Case Digest Asgn1 Oblicon

Peachy Anne C. Apolo 1K—Atty. Castillo.  SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998. FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process. A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries. About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)

in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta" Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.

ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case? 2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case? RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED. RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end

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LRTA V NAVIDAD| VITUG GR 145804, 6 February 2003 FACTS • On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a “token” (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. • On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court also dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman. • Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court modified the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. The appellate court denied LRTA’s and Roman’s motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N LRTA liable for tort arising from contract HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YES. The premise for employer’s liability for tort (under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Herein, such a factual matter that has not been shown. • The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. • A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

REYES TRUCKING VS. PEOPLE| Pardo G.R. No. 129029 April 3, 2000 |SCRA FACTS o Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short). o Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. o At around 4:00 o’clock in the morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road which was uneven because there were potholes about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. o Before approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lane but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. o This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. o The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and

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Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly o Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita. The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against Reyes Trucking. They also withdrew their reservation to file a separate civil action against Dunca and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. o TC consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same. TC held: o Accused Dunca guilty of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages. o Dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil case. o TC rendered a supplemental decision ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS 1. May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the heirs of Dy in the criminal action against Dunca, despite the filing of a separate civil action against Reyes Trucking? 2. May the Court award damages to the heirs of Dy in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against Reyes Trucking? HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI 1.) No. Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. However, Reyes Trucking, as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. o Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code [civil liability ex delicto]; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines [civil liability quasi delicto]. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of the Civil Code).

o Preponderance Evidence

of

o Liability of employer is Direct and Primary subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. o Employer and employee are solidarily liable, thus, it does not require the employer to be insolvent.

o Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt o Liability employer Subsidiary to liability of employee.

of is the the

o Liability attaches when the employee is found to be insolvent.

2. No. The CA and the TC erred in holding Dunca civilly liable, and Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto. IN SHORT, THE TC ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE AND IN DISMISSING THE CIVIL ACTION. o Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the heirs of Dy reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of Dunca. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. o Civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed [Ramos vs. Gonong]. Note: Dunca is guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property and not double homicide through reckless imprudence. There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code. o In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.

o In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against Reyes Trucking as employer of Dunca, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. o Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law: Art. 2176 in relation to of the Art. 2180 of the Civil Code Penal Code

Article

103

Revised

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(BOOK) ELCANO VS. HILL | Barredo G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977| 77 SCRA 98 FACTS • Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his father, codefendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." • Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss. Trial court ISSUES & ARGUMENTS • Whether the action for recovery of damages against Reginald and Marvin Hill is barred by res judicata. • Whether there is a cause of action against Reginald’s father, Marvin. Respondents: Marvin Hill is relieved as guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage. Hence the Elcanos could not claim against Marvin Hill. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. • There is need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation, which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia (73 Phil. 607). • In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) • Notably, Article 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that: “Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.” • Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended

party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Marvin Hill vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age, as a matter of equity, the former’s liability is now merely subsidiary. • Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the case at bar, Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. • The joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Art. 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do not any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. Order appealed from REVERSED. Trial court ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion.

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