974. On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the trial court's judgment was modified, the rest of the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The defendantsappellants shall pay costs in favor of the plaintiffs. The said decision having become final on October 24, 1980, the case was remanded to the lower court for execution and this is where the controversy started. In the computation of the "legal interest" decreed in the judgment sought to be executed, petitioners claim that the "legal interest" should be at the rate of twelve (12%) percent per annum, invoking in support of their aforesaid submission, Central Bank of the Philippines Circular No. 416. Upon the other hand, private respondents insist that said legal interest should be at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum only, pursuant to and by authority of Article 2209 of the New Civil Code in relation to Articles 2210 and 2211 thereof.

ISSUE: How much, by way of legal interest, should a judgment debtor pay the judgment creditor?

RULING: Central Bank Circular No. 416 provides: otherwise known as the "Usury Law" the Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve (12%) per cent per annum.

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The judgments spoken of and referred to are Judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearance of any 'money, goods or credits. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with, nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the coverage of the said law for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to the Central Bank. Coming to the case at bar, the decision herein sought to be executed is one rendered in an Action for Damages for injury to persons and loss of property and does not involve any loan, much less forbearances of any money, goods or credits. As correctly argued by the private respondents, the law applicable to the said case is Article 2209 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six percent per annum. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding the instant petition to be without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioners.

Submitted by: Suntay, Angel SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993 FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,

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however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Liana Zalamea and Cesar Zalamea, holding full fare tickets were able to board while the two others holding discounted tickets were not able to fly and thus were constrained to purchase tickets with American Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in favor of petitioners ordering the defendants to pay for the purchase of tickets fro, American Airlines, Suthira and Liana’s ticket with TWA, P250, 000 as moral damages and P100,000 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals modified the ruling eliminating the award for moral and exemplary damages. That moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. And in cancelling the order of refund for the tickets purchased with TWA. Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not fraud or bad faith existed on the part of TWA in overbooking their flights and in the absence of bad faith or fraud defendants need not pay exemplary damages? HELD: SC ruled in favor of petitioner and modified the ruling of the Court of Appeals allowing the payment of exemplary and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees however modifying to a lesser amount. Court ruled that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately

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overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. A duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline. Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

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Submitted by: Gatioan, Edison ZAMBOANGA vs. BUAT G. R. No. 100514 March 29, 1995 FACTS: On June 25, 1986, petitioner's board of directors, acting upon a complaint by some members, held a special meeting and passed Board Resolution No. 16A-86, creating a fact-finding committee to investigate charges of unlawful disbursement or misappropriation of cooperative funds committed by certain officers of the electric cooperative. Among those charged with committing the alleged irregularities was private respondent. On July 15, 1988, petitioner's board of directors passed Resolution No. 21A-88 terminating the services of private respondent on the grounds of mismanagement and loss of trust and confidence.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to moral damages arising from the dismissal?

HELD: NO. Before private respondent was dismissed from the service, petitioner created a committee to investigate the charges against him. The committee was composed of highly respectable members of the community. Private respondent was given an opportunity to answer all the charges against him, which he did. After almost one year of investigation, the committee recommended that private respondent be dismissed from service. Private respondent's dismissal from the service based on loss of trust and confidence had basis. Therefore, his dismissal was not attended by bad faith. Private respondent is not entitled to the recovery of moral damages since these are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

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